Chapter Seven

TOWARDS CONFLAGRATION
As noted in the previous chapters, the attitudes of India and Pakistan towards each other hardened particularly since the closing months of 1964. There was serious talk in certain responsible Pakistani circles about the urgent need to "liberate" Kashmir and to devise plans for the purpose. On the Gujarat-Sind border, the dispute over the Rann of Kutch took the ugly shape of an armed clash, in which Pakistan used Patton tanks. Things, however, had yet not gone out of hand. But when there began on 5 August 1965 a massive armed infiltration into Kashmir from the Pakistani side, events marched fast. An almost full-fledged, though undeclared, war between the two countries began on 1 September, a war which further escalated on 6 September when the Indian infantry marched towards Lahore. Indo-Pakistani relations now touched their lowest point.

INfiltration in Kashmir: Its Beginning, Organization, and Nature

Beginning of Infiltration

The infiltration of armed personnel into Kashmir from the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line began on 5 August at various points. (1) It took place across the cease-fire line in several

(1) See the report of the Secretary-General of 3 September 1965, United Nations, Security Council (UN, SC), Distr., General, Doc. S/6651 (Mimeo.), p. 3; also see statement of Y.B. Chavan, India's Defence Minister, in India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 44, 16 August 1965, col. 127; Message dated 4 September 1965 from the Prime Minister of India to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6672 (Mimeo.), p. 2; G. Parthasarathi's statement in the debate of the UN Security Council, S/PV.1237 (Provisional) (Mimeo.), 4 September 1965, p. 61.
selected sectors like Chaknot, Keran, and Tithwal up in the north and Uri, Poonch, Mendhar, Rajaure, and Naushera in the western sector. The infiltrators also crossed into the Chamb and Samba sectors of the international border of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (2) Their number in the beginning was estimated above a thousand, (3) but was soon discovered to be several thousands, nearing about 5,000. (4) They were first noticed on 5 August in large groups in the south-west of Gulmarg, where an encounter took place between them and the Indian security forces. (5) From then onwards a series of armed clashes were reported. (6)

Organization, Nature, and Object of Infiltrators

From the interrogation of prisoners captured by the Indian forces from among the infiltrators, many of whom appeared to be regular officers of the Pakistani Army, it was revealed that the infiltration was directed from the Pakistani military headquarters set up in May 1965 at Murree in West Pakistan under Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, General Commanding Officer, 12th Infantry

(2) Parthasarathi, n. 1; see also all other sources in n. 1.


(4) See Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 61 who gave the figure "about 5,000". M.C. Chagla gave its number as between 4,000 to 5,000. See S/PV.1239 (Provisional) (Mimeo.), 17 September 1965, pp. 28-30. L.B. Shastri gave the figure in his speech of 26 September 1965 as between five to seven thousands. See Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, When Freedom is Menaced: Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri August 13 - September 26, 1965 (Delhi, 1965), p. 52.


Division of the Pakistani Army. These infiltrators were trained there in guerrilla warfare and in the handling of arms. (7) Their organization was known as Headquarters Gibraltar Forces. (8) They had been given six weeks special training. Most of them belonged to the Azad Kashmir forces. Each column was reported to have consisted of 300 regular troops and 100 each of Razakars and Mujahids who acted as Porters and were commanded by a major with captains and JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers), as company commanders. (9) They were officered by Pakistani Army personnel. (10) Each small group of infiltrators was reported to have consisted of three persons: a combatant soldier, a Mujahid, and a helper called Razakar, who was more or less a coolie for carrying supplies. (11) They were officered by Pakistani Army personnel.

(7) See Chavan, n. 5, col. 127; Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 63; L.B. Shastri, Doc. S/6672, n. 1, p. 2; Chagla, n. 4, p. 26; The Statesman, 13 August 1965; and The Hindu (Madras); 14 August 1965. Also see The Observer (London), 15 August 1965 and the editorial of New York Times (international edn), 25 August 1965. That Major-General Malik was in charge of the campaign was also illustrated by a document captured from a Pakistani officer, containing instructions from Major-General Malik to Brig. Niazi regarding the infiltration operations in Kashmir. See its photostat copy in The Statesman, 16 September 1965.

