Chapter Three

THE KASHMIR PROBLEM - II
After the breakdown of the talks between Bhutto and Swaran Singh, the attitudes of India and Pakistan towards each other hardened further. In the meantime a hair of the Prophet preserved in a shrine in Srinagar and venerated by all Muslims was reported stolen and this created great unrest. Pakistan raised the question of Kashmir once again in the Security Council and a tense situation was created between the two countries. The release of Sheikh Abdullah in April 1964 and the subsequent developments, however, somewhat eased the situation, reviving the hope that a settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir would be arrived at. But the sudden death of Nehru in May 1964 thwarted the efforts that were made at that time in this direction. The President of Pakistan and the new Indian Prime Minister made renewed efforts to create a better understanding. But before they could settle down to talk business, they found that the gulf in their approaches were too wide to be bridged. Towards the end of 1964, their attitudes hardened once again. There began a sharp and abrupt deterioration in the relations between the two countries leading to large-scale infiltration of armed personnel from across the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line into Kashmir on 5 August 1965.

**AFTERMATH OF THE TALKS BETWEEN BHUTTO AND SWARAN SINGH**

Following the breakdown in May 1963 of the Indo-Pakistani ministerial talks on Kashmir, Britain and the USA once again
suggested mediation. India's initial response was favourable, (1) but Pakistan was indifferent (2) and said that it wanted certain conditions to be fulfilled before it could agree to mediation. (3) Finally, when Pakistan agreed to mediation, it did so, on 10 August 1963, on the following conditions: (a) India must give a categorical commitment that it would abide by the verdict of the mediator; (b) India must reaffirm its willingness for the settlement of Kashmir on the basis of self-determination; (c) the mediator must be given a specific time-limit to make his recommendations to India and Pakistan; and (d) only the Kashmir dispute should be referred to the mediator. (4) On 13 August, Nehru expressed, in the Lok Sabha, his disappointment with the Pakistani response and said that "concessions which we offered to Pakistan are no longer open, and they must be treated as withdrawn. We do not wish our generosity and sincere desire for friendly relations with our neighbour to be treated by its Government as a jumping off ground for further claims". (5) In Pakistan, this particular statement by Nehru was considered to have damaged heavily any prospect of future mediation on Kashmir. (6)

(1) See the remark of India's Minister for Railways, Swaran Singh in a Press conference on 16 May 1963, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 17 May 1963. Also see Nehru's statement of 13 August 1963 stating India's acceptance of the Western proposal of good offices, India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 19, 13 August 1963, col. 163.


(3) Times of India, 25 May 1963; also see Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on 13 August 1963, Lok Sabha Debates, n. 1, col. 163.

(4) Dawn (Karachi), 11 August 1963; also see The Times (London), 12 August 1963.


(6) Pakistan Times (Lahore), 14 August 1963.
In fact, all moves for a mediation thereafter came to naught.

Pakistan's vilification of India also increased after the failure of the Kashmir talks. In his speeches before the National Assembly of Pakistan on 17 and 24 July 1963, besides other things, Bhutto accused India of committing "aggression five times" during the fifteen years of Independence, three of which were against Pakistan itself, (7) criticized India for using Kashmiris and their land for war against China, (8) and called India "a suspect nation" in the Asian-African world. (9) He also gave a number of reasons for Pakistan's refusal to accept India's offer of a no-war declaration (10) and said that "Pakistan will never accept —

(7) See Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 2, 17 July 1963, p. 1663; vol. 2, 24 July 1963, p. 2056; the five aggressions as explained on 24 July were three against Pakistan — in Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir — and the two others were one against Portugal in Goa and another against China on the Himalayan frontier.


(9) Ibid., 24 July 1963, p. 2054.

(10) Bhutto's arguments against Pakistan's refusal to accept India's no-war offer were the following: (1) It would mean that Pakistan had no conflict and there was no cause for the armies of India and Pakistan to face each other and that Pakistan must accept the cease-fire line. (2) History showed that only countries like Nazi Germany made no-war pacts. Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union soon after such a pact was entered into. (3) It would mean that there is an estoppel on the settlement of the Kashmir problem and India would claim after such an agreement that "now that a No-War Pact exists, Pakistan has accepted the cease-fire line". (4) Both India and Pakistan were Members of the United Nations and the United Nations enjoined on all Member states to settle their problems by peaceful procedure. See National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 2, 24 July 1963, pp. 2054-5. Similar arguments were repeated by Bhutto in general debate of the UN General Assembly in September 1963. See General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), session 18, plen. mtg 1221, 30 September 1963, pp. 20-27.
now, tomorrow, or a hundred years from now". (11) More significantly, Bhutto gave a broad hint of a Sino-Pakistani entente against India. Two passages of his speeches in the National Assembly made respectively on 17 and 24 July 1963 are worth quoting here. On 17 July Bhutto declared: "If there was to be a clash, if India in her frustration turned her guns against Pakistan, ... Pakistan would not be alone in that conflict. ... An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia." (12) On 24 July Bhutto said more clearly: "... we have an assurance from our friends ... that in the event of aggression they would come to our assistance. We have an assurance also from other countries that if India commits aggression against us, it will not be against us but against them also." (13) Here the words "also from other countries" are significant because they clearly imply an assurance from countries other than Pakistan's traditional friends, the members of the Western defence alliance. In the context of the passage quoted from his statement of 17 July 1963, it was clear that Bhutto had, among other countries, Communist China in mind.

Pakistan's admiration for and collaboration with China was further demonstrated when, on 30 September 1963, going out of his way, Bhutto attacked India in the general debate in the UN General Assembly and said that India's notion of the Chinese aggression against it was "illusory". (14) On 11 October he asked: "Is the


McMahon line a legal line?" (15)

In the meantime Pakistan signed an air agreement with Communist China on 29 August. (16) About a month later, on 30 September 1963, a barter trade agreement was signed between the two countries. (17) Pakistan also reached an agreement with China on 5 September regarding ground survey, aerial photography, and erection of boundary markers along that part of Kashmir's boundary with China which was under Pakistan's possession. (18) India immediately protested to both Pakistan and China against the agreement of 5 September and sent copies of these protest notes on 7 October 1963 to the President of the UN Security Council. (19)

During this period Pakistan also complained against the announcement made on 3 October 1963 by the Kashmir Premier, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, that the Sadar-i-Riyasat and the Premier of the State would soon be redesignated Governor and Chief Minister respectively and that a legislation to this effect would be introduced in the State legislature in its next session in February 1964. (20) Complaining against this announcement, in its letter to

(15) Ibid., plen. mtg 1239, 11 October 1963, p. 20.
(17) Ibid., 1 October 1963.
(18) Ibid., 6 September 1963.
(19) See copies of India's protest notes of 30 September to China and of 5 October to Pakistan and the communication to the President of the Security Council on 7 October 1963 in Security Council Official Records (SCOR), yr 18, supplement for October, November, and December 1963, Doc. 3/5435 and 3/5435, Annex I and II, pp. 3-5; the text of Indian note to China is also given in Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China, White Paper 10 (Delhi, 1964), pp. 7-8.
(20) See Bakshi's announcement in Times of India, 4 October 1963.
the President of the Security Council dated 9 October 1963, Pakistan said that this was in "contravention of the fundamental principles" of the resolutions of the UNCIP and of the Council. (21) The Government of India, in its reply of 12 November 1963 addressed to the President of the Council, justified the steps of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, cited the rejection of a similar complaint of Pakistan by the UNCIP in 1949, and said that Pakistan had no locus standi in Kashmir. (22) Pakistan replied to it on 3 January 1964, in which it refuted the Indian contentions and warned that "unless the Government of India is persuaded to desist from violating its commitments with regard to Kashmir, the tension between India and Pakistan will increase and might become uncontrollable". (23)

Although during the ministerial talks on Kashmir in the early months of 1963, reports of cease-fire violations were fewer than those during 1961 and 1962, (24) after the breakdown of the talks their number considerably increased. Thus, according to the Indian version, whereas there were only 95 reports of cease-fire violations by Pakistan in the first six months of 1963, by the end of the year 1963 they rose to 267. (25) In the second half of the year 1963, in fact, a number of violations of the cease-fire agreement of 1949 were reported from both sides and not only were protest notes

(21) SCOR, yr 18, supplement for October, November, and December 1963, Doc. S/5437, pp. 5-6.
(22) Ibid., Doc. S/5454, pp. 91-93.
exchanged with each other against some incidents but also protests against them were lodged with the President of the UN Security Council. One such incident related to Chaknot village in Baramula, about which Pakistan raised much hue and cry, (26) and the other was concerning Betar Nalla in Poonch sector, in which India alleged Pakistan of undesirable activities. (27) The findings of the UN military observers, however, in both the cases, were in favour of India. (28)

THEFT OF THE HOLY RELIC AND DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Hazratbal Incident and Pakistan's Reaction

On the night of 26-27 December 1963 the holy hair of Prophet Mohammed disappeared from a shrine known as the Hazratbal shrine in Kashmir. (29) The same night the famous Muslim shrine at Kishtwar was set on fire. (30) These two incidents, and particularly the

(26) See Pakistan's protest note to India of 16 October 1963. The text is given in Patriot (New Delhi), 26 October 1963. See also Pakistan's letter dated 1 November 1963 to the President of the Security Council. The text is given in SCOR, yr 18, supplement for October, November, and December 1963, Doc. S/5450, pp. 89-90.


