Chapter II

INDIA IN SOVIET POLICIES UNDER STALIN
India became independent on 15 August 1947 but her diplomatic relations with major powers were established by the Interim Government, which had been formed about a year earlier. By the middle of April 1947 Indo-American diplomatic relations were established. A press communique issued in New Delhi on 13 April 1947 stated that the Governments of India and the USSR had agreed to exchange diplomatic missions at the ambassador's level. (1) The actual appointment of the Indian ambassador to the Soviet Union, however, took place on 25 June 1947.

As Vice-President and Minister of the External Affairs of the Interim Government, Nehru stated that it would be the policy of his government to build up good relations with the Soviet Union and the United States of America. In his very first speech he outlined free India's foreign policy; maintaining that it would be his endeavour to keep India "away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to disasters ...." (2) He stated that it was his government's policy to remain in the British Commonwealth of Nations and establish friendly relations with the USA and the Soviet Union. Coming to Soviet Russia, he said:

To that other great nation of the modern world, the Soviet Union, which also carries a vast responsibility for shaping world events, we send greetings. They are

(1) Hindu (Madras), 16 April 1947, p. 7.
(2) The Statesman (New Delhi), 8 September 1946, p. 5.
our neighbours in Asia and inevitably we shall have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do with each other. (3)

At a time when the Interim Government was formed there were famine conditions in some parts of India and the first task the government had to face was to supply food to famine-gripped areas. With a view to securing food aid from the Soviet Union and establishing diplomatic relations with her, Nehru instructed V.K. Krishna Menon to see the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, M. Molotov, who was in Paris in connection with the post-war peace conference, and have talks with him on these matters. Menon met Molotov on 28 September 1946. Reuter's dispatch on Menon-Molotov talks said that Molotov gave "a most friendly ear to the subject of future exchange of Ambassadors", but on food issue he expressed his inability to supply large quantities of food-grains from the Soviet Union to India, as Russia herself was experiencing food shortage. "If we do not send you food, it is only because, we can not", Molotov was reported to have told Menon. After his talks with Molotov, Menon told Reuter's correspondent: "My talks with M. Molotov were carried out in a most friendly atmosphere and I met with sympathy and understanding for India from everyone at the Russian Embassy." (4)

Whether Russia had surplus wheat and rice to give India in 1946 is not clear. Reports from the Soviet Union in those days spoke of surplus food in the country, but the subsequent studies reported that the food situation in Russia in 1946 was far from

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(3) Ibid.

Besides other factors, what conditioned Soviet behaviour in the post-war days was the peculiar circumstances obtaining in those days. The complexity of the post-war problems and the frequent encounters with the war-time allies involved Russia more and more in European situations and India, under such circumstances, was a far off land to attract her particular attention. With the end of war the war-time inter-allied co-operation had ceased and instead there grew strained relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The West was opposed tooth and nail to communization of Eastern Europe. Right on the pattern of Eastern Europe Stalin planned to bring Greece under Communist rule. But this plan was foiled by the presence of British troops, which were kept to fight against the Greek National Liberation Front. Under the circumstances Churchill gave expression to his anti-Soviet feelings in his famous Fulton Mo speech, delivered on 6 March 1946, in which he pleaded for the joint Anglo-American alliance against the Soviet Union. In his interview to the Pravda correspondent Stalin termed Churchill's speech as war-mongering and warned the West of the consequences of such a policy. (6) Commenting upon this speech a Soviet journal stated that the "iron curtain has descended not upon the liberated countries of Europe ... but upon Indonesia, India, Greece and other places where the British imperialists are exercising sway and trampling upon the vital rights of the


(6) Pravda, 14 March 1946.
peoples." (7) By the middle of 1947 the Soviet Government came out against the "Marshall Aid" and Pravda was full of criticism of the American policies of "enslaving" Western Europe. (8)

In one of its cartoons Marshall and Dulles were shown cutting the UN tree; (9) in another the leaders of Cuba, Australia, England, Turkey, Holland, and Canada were shown sitting in chairs with their hands tied by ropes of American dollars. (10) The London Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers, held towards the end of 1947, failed on the issues of German Peace Treaty and the German unification. In a statement issued to the Soviet press Molotov stated that the failure was due to unwillingness of the Western powers to abide by the commitments made at Potsdam and Yalta. (11)

In the midst of such an atmosphere Stalin revived the dissolved Communist International under a new name, the Communist International Information Bureau. Although this organization was charged, in particular, with the task of formulating policies for the European Communist parties, it started assuming the role of directing all the communist parties, including that of India. The official proclamation of the policy soon came. In one of his odd speeches, reportedly delivered in Poland towards the end of


(8) See its editorial of 10 October 1947.

(9) Pravda, 17 October 1947.

(10) Pravda, 13 October 1947.

September 1947 before some officers of Polish Communist Party and published in Pravda after one month, the Soviet Communist Party Secretary, Andire Zhdanov, advanced his thesis of the division of the world into two camps. He spoke of "the new position of the post-war political forces and the establishment of two camps - imperialistic and anti-democratic camp on the one side, and the anti-imperialistic and democratic camp on the other side." In this historic speech, which ran over two full pages of Pravda, Zhdanov attacked "American plans to enslave Europe" and spoke of "Party lessons on the solidarity of the democratic, anti-fascist, peace-loving elements in the struggle against new plans of war and aggression." However, he rarely touched on the colonial question or on countries, such as India, which had just then freed themselves from the colonial yoke. This was, in a sense, an indication of the pre-dominantly European pre-occupation of the Soviet Union in post-war days, as well as, as far as India was concerned, of the lack of Soviet policies towards her on the eve of her independence. In one of his incidental references to India Zhdanov attacked the Anglo-American policies and maintained, even after India became free, that the latter was kept in "obedience and enslavement" of these powers. As he said:

Most wicked, imbalanced, imperialistic policies were of Churchill, who advanced quickly realizable preventive wars against the U.S.S.R. and gave call for the use of atomic weapons, at present under American monopoly, against the Soviet people. Instigators of the new war are not only setting fire to the U.S.S.R. but also to other countries, in particular, to China and India. They are presenting the slanderous picture of the U.S.S.R. as the possible aggressor and presenting themselves as "friends" of China and India, as "rescuers" from the communist danger and as "helpers". In such a
Way China and India are kept in their obedience and enslavement. (12)

TOWARDS FREE INDIA: INDIFFERENT AND HOSTILE

Zhdanov's speech cited above, in a sense, had all the characteristics of Stalin's policy towards free India. It was indifferent and hostile and hardly paid any attention even to see whether or not India was free. When, however, he cared to notice the changed situation, he hardly allowed his policy, which was meant to deal with a world divided into two camps only, to be affected by it. And this utter indifference, accompanied by hostile posture, was reflected in the Soviet publicity organs which did not even bother to note the proclamation of Indian independence. Neither Pravda nor any other Soviet paper of importance carried the news of Indian independence. The emergence to independent statehood of a big neighbouring country went unnoticed in a society which, as its rulers claimed, was established for freeing colonies. This is a tragic comment on the circumstances in which post-war Russia under Stalin had come to as well as on a people whose national policy kept them away from the developments abroad.

Not only that the emergence of independent countries on the whole was not noticed by the Soviet rulers but such of their writers who cared to take note of it termed the new situation as no different from the one existing in the past. In an article on "Partitioned India" Dr. A. Dyakov, Russia's foremost Indologist, wrote:

The acceptance of the Mountbatten plan (for partition) by the leaders of the Indian National Congress was a result of a compromise deal between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism. The deal is based on concessions made by both sides. The British government announced that it was prepared to grant India dominion status. Congress, for its part, renounced the demand for immediate Indian independence and consented to the partition of the country.

