Chapter Eight

CONCLUSION
This study of Indo-Pakistani relations from September 1960 to September 1965 describes how they deteriorated from a point of near-amity to that of a full-fledged undeclared war. September 1960 was a very good period in Indo-Pakistani relations, while September 1965 was decidedly the worst. Throughout the period under study the relations of the two countries remained troubled, and the only period when there appeared to be a chance of their improving was from April 1964 to mid October 1964, i.e. during the last days of Nehru's and the early days of Shastri's Prime Ministership.

Except for the phase referred to above, a continuous process of deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations during the period under study can be seen, the pace of deterioration varying from time to time. From the point of view of pace of deterioration, it is possible to divide Indo-Pakistani relations during the period from September 1960 to September 1965 into the following seven short phases: (1) September 1960; (2) October 1960 to end of October 1962; (3) end of October 1962 to mid August 1963; (4) mid August 1963 to March 1964; (5) April 1964 to mid October 1964; (6) mid October 1964 to 4 August 1965; and (7) 5 August to 6 September 1965. In this process one notices that in September 1960 the relations were at a point near-amity. From that point they started deteriorating slowly from October 1960, and this process continued till the Chinese aggression on India in October 1962. After the Chinese aggression, the pace of deterioration was slightly accelerated, although it was kept well within limits mainly because of the good offices of the USA and the UK. The talks between
Z.A. Bhutto and Swaran Singh initiated by these Powers towards the end of 1962 broke down in May 1963 and the prospects of a settlement over the Kashmir question became still more bleak by August 1963 with the collapse of efforts at mediation between India and Pakistan. With this their relations entered upon a phase characterized by rapid deterioration. In March 1964 they touched a comparatively low point. In April 1964, however, a Home Ministers' conference between India and Pakistan took place. About the same time Sheikh Abdullah was released from his detention which was followed by his talks with the Indian and Pakistani leaders to find out some solution on Kashmir. A meeting between the heads of Governments of India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir problem also appeared imminent. All this reversed the process of deterioration and a hopeful phase in Indo-Pakistani relations began. This was further accentuated by the helpful attitude of Pakistan at the time of Nehru's death and by the pleasant exchanges between the new Indian Prime Minister, L.B. Shastri, and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. This lasted till mid October 1964, when a joint statement was issued by the two leaders. By that time, however, the two leaders had found that the difference in their basic stands was too wide. In fact, approximately since September 1964 the process of deterioration had again set in because by that time both India and Pakistan had started strengthening their hold over these parts of Kashmir which were under their respective control. The scheduled meeting between President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri and their subsequent joint statement of 12 October 1964 kept the process somewhat in check. But after the Ayub-Shastri talks of 12 October 1964 had failed to bring any basic change in the situation, the process of
deterioration gained strength. One after another a series of events followed, quickening the pace of deterioration. After the signing of the Kutch Agreement it was temporarily halted. During April-May 1965 when there was an armed clash over the Rann of Kutch and when Sheikh Abdullah was re-arrested, the relations touched a very low point and a general conflagration was averted only by the pressure of the Great Powers in general, and of Britain in particular. With the signing of the Kutch Agreement on 30 June 1965, the process of deterioration was halted for some time. But it was too short and was also unreal because by that time Pakistan had already made plans, and was preparing, for the seizure of Kashmir. From 5 August 1965, therefore, when large-scale infiltration of armed Pakistanis began in Kashmir, Indo-Pakistani relations reached their lowest point. Events moved quickly beginning with the entry of the Indian security forces into the Azad Kashmir area, followed by the Pakistani armoured thrust in the Chamb sector on 1 September, and an air battle in that area on the same day. Finally the Indian Army moved towards Lahore on 6 September 1965. Thus India and Pakistan entered into a full-fledged undeclared war.

Two types of factors - old and new - together worked in the almost (1) continuous deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations during the period under review. Old factors were of the following three varieties: (1) historical, which were inherited from the pre-Partition days; (2) those which emerged from the Partition and had continued since then; and (3) those which came up between August 1947 and September 1960 and continued to condition the relations during 1960-65.