(8) Same as n. 7 except the reports from The Observer and New York Times.

(9) The Statesman, 13 August 1965; The Hindu, 14 August 1965; also see the interview of UN observers with a captured infiltrator in the report of the Secretary-General of 3 September 1965, S/6651, n. 1, p. 11.

(10) See Chavan, n. 5, col. 128; also see James Keat's report in Baltimore Sun, 13 August 1965 as reported in World Press Review (New Delhi), no. 526, 17 August 1965.

(11) See K. Rangaswami, "Is Any Let-up Possible Against Pak?", The Hindu, 17 August 1965; also Chavan, n. 5, col. 128.
equipped with rifles, sten-guns, light machine guns, grenades, rocket launchers, and explosives. (12) Each company commander was also reported to have carried Indian currency worth Rs 9,000, and from one such officer Indian currency worth Rs 5,000 was recovered. (13)

The infiltrators were to remain hidden and to participate in the procession proposed to be taken out on 9 August at Srinagar to protest against the detention of Sheikh Abdullah. (14) Perhaps, their "most important aim ... was to enter the city of Srinagar, coinciding with an expected demonstration by some political parties on the 9th August in the hope that they could so disorganise the affair as to give the resulting situation the complexion of an armed rebellion". (15) They were supposed to capture Srinagar and especially its adjacent airfield. (16) They were required to blow up strategic bridges, raid supply dumps, destroy places of strategic importance, kill important persons, and create commotion in Kashmir. (17)

(12) Chavan, n. 5, col. 129; also Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 62; see also James Keat's despatch in Baltimore Sun, 13 August 1965, as produced in World Press Review, n. 10.


(14) See Rangaswami, n. 11.


(16) Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 61.

(17) See Chavan, n. 5, col. 127; Shastri's letter of 4 September 1965 to the Secretary-General, n. 1, p. 2; Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 61; The Statesman, 13 August 1965; The Hindu, 14 August 1965.
PAKISTANI COMPLICITY AND PLANNING OF INFRINGEMENT

Pakistan's Complicity

Pakistan pretended ignorance of all this and denied complicity in any form whatsoever in the matter. Its Foreign Minister, Z.A.Bhutto, said on 10 August 1965 that what was happening in Jammu and Kashmir was merely the intensification of the "liberation struggle which they [the people of Kashmir] have been carrying on for the past 17 years" and pleaded that "the responsibility of the rebellion cannot be attributed to Pakistan". (18) He repeated the same thing on 12 and on 15 August. (19) Pakistan also informed the UN Secretary-General on 12 August that none of its forces had infiltrated into "Indian-occupied" Kashmir and that so far as Pakistan was aware, no Azad Kashmir forces had crossed the cease-fire line. (20)

Pakistan advanced two arguments in this connexion. First, it referred to General Nimmco's observation that in most cases the actual identity of those engaged in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the cease-fire line and the actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation and evidence. (21) Secondly, it was argued that it was not possible for these "infiltrators" to escape the vigilant eye of six divisions of the Indian Army and to penetrate a "heavily patrolled border". (22) It was also argued by

(18) Pakistan Times (Lahore), 11 August 1965.
(19) Ibid., 13 and 16 August 1965.
(20) Ibid., 14 August 1965.
(21) See text of the telegram received on 6 September 1965 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the President of Pakistan, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6666 (mimeo.), p. 4.
(22) See editorial of Pakistan Times, 16 August 1965; also see Abdul Majid, "Weekly Commentary. The Kashmir Uprising", ibid., 17 August 1965; Khalida Qureshi, "Diplomacy of the India-Pakistan War", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol. 18 (1965), p. 360.
President Ayub Khan that if more than six divisions of the Indian Army deployed along the cease-fire line were unable to prevent the people of Azad Kashmir from moving across the line to aid "the armed uprising of their compatriots in occupied Kashmir", it could hardly be expected that "the much fewer troops of the Pakistan Army would be able to seal the Line against them...". (23)