What chiefly prompted the Indian bourgeoisie to make this political compromise was its fear of the mass movement for national liberation. (13)

A Soviet journal chose to publish a statement, reportedly made by an Indian delegate at the Trade Union Congress held in 1949, which said:

The last year-and-a-half since the 'transfer of power to Indian hands' has made it quite plain that the national bourgeois leadership of the Congress obtained the reins of power by signing a treacherous deal with British imperialism. The subservient big bourgeoisie with their close ties with British and American monopolies, and their Congress champions, sold India's freedom for a deal with British imperialism in order to save their parasitic privileges from the advancing sweep of democratic forces. (14)

This attitude of treating India still as an Anglo-American colony found its expression on other grounds too. The existence of foreign capital in India, India's continuation in the British Commonwealth of Nations, etc., were considered as proofs of her dependent status. In a speech in March 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, said that in Asia such countries as India, Ceylon, Burma, etc., had achieved independence, but in the case of China, he argued, "the struggles of the people have not achieved similar results". E. Zukov, another Soviet authority on

the East, ridiculed Acheson's contention that India was free and China was not. He was surprised to see that India, which did not possess heavy industries of her own, "for the sole reason that it is not desired by the Anglo-American monopolists, as it would weaken India's colonial dependence on the imperialist powers", was termed as free. (15)

India's decision to continue in the Commonwealth was looked upon as a mark of her colonial status. Commenting upon the Indian Constituent Assembly's decision in this respect a Pravda columnist said that India's decision to continue in the Commonwealth of Nations amounted to her being "a part of the British Empire". (16) Izvestia published an article on "The colonial policy of the British Labourites" in which the author argued that the British act of granting independence to India had in no way changed latter's status in the British Empire.

In 1947 India was divided into two states 'enjoying equal rights', which were included in the British Commonwealth of Nations - the dominions of India and Pakistan. ... In January 1950 the dominion of India was proclaimed a republic, headed by an elected President. This republic, however, remained a part of the British Empire and recognized the hegemony of the king of England.

Have these formal modifications actually altered the position of the colonial countries? In no way whatsoever. The dominant position of the English capital remained in tact in all English colonies now called "independent". The English firms are the real bosses in the colonial economies. (17)

Stalin's was a typical communist outlook and his policy towards newly freed Asian countries suffered from inadequate interest as well as from expressed hostility. The hostile Soviet posture was shared

(15) Pravda, 23 March 1950, p. 4.
(16) Pravda, 2 December 1948, p. 4.
(17) Izvestia, 10 September 1950.
by the communist parties of many countries, including that of India. The Indian Communist Party held its Second Congress in February 1948, in which it changed its old rightist leadership and the policy of co-operation. The Party now adopted a policy which sought to overthrow the Congress governments at the Centre and in the states by violent means. As a result, strikes were organized in large cities where the Party controlled some trade union organizations and in some remote rural areas, such as in Telangana in Hyderabad state, where peasants were under its hold it sought to supplant the Congress regime. To deal with such a situation the Indian Government banned the Communist Party and arrested its leaders on a large scale. During 1948-50 Pravda's news about India was full of such arrests and strikes. It reported "massive arrests of democratic workers in India" and spoke of "the movement of protest against the government's anti-democratic activities". It was reported that a group of professors of Allahabad University had criticised government's repressive policies. (18) Another Tass dispatch said that "the present terrorist anti-communist activities of the government are guided with a view to clearing the way to tie down the country economically and politically to the U.S.A." (19) In fact, during 1948 and 1949 more than 1/3 of Pravda's news on India was about the arrests and repressions of the Indian communists. A Tass dispatch from Delhi said that from 1947 up to the first quarter of 1948 there were about 1,811 strikes in India in which

(18) Pravda, 8 April 1948, p. 4.
(19) Pravda, 27 February 1949, p. 4.
about 1,840,780 workers participated. (20) In a leading article in Pravda it was alleged that this repression of the national liberation and democratic movements of the masses is conducted not only by the Indian capitalists and industrialists, but it appears to be a part of the world-wide plan of Wall Street and City Street to bring India into a special base of Anglo-American imperialistic plans in the East. (21)

The author further alleged that the Indian soldiers were already used to suppress the people's movements in Malaya and the Indian government had entered into an agreement with the Burmese government to help suppress people's movements in that country. In another context he argued that the government of India's police action in Hyderabad was motivated with the desire to suppress the spread of "Telangana revolt and the peasant unrest" in other parts of India. (22) And how were the communists treated in the jails? The treatment meted out to them spoke of "increasingly monstrous acts of terror and police tyranny in India. Thousands of absolutely innocent men and women have been flung into concentration camps and jails. The conditions in these camps ... is only to be compared with that of the more infamous Hitler's dungeons." (23)

NEHRU GOVERNMENT: ANTI-PEOPLE BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENT

Stalin's hostility to the non-communist world reached its peak during the period following the Berlin blockade and the start of the Korean war. When the Berlin blockade was in its last phase and

(20) Pravda, 7 July 1948, p. 4.
(21) Pravda, 25 November 1949, p. 3.
Stalin was seeing the failure of his policy, he condemned "the aggressive policies of Anglo-American ruling circles" on Berlin and warned that "the policies of contemporary leaders of U.S.A. and Britain are aggressive policies and these policies will lead to new war." (24) By the middle of next year he was out against the "Tito clique." By the end of October of the same year German policy of the West and the Soviet Union reached its point of no return as both the German states had come into existence as independent, sovereign, states. Over and above that the Soviet Union had now become an atomic power. To add to Stalin's sense of strength China joined in a big way his socialist camp. Stalin, therefore, now was in a position to pursue the toughest and most hostile policies towards the non-communist world and by his added strength and resulting sense of security, the pursuit of such a policy became feasible.

What is more important in this connection is that it was during this period that the Soviet Union assumed a more hostile posture towards India. The Nehru government was now regarded as a puppet government in the hands of big business. As one Soviet commentator wrote:

It is no secret that Birla is particularly close to Sardar Patel, the generally recognised leader of the Congress right-wing, Minister of Home Affairs in Nehru Government, and the man who is regarded as the moving spirit in that government. ... There are numerous facts which indicate that the all-powerful Minister for Home Affairs, whom many regard as India's

(24) Interview to Pravda's correspondent. Pravda, 29 October 1948.
future dictator, owes his career to the unfailing support of the firm of Birla Brothers, Ltd.

The Tata family is another of the pillars of the Indian National Congress. ... Dr. John Mathai, one of the directors of Tata Sons, Ltd., was before, during the war, a top administrator in the government of India; to-day Dr. Mathai is Minister of Transport and Railways in the Nehru Cabinet. (25)

Further, it was alleged that the Nehru government was deliberately following anti-Soviet policies. A Tass dispatch stated that the Bombay government had banned the exhibition of Soviet films, an example which was soon followed by other Indian states. The banning of the Soviet films, it was stated, "was guided by dishonest motives of not allowing the Indian public to know the life of the great Soviet people, how quickly and successfully they are solving their human problems." (26) Much was made of the alleged refusal of the Indian Government to issue visas for fifteen Russians connected with the anti-fascist organizations to participate in a conference organised by the All-India Students Federation. (27) Likewise, the banning by the Indian Government in May 1949 of the Conference of "Progressive Writers" (in which the delegates of the Soviet Writers Association were to participate) on the eve of its inauguration irked the Soviet Government. A Pravda news said that the "Banning of the conference of progressive writers and refusal to give permission to Soviet writers to come to India had aroused the just indignation among the progressive social

