Chapter IV

SINO-SOVET RELATIONS AND INDIA
SINO-SOVET RELATIONS AFTER THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER OF CHINA

Since the establishment of communist regime in China, Sino-Soviet relations followed an interesting course. As soon as Mao Tse-tung came to power, he declared his intention of removing some burdensome provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945, concluded by the Soviet rulers with the Kuomintang Government, and accordingly a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was made by Mao with Stalin in February 1950. The team that succeeded Stalin in the Kremlin made further efforts to foster economic and political bonds between the two countries. Both under Stalin and Khrushchev China received massive economic and technological assistance from Soviet Russia. (1) In addition to such economic assistance, the Soviet rulers also helped to build up China's military strength. Even though China had a well-equipped ground force in 1950, nearly all her airforce and navy was built by the Soviet assistance. Khrushchev helped in earlier days to build China's nuclear reactors too and to train her nuclear scientists in the Soviet Union.

(1) The Soviet economic assistance to China is well-stated in Suslov's report to the Central Committee of the CPSU on 14 February 1964. In his report Suslov said: "More than 10,000 Soviet scientists were sent to the People's Republic of China for varying terms between 1950 and 1960. Some 10,000 Chinese engineers, technicians and skilled workers, and about 1,000 scientists were taught and trained in the USSR between 1951 and 1962." Between 1954 and 1963 the Soviet Union "gratuitously" handed over to China more than 24,000 sets of scientific and technical documents, including 1,400 projects of large industrial enterprises. See, New Times, no. 15, 1964. Supplement, p. 58.
During this period, when China depended upon the Soviet assistance in many fields, including economic and military, both countries supported the foreign policies of each other. There is no evidence to show that China had any hand in sparking off the Korean war. In all probability it was started by the North Koreans or they did so under Stalin's instructions. What is important in this connection is not whether China had a hand in starting the Korean war, but that once the Korean war had begun, she stepped in it to rescue her embarrassed Soviet ally. On major issues of war and peace both countries supported each other in world political arena and it is only when this period of comradeship came to an end, they started voicing their disagreements on many issues in public.

Khrushchev's secret speech before the XX Congress of the CPSU in 1956 planted the seeds of dissidence among the Chinese. China's ideological differences with Moscow are grounded in her attitude to the West, to major issues of war and peace, and to communism's perennial problem of 'revisionism', which was to find expression in her opposition to de-Stalinization and attack on Yugoslavia. Unlike Khrushchev, Mao pleaded for militant policies for liberating colonies and was opposed to any kind of *detente* with the West. In his calculations, such a policy would at the most bring in some 'local wars', but to talk of 'world war' in nuclear age was like "shooting at non-existent target ...". (2) The national elements involved in the conflict had mainly centered around China's demand for share in leadership of the

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Communist world, her determination to build up her independent nuclear deterrence and her desire that the Soviet Union should assist her in becoming a nuclear power.

Not only was there a divergence in the Sino-Soviet attitude towards the West, but the two countries viewed differently the newly emerging Afro-Asian nations, some of which, like India, were, to China's irritation, occupying a larger place in world politics in general and in Soviet policies in particular. Since this study deals with Soviet policy towards India, it is fruitful for us to cover Sino-Soviet relations with special reference to Indian involvement in it.

INDIAN INVOLVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIE T CONFLICT

It is interesting to note that the gulf between China and the USSR has a parallel in the gulf that has come to exist between China and India. Even though India and China had border problems, which were evading solutions at least from 1954, the Sino-Indian conflict became intense from a much later date when the Indian Government, and through it the Indian public, learnt that a large tract of Indian territory was under China's illegal possession. Hence forth, frictions along Sino-Indian borders became endemic.

Parallel to this there began to occur a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev's efforts to effect a detente with the West at a time when China was nursing deep injuries to her national pride had developed into one of the major issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Although the Chinese had extended a formal support to his proposal for a summit conference, (3) they were not very happy to see

that Khrushchev proposed a summit conference for the solution of East-West problems with the participation of India but not that of China. India had begun to figure in a big way in the Soviet global policies. The Chinese leaders saw that China was being left out from her share to shape world events at the insistence of the United States and they also felt that Soviet negligence of her was partly due to Indian representation of the East. (4)

