Chapter III

INDIA IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER KHRUSHCHEV
POST-STALIN POSTURE OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

When Stalin died the Soviet Union's foreign policy was in a state of stagnation, largely due to many of his miscalculations regarding the Western and the Asian world. On many important issues between West and East the Soviet government had either broken off contact or was locked in stalemate. Contacts between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and Greece were minimal; it had broken off relations with Israel during the crisis following the arrest of Jewish doctors in early 1953. There was a virtual deadlock over the issue of successor to Trygve Lie as Secretary General of the United Nations. Relations with the war-time allies were hostile. In the cold war that gripped Stalin's period after the end of war, Western powers were forming military alliances against the Soviet Union and many of the newly freed Afro-Asian countries were in search of a policy that would keep them away from Western domination and communist fear; Stalin's Russia evoked more fear than hope in weak countries and thus gave birth to a politics that took the world, which had just come out of the worst experienced war, on path to preparations for fresh war.

Efforts of the new Soviet leadership, in these circumstances, were directed to break through past obstacles and to establish fresh contacts with the leadership of the newly freed countries with a view to keeping them away from the Western bloc. The assertive Mr. Khrushchev was steadily spreading his control over the Party and the government apparatus; in about three months after Stalin's
death Beria was eliminated. By the middle of September Khrushchev
became the First Secretary of the Party and thus the issue of
Stalin's successor was solved in his favour. Even though Malenkov
continued to head the government till the beginning of 1955, collective
leadership operating under Khrushchev's directions was moving away
from Stalinist policies that resulted in accentuating Soviet Isola-
tion and intensifying Western antagonism against it.

This new mood was apparent in the first May Day slogans issued
after Stalin's death. Even though time for a slogan on India had
not still come, the new mood was reflected in a slogan which said:
"There is no controversial or unsolved question which cannot be
solved by peaceful means through mutual negotiations of interested
parties!" (1) Korean armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. At the
United Nations the Soviet Government withdrew its opposition to the
appointment of Dag Hammerskjold. The USSR offered to resume diplo-
matic relations with Israel and the proposal was accepted by the
latter. On 30 May the Soviet Government withdrew all its territorial
claims against Turkey and suggested a new approach to the problem
of the Straits. However, this choice for relaxation was not without
checks. In June 1953 the workers in East Berlin demonstrated against
the East German Government's attempts to cut their wages and the
movement soon spread to other towns. Although the Soviet army
suppressed the riots swiftly this event might have caused some second
thoughts in the Kremlin. But, by and large, the policy favouring
the establishment of normal relations with many countries which had
been previously antagonised continued in the days following Stalin's
death. By the time when Premier Malenkov addressed the Supreme
Soviet on 8 August 1953, this new posture appeared to have gathered

(1) Pravda, 22 April 1953.
some ground; the Soviet Government felt no longer isolated from
the outside world and this mood certainly found its reflection in
his first report to the Supreme Soviet after Stalin's death.

The changed post-Stalin posture of the Soviet leadership was
more visible in its relations with India. Cultural contacts between
India and the Soviet Union during Stalin's days were almost non-
existent. Whatever contacts there were owed their origin to Nehru's
desire to know much of Soviet life and to be benefited by the new
"experiment" in human life. On Nehru's initiative some Soviet
scientists were invited to attend the annual conferences of the
Indian Science Congress since December 1946; on the Soviet side,
however, there was hardly any response to Indian initiative during
Stalin's time.

The new Soviet posture towards India found its expression
in the Soviet Government's moves to establish cultural and
economic ties with India. India's Health Minister, Raj Kumari
Amrit Kaur, visited Moscow in June 1953 at the invitation
of the Soviet Government and saw some centres of public health
in different parts of Russia. On her return to India she
held a press conference in New Delhi in which she told
that the Soviet Union wished "warm friendly relations with
India. Soviet people ardently desire peace." (2) In the following
month Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, was in the USSR; she travelled

(2) Pravda, 22 June 1953, p. 3.
extensively in the country for nearly two months, and apparently, was the first foreigner allowed to visit the Central Asian Republics. After her return to India she too testified to the warm feelings of friendship towards India, prevalent everywhere in the Soviet Union. (3) A delegation of Indian women was on a visit to the USSR during the same month and it publicly expressed appreciation of many things in Soviet Society. A Tass news despatch on this delegation bore the caption; "Common people in India extremely love Soviet people." (4) Thus within a year-and-a-half after Stalin's death as many as 14 Indian delegations, from a football team and film artists to industrialists, visited Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Government. Before the mode of cultural contacts was regulated by bilateral government agreements, heads of visiting Indian delegations were, at times, extending invitations to their Soviet counterparts. Thus the First Soviet Deputy Health Minister came to India in December 1953 to return the Indian Health Minister's visit. A delegation of Soviet artists led by the Deputy Minister of Culture visited India in January 1954 along with a delegation of USSR Academy of Sciences.

As contacts between the two governments were steadily being established, the Kremlin showed its awareness that like itself the Indian Government too was critical of the West. From Moscow's point of view this was rendered possible not only by the deepening of the cold war atmosphere but by the extension of the cold war itself to the very doors of India following the successful Anglo-American efforts to draw Pakistan into their military

(3) Pravda, 30 August, 1953, p. 4.
(4) Pravda, 12 July, 1953. p. 3.
alliance system. Nehru's severe criticism of the US military aid to Pakistan not only did not go unnoticed in Moscow but, on the contrary, was given wide publicity in the Soviet press. In a lengthy article Pravda criticised the American designs to establish military bases in Pakistan and showed how this had caused the Indo-American relations to touch the lowest point. (5) Another Pravda article stated:

The Indian people cannot but be alarmed seeing the attempts to set up an aggressive bloc right on India's borders, which will invariably lead to the building of foreign bases and airfields on the territories of India's neighbour and to militarization of the countries with which it is attempting to maintain closer relations. (6)

Again a Pravda columnist maintained that the US was trying to use its negotiations with Pakistan to exert political pressure on India, which "refused to submit to American dictation". (7) In about eight months after Stalin's death Pravda published as many as sixteen articles and news items with Indian reaction to American bases in Pakistan as the main theme. As the negotiations between Pakistan and the United States on former's joining the Middle East Treaty Organisation were in progress, Soviet authorities took a serious note of it. On 30 November 1953 the Soviet Ambassador in Karachi called on the Pakistan Foreign Secretary and delivered a strong note which stated that the "Soviet government considers it necessary to draw the Pakistan government's attention to the fact that the Soviet government cannot be indifferent to reports" about Pakistan joining the Middle East Treaty Organisation, as such a development would "have a direct

(5) Pravda, 3 December 1953, p. 3.
(6) Pravda, 27 September 1953, p. 3.
(7) Pravda, 21 December 1953, p. 3.
bearing on the security of the Soviet Union". (8)

In these circumstances the Soviet press was taking note of Indo-Pak efforts to solve Kashmir dispute through bilateral negotiations. When Pakistan's Prime Minister came to Delhi in August 1953, Pravda carried a lengthy article on "Negotiations between India and Pakistan" in which the author gave the history of Kashmir dispute and expressed his hope that it would be solved through such bilateral negotiations. In another article published in the same fortnight the author praised efforts of the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers to solve this dispute by peaceful means and hoped that this question, which had divided the two Asian countries and provided Anglo-American imperialists opportunities to interfere in the internal affairs of the sub-continent, would be solved by peaceful means. (9)

After seeing the new Indian posture vis-a-vis the West the Soviet leaders' estimation of India's overall position in the contemporary world began fast changing. By its active and helpful role in the Korean war India had emerged as a neutral power, capable of influencing the course of events by her mediatory role. American efforts to keep India out of the proposed political conference on Korea was criticised by the Soviet delegates at the United Nations (10) and by the Soviet press in a way which showed an acknowledgement of growing importance of India as a world power. In an editorial, a Soviet weekly said:

(8) Pravda, 2 December 1953, p. 2.
(9) Pravda, 22 August 1953, p. 4.
(10) Please see pp. 81-2.
The Western press is unanimous in admitting that the 15-nation resolution received a majority in the General Assembly as a result of powerful pressure on the part of U.S. diplomacy. How strong was the resistance to this pressure was revealed by the battle which arose over the question of inviting India. The Western bourgeois press remarks that on this question the Atlantic Alliance was "split". The American representatives were fiercely opposed to the participation of India because India had shown that she was a supporter of peace in Korea. It was precisely for this reason that India's nomination was supported even by many of the countries which usually vote with the United States. In the political Committee, the U.S. sustained a defeat, 27 countries voting for India's participation including all America's NATO allies (with the exception of Greece) and only 21 against. It was only by continued gross pressure that the American delegation finally secured the rejection of the proposal that India be invited to the conference. The Western press, including a number of American commentators, admits that Washington suffered a moral and political defeat on this question. The efforts of the American representatives to exclude India from the Political Conference out of fear that she might assist the success of the peace settlement aroused broad public indignation in all countries. (11)

Official expression to the post-Stalin leadership's new posture towards India came within five months of Stalin's death, when Malenkov submitted his report on national and international policies to the Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953. He expressed his government's desire to establish good neighbourly relations with all the neighbours of the Soviet Union (Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Finland) and maintained that negotiations with some countries, Iran and Finland, with this view were in progress. Amidst applause from the deputies, the Soviet Premier stated:

Of great importance for the promotion of peace in the East is the attitude of so big a country as India. India has made a substantial contribution to the efforts of the peace-loving countries to stop the Korean war. Our relations with India are growing firmer, and cultural and economic intercourse with her

is becoming wider. We hope that relations between India and the Soviet Union will become stronger and develop in a spirit of friendly co-operation. (12)

Along with the Korean peace settlement, the Geneva Conference of 1954, in which Foreign Ministers of 19 countries, including those of the USSR, the People's Republic of China, France, Britain and the representative of India participated, helped in a big way to enhance Indian position in the Soviet eyes. In pursuance of the decisions adopted at the Berlin Four Power talks the Geneva conference was convened to discuss the Korean and the Indo-Chinese issues. India's V. K. Krishna Menon played a major role in behind-the-scene negotiations, which helped Russia's seasoned diplomat, V.M. Molotov, to see the dynamic Indian diplomacy in action. Molotov, apparently, was so much impressed by the role of Indian diplomats that it led him to believe that India's presence in any negotiations on Asian issues was essential, from the point of view of their success. In the course of Geneva talks he received Menon several times and gave a reception in his honour. A careful reading of the speeches of the Western and Communist delegates to the Geneva Conference shows that the proposal to appoint a neutral nations commission of the Korean type to supervise cease-fire in Indo-China or to conduct elections in Korea with the ultimate object of unifying a divided country had, at all stages of discussion, originated from the Chinese or Russian side. At the Geneva Conference the Western delegates played a passive role of approving or rejecting the proposed solutions.

In his statement made on 5 June on the Korean question, Molotov supported the proposal of the Chinese delegation to the effect that to supervise Korean election a commission of neutral nations "identical in composition to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea" be appointed. (13) In his statement on Indo-China he proposed for cessation of hostilities between Indo-Chinese and French forces and pleaded for a political solution of the problem. In this connection, he proposed a neutral nations commission, composed of India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan, to supervise the cease-fire. (14) A Soviet correspondent, who was present in Geneva, revealed that in the negotiations that followed over Molotov's proposal suggestions were made at one stage to include Indonesia in the commission and at another stage to drop Czechoslovakia and Poland; but India's inclusion was favoured at all the stages. (15). Finally the Geneva Conference appointed the International Control Commission with India as Chairman and Poland and Canada as members. At the same conference Molotov appraised India's status in a speech in unambiguous language:

who can deny that a country like India, with a population of more than 300 million people, has entered into a new, historic arena? Not long ago India was a colonial country. But now no body can deny that India is occupying a very important place among the countries which are consolidating their national independence and striving to secure her weighty place in world affairs. (15)

(16) Pravda, 30 April 1954, P. 3.
When the Geneva conference was in progress Britain recognised the People's Republic of China. Soon after the Geneva conference Chou En-lai came to India in June 1954; during his visit both governments restated their adherence to Panch Sheela, adopted two months before in the preamble to India-China agreement on Tibet. The Indian role in committing the Chinese rulers to the famous Five Principles, in which they declared their non-interference in other country's internal affairs, respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and peaceful co-existence with it, is worth comparing to the British role in committing the Russians, through the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of 1921, to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, either by way of political propaganda or through communist agents.