That none of these arguments was valid is clear. With regard to the first Pakistani argument, "in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the CPL [cease-fire line]", it was clear that they had come into Kashmir from across the Pakistani side. (24) Moreover, in many cases, as indicated by General Nimmo's letter of 30 August 1965 to the Secretary-General, their identity was also clearly established. (25) Thus, as the Secretary-General wrote in his report of 3 September 1965,

General Nimmo has indicated to me that a series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CPL [cease-fire line] from the Pakistani side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This is a conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of the investigations by the United Nations Observers... (26)

As regards the second Pakistani argument, relating to the impossibility of Pakistanis entering a heavily guarded frontier, two things may be mentioned here. As the Secretary-General himself

(23) President Ayub's telegram, n. 21, p. 4.
(24) Secretary-General's report of 3 September 1965, Doc. S/6651, n. 1, p. 4.
(26) Ibid., p. 4.
reports, half of the 500-mile-long cease-fire line is in high mountains and is not easily accessible. (27) Moreover, the cease-fire line was "fixed ad hoc and does not follow natural features providing easy defence against infiltration". (28) This being the case, it is difficult to guard against infiltration particularly when we find that India has not been able to stop the movement of the Nagas to and from East Pakistan. Secondly, as was reported, heavy artillery cover along the cease-fire line was provided by Pakistan to these infiltrators. (29)

Pakistan's hand in the whole affair is also established on many other grounds. In the first place, the Pakistani leaders themselves indirectly admitted their complicity in the infiltration move. In a number of statements, leaders of the Azad Kashmir Government expressed their pledge of sympathy and support to the "freedom fighters", (30) and so did Foreign Minister Bhutto. (31) Governor Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of West Pakistan, (32) and Pakistan's Home and Kashmir Affairs Minister, Chaudhari Ali Akbar. (33) Chaudhari Ali Akbar also said that none could question the right of the Azad Kashmiris to go to the help of their brethren in "Occupied" Kashmir and be there, (34) an argument which was proudly repeated by Bhutto.

(27) Ibid., p. 2.
(28) Chavan, n. 5, col. 130.
(29) Parthasarathi, n. 1, pp. 66, 69-70; also see Secretary-General's report of 3 September 1965, n. 1, p. 4.
(30) Pakistan Times of 11, 12, and 18 August 1965.
(31) Ibid., 13 and 16 August 1965.
(32) Ibid., 17 August 1965.
(33) Ibid., 19 August 1965.
(34) Dawn (Karachi), 19 August 1965.
On 19 August Bhutto said that India's threats of war and aggression would not deter Pakistan from supporting the "freedom fighters" and that "the cease-fire line was not a permanent arrangement ... it was a temporary line" and asked: "How can Pakistan commit aggression against her own people? The Kashmiri people are our kith and kin." (35) Later, in the National Assembly of Pakistan, Bhutto further declared: "... the people of Pakistan have every right to help and support their brethren in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, in this war we have proved that we shall give and make any sacrifice" for them. (36)

Arms, ammunition, and the clothes captured from the infiltrators also proved their Pakistani origin because the arms and ammunition bore Pakistani markings and the clothes resembled those of the Pakistani scouts and soldiers. (37) Moreover, as New York Times (international edn) editorially wrote on 25 August 1965: "Where could the arms have come from except from Pakistan?"