(1) The word almost is used because it did not apply to the period from April 1964 to mid October 1964.
The factors which had operated from the pre-Partition days and which affected the relations of the two countries have been discussed in detail in the first chapter. Here it will suffice to say that all those factors had their impact during 1960-65 also. One point, however, needs some elaboration here. It is the opposition of the Congress to the partition of the Indian subcontinent almost till the agreement over the Partition in 1947. This has created a suspicion in the Pakistani mind that India might some day try to undo the Partition. The Pakistani suspicion is so deep that not only does Pakistan view with alarm any suggestion for Indo-Pakistani confederation — such as the one made by Nehru in December 1962 — but that any statement to the effect that the people of the two countries are similar is also resented. One can mention here the strong reaction expressed editorially by Dawn (Karachi) when Vinoba Bhave, while passing through East Pakistan in September 1962, said that he did not find any difference between the peoples of the two countries. Immediately Dawn carried an editorial on 8 September 1962 under the caption "The Folly of Letting Bhave Come" and referring to the above remarks by Bhave, wrote: "This is the very denial of the ideological basis of Pakistan and of the two-nation theory which alone could justify the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims."

Partition, moreover, created many irritating problems between India and Pakistan which remained unresolved till September 1960 — like the Kashmir dispute, border problems, minority and other such problems, the problem of the use of the eastern rivers, problems relating later to the Karnafuli dam and the Farakka barrage, etc. — which to a great extent determined Indo-Pakistani relations during the period from September 1960 to September 1965. Over Kashmir, a
conflagration took place in September 1965 and over the Rann of Kutch the armies of the two countries clashed in April 1966. As for the communal problem, serious riots took place in 1961, 1962, and 1964 in India and Pakistan which added to the bitterness in their relations. The riots of 1964, in particular, were most violent, the like of which had not taken place in the Indian subcontinent since 1950. Added to this was Pakistan's problem, since the Partition, of maintaining the unity of its two wings, East and West. There was trouble in East Pakistan in 1962 and in 1964. The Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan felt themselves very close to the Bengali Hindus there, and as a result during the communal disturbances in East Pakistan in January 1964 they were said to have tried to save the Bengali Hindus. (2) In the January 1965 election, moreover, Ayub received less support from East Pakistan that he did from West Pakistan. (3) The result was the renewed Pakistani emphasis on Islam, the only common link between the two wings of Pakistan, and this emphasis, in spite of the Pakistani claim that an Islamic society provided security to the non-Muslims there, only complicated the minority problem. The problem of maintaining unity between the two wings of Pakistan, together with some other factors discussed in Chapter Four, was perhaps also responsible for the perpetuation of tension along the border between India and East Pakistan. In fact, it is interesting to note that whereas, except for an armed clash over the Rann of Kutch, all was quiet on the border between India

(2) See Ch. Five, n. 133.

(3) He got only 20,720 from East Pakistan as against 28,927 from West Pakistan, whereas his main rival, Fatima Jinnah, secured as many as 18,080 votes from East Pakistan as against only 10,263 from West Pakistan. See Dawn, 3 January 1965.
and West Pakistan during the period under study, the reverse was
the case with the border between India and East Pakistan.

Again, many forces and problems created between 1947 and 1960
continued to embitter Indo-Pakistan relations during 1960-65. One
such force was US military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan's membership
of Western alliances and the corresponding Soviet support to India
over Kashmir. Another was the role of the Press, the political
parties and other media of public opinion of both the countries, in
preventing their Governments from taking a co-operative attitude
towards each other. Besides, the two countries were accused by each
other of taking undue interest in each other's internal problems –
Pakistan in the problems of the Nagas and the Mizo and the Akalis,
and India in East Pakistan's troubles and in Pakistan's Presidential
election of January 1965. Moreover, both sides charged each other,
as before, with the undesirable activities of their diplomatic
personnel and asked for their recall.