The Sino-Indian endorsement of the Five Principles, which had gone rather unnoticed earlier, received attention and applause from the Soviet side when Chou-En-lai visited India and the principles were embodied in the joint communiqué issued on the occasion. Pravda wrote its first ever editorial pertaining to India, in which it paid high compliments to the leadership of China and India for introducing commendable principles of Panch Sheela and stated that the talks between Prime Ministers of India and China showed that the countries with different social systems, who desire peace, can successfully co-operate, if only they manifest their will for co-operation and friendship with each other. As the editorial said:

The participants of Delhi talks formed certain principles which are meant to guide relations between these two countries. These five principles are as follows: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit;
peaceful co-existence. There cannot be any doubt that the acceptance of these important principles by the Asian as well as other countries would diminish the possibility of wars, serve to alleviate tension in world community and improve the valuable co-operation between countries. (17)

During the days when Sino-Soviet friendship was moving on high tides, the official Soviet endorsement of the Five Principles, once China accepted it and the Soviet rulers praised it, was a matter of course. It came when Khrushchev and Bulganin undertook their first foreign tour in a big way to China in September 1954. The team that visited China was one of the most high-powered delegations that the Soviet Communist Party and the Government had sent abroad and showed the scope for negotiations with the Chinese leaders on various issues. It consisted of Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Party; Bulganin, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; A.I. Mikoyan, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Trade; Shvernik, Shepilov, Furtseva, and a large number of officials. In the negotiations that took place, the Soviet government agreed to withdraw its forces from Port Arthur; agreed to hand over Soviet interests in the Joint Soviet-Chinese companies that had been formed to explore Sinkiang's economy and agreed to establish technical and scientific collaboration with China. (18) What is more important in this connection is that in a joint communique issued on this occasion the Soviet leaders endorsed their commitment to the Five Principles, enunciated by China and India a few months before. As the communique stated:

(17) Pravda, 1 July 1954.

(18) At a later date, when strains and stresses had entered into Sino-Soviet relations, Mao Tse-tung told in an interview to a group of Japanese socialist leaders that in these negotiations he demanded that Outer Mongolia be made part of China, which demand the Soviet leaders had rejected.
The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic deem it necessary to declare that they will continue to base their relations with the countries of Asia and the Pacific, and also with other states, on strict observance of the principles of mutual respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, which opens up broad possibilities for fruitful international co-operation. (19)

In the days when India's influence as a neutral power was thus spreading over many Asian countries, especially most of the Asian neighbours of Russia, were joining Western military camp, which development was adding to the Soviet rulers' irritation over these countries and bringing home to them increasing significance of India and her neutral policies. The South East Asian Defence Treaty was signed on 8 September 1954 by the representatives of the USA, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, and Pakistan. This development obviously disturbed the Soviet rulers. A statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR not only condemned the treaty for impairing peace and security interests of Asia but also took note of Indian opposition to it:

The overwhelming majority of the South-east Asian countries had no great difficulty in discerning the real aims of the sponsors of the conference, with the result that such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon refused to participate in it. Thus, of the countries which it was sought to bring into the bloc, the majority of South-east Asian countries, including India and Indonesia, which have a combined population of about 400 million, have declined to be parties to it. ..... These figures are a clear indication of the attitude of the South-east Asian peoples to the plans - which are being forced upon them from outside - for a military bloc in that area, and how alien these plans are to their interest. ....

It is beyond question that the economic and cultural progress of the Asian peoples is possible only in conditions of peace and with recognition of their independence and sovereignty. One cannot but agree with the Prime Minister of India when, speaking recently in the House of People on the importance of cessation of hostilities in Indo-China, he said: "Asia has greater hopes of peace and stability as a result of the Indo-China settlement." (20)

The changed Soviet attitude towards India began to find its reflection in the warm receptions given to a number of Indian cultural delegations that visited the USSR. In June 1954 a team led by Mrs. Rameshvari Nehru attended a world conference on lessening international tension at Stockholm. On its way back to India the members of the team broke journey at Moscow availing the invitation extended to it by the Soviet delegation to the conference. The team was received by Molotov and the news of this meeting, unlike previous occasions, found a prominent place on the front page of Pravda. (21) A team of rather unknown Indian musicians visited Moscow towards the end of August 1954; the news of its musical concert, which was staged in Bolshoi theatre and was attended among others by Bulganin, Kaganovich, Shvernik, Suslov and Gromyko, was displayed with a large photo in Pravda on its front page; in an article published under the title "The Soul of India", a writer wrote:

In Moscow on the stage of Bolshoi Theatre, at the concert of Indian artists, it was as if we were confronted by the living soul of India, since the real art always reflects the thoughts and feelings of the people. In the songs and dances - unique, original, inimitable - and in the actors' very features - sincere, modest, noble and simple - we sensed the remarkable qualities of national character. (22)

(22) Pravda, 2 September 1954, p. 1.
The first Indian film festival was held in Moscow in September 1954, which achieved spectacular success. The three Indian films that were taken to Moscow in this connection were shown in Moscow's 49 cine-theatres. (23) The leading cultural organizations in Moscow celebrated an evening in honour of the visiting Indian film artists. (24).

The official seal to this friendly attitude was given on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution of that year, when the CPSU Central Committee issued a slogan on India for the first time. The slogan said: "May the friendship and co-operation between the people of India and the Soviet Union widen and strengthen for the protection of peace in the whole world." The slogan was thirteenth in order and was placed only next to slogans on China and Korea at a time when no other Afro-Asian country proved eligible for such a favoured treatment. (25) In an editorial, Pravda pointedly referred to India and acknowledged her "valuable contribution for strengthening peace." (26)

PERIOD OF BIG FRIENDSHIP.

Speaking on one occasion before a distinguished Soviet audience, India's earlier Ambassador to the Soviet Union, K. P. S. Menon, had said:

The relations between India and the Soviet Union after India became independent may be divided into two phases - a passive phase and an active phase. If one is to give

(26) Pravda, 28th October 1954.
a date, the active phase may be said to have begun in 1955. It was in that year that Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru paid his memorable visit to the Soviet Union. It was in that year that Mr. Khrushchev also paid his equally memorable visit to India. (27)

The cordiality between India and the USSR increased to such an extent that the Indian Ambassador began to find it increasingly difficult to accommodate his ever-increasing Soviet friends at formal functions on the Embassy premises! As he later put it on an occasion of the Republic Day celebration:

In the first three or four years of my stay in Moscow, it used to be quite easy to have this function there. But, during the last four or five years, the circle of our Soviet friends has expanded so much that even this spacious hall is not quite large enough to accommodate our guests. This shows the extent to which the relations between India and the Soviet Union have grown in recent years. (28)

During this period every new occasion was bringing additional expression of friendly gestures from the USSR to India. On the occasion of the Republic Day in 1955 for the first time the Soviet leaders sent their goodwill messages to heads of Indian State and government. In his message to Nehru, Malenkov said:

Allow me to express the confidence that the relations between India and the Soviet Union will henceforward strengthen and grow for the general good of the peoples of our countries and in the interest of strengthening world peace. (29)

On previous occasions when the Indian Embassy celebrated the Republic Day the Soviet papers never took any note of it and only minor Soviet dignitaries used to attend the celebrations. But in 1955 an impressive team consisting of Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Shvernik, about 18 other Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the USSR


(28) Ibid., p. 10.

and RFSSR governments, 13 Secretaries of different Ministries and a large number of artists, writers and public figures attended the celebrations of the Indian Republic Day at the Indian Embassy. (30) In a long unsigned article on the "Fifth anniversary of the Indian Republic" a Pravda writer surveyed the growing cultural and political relations between the two countries and noted:

The Soviet people are confident that the relations between India and the Soviet Union will strengthen and grow in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation. On this day of the fifth anniversary of the Republic of India the Soviet people express their feelings of high sympathy to the great Indian people for consolidating their independence, for peace in Asia and in the whole world. (31)

Apparently, Malenkov did not attend the celebration at the Indian Embassy because on the very same day the Party's Central Committee was in session and it was in this meeting the decision to replace him with Bulganin as Prime Minister was taken. With Malenkov's removal the Stalinist inhibitions against befriending bourgeois leaders of afro-Asian countries had

(31) Pravda, 26 January 1955, p.3.
partially gone. (32) The same session of the Supreme Soviet which confirmed the replacement of Malenkov adopted an important document which was to indicate the extent of importance which India with her Five Principles had come to attain in policies of the Soviet government. The Supreme Soviet issued a "Declaration" recommending the adoption of the Five Principles by the rest of the world. Such "Declarations" are very rarely made by the Supreme Soviet which itself meets hardly twice a year, each time normally less than a week. The declaration read:

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it of the highest importance that the principles guiding relations between states, big and small, should be such as to conduce to the development of cooperation among nations in friendship, peace and tranquility.

Relations between the states must be based on the principles of equality, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, non-aggression, and respect for each other's territorial integrity, sovereignty and national independence.

The observance of these principles, on which number of states, such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and India, already base their relations

(32) Even though the news of replacement was announced on 8 February 1955, the Party's Central Committee met from 25 to 31 January. In a later interview to some American correspondants Bulganin confirmed their impression that the decision to remove Malenkov from Prime Ministership, which was formally implemented by the Supreme Soviet on 8 February when it was in session, was first taken by the Party's Central Committee, which met from 25 to 31 January 1955. See the text of his interview, *New Times*, no. 8, 1955. Supplement.
with other countries, would guarantee the peaceful co-existence of states with different social and political systems. (33)

In his report to the same session of the Supreme Soviet Molotov pointedly referred to India's increasing importance in world affairs and noted with satisfaction the growing ties of friendship with her:

It is a fact of great historic importance that colonial India is no more, and there is an Indian Republic instead. This important transformation is characteristic of post-war developments in Asia. India's international prestige as a new and important factor of peace and friendship among nations is steadily rising. (34)

In the same report he welcomed the conclusion of economic agreement between India and the USSR for the construction of Bhilai Steel Plant and said amidst prolonged applause from the deputies that "the people of the USSR desire from the bottom of their hearts" promotion of "economic progress of this ancient and great country". (35) Coming to the principles of Panch Sheela, he observed:

We are entitled to ask the governments and Parliaments of all countries: why should not these peaceful principles, now formulated in the India-China declaration of June 28, 1954 become the general platform for preserving and consolidating peace of all nations? (36)

During this period some developments took place which added to the sense of relaxation of the Soviet leadership over the European situation. The vexed war-time Austrian problem was solved by signing the Austrian Treaty by the Big Four a month before Nehru's

(33) Pravda, 10 February 1955, p. 1.
(35) Ibid., p. 22.
(36) Ibid., p. 24.
arrival in Moscow. The USSR agreed to return the oil fields and refineries in eastern Austria and to withdraw its forces from Austrian territory in return for some compensation and Austria’s declaration of permanent neutrality. The Soviet leaders' attitude to neutrality in the changed circumstances was well expressed by Molotov when he said, "The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the Austrian settlement that she will not join any military alliance, and that she will not permit foreign military bases on her territory." (37)

By successful rapprochement with Marshal Tito, Khrushchev and Bulganin ended the Stalin-made hostility with Yugoslavia. A week before Nehru’s arrival in Moscow, Khrushchev and Bulganin went to Yugoslavia, admitted that "in recent years" relations between both countries were "gravely disturbed" and resolved to develop "their future relations in a spirit of friendly co-operation". (38)

In this relaxed mood Molotov made an unusual advance and addressed a note, through his Ambassador in Paris, to "the Government of the German Federal Republic" stating that "direct, diplomatic, trade and cultural relations be established between the two countries". (39)

When the Soviet Government was thus making fresh moves in its relations with other governments, with the Geneva conference of the Big Four well in sight, a major event took place in Asia, which added new dimensions to the Kremlin’s understanding of the Afro-Asian world and India’s place in it. The Bandung Conference, the

---

(37) Quoted in Mackintosh’s Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 106.


(39) Pravda, 8 June 1955.
like of which would have gone unnoticed under Stalin, brought increasing realization on the part of the USSR of the importance of uniting forces of the Afro-Asian countries, newly independent and fresh for influence. By befriending these new forces the Kremlin had nothing to lose, but by influencing them it was to gain many things. In addition to this political realization, there was also economic necessity of the post-war industrial Soviet society. With an annual increase of about 9 per cent of its gross industrial produce, there was an obvious compulsion on Soviet foreign policy-makers to face the problem of finding expanded foreign markets for Russia's heavy industry producing economy. By making friendship with the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries the Kremlin, in the post-Stalin period, was thus meeting the major urges of its foreign policy - making political and economic gains in a world community.