(29) Times of India (Bombay), 28 December 1963.

former, created a commotion in Kashmir. (31) Although, on 4 January 1964, the Indian Government announced the recovery of the holy hair, (32) the story was rejected in Pakistan. The spokesman of the Azad Kashmir Government called the recovery story a hoax and a daring fraud on Muslims. (33) President Ayub Khan, moreover, described the theft of the relic, as an act of a non-Muslim. (34) Some people in Kashmir also refused to believe in the validity of the relic recovered by the Indian Government (35) and on 8 January the Indian Home Secretary remarked that those who questioned the genuineness of the recovered relic "speak with the voice of Pakistan". (36) Agitation in Kashmir, however, continued, (37) although it was non-communal (38) and was directed chiefly against the State Government. (39) Stories of the massacre of Indian Muslims in Kashmir meanwhile were carried in the Pakistani Press, (40) resulting in riots in Khulna and other parts of East Pakistan, which had its reactions in India. (41) In order to reassure the Kashmiris,

(31) Times of India, 29 December 1963 to 4 January 1964. Sheikh Abdullah also wrote a letter to the President of India on 3 January 1964. For the text, see Pakistan Times, 19 January 1964.


(33) Pakistan Times, 6 January 1964.

(34) Ibid., 6 January 1964.

(35) Hindustan Times, 7 January 1964.

(36) Times of India, 9 January 1964.

(37) On 25 January the police had also to resort to firing. The Times, 27 January 1964.

(38) Times of India and The Statesman, 3 January 1964.


(40) Pakistan Times of 8, 9, 10 January 1964 and other subsequent days.

(41) See Ch. Five.
the sacred relic was placed for a verification by a panel of devout Muslims on 3 February who "one by one nodded their recognition". (42) Many political agitators in Kashmir were also released the next day. (43) There were fewer demonstrations thereafter (44) although some trouble still persisted. On 17 February, the Indian Home Minister, G.L. Nanda, spelled out the names of the persons, all Muslims, arrested in connexion with the theft of the relic, one of whom was stated to have "affiliation with Pakistan". He did not rule out "some kind of inspiration, some kind of complicity" from Pakistan. (45) Pakistan Government, however, in a protest note, denied the charge as "baseless and false". (46)

Pakistan's Note to the Security Council

It was in this context that Pakistan moved on 16 January 1964 for an immediate meeting of the Security Council for the consideration of "the grave situation that has arisen in the State of Jammu and Kashmir". It referred to the proposed Indian attempts for the further integration of Jammu and Kashmir, to the creation by India of "a vicious climate" in the State as a result of which the theft of the holy relic was made possible, and to the demonstrations in the State which were said to be an expression against the "moves" of the Indian Government "forcibly to annex their homeland". It also contended that unless these things were halted "the people of Azad Kashmir and

(42) The Times, 4 February 1964.
(43) Hindustan Times, 5 February 1964; also The Times, 6 February 1964.
(44) The Times, 6 February 1964.
Pakistan may, in desperation, turn to other courses". (47)

In reply, the Indian representative stated on 24 January that "the interrelationship between the Union Government and the Government of the State [of Jammu and Kashmir] is an internal matter", that Pakistan's letter was "a propaganda move" designed to exploit certain recent incidents and to divert attention from tragic disturbances in East Pakistan affecting the minority community there, and that the discussions in the Council "could only lead to exacerbation of feelings and worsening of communal situation". He suggested, therefore, that the two Governments should "put their heads together" to bring out an atmosphere of communal amity. (48)

Debate in the Council in February 1964

On 3 February the matter was placed on the agenda of the Council.

Opening the debate on 3 February, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, said that he had come to the Security Council "to obtain its assistance in an impartial examination of the existing situation" between India and Pakistan and to urge the Council to "take appropriate action to ensure that Kashmir dispute moves rapidly towards an honourable and just solution". He said that "an extremely tense situation" had arisen as a result of India's policies towards Jammu and Kashmir and especially its recent declaration to integrate the State, and that the people had risen in open revolt. He referred


to the communal riots in the subcontinent and said that the denial of the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir was "embittering" Indo-Pakistani relations and was "poisoning" the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims of the two countries. He also warned that if the change brought about by the passage of time was supposed to operate to the disadvantage of those who laid down their arms on the pledge given by the United Nations, it would give "a virtual inducement to them to resume hostilities". (49) He repeated this on 7 February, saying that it was the restraining hand of the Pakistani Government that alone preserved peace in Kashmir. (50)

Replying to Bhutto, India's Education Minister, M.C. Chagla, contended on 5 February that there was no reason for convening the Security Council because no new situation had arisen to aggravate the existing situation in Kashmir. He rejected the Pakistani charge against India's attempt to integrate the Kashmir State saying that it was "purely a domestic matter". He then referred to Bhutto's linking up of India's steps to integrate Kashmir with that of the theft of the holy relic, which was "baseless and mischievous" and pointed out that the demonstrations in Kashmir were non-communal, that they were not aimed against the Government of India, and that they had shown "complete confidence in the policies of my Government". He further pointed out the dangers in granting the right of self-determination to integral parts of states, saying that it might break many countries in Asia and Africa which had dissident minorities. He cited in this connexion the opposition of the United Nations and the African states to the secession of Katanga from the Congo. (51) In his statement of

(49) SCOR, yr 19, mtg 1087, 3 February 1964, pp. 3-28.
(50) Ibid., mtg 1089, 7 February 1964, p. 36.
(51) Ibid., mtg 1088, 5 February 1964, pp. 2-27.
10 February, Chagla stated: "If the theft of the sacred relic could be exploited by Pakistan to produce riots 1,500 miles away in East Pakistan, the stirring of communal passions on a large and massive scale will lead to serious communal riots all over India and Pakistan and to migrations." He also pointed out nine violations of the terms of the UNCIP resolutions by Pakistan. (52) In conclusion, Chagla submitted that Pakistan's Foreign Minister had failed to substantiate his own charges and that, therefore, there was "nothing before the Council on which it need take action". (53) He said that the first necessity was the restoration of communal harmony in the subcontinent (54) and added that "we are prepared to discuss all our outstanding differences with Pakistan, including Kashmir, once the bitter feelings and communal passions have subsided". (55)

Between 10 and 15 February, the members of the Council expressed their views. Among the Council members, those nearest to India were the representatives of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and those nearest to Pakistan were those of Britain and the Ivory Coast. The representative of the Ivory Coast was also prepared to move a resolution if the majority of the Council members so desired. He, however, preferred the issue of an appeal by the Council to India and Pakistan asking them to restore communal harmony, and to start negotiations on Kashmir within the framework of the Council's past actions and the wishes of the people concerned, and to use the good offices of a person or a country when they considered it desirable. (56)

(52) Ibid., mtg 1090, 10 February 1964, pp. 3, 17-18.
(53) Ibid., p. 20.
(54) Ibid., mtg 1088, 5 February 1964, p. 32.
(55) Ibid., mtg 1090, 10 February 1964, p. 20.
This appeal was quickly endorsed by the British representative. (57)

On 17 February, Bhutto requested a few days' postponement of the Council meeting to enable him to have more time for reflection. (58)

On 16 February the Council meeting had already been postponed to 17 February on Bhutto's insistence and in face of Indian opposition. (59)

On 17 February, therefore, when the request for an adjournment was made by Bhutto, Chagla opposed it vehemently and asked "what has happened to that grave emergency" for which his delegation had been "dragged from India" to the United Nations by Pakistan. (60) But after a formal motion was submitted by the representative of Morocco under rule 32, sub-para 2, the Council was adjourned. (61)

While the meetings of the Council were going on in February, several informal consultations among the members of the Council were reported. On 13 February the smaller Powers of the Council were reported to be working for a "non-controversial" draft for a consensus. (62) Pakistan was not prepared to accept a consensus from the Council that did not make a reference to the wishes of the people of Kashmir. (63) But none, except the Moroccan representative, was reported to be in favour of a resolution which made a reference to

(57) Ibid., p. 31.
(59) Ibid., mtg 1092, 16 February 1964, pp. 2-3.
(60) Ibid., mtg 1093, 17 February 1964, p. 2.
(61) Ibid., pp. 3-4.
(63) See Bhutto's statement of 18 February in London in Pakistan Times, 19 February 1964.
the wishes of the people of Kashmir, (64) and in any case it was sure to be vetoed by the Soviet delegation. (65) There was a report that the main reason for the Council's postponement of its meeting on 15 February was to see whether Pakistan and its friends could over the week-end exert enough pressure on capitals of Council members to get a draft resolution tabled or a consensus obtained which suited Pakistan. (66) As that was not forthcoming, and a Soviet veto against any formula involving a reference to the wishes of the people of Kashmir seemed certain, Bhutto favoured a postponement. (67) Moreover, Bhutto wanted a postponement, because, in his own words, he had to return to Pakistan to entertain "the distinguished Chinese statesmen", (68) the Premier and the Foreign Minister of Communist China.

Assessment of the Council's Meeting of February 1964

As to the outcome of the Council's deliberations, both sides claimed that they had won. Z.A. Bhutto, on his return to Karachi on 19 February, claimed seven distinct gains for Pakistan from the debate of the Security Council. (69) The Pakistan Times, however, in its editorial of 17 February, claimed only three advantages:

(64) H.R. Vohra's report from Washington in Times of India, 21 February 1964; on 15 February Bhutto was also reported to have said that "one or two members" were ready to sponsor a resolution. See A.P. report in The Hindu, 17 February 1964.

(65) Vohra's report, Times of India, 21 February 1964.


(68) Bhutto's disclosure in Karachi on 19 February, Dawn, 20 February 1964.