Pakistan's hand was also established from the publicity of the news about the acts of the infiltrators. The broadcasts of "Sada Kashmir" (Voice of Kashmir) Radio were quite frequently monitored by Azad Kashmir Radio, (38) and Pakistani newspapers gave wide


(37) See the Secretary-General's report of 3 September 1965, n. 1, pp. 10-19; see also James Keat's report in Baltimore Sun, 13 August 1965, n. 2; Chavan, n. 5, col. 128; see photographs of the arms, ammunition and clothes captured from the infiltrators in Government of India, Pakistan's Attempt to Grab Kashmir (Delhi, 1965), pp. 5-9.

(38) See Pakistan Times of 9, 12, 14, and 18 August 1965.
publicity to the "revolt" in Kashmir. To quote the Commonwealth correspondent of The Observer (London): "Without Pakistani official news sources it would have been hard to obtain information about the "revolutionary" Council's activities." (39) In fact, as was later reported, the "Sadal Kashmir" Radio station was also known to be located in Azad Kashmir — at Khari, six miles from Muzaffarabad (40) and the voice employed by that Radio was said to be that of an Information Officer of the Information Department of the Government of Pakistan. (41)

The two documents captured from the Pakistani infiltrators — one containing a set of operational instructions of 29 August 1965 from Major-General Malik, General Officer Commanding, 12th Pakistan Division, to Brigadier Fazle Rahim and the other a file containing letters of 7 July 1965 written by one Major Ahmad Khan to the City Magistrate, Lyallpur — further substantiated Pakistan's complicity in the infiltration. (42)

As reported earlier, the interrogation of the captured infiltrators also confirmed that they were Pakistanis and that they had been sent by the Pakistani Government.

Pakistan's failure to give an assurance to the Secretary-General that the cease-fire and the cease-fire line would be

(40) Chavan, n. 5, col. 127.
respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normalcy along the line, as demanded by the latter, also gives an inkling of Pakistani designs. (43)

The foreign Press and observers, moreover, overwhelmingly acknowledged Pakistan's complicity. (44)

**Pakistani Planning**

The fact that Pakistan started training the infiltrators at Murree in May 1965 has been mentioned earlier. But when exactly did Pakistan decide to send infiltrators into Kashmir to seize the State?

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(43) See the Secretary-General's report of 3 September 1966, n. 1, p. 6.

In Chapter Two it has already been stated that there was a strong move in Pakistan in 1961-62 to send "freedom-fighters" into Kashmir. But for certain reasons which have been explained in that chapter, Pakistan decided not to do so. Pakistan, however, always tried to keep the door open to any such manoeuvre at a future date. We have already noticed in Chapter Three that Pakistan consistently refused to sign a non-aggression agreement with India. And significantly the reason advanced for the refusal was that the signing of any such pact by Pakistan would mean that Pakistan recognized the status quo in Kashmir. (45) In other words, Pakistan had made it clear long back that it would even use force to seize Kashmir. (46) Moreover, when in October 1963, on 24 June 1964, and on 8 March 1965 the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations in Kashmir suggested to India and Pakistan that they should consider problems arising from the cease-fire violations in Kashmir, India agreed but Pakistan was unresponsive. (47) In fact, even after agreeing to an Indian proposal for a meeting on 2 November 1964 between the Indian and Pakistani representatives to consider this problem, Pakistan asked for an indefinite postponement of the meeting, and that never took place. (48) Pakistani leaders also spoke contemptuously of the inviolability of the cease-fire line, stated repeatedly that if the resolutions of the UNCIP of August 1948 and January 1949 regarding the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir were obsolete, the cease-fire line also was obsolete, (49) and that if the United Nations

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(45) See Ch. Three.
(46) See Chs Two and Three.
(47) See Ch. Three; also see Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 48; and Chagla, n. 4, p. 36.
(48) See Ch. Three; also Chagla, n. 4, p. 36.
(49) Chs Two and Three.
was not able to settle the Kashmir problem, it would be difficult for Pakistan to prevent its nationals from going to the help of the "freedom-fighters" of Jammu and Kashmir. (50)