When the Summit talks were in progress, Khrushchev announced his visit to the United States which was to begin on 15 September. The Chinese showed no enthusiasm for Khrushchev's American tour; in fact, it was reported, that Mao conveyed his opposition to this project to Khrushchev directly. When the controversy over Khrushchev's visit to the United States was raging within the communist camp, some incidents took place on the Indian border in Ladakh in which Chinese soldiers killed some members of the Indian patrolling party and captured a few others. It is rather stretching things too far, as some maintain, that China created this incident to exhibit its disapproval of Soviet efforts to effect a rapprochement with the West. (5) However, this incident caused great indignation in India and even the Indian communists, who were full of praise of China on her internal achievements in those days, expressed their "opinion" that "there was no justification whatsoever for the firing which resulted in such a heavy loss of life". (6) Tass used this incident to express the Soviet disapproval


(5) Dr. Zagoria argues so by substantiating that some Polish communists gathered from some Chinese leaders that China created this incident to show its disapproval of increasing Soviet detente with the West. See, ibid., p. 280.

(6) New Age (W), 1 November 1959.
of China's belligerency towards India as well as the former's opposition to Khrushchev's visit to the United States. The Tass Statement of 9 September 1959 expressed its "regret" over the border clash and termed it as "tragic" and "deplorable". Its criticism of the Chinese leaders was explicit; it was critical of "those circles in the Western countries, especially in the United States of America, which seek to obstruct a relaxation of international tension and to complicate the situation on the eve of the exchange of visits between N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America." "Its inspirers (inspirers of international tension) are trying to discredit the idea of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems". (7) Looking at the manner in which the SinO-Soviet dialogue was conducted in those days it becomes quite clear that the statement, in fact, was addressed to the Chinese leaders. Indeed a later Jin-min Jih-pao editorial cleared off the doubts when it accused the Soviet Union of bringing SinO-Soviet conflict into the open by this statement and for adopting a neutral position in Sino-Indian conflict. As the editorial said:

The truth is that the internal differences among the fraternal parties were first brought into the open, not in the summer of 1960, but on the eve of the Camp David talks in September 1959 - on September 9, 1959, to be exact. On that day a Socialist country, turning a deaf ear to China's repeated explanations of the true situation and to China's advice, hastily issued a statement on a Sino-Indian border incident through its official news agency. Making no distinction between right and wrong, the statement expressed "regret" over the border clash and in reality condemned China's correct stand. They even said that it was "tragic" and "deplorable". Here is the first instance in history in which a socialist country, instead of condemning the armed provocations of the reactionaries of a capitalist country condemned another fraternal socialist country

(7) Pravda, 10 September 1959.
when it was confronted with such armed provocation. (8)

The editorial further accused the Soviet leaders for taking "neutral" stand in the Sino-Indian conflict. (9)

As the Tass statement was issued after "turning deaf ear to China's repeated explanations of the true situation and to China's advice", it was clear that before issuing it the Soviet authorities had approached the Chinese leaders for their version of the incident. It is not yet known whether such an approach was made to the Indian Government also. The immediate favourable reactions of the Indian leaders to the Tass Statement (10) was a clear indication of their jubilation over the apparent neutral position the Soviet Government now publicly had taken in the Sino-Indian conflict. This neutral position was officially confirmed in Khrushchev's report on international situation to the Third session of the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1959 in which he equated "fraternal" China and "friendly" India; and expressed his "regret" over the India-China border incidents.


(9) Ibid., p. 72.

(10) V. K. Krishna Menon reacted on the same day on which the statement appeared in the Indian press. Speaking about it on 10 September, he welcomed the Tass statement and said that the Russians had broken their silence and for the first time since the October Revolution they came out with a categorical statement asking India and China to solve the problem in a peaceful manner. (See, Hindu, 11 September 1959, p. 1.) Nehru commented on the Tass statement at press conference in New Delhi on 11 September. He expressed his appreciation of the statement. He presumed that the statement reflected the Soviet Government's views and said: "Considering everything the statement was a fair one and an unusual one for the Soviet Government to sponsor". See, Hindu, 12 September 1959, p. 1.
and hoped that the border problem would be solved by friendly negotiations between India and China. (11)

With a view to checking the growing Sino-Soviet difference on ideological issues and on matters of foreign policy Moscow convened a conference of communist and workers parties of various countries towards the end of 1960. This conference, in which 81 communist and workers' parties had participated and debated the issues causing a division in the international communist movement, lasted for one whole month. The "Statement" issued at the end clearly showed the tussel for power, even though China accepted the Soviet leadership of the Communist camp. Some months before this conference had begun Chou-En-lai visited New Delhi to see whether the Sino-Indian border problem could be resolved through negotiations. Although what actually transpired in Chou En-lai's meeting with Indian leaders had not been