(69) For details, see ibid., 20 February 1964.
(1) No country, including the Soviet Union, accepted India's argument that the dispute no longer existed; (2) that all speakers agreed that Kashmir was an explosive issue which had got to be settled; and (3) that the overwhelming majority expressed themselves in favour of a resolution based on the wishes of the people concerned. *Dawn*'s Special Correspondent, Ejaz Hussain, noted three other things: (1) some change in Soviet stand as compared to that in 1962; (2) a change in the position of the Arab-African world (both Morocco and the Ivory Coast supported plebiscite); and (3) a categorical British stand in favour of Pakistan. (70)

On the other hand, as M.C. Chagla rightly said, Bhutto obtained neither of the two reliefs for which he had gone before the Council, namely to bring India to a conference table on the basis of the old resolutions which called for a plebiscite in Kashmir and to get a definite interdict from the Security Council against further integration of Kashmir with India. He also noted the support of the USSR and Czechoslovakia and the complete support of Bolivia. He further said that the speeches of the representatives of Bolivia, Norway, even Nationalist China, and France "revealed a getting away from the old positions" and that the statement of the US representative, although anti-India, "was pitched in a much lower key". (71) He was, however, very critical of the British stand. (72) Five days earlier, on 19 February, India's Minister without Portfolio, L.B. Shastri, had also criticized it in the Lok Sabha. (73)


Council Meets Again in March

As early as 18 February, Bhutto had said in his Press conference in London that he would raise the Kashmir question in the Security Council in the middle or at the end of March 1964. (74) On 4 March Pakistan formally requested the resumption of the Council's meeting "as soon as possible". (75)

India, in reply, argued that the adjournment of the Council's meeting on 17 February was sine die, that there had to be substantial reasons for any further meeting of the Council, that the Council had to satisfy itself as to the necessity of a meeting, that nothing had happened since the Council's adjournment, and that if any meeting of the Council was to be convened, this had to be done with due regard to the convenience of other parties. In conclusion, it submitted that because of the current budget session of its Parliament, India would be unable to participate appropriately in the Council's meeting until the beginning of May 1964. (76)

Despite India's objections the Council met on 17 March. Bhutto contended that the popular movement in the State of Jammu and Kashmir against India's repressive measures against the Kashmiris, and against the steps which were being taken to integrate the State with the Union of India (against which Pakistan had complained) still

(74) *Pakistan Times*, 19 February 1963.


continued. (77) India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, B.N. Chakravarty, in his reply, refuted the charges, repeated the contentions of his letter of 8 March, and sought for the Council's adjournment till the first week of May. (79) The Czechoslovak delegate, supported by the Soviet representative, thereupon moved for adjournment till 5 May, (79) On Bhutto's initiation, the Brazilian representative objected to such a long adjournment. (80) In the next meeting, however, the Brazilian representative agreed to the postponement, but upon certain conditions. His conditions were that in case of new developments, the Council should meet earlier, that the parties should desist from any action that might complicate the issue, and that the interval between the Council's meetings should be utilized by the parties for the exploration of every possibility of a peaceful settlement of the problem. (81) This was supported by eight members of the Council. (82) But the Soviet representative regarded the imposition of conditions on the Indian delegation "in return for an agreed adjournment" as "unjustified". (83) The Indian representative, Chakravarty, also violently reacted to the Brazilian suggestion, wondered at the need for an appeal "in a purely procedural question", and said in clear terms: "I cannot give an assurance that we will not proceed with the

(77) SCOR, yr 19, mtg 1104, 17 March 1964, p. 2; see also pp. 2-10.
(78) Ibid., pp. 11-15.
(79) Ibid., pp. 16-17.
(80) Ibid., p. 18.
(82) For the views of eight other members, Morocco, Norway, the USA, the Ivory Coast, the UK, Bolivia, France and Nationalist China, see ibid., pp. 2-5.
(83) Ibid., p. 5.
constitutional process which we may consider necessary in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, because that is entirely an internal affair of ours, and let it not be made a ground for further complaint later that, despite the appeal, India did not do this or that." (84) The Council adjourned at that point.

**Council's Meeting in May 1964**

During the intermission between the Council meetings, two important developments took place. Sheikh Abdullah was released from goal and attempts by him for some settlement of the Kashmir problem started. Secondly, the Home Ministers of India and Pakistan met to resolve their minorities problem. (85) But along with these good developments, a complaint was also lodged by Pakistan on 14 April against the introduction of a bill on 9 March in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly seeking to change the designations of the Heads of State and Government of Kashmir. (86)

On 5 May the Council resumed consideration of the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, repeated the case of his Government in his opening speech on 5 May, (87) and in another speech on 11 May. (88) Bhutto contended that withdrawal of the charges by

(84) Ibid., pp. 6-8.

(85) About Sheikh Abdullah's release and his attempts for a settlement, see subsequent pages in this chapter. About the Indo-Pakistani Home Ministers' conference, see Ch. Five.

(86) Letter dated 14 April 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the United Nations to the President of the Security Council. For the text, see SCOR, yr 19, supplement for April, May, and June 1964, Doc. S/5557, pp. 18-19.

(87) See SCOR, yr 19, mtg 1112, 5 May 1964, pp. 2-22.

(88) See ibid., mtg 1114, 11 May 1964, pp. 3-14.
the Indian Government against Sheikh Abdullah was an admission of the fact that they were baseless and quoted many of the Sheikh's statements made after his release that supported the Pakistani stand to some extent. He claimed that a number of countries of the world supported self-determination for the Kashmiris and that some Indians also wanted re-thinking in the views of their Government. He repeated the threat that Pakistan might go to the help of Kashmiris if the Indian repression continued there and declared that if the resolutions of the UNCIP were obsolete "then the cease-fire line also becomes obsolete". He wanted Sheikh Abdullah to be invited to appear before the Council as he would be able to give it information which would be of assistance in examining the question of accession. (89)

M.C. Chagla submitted India's case in his speeches on 7 and 12 May in the Council. (90) In his submission to the Council on 7 May, Chagla put forward a new point that: "Kashmir is vital to India not only for recovering the territory which China has unlawfully occupied but also for resisting future aggression by China". He held, moreover, that the release of Sheikh Abdullah was not only "a tribute" to Indian democracy but also a demonstration of the fact that everything was normal in Kashmir. He declared that the opinion of an individual could not alter the status of a territory and that if Sheikh Abdullah's opinion was at all important, under the Evidence Law of India and Pakistan, only those statements made by him were relevant that were made at the time of aggression which had been against the Pakistani contentions. He also rejected as "fantastic"

(89) See n. 87.

(90) See his speeches in ibid., mtgs 1113 and 1115 of 7 and 12 May 1964 respectively.
the suggestion that Sheikh Abdullah should be invited to the Security Council. (91) In his statement of 12 May, Chagla further said that "it would be a most dangerous precedent for this Council to lay down that any citizen in a country who holds a dissident opinion ... should have the right of audience here" and demanded why, if the Sheikh were to be invited, the representatives of other parties of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the representatives of 50 million Muslims in India, who have a vital stake in the future of Kashmir should not be invited to the Council? He opined that "the debates on Kashmir are only exercises in futility". He requested the Council not to superimpose any solution and not to introduce any third-party intervention in the talks that India and Pakistan might have on Kashmir. (92)

**Council's Response**

After the members of the Council expressed their views on 12 and 13 May, the representative of Brazil, supported by the representative of Norway, suggested a summing up by the President of the Council of the opinions of the Council members expressed during the debate. (93)

Accordingly, after informal consultations with the Council members, the President of the Council, Roger Seydoux of France, submitted his statement, in two parts, before the Council on 13 May; part one contained those views of the Council members which were unanimously held and part two dealt with differences among them.

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(91) Ibid., mtg 1113, 7 May 1964, pp. 2-16.
(92) Ibid., mtg 1115, 12 May 1964, pp. 2-10.
(93) Ibid., mtg 1116, 13 May 1964, pp. 8-9.
on other points. (94) Part one included the following: (a) The disputes between India and Pakistan, particularly that of Jammu and Kashmir, should be amicably settled; (b) recent developments 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He claimed that the Council debate revealed the deep concern of all its members for the settlement of the Kashmir issue and the desire of many members that the issue should be settled with reference to the people of the State. He further held that negotiations between India and Pakistan on Kashmir without reference to the people's wishes would not be meaningful and said that the Secretary-General should have been given a well-defined role to facilitate negotiations between the parties. (96)

Chagla, on the other hand, while agreeing with Bhutto that the summation was "not a consensus, is not a resolution, and ... has no binding effect", claimed that three things emerged from the Council's debate: (1) Kashmir was not in open revolt; (2) this matter could only be solved by India and Pakistan and any third party intervention would be undesirable; and (3) it was time that we discarded all shibboleths, forgot all resolutions which had been passed many years ago, and faced the realities of the day. With regard to negotiations he wanted Pakistan to accept certain "basic positions" of India which were that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that no country could be a party to giving up of its own territory. He added that whereas the Secretary-General was most welcome in his country, he did not like him to visit his country in the context of the Kashmir debate without an agreement of both the parties. (97)

(96) Ibid., pp. 3-4.

(97) Ibid., pp. 5-6. These views were repeated by Chagla in his Press conferences in London, Bombay, and New Delhi on 19, 20 and 23 May respectively. See Times of India of 20, 21 and 24 May 1964.
The two delegations, thus, not only reiterated their rigid stands but also interpreted the Council's deliberations in different ways.