About the end of 1964, and more specifically, from the beginning of 1965, it appears certain that Pakistan started planning an attack on Kashmir. On 14 November 1964, Bhutto talked about devising "a master plan" effectively to counter the Indian threat. (51) On 4 January 1965 a high-level conference was held in Pakistan under the chairmanship of Pakistan's Minister for Home and Kashmir Affairs, Khan Habibullah Khan, to recommend measures to counter the Indian move to "annex" Kashmir. (52) President Ayub Khan also said that if a peaceful solution of Kashmir was not found, the final solution would result in greater loss to India (53) and that Pakistan would take counter-measures if India stuck to its "forcible occupation" of Kashmir. (54) Compulsory military training for students and people in Azad Kashmir between the age of 16 and 45 was also introduced. (55) Moreover, a regular Mujahid force, with rank and structure similar to the Pakistani Army was set up under the Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary of 8 June 1965. (56) Even after the signing of the Kutch Agreement, Pakistan

(50) See Chs Two and Three.

(51) Pakistan Times, 15 November 1964.

(52) Ibid., 5 January 1965.

(53) See his statement of 1 February, ibid., 2 February 1965.

(54) Statement of 29 March, ibid., 30 March 1965.


(56) Ibid., 12 June 1965.
continued to keep its troops in forward areas. To quote the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, General Mohammad Musa, "I decided to retain our field Army in the forward concentration areas. Foreseeing the terrible eventuality that came upon us, I kept this Army there for over five months. Because it was there, I was immediately able to move it to battle positions when the invasion came." (57) It was also reported that during the second week of July 1965 all the commanders connected with Operation Gibraltar were summoned to Murree where President Ayub Khan addressed them personally and explained to them the task which they were to accomplish in Kashmir. (58)

**Infiltration of 1965 Compared with the Tribal Invasion on Kashmir of 1947**

A close parallel can be noticed between the tribal raids of 1947 and the infiltration of August 1965. Like the tribal invasion of 1947, Pakistan denied its complicity in the infiltration move of 1965. Again, even as Pakistan admitted its involvement in the matter in 1948, so it did this time although in a sophisticated manner. Thirdly, as it did in 1947, Pakistan argued in 1965 that if it was not possible for India with a much bigger army than that of Pakistan to stop these intruders, Pakistan, with a far less smaller army, could hardly prevent them from entering Kashmir. Finally, as will be seen in the subsequent pages, in 1965 also the invasion by the armed personnel in civilian clothes was followed by an attack on Kashmir by the regular Army of Pakistan.


There were, however, two differences. First, according to reports, this time the raiders had instructions to pretend to be "liberators" and to refrain from harassing the local people, although these instructions were not followed. (59) Secondly, and more significantly, the intruders this time were trained personnel, having received training in guerrilla warfare, and were also reported to have been trained by the Chinese. (60)

CAUSES OF INFILTRATION

What led Pakistan to send armed infiltrators, and then its regular Army, into Jammu and Kashmir? The answer to this question is more important because India had warned Pakistan beforehand and Nehru had specifically stated in 1962 that an attack on Jammu and Kashmir in any form would be considered an attack on India and would lead to an all-out war between the two countries. (61) The following reasons can be given to explain the Pakistani actions of 1965:

(59) When they ran short of supplies and the local people refused to collaborate with the infiltrators, they again indulged in atrocious acts. See Chavan, n. 5, cols 129-30. Also see K. Rangaswami, "Unfolding Tale of How Pak.'s Grand Designs Failed", The Hindu, 29 August 1965.