(11) In a long report on foreign policy Khrushchev dealt with India-China border problem just in one paragraph. He said: "We keenly regret the incidents which have lately taken place on borders of two countries, with which we are friends—The People's Republic of China, with which we are linked by inviolable ties of brotherly friendship, and the Republic of India, with which we are successfully developing friendly relations. We are particularly distressed by the fact that as a result of these incidents both sides suffered human losses. Nothing can compensate the parents and relatives of the fallen for these losses. We will be glad if the incidents on the Chinese-Indian frontier were not to be repeated, if the existing disputed border questions were to be settled by friendly negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of both sides." See, International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy - N. S. Khrushchev's report to the Third Session of USSR Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1959. (Soviet Land Booklets, USSR Embassy Publication, New Delhi, November 1959), p. 20.
still officially made public, it is by now fairly clear that Chou offered to recognise the validity of Line in exchange of Indian government's recognition of China's claim to Aksai Chin area, which she had occupied. (12) The talks, however, proved fruitless; and it is against this background that he went to Moscow to attend the international communist meet, which continued for nearly one full month. In view of the overwhelming Soviet majority in the conference, Chinese obstinacy is proved by the prolonged deliberations. The obstinacy with which Chou held his ground in Moscow, however, may not necessarily indicate the frame of mind that he had carried to New Delhi too a few months before. But the apparent unmoving attitude shown by the Government of India on a matter in which Chou felt he had a firm hand, might have injected some hardening material to his positions in Sino-Soviet conflict which he soon advanced in Moscow. It is important to bear in mind in this connection that Ajoy Ghosh, the head of the delegation of the Indian Communist Party in Moscow conference, also supported the general line of the conference. He exposed the "Chinese comrades' responsibility in the Sino-Indian conflict and pointed out that Chinese comrades had received all the communications from the Indian Party on this question in complete silence". (13)

Even if China and the Soviet Union agreed to sign the Statement, in which differences between them were patched up in a clearly discernible way, the gulf between them went on increasing and in the


period that followed, in all fields where national interests were involved directly both Moscow and Peking behaved independently, irrespective of the fact whether such a behaviour was to the liking of the other or in conformity with the statement. No wonder, then, that Mao did not share Khrushchev's anxiety to settle the Sino-Indian dispute peacefully.

During the period that followed not only the Sino-Indian relations deteriorated very fast, but the relations between India and the Soviet Union were strengthened considerably. From now onwards more Soviet leaders began to visit India and among those were Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Kozhlov, Fursteva, and Mikoyan. Indeed, Khrushchev preferred to be in India on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of Friendship and Alliance of 1950, which incident, according to a leading expert of Chinese affairs, tended to add to Mao's irritation against Khrushchev and India. (14) From the Indian side too a large number of high dignitaries went to Moscow. In the economic field too Soviet economic assistance to China shrank considerably when trade relations between India and the USSR improved significantly. In 1960 Soviet exports to China amounted to 735 million roubles and it went down to 210 million roubles in 1962. China had been the biggest trading partner of the Soviet Union in 1955 and was next only to East Germany in 1960. By 1963, however, the picture had changed perceptibly and China occupied 7th place in the market of Soviet goods. (15) A


Communique issued by the Indian and the Soviet government in 1960 maintained that the volume of trade between the two countries would double in the following three years. (16) A Soviet government publication maintains that from 1955 to 1959 Soviet trade with India increased eleven times, from 47 million roubles in 1955 to 514 million roubles in 1959. (17) Not only did Indo-Soviet trade and cultural relations develop considerably during this period, but Soviet assistance in strengthening Indian airpower too was noticeable. At a time when the border dispute between India and China had flared up, the Soviet Union had agreed to provide India some helicopters, which were clearly meant to be used in the Sino-Indian border regions. Over and above this, the Soviet Union also entered into an agreement with India to sell a squadron of MIG-21 fighter planes to her and to assist for their manufacture in India.