In his Press conferences Bhutto on 18 May, pointed out two further following gains from the Council debate: (1) release of Sheikh Abdullah (98) and (2) foiling of India's attempt for the further integration of Jammu and Kashmir. (99)

A Pakistani columnist, however, noted some disquieting features of the debate in the Council. According to him, the US delegation had not only made it known in the Council that it would not support a formal resolution reaffirming the resolutions of the UNCIP but also worked actively to dissuade even the elected members from forcing the issue in the Council. (100) The Pakistan Times, in its editorial of 22 May, made a reference to Chagla's statement that the Council debate was "an exercise in futility", and wrote: "Indeed it was, in a way". It added that both the USA and the USSR were "falling over one another to placate India".

SHEIKH ABDULLAH'S RELEASE AND HIS ATTEMPTS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Abdullah's Release and Reactions in India and Pakistan

Following the theft of the holy relic, Kashmir's administration was overhauled. In an attempt to create a new atmosphere, (101)


(99) See his talk with newsmen in London on 19 May, ibid., 21 May 1964.

(100) Report of the Special UN correspondent, ibid., 20 May 1964.

(101) See the statement of India's Minister without Portfolio, L.B. Shastri, in Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 28, 1 April 1964, col. 8580.
the new Kashmir Premier, G.M. Sadiq, also announced his Government's decision to release Sheikh Abdullah on 31 March. (102) On 8 April, the Sheikh and his associates were released and all charges against them were withdrawn. (103) With the release of the Sheikh the hope of better Indo-Pakistani relations was revived. The Economist wrote in its commentary that "given statesmanship on Abdullah's part ... it will be much harder now for the two disputants [India and Pakistan] to resist a compromise which he approves". (104) A day before Sheikh Abdullah's release, a letter from Nehru, expressing the latter's desire to meet the Sheikh, was delivered to him. (105)

Pakistan passionately welcomed the Sheikh's release. On 6 April, Z.A. Bhutto expressed himself in favour of an Abdullah-Ayub meeting and invited the Sheikh to visit Pakistan in connexion with the solution of the Kashmir issue. (106) On 1 May Pakistan's High Commissioner in India, Arshad Husain, orally invited the Sheikh to visit Pakistan. (107) This was followed on 6 May by a letter of the Pakistani Government in which the latter expressed their anxiety that no settlement should be reached "without due consultation and agreement with us". (108) Sheikh Abdullah favourably responded to all these communications (109) and assured

(102) Hindustan Times, 1 April 1964.
(106) Pakistan Times, 7 April 1964.
(107) Ibid., 2 May 1964.
the President of Pakistan "that when my discussions [with the Indian leaders] reach a stage where such a proposal [proposal for a settlement] takes a concrete shape, I shall lose no time to inform you and avail myself of your kind invitation for mutual consultations before it takes a final shape." (110)

After his release Sheikh Abdullah made several statements in which he challenged the completeness of Kashmir's integration with India, held that the wishes of the people of Kashmir must be ascertained by plebiscite or some other means, and that the issue must be solved peacefully and by agreement between India and Pakistan. (111) More particularly after his meeting with the Indian leaders, he also started saying that any solution of the Kashmir problem must take into account the fate of the six-crore minorities in the subcontinent (112) and that Indo-Pakistani amity was essential to any solution of the Kashmir problem. On 23 May he even held in an interview with an Indian columnist: "I do not intend to make a direct assault on the Kashmir problem. If I can get the leaders of Pakistan to agree on the basic desirability of promoting good relations with India, ... a solution of Kashmir problem would be easier." (113)

While some of Abdullah's statements created stir in the Indian circles, others made Pakistan cautious. Thus, while it was

(110) See his reply dated 7 May to President Ayub in The Hindu, 8 May 1964.

(111) See The Hindu, 10 and 24 April 1964; Times of India of 10 and 12 April 1964.


(113) See report of Sheikh Abdullah's interview with Prem Bhatia, as reported by Prem Bhatia in The Guardian (Manchester), 25 May 1964.
indicated in India that no Government could allow the Sheikh to preach secession, (114) it was made clear in Pakistan that Pakistan would not accept the proposal for an independent Kashmir or for a political settlement or for any solution that did not accept a plebiscite and a provision for accession either to India or to Pakistan. (115)

Sheikh's Meetings with the Indian Leaders

After his release Sheikh Abdullah held a number of meetings with the Indian leaders in order to find out a formula for the final settlement of the Kashmir problem. He met a number of Indian leaders including Prime Minister Nehru and President Radhakrishnan on the one hand and J.P. Narayan and Minoo Masani on the other in Delhi from 29 April to 4 May 1964. (116) On 5 May he met C. Rajagopalachari in Madras and the two leaders agreed on a Kashmir solution which, in the Sheikh's opinion, was such as "would not give a sense of victory either to India or to Pakistan and will, at the same time, ensure a place of honour for the people of Kashmir". (117) It was reported soon after that the Sheikh-Rajaji formula was related to a solution of the Kashmir problem under which India and Pakistan would share


(115) See Bhutto's statements of as early as 6 April in Pakistan Times, 7 April 1964, of 6 May in ibid., 8 May 1964, and of President Ayub Khan of 14 May in ibid., 15 May 1964.


(117) The Hindu, 6 May 1964. Also see The Times, 6 May 1964.
sovereignty over the disputed and divided state of Jammu and Kashmir. (118) The Sheikh himself, however, declined to give any hint of his formula. (119)

Sheikh Abdullah held further meetings with the Indian Prime Minister. In these he re-emphasized that a formula for Kashmir should be so framed as to be acceptable to India, Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir, promote amity between India and Pakistan, and did not weaken India's secular base. (120) He is also reported to have stood for whatever he had done when he was in power in Jammu and Kashmir and to have stated that once India and Pakistan were brought near to each other the Kashmir question would "automatically be solved". (121) After his meeting with Nehru on 12 May, Sheikh Abdullah further reported that they were working on "some formula, and in due time we hope we will be able to evolve an adequate framework of the possible solution" and added that a "basis" existed in India for the kind of settlement he was working for. (122) Nehru, however, while saying that if Sheikh Abdullah could help the two countries to improve their relations "he will have done a great service to both countries" and that "we will have to help him in his attempt", added, at the same time, that some of the Sheikh's suggestions "appear to be


(119) The Hindu, 6 May 1964.


(122) Ibid., 14 May 1964.
difficult in the present circumstances" and that "we must adhere to
our principles as well as to our basic attitude in regard to
Kashmir". (123) The Indian Prime Minister also said that he was
"not very very much hopeful of Pakistan changing her attitude at
this time". (124) A few days earlier, moreover, he had assured the
Lok Sabha that "nothing is going to be agreed to or settled without
reference to this House". (125) However, in his Press conference on
22 May, Nehru disclosed that Sheikh Abdullah was going to Pakistan
for "exploratory talks" and suggested that some constitutional
approach to bring about Indo-Pakistani amity might be desirable. (126)
If one reads this statement in the context of the reported Abdullah-
Rajaji formula (there was also a report in the New York Times saying
that Nehru had shown 'some sympathy' for the Sheikh's condominium
formula) (127) and Sheikh Abdullah's remarks after his meeting with
Rajaji on 5 May and after his talks with Nehru on 12 May, as
mentioned above, it is possible to say that Nehru and the Sheikh
were working on some device like a condominium for Kashmir. This
assumption is strengthened by two more things. The first is Sheikh
Abdullah's statement made in New Delhi on 28 May 1964 at a Press
conference in which he said that "it was Mr. Nehru's last wish that
mutual disputes between India and Pakistan should be resolved and

(123) See Nehru's statements in the All-India Congress Committee
in Bombay on 16 May, ibid., 18 May 1964.
(126) The Statesman (Calcutta) (dak edn.), 24 May 1964; also
The Hindu, 23 May 1964.
friendship established between the two countries" and that "it was in pursuance of this wish and for this specific purpose that I visited Pakistan". (128) The second was the report that the Sheikh discussed condominium with the Pakistani President during his tour of Pakistan. (129)

Abdullah's Visit to Pakistan

On 24 May 1964 Sheikh Abdullah visited Rawalpindi, where he was given a red-carpet reception. (130) There also he took the first opportunity to tell the people about his views which were not very dissimilar to what he had earlier said in India. While saying many things which pleased his audience, (131) he chided Pakistan for "running to the United Nations" for a solution that could be found only in the subcontinent, for making Kashmir the foundation of its foreign policy, and for its friendship with China. (132)

Sheikh Abdullah met President Ayub Khan on 25 and 26 May. On the evening of 25 May the Sheikh announced that a meeting between Ayub and Nehru would be held in New Delhi in the next month for a


(129) See report of Sheikh Abdullah's Press conference in Rawalpindi in which he admitted these by implication, Pakistan Times, 27 May 1964. See also President Ayub's statement as reported in The Hindu, 1 June 1964; and President Ayub's disclosure in his autobiography, entitled Friends Not Masters, that the proposal that Sheikh Abdullah brought to him in 1964 was of a "confederation between India, Pakistan and Kashmir", as cited in S. Nihal Singh, "A President's Story - II; Peace With India Only on Ayub's Terms", The Statesman, 11 August 1967.