(26) Pravda, 26 July 1948, p. 10.
(27) Pravda, 9 September 1949, p. 4.
workers in India." (28) The government of India, according to a
Soviet weekly, allowed the "reactionary American publications" to
be sold on Indian railway stalls but not the Soviet magazines, the
sale of which, it was alleged, was previously allowed but now
banned for "political reasons". (29)

Not only this. The Indian Constitution was viewed as an
instrument for keeping power in the hands of the Indian bourgeoisie.
When the Indian Constituent Assembly was discussing its draft a
Pravda commentary said that the object of the Constitution was to
"strengthen the interests of bourgeoisie and capitalists". (30) It
was alleged that the Indian Constitution had embodied the
characteristics of all bourgeois constitutions - "the private
ownership of the land, forests, factories, mills and other means
of production; the exploitation of man by man and the existence of
exploiters and exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority and
luxury for the idle but secure minority, etc." (31)

During this period a very gloomy picture of Indian economy
was presented. The Indian economy was shown to be under the
dominance of Anglo-American monopolists who were fighting amongst
themselves for establishing their control over it. In an article
on "Americans in India", Pravda's special correspondent wrote:

India in these days is torn up in struggles between
American and British capitalists. American monopolists
are competing with British, who have long established

(28) Pravda, 28 May 1949, p. 4.
(30) Pravda, 2 December 1948, p. 4.
(31) New Times, no. 11, 1950, p. 3.
their hold and are unwilling to lose it. As is clear, India continues to be a part of the British empire, she is in the English sterling bloc and is in the imperial defense system. English financial capital controls industrial and banking concerns in India. Two-thirds of the foreign capital in India is British. The English admirals and marshalls are commanding the Indian army and airforce and Indian generals receive their training in the British defence academies. (32)

When the First Five Year Plan was launched a news item stated that "it was nothing more than the imperialistic plan of Mountbatten. This plan does not aim at industrialising India, nor does it want to free India in distant future from its dependency on imperialist states in agrarian matters." (33)

The Soviet attitude towards the Indian press, during these days, was equally hostile. It was said to be on the pay list of the Americans. An officer of the American Information Service in Calcutta was reported to have "contacted editors of Calcutta's papers, and with them he discussed such issues as propagating American foreign policy to Indian readers and organizing slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union and China." (34) A Tass dispatch claimed that a visiting US government delegation was "pouring dollars for planting agents in India" and that some newspapers had received money for conducting American propaganda. (35) The Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh were reported to have received some "tens of millions of Rupees" from the Americans. (36)

(32) Pravda, 29 March 1952, p. 3.
(33) Pravda, 21 June 1951, p. 4.
(34) Pravda, 4 February 1953, p. 4.
(35) Pravda, 8 January 1951, p. 4.
(36) Pravda, 8 January 1951, p. 4.
The picture presented of an average Indian was also very bleak. Komsomolskaya Pravda published a series of travel notes by a Soviet professor who had attended the Indian Science Congress in 1951. The notes were full of accounts of the author's encounter with half-naked, bare-footed women workers in mines, sick, helpless children doing laborious manual work and of students with dark and uncertain future. (37) Giving his account of the year 1950 in India, a Tass correspondent said that Indians saw only pessimism and despondency in future: "1950 is a year of confusion and uncertainty. ... After living through the old year and in greeting the new, the man in the street says helplessly: how long will this go on?" (38)

This attitude was more clearly expressed in the account of Soviet and Western aid of food grains to India. During 1951 India suffered acute shortage of food and there were famine conditions in some areas. But the Soviet press gave highly exaggerated accounts of "large-scale starvation deaths and food-riots". A Tass dispatch said:

In Kampur, Gauhatti, Pandy and other towns of Assam starvation is spreading. In Gauhatti starving people demonstrated shouting for bread and food. In a statement issued to the press the head of the Bihar government admitted that large-scale starvation deaths had occurred in Bihar. The statement said that out of the total 40 million people, more than 30 million were starving. (39)

This news about "starvation" was continuously pouring in the Soviet newspapers during the whole of 1951-52. Pravda's special correspondent visited Bihar and wrote a lengthy article on "Who

(37) Komsomolskaya Pravda, 30, 31 May and 1, 3 June 1951.
(38) Pravda, 1 January 1951.
(39) Pravda, 1 April 1951, p. 4.
is responsible for starvation in India"? In which he maintained that American imperialists and the Indian anti-people rulers were jointly responsible for the large-scale starvation deaths in India. (40) In another news item of 12 sentences the term "starving population" occurred 7 times. (41) The Pravda correspondent's dispatch on Bihar famine was broadcast on Moscow radio home service on 12 October 1951. It described Bihar as a land of sickening poverty. "Bihar to-day resembles a gigantic death camp where more than half of the population of 40,000,000 are doomed to slow death by starvation." (42) And if, under such circumstances, an Indian economist argued of over-population in India he was rebuked as an "Indian Malthusian". (43)

By a trade agreement concluded in late 1949 the Soviet Government supplied India about less than a quarter million tons of wheat in 1951-52. However, the Soviet wheat was delivered to India the news was published as "aid from Soviet trade unions to the starving population of Madras". Contrary to the unmotivated Soviet help, it was alleged, the American help was designed and even useless. A Pravda report said that 50 per cent of the American wheat supplied to India on credit was "rotten and useless" and the rest contained much of dust. (44) Not only that America was reportedly supplying useless wheat but was said to be charging

(40) Pravda, 15 October 1951, p. 4.
(41) Pravda, 13 September 1952, p. 3.
(43) New Times, no. 46, 1951, p. 17.
(44) Pravda, 13 September 1952, p. 4.
more prices too. An article claimed that the US wheat which was priced at 73.95 dollar a ton in the home market was sold to India at 105 dollar a ton. (45) A Tass dispatch maintained that the US aid of wheat to India was contingent upon the Indian supply of raw materials, strategically most valuable to the United States, such as manganese, chrome ore, beryllium, potassium cyanide, etc. (46)

Even though the Soviet leaders never keep out of view the policy of helping the spread of communist movement abroad through the instrumentality of national communist parties, this policy rarely finds expression in the Soviet press except when the official Soviet attitude is critical of the government concerned. When Stalin attacked the Nehru government on various accounts, the Soviet press criticized the non-communist parties of India and presented the Indian Communist Party as the only party championing the cause of the down-trodden. When, however, the official Soviet policy towards India changed under Khrushchev, as we will see later on, such references to the Indian scene were avoided. On the eve of the first general election in India in 1952, Pravda sent a special correspondent to cover the election news. His reports were full of criticism of the principal non-communist parties. When the election campaign was in progress, victory of the CPI and its leftist fronts was predicted. But when the results of the election belied this prediction, Soviet news reports began to speak about bribing of voters and falsification of election results. The Indian National Congress was presented as a bourgeois organisation;

(45) Pravda, 28 January 1953, p. 4.
the non-communist leftists were branded as opportunists; the Hindu communal parties were termed reactionary and fascist. A Pravda report presented this attitude clearly enough:

The Indian press confirms the fact that the Congress candidates were able to maintain the majority of votes by subversive, separatist tactics of the leaders of the Indian Socialist Party, financed by the Americans. ...

Making use of American and British experience of falsifying elections and giving bribes, threats, promise and deceit, the Congress Party members are obtaining the majority of votes. ...