It is in these circumstances that Jawaharlal Nehru came to Moscow and was received in a way, to put it in the words of the then Indian Ambassador in Moscow: "for which there has been no parallel in Moscow before or since". (40) He was received at the airport by a team which consisted of such top Soviet leaders like Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Saburov. In his honour Bulganin held a reception and Voroshilov, the President, gave a breakfast. The Indian Ambassador too held a

reception and gave a dinner, which was attended by many including Khrushchev and Bulganin. Right from the day of his arrival to the day of his departure Soviet press covered his tour extensively. Pravda wrote two editorials on his visit, once when he came and another when he left. Its editorial welcoming his visit said:

Today the Prime Minister of India is visiting our country. From the bottom of their heart the Soviet people welcome the growing friendship with the people of India and say: Long live the friendship!

Interrelations between these two countries spread over the entire history, starting from the old days when the Russian traveller Afanas Nikitin journeyed to India in the 15th century, till the present day. The well-known Russian artist Bereshagin felt inspired by the history and nature of India; by her struggle for national freedom. Esteemed Indian writer Ravindra Nath Tagore wrote with high sympathy about the national policies of the Soviet government, about Soviet culture, Soviet and Indian people always had friendly relations and high respect. They always had friendly, moral backing in their struggle for better future. (41)

Nehru arrived in the Soviet Union on 7 June 1955 and stayed up to 23rd of that month; during his stay he visited the major Soviet republics and saw practically everything that he was interested in. He was the first head of a non-communist state to make such an extensive tour of Soviet republics.

When Nehru finally returned to Moscow after his grand tour of the Soviet republics on 21 June, he addressed a big open-air meeting held in honour of Indo-Soviet friendship in Moscow's 'Dynamo' stadium, which, according to Soviet estimate, was attended by as many as 80,000 invitees. It was, probably, the largest open-air meeting ever addressed by a foreign visitor till then in the history of Soviet rule. The rally was also attended by Khrushchev, (41) Pravda, 7 June 1955.
Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Zhukov, Mikoyan and others. In an editorial written on the day of his departure, Pravda noted that as a result of Nehru-Bulganin talks both leaders had issued a communique which embodies certain principles, which all peace-loving people hoped "would govern affairs of the international cooperation and strengthen peace and friendship among people". (42)

In the Joint Communique issued by Bulganin and Nehru on the occasion both leaders reaffirmed their faith in the Panch Sheela and expressed their desire for promoting further cultural and economic cooperation between the two countries. As the Communique stated:

The Prime Ministers are convinced that these principles, which have lately received an increasing measure of recognition, are capable of wider application and that in the observance of these principles by nations in the conduct of their mutual relations lies the main hope of banishing fear and mistrust from their minds and thus of lowering world tensions. The wider acceptance of these principles will enlarge the area of peace, promote mutual confidence among nations and pave the way for greater international cooperation. In the climate of peace thus created, it will become possible to seek peaceful solutions to international questions by the methods of negotiations and conciliation.

Both Prime Ministers recognise that, in various parts of the world, there is, on the part of the smaller and weaker states, a vague and possibly unreasoning fear of big powers. They feel that it is essential to dispel this fear in all possible ways. Here, again, the best remedy is to adhere unflinchingly to the principles of peaceful co-existence enunciated above.

The Prime Ministers believe that, under the aegis of the Five Principles enunciated in this statement, there is ample scope for the development of cultural, economic and technical cooperation between their two states. The fact that each country is following a system, which is moulded by its own genius, traditions and environment,

(42) Pravda, 23 June 1955.
should be no bar to such co-operation. Indeed, the essence of true co-existence, in which both Prime Ministers have profound faith, is that states of different social structures can exist side by side in peace and concord and work for the common good. (43)

In the following month when the Big Four met at Geneva, in his opening statement, Bulganin mentioned Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union as one of the events of great significance. (44) Shortly afterwards, in the joint communiqué issued on the occasion of Dr. Ho Chin Min's visit to the USSR, the role played by India in the Bandung Conference and Panch--Sheela were praised. (45) The Five Principles in those days made such a deep impact on the Soviet policy makers that on its own the Soviet Government stated its acceptance in its statements with the heads of governments of Burma, People's Republic of China, Indonesia, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavía. In his report to the Supreme Soviet on the Geneva Conference of the Big Four in 1955, Bulganin pointedly referred to Nehru's visit and said:

The Soviet Government, attaching great value to the Soviet-Indian co-operation as an important factor in the struggle for peace in Asia - and not only in Asia - considers it indispensable to maintain this co-operation in future on the basis of the principles set out in the Soviet-Indian declaration and widely supported by peace-loving States.

He further noted that both countries "take the same position on urgent problems concerning the struggle for peace and this is of great importance in the settlement of pressing Asian and Far Eastern problems and in easing international tension." (46)

In his speech at the United Nations Tenth Anniversary Session, held in June 1955, Molotov mentioned the improvement of Soviet-Yugoslavia relations and the visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Moscow as events of world wide significance. The former helped to lessen tension in Europe, while the latter helped to bring together the forces that worked for the promotion of world peace:

The visit to the Soviet Union of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, is especially noteworthy. His visit is of far reaching significance for future cementing relations of friendship between the Soviet Union and India and, at the same time, for lessening international tension and promoting peace.

In the same speech he also praised the role played by India in organising Bandung powers. (47)

In the days following Nehru's visit, Soviet leaders were availing of every opportunity to express their friendly attitude towards India. An exhibition of Indian art and culture was held in Moscow's Gorkey Park on 8 October 1955, at the opening ceremony of which Bulganin himself went. In an article written on the occasion Pravda's correspondent wrote that the exhibits were "a clear and striking example of talent and love of work of the Indian people."(48)

This respectful attitude towards Indian art and culture, prevalent in all sections of Russia's population (the expression of which the author saw on many occasions) was more demonstratively displayed at another exhibition of Indian handloom and handicrafts products held a month later in Moscow. Its opening ceremony was attended by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan. In the visitor's book, kept at the exhibition, they wrote the following remarks, which Pravda prominently carried the next day:


(48) Pravda, 9 October 1955, p. 2.
It is difficult to express in words how many excellent things we have seen. The exhibition clearly illustrates the great ancient art of the Indian people, which is born at the dawn of human culture.

We wish the Indian people development of their national industry, which alone will strengthen their independence and raise the welfare of the people. (49)

The slogan issued on India on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution reflected the changed attitude towards her. Unlike the previous one, which had said:

"May the friendship and co-operation between the people of the Soviet Union and India widen and strengthen for the propagation of peace in the whole world," the new slogan said: "Greetings to the great India people! Let the friendship and co-operation between the people of the Soviet Union and India grow and strengthen in interest of the whole world!" (50)

THE VISIT OF KHRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN TO INDIA.

When Nehru was in Moscow, he had extended his invitation to Bulganin to visit India. It is not clear whether Khrushchev too was invited by him on the same occasion. At a much later date Pravda (51) published Khrushchev's letter to Nehru in which he wrote that the Indian Ambassador in the Soviet Union had handed over to him the Indian Government's invitation to visit India along with Bulganin and conveyed his acceptance of it with happiness. It is possible that the invitation to Khrushchev might have been decided upon and extended at a later date. Along with Khrushchev and Bulganin, the Minister of Culture, the Deputy Minister of Foreign affairs, Andrei Gromyko, the

(49) Pravda, 17 October 1955.
(51) Pravda, 27 September 1955.
Deputy Ministers of Foreign Trade and Agriculture also came to India. The Bulganin-Khrushchev party landed in India on 18 November 1955 and stayed for three weeks. From India they also visited Burma and on way back to Russia they visited Afghanistan. During their stay of three weeks in India they spoke on 32 occasions, visited eleven states; nearly on all the occasions both Khrushchev and Bulganin spoke. Wherever they went, they made it a point to refer to the special features of that place. At a reception in Bombay both Khrushchev and Bulganin praised Bombay's industrial life and film industry, which produced films that were liked by the Soviet film-goers. In a speech at the civic reception in Poona, Bulganin paid compliments to fighting traditions of Marathas. "Let the noble, freedom loving traditions of the Marathas always live in Poona and let the modern culture of the Maratha people develop." (52) So also they spoke at Chandigarh, Bangalore, Madras, Agra, Jaipur, Srinagar and Calcutta. On many occasions Khrushchev criticised Western capitalist policies and spoke of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet state and its marvellous achievements.

Khrushchev's and Bulganin's tour of the subcontinent and the spontaneous and the mammoth receptions that the Indian people gave them helped to strengthen the friendly attitude of the visitors towards India. As would be clear from our previous treatment (53) the Soviet Government so far had never taken any side between India and Pakistan on Kashmir dispute and, apparently, that it was for the

(52) N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Speeches during Sojourn in India, Burma, Afghanistan (Representative of Tass in India, New Delhi, January 1956), p. 57.

(53) Please see relevant part of Chapter II.
first time that the Soviet Government's policy on Kashmir was pronounced in favour of India.

Practically in all major speeches Khrushchev mentioned Goa and forecast its early freedom. As he said in Calcutta: "Sooner or later this will happen and Goa will free itself from foreign rule and will become an integral part of the Republic of India." (54)

The visiting Soviet leaders made a major policy statement on Kashmir when they visited Srinagar on 10 December 1955. In reply to a reception given to them by the people of Srinagar, Khrushchev said in unqualified terms that the question of Kashmir, which was created by some colonial powers, had been solved by the people of Kashmir in their decision to join the Indian Republic and the Soviet Government had accepted this position. Khrushchev even went to the extent of disapproving the very partition of Indian subcontinent on religious ground and doubted the wisdom of creating Pakistan.

In the Soviet Union we have found good solutions to both the questions of nationalities and the question of the freedom of conscience. Every citizen in our country can order his religious life in any way he considers necessary.

I am saying this in order to make our position on this question clearer to you. You see, some states are still trying to sow seeds of discord amongst the people of India by setting national hostilities aflame or by dividing the people on the principles of religious cults. Officially representatives of such states are trying artificially to create conflict ....

One can, therefore, say that it was not the differences in the religious faiths of the people which was the principal factor in the creation of Pakistan and in her separation from the one united state of India. Some states which have for a

(54) Bulganin and Khrushchev, n. 52, p. 73.
long time followed the well-known principle of "divide and rule" actively helped in this.

We are absolutely convinced that when passions have calmed down and the people realize the significance of such an artificial division of India, they will regret it. (55)

The Soviet support to India on Kashmir, Goa and some other issues was officially reiterated in Bulganin's report to the Supreme Soviet on his return. In his report on "The visit to India, Burma, and Afghanistan" Bulganin expressed his deep appreciation of friendly India and noted that on many issues, such as opposition to colonialism, armaments race, production and tests of nuclear weapons, the formation of military blocs etc., the two countries followed a similar policy.

Coming to Goa and Kashmir, he said:

As you know, there is still a small Portuguese colony in ancient Indian territory - Goa. The Indians are legitimately demanding that this intolerable state of affairs should be ended and Goa liberated. We have only to glance at the map of India and at these "possessions" of the Portuguese intruders to see how justified and legitimate is the claim of the Indian government that this Indian territory should be returned to its motherland. The Soviet government supports this just demand and considers that the preservation of a Portuguese colony on Indian territory - as the preservation generally of the colonial system in our day - is a disgrace to civilized nations.

As to the Kashmir problem, it has been provoked by countries which are pursuing definite military and political aims in this area. On the pretext of supporting Pakistan in the matter of Kashmir, certain countries sought to entrench in this part of India, in order to threaten and exert pressure on areas in the vicinity of Kashmir. An attempt was made to sever Kashmir artificially and convert it into a foreign military base.

The people of Kashmir are emphatically opposed to this imperialist policy. The Kashmir issue has already been settled by the people of Kashmir themselves; they regard themselves as an integral part of the Republic of India, and desirous of working within the fraternal family

of Indian peoples for the upholding of a new and independent India, and for the peace and security of the nations. (Prolonged applause) We gathered this deep conviction from our meetings with the people in Shrinagar and from our conversations with the esteemed Prime Minister of Kashmir, Mr. Gulam Mohammad Bakshi, and his colleagues.