(131) Ibid. Also The Times, 26 May 1964.

possible solution of the Kashmir problem and added that he himself might be present at the summit meeting. (133) On the conclusion of his talks with the Pakistani President, the Sheikh told Pressmen on 26 May that he was "absolutely optimistic" about the success of his mission and that he found that the desire for amity and friendship was present in Pakistan as in India. (134)

In the meantime, barely twenty-four hours before his death, Nehru was reported to have decided to send an important message to Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru's emissary, Prabodh Chander, was said to have actually arrived in Lahore on his way to meet Sheikh Abdullah, when the Indian Prime Minister's sudden death prevented any further progress on this matter. According to the same report, it was believed in Karachi that "Mr. Nehru wanted to spare his successors the burden of the Kashmir dispute". (135)

Thus while the Sheikh was still in Pakistan, the news of the death of Nehru on 27 May reached him, and he came back to New Delhi. The death of Nehru marked for the time being an end to whatever hope had been revived for a Kashmir settlement. The new leadership in India, in the eyes of many, had neither the prestige nor the power to take any major decision on this sensitive issue. (136)

(133) Pakistan Times, 27 May 1964.
(134) Ibid. Also see the text of a statement issued by the Sheikh to the Press, ibid.
(136) See New York Times' (international edn) editorial of 14 May 1965 in which it wrote: "... after Nehru's death it became evident that Prime Minister Shastri had neither the will nor, probably, the prestige and power to attend this kind of settlement." The words "this kind" relate to giving Kashmir the status of Sikkim. Also see its editorial of 25 August 1965 which held "Prime Minister Shastri might, personally, be more compromising, but his political situation is weak ..." Daily Telegraph similarly wrote editorially on 26 August 1965 that "If Mr. Shastri may personally feel less intransigent about Kashmir, he is politically weaker than his predecessor".
Nehru's Death and Pakistani Feelers

On 27 May 1964 Nehru died. The Government and the people of Pakistan reacted sympathetically to his demise. In his telegram to President Radhakrishnan of India, President Ayub Khan expressed his country's "profound regret" and "sincere sympathy" at the passing away of the Indian leader. (137) Similar sentiments were expressed by his Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, who came to India on 28 May with a Pakistani team to participate in the funeral. (138) The Pakistani Press and the general public also, on the whole, took a sympathetic attitude. (139)

The Government of Pakistan, moreover, worked for a new approach in Indo-Pakistani relations. On 30 May, Bhutto disclosed to newsmen in New Delhi that in his series of meetings with the Indian leaders on 29 May, he had assured them that Pakistan would not bring up matters such as Kashmir while the new Indian Government was settling

(137) For the text see Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements (Karachi, n.d.), vol. 6, p. 221.

(138) See Bhutto's talks with newsmen in New Delhi on 28 May in which he said that "the people of Pakistan mourn his [Nehru's] death and join the people of India in the hour of crisis." Pakistan Times, 29 May 1964.

(139) The National Assembly of Pakistan observed two minutes' silence in honour of Nehru and the Leader of the Opposition hailed him as "a friend of Muslim minority in India". National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 2, 1 June 1964, pp. 12, 14. Also see editorial in Pakistan Times of 28 May 1964. See also Editorial Staff, "Pakistan's Reactions to Nehru's Death", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol. 17 (1964), p. 160.
down. (140) In his monthly broadcast on 1 June, the Pakistani President, expressing his sympathy on Nehru's death, said: "An event like this should be an occasion for a searching of the heart. ... Now may be the occasion for both sides ... to have fresh look at our relationship. On our part, we shall respond to any sincere move for the improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations." (141) After the election of L. B. Shastri as the leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party, President Ayub Khan sent a message on 5 June to Shastri in which he described Shastri's election "as good augury for Indo-Pakistan relations" and hoped that "given goodwill and perseverance, there is no reason why we should not be able to remove the causes which have bedevilled Indo-Pakistan relations during past 17 years". (142) Bhutto also promised Pakistan's willing co-operation to the new Indian Prime Minister for the settlement of all Indo-Pakistani issues. (143)

**Shaastri's Response**

All these sentiments were promptly reciprocated by the new Indian Prime Minister. Soon after his election as the leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party, Shastri told Pressmen on 2 June that he had been greatly impressed by the 1 June broadcast of President Ayub Khan and that he hoped to meet the President in July in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. (144) He repeated

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(140) *Pakistan Times*, 31 May 1964.
(141) See for the text, Ayub Khan, n. 137, p. 224.
(142) For the text, see ibid., p. 230; also *Indian Information* (Delhi), vol. 7, 1 July 1964, p. 310.
(143) *Pakistan Times*, 3 June 1964.
(144) *The Hindu*, 3 June 1964.
this on 5 June. (145) In his first broadcast as the Prime Minister of India on 11 June, Shastri further said that "for too long have India and Pakistan been at odds with one another" and that "we must reverse the tide". (146) Replying to President Ayub Khan's message of 5 June, Shastri said in his letter of 12 June: "I wholly and sincerely reciprocate your sentiments and your desire for the improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations. ... On my part I shall not spare any effort to achieve those noble objectives." (147) The leading Indian newspapers also welcomed President Ayub's moves. (148)

Thus, as a correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor reported, "For the first time in 17 years bold voices are being raised in the Indian subcontinent for friendly relations between the two countries of the area." (149)

A formal Ayub-Shastri meeting was also reported to be fixed for 14 July in London. (150) Although Shastri could not go to London because of his illness and thus missed an opportunity to meet the Pakistani President, India's Finance Minister met the Pakistani President on Shastri's behalf in London on 11 July. At the meeting, the Indian Finance Minister also handed over his Prime Minister's letter to the Pakistani President containing Shastri's wish to meet

(145) Ibid., 6 June 1964.
(147) Text, ibid., p. 310.
(148) See editorials of the Times of India of 3 June, Indian Express, the Hindustan Times of 4 June, and The Hindu of 5 June 1964.
President Ayub. Ayub reciprocated the wish. (151) In their Independence Day messages, again, both the Heads of Governments expressed pleasant words. President Ayub talked of a "change of heart", (152) whereas Shastri said that "we shall be able to hold talks within the next few months and create an atmosphere of goodwill which may lead to a settlement". (153)

The desire for a settlement of Indo-Pakistani differences was further expressed strongly by India's Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, in the Indian Parliament. (154) The offer of a no-war pact to Pakistan was also repeated by him on 25 August. (155)

**Jai Prakash Narayan's Visit to Pakistan**

Between 6 and 12 September, J.P. Narayan, with an unofficial team of four other members, visited Pakistan and met President Ayub Khan, Z.A. Bhutto, and other Pakistani leaders. (156) In his meeting with the Pakistani President, J.P. Narayan was also understood to have expressed the Indian Prime Minister's wishes that the former should visit India. (157)


(152) See the text in Pakistan Press Release, no. 28, 12 August 1964.


(156) Pakistan Times, 7 and 9 September 1964.

(157) Ibid., 7 September 1964.
Ayub-Shastri Joint Statement

On 12 October a brief three-hour Ayub-Shastri meeting took place at Karachi. On his way back home from Cairo, the Indian Prime Minister stopped at Karachi and had a talk with the Pakistani President. An announcement regarding this meeting had already been made by Prime Minister Shastri himself on 1 October. (158) In the joint communique that was issued after the talks on 12 October, it was stated that the two leaders were "firmly of the view that these Indo-Pakistani relations needed to be improved" and that to that end they agreed "to promote a better understanding between the two countries and to settle outstanding problems and disputes on an honourable and equitable basis". For this purpose they further agreed to hold discussion between the two Governments at "appropriate levels" at the earliest possible moment and decided to "remain in touch to determine how these objectives could be best realized". (159) Shastri described the talks as "very pleasant and useful". (160) During the talks the two leaders were reported to have discussed subjects like Kashmir, the cease-fire violations, and the question of minorities and to have appreciated the urgency of resolving Indo-Pakistani differences, including Kashmir. (161) This talk was appreciated in many circles. (162)

(158) The Hindu, 2 October 1964.
(159) For the text, see Pakistan Times, 13 October 1964.
(160) Ibid.
(161) Ibid., 14 October 1964.
Thus after the death of Nehru a new era began in Indo-Pakistani relations. The friendliness continued till the middle of October 1964.

**Differing Attitudes**

However, it must be said that even during this period the basic stands of the two countries remained the same. That is why in spite of all the pleasantry no settlement on any issue was possible even during this period.

In his broadcast of 1 June 1964 President Ayub had not only appealed for a change of heart, but had said that the people of Kashmir would not "wait indefinitely" for the settlement of this question and that the Kashmir issue was "agitating communal passions". (163) In another statement, the Pakistani President had also reiterated on 31 May his rejection of any idea of a confederation between India and Pakistan by way of a solution of the Kashmir problem. (164) A day earlier, on 30 May, his Home Minister, Khan Habibullah Khan, had made things more explicit by saying that there could not be a lasting peace and understanding between India and Pakistan unless the dispute of Kashmir was honourably settled. (165) Speaking on the Central Budget in the National Assembly on 20 June, Z.A. Bhutto said similarly that the future of Jammu and Kashmir could only be decided by a plebiscite, that it was the only outstanding problem between India and Pakistan without which "we can never achieve lasting peace", that the passage of time could not solve the problem.


(164) *Pakistan Times*, 1 June 1964.

(165) Ibid., 30 May 1964.
and that "Pakistan is incomplete without the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir". (166) In his broadcast of 1 July the President of Pakistan again expressed himself in favour of a solution of the Kashmir question on the basis of the two-nation theory. (167) It was also repeatedly suggested by Bhutto that an Ayub-Shastri summit could take place only after a Foreign Ministers' Conference of the two countries had met and prepared the ground for a summit. (168) He even wanted the Foreign Ministers meeting to discuss the Kashmir question in a "specific manner" in order to achieve some progress. (169) In the National Assembly debate of 21 August, Bhutto further talked about India's colonial policy in Kashmir and said that only Portugal and India "still retain colonies". (170) Moreover, Pakistan's criticism of Western arms aid to India also continued (171) and so also the propaganda that such arms aid threatened the security

(166) National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 2, 20 June 1964, pp. 1242-3, 1263-5. The sentiment that Pakistan would not stop its efforts unless a plebiscite was held in Kashmir was repeated by Bhutto. Ibid., vol. 3, 21 August 1964, p. 1263. He also repeated on 10 September that a settlement on Kashmir must precede Indo-Pakistani amity. See Pakistan Times, 11 September 1964.