When the Sino-Indian dispute could not be resolved peacefully, Mao, for his own reasons, launched a large-scale aggression on India in 1962. The persistent Soviet disapproval at China's attack on India is sufficient proof to believe that China's attack on India was done by China alone and none of her allies, not at least the Soviet Union, had any hand in it. What was Russia's immediate reaction to it? China attacked India on 20 October. There was nothing to show that Russia exhibited either pro-India or pro-China behaviour instantly. No Soviet papers carried any news of Sino-


(17) M.V. Nesterov, Trade Between the Soviet Union and Countries of Asia and Africa (Soviet Land Booklets, the Soviet Embassy publications, New Delhi, 1960).
Indian war in the following two days. When the Chinese forces were on Indian soil, the American President declared the Cuban blockade from 24 October to ships carrying war material to Cuba. The Cuban blockade, more than the Sino-Indian war, was a big embarrassment to the Russians. Unlike clashes on the Indian frontier, it came up sudden and unexpectedly; and it placed the Soviet leaders in an enviable predicament. Under the compulsion of developments on Cuban front, Russia made quick moves in the Sino-Indian war too. In its essence, the Cuban blockade was a total challenge to Soviet diplomacy and, had it led to conflict, to the Soviet might too. The immediate Soviet reaction to the Cuban blockade was in favour of facing the American challenge squarely on the high seas. On 24 and 25 October Soviet ships were seen moving towards the Caribbean Sea with apparent instructions to shoot their way through the US blockade. (18) At this moment of crisis the Soviet leaders decided to rally the Socialist camp behind them on Cuban front and there was no question of alienating China at this stage by taking an anti-China stand on the Sino-Indian war. The best way to get an unhesitating support of an ally is to extend support to her in her policies which were previously opposed. This was precisely what the Russians did with respect to China during Cuban crisis. Pravda wrote its first editorial on the Sino-Indian war on 25 October 1962. By any account the editorial was frankly pro-Chinese. It spoke of the "notorious McMahon Line, which has never been recognised by China", and which had been "foisted on the Chinese and Indian people" and supported China's proposals. "As to the Soviet people, they see in

the statement of the Chinese Government (of Oct. 24, 1962) a manifestation of sincere concern over its relations with India and of its desire to end the conflict. The proposals made by the Chinese government are constructive in our opinion. Without impairing the prestige of either side, they provide the acceptable basis for the beginning of talks and a peaceful settlement of the disputed questions with due account taken of the interests of both the People's Republic of China and India."

The editorial also chided the Indian communists for their nationalistic behaviour. "A peaceful settlement of conflict demands more active efforts on the part of the progressive forces in India. One, of course, must realise that when relations are strained, as they are now, even some progressively minded people may yield to nationalistic influences and move over to chauvinistic positions. However, one cannot do that when questions of the struggle for peace, of the solution of international issues, are at stake. In this case an internationalistic approach is called for." (19) It is important to bear in mind that this editorial was written after the Cuban blockade had already come into effect; the last paragraph clearly solicited China's support in the Cuban crisis.

"This turn in the Soviet policy towards India, however, came to an early end when the cause which brought it into existence had subsided. Pressed with the American confrontation on Cuba, the USSR's policy to rally her allies round her continued so long as she had a mind to meet the US challenge. When, however, her Cuban policy changed and Russia decided to withdraw the missiles from

Cuba, her policy in the Sino-Indian war once again underwent a change. When, thus, the Soviet authorities decided the Cuban policy once for all, they made up their mind to restore the earlier Soviet policy of neutrality in the Sino-Indian conflict and it is this restored policy, probably with an anger contained in it, was given expression to on 5 November 1962 when Pravda wrote a second editorial, almost ordering China to stop fighting with India immediately. The editorial was entitled as: "Negotiation is the road of settling the conflict". It said that war was bad for both the countries; the imperialists were exploiting the situation; Asian people had a strong desire to end the conflict. It expressed Soviet people's "firm opinion that in the present situation the main thing to do is to cease-fire and start negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict". "There is a way out of the present situation. The long experience accumulated by the history of international relations shows that to end a conflict it is necessary to start with the main thing, with cease-fire, overcoming the war hysteria. The bloodshed cannot be allowed to continue." (Italics added)

The bloodshed, however, continued for some more days. During this period China openly attacked the Soviet Cuban policy (20) and the Russians retaliated by implicitly attacking China's invasion of India. (21) Indeed, the Soviet efforts at ceasefire were evident