The Soviet government supports India's policy on the Kashmir issue (applause), because it fully accords with the interest of peace in this part of Asia. We declared this when we were in Kashmir, we confirmed this declaration at the press conference in Delhi on December 14, and we declare it to-day. (Applause). (56)

Towards the end of the tour a Joint Communique on economic relations was issued, in which both governments agreed to establish trade representatives in their countries to look after the growing trade transactions, the Soviet government agreed to supply necessary machinery and help for oil exploration and erection of hydroelectric projects in India. (57) Speaking at a meeting of Members of the Parliamentary Association for the promotion of Hindi, Khrushchev disclosed that he and Bulganin had agreed that on return they would do everything necessary to "enable the Soviet people to have more opportunities for studying Indian languages, Hindi in the first place". (58)

Khrushchev's and Bulganin's Indian tour was extremely well-covered in the Soviet press; Pravda devoted nearly the entire front page to cover it for all the three weeks when they were in India. It wrote three editorials and termed their visit as "unforgettable and historic". (59) After the return of Soviet leaders to Moscow, a special

(57) Pravda, 14 December 1955.
(58) Bulganin and Khrushchev, n. 52, p. 96.
session of the Supreme Soviet was convened, where both Bulganin and Khrushchev reported on their trip to India. It is very rarely that special sessions of the Supreme Soviet are convened. In the post-war days such special sessions were convened only on three occasions - on Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to India, after the Geneva conference of the Big Four and after Khrushchev's first tour of the United States, when he met President Eisenhower at Camp David.

One other significant event which showed the extent of Indian influence on the visiting Soviet leaders happened in connection with the admission of large bloc of new members to the United Nations Organization. Applications of 18 states for membership of the United Nations were pending before the Organization for quite some time and the issue was not resolved for want of agreement over it among the Big Powers. At the 10th session of the UN General Assembly, India, along with some other member states, moved a resolution recommending the admission of 18 new states to the United Nations. Unexpectedly Nationalist China's delegation vetoed admission of the Mongolian Republic; in retaliation the Soviet delegate vetoed admission of fifteen other states. At this time Bulganin and Khrushchev were in India. Krishna Menon cabled Nehru from New York and at his suggestion Prime Minister Nehru interceded with the Soviet leaders in New Delhi to reconsider the Soviet veto. As a result the Soviet veto was withdrawn on condition that Japan too, along with Mongolian Republic whose admission was opposed by Nationalist China, be eliminated. The Soviet delegate, however, made it clear that he was in favour of admission of all the 18 states, as sponsored by the original resolution. Nehru paid handsome tributes to the Soviet leadership for its "wise and effective step". The then President of the UN General Assembly paid
handsome compliments to Krishna Menon and Nehru for influencing Soviet leadership in this respect. (60)

Following the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India expression of friendly Soviet attitude towards India was at its peak. In the following year India's Republic Day was celebrated in Moscow for three days by various public organizations. It was celebrated on 24 January by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Soviet-Indian Cultural Association; (61) on 25, a big meeting was organized on behalf of the Soviet Central Trade Union Organization, the Organization for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the USSR Ministry of Culture and the Central Organization of Writers of the USSR. Among others, it was addressed by N.M. Shvernik, the trade union chief since Stalin's days, N.A. Makhallov, the USSR Minister of Culture and the Indian Ambassador, K.P.S. Menon. Soviet speakers high-lighted on this occasion the important role played by India in international affairs, the warmth of reception given to Khrushchev and Bulganin by the people of India in their recent visit and the growing bond of friendship between the governments and peoples of these two countries. More indicative of the mood of the year was an item published on Pravda's front page, a letter addressed by "the residents of the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, Moscow" to "the citizens of Delhi". In this letter of more than 500 words, warm feelings of friendship were expressed, the historic visits of friendship were


recalled and adherence of both countries to the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence was stated. (62)

At the Indian Embassy function, Khrushchev, along with Malenkov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Shvernik and others was present. It was the first time that the chief of the Soviet Communist Party attended the Republic Day reception at the Indian Embassy. From then onwards Khrushchev continued to attend this function for the following four years, during which period Soviet-Indian relations grew in all the fields - cultural, economic and political. Since 1961, however, Khrushchev chose to keep away from it, even though the rest of Soviet top leaders attended it. The apparent restraint in the show of friendship might have been as much a result of India's involvement in the growing Sino-Soviet rift, as of a realization both in New Delhi and Moscow of the fact of established friendship, the continuation of which did not require the necessity of displays on such formal occasions.

The May Day slogan of 1956, issued after the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit of India, conveyed "Brotherly greetings" to the great Indian people who were "struggling for the progress of their own land, for peace in Asia and in the whole world." (63) In June 1956, the Indian Vice-President visited Moscow and he was warmly welcomed.

(62) A part of the letter read: "We, the people of Moscow, associate ourselves in celebrating India's national day, and with all our feelings and warmth, we wish you, the people of important town, and to the whole of India, growth, happiness and achievements. We wish, the heroic people of Delhi, the overfulfilments of your Second Five Year Plan, and wish you great success in building new India, and building Indian Republic as a great power in the contemporary world." See, Pravda, 26 January 1956, p. 1.

(63) Pravda, 19 April 1956.
A reception was held in his honour by the President of the Supreme Soviet, K. E. Voroshilov, which was attended, among others, by Khrushchev and Bulganin. Khrushchev and Bulganin were also present at the Indian Embassy reception held in honour of Dr. Radhakrishnan. (64) The Indian Vice-President addressed Soviet people on Moscow Radio and Television, a rare opportunity given to a foreign visitor. (65) On that occasion the first volume of his work on "Indian Philosophy" was published in Russian and the honorary title of "Professor" of Moscow University was conferred on him.

The change that had come in the official outlook was reflected in the Soviet writings also. In an article entitled "India - a Great Power", a writer maintained that by virtue of her important role in world affairs, India had become a great power, and this position was denied to her by the United States by "her blind, irresponsible policy of ignoring India as a Great Power and attempting to exert gross pressure upon her." (66) The famous Soviet Indologist, Academician Y. Zhukov, who in his earlier writings had branded Mahatma Gandhi as "reactionary", now wrote on "Gandhi's role in history", admitting that most Soviet Orientalists, himself including, had an "incorrect assessment of his activities" in the past and stated that "despite certain defects" Gandhism was a genuinely popular anti-imperialist movement. That is to say, in the end, under the leadership of Gandhi, Nehru and others, it brought India political independence." (67) Apparently,

(64) Pravda, 16 and 17 June 1956.
(67) New Times, no. 6, 1956. (Italics original)
as a result of the changed assessment of Afro-Asian neutrals, and the Soviet Government's adherence to the Five Principles by which it undertook not to interfere in other country's internal affairs "for any reasons - of an economic, political and ideological character (68) - the Cominform, which was established under Stalin for the purpose of directing the policies and activities of foreign communist parties, was dissolved in April 1956.

SUEZ AND HUNGARY

The signs of coming deterioration in East-West relations were seen a few months before the Hungarian and Suez episodes when the German question was tactfully sealed by Molotov. In pursuance of decisions of the Geneva conference of the Big Four, their Foreign Ministers were to meet to conduct discussions on German unification and disarmament. Before Molotov went to Geneva to participate in the proposed conference, the Foreign Minister of East Germany came to Moscow and Molotov issued a Joint Statement with him saying that the East German Government too should be associated with talks on German unification and thus left the West in a predicament of extending de facto recognition to East Germany in the talks which might not have led to any fruitful results.

The tragedy of the Soviet system is that such an able diplomat as Molotov was so silently dropped from foreign ministership that even a line by way of public announcement of it was thought unnecessary and in his place came Pravda's editor and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, D. T. Shepilov, only to be

expelled from the Party and the government, along with Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, in the following year on the charge of 'anti-Party' activities. (69)

In point of occurrence Suez crisis preceded Hungarian episode. Nehru immediately condemned Suez invasion as "unabased aggression", but took several weeks to "find facts" (70) before he could express his criticism of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary.

President Nassar announced the nationalization of Suez canal on 26 July 1956. On 29 October Anglo-French forces, with Israeli participation, launched armed attack on Egypt. The Soviet Government issued a statement condemning Israel, Britain and France of joint aggression on Egypt and warned of "the dangerous consequences that may follow from aggressive actions". (71) In the midst of Hungarian and Suez crisis, the Swiss President called for the conference of the heads of Governments of the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and India to pave way out of the crisis. In a statement issued on that occasion the Soviet Government stated its support to the Swiss President's proposal. (72)

(69) The formal announcement of Molotov's removal or resignation as Foreign Minister was never made. The last occasion he was described in Pravda as Foreign Minister was on 27 May 1956. Apparently, the matter might have been decided upon by the Central Committee, which met two days earlier. In a list published in Pravda as Soviet Government's participants in talks with Marshal Tito, who was then in Moscow, Molotov was described as First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Shepilov as Foreign Minister on 6 June 1956.

(70) See Karunakaran Gupta's article on "Indo-Soviet Relations in Retrospect" in Afro-Asian and World Affairs (New Delhi), vol.2,


(72) Pravda, 18 November 1956.
In policies and attitudes India and the Soviet Union were alike on the Suez issue. Leaders of both Governments sharply reacted to the Israeli-participated Anglo-French attack on Egypt and condemned it in no uncertain terms in the UN General Assembly as well as outside it. This common approach was revealed at the London Conference, convened on Anglo-French initiative to deal with the Suez canal issue. Even though the Soviet Government participated in the conference it made it clear that it did not approve the list of participants in the proposed conference and that it wanted the inclusion of some more Afro-Asian and East European countries. At the conference the Soviet delegates supported the proposals made by the Indian delegation and opposed the proposals of the Western delegates. The degree of identity in the policies of India and the USSR on this issue could be judged from Shepilov's statement which was issued soon after the London Conference. In his statement, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated:

What mainly determined the whole content of work at the London Conference was the clash of quite two different trends, two completely different principles, regarding the solution of the Suez question. One line of policy was expressed in the proposals made by India and supported by Indonesia, Ceylon and the Soviet Union. The other line of policy found its expression in the proposals made by the United States of America, which have become widely known as the Dulles plan.

The Soviet Foreign Minister further gave the details of the Indian proposal, termed it as "a plan for just and peaceful settlement of the Suez problem" and maintained that the "Soviet delegation has endorsed this proposal of India and, for its part, made a number of practical suggestions ....". (73)

The conference took no sides in the conflicting approaches made by the two sides but merely decided to pass on the entire proceedings.

of the London Conference to President Nasser and for that purpose elected a delegation of representatives of five countries—Australia, USA, Ethiopia, Sweden and Iran.

One of the reasons why Shepilov depended heavily on neutrals' policies on Suez, apart from his novelty on the diplomatic scene, must have been his difficulties in going away from the neutrals when Hungary too was simultaneously alive before public eyes. In the UN debate Hungary provided an occasion for Soviet Union's worst confrontation with the West and a host of neutral nations. The Western attacks were sharp and public opinion in some neutral countries, Delhi among them, was evidently agitated on what appeared to the non-communist world a ruthless suppression by Russian armed forces of the freedom struggle of the Hungarian people.

Since there was hardly anything to be gained by taking the Hungarian issue to the Security Council, the Anglo-French diplomats, apparently, decided to make political gains by taking it to the General Assembly, which was discussing the Egyptian issue at the same time. A 20-nation resolution, sponsored by the US and some other countries, charged that "the Soviet army of occupation in Hungary is forcibly deporting Hungarian men, women and children from their homes to places outside Hungary" and urged the Soviet and Hungarian governments to stop it forthwith. (74) Shepilov forcefully attacked the US-sponsored resolution and charged that "even in the worst period of cold war it would have been difficult to find a document which ignored the basic requirement in the way of substantiation of charges made to such an extent as this one". (75) In the concluding part of his speech Shepilov

Henceforth the Official Records of the General Assembly of the United Nations will be denoted as GAOR.

(75) Ibid, mtg.582, p.108.
sought to take shelter under Nehru's appeal, made some time back, in which Nehru had "reiterated his opposition to military pacts both in Asia and in Europe, to the stationing of troops on foreign soil." (76)

At this stage the Indian delegation, along with that of Ceylon and Indonesia, moved a resolution in which, incorporating Western charges of deportation of Hungarian citizens by the Soviet army and the Soviet denial of them, urged the Hungarian government "to permit observers designated by the Secretary-General to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein, and to report their findings to the Secretary-General". The General Assembly passed both the Western as well as the neutral resolutions; but the Soviet delegation voted against both.

Even though Shepilov voted against the Indian resolution considerations shown by him to its sponsors was evident by the tone and content of his speech. His references to Indian resolution were too short and he maintained his opposition to it on the ground that it was opposed by the Hungarian Government as it amounted to interference in its domestic affairs. (77).