The draft programme and election manifesto of the Indian Communist Party opened the eyes of millions of people in India. The common people of India are becoming more and more convinced that only under the leadership of the Communist Party can they achieve national and social liberation. (47)

Another report said that the ruling party, which was closely connected with the landlords and capitalists, had not made any efforts to carry out social reforms and to raise the Indian people's standard of living. This was offered as an explanation for the Congress reverses in Madras, Travancore Cochin, Orissa and Rajasthan "where it was opposed by the People's Democratic Front, headed by the Communists". (48)

Internal rivalries for leadership in the Indian National Congress were at times published in the press and broadcast on radio. Commenting upon Purushottam Das Tandon's resignation as Congress President, Moscow radio told its South-east Asian listeners that even if Tandon's resignation had ended the tussle for leadership temporarily, the causes were deep-rooted and they

(47) Pravda, 3 February 1952, p. 3.
(48) Pravda, 22 February 1952.
were to be sought in the Congress policy of suppression of the press and the people. (49)

During this period the Soviet press had much to say on the activities of the Indian Communist Party. The latter's statements of programme and election manifesto were carried in full in Pravda. On not less than three occasions Pravda devoted more than half of the total space to cover the news of the Indian Communist Party, a sort of indulgence which was never repeated after the death of Stalin.

INDIA: AN UNNOTICED POWER.

In such circumstances the question of recognizing India's non-aligned status, or her position in the newly emerging Afro-Asian world, rarely occurred to the leaders in the Kremlin. Apparently to some extent, after Russia's involvement in the Korean war members of the Soviet delegation in the United Nations did show some change in their official expressions concerning India. But this changed outlook was not permitted to touch India on issues not connected with the Korean war. Indeed, in the whole of Soviet writings during this period India was never presented before the Soviet readers as a non-aligned, neutral, power.

Soviet writings under Stalin almost never touched upon the issue of India's neutrality. It was only once a Soviet journal indulged in the exchange of polemics with an Indian Socialist

(49) Summary of World Broadcasts, no. 42, no. 248, p. 23.
leader, Dr. Lohia, who charged the journal either of misunderstanding his policies of "neutrality" and "Third camp" or of misrepresenting him deliberately. The journal wrote: "His programme for this 'Third camp' shows that the latter is in fact nothing other than the aggressive Pacific pact which the American imperialists have so long been trying to engineer and which the British labour leaders support." (50) On such a misrepresentation the Indian Socialist leader wrote a letter to the editor elucidating his policies and pleading for fair presentation of his position to the readers. Joining the renewed debate the journal wrote: "No matter how many times he may repeat his word 'third' it does not change the basic fact that under present-day conditions, the neutrality he prefers profits only the U.S. and British imperialists who fear the active participation of the masses in the fight for peace, democracy and freedom." (51)

Whenever the government of India opposed the Western powers on some issues and took similar position to that of the Soviet Union, the Soviet press took note of it occasionally. Nehru's refusal to go to San Francisco to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan was given good publicity in Pravda. But this occasional coverage of India was too meagre. Twice a week Pravda commented on events abroad. In the first three years after the end of world war Pravda never commented on any issue pertaining to India, during which period India gained her independence and lost the Father of the Nation. It was for the first time in early 1949 that Pravda's column of "International Review" covered an issue concerning India. This was about the

conference of some Afro-Asian countries, held in New Delhi in early 1949, to discuss the question of Indonesian freedom, an event well covered in the Soviet press. Commenting upon this conference, Pravda said:

In the Indian capital, Delhi, a conference of some Asian and Far Eastern countries was held to consider the Indonesian question. The tone of this conference was set by a group of British dominions - India, Australia, Pakistan - and worked with the support of such dependencies of England as Burma, Iraq, Yemen and others. Characteristically, no invitations were sent for this conference in Delhi to such Asian countries as the Indonesian Republic, which is fighting for its freedom. The republic of Vietnam was also not invited. ...

However, the resolutions, which were passed at the conference, did not bear any relations to the kind of deliberations made. As it is pointed out, these resolutions were passed in committees which were composed of British dominions. (52)

The lack of any particular interest in the newly emerging Afro-Asian world was evident from the fact that in his report on national and international policies to the XIX CPSU Congress, held in 1952, G.M. Malenkov, Party Secretary, made no special reference to it. The four-fold task of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy, he said, was to rally "anti-war democratic front for the purpose of strengthening peace"; continue to develop business relations with all countries; strengthen and develop inviolable friendly relations with the newly-formed socialist camp; and to strengthen the defence power of the Soviet Union. (53) From this it is clear that the newly emerging Afro-Asian countries were not still attracting Soviet attention.

(52) Pravda, 30 January 1949, p. 3.
However, in an incidental reference to India and some other Asian countries Malenkov said that the struggle to retain complete hold over the Afro-Asian countries was going on in the imperialist camp; and the internal resistance to national bourgeois governments in such countries was also on the increase. His report said:

As a result of prolonged imperialist oppression and of survivals of feudalism, the economy of the colonial and dependent countries, especially agriculture, is in a state of decline. Tens of millions of people in India, Indonesia, Iran, Africa, are living in a state of constant hunger and vast numbers of people have actually died of starvation. The rapacious exploitation of the colonial and dependent countries by the imperialist powers is retarding the development of the productive forces of these countries; the purchasing capacity of the population is extremely low, and the market for manufactured goods is striking. All this is a dead weight that is dragging down the economy of the capitalist system as a whole.

The peoples of the colonies and dependent countries are offering more and more determined resistance to the imperialist enslavers. Evidence of the growing scope of the national resistance movement is provided in the struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, and by the growth of national resistance in India, Iran, Egypt and in other countries. (54)

In view of the assumed Soviet hostility, coupled with indifferent attitude, there were rarely any occasions for cooperation between India and the Soviet Union during this period, excepting on problems concerning the Korean war. In contravention of the tacit understanding among the powers for the geographical distribution of the Security Council seats, the Soviet Ukraine candidate opposed the Indian candidate in 1947. "It was clear that Russia had become uncertain of India's attitude and was generally suspicious

(54) Ibid., p. 7.
of our approach to questions of vital interest to her," wrote Sardar K. M. Panikar, who had met the Ukrainian delegate in company with Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit during the second session of the UN General Assembly. (56) Even though there was some change in the official Soviet approach to India after the former's involvement in the Korean armistice negotiations, this hostile attitude generally persisted in the whole of Stalin's period - and it would be wrong to see, therefore, too much in Stalin's grant of interview to the retiring Indian Ambassador in April 1952, on the ground that he had not seen any foreign dignitary in the preceding two years, or to the new Ambassador in February 1953.

SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT IN TIBET
AS SEEN IN THE SOVIET EYES

The hostile posture which the Soviet adopted towards India under Stalin was to become further clear in Moscow's attitude to the Sino-Indian conflict over Tibet. Tibet was traditionally a sore point in Sino-Indian relations. Even though India admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, she also expressed her feelings that China should not disturb the special status of Tibet arising out of Sino-Indian treaties. But soon after they had established their rule over mainland China, The Chinese communists invaded Tibet with a view to bring it under their complete control. On 24 October 1950 China's liberation army marched into Tibet and occupied it soon afterwards. The Chinese move irritated the Indian public and the Government too expressed its concern over Communist China's attempt to grab Tibet. On 26 October, the Government of India sent a note to the Chinese Government expressing

its "surprise and regret" at their decision to invade Tibet. Surveying the international situation Pravda's columnist, Ya. Victorov, welcomed the liberation of Tibet, where the "activity of the Anglo-American imperialists ... was drastically intensified following the historic victory of the Chinese people." He also noted that Chinese Government had firmly told the Indian Government that, as Tibet was an integral part of China, she would not tolerate any interference in Tibet from India.(57)

Commenting upon the "Liberation of Tibet", a Soviet weekly welcomed China's action and charged that in collaboration with Anglo-American imperialists India was nursing some designs on Tibet. It wrote:-