One notices that many new factors were in operation during
1960-65 and added to the worsening of Indo-Pakistan relations. The
most important of these factors was the Chinese aggression on India
and development of Sino-Pakistani collaboration since then. Although
Sino-Pakistani friendship had started developing since 1955, it had
not become till 1960 a direct factor in embittering Indo-Pakistan
relations. From January 1961, however, Sino-Pakistani friendship
started affecting Indo-Pakistan relations. The Chinese attack on
India in October 1962 greatly strengthened their friendship, and it
was viewed with alarm in India. It made the Pakistanis feel that
in China they had a friend, one who was a declared enemy of India
and whose support they could count on in the event of any Indo-
Pakistani showdown. On the other hand, it hardened the attitude
of India towards Pakistan, for, having already been humiliated by China, a stronger Power, it was no longer in a mood to make any further concession, however voluntary, to a weaker Power. Another new factor was India's decision to give priority to its defence following the Chinese attack of October 1962. India drew up a five-year defence plan. This irritated the Pakistanis because they feared that it would heavily upset the military balance in the Indian subcontinent against Pakistan. Pakistan, therefore, not only criticized any Western military aid to India but turned more and more towards China. Further, Pakistan wanted to change the status quo in Kashmir before it was too late. Moreover, since John F. Kennedy became President of the United States in January 1961, US attitude towards India had grown more friendly, and since the Chinese aggression on India, US military aid had started coming to India. This infuriated the Pakistanis and brought further tension in their relations with India. Again, occasional statements by the leading figures of India and Pakistan, like the one made by President Ayub Khan at Muzaffarabad on 6 October 1960, which revived the Indo-Pakistani cold war at that time, added to the bitterness. Although it is true that such statements were only the manifestations of their bad relations for which other factors were also responsible, it is also true that they accentuated the bitterness. There was thus a vicious circle.

During 1960-66 some new problems also emerged. For the first time the problem of the eviction of allegedly Pakistani Muslims from some of the eastern Indian States came to dominate and adversely affect Indo-Pakistani relations. Moreover, for the first time in Indo-Pakistani history, the libraries and reading-rooms of the Indian Mission at Dacca and Rajshahi and the Assistant High Commission
at Rajshahi were ordered to be closed by the Government of Pakistan in October and November 1963 respectively. The Indian Government, after Pakistan's failure to reconsider its decision, retaliated in May 1965 and ordered the closure of the Pakistani Assistant High Commission at Shillong.

Finally, several problems, such as those of food and language, came up in India in 1965, and the not-so-strong position of Nehru's successor, Shastri, until the middle of 1965, had its impact on Indo-Pakistani relations of that time. On the one hand, these problems encouraged Pakistan to adopt an inflexible posture; on the other, they hardened the attitude of the new Indian Government, which thought that Pakistan was trying to exploit the situation. Moreover, against this background, the new Indian Government was unable to take a bold and radical step to improve relations with Pakistan.

All the above factors together led to the worsening of Indo-Pakistani relations during 1960-65. Of all problems, Kashmir affected the relations between the two countries most decisively. This is true in more than one way. First, Pakistan refused to hold talks on other Indo-Pakistani problems without a meaningful discussion of this problem. It also refused to sign a no-war pact with India before this problem was solved to its satisfaction. Secondly, the dispute over Kashmir has always intensified other issues. But for this problem, the theft of the Holy relic would not have led to serious communal riots in East Pakistan in January 1964 and started a chain reaction in the subcontinent. Again, whenever the issue was debated in the Security Council — for example, in early 1962 and early 1964 — there were communal
disturbances, border clashes, and other kinds of tension between the two countries. Moreover, when tension rose high over Kashmir towards the end of 1964, Indo-Pakistani relations in general began deteriorating, border problems increased, the proposed Ministerial conference to consider the minority problem and a meeting of the delegations of the two countries to discuss border incidents were first postponed and then cancelled. The Pakistani attempt to change the status quo with regard to the Rann of Kutch early in 1965 was also considered to be a prelude to the final Pakistani attempt to seize Kashmir. The result of all this was that the pace of deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations was often determined by this problem. Finally, it was largely due to Kashmir that Communist China became a factor in Indo-Pakistani relations. Pakistan needed an enemy of India which could help it in Kashmir, and China, besides other things, by supporting the Pakistani case over Kashmir, gained Pakistani friendship. Besides this, the Sino-Pakistan border agreement, which offended India, related to the demarcation of the boundary between China and Azad Kashmir.