(169) See the text of Bhutto's letter dated 7 September to Swaran Singh, India's Foreign Minister, in Pakistan Times, 28 September 1964.


of small nations on the periphery of India, (172) which might even turn to Communist China to save themselves from India. (173) The no-war offer of India was similarly ridiculed. Bhutto held that "an aggressor state always creates a false sense of security and to cover its aggressive intent makes such an offer". (174) Referring thus, to these utterances of Bhutto and especially the one in which he bracketed India with Portugal as the only colonial powers, Christian Kind wrote: "Undiplomatically sharp attacks by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto, ... have done much to vitiate the effectiveness of the conciliatory statements made by President Ayub, ..." (175)

Again, when J.P. Narayan visited Pakistan with his unofficial team, he was confronted with a very tough Pakistani line. On 12 September, J.P. Narayan disclosed that his suggestion for a settlement of minor disputes between India and Pakistan with a view to lessening the "rigidity" in the attitude of the two states and promoting a more cordial atmosphere for talks on the Kashmir question had not been welcomed in Pakistan. (176) On 18 September Pakistani official quarters also categorically stated that no indication of any "shift" whatsoever in Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir dispute.

(172) Bhutto in the National Assembly on 22 June, ibid.; President Ayub's broadcast of 1 July in Pakistan Times, 2 July 1964 and his warning in the Commonwealth conference on 9 July in ibid., 10 July 1964.

(173) President Ayub in the Commonwealth conference on 9 July, ibid.

(174) See Bhutto's remarks of 30 August, ibid., 31 August 1964.


(176) See his statement in Lahore in Pakistan Times, 13 September 1964.
was given to J.P. Narayan during his talks with President Ayub Khan. (177)

In India, similarly, there was no sign of any basic change in the Government's stand. On 5 June 1964 the Prime Minister designate, L.B. Shastri, declared that in the matter of Indo-Pakistani and other relations he would do nothing which would be inconsistent with the honour and dignity of India. (178) Both in his broadcast of 11 June 1964 and in his letter to President Ayub Khan of 12 June 1964, though he expressed his desire for Indo-Pakistani amity, nowhere did he mention Kashmir specifically. (179) On 29 June, India's Education Minister, M.C. Chagla, spelled out more clearly that Kashmir was an integral part of India and ruled out any basic change in India's stand on Kashmir. (180) There was also a strong reaction in India to a mention of Indo-Pakistani disputes in the joint communique of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and the Prime Minister made it clear that "we will never accept the position that Commonwealth Conference can be a forum for the discussion of differences between the Commonwealth countries". (181) This led Bhutto to remark that "if there is a genuine desire and willingness to come to a settlement with Pakistan, they [the Indian Government] should have welcomed the reference to Kashmir in the Commonwealth Conference". (182) Moreover, it was held in India that

(177) Ibid., 19 September 1964.

(178) The Hindu, 6 June 1964.

(179) See their texts respectively on pages 307 and 310 of Indian Information, vol. 7, 1 July 1964.


any Indo-Pakistani talks must be without "preconditions", without its being confined to the Kashmir question alone. (183)

Indian attempt to obtain US military assistance at this time and the announcement on 6 June that the United States would provide assistance worth $110 million (184) made Pakistan unhappy. Stephen Hugh-Jones felt that the US promise of assistance to India had "poisoned" the atmosphere and "killed" the chances of a Kashmir settlement. (185)

Cease-fire Violations

During this period there were also frequent violations of the cease-fire agreement in Kashmir from both the sides. From the beginning of 1964, the number of the cease-fire violations had increased, and they became more frequent than in 1963. (186) Already there had been reports of serious cease-fire violations in February and March 1964. Two major incidents may be mentioned here. In the first of them, twenty-five persons of an Indian patrol party were ambushed and killed by the Azad Kashmir armed personnel on 21 February 1964, (187) and Pakistan was held responsible by the UN observers; (188)


(184) The Hindu, 7 June 1964.


(186) See the statement of India's Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 43, 3 May 1965, col. 12504.

(187) Chavan's statement, ibid., vol. 26, 24 February 1964, col. 2249

(188) See text of the letter of India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 24 April 1964 to the President of the Security Council, SCOR, yr 19, supplement for April, May, and June 1964, Doc. S/5668, p. 76.
and in the second, twenty-four Pakistanis were reported to have been killed on 23 March. (189) — the award is reported to have been given against India. (190)

In the first five months of 1964, there were fewer incidents of cease-fire violations than in the subsequent seven months of the year. According to an official Indian report, whereas during January-May 1964 there had been only 134 breaches of the cease-fire agreement, by the end of 1964 the figure reached 1,522. (191) An "abnormal increase" had taken place since 21 June 1964 (192) and the total number for 1964 was three times as great as for 1963, (193) similar reports alleging increased cease-fire violations by India were made by Pakistan. (194)

Writing about the cease-fire violations, Rawle Knox reported from Srinagar on 22 August 1964 that seven violations a day were being reported to the UN military observers' group in Kashmir and "on nearly every occasion both India and Pakistan have protested that the other side has breached the peace". He compared this situation with that


(190) See Pakistan Government's official statement of 29 April in Pakistan Times, 30 April 1964.


(194) See Pakistan Press Release, nos. 21 and 25 of 30 June and 24 July 1964 respectively; Pakistan's protest note to India of 27 June in Pakistan Times, 3 July 1964; letter of the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council dated 27 July 1964, SCOR, yr 19, supplement for July, August, and September 1964, Doc. S/5836 and Appendix, pp. 116-20; also see Pakistan Times' reports from July 1964 onwards.
in 1954, when only twenty-three protests had been lodged with the observers group in the whole of the year. As he was told by a senior UN officer in Srinagar, in fact, "there isn't a cease-fire". He also estimated that India and Pakistan had roughly two divisions each facing each other along the 500-mile cease-fire line. (195)

About the nature of these violations, the Indian Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan said that besides their increased frequency, (1) the number of persons taking part in these incidents had increased; (2) that the aim was to attack a remote village, a post, or a picket held by a small body of Indian troops so as to overwhelm it and do as much damage as possible before help could arrive; (3) that the attacks were well planned and pressed with determination with the result that the casualties were high; and (4) that Pakistan was using armed civilians for these raids on Indian territory without any attempt at concealment. (196)

About the abnormal increase in these incidents, different and contradictory versions were provided in the two countries. The Statesman in its editorial of 25 July 1964, gave the following four possible explanations: (1) to assess the strength of the forces on the other side; (2) to draw away forces from the other areas where pressure could then be applied which in the present context could only be done "to annoy, because they know it teases"; (3) to strengthen its own hands in any negotiations by intimidation of this rather puerile sort; and (4) "and most likely" the Pakistani belief that agitation of the cease-fire line would encourage trouble-makers in Kashmir itself.


The *Pakistan Times*, on the other hand, in its editorial of 11 October 1964, observed that "the only possible explanation for the intensification of hostilities along the truce line can be that India is still harbouring the delusion that such a display of force could intimidate the Kashmiris". Earlier it had said, referring to the border incidents in its editorial of 4 September 1964, that it was significant that border raids by Indian troops had "shown a steep rise since the spread of popular agitation in Occupied Kashmir".

In order to stop these violations, both India and Pakistan approached each other for some action. In July 1964, the Government of India proposed to the Government of Pakistan the consideration of a gentleman's agreement to avoid these incidents. (197) This was repeated in India's letter to the President of the Security Council of 21 August 1964. (198) A suggestion was also made to Pakistan that both countries should accept the suggestion made by the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations in Kashmir in October 1963 that he should have power to give awards even against civilians if they were found committing breaches of the cease-fire agreement. (199) Pakistan, in response, asked the Government of India on 30 August 1964 to authorize its High Commissioner in Karachi to enter into negotiations to this effect. (200) This was agreed to by India. (201) After

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(200) *Pakistan Times*, 2 September 1964.

(201) Ibid.
consultations between the two Governments, it was announced that a
meeting of the two delegations would take place in Karachi between
2 and 4 November 1964. But on 31 October the Pakistani Government
asked for a postponement and it never took place. (202)

Thus, during June-October 1964, not only did the basic stands
of the two Governments of India and Pakistan remain unchanged, but
cease-fire violations in Kashmir also increased.

WORSERING OF RELATIONS: MID OCTOBER 1964
TO 5 AUGUST 1965

Whatever hopes for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute had been
revived with Sheikh Abdullah's release, his subsequent meetings with
the Indian and Pakistani leaders, and the exchange of cordial notes
between India and Pakistan after the death of Nehru, appeared to be
completely lost after the middle of October 1964. India went ahead
with its plan for the further integration of Kashmir with itself.
Pakistan protested strongly and took steps to integrate Azad Kashmir
with itself. Sheikh Abdullah, who had by now found that there were
no chances of a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, tried to contact
the Chinese for some help. This made him a renegade in Indian eyes
and resulted in his arrest. This, further, irritated the Pakistanis
and removed from the scene a man who had for some time tried to find
a solution for Kashmir. Pakistan's friendship with China increased
still further and Pakistan started opposing every measure that India
tried to take against the Chinese menace. An armed clash over the
Rann of Kutch, furthermore, embittered the relations. Even in
Kashmir, armed clash took place near Kargil. Talks of jehad continued

(202) Reports 1964-65, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India, pp. 41-42; also see Swaran Singh's statement in
Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 35, 23 November 1964,
col. 1214.
in Pakistan until infiltration on a massive scale of armed Pakistanis in Kashmir began on 5 August 1965.