(61) See Ch. Two.
As explained in the chapters on Kashmir, it had been repeatedly stated by the Pakistani leaders, particularly by President Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister, Bhutto, that there could be no peace between India and Pakistan unless the question of Kashmir was solved to their satisfaction. It had also been repeatedly declared that Pakistan was incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir and that even without a plebiscite, the State belonged to Pakistan. That being the case, Pakistan was ready to take any measure to get Kashmir. As we know the Pakistani President had already indicated as early as November 1962 that there were only two ways of settling the Kashmir dispute, by peaceful means and by force, and that for the time being he preferred the former method. From the end of 1964 onwards the tone of his pronouncements as well as that of his Foreign Minister was more and more in favour of forcible action, and there were talks of teaching India "a lesson". As Bhutto also declared in UN Security Council later, "we will wage a war for 1,000 years" for Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, the most important cause of Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir from 5 August 1965 onwards and the Pakistani armoured attack in the Chhamb sector on 1 September


(63) See Ch. Three.

(64) See Ch. Two.

(65) See Ch. Three.


later was the Pakistani design to seize Kashmir by whatever means possible. (68)

A question, however, arises here as to whether the seizing of Kashmir was the only objective of the Pakistani actions of August-September 1965. It has been held that the real intention behind the Pakistani move was not just the capture of Kashmir but the "balkanization" of the Indian Union, (69) Although it is difficult to say definitely whether it was exactly so, it is possible to find some justification for this contention. In the first place, there is little doubt that the alienation of Kashmir from the Indian Union would have encouraged the separatist movements in the Indian Union. Moreover, as already seen in the previous chapter, Pakistan had quite often armed and aided secessionist Nagas and Mizos of India. Its Press had also frequently incited the Akalis in their demand for a Punjabi Suba. Again, responsible persons in Pakistan, like Bhutto, had talked about Pakistan's "legitimate rights ... in eastern parts" of India, called India "a great fraud" and laid claim to certain regions of Assam and Tripura. (70) Pakistan's

(68) In fact most of the Western observers considered the Indo-Pakistani undeclared war of September 1965 to be due to Pakistan's restlessness to get Kashmir. See "Genesis of War", Sunday Times, 12 Sept 1965; "The Seeds of War", The Observer, 12 Sept 1965; also see the editorial of New York Times (international edn) of 23 June 1965.


(70) See Bhutto's address to Pakistani students in London on 13 August 1966 as reported in "Pakistan: Ayub's Rival, Menon's Heir", The Economist, vol. 220, 20 August 1966, pp. 723-9. The idea of ultimately claiming Assam as being behind the reported infiltration of the Pakistanis in Assam and other eastern states of India has already been mentioned in Chapter Five.
Foreign Minister had also planned a visit to Bhutan and had tried to create a rift between India and its Himalayan Protectorate. (71) He had further tried to cast doubt on the validity of the MacMahon Line. (72) Pakistan's obsession with its smallness vis-a-vis the vastness of India and Jinnah's attempts to obtain accession of the rulers of some states which neither were contiguous to Pakistan nor had a predominantly Muslim population and to encourage the independence of some which could not accede to Pakistan for various reasons have already been explained in the first chapter.

(2) Pakistan decided to send infiltrators, and then its army, into Jammu and Kashmir primarily because it had lost the hope of obtaining Kashmir on its own terms by other means. (73) The talks of 1962-63 between Bhutto and Swaran Singh had proved abortive because India was not prepared to submit to the Pakistani terms. Equally frustrating for Pakistan was the response of the Security Council when the Kashmir question came up before it in 1964. To quote President Ayub Khan himself:

You will recall that, in 1964, the members of the Security Council would not even agree to recommend direct negotiations between India and Pakistan with the assistance as may be mutually acceptable of a third party or even the Secretary-General. To our deep sorrow and regret, the debate in that forum did not end in a consensus, much less a resolution. (74)

Pakistan's disgust was also expressed in Bhutto's threat of 22 September 1965 that if the problem was not settled within "a time

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(71) The Hindu, 4 June 1965.
(72) See Ch. Three.
(73) See some references to it in "Pakistan Can't Win", The Economist, vol. 216, 4 September 1965, p. 853.
(74) See the telegram dated 1965 (received on 6 September) from the President of Pakistan to the Secretary-General, S/6666, n. 21, p. 7.
"limit", "Pakistan will have to withdraw from the United Nations". (75)