The fundamental difficulty regarding Kashmir arises from the fact that both India and Pakistan are deeply committed to it and each has strong reasons for doing so. From the Pakistani point of view Kashmir must go to Pakistan because of the following reasons: (1) It gives completeness to the idea of Pakistan; it is the only area of the subcontinent whose fate has not yet been decided in accordance with the two-nation theory to which Pakistan owes its existence. In fact, the letter K in the word Pakistan (which was first coined by one Rahmat Ali Chaudhry in 1931), stands for Kashmir, whereas P stands for Punjab, A for Afghan area of North-West Frontier Province, S for Sind and T for Baluchistan. (4)

(4) Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961),
(2) Pakistan's economy is dependent on the rivers of Kashmir and its
defence is vulnerable as long as India holds Kashmir because India
can more effectively and easily take offensive against Pakistan with
its army in Kashmir. (3) The economy and communications and also
the religion of the Kashmiris are more closely linked with those of
Pakistan than with those of India. (4) Pakistan feels that an
injustice has been done to it because India has held not only States
such as Jammu and Kashmir, whose ruler had acceded to India, but also
States like Junagadh, whose Nawab had acceded to Pakistan. Pakistan
feels the "injustice" all the more because it can do little in view
of its inferiority in strength vis-a-vis India, and also because,
contrary to Pakistan's expectations, India has consolidated and
integrated all the native Indian States contiguous to it. (5) Pakistan,
claiming itself to be the logical champion of the Muslims in the
subcontinent, feels interested in the lot of the Kashmiris and wants
the right of self-determination to be given to them.

India has equally strong reasons to be interested in Kashmir.
They are: (1) India, whose Muslims constitute numerically the third
largest Muslim community in the world, cannot afford to believe in
the two-nation theory. To accept the two-nation theory is to make
its 60 million Muslims aliens in their own homeland and may break
India into many parts. (2) Giving away of Kashmir to Pakistan will
bring intolerance among the majority community and may be detrimental
to the interests of the Muslim population in India. (3) To grant the
right of self-determination or of secession to any part of India
which has remained as its integral part of it for quite some time
and the people of which are similar to Indians in general, may
encourage the Akalis, the Nagas, the Mizos, and many others to demand
a similar right, and this will be detrimental to the interests of India. (4) A weak India will only create a power vacuum in this part of the world and other Powers, and China in particular, will try to fill it. This will be against the interests of the peace and well-being of Asia and the world. (5) Kashmir is necessary for India also for its defence against China. (6) India strongly feels that the State belongs to it in every way. It has legally acceded to the Indian Union and, politically, its most important political party, the National Conference, has supported the accession. The people of Kashmir have also done so in three general elections. It contends that the plebiscite could not take place in the State because Pakistan failed to implement the conditions precedent to a plebiscite as laid down by the resolution of the UNCIP of August 1948 and January 1949. It further contends that it had agreed to a plebiscite in the circumstances which have changed altogether today. If this contention of India is examined in the light of the findings of Michael Brecher, in his book The Struggle for Kashmir, it could conveniently be said that if a plebiscite had been held at least until 1961, Jammu and Kashmir, including the Valley, would have opted for India. Brecher says on the basis of his interviews in 1951 with about two hundred people in the Valley, that only 10 per cent of the total population of the Valley, those who depended on tourist trade, were inclined to favour Pakistan while "the overwhelming majority ... favour the continuation of the present pro-
Indian Government of Jammu and Kashmir. (5) He also writes that the impression of most foreigners to the contrary is only because they deal mostly with those who depend on the tourist trade. (6)

Apart from the above-mentioned stakes of India and Pakistan, the people of the two countries are so emotionally involved in the issue that it is difficult for either Government to make any big concession to the other over this problem. The result was that the armies of the two countries openly clashed with each other on this issue in September 1965.