In the following days when the General Assembly was discussing the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt the magnitude of the popular uprising in Hungary as well as the destruction caused there had come to the knowledge of the Indian Government and Krishna Menon's non-

(76) Ibid., p. 113.

(77) As he put it: "With regard to joint draft resolution presented by Ceylon, India and Indonesia, we must take note of the fact that it contains a proposal to send observers to Hungary. This proposal has already been rejected by the Hungarian Government which quite properly regards as an attempt to interfere in Hungary's domestic affairs. The delegation of the Soviet Union could not support this point, which was unacceptable to the Government of Hungary and consequently voted against the draft resolution." Ibid., mtg. 587, p. 138.
critical approach to the Hungarian issue was being severely criticized at home. Krishna Menon chose to state his criticism of the Soviet Government's Hungarian policy in a way that neither aroused Soviet reaction, nor pacified home critics but served the purpose of going on record that the Indian delegation had criticised the Soviet Government on the Hungarian issue. (78).

In his speeches, so far, the Indian delegate had never criticised the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary or its suppression of Hungarian uprising. Now he preferred to do this in a mild way at a subsequent session:

The amount of damage that has been done to Budapest, we are informed, is on a scale that would take place in war-time. Therefore, it is necessary for us to state here and now, as we stated before, that the responsibility rests with the Soviet Union. Irrespective of whatever explanations, whatever justifications there are for intervention; irrespective of the fact that under the Warsaw Treaty or under the Treaty of Peace, it has the right to station troops, as is contended—irrespective of all that there is a responsibility resting on one of the great powers in the world, for taking the initiative to bring about a position which will lead either to anarchy ... or to anarchic elements creating local governments of their own and the disintegration of the state — to prevent all that there is responsibility resting on the Soviet Union. (79).

(78) He said" ... it is necessary to use every kind of vigilance, and my government wants to be known, beyond all doubt, that we believe that Soviet government has disregarded the opinions of the majority of the Member States, as also has the Hungarian government, in not permitting observes to go to Hungary.

In this respect I would draw particular attention to the fact that the Secretary-General has not been permitted to visit Hungary up to the present time. There has been comments on the undesirability of sending foreign observers into sovereign States; we do not, however subscribe to the doctrine that these matters are within the sphere of domestic jurisdiction when there is such great violence which is likely to spread through the world."

Ibid., mtg. 608, p. 522.

(79) Ibid., mtg. 614, p. 609.
The Soviet delegate, who spoke next to him, counterattacked the US in sharp language, but preferred to say nothing on Indian delegate's observations.

So far as Indo-Soviet relations were concerned the Hungarian episode clearly showed that even though the Russians were unhappy over all that had happened in this connection, including, probably, for the mild criticism from the Indian side, the Soviet rulers did not allow such gathering clouds to over-shadow the otherwise smooth course of Indo-Soviet relations in the post-Stalin period.

**MIDDLE-EAST AND DISARMAMENT.**

Soviet government's policy to associate India in talks with the big powers on Asian issues and disarmament question had steadily developed in the post-Stalin days. Indian diplomats' work in Korea, at the Geneva conference of 1954, in the Suez crisis, in organising Bandung Conference, and at the United Nations, accompanied with the bonds of friendship that had grown between the two countries during this period, contributed in upgrading India's stature in the eyes of Soviet leaders which ultimately resulted, as can be seen through their proposals made in this respect, in shaping Soviet Government's policy of associating India in talks with the Western Big Three on Afro-Asian and disarmament matters. In bringing India thus in company with the big powers the Soviet leaders, apparently, had a feeling of India's usefulness in solving such questions. By historical circumstances, economic interests, and through accumulated attitude the General current of political developments in Asia and Africa was in a way which brought conflict of interests and policies between the Afro-Asian and Western rulers. In such a situation, where apparently no direct Soviet stakes were involved, the USSR was to make some gains
by confronting the West with the Neutrals.

Policy of associating India in the summit talks over Afro-Asian issues was soon clearly stated by the Soviet Government in the middle East crisis of July 1958, by which time the Soviet Government came under the direct control of Khrushchev, as Bulganin was removed from Prime Ministership in March 1958. A crisis situation developed in the Middle East when a military coup in Iraq killed the king and the new government announced Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. Following the developments in Iraq, the British landed their troops in Jordan and the US in Lebanon. The Indian Government adversely reacted to these moves and in a note sent to President Eisenhower Nehru demanded the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon. The Soviet Government issued a statement in which it condemned the Anglo-American aggressive acts in the Middle East and notified that the Soviet Government "cannot remain indifferent to developments which create a serious threat in an area adjoining its borders, and reserves the right to take such measures as may be necessary in the interest of safeguarding peace and security." (80)

In the midst of such crisis Khrushchev sent messages to the heads of the US, British, French and Indian Governments on 19 July 1958, in which he proposed that "the Heads of Governments of the USSR, USA, Britain, France, and India, should meet without delay together with the U.N. Secretary General and take measures to end the present military conflict." He proposed that such a summit conference "should draw up concrete recommendations for ending the conflict in

the Near and Middle East and submit them to the Security Council, which should consider them with the participation of the Arab countries." In this letter to Nehru Khrushchev made a special reference to India's role in world affairs:

We in the Soviet Union know India as one of the leading states, a country whose voice is heeded not only in Asia, but throughout the world. The Soviet government hopes that you will do everything possible to facilitate successive collective efforts by the peaceloving states to avert the imposing catastrophe, while it can still be averted.

By supporting the proposal for an immediate conference, and by her active participation in it, India will make an inestimable contribution to the preservation of peace. (81)

Nehru, who was also disturbed by the situation in the Middle East, welcomed the Soviet initiative and he informed Khrushchev that if the proposed conference took place, he would gladly participate in it. The western leaders, however, rejected Khrushchev's summit proposal and suggested that the Security Council should deal with the Middle East situation. On receiving their replies, Khrushchev again wrote to Nehru on 23 July in which he stated that the Soviet Government would like the participation of India in such a Security Council meeting, if it took place. (82) He also conveyed his proposal to the concerned Western leaders of inviting India to the proposed Security Council meeting. (83) In his reply to Khrushchev MacMillan had stated that he himself would participate in the proposed Security Council meeting, if Khrushchev too participated in it. He made no mention whether India should be invited to such a meeting which was

(82) Pravda, 24 July 1958, p. 2.
(83) Pravda, 24 July 1958.
to discuss an Asian matter but maintained that besides Big Powers such other invitees which the Council decided upon could participate in it. President Eisenhower's reply was on similar lines. President de Gaulle wrote that in such a proposed Council meeting

of course the Big Powers would participate. If, however, in any case the heads of all the eleven member states of the Council, as well as head of the Government of India and of such concerned Arab governments were to participate, I must state that in my opinion it is necessary to invite such other governments in the Near and Middle East as the representatives of Turkey, Iran, Israel, which are also interested in this question. (84).

Khrushchev felt that his earlier proposal of holding a summit conference of the Big Four plus India was modified to a great extent. He, therefore, restated it maintaining that the Security Council never took any positive decisions in the past on such questions, and it would not be of much use if it was summoned once more. Regarding India's participation in such proposed conference, he wrote to the British Prime Minister, MacMillan:

In your answer nothing is said about the question of the participation of the Indian Prime Minister in the conference of the heads of government. In this connection it is necessary to emphasise again that the Indian participation in the present conference is of very great importance from the point of view of arriving at constructive decisions regarding the regularization of situation in the Middle and Near East. (85).

The proposed summit conference, however, never took place as the concerned Western leaders preferred to let it die unborn.

As the Soviet leaders in post-Stalin days had formed an attitude that by virtue of her geographical position and political weight India should be rightfully associated with talks of the Big Powers on Afro-Asian issues, they also framed similar policy with

(84) Pravda, 29 July 1958.
(85) Pravda, 29 July 1958, p. 2.
respect to India's association with disarmament talks. In a world gripped with cold-war politics, the efforts of the Soviet leaders on disarmament are likely to go unappreciated. But no observer can term all that the post-Stalin leadership has done in the field of disarmament as a "propaganda stuff" except at the expense of objectivity and justice. Likewise nothing is gained by dismissing Soviet proposals on "complete and total disarmament", since such a proposal by itself does not debar partial disarmament. The initiative and willingness of the Soviet Government to associate neutrals with disarmament talks, in a sense, is a mark of its seriousness of purpose.

When the International Scientific-Technical Conference for peaceful uses of atomic energy was held at Geneva in August 1955 under the chairmanship of the Indian Atomic Scientist, Dr. H.G. Bhabha, Bulganin sent a message to him in which he wished the conference a big success. (86) In the midst of Suez crisis the Soviet Government issued a statement on 17 November 1956 on "Disarmament and Reduction of International Tension" in which it put forth its proposals for simultaneous reduction of standing armies of the Big Powers, prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons and the destruction of their existing stocks. To carry out this disarmament task, it called for a conference of the Big Four plus India and stated that such a summit conference would lead to a further bigger conference in which representatives of the Warsaw and NATO Treaty organizations would participate along with those of India and the People's Republic of China. (87)

---

(86) Pravda, 21 August 1955.

In a covering letter sent to the Indian Prime Minister, Bulganin stated that he highly valued "the role played by India" and Nehru himself "in strengthening world peace", and hoped that the note would receive the Indian Prime Minister's due consideration. (88) Nehru in his reply indicated his willingness to participate in the disarmament conference if it was held. (89) As the Western leaders rejected the Soviet Government's proposal, the conference was not held.

By the end of 1957 both the Super Powers, the USSR and the USA, had resumed open air nuclear tests, which obviously disturbed Nehru. On 28 November Nehru appealed to the heads of the governments of the USA and the USSR for terminating nuclear tests and stopping nuclear arms race. In his appeal the Indian Prime Minister stated that the weapons development had brought life on earth to a point when human life itself would be destroyed if the arms race was not checked. "I have no doubt this can be done. I have no doubt that America and Russia have it in their power to put an end to this horror that is enveloping the world and darkening our minds and our future." (90) In his reply sent on 10 December Premier Bulganin stated that he agreed with the Indian Prime Minister's feelings on nuclear tests and contended that the unhelpful attitude adopted by the Western powers on this issue was coming in the way of banning such tests. (91)

In this situation Marshall Bulganin addressed a letter to Nehru, along with one to Nassar, on 8 January 1958 in which the Soviet

(88) Pravda, 18 November 1956, p. 2.
(91) Ibid.
Premier made not-so-well-thought of a move of acquainting his government's disarmament proposal, which was then introduced in the UN General Assembly, to the neutral leaders with a suggestion that a conference of such non-aligned nations as India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Austria be convened to consider the deteriorating situation in the world resulting out of the NATO Council's decision to install rockets with atomic weapons in Europe and the Soviet disarmament proposals and hoped that the result of such a meet of non-aligned countries would contribute to the solution of these problems. (92) The proposed conference never took place, as, apparently, it was not seriously pursued by the concerned neutrals.

The real business for disarmament started during this period in the Disarmament Committee appointed by the UN General Assembly. The XIV UN General Assembly session appointed a Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, in which a Soviet writer maintains that neutrals were not included because of the opposition of some leading Western powers. (93) After the break of the Summit Conference in May 1960, the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee was wrecked in the following month by the withdrawal of Soviet delegation from it. The deadlock was broken at the XVI UN General Assembly session in November 1961 when the Soviet delegation proposed the appointment of a fresh UN Committee with the inclusion of neutrals in it. The UN General Assembly asked the Soviet and the US delegates to draw up recommendations on the composition and functions of the Disarmament Committee. At the joint recommendation of these powers The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was formed with

the inclusion of five Warsaw Treaty powers, five NATO powers and eight neutrals. (94)

In the middle of February 1962, Khrushchev proposed that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee should meet in March and the heads of government should personally attend its first meeting so as to help the solution of this complicated and important problem. In his reply Nehru informed that he fully agreed with Khrushchev on the importance of disarmament question and with his proposal that the heads of concerned government should personally attend the first meeting of the Disarmament Committee. He, however, conveyed his difficulties in going out of India during the proposed period in view of the forthcoming parliamentary elections in India and the subsequent formation of the new government. (95) Khrushchev's reply to Nehru showed the importance he attached to India in disarmament talks. He wrote:

You rightly note that the working agreement on the general and complete disarmament is one of the most important things in the life of future generations. I can say, as I expressed on many occasions and personally to you when we met, that the Soviet government views highly the contribution of the government of India in strengthening the force of peace-loving governments and people and helping the realization of this great object in life. Your statements, Mr. Nehru, in supporting the general and complete disarmament, imbied with the conviction that the earlier solution of this problem would help removing tension in mankind, has always been receiving understanding and respect in our country. (96)

(94) The eighteen members were: USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, USA, Britain, France, Italy, Canada, India, UAR, Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico and Sweden.