(3) India's measures for the further integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union, including the change in the designations of the heads of the State and Government, extension of Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution to the State, and the merger of the National Conference with the Indian National Congress further irritated Pakistan. (76) Arrest of Sheikh Abdullah confirmed India's refusal to loosen its ties with Kashmir and offended the Pakistanis. (77) While stating this it must be mentioned that whereas Pakistan protested and showed much sound and fury over India's moves to strengthen its ties with Kashmir, Pakistan on its own part never hesitated to do the same with respect to Azad Kashmir. (78)

(75) S/PV. 1244 (Provisional) (Mimeo.), 22 September 1965, p. 17.

(76) See Ch. Three; also see Bhutto's statements in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 3, 17 November 1965, pp. 82-83; see also, Eric Streiff, "Fluctuating Tensions between India and Pakistan", Swiss Review of World Affairs (Zurich), vol. 15, January 1966, p. 9; and Rushbrook Williams, n. 44, p. 89.

(77) See Ch. Three; also see President Ayub Khan's telegram to the Secretary-General, S/6666, n. 21, p. 3. Also President Ayub Khan's speech in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 3, 15 November 1965, p. 33; editorial of The Times of 12 August 1965; and Kingsley Martin, "The Kashmir Crisis I: Heading for War?" New Statesman, vol. 70, 3 September 1965, pp. 307-8.

(78) In fact, as Richard Critchfield reported, "Pakistan had also jailed K.H. Khursheed, the former President of Azad (Pakistan-held) Kashmir, reportedly for favouring Kashmir's reunification as an autonomous state, relatively independent both of India and Pakistan". Richard Critchfield, "Background to Conflict", The Reporter, vol. 33, 4 November 1965, p. 29.
(4) After its debacle at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, India embarked upon a five-year plan for its defence. It started building its armed might in every possible manner to frustrate any possible violation of its territorial integrity. (79) This alarmed the Pakistanis. If India was allowed to build up its might militarily, there would be no possibility of seizing Kashmir by means other than peaceful. Any delay on the part of Pakistan to use force was not at all desirable. That President Ayub Khan was conscious of this fact is clear from his speech of 11 October 1964 in which he cautioned his people against India's rising military strength and said that by 1970 India would be a tremendous military Power. (80) A member of the National Assembly of Pakistan spelled it out more clearly in the House on 13 July 1965: "This was the time to liberate the people of Kashmir. ... India as yet has not been able to complete its defence plans. ... I am afraid, after five years or ten years India ... might emerge as one of the great powers at that time." (81) He continued: "this was the time when the morale of the people was very high and they could hit back on India and get back our legal rights. ..." (82)


(80) Pakistan Times, 12 October 1964.


(82) Ibid., p. 1334.
(5) Equipped with superior US-made arms, including Patton tanks and Sabre jets, having absorbed the massive flow of the US military aid and trained its army in the use of advanced American weapons since 1954, (83) and conscious of the superior physical strength of the Western Pakistanis, (84) Pakistan thought that its military might was qualitatively superior to that of India. On 8 December 1964, President Ayub Khan said: "If there is ever a war between India and Pakistan, India will learn the lesson of its life. Pakistan has a wonderful army." (85) Five days afterwards he further claimed that "our army today is amongst the best in the world" and warned that should India embark on any military venture it would have to pay through its nose. (86) In the middle of June 1965 he also talked about hurting India "beyond repair". (87)

Two incidents gave Pakistan an exaggerated picture of its own military might and the weakness of the Indian Army. The first was the humiliating defeat of the Indian Army at the hands of the


(84) See the comment of the Pakistani commander on Pakistan's success at Biaf Bet, Rann of Kutch, in which he gave a general ethnic analysis of the inevitable superiority in fortitude and discipline of the Pakistanis — the northerners of the subcontinent — over the Indians who came from the much less martial "clergy-vorky people" of the tropical and Dravidian south. See Tom Stacey, "War In the Desolate Place", Sunday Times, 2 May 1965. Some Western observers also believed in the military superiority of Pakistan. See Victor Anant, "The Kashmir Crisis - 2: Seen from Pakistan", New Statesman, vol. 70, 3 September 1965, p. 308. He writes: "... the claim that one Pakistani soldier is worth three Indians is no exaggeration".