This being the case, any major concession by one party to the other must be ruled out. What, then, could be the solution? After ruling out any major concession, the only possible alternatives that remain are: (1) partition; (2) an independent Kashmir with a joint guarantee from both India and Pakistan, and possibly the United Nations; and (3) a condominium. Both Pakistan and India have emphatically ruled out the last two alternatives. They do not want an independent Kashmir because each has a vital stake in Kashmir and also because they are afraid that an independent Kashmir may become an arena of world power politics. A condominium is ruled out because that will complicate the problem rather than solve it. So, the only possible solution of the problem that remains is the partition of the Jammu and Kashmir State. But when we come to the


partition idea, we are again confronted with the difficulties. Which portion should go to India, and which to Pakistan? During the talks between Shutto and Swaran Singh in 1962-63, their respective claims demonstrated a very big gap. However, if we take the issue rationally, we can see that even on the basis of the two-nation theory Jammu and Ladakh should go to India. The main hitch, therefore, is over the Kashmir Valley. Most Pakistanis and Indians realize this. A solution, therefore, lies in the partition of the Valley. The question of what portion of the Valley should remain with whom could only be settled mutually by negotiation between the parties themselves.

A question now arises as to whether, as Pakistan claims, (7) a solution of the Kashmir problem itself will improve Indo-Pakistani relations, or whether, as India contends, a general improvement in their relations is necessary for the solution of the Kashmir problem. Any objective answer to this will be that both are partially true and that neither can be completely separated from the other. As we have seen, without a solution of the Kashmir problem, Pakistan is not prepared to normalize its relations with India. Moreover, this problem has often accentuated other problems and brought deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations. Similarly, it can easily be said that none of the Indo-Pakistani problems, least of all Kashmir, can be solved without a congenial atmosphere, for the more

(7) There is a section in Pakistan, however, which does not believe in this. That section feels that "the antipathy of India toward Pakistan is much deeper" and goes to the length of stating that "out relations with India will only improve if by some miracle of modern science we could physically get us away from its border". See Mian Ziauddin, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Pakistan Times (Lahore), 23 March 1964. Opposite to this has been the view of a Pakistani writer Arif Hussain, as given in subsequent pages of this chapter.
serious a problem, the greater the need for understanding between any two countries. Besides, any agreement over this problem without a full understanding between the parties will only aggravate it.

More or less a similar answer, with a difference, can be given to another question. This is whether Kashmir itself is the disease of Indo-Pakistan relations or whether it is merely a symptom of the disease, the disease being a deeper mistrust and some greater conflicts between the two countries. It cannot be denied that even if Kashmir is not the main disease, it is at least one which aggravates the disease and prevents cure. At the same time, the conflict over Kashmir is the result of some deeper conflicts — conflict of interests, conflict of ideologies, conflict of status, conflicts dating back to the pre-Partition days. One can go beyond this and say that since there are some deeper conflicts between the two countries, a solution of the Kashmir question has not been possible. (8)

What then are the prospects for improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations? All that can be said for the present is that there is no immediate possibility of any marked improvement in their relations. The reason is that suspicion between them is too great, (9) their

(8) A Pakistani writer, Arif Hussain, has clearly recognized it in his recently published book. He writes: "Both countries [India and Pakistan] have evolved an image of the other which further complicates resolution of the [Kashmir] problem. For it is possible that even after the solution of the Kashmir disputes relations between the two countries may remain hostile. ... In such a situation not only does the resolution of disputes become difficult but even where this is achieved it does not necessarily change the image, though it may ease the tensions." Arif Hussain Pakistan; Its Ideology And Foreign Policy (London, 1966), p. 77.