(95) Pravda, 4 March 1962.

(96) Pravda, 4 March 1962.
The Eighteen Nation Committee, however, did not meet at the heads of governments' level. President de Gaulle rejected Khrushchev's proposal of meeting with neutrals for disarmament talks and maintained that its participation be confined to nuclear powers. President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan stated that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee be opened by the Foreign Ministers of the concerned countries. Accordingly its first conference was held in March 1962 at Geneva at the Foreign Ministers' level. The Soviet delegate submitted a draft for the "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict International Control", which the Western delegates rejected as impracticable. The British and the US delegates, on the other hand, submitted a plan for limited disarmament under international inspection on the territories of the powers concerned, which the Soviet delegate rejected on the ground that it would only serve the espionage purpose. The Anglo-American delegations then stated that if the Soviet Union did not accept this proposal, they would soon resume nuclear open air tests. At this stage the eight neutral members of the Disarmament Committee submitted a memorandum outlining new proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests. The Soviet delegation declared that it was prepared to consider it, while the Anglo-American delegations virtually rejected it. When thus the negotiations on disarmament and on stopping open air nuclear tests were still in progress, the United States Government started its open air nuclear tests. This led Nehru to appeal for the cessation of nuclear tests at least during the period when the conference was in session; this, however, brought no effect on the American decision. On an earlier occasion when the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned powers was going on in September 1961, the Soviet Government had resumed
her nuclear tests, which had disturbed Nehru and he had communicated his strong feelings on it to the Soviet leaders personally, when he went to Moscow soon after the conference. Judging from Khrushchev's reception to Nehru (97) on such similar occasion, one feels that Khrushchev was more respectful and responsive to Indian feelings and policies on disarmament than the head of the American Administration.

A major achievement of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was the drawing up of the Test Ban Treaty, which was signed by all the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, barring France, China and a few others, on 5 August 1963. The importance attached by the Soviet Government to India on disarmament issue was indicated by the fact that, unlike in London and Washington, India led the list of signatories to the treaty in Moscow.

FRIENDSHIP CONTINUED

The continuity of friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union is a salient feature of the Khrushchev period. Despite some obstacles occasionally cropping up largely by the relations of the two countries with other states, the flow proved stronger than the disturbing pulls and the process continued to the advantage of both the countries. The basic reason why communist Russia's friendship with neutral India became thicker during this period, apparently, was that to the Soviet leadership which had experienced the horrors of war, expansion of neutral world was serving the purpose of defence in the days when, had there been no alternative, many of the newly-freed Afro-Asian countries would have joined "Capitalist camp! The

(97) For detailed discussion of it, please see pp. 155-157.
expansion of neutral world was, thus, coming in the way of expansion of Western alliance against the Soviet Union and communist China.

In the days following Suez and Hungary the course of Indo-Soviet relations travelled the old post-Stalin way, until the time when the Soviet policies towards India were under visible strain, as Russia's relations with fraternal China had fast deteriorated with the increasing involvement of India in it. So far as Indo-Soviet relations were concerned, Hungary was an unhappy occurrence; but since it came along with Suez in the days when a Soviet veto on Kashmir averted the passage of Anglo-American sponsored resolution on Kashmir which favoured the dispatch of UN forces to conduct a plebiscite there, (98) Indo-Soviet relations followed the smooth course out of necessity. As soon as the Hungarian crisis was over, the heads of Party and government of all the communist countries, including China's Chou En-lai, visited Moscow and issued statements with the Soviet leaders supporting the Soviet Hungarian action and condemning "imperialist" efforts to impose "fascism" in Hungary. Chou En-lai came to Moscow in January 1957; in the joint communique issued by him and Bulganin, besides condemning Western efforts to impose "fascism" in Hungary, both leaders noted that "many nationally independent states in Asia and Africa, and primarily such a great power as India, are firmly committed to a policy of peace and neutrality. There is also no small number of countries in Europe and other parts of the world which stand for peace and neutrality, or tend towards that policy."(99)

There was continued recognition of India's position as a friendly neutral power in the post-Hungarian days. The Indian Republic

(98) For detailed discussion of it, please see pp.
day reception of the year following Hungarian uprising was attended not only by Khrushchev and Bulganin, but the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister too, who was in Moscow at the time, attended it, apparently at the initiative of Khrushchev. (100) When the second general election was held in India in April 1957, unlike in the days of Stalin, Pravda did not indulge in tendentious accounts; even the news that the communists captured majority seats in Kerala was just a factual reporting. (101) Soon after the election when Nehru formed a new government, both Bulganin and Khrushchev sent congratulatory messages to him. In his message, Khrushchev said:

Mankind cannot evaluate the great contribution of India and yourself in the big task of preserving and strengthening peace. We are confident that the government headed by you will in future too steadfastly champion the cause of peace and international co-operation.

The Soviet people greatly value the brotherly friendship with Indian people, for the growth of which you did so much and which is already demonstrating its firmness as a factor in the world. We are confident that the Soviet-Indian friendship will in future grow and strengthen in the minds of peoples of both countries. (102)

In his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet in that year Shepilov made a pointed reference to India and her neutral role:

The Soviet people are highly gratified at the growing mutual understanding and strengthening of friendly co-operation with the Republic of India. The foreign policy pursued by the Republic of India, which remains outside military alliances and consistently advocates a peaceful solution of pressing international problems, is striking example of genuine peace policy which has won for the Indian government headed by Mr. Nehru the

(100) Pravda, 26 January 1957.
(101) Pravda, 6 April 1957, p. 6. Also see, New Times' article on "India at the Polls", no. 13, 1957.
(102) Pravda, 4 May 1957, p. 1.
respect and prestige it deserves. The Soviet government intends in future too to develop around cooperation with the great Indian power on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence. (Applause)

Shepilov also expressed his government's desire to establish friendly relations with Pakistan. (103)

Even though in the midst of the XXI Congress of the Party, Khrushchev and Voroshilov sent congratulatory messages to Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Rajendra Prasad on the occasion of the 9th anniversary of the Indian Republic. (104) On learning Khrushchev's intended tour of the United States and his meeting with President Eisenhower, Nehru sent a message to Khrushchev in which he expressed his good wishes and hoped that the forthcoming talks would be fruitful. In his reply Khrushchev expressed his sense of "high value" of Nehru's "correct understanding" of his policies. (105) On the occasion of Nehru's 70th birthday, Khrushchev sent a well-wishing message, (106) whereas Voroshilov sent a similar message to Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the Indian President, on the occasion of his 70th birthday. (107) Even though Pravda's pages were under heavy demand by the news items of the XXI Party Congress, the paper published a big article on Indo-Soviet


(104) On that occasion the Vice-President of the Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations Organization wrote an article in Pravda in which he pointed out the growing economic, political and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and India and concluded that "On this memorial day the Soviet people send their brotherly greetings to the great Indian people, our partners in the struggle for peace, and wish them success in the task of building independent and prosperous India." Pravda, 26 January 1959, p. 6.

(105) Pravda, 19 August 1959, p. 1.

(106) Pravda, 14th November 1959.

Friendship when the Bhilai Plant was officially commissioned; (108) and when its Second furnace was commissioned towards the end of 1959, Khrushchev personally sent a congratulatory message to Nehru, in which he hoped that "the future Soviet-Indian economic and technical cooperation, which was born at Bhilai, would grow on all sides". (109) In those days some proposed items in India's Third Five Year Plan were in troubles of foreign exchange. The Soviet Government sent a delegation of economic experts in February 1959 and on their recommendations offered a fresh credit of 1500 million roubles to help their implementation. In August 1960 it again offered a further credit of 500 million roubles. These acts evoked goodwill in the informed Indian circles.

The visits of high dignitaries were continuing as in the past; both the President of the Supreme Soviet, K.E. Voroshilov, and the Party and the government chief, Khrushchev, visited India in 1960. Voroshilov came along with Kozhlov and Furtseva in January 1960 and stayed here for two weeks. Editorially commenting upon the Soviet President's Indian tour, a Soviet weekly wrote that the course of Indo-Soviet relations afforded an ideal state for other countries:

The future historian, we feel sure, will live in a world in which friendship will be the basis of international relations. Doubtlessly he will want to study the origins and sources of this friendship - how, in a cold-war world, states with differing social systems built a fund of confidence and amity and worked together in close cooperation. Who pioneered in this noble work? The record of Soviet-Indian relations will provide the historian with ample and thankful material. (110)

Soon after President Voroshilov's tour Khrushchev came to India on his second visit in February 1960, when he was on way to Indonesia.

(108) Pravda, 5 February 1959, p. 12.
In the Tass announcement made just six days before his visit, it was stated that Khrushchev would stay in India for two days, (111) whereas when he came, he stayed on for five days. In New Delhi he was received at the airport by Nehru and Dr. Rajendra Prasad. The Indian President normally never goes to the airport to receive the visiting head of government. When Khrushchev and Bulganin came on an earlier occasion, the Indian President did not go to the airport to receive them. The informality that grew during this period was indicative of the strength of close bonds that existed between the two countries. In his second visit, Khrushchev addressed the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament, had talks with the Indian Government leaders, visited Bhilai plant and Suratgadh state farm and was given civic receptions in Delhi and Calcutta, where Nehru personally went to attend the function. On the occasion of Khrushchev's visit, New Times correspondent interviewed the then Vice-President, Dr. Radhakrishnan. The Indian Vice-President said that he was convinced of the humane side of Soviet foreign policy:

You are against national enslavement, economic bondage, race discrimination. That unites us. The humane position that you have taken means very much to us. (112)

The bonds of close relations that grew between Khrushchev's two Indian visits were visible in the public utterances of the Indian and the Soviet leaders on the occasion of his second visit. In his address to the Parliament Khrushchev paid high tributes to Jawaharlal Nehru and the Five Principles. Coming to economic relations, he said:

Dear friends, the peoples of the Soviet Union worked hard to achieve industrialization, we suffered much and lived through much, we experienced great privations in


establishing our own home industry. The Soviet people were aware of the hardships they had to overcome. ...

Therefore the aspirations of the government of India to establish its own home industry are especially near and understandable by us. Our sympathies are with you in this, for we ourselves are inspired by the idea of industrial development and as you are aware, we have achieved great results. (113)

Proposing vote of thanks the Speaker of the Lok Sabha told Khrushchev, "Last time you came here four years ago, you came as a visitor; this time as a friend and when you come next time you will be a relation". (114) Khrushchev gracefully acknowledged the compliments.

GATHERING CLOUDS

The Hungarian episode, in a sense, spoiled the Khrushchevan mood in the mid fifties. Another opposition to Khrushchev's post-Stalin posture, however, came not as much from the capitalist West, as from the fraternal China. Even though the Sino-Soviet conflict strained relations between China and Russia, in consequence it involved China's and Russia's relations with the rest of the world. (115) Chinese were unhappy over Khrushchev's meeting with President Eisenhower and were opposed to the East-West detente, which neglected China's "rightful" share in the summit conferences. During this period, when Sino-Soviet relations had neither broken off nor were smooth but were under the constant pressure of expression of some kind,


(114) Ibid., p. 4.

(115) For the detailed discussion of the Sino-Soviet conflict and Indian involvement in it, please see Chapter IV.
the presence of this exterior non-Russian element in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy was visible. Its expression soon came in relation to the Summit Conference of the Big Four in May 1960, which was held as a result of Khrushchev's own efforts. There must have been an element of suddenness in Khrushchev's decision to break the Summit. On 1 May, the US U2 spy plane was brought down. In a fortnight preceding the Paris summit conference the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee met twice; in one of these meetings Khrushchev made the biggest reshuffling of the Party Presidium, by removing five full members and one candidate member from it. Apparently, this reshuffling was done because of these members refusal to approve Khrushchev's decision of not participating in the Summit Conference, which was hardly a week ahead. When the heads of Big Four assembled in Paris on 16 May, Khrushchev told the Western leaders his inability to participate in the Summit Conference unless the US Government declared that "the United States will not henceforth send its forces to violate the Soviet Union's national frontiers, that it condemns the acts of provocation committed in the past, and that it will punish those immediately responsible" for such spy flights. (116) In the same speech Khrushchev asked for the postponement of the Summit meet by six or more months and declared his inability to welcome President Eisenhower on 10 June, who was to pay return visit to the Soviet Union on Khrushchev's invitation.