(21) In an article in Pravda Boris I. Ponomaryov attacked China for her Cuban policy. One portion of the article contained an implied criticism of the Chinese aggression of India. It said that one could not "preach the struggle against imperialism and the same time carry out provocative actions which do not strengthen but undermine the cause of peace and socialism". See, Pravda, 18 November 1962.
right from the beginning. The Soviet Ambassador in India delivered
a letter from Khrushchev to Nehru on 2 November. Although the
contents of this letter are unknown, press reports on Nehru's reply
to it indicated the Indian Prime Minister's opposition to any
negotiations until the Chinese had withdrawn to the position they
had held on 8 September 1962. (22)

The first expression of Soviet official feelings on China's
policy in the Cuban crisis and on the Sino-Indian border conflict was
made on 6 November, when Kosygin spoke on the occasion of the 45th
anniversary of the October Revolution. In an implied reference to
the Chinese attack on Soviet Cuban policy, he said: "Some may ask,
is it not yielding to pressure? We think it is necessary to give
concession on this or that side because it is not concession but a
reasonable compromise. This compromise is in the interest of all
people and that is the basis of avoiding thermo-nuclear war on earth".
His reference to the Sino-Indian border conflict was open and his
handling of China more blunt. He stated that:

The Soviet people cannot but express their regrets
over the events that are happening on the Sino-Indian
border, where so much blood has been shed through
armed conflict. This conflict strengthens the hands
of imperialists only, who are doing everything to
spread war and destroy the friendship between the
great peoples of China and India.

The instigators of the war want to make use of anti-
democratic circles in India for their own objects,
who are obstructing the progressive strength of the
country and who want India to be included in the
aggressive war blocs.

(22) The Statesman, 6 November 1962.
We think that the right decision would be to ceasefire and carry out reasonable steps towards negotiations between India and PRC (prolonged applause), because there are no such fundamental opposition and differences, which cannot be settled through round-table conferences. Earlier the negotiations start, greater will be the victory of the peoples of these countries, greater will be the victory of peace (prolonged applause). (23)

It is probable that China stopped her war with India, as she started it, on the basis of her own policies. But there is reason to believe that the Soviet Government did try to bring an early end to Sino-Indian war, and it appears, put some pressure on China towards this end. A British Professor, who visited India after the Chinese aggression, interviewed the Indian President and the Prime Minister. Recalling this interview, he maintained that the Indian President informed him that the Chinese yielded to pressure from Soviet Union leaders, especially to their threat to cut oil supply to China's airforce, if she did not stop the war with India. (24)

To what extent China's withdrawal was due to her predetermined policy and how far it was due to Soviet compulsion is difficult to judge at present. If China was to withdraw finally, could she relish Soviet pressure on her for such an action?

The Sino-Indian war, as we have seen, accentuated Sino-Soviet differences. As Russia failed to support China in the Sino-Indian conflict, China too did not support the Soviet Union in her Cuban policy. The Chinese severely criticised the Soviet leaders for first installing the missiles on Cuban bases and later on, when

(23) Pravda, 7 November 1962, p. 3.

already installed, for withdrawing them at the threat of war from the United States. Soviet policy for them appeared "cowardly", "capitulationist" and "irresponsible". The Cuban divide undoubtedly provided much of the heat in the Sino-Soviet conflict and it partly found its expression in the Soviet attack on China for her behaviour with India. In his first report to the Supreme Soviet on Cuban and Sino-Indian developments on 12 December 1962, Khrushchev gave a bit of his mind by providing mild doses of criticism to China for her war with India. He welcomed China's unilateral withdrawal of her troops, but chose to add:

It may be asked, how can you call this a reasonable step when it was taken after so many lives had been lost and so much bloodshed. Would it not have been better if the sides did not resort to hostilities altogether? Yes, of course, it would have been better.

There may, of course, be people who may say: the People's Republic of China was now withdrawing its troops actually to the line on which this conflict began, would it not have been better not to move from these positions on which these troops stood at one time? These arguments are understandable, they show that people display concern and regret over what has happened. (25)

Looking at the fact that Khrushchev had to shelter under such a dialogue as Sino-Soviet conflict was still behind curtain, it becomes more than clear that he was more than unhappy over China's attack on India.