**Steps for Further Integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by India and Pakistan's Reaction**

As early as 11 September 1964, a bill for the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had provided for the special status of Kashmir, was introduced in the Lok Sabha by a private member, Prakash Vir Shastri. (203) On 30 September, India's Home Minister, G.L. Nanda, announced that a proposal to extend some entries of the Union and Concurrent Lists of the Indian Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was under the consideration of the Government. (204) However, on 4 December 1964, Nanda opposed in the Lok Sabha the bill for the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution and the bill was defeated on the same day by a big majority, but he announced in the House the Government's decision to apply the provisions of Articles 356 and 357 and some entries of the Union and Concurrent Lists of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir. (205) A Presidential Order to apply Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir was accordingly issued on 21 December. (206) Soon after this, the ruling National Conference decided to merge with the Indian National Congress. (207) A final decision to introduce a


(204) Entry 65 of the Union List and entries 25, 30 and 39 of the Concurrent List. See Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 34, 30 September 1964, col. 4493.

(205) Ibid., vol. 36, 4 December 1964, cols 3452-64, 3477. These were entries 43 and 78 of the Union List and 33 and 34 of the Concurrent List.


(207) See decision of 3 January by the National Conference Working Committee, ibid., 5 January 1965.
bill in the Kashmir legislature to change the designations of the Heads of State and Government was also taken by the State Government on 28 February 1965 (208) and a bill to this effect was passed accordingly by the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly on 30 March 1965. (209)

As a reaction to these steps, the pro-Pakistan Plebiscite Front of Kashmir created some trouble in Kashmir, and 165 persons of that party were taken into custody on 7 March 1965 under the Defence of India Rules. (210) In Pakistan reactions to these Indian measures were sharp and bitter. As early as 5 November 1964, the Pakistani Government protested against the proposed move in the Indian Parliament to abrogate article 370 of the Indian Constitution. (211) Six days later it lodged another protest with the Indian Government against the extension of some Indian laws to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (212) On 25 November, Bhutto further warned the Indian Government against these measures and said that "if despite this, India should go forward with her plans for annexing the State, she should be doing so with full knowledge of the consequences of her recklessness". (213) Similar warnings were repeated in the Pakistani protest note, delivered on 4 December to the Government of India (214) and in the complaint on 17 December 1964.

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(208) Ibid., 1 March 1965.
(209) Ibid., 31 March 1965.
(210) Ibid., 8 March 1966.
(211) Pakistan Times, 6 November 1964.
(212) Ibid., 12 November 1964.
(213) Ibid., 26 November 1964.
to the President of the Security Council. (215) On 24 December, Bhutto further warned India of "serious consequences" in case the latter took the proposed measures with regard to Kashmir and talked about teaching "them a lesson". (216) A high-level conference also took place in Pakistan on 4 January 1966 under the chairmanship of its Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Habibullah Khan, which recommended certain measures against the Indian moves to "annex" Kashmir. (217) Five days later, Pakistan's Minister for Communications, Khan Abdul Sabur Khan, said that his Government would soon devise some method to liberate the four million Muslims of Kashmir. (218) A forceful debate, moreover, took place in the National Assembly on 21 January in which many members urged jehad and coercive action against India. (219) The Leader of the House, Khan Sabur Khan, declared that "Pakistan shall not stand by for ever while the rights and honour of their brethren in Kashmir are trampled under foot", (220) a statement which he repeated in the House the next day. (221) A threat to devise counter-measures against Indian designs was also given by President Ayub Khan on 29 March. (222) A note protesting

(215) For text of this note, see SCOR, yr 19, supplement for October, November, and December 1964, Doc. S/6114, pp. 319-20.
(217) Ibid., 5 January 1965.
(218) Ibid., 10 January 1965.
(219) See National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 1, 21 January 1965, pp. 301-20, for the statements of Murti Mahmood, Mansural Huq, Begum M.A. Ahmad, Farid Ahmad, Brig. S.A.A. Abbasi, and Ghulam Sabir Rana.
(220) Ibid., p. 320.
(221) Ibid., 22 January 1965, p. 329.
(222) Pakistan Times, 30 March 1966.
against the change in the designations of Sadar-i-Riyasat and Prime Minister of Kashmir was further sent to India in the first week of April 1966. (223) Slogans for _jehad_ were raised by Azad Kashmir's new President, Khan Abdul Hamid Khan. (224) India was threatened against any possible military venture by President Ayub Khan himself. (225)

The Delhi correspondent of _The Economist_, thus, felt that L.B. Shastri had "given Pakistan grave offense by whittling down Kashmir's separateness". (226)

**Further Merger of Azad Kashmir with Pakistan and Indian Protests**

Although Pakistan was violently protesting against the Indian steps to extend its jurisdiction over Kashmir, it was at the same time doing the same thing with regard to Azad Kashmir. As early as 23 September 1964, the Government of India protested against the reports of the replacement of the Azad Kashmir flag by the Pakistani flag and called it "a blatant infringement of the sovereignty of India and a further act of aggression on its territory". (227) On 5 March it complained to the President of the Security Council and said that it resented Pakistan's not replying to its note of 23 September 1964. It also protested against a newly promulgated Act in Pakistan - the Azad Government Act of 1964 - under which the

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(223) Ibid., 8 April 1965.


(226) _The Economist_, vol. 214, 2 January 1965.

President of the Azad Government and his Government could hold office for an indefinite period as long as "they continue to dance to the tune of Pakistan rulers". It complained against "a progressive annexation of the area", and called it "illegal and unconstitutional". (228)

Sheikh Abdullah's Rearrest and Reaction in Pakistan

Meanwhile, Sheikh Abdullah who had been out of India on a foreign tour since 22 February 1965, was pleading his case for the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris in Cairo and London. (229) During his tour the Sheikh was reported to be in close touch with the Pakistani missions abroad. (230) On 27 March Bhutto was reported to have announced China's invitation to the Sheikh to visit that country. (231) Four days later, the Sheikh also met Premier Chou En-lai of China. (232) On 2 April Bhutto further declared that Pakistan was prepared to grant Sheikh Abdullah a passport in case he was denied one by India to enable him to visit China if he so wished. (233)

(228) Ibid., Doc. S/6218, pp. 91-93.
(229) About his Press conference in Cairo on 7 March 1965, see The Hindit, 8 March 1965 and about his activities in London on 18 March, see Pakistan Times, 19 March 1965.
(232) Pakistan Times, 1 April 1965.
(233) Ibid., 3 April 1965.
All this evoked sharp reaction in India. The Government of India took exception to the Chinese invitation to the Sheikh, Sheikh Abdullah's meeting with the Chinese Premier, and his seeking support from the latter. It said that it would not allow Sheikh Abdullah to go to China (234) and that if he did "he will have to suffer the consequences". (235) Abdullah's attempts to obtain support from China, in particular, was regarded as "a highly prejudicial act", and the Government decided to cancel forthwith all the endorsements on his and his party's passports other than those necessary for the purposes of the Haj pilgrimage and declared the passports valid only till 30 April 1965. (236)

Although, in view of the strong reaction in India, the Sheikh decided not to go to China, he expressed, on 18 April, in an interview with APP in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, his determination to resort to force, if necessary, to recover the independence and sovereignty of Kashmir. (237) It was also reported by a British correspondent, Rawle Knox, that the Indian Government had the information that Sheikh Abdullah had hatched a "plot" in league with Pakistan under which he intended to raise the standard of revolt after his return in Srinagar which would have been supported, as in


(235) See Prime Minister Shastri's statement, in ibid., vol. 41, 2 April 1965, col. 7450; also Swaran Singh, ibid., cols 7428-9. In a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party on 2 April Shastri further said that the Sheikh would be declared a persona non grata if he visited China. See The Hindu, 3 April 1965.


1947, by an invasion of Pathan tribesmen and Kashmiri volunteers. The correspondent also wrote that "that some plot was afoot is fairly clear" and opined that the Sheikh's arrest, which took place subsequently, foiled the plot. (238)

The result was that soon after their return from foreign tour to Delhi on 8 May, Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg were arrested and interned at Ootacamund, in the Madras State. (239) Reporting the arrest, India's Home Minister, G.L. Nanda, said in the Rajya Sabha that Sheikh Abdullah and his associate were arrested under the Defence of India Rules, that the arrest had become "absolutely necessary", and that "their activities during the last two months or so had made it clear that unless some restrictions were placed on their movement they would act in a manner prejudicial to the external and internal security of the country", (240)

Sheikh Abdullah's arrest resulted in hartal and rioting in the Kashmir Valley, as a result of which the police resorted to firing in which four persons were killed. (241)

Sheikh Abdullah's arrest was considered by some to have destroyed the last hope of a Kashmir settlement. Criticizing the arrest, the New York Times (international edn) editorially wrote on 14 May, that "the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah now has made the termination of the Nehru experiment a black day not only for Kashmir


but for India and Pakistan as well. The Delhi correspondent of *The Economist*, although less critically but more accurately, observed: "The Kashmir issue is, in fact, back where it was before Abdullah's release last year. ... Instead of a bridge, as he hoped, he has become another rift between India and Pakistan". The correspondent also noted, at the same time, the difficulties of the Indian Government in the following words: "Letting the Sheik loose in Kashmir in the midst of the Rann of Kutch crisis was a risk he [Shastri] could hardly be expected to take." (242)

As expected, Pakistan strongly reacted to the arrest. As early as 8 April 1965, Bhutto had declared that if Sheikh Abdullah was arrested by India after his return from foreign tour, it would stand condemned in the eyes of the world and that its consequences would be quite serious. (243) Now that the Sheikh was actually arrested, he called upon his nation to dedicate itself to the cause for which the Sheikh stood, namely the liberation of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. (244) The Government of Pakistan also protested to the President of the UN Security Council against the arrest which was called "not only a provocation to the peoples of Kashmir and Pakistan but also an affront to and a defiance of, the Security Council". (245)

The slogan for jehad was once again raised in Pakistan. In the last week of May 1965, Khan Ajoon Khan, a member of the National

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(244) Ibid., 10 May 1965.