Among the most outspoken supporters to Khrushchev on his decision to wreck the Summit Conference were the Chinese. Soviet press reported that on 17 May more than a quarter million people demonstrated in Peking in support of Khrushchev's policy to break the

Summit Conference. Apparently, under Mao's pressure Khrushchev told the Western leaders that it was futile to meet so long as the US Government asserted that it was its "national policy" to conduct intelligence activities on the Russian territory.

In those days Khrushchev certainly was acting with a view to patching up Sino-Soviet differences. It is significant to note in this context that he showed his inclination to compromise with Mao on the issues of his country's relations with West, as was evident from his summit policy, and with the 'Yugoslav revisionists', but the Soviet policy showed no such change vis-a-vis neutral India, which was also a bone of contention in the Sino-Soviet dialogue. His policy to toe China's line on Yugoslavia, but retain his friendly posture towards India, was well-expressed a month after the break of the Summit Conference in a speech at the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party. Pointedly referring to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev said:

It is now clear to everyone that only close economic and political cooperation of the members of the socialist world system can assure their successful advance to socialism and communism. There is no other way. That has been demonstrated, in particular, by the case of Yugoslavia. We know that for a long time now the leaders of the League of Communists have denied the need for the socialist camp, equating it with a military bloc.

The Yugoslav leaders say theirs is a non-alignment policy, though everyone and certainly the Yugoslav leaders themselves, knows that Yugoslavia is affiliated to the so-called Balkan bloc, of which Greece and Turkey are the other two members. Yugoslavia's policy, therefore, is not one of non-alignment, for through the Balkan bloc she is associated with the aggressive NATO and CENTO military alliances. (117)

It becomes clear that Khrushchev, apparently, was walking on a tight rope. He had opted to show his support to China in condemning

'Yugoslav revisionism' but had no mind even to implicitly criticize the policy of non-alignment and its pioneers like Nehru.

At a time when Khrushchev was in Rumania, India's President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, was in Moscow on a state visit. Even though he came on not so very happy occasion, as the summit meeting had broken down with no word of support to Khrushchev from Nehru, Breznev's speech showed his indifference to China in welcoming the Indian President. He said:

Warm friendship and wide cooperation between our governments and peoples is a very bright evidence of the fact that nothing can stop the irresistible longings of the progressive forces from establishing new relations based on principles of peaceful co-existence between countries. (118)

At this time, besides Indian President, there were as many as four other Indian Ministers who had come separately to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

A conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties was held towards the end of that year in which after a month's protracted negotiations Sino-Soviet conflict was patched up. A big meeting was held at Moscow's Lenin stadium in honour of Sino-Soviet friendship on the day following the issue of the 'Moscow Statement', the product of the conference. In the foreign policy report submitted a fortnight later, Gromyko, unlike in the past, did not refer even once to Indo-Soviet relations. (119) His silence over India, however, was not so much an evidence of a change in policy as an indication of Moscow's desire for avoiding recriminations with China at the time when the differences had just been patched up.

However, following the break of the Summit Conference the Soviet posture towards the West showed signs of hardening although the immediate cause for it remained unknown to many. The West's puzzle over the Soviet attitude found its reflection at this time in a letter which MacMillan wrote to Khrushchev. The British Prime Minister expressed his "deep concern" over what then appeared to him "a new trend in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy." "I simply do not understand what your purpose is to-day," he wrote. The letter was written after the Soviet Government withdrew its delegation from the Committee of Ten on Disarmament at a time when Khrushchev knew that the US delegation was about to present its proposal. (120)

The exuberant Khrushchev must have felt somewhat outcast after the collapse of the Summit Conference. Although he was trying to adjust with the Chinese position on East-West relations, he was not willing to go the whole way to adopt Peking line on all the dividing issues. Soon after the break of the Summit Conference he declared his plan to go to New York to attend the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1960. In response to Khrushchev's initiative many leaders, including President Eisenhower and Nehru, attended the UN General Assembly session. Khrushchev, like many neutrals, was very much unhappy over the Congo muddle, for which, he felt, the UN Secretary-General's actions and inactions too were responsible. To the extent to which the Congo episode was indicating the inability of the UN Secretary-General to withstand Western pressure, Khrushchev's anger was centring on him. It was against this background that Khrushchev went to New York to attend the UN General Assembly

session where he made a policy statement in which he criticised the Western leaders and the UN Secretary-General but expressed his recognition of neutral world as a force on par with the two power blocs. Seeing the lack of response to it from Nehru or any other neutral leaders one doubts whether Khrushchev had ever consulted them on his 'Troika' proposal. On 23 September 1960, Khrushchev suggested that the post of the UN Secretary-General be abolished and in its place an executive agency representing the West, the Communists and the neutrals be created. As he stated:

It is necessary that the executive agency of the United Nations reflect the actual situation now obtaining in the world. The United Nations include member states of the military blocs of the Western powers, socialist states and neutralist countries.

We deem it wise and fair that the United Nations executive agency consist not of one person, the Secretary-General, but of three persons, enjoying the confidence of the United Nations - representatives of the states belonging to the three basic groups mentioned above. The point in question is not the name of this agency but the necessity for member states of the military blocs of the Western powers, the socialist states and the neutralist states to be representative in this executive agency. (121)

Four months after this UN General Assembly session, when Patrice Lumumba was murdered, Khrushchev sent a message to Nehru in which he restated his earlier proposal of replacing Dag Hammarskjold, whom he held responsible for the African leader's murder, by a three-group-executive agency. The content of the letter to Nehru suggests his unhappiness over Nehru's lack of support to it. He wrote:

We have had clear enough examples of the colonial and imperial powers exploiting the United Nations in furtherance of their interests. If the socialist and neutralist countries were to accept that in silence, their leaders would have failed in their duty, would have proved unable realistically to assess the situation and draw the necessary conclusions. (122)


Although the Soviet Government restated this proposal once more after Hammerskjold's death, apparently, both owing to its impracticability and lack of support from others, it did not press for it when it was in a position to block the election of Hammerskjold's successor.

In the same days the XXII Congress of the CPSU was held and it decided to remove Stalin's body from Lenin Mouseleum, passed a resolution on the "Elimination of the consequences of the Personality Cult" and openly condemned the Albanian leaders for their "anti-Leninist and splitting policy". (123) This showed Khrushchev's determination to pursue his own policy and not to compromise with Mao on major issues in Sino-Soviet conflict. A little earlier the CPSU had sent a message to the Indian Communist Party on the occasion of its Sixth Congress in which it wished success to the CPI leadership in its "struggle for ideological and organizational unity and strength in its ranks on fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism". It was evident from this message that Moscow hoped that the CPI would toe the Soviet as against the Chinese line in international Communist movement. (124)

A year after the publication of the 'Moscow Statement' and at a time when Khrushchev had reconciled to his original position in the Sino-Soviet conflict, an event happened which showed the extent of Khrushchev's consideration for Nehru's feelings even on a matter which involved Russian defence stakes and in which Indian interests as such were not directly involved. The first conference of the non-aligned nations was held at Belgrade in September 1961. A day earlier the


Soviet Government had resumed its suspended nuclear open air tests, which obviously disturbed Nehru. In the closing session, the conference addressed letters to the heads of government of the USSR, and the USA saying that the neutral leaders were "distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in international situation" and urged them to resume negotiations on dividing issues and save world from the danger of war. (125) The letter to Khrushchev was brought by President Nkrumah and Nehru, who was, in fact, to come to the Soviet Union on his official visit, which was fixed earlier. Soviet press had boycotted the news of the reaction of the Belgrade powers to the resumption of nuclear tests. This change in mood reflected in all the speeches that both leaders made on the occasion of Nehru's visit as well as in the Joint Communique issued at the end. Khrushchev's welcome speech at the airport was short; it confined mainly to recollecting past meetings with Nehru. Nehru's speech was still shorter, but he preferred to tell Khrushchev that "in the world in these days many new important problems have come up and I will be glad to discuss them with you". (126) Both leaders met for talks twice and attended receptions organized in their honour by both sides. Nehru made his major speech on 8 September at the Indo-Soviet friendship rally, in which he told his large Soviet audience what had happened at Belgrade and why he came to Moscow, which news was withheld from them by the Soviet press. He strongly pleaded for the resumption of negotiations, which were suspended after the summit break, for solutions of major issues between the two super powers. He said:


I came to Moscow from Belgrade where the conference of 25 non-aligned countries was held. At the request of the participants of this conference, President of Ghana and I have brought a message for Chairman Khrushchev in which is expressed the concern for the dangerous developments in international situation. A similar message is addressed to President Kennedy of the U.S.A.

In this message the participants of the conference express that the negotiations between these two great powers should start early for the solution of important contemporary problems and for lessening international tension.

This message from 25 countries from some continents, I think, expresses the innermost wishes of 100 million people of the whole world. In this message they have expressed their feelings on the contemporary problems before the world. They think that all that is necessary must be done for the solution of these problems in mutually acceptable ways. They feel that only negotiations can lead us to satisfactory results. There is no other way before us besides negotiations which would solve these serious problems. (127)

In his reply speech Khrushchev defended the resumption of nuclear tests maintaining that the Western powers were following aggressive Dullesian line by refusing to sign German Peace Treaty; had built aggressive war blocs, like NATO, SEATO, etc. around the Soviet Union; had not responded to various proposals made by the Soviet Government for complete and total disarmament but instead had increased their war-preparations. This situation had made it necessary, he said, to build Soviet Union's defence preparations and thus safeguard its own life as well as world peace. (128)

Nehru stayed in Moscow for four days only. In his farewell speech, Khrushchev referred to his very short stay and expressed his hope that the Indian Prime Minister would visit Moscow once again and stay longer. While Khrushchev did not bring the question of contemporary

(127) Pravda, 9 September 1961, p. 2.
(128) Pravda, 9 September 1961.
world situation in his short speech, Nehru brought it in his still shorter speech and expressed the hope that "some questions concerning contemporary international situation", which he had discussed in his short stay in Moscow with Khrushchev, "would receive more attention" from him. (129)

In the joint communique issued by both leaders, unlike on past occasion when the agreed issues alone were mentioned, both leaders stated their respective positions on German question, disarmament problem, and nuclear tests. Nehru agreed with Khrushchev that "the fact of the existence of two German states could not be ignored now and that any attempt to change the frontiers would have dangerous consequences" and "stressed the urgent need of searching for a peaceful solution of the German problem through negotiation between all sides concerned". In return, Khrushchev "explained the motives and reasons which compelled the Soviet Union to take the decision to resume nuclear weapons test explosions". (130)

GOA AND KASHMIR

But the strains and stresses in Indo-Soviet relations of the kind noted above were only occasional which did not vitiate the otherwise warm climate of the post-Stalinist days. On some issues like Kashmir and Goa in which India's interests were so obvious, the Soviet Government's policy of supporting India remained unchanged. Unlike the Western powers, which generally supported Pakistan and Portugal on Kashmir and Goa respectively, the Soviet Government's

(129) Pravda, 10 September 1961, p. 2.
support to India was firm and solid. Any historian of Indo-Soviet relations will have to record, whatever be his ideological inclinations, that but for the Soviet support to India on Kashmir the Western machinations would have caused a great deal of trouble to India on this issue. The Soviet Government's support to India's claim on Goa, as its support to any issues concerning the liquidation of colonialism in general, is old and well-known. When the Indian forces liberated Goa, Diu and Daman, Pravda flashed the news: "Portuguese colonialists are ousted from India! Indian forces liberate Goa, Daman and Diu". (131) Soon after receiving the news of the liberation of Portuguese colonial pockets in India, Khrushchev sent a message to Nehru in which he expressed his government's complete support to the Indian action. The message stated:

On behalf of the Soviet people, Soviet government and myself, I send you, respected Mr. Prime Minister, your government and the people the warmest and most sincere congratulations on the occasion of liberation of the age-old Indian land - Goa, Daman and Diu - from the alien people and its joining with the motherland. This step of the government of India is a great contribution to the noble task of people's struggle for the complete and urgent liquidation of the shameful colonial system.

Soviet Union always firmly stood and stands by the side of all peoples who are fighting against colonialism. Soviet people supported the Indian people in their fight for national freedom. They, therefore, very well appreciated their strength, which was directed against the liquidation of last colonial yoke.