The expression of Soviet criticism of China's policies in the Sino-Indian dispute became more profound and explicit once the Sino-Soviet rift came into the open. Since the publication by China of the famous letter of 14 June 1963, the Sino-Soviet conflict on Indian issues went on openly. Suslov indicated China in his report to the Central Committee of the Party in the following words:

It is a fact that when the Caribbean crisis was at its height the PRC government extended the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian frontier. No matter how the Chinese leaders try to belatedly justify their behaviour at that moment they cannot escape their responsibility for the fact that by their actions they essentially helped the extreme reactionary circles of imperialism, thereby aggravating an already complicated and dangerous situation in the world. (26)

In the same report Suslov also chided Chinese leaders for joining hands with Pakistan in an anti-Indian alliance:

While allowing relations with India, which as everybody knows is not a member of military blocs, to deteriorate sharply, the Chinese leadership has factually made an alliance with Pakistan, a member of SEATO and CENTO, which are threatening the peace and security of the Asian peoples. It is a fact that, having discarded their 'revolutionary phrase-mongering', the Chinese leaders are steering a course that can hardly be regarded as compatible with the principled position of the socialist countries with respect to imperialist blocs.

The approach of the Chinese leaders of the choice of friends and allies is strange, to say the least. How is it possible, it may be asked, to abuse and slander the socialist countries and the communist parties and, at the same time, with the whole world watching, shower compliments on the reactionary regime in Pakistan? That is simply beyond one's understanding.

Can any one believe that the rapprochement with Pakistan was prompted by the interests of the development of the revolutionary anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of Asia, about which the Chinese leaders talk so much? (27)

Indeed, Pravda wrote a major editorial on India to reply China's criticism of Soviet policies of supporting India against China in the Sino-Indian conflict. In an editorial entitled as "Dangerous seat of Tension in Asia", Pravda declared clearly Soviet support to India on many counts:

The Chinese leaders, however, are dissatisfied with the Soviet Union's peaceful stand. Perhaps they wished to solve the frontier dispute with India by military means and hoped to receive Soviet assistance in this matter. If this is what the Peking leaders wanted, well, then they do have reasons to be 'angry' at the Soviet stand.

It criticised China for belittling Indian position as an important member of peace-camp. "The Chinese leaders absurdly accuse the Soviet Union of 'co-operation with American imperialism', of 'collaborating with India in the fight against China'. They blame the Soviet government for believing that India is an important part of peace zone." The editorial further attacked China's efforts to "prove" that

Nehru's government is imperialist, that it strives, allegedly, to create a huge empire which would be bigger than the British empire. In the light of such claims it is difficult to believe the sincerity of the Chinese leaders, who make assurances that they are striving to achieve peaceful settlement of the frontier dispute with India. (28)

The participation of the Indian delegations at the various conferences of Afro-Asian organizations or meets of communist parties also helped to widen the gulf between China and the Soviet Union.

(27) Ibid., p. 50.
The Indian delegates at these conferences supported Russia against China on all issues or raised the issue of China's border clashes with India to criticise China and thus got Soviet support. At the Moshi conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement the Indian speakers supported the Soviet delegates in their arguments with the Chinese. At the conference of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, held in Nicosia, Cyprus, in September 1963, the Soviet and the Indian delegations supported each other against the Chinese. (29) In the conferences where the Soviet Union was not represented, such as at the proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference, Indian delegation tried for Soviet participation and China opposed it. (30)

Even though the Soviet Union preferred to criticise China on Indian account, it is necessary to bear in mind that Soviet criticism of China in this matter was essentially confined to her efforts to solve the dispute by the use of force. Her support to India meant, generally, her support for negotiated solution of the problem. On major issues in the dispute as such, the Soviet Union has not taken any side, even though her old maps showing the disputed Indian territory in Ladakh as part of China still exist.

In supporting India in some ways, probably, the Soviet Union was facing major problems of her foreign policy - China and the West. As Professor Levy recently argued, Soviet policy of strengthening

(29) The Times of India (Delhi), 12 September 1963.

(30) The Hindustan Times, 14 April 1964. In a statement issued by the Soviet government "On concerning the Second Afro-Asian Conference" at a later date, the Soviet government criticised China for opposing her participation in the proposed conference and thanked India for trying for it. See Pravda, 14 August 1964.
India against China is dictated by her desire to contain China's behaviour within her frontiers and to keep Russian Central Asian territory free from China's troubles. (31) China, from this point of view, appears to be Russia's permanent problem. It seems that the problem may exist in the Russian mind, irrespective of the state of Sino-Soviet relations at the time, and her policies in this region may be moulded by the necessity to safeguard her own interests arising through the happenings beyond her frontiers. Neutral India, from this point of view, may attract attention as a power to contain China's behaviour in the region where Russia meets China and India.