.... new roads and aerodromes were being constructed in great haste in the parts of India adjacent to Tibet. Large quantities of American arms and war-materials were shipped via Calcutta to Darjeeling railway terminus on the Tibetan boundary, from which they were taken to Lhasa by road. Two years ago a chain of radio transmitters was set up along Tibet's eastern border. (58)

MAHATMA GANDHI IN SOVIET EYES

In a way all that appeared in Soviet writings had a sanction of national policies and, therefore, the author's verdict on events and personalities in other countries was the reflection of the official attitude held over them. This was evident in the Soviet writings on Mahatma Gandhi. Right from the days when the Communist International was handling the policies of the Communist Party of India, Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Congress Party were rarely looked upon with respect. In his famous speech before the students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, delivered in May 1925, Stalin had implicitly criticised Gandhi as a stooge in British hands. Since then the official approach towards Mahatma Gandhi and his work remained unchanged. The Enlarged Soviet Encyclopaedia introduced Gandhi as the "Indian Political activist, author of reactionary political doctrine - Gandhism." He was described as having helped British imperialism in the First World

(57) Pravda, 20 November 1950.
War and attacked Hitler's fascism in the Second World War. (59) A leading Indologist, E. Zukov, wrote about Gandhi and his work on the eve of India attaining its independence in the following words:

Gandhism is an ideal system for covering up a deal between the imperialists and the feudalists. ... To this day Gandhi played a negative, arresting role in the development of India and Indian social thought. The demonstrative democratism of Gandhi is seen in that he travels in third class, mixing in this way with the simple people. But Gandhi is deeply hostile to the people in that he is against progressive changes made by the people. (60)

Another Indologist, Dr. Dyakov, wrote about Gandhi in 1948:

The Gandhian tactics of the involvement of the masses in the struggle, its call for a refusal to use violence against the British oppressors gave the bourgeoisie the possibility of utilizing the movement of the masses to exert pressure on the English ruling classes without endangering their position in the country. Advocating non-violence in the struggle of the masses for liberation, Gandhi could not come forward against the oppression of the masses by the imperialists but rather justified the forcible suppression of the mass movement by the police, when the working people actively came forward against the imperialists. (61)

With such an attitude sanctioned by the regime, it was not surprising that Mahatma Gandhi died utterly unnoticed in the Soviet eyes. Pravda carried the news of his death in two sentences only. In a dispatch from London, the Tass news said: "As the news agency Reuter reports from Delhi, the well-known Indian political worker, Mahatma Gandhi, died here to-day by four point-blank shots, when he was addressing his prayer meeting. Gandhi was 78." On the same page


(61) Ibid., p. 105.
was the news about "The draft programme of the United Leftist Front in India". The space devoted to this news was about eighteen times more than to the news of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. (62).

When the news of Gandhi's death reached the Security Council, the Council held a special meeting to pay tributes to the departed Indian leader. Practically every delegate spoke very highly of Mahatma Gandhi. But the Soviet delegate made a very brief speech making, as if, formal references to his role in Indian freedom struggle. (63).

INDIA IN THE SOVIET POLICIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

An analysis of the factors which determined the Soviet Union's attitude to India's place and role in the United Nations has an important bearing on this study. If we shift our attention from examining how India figured in Soviet writings of this period to see how India fared in the moves that were made by the Soviet Union in

(62) Pravda, 31 January 1948, p. 3.
(63) The Soviet delegate said:

On behalf of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, I should like, on the occasion of the tragic death of a great Indian, Mr. Gandhi, to express our deepest sympathy with the Indian delegation, the Government of India and the whole Indian people.

As one of the most outstanding political leaders of India, Gandhi has undoubtedly left a deep imprint on the history of India and the Indian people. The name of Gandhi will always be associated with the struggle for national liberation which the Indian people have waged over so long a time.

the United Nations, the picture appears somewhat different. The simple hostility of the Soviet rulers to treat India as an Anglo-American colony is nowhere found here. It is interesting to note, however, that right up to the days when the Security Council had seized of the Korean question, in which the Soviet Union was directly involved and for the solution of which Indian assistance was clearly seen, India was a neglected country in the eyes of the Soviet delegates at the United Nations.

The Soviet recognition of neutral India was impelled by its own involvement in cold war politics. When such politics was still under shape, its delegates at the United Nations showed lack of direction in Asian affairs. When India brought the question of Dutch killings in Indonesia and pleaded for its immediate stoppage, the Polish delegate, at one stage, proposed that the Netherlands should withdraw all its forces and civilian administration from Indonesia, failing which the Council should take some enforcement measures against it. This was exactly the type of action which India and Indonesia had desired the Council to take. But instead of supporting such a measure, the Soviet delegate introduced an alternate resolution, which considered it "necessary that the troops of both the sides, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, should be immediately withdrawn to the positions which they occupied before the beginning of military operations." (64) Apparently, the Soviet delegate was playing a neutral role on occasions in Asian matters in 1947.

(64) SCOR, yr 2, met 217, no. 102, p. 2698.
Even on occasions when the Soviet delegate was responsive to Asian sentiments, he rarely recognised the role of emerging India. During 1949 in the debates on Indonesia the Soviet delegate attacked the Western powers on numerous occasions, but he rarely took note of the Indian role in representing the Indonesian question in the United Nations. Indeed, even in the days when the Soviet Union had adopted an anti-Western posture and non-aligned India was steadily assuming some position in the eyes of newly-emerging Asian countries, the Soviet delegate paid no attention to India's emerging position in the newly freed Afro-Asian countries. One of such beginnings of the Asian or Indian impact on the Soviet policy at the United Nations was towards the middle of 1949 when the Soviet delegate attacked the Anglo-American bloc for its colonial policy. Speaking on the Indonesian question, Jacob Malik took note of the Asian conference held in New Delhi towards the end of 1948 in which nineteen Asian countries participated and had supported the Indonesian struggle for freedom. While attacking the West for its colonial policies, the Soviet delegate presented the newly-emerging Asia, if not as a Soviet ally, at least, as an anti-Western force. Even in such a speech, however, India figured less. (65)

(65) The Soviet delegate, Malik, said in the course of his speech:

It has thus become quite evident that a number of countries belonging to the so-called Anglo-American bloc have openly aided with the aggressor and have rejected even the modest and restrained proposals contained in the resolutions of the Asian countries. This is a striking example of the attitude of the West to the East and to the extent to which the government of Western Europe and the United States of America heed the voice of the countries of Asia.

SCOR, yr. 4, mtg. 406, no. 9, p. 4.
SOVIET POLICY: ON KASHMIR

When the Pak-aided tribal forces attacked Kashmir, the Soviet press generally gave an objective account. A Tass correspondent, who visited the Kashmir front in those days, wrote that Pakistan-backed tribes had committed an act of aggression in Kashmir, that the area in which these preparations of attack were made was under the rule of a British governor, whose government wanted it for its military bases against the Soviet Union and China. In an article on "The war in Kashmir" he wrote:

At that time the preparation for intervention were already in full swing. In the areas along the Afghan border, British agents, holding out promises of easy plunder, incited the war-like Pathans (Mountain tribes of Afghan origin) to march on Kashmir as "saviors of Islam".