(245) See letter of the Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the United Nations dated 18 May 1965 to the President of the Council, as given in SCOR, yr 20, supplement for April, May, and June 1965, Doc. 37/6367, p. 150. Full text is given on pp. 145-50.
Assembly, issued a statement in Peshawar saying that 50,000 tribesmen were ready for the liberation of Kashmir. (246) On 22 May, the President of Azad Kashmir, Abdul Hamid Khan, said that his people were all set to fight their way through the cease-fire line to "liberate their oppressed brethren". (247) Early in July 1965 a group of members of the National Assembly expressed their support to "freedom fighters". (248) It was further disclosed on 28 May by the Azad Kashmir President, Abdul Hamid Khan, that his Government had ordered compulsory military training for students and people between the age of 16 and 45. (249) The Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary of 8 June 1965 also published a report about the constitution of a regular Pakistan Mujahid Force under the Pakistan Mujahid Force Ordinance 1965, with ranks and structure similar to those of the Pakistan Army. (250)

On 13 July, Z.A. Bhutto, went further and not merely reiterated that "Pakistan without Jammu and Kashmir is a country without a head" or that "Pakistan ... can never be complete without the people of Jammu and Kashmir forming part of Pakistan", but also said: "We do not believe any more that the United Nations must hold a plebiscite to determine whether the people of Jammu and Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan. The people of Jammu and Kashmir belong to Pakistan." (251) This statement was significant because

(248) Ibid., 4 July 1965.
(249) Pakistan Times, 29 May 1965.
(250) Ibid., 12 June 1965.
Bhutto now claimed Jammu and Kashmir even without a plebiscite.

India's attitude, on the other hand, became even more tough, probably because of its clash with Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch.

The Indian Home Minister, G.L. Nanda, declared on 1 July that Kashmir was an integral part of India and ruled out any talk with Pakistan on the subject. (252)

Cease-fire Violations

Meanwhile there was increased violation of the cease-fire in Kashmir. (253) A big clash took place near Kargil in which the Indian armed forces attacked and captured three posts on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line on 17 May 1965. (254) On 22 May Pakistan protested to India against this action (255) and on 13 June complained against further reported concentration of Indian troops in the area. (256) Letters were also addressed by Pakistan to the President of the Security Council on 18 (257) and 23 June 1965. (258) India,

(252) The Hindu, 3 July 1965.


According to the report of the Secretary-General in the first five months of 1965 there were 2,231 complaints in total from both sides charging violations of the cease-fire line. Of these, according to him, 377 violations had been investigated by the UN Observers out of which Pakistan was found to have committed violations on 218 occasions while Indian violations were 159. See Report of the Secretary-General, 3 September 1965, in SCOR, yr 20, supplement for July, August, and September 1965, Doc. S/6681, p. 241.

(254) See Pakistan's note of 22 May to India and its letter to the President of the Security Council of 18 June referred to in n. 255 and n. 257 respectively.


(256) Ibid., 14 June 1965.


on the other hand, justified its action by stating that in view of Pakistan's constant interference with its line of communication with Ladakh it was necessary for India to do so. (259) After the UN military observers team in Kashmir assured the Indian Government that there would be no attack on the road and after some UN observers were posted in the area, the Indian troops withdrew from the area. (260)

Further Sino-Pakistani Collaboration

During this period, Sino-Pakistani collaboration also increased in various ways. They signed a number of pacts such as an agreement for a Chinese loan to Pakistan, (261) a boundary protocol, and cultural, (262) shipping, (263) and banking (264) agreements. Of these the boundary protocol, which was signed on 26 March 1965, marked the completion of the demarcation of border between China and the contiguous areas of Pakistani Kashmir. (265) On 5 March 1965 China's Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Marshal Ch'en Yi, while addressing Pakistani correspondents, made a categorical declaration in Peking saying that in the event of aggression against a friendly Asian country, China, if asked, would

(260) Ibid., 23 June and 2 July 1965.
(261) Pakistan Times, 19 February 1965.
(262) Ibid., 27 March 1965.
(263) Ibid., 15 April 1965.
(264) Ibid., 17 June 1965.
(265) Ibid., 27 March 1965.
come to its assistance. (266) Early in March 1965 President Ayub Khan also visited China. (267) Both Pakistan and China further spoke for each other and against India. Pakistan repeatedly talked about India's 1962 aggression on China (268) vehemently attacked any idea of a nuclear shield (269) and further arms aid to India, (270) and also welcomed China's possession of the nuclear weapon. (271) China, similarly, supported Pakistan on Kashmir (272) and accused India of an "armed attack" in the Rann of Kutch. (273) In fact, there was a

(266) Ibid., 7 March 1965.

(267) For details see Peking Review, 5 March 1965, pp. 5-6 and ibid., 12 March 1965, pp. 8-9.


(269) See President Ayub Khan's view of 20 October 1964 in Pakistan Times, 21 October 1964. Also see Bhutto's concern shown to the British Commonwealth Secretary, Arthur Bottomley, ibid., 20 January 1965; Bhutto's speech in general debate of the UN General Assembly in GAOR, session 19, plen. mtg 1319, 22 January 1965, p. 14; also see the joint communique signed by Z.A. Bhutto and Chen Yi in Peking on 7 March in Pakistan Times, 8 March 1965 and in Peking Review, 12 March 1965, p. 10.

(270) On 3 January 1965 President Ayub Khan in an interview in Rawalpindi, held out little hope of improvement in US-Pakistani relations as long as the United States supplied arms to India, Pakistan Times, 4 January 1965.

(271) See reports in Pakistan Times, 19 October 1964. Also see editorial in ibid., 20 October 1964; also Bhutto's remarks in GAOR, session 19, plen. mtg 1319, 22 January 1965, p. 14.

(272) See the joint communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and China on 7 March in Pakistan Times, 8 March 1965. Text also in Peking Review, 12 March 1965, p. 10.

talk in Pakistan that "in China, Pakistan has not only found a
friendly neighbour but a steadfast ally". (274)

These developments and particularly the signing of the
boundary protocol between Pakistan and China, irritated India. It
protested against their decision to do so even before it was
signed. (275) After it was actually signed on 26 March, the
Government of India further protested against it in its communications
to the President of the UN Security Council of 27 April 1965 (276)
and 27 August 1965. (277)

Thus, from mid October 1964 to 5 August 1965, not only was
there no talk of a settlement but the situation deteriorated more
and more and the attitude of the two sides became much more hostile
and rigid than they had been at any previous time.

From the above survey, it becomes clear that the Kashmir
problem remained as insoluble during the period between May 1963
and August 1965 as it was before. In fact, except during the
period beginning with Sheikh Abdullah's release in April 1964 and

(274) Z.A. Suleri, "The President in China - III: Peking's World
Outlook", Pakistan Times, 17 March 1965; also see Z.A. Suleri,
"The President in China - I: A Friend Gained", ibid.,
14 March 1965.

(275) See India's protest notes to China and Pakistan respectively
of 10 and 13 March in The Hindu of 13 and 17 March 1965.
For India's protest note of 10 March 1965 to China, also see
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, n. 19,

(276) Text in SCOR, yr 20, supplement for April, May, and June

(277) See text in ibid., supplement for July, August, and
ending with the Ayub-Shastri meeting in mid October 1964 — and particularly during Sheikh Abdullah’s exploratory talks with the Indian and Pakistani leaders for a settlement of Kashmir in April-May 1964, when there were chances of solution of this issue — the problem proved more intractable than it was before. Except during the above mentioned phase, each side adopted hard and inflexible posture. Neither was prepared to make any concession to the other. Pakistan put several conditions to any move for mediation on Kashmir (as in August 1963), seized the opportunity of the theft of the holy relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Kashmir and brought the matter before the UN Security Council (early in 1964), continued to vilify India in the world forums and even bracketed it with Portugal as the only other colonial Power, criticized Western military aid to India and drew closer to China, strengthened its hold still further on Azad Kashmir, emphasized that any discussion of Indo-Pakistani problems must specifically be on Kashmir, contemptuously rejected the Indian offer of a no-war pact, indefinitely postponed an Indo-Pakistani meeting to normalize the cease-fire line (in October 1964), and made preparations, particularly from the beginning of 1965, to seize Kashmir by force, if necessary. India, on the other hand, withdrew (in August 1963) whatever concessions it had made to Pakistan during the talks between Bhutto and Swaran Singh, ruled out any third-party mediation on Kashmir, extended the laws of the Union to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and otherwise tried to bring the State closer to the rest of India, objected to any Indo-Pakistani talks confined to the Kashmir issue, put Sheikh Abdullah once more in prison in May 1965 for activities which it considered prejudicial to its interests, and temporarily captured in May 1965 some posts
across the cease-fire line in Azad Kashmir near Kargil when its line of communication with Leh was reported to be interrupted by the Pakistanis. Cease-fire violations were also rampant. All this brought Indo-Pakistani relations to a boiling point.