(9) Arif Hussain believes that "the real stumbling block [in the path of Indo-Pakistan friendship] has been the original suspicion of each other, reinforced by an opposing world outlook". Hussain, n. 8, p. 173.
attitudes have been too hard and inflexible, and public opinion in
these two countries is so worked up that the Governments are in no
position to make any sudden or radical change in policies towards
each other. This hostility has been perpetuated by the undeclared
Indo-Pakistani war of September 1965. Furthermore, China has been
a big stumbling-block, preventing the two countries from coming
nearer, and it will continue to be so as long as Sino-Indian
relations are strained.

There are, on the other hand, some factors which may help in
bringing India and Pakistan together. First, for the first time in
contemporary history, the USA and the USSR are finding their
interests overlapping, rather than competitive, in the Indo-Pakistani
subcontinent. This was clearly demonstrated in their attitude
towards the Kutch conflict and the Indo-Pakistani conflagration of
September 1965 and in their effort in January 1966 to bring India
and Pakistan to a conference table at Tashkent. This is a great
change from their original position, the USA supporting Pakistan and
the Soviet Union supporting India on issues like Kashmir. It should
also be mentioned here that the leverage of USA and the USSR is
quite high in India and Pakistan; both India and Pakistan are very
much dependent on the two super Powers for economic aid and assistance
as well as for their defence requirements. In these circumstances,
it is difficult for both India and Pakistan to defy the joint moves
of the two Great Powers. Secondly, there has been a group in India
since 1964 called the India-Pakistan Conciliation Group, led by
J.P. Narayan, which believes in and tries for better relations with
Pakistan. This group visited Pakistan in September 1964 and tried
to form a corresponding group there, but it did not succeed in its
mission. Moreover, the Swatantra Party of India has always believed, since its formation in 1959, in improved relations with Pakistan and since the Kutch crisis of 1965, the Communist Party (Rightist) of India and the Marxist Communist Party have also changed their tough line towards Pakistan and have started pleading for better relations with it. A recently published book by a Pakistani, holding the view that "the negative aspect of Pakistan's ideology, i.e., hatred of India, has served its purpose" and that "now nationalism [in Pakistan] can only be strengthened by more positive factors", (10) gives an indication that a school of thought has emerged in Pakistan which wants normal relations with India. Thirdly, the undeclared Indo-Pakistani war of September 1965 demolished many misconceptions of the two countries and taught quite a few lessons to them. It demonstrated the futility of the use of force by either of the parties as a means to the solution of the problems between them. It has also indicated that none could give a crushing blow to the other, that India, in spite of all its divisive forces, was not going to collapse in the event of strong external pressure, that the Muslims of India and the non-Muslims of Pakistan were first of all nationals of their own homelands, that both the countries had to make their stands flexible for any solution of the Kashmir problem, and that another show of arms over Kashmir would only be suicidal to them, bringing economic disruption and misery to both. Finally, few countries are as contiguous in their geographical location, and as similar

(10) Hussain, n. 8, p. 177.
in language, culture, religion, (II) and many other things, as are India and Pakistan.

Such being the case, it may be said that if the two countries stop suspecting each other's motives, if they further change their mutual outlook, if the Governments, Press and leaders of the two countries stop inciting their peoples against each other and change their mutual inflexible stands on Kashmir, and, above all, if a psychology of mutual acceptance is created — by India accepting the permanence of Pakistan as a sovereign state and by Pakistan reconciling itself to the comparative bigness of India in size and resources and its consequent position in the family of nations — their relations may some day improve. The fact that the Franco-German relations, which were bitterly hostile from 1870 down to the Second World War, did improve after that war and that US-USSR relations, after a fifteen-year period of cold war, did radically improve in the sixties, strengthens our hope in this regard. Moreover, as is evident in international relations a state of tension between the two countries is never permanent. It is possible, therefore, that some day Indo-Pakistani relations will also normalize.

(II) In spite of the fact that whereas Pakistan is predominantly Muslim and the bulk of the Indian population consists of Hindus, there is a large and important Muslim minority in India — which has the third largest concentration of Muslim population in the world after Pakistan and Indonesia — and a sizable Hindu minority in Pakistan, especially in the eastern wing of that country.