On October 22 the invasion began. Some 2000 warriors of various tribes - Afridis, Masuds, Mohmads, etc. - equipped in Pakistan with modern weapons, trucks and patrol, crossed and sacked the town of Baramula. On October 26 they appeared at the approach to Shrinagar. (66)

A Pravda news said that the "Muslim Army" which attacked Kashmir, was planned by a British General by name Noel Baker. (67)

Even though the account of the Kashmir war in the Soviet press was objective, the policy which the Soviet government followed in those days was non-committal. A survey of speeches made by the Soviet delegates on the Kashmir issue reveals that, right up to early 1952, when the Security Council discussed the Graham report, the Soviet delegate very rarely participated in the debate and even on occasions when he spoke he dealt either with some procedural

(67) Pravda, 3 November 1948, p. 4.
matters or referred to some aspects of a resolution under consideration. With his country's involvement in the Korean war, and with the news of the construction of Anglo-American bases in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the Soviet delegate at the United Nations came with hardened attitude towards the Anglo-American powers. What was reflected in his speeches on Kashmir in the succeeding period was more of a nature of attack on the West than support to either of the parties, India or Pakistan, which were directly involved in the Kashmir dispute.

The Soviet delegate's first speech on Kashmir was very brief; he simply dealt with the merits of a Belgian resolution which was being discussed in a Council meeting. (68) Being indifferent to the issue, his participation in Kashmir discussion was on occasions pointless. The Kashmir question was taken in the United Nations by India under the heading "the situation in Jammu and Kashmir". Within some weeks after its entry on the Council agenda, the machination of the UN Secretariat, probably under the influence of some Western Big Powers, changed the agenda from "the situation in Jammu and Kashmir" to "India-Pakistan question", to which the Indian delegate raised a strong objection. The Soviet delegate, at first, supported the Indian position, but later on, when it came to voting, he raised no voice against it. (69) Throughout 1948 Kashmir dominated the proceedings of the Security Council, occupying more than six months of its business. During this period the Soviet delegate never spoke on the issues involved in the dispute; he never made a lengthy speech and took no sides. His behaviour was one of an uninterested observer who had nothing to say on the question under discussion.

(68) SCOR, yr 3, mtg 230, pp. 139-40.
(69) SCOR, yr 3, mtg 231, pp. 150 and 164.
When the Security Council again took up the question for discussion in February 1951, Sir Owen Dixon had submitted his report on Kashmir. During this important period, Dixon's report was considered and Frank Graham was appointed to mediate further in the dispute. In more than two months' time, when the Council discussed the issue, the Soviet delegate spoke only on two or three occasions, each time about half-a-dozen sentences. To judge from his speech the only point that interested him much was why the United Nations appointed every time a representative from the United States as the UN representative for Kashmir. (70) When Graham submitted his first report, the Security Council considered it in November 1951. A joint resolution moved by the United States and the UK was passed maintaining that the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir constituent Assembly would not "constitute a disposition of the State", which would be done by a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the UN supervision. The Indian delegate criticised it in no uncertain terms but to the Soviet delegate the whole discussion was without much interest and he did not participate in it even once. As usual he abstained from voting on it. (71)

The long-held silence was broken for the first time by the Soviet delegate when the Security Council considered the second Graham Report on Kashmir. On this occasion Jacob Malik made his delegation's first major speech on Kashmir since the Council took up the matter. His speech was typical of his country's attitude to world politics. He devoted his entire speech for

(70) See his speech in the 543rd meeting. SCOR, yr. 6.
(71) SCOR, yr. 6, mtg 566.
attacking the Anglo-American bloc for its interference in Kashmir and stated that the solution of Kashmir was proving difficult owing to such external interferences. Of the total 24 paragraphs of his speech, in 23 he dealt with the American and British designs on Kashmir. He said:

What is the reason why the Kashmir question is still unsettled and why the plans put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom in connection with Kashmir have proved fruitless from the point of view of a settlement of the Kashmir question? It is not difficult to see that the explanation of this is chiefly, and above all, that these plans in connection with Kashmir are of an annexationist, imperialist nature, because they are not based on an effort to achieve a real settlement of the Kashmir question. They pursue different aims, different - directly contrary - objectives. The purpose of these plans is interference by the United States and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering it 'assistance through the United Nations'. Finally, the purpose of these plans in connection with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base. (72)

When the Security Council met again to consider the Fourth Graham Report on Kashmir in December 1952, the Soviet delegate, Valarin Zorin, practically repeated both the tone and contents of his predecessor's earlier speech, though this time in brief. Of the total 14 paragraphs of his speech in 12 paragraphs he attacked Anglo-American interference in Kashmir. (73)

(72) Quoted from pp. 13-14. For his whole speech, see, SCOR, yr 7, mtg 570, pp. 13-18.
(73) SCOR, yr 7, mtg 610.
By the end of 1951 the Soviet press was carrying some reports about Pakistan joining the Western military alliance and of the surveys of Anglo-American teams for the establishment of military bases against the Soviet Union in the Pak-held Kashmir. Apparently, this development caused a great amount of consternation to the Soviet policy-makers. What is important in this context, however, is not whether there was any substance in the Soviet criticism of Anglo-American policies, but that by their lack of interest and negative attitude the Soviet diplomats were not in a position to do anything to avert the development. If the policy of appointing the UN commissions to prepare some reports was motivated to consume time for using Kashmir for strategic purposes, the simple exposition of this policy was not a measure to thwart its ends. It would have required the use of Soviet veto to resolutions which brought these commissions into existence and co-operation with a side in the dispute which could have helped the Soviet Union to defeat such an unwanted course.

Indeed, from as early as January 1948 Pravda was carrying reports of Anglo-American strategic interests in Kashmir. Right from the date of armed attack on Kashmir the Soviet press was continuously writing about it. The same Tass correspondent who visited forward areas in Kashmir wrote:

The underlying cause of the war in Kashmir lay in this state's geographical location at the juncture of several state borders - including, in particular, the Soviet border. Anglo-American imperialist strategists aimed to convert Kashmir into a link in the chain of military bases with which they are doing their best to surround the Soviet Union. They were particularly interested in the northern districts - Gilgit, Chitral, and a number of other small feudal principalities. (74)

A Tass despatch from Delhi in early 1948 said that Pakistan had entered into a secret pact with England, according to which she had agreed to permit Anglo-American war bases in her territory and that England had agreed to supply some weapons to her. (75) Another despatch spoke of Anglo-American policy "to merge Kashmir kingdom with Pakistan". (76) At a subsequent date Pravda carried a news item about "U.S. plans to build air-bases in Gilgit" (77). A commentary in New Times claimed that an American military mission had arrived in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to survey and chart the Gilgit area for which Pakistan government was giving every assistance. "The United States and Pakistan recently signed a secret agreement, under which the latter undertook to place military bases at the Pentagon's disposal both in Pakistan itself and in 'free Kashmir'. This is a fact truly worthy of public attention." (78)

It is against this background that one has to examine the Soviet policy on Kashmir, an area involving Soviet national interests and countries towards which Stalin had developed hostile attitude and indifferent policies. Looking at the expression of Soviet Kashmir policy in the United Nations one feels that it is this lack of interest and assumption of simple hostility that shaped Stalin's policy in early days.

In the days when Pakistan's involvement in the Western military pacts was not still finally declared, Russia's Kashmir policy was

(75) Pravda, 6 January 1948, p. 4.
(76) Pravda, 26 February 1948, p. 4.
(77) Pravda, 12 April 1951, p. 4.
one of neutrality in Indo-Pakistan dispute. On no occasion the Soviet government took sides on Kashmir and practically on every occasion, whenever the Council passed a resolution, its delegation abstained from voting on it.

INDIA IN SOVIET POLICIES DURING THE KOREAN WAR

The rigidity of Soviet policy towards India remained so long the latter remained on the periphery of Soviet national interests. With the Korean war, however, the situation changed and neutral India was steadily assuming a role which was both noticeable and effective. The Indian initiative for peaceful solution of the Korean war and her assistance to the Powers involved in it brought her a status and an influential position in the eyes of those powers. To the extent to which the cold war atmosphere and the Communist outlook permitted Stalin and his assistants, they sought to profit from the new circumstances. Such flexibility, however, was in evidence only in areas, and with respect to the matters, which directly involved Soviet national interests. Thus even if India gained some consideration and status in Soviet policies during the Korean war, such treatment was offered to her only with respect to the Korean question. In other matters, such as Kashmir, for example, the old mentality continued to prevail in Soviet policies and no change was in evidence as long as Stalin was alive.