The government of India showed maximum patience and self-restraint in its efforts to restore historic justice by peaceful means and liquidate the last remnants of colonial pockets and join it with free India. Isolated colonialists, operating under the support of war-bloc of NATO, ignored the wishes of the people and created constant threats to the peaceful efforts of the Indian people.

The determined action of the government of India in liquidating the colonial pockets in its territory is a

completely lawful and rightful act. Soviet people unanimously support friendly India in this action and wish her every success in strengthening her independence. (132)

Speaking at the Indian Embassy on the occasion of the Republic Day celebration of that year, the First Deputy Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, restated his government's support to India's action in Goa. (133) When Indian forces marched into Goa, the President of the Supreme Soviet, Brezhnev, was in India on official tour; in his speech in India he too supported the Indian government's action. Against this background when the Security Council, with Western support, took up the Goa question to censure India, the Soviet delegate supported Indian action and by his prompt veto put an end to the Anglo-American manoeuvres.

As we saw earlier (134) Khrushchev and Bulganin stated their support to India on Kashmir when they were on their historic Indian tour in November-December 1955. Since then, unlike in the past, Soviet Government's support to India on Kashmir came so long as Khrushchev was in power. The Kashmir issue figured again in the Security Council in early 1957 when the Pakistani delegate took it to the Council on the ground that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had accepted certain provisions of the Indian Constitution which were to make the state constituent part of the Indian Republic with effect from 26 January 1957. Even before the head of the Indian delegation had completed his speech, the representatives of UK, USA, Australia,

(134) See pp. 116-8.
Columbia and Cuba circulated a resolution which read "having heard the statements from representatives of the governments of India and Pakistan concerning the dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir"; the Security Council finally adopted a resolution which stated that "the final disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations". (135) Indian delegation strongly opposed this resolution. In his speech the Soviet delegate gave full support to Indian stand. As on previous occasions, he maintained that the Kashmir question was created by the interested Western powers who "were guided primarily by their own interests which were aimed at penetration into this region as one of great strategic importance".

Coming to the question of Kashmir's accession to India, he said: "The Kashmir question was thus settled by the Kashmir people themselves who consider themselves to be an inalienable part of the Republic of India. The Security Council cannot disregard these facts." (136) The Soviet delegate again restated in unambiguous language his government's position at a subsequent meeting. "The Soviet Union's view, and its basic premise, is that the Kashmir question has in actual fact been settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves, who consider their territory an integral part of the Republic of India." Referring to the question of plebiscite, he said:

The Security Council cannot ignore the facts which have been placed before it notably in the statement made by the representative of India. The facts show that in


(136) Ibid., mtg. 765, p. 16.
the many years that have passed since the Security Council adopted its resolutions on the holding of a plebiscite, the situation in Kashmir has changed considerably. We must not forget that the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir now meets with the objections of one of the parties; that it has in fact been rejected by that party. At the present time, the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir, with outside interference in one form or another, as proposed by some members of the Security Council, can serve only to excite local conflicts and to complicate the international situation in the area. The task of the Security Council, however, is to strengthen peace and tranquility in the area. In these circumstances, what useful purpose will be served by including in the Security Council resolution a clause providing for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir? Clearly, no purpose at all. (137)

The Soviet delegate, however, did not veto the Anglo-American resolution at this stage, as it was only an attempt to reiterate the Council's earlier position. The use of Soviet veto in India's favour, however, came when the Anglo-American delegates tried to implement the resolution on plebiscite with the use of UN forces against India at a subsequent meeting. The representatives of UK, USA, Australia, and Cuba tabled a draft resolution which for the first time recommended the use of UN forces for the solution of Kashmir dispute. (138) This resolution was defeated by the Soviet veto. In his speech explaining the use of veto, the Soviet delegate said:

The Charter of the United Nations, however, states clearly and unmistakably that the United Nations armed forces may be used solely for the purpose of repelling aggression and restoring international peace. The dispatch of United Nations force to permit the holding


(138) Among other things the resolution stated: "Noting the proposal of the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force in connection with demilitarization,

"Believing that in so far as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarization as envisaged in the resolutions in the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and towards the pacific settlement of the dispute the use of such a force would serve consideration."

Ibid., Doc. S/3787.
of a plebiscite in Kashmir would be contrary to the Charter and would be insulting to the national pride of the people of Kashmir. (139)

The Anglo-American delegates attacked the use of Soviet veto in favour of India on Kashmir.

Pakistan again took the Kashmir question to the Security Council in January 1962 this time on the ground that some speeches of certain leading Indian leaders revealed a plan to recapture the part of Kashmir which was under Pakistani control. In view of this, he claimed, that a serious situation had arisen which warranted an immediate consideration by the Council. (140) Speaking in this renewed debate on Kashmir the Soviet delegate maintained that no new situation had arisen in Kashmir which warranted any fresh discussion by the Council. He charged that it was not the Indian leaders who were preparing to recapture Kashmir under the control of Pakistan, but, on the other hand, it was Pakistan which was preparing to recapture Indian territory. He further stated that unlike in the Pak-held Kashmir, the Indian area had made a definite progress in socio-economic matters. (141) At this stage the Irish delegate introduced a resolution which urged the governments of India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations on the question at the earliest time and settle the dispute on the basis of a plebiscite. (142) The Soviet delegate vetoed this resolution stating categorically that the question of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir was dead and outdated and the Kashmir question had been solved once for all. In his speech he said:

(139) Ibid., mtg. 773, p. 32.
(141) Ibid., mtg. 1010.
A careful study of the draft shows that its central idea is, as the United States representative asserted more than once, that our earlier resolution on holding a plebiscite in the territory of Kashmir in order to determine whether this territory belongs to India or to Pakistan is still in force at the present time. ... 

We have already pointed out in our statement of 4 May 1962 (1010th meeting) that the resolution about this plebiscite was adopted by the Council in quite a different set of practical circumstances and that the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan rested on conditions which were prerequisite for carrying out this whole plan. The most important condition - and I must apologise for having, so to speak, to return from Z to A, but that is not the fault of the USSR delegation - was the preliminary withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the entire territory of Kashmir. (143) 

He further said that it was India which first brought the Kashmir question to the Security Council. As the draft resolution went counter to the spirit of the solution, he said, his delegation was opposing it.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

Our survey of Soviet Government's policies under Stalin and Khrushchev so far has given some idea about the type of cultural relations too that existed between the two countries. Some more words must, however, be added to give fuller account of the Indo-Soviet cultural relations during this period. Russians' interest in Indian art, music, literature and Indian studies is well-known. The study of Sanskrit was begun at the Moscow University more than a hundred years ago. In 1852, the first Russian Sanskritologist, P. Ya. Petrov, occupied the chair of Oriental languages at the Moscow University. (144) Moscow's Lenin library has a copy of 'Bhagwat Geeta' published in

(143) Ibid., mtg. 1016, p. 17.
Russian language in 1788. Leo Tolstoy's personal library consisted of 200 books and magazines from India. Works of Ramkrishna Paramhansa, Mahatma Gandhi, Swami Dayanand Saraswati and some issues of 'Modern Review', etc. were in his personal collections. (145)

The interest which pre-revolutionary Russia evinced in Indian culture and arts however, for one thing, was sporadic and for another, confined to only a handful of individuals and institutions. In the Soviet period, particularly, in the Khrushchev era, when expansion of cultural relations between the two countries became a matter of state policy, there was a great spurt of interests in the cultural life of the Indian people. Even though in the old Stalinist days Gandhi's autobiography was published in a consigned form, no work of any other Indian public figures or writers was offered to the Russian reading public. On the eve of Nehru's visit in 1955 a Russian translation of his 'Discovery of India' was published; a little later his Autobiography, along with full version of Gandhi's autobiography, was published in Russian language. Following Dr. Radhakrishnan's visit in 1956 his works on Indian Philosophy were translated. Publication of such non-communist material in Soviet Russia, however, is done with sufficient care to see that it does not reach the hands of average Russian. One way of doing this is by issuing such books in few prints.

Among the most read and known Indian writers in the Soviet Union is Rabindranath Tagore. Most of his well-known works have been translated in Russia in popular editions. According to a Tass statement issued in November 1957, during 40 years of Soviet power upto 1957, publishing houses of Soviet Russia translated Rabindranath Tagore's

(145) Ibid., no. 39, 1956.
65 books in 8 languages in more than two million copies. Among the other popular writers were Krishnan Chander, whose works were published in 6 languages with more than half a million copies; and Mulk Raj Anand, whose works were translated in three languages with about a million copies. (146) A Soviet writer states that from 1915 to 1 October 1958, 243 works of Indian writers were published in 26 Soviet languages. The total number of copies published were 10,989,415. Between 1940 and 1958, Soviet writers too wrote on Indian history, economy, art, literature, socialist movement, etc. The total copies published of Soviet writers on India during this period was 4,962,340. (147)

Along with the publication of Indian writers' works in Russian and other languages, exchange of literary and scientific works between the two countries since 1954 also helped the cause of flow of information and indicated the growing interest. A Soviet writer mentions that in the first three months of 1955 the Library of the Leningrad Academy of Sciences alone sent about 3,000 scientific and political works to India and received 700 such publications from India. Seven big libraries in Moscow had exchange programme with 330 Indian libraries and organizations. In 1958 they sent 12,373 publications to India and received 2,237. (148)

In old Russia, Russian scholars' interest in India was confined to study of Sanskrit language and literature. When Khrushchev and Bulganin came to India in 1955, Khrushchev spoke before the Parliamentary Association for the promotion of Hindi and declared:

(146) Ibid., no. 123, 1957.

(147) M.A. Kocharyan, Dryzhba i Sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Indii (Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literaturii, Mosckva, 1959), p. 36.

(148) Ibid., p. 37.
we will see to it that an educational establishment is founded in our country in which the finest, most gifted, young people will study Hindi and other Indian languages. (149)

Following his Indian visit, more attention was paid to the study of Indian languages, history and economy. Hindi has been introduced in many secondary schools in Moscow, Leningrad, and Tashkent since 1957. The Moscow State University and some other universities have separate departments for the study of Eastern languages, where Hindi, Bengali and Urdu are taught for a full five-year-course. Besides Moscow, Leningrad has an Institute of Living Indian Languages where Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, Tamil, etc. are taught. Moscow and Tashkent radio stations have broadcast programmes in most of the Indian languages.

More reflective of the state policy is the increasing number of visits of delegations from both countries in recent past. In Stalin's days hardly two or three delegations of Russian scientists had visited India, and these visits had materialized largely due to active interest shown from the Indian side. Within a year and a half after Stalin's death as many as 14 Indian delegations had visited Moscow at the invitation of the Russian Government. (150) As the trade and political transactions between both countries increased in the following years, visits of political leaders, scientists, artists, writers, musicians, etc. increased on both sides. Since 1960, when a separate 'Friendship' university was established in Moscow for the students from Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, about 100 students from India had come annually to do undergraduate and postgraduate courses against Russian Government scholarships. From the

(149) N.A. Bulganin and Khrushchev, n. 52, p. 96.
(150) See p. 92
Soviet side too some students went to India to study Indian languages, and in rare cases, to study Indian classical music and dances. Both governments made annual cultural exchange agreements since 1950 under different heads and thus exchanged sports meets, art exhibitions, dance, film and other entertainment items. Under the cultural exchange agreements the Soviet side provided services of its scientific personnel to teach in Indian educational institutions and offered seats to Indian research scholars in its research and educational establishments. The state of smooth relations during this period was reflected in the increased number of such visitors on both sides.

With a view to giving institutional expression to friendship-cultivating activities, a society of Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations was established in Moscow in 1958 on the occasion of the 8th anniversary of the Indian Republic. It should, however, be remembered that a similar organization was established in India in March 1952, right in the days of Stalin. The group which sponsored the formation of this organization in Moscow was headed by the Deputy Foreign Minister, N.P. Firyubin. Academician Nikolai Tsytsyn was elected its President and among its 11 Vice-Presidents was I.A. Benedictov, who was then the Minister of Agriculture in the RFSSR government and who later became the Soviet Union's Ambassador to India staying there for a longer period than any of his predecessors. The Association of Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations has branches all over the Soviet Union and it celebrates every year India's independence and Republic days and some other occasions of national importance. In 1958 branches of this organization celebrated different Indian functions at 21 places in the Soviet Union in which 17,000 people participated.
This organization celebrated 125th birth day of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and 100th birthday anniversary of Rabindranath Tagore. (151)

(151) Kocharyan, Dryzhba i Sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Indii, n. 147, p. 39.