Even though India voted for the Security Council's first two resolutions on Korea, one recording that the North Korean forces had committed an act of aggression against the Republic of Korea and the other asking the member states to assist in repelling this
aggression, she did not supply her troops to fight against the Communists in the Korean war. With such an entrance with difference into the Korean question, India might not have presented herself as a Western stooge to Stalin.

Within three weeks from the start of the Korean war, apparently on the advice of Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Nehru sent a personal message to Marshal Stalin on 13 July stating that the aim of India is to localise the conflict and assist for speedy, peaceful settlement through the elimination of the present impasse in the Security Council, so that the representative of the People's Government of China could take a place in the Council, the U.S.S.R. could return to it, and, within the framework of the Council, or outside the Council through unofficial contact, the U.S.S.R., the United States and China, with the assistance and co-operation of other peaceable states, could find a basis for the cessation of the conflict and for the final solution of the Korean problem. (79)

The Soviet reception to Nehru's initiative was quite impressive. Not only was it prominently carried in all the newspapers but, in its characteristic way - which indicated the amount of importance attached to it - Pravda carried the reaction of world press to Nehru-Stalin correspondence, which continued for six days each day devoting quite a large space to it. In a leading article an "Observer" maintained that the Anglo-American press, which supported the Western war against the Korean people, attacked Stalin's positive response to Nehru's peace proposal. (80)

Noticing that such an Indian initiative could subserve Soviet interests, Stalin replied to it quickly and in a manner which

(80) Pravda, 23 July 1950, p. 4.
the Indian Prime Minister felt helpful. Stalin wrote:

I welcome your peaceable initiative. I fully share your point of view as regards the expediency of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council with the obligatory participation of the representative of the five Great Powers, including the People's Government of China. I believe that for a speedy settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient to hear in the Security Council representatives of the Korean people. (81)

Thus in his reply not only Stalin welcomed Nehru's initiative to seat Communist China in the United Nations and to bring back the Soviet representative to the Security Council but also tried to have Nehru's support to get the representative of North Korea in the discussion on Korean war in the Security Council. Finding Nehru's proposals helpful to Soviet interests and against the known American policies in this respect, the American Secretary of State, Acheson, to whom too Nehru had addressed his peace proposal, did not encourage the latter in his peace moves. In his second communication sent on the same day on which he received Stalin's letter, Nehru thanked Marshal Stalin for his "prompt and energetic" reply, and informed him that he was immediately contacting the other governments for this purpose. (82)

To follow a neutral policy in the midst of war, and to try to mediate in the dispute at the same time, is a delicate task. Quite often the country displeases both the parties to some extent and, unless circumstances warrant its assistance, its role as mediator suffers from limitations. The Soviet delegate was insisting from the beginning that the representative of the North

(81) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n. 79, p. 10847.
(82) Ibid.
Korean Government too be invited by the Council to participate in its deliberations on Korea, as the South Korean delegate was already invited. But Sir Benegal Rau of India opposed it on the legal ground that there was no 'dispute' between the North and South Korean Governments and the UN was engaged in solving not a "dispute" between the two, but in a "campaign" against the North Korean Government. In view of this, Sir Rau had added: "the question of hearing the representative of the North Korean authorities cannot arise until the campaign is over." In an evidently angry tone the Soviet delegate replied to one "who calls himself a jurist" and still "tries to defend injustice and lawlessness on legal grounds". It is significant to note that even in such an angry reply, the Soviet delegate did not name India for attack, a sort of concession which he was not seen giving others in similar situations. (83) Such a changed attitude was revealed on some other occasions too. For instance during the debate on Korean affairs Chou En-lai accused the United States for violating China's airspace in Manchuria and bombing some of its villages. Both the Soviet Union and the United States brought this matter before the Council; the Soviet resolution condemned such illegal bombing by the US and the American resolution proposed to appoint a commission of the representatives of India and Sweden to investigate into the Chinese charges. India supported the US position. In the course of his speech the Soviet delegate remarked that the US was interested in intelligence activities against China and such a commission might serve the US interests in this respect. The Indian delegate protested against such insinuations. Explaining his position later, the Soviet delegate said that his charges did not apply to

(83) SCOR, yr 5, mtg 494, no. 36, pp. 16-19.
India. (84) Soviet delegates had rarely heeded Indian protests on matters affecting Soviet interests on previous occasions. It was, therefore, evidence of a new consideration shown to India.

Indian assistance in the Korean war was taken by both the sides not so much to stop fighting as to solve the intricate problem of exchange of prisoners of war. At all stages of the Korean war India struggled for a ceasefire, but the actual ceasefire took place only when both sides were convinced of a stalemate and war was proving expensive in terms of men and material. At a time when victory was within the sight of one party, it did not heed Indian efforts for ceasefire. When the UN forces were on the way to victory, the General Assembly passed a resolution implicitly authorising them to cross the 38th Parallel. India opposed such a move. (85). The Chinese entered the Korean war in November 1950 and soon recaptured the lost North Korean as well some south Korean territory. When the Western forces were on retreat the General Assembly passed a resolution setting up a committee consisting of India, Canada and Iran to determine the basis of ceasefire in Korea (86). But Chou En-lai rejected the Committee's proposals of ceasefire first and negotiations afterwards and proposed for a seven nation conference to solve Far Eastern problems. It was only when an actual stalemate

(84) SCOR, yr 5, mtg. 501, no. 43, pp. 24-25.
(86) Ibid., pp. 310-11.
took place in the middle of 1952, that both sides showed their genuine concern for armistice negotiations and Indian efforts for ceasefire had now a chance of success.

The major hurdle in such a negotiation was the question of the exchange of prisoners of war. Americans insisted that only such prisoners who expressed their willingness to go to North Korea or Communist China should be handed over. China insisted on exchange of all prisoners, maintaining that the use of force was certain in all cases where prisoners would express their desire not to return to the country of their origin. At this stage of stalemate, V. K. Krishna Menon introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 19 November 1952, establishing a repatriation commission of four powers who would arrange exchange of POWs on the basis of Geneva Conventions in this respect in a given period. The Indian resolution aroused wide interest in the UN General Assembly; it was debated for more than 12 days and practically every delegate commended it, excepting those from the communist countries. It was adopted by 53 to 5, with one abstention. The Soviet Union opposed it for reasons which it is still difficult to understand. Apparently such a proposal at this stage should have proved welcome to the Chinese as they were losing heavily in an endless war. India's former ambassador to the Soviet Union, K.P.S. Menon, sensed some Soviet pressure on China. According to him Russia opposed the resolution

Ostensibly on the ground that the resolution ran counter to the Geneva Convention; but in reality the reasons lied deeper. At present Russia has far less to gain by a settlement in Korea than has the U.S.A. In men, money and prestige the U.S.A. has been losing heavily; Russia, nothing. (87)

The Soviet opposition to the Indian move was so strange, and yet so strong, that Vyshinsky felt injured at the Indian efforts to voice Asian (and particularly Chinese) feelings in the world body and retorted against it in a language which the Soviet diplomats use to criticise a country without naming it, a sort of recognition of that country's special position in the Soviet mind:

The Soviet Union stood squarely on the position to which it was committed because it listened to the voice of the peoples; particularly of the great Chinese people and of the gallant Korean people. It questioned and indeed denied the right of any side to arrogate unto itself the role of spokesman for all the Asians. Life in the future would show who was the defender of interest of all the Asian peoples. (88)

After the armistice agreement was concluded, the General Assembly discussed the question of the composition and task of the proposed Political Conference, visualised by Para 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement. On the pretext of opposition by South Korea, the United States opposed Indian participation in such a Conference. Some Western powers, notably Britain, Australia and Canada, proposed that by virtue of her playing an important role in the Korean peace India should be invited to such a conference. The United States wanted the membership of such a conference limited to countries which supplied their troops in Korean war. On this account both India and the Soviet Union would have been eliminated from such a conference. The Soviet Union tabled a resolution restricting the membership of such a conference to a few countries, including herself.

and India. Speaking on the occasion Vyshinsky said: "From the political and practical point of view there should be included not only the Soviet Union but also such states as India, which had made a considerable contribution to the cessation of hostilities. ..." (89) The General Assembly passed both the 15 power resolution, eliminating Soviet and Indian participation in such a conference, and the 4 power resolution inviting India to participate in it. The Soviet resolution, however, was defeated. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union voted against a resolution restricting the membership of the proposed conference to combating powers, but voted for a resolution bringing India in it. (90)

The survey of Soviet policies concerning India during the Korean war does show a change in the Soviet approach to India. India was now no more an unnoticed power, as she was previously. The fact that Indian influence on Soviet policies was limited to the field where Soviet stakes were involved and Indian assistance in the situation was visible, such as in Korea, was an indication of both the Soviet view of world problems as well as of limitations of India's power-position. In this connection it is important to note that in spite of India's role in the Korean war, and a resulting elevation of her status in Soviet eyes, Soviet policies on Kashmir remained unchanged till the death of Marshal Stalin.

**CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA: MEETING POINTS**

In a situation where the Russian and the Western powers were

(89) *GAOR*, session 7, 1st Cttee, mtg 623, p. 751.
(90) *GAOR*, session 7, 1st Cttee, mtg 625.
clashing with each other on different issues, and communist China was increasingly figuring on the scene, the fact that India and the Soviet Union had similar policies towards the question of seating Communist China in the United Nations provided a common ground for the delegates of both countries to meet together. In September 1950 the Indian delegate tabled a resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly maintaining that the Central Government of the People's Republic of China was "the only government functioning in the Republic of China" and hence it should be allowed to represent China in the General Assembly. Speaking next to him, Vyshinsky acknowledged the Indian delegate's interest in the issue and warmly supported him. (91) After a month's boycott in July 1950, the Soviet delegate returned to the Security Council in August to preside over its meeting. Soon after his assumption of presidential chair, he gave a ruling that "the representative of the Kuomintang group seated in the Security Council does not represent China and cannot, therefore, take part in the meetings of the Security Council." The ruling was challenged by many delegates, including that of the United States and the UK. India, however, supported it. (92) In debates on the Korean war, on numerous occasions the question of inviting the representative of the People's Republic of China was raised, and India, which had opposed inviting the representative of North Korea in the same debate, supported it. (93)

(91) Please see his speeches in the 277th and the 279th Meetings. GACR, session 5, plen. mtgs.
(92) SCOR, yr 5, mtg 480, no. 22, p. 5.
(93) SCOR, yr 5, mtg 506, no. 48.
Indeed, as between the Soviet Union and Communist China, India occasionally showed greater consideration for the latter. When the Russian delegate tabled a resolution condemning the United States for its alleged bombing of China, India opposed it on the ground that it would be improper to accept the truth of the allegation without investigating it. But when such a resolution was discussed in the presence of Communist China's delegate in the Security Council, India's attitude was slightly different. A resolution was tabled by the Soviet delegate condemning "the said acts of the government of the United States of America as an act of aggression and as an act of intervention in the internal affairs of China." On this occasion India did not participate in the voting. (94)

It was not only that the Indian and the Soviet policies had a common objective on the question of Communist China's representation in the United Nations, but that there was still a wider field wherein they supported each other. Racial discrimination in Africa proved to be one of such areas of mutual support. Quite often India brought the question of discriminatory treatment to Indians in South Africa, and on all occasions, she had the warm support from the Soviet delegates. India raised this question as early as September 1946 in the UN General Assembly. The delegates of the United States and Britain opposed the Indian resolution on the chosen legal ground that it was an internal matter of South Africa and the UN had no competence to discuss it. When the Indian delegate

(94) SCOR, yr 5, mtg 530, no. 73.
introduced a resolution expressing General Assembly's "regret" over the failure to implement its earlier resolutions by the South African Government, the delegates of the United States and the United Kingdom opposed it. (95) The Soviet delegate, however, supported the Indian proposal in toto and opposed the view that the question be settled through bilateral negotiations between the parties concerned, as no such negotiation, in his view, was likely to be successful. (96) The Indian delegate brought, on another occasion, a resolution saying that the international trust territories be administered with a view to speedily securing "self-government or independence under the collective guidance or supervision of the United Nations"; the Soviet Union supported it, whereas the US and the UK delegates opposed it. (97)

This survey of Soviet policies towards India under Stalin shows that on the whole the policies were influenced by two factors. In the initial stage, when India was an ineffective power to Soviet national interests, she was treated as an Anglo-American colony. During this period India was rarely noticed by the Soviet representatives in the United Nations. By 1950, the Cominform's policy of overthrowing the nationalist governments in the newly-independent countries had failed, and the national communist parties suffered heavily, both at the hands of public and the government. During this period, the Soviet authorities were testing their toughness in Europe too, by engaging in the Berlin blockade, which lasted

(95) GAOR, session 2, 1st Cttee. See Proceedings of 110th and 112th Meetings, pp. 460-2 and 479-82.

(96) Ibid.

(97) GAOR, 1947, 4th Cttee, mtg 44, p. 92.
for nearly two years. Right through 1947 to the end of 1949, the Soviet Union was pre-occupied with the Marshall Plan, NATO, Berlin Blockade, Yugoslavia, and the communization of East Europe. Thus, principally engaged in Europe, Asia was a neglected land in the Soviet eyes during this period. The Soviet policy of treating newly-independent countries like India as Anglo-American colonies, had its base both in its European pre-occupation and in the supposition that such unwanted, exploiting bourgeois nationalist governments would be overthrown by the popular communist parties in the countries concerned. Contrary to its calculations, however, the nationalist governments survived. With the Korean war the theatre of hostility shifted from Europe to Asia and such Asian countries as India, which could influence the course of events due to their neutral policies and geopolitical position, came into the considerations of Soviet policy. With the Korean war India began to engage Soviet attention; even on occasions when the Soviet delegates criticised India and opposed its moves in the United Nations, they felt like explaining the differences, a sort of feeling which was never shown towards India before the advent of the Korean war. As has been observed previously, the Korean war did not bring an over-all change in Soviet policies towards India because of its ideological tone under Stalin and the limitations of India's power position. Stalin could not forget that India was a non-communist country, that Anglo-American bloc had considerable hold over Indian economy (and consequently over her policies), and, therefore, she needed to be freed from the control of such imperialists. It is this communist view in the cold war circumstances and the limited Indian capacity to influence the course of international politics, that kept Stalin's overall
policies towards India unchanged.

Vyshinsky's oft-quoted remark on India in a General Assembly debate on Korea was indicative of the mood of Soviet policy towards India during the last days of Stalin: "At best you (Indians) are dreamers and idealists; at worst, you don't understand your own position and camouflage horrible American policy." This showed that India was increasingly figuring in the calculations of Soviet policy-makers, but was yet to be treated as a friendly power.