(86) Pakistan Times, 14 December 1965.

Chinese in NEFA in 1962 and the second was the partial success of the Pakistani Army in its clash with its Indian counterpart in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. Indeed, after their success in the Rann, the Pakistanis went wild. Mianzur Rahman Chowdhury said in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 10 July 1965 that optimism was generally expressed in West Pakistan that in the event of a war with India, Pakistani troops would occupy Delhi and its Red Fort and hoist the Pakistani flag on it. (88) Hurriyat, a Karachi daily, also wrote on 23 April 1965 that "it is highly probable that the hostilities between Bharat and Pakistan will be a repetition of what happened between China and Bharat in NEFA". (89) Similar views were expressed by other Pakistani newspapers. (90) The Pakistan Times wrote editorially on 26 August 1965: "The Indian war hawks would do well to bear in mind the happenings in NEFA and the Rann of Kutch before they launch upon new adventures". (91) In its editorial of 20 May 1965, on the eve of the Indian seizure of a few posts in Azad Kashmir, Dawn said: "The striking power of Pakistani forces has already been proved in the fighting in the Rann of Kutch. ... It will therefore be in India's own interest to refrain from acting in a reckless manner which will bring upon the Indian people all the horrible


(90) See also comments of Masbhid (Lahore), 5 March 1965 and Jung (Karachi), 3 May 1965. Ibid., pp. 20, 25.

(91) See also, Abdul Majid, "Weekly Commentary. The Kashmir Uprising", Pakistan Times, 17 August 1965.
consequences of a general and total war. ... The extremists in New Delhi ... do not seem to realise that their present policy is leading their country into a war the consequences of which cannot but be disastrous for it."

On 28 May 1965, *Dawn* observed in an editorial that the fighting in the NEFA and at Biar Bet were not "real wars, but routs" and that if the Indian leaders thought in terms of running down Pakistan, "Pakistanis will sell their freedom so dearly that the sub-continent, at least a major portion of it, will be reduced to shambles". India was told that "a full-scale war will bring about complete destruction of whatever they [the Indians] have been able to achieve since Independence".

(6) Pakistan's possible entente with China added to its ambitions. As mentioned in a chapter on Kashmir, Bhutto had confidence that in the event of a war between Pakistan and India, the mightiest Power of Asia, namely China, would be on the side of Pakistan. (92) The idea that Pakistan had now a friend and an ally in China, a country which had proved its enmity against India and had miserably defeated the latter in 1962 and which was always present on India's long Himalayan frontier to put pressure on it at any time it chose, made Pakistan feel that in the event of an armed clash with India, it could not but have the advantage. The Chinese Government also continued to help Pakistan against India. It had supported Pakistan at the time of the Kutch crisis by issuing a statement in Pakistan's favour. (93) Similarly, this time Radio Peking came out with a strong support on 15 August for "the freedom

(92) See Ch. Three.
(93) See Ch. Four.
of the Kashmiri people". (94) China further exercised its pressure on India by sending a note on 27 August in which it accused India of sending its troops into Chinese territory across China-Sikkim border and strongly protested against this "aggression". (95) On 4 September the Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, also met Bhutto in Karachi and supported Pakistan's action of 1 September in Chhamb, and the "just struggle of the Kashmiri people against the tyrannical domination of India". (96) On 7 September 1965, the Chinese Government further issued a statement in which they talked about the Indian Government's "act of naked aggression" against Pakistan, supported Pakistani case on Kashmir, expressed "firm support for Pakistan in its just struggle against aggression", and solemnly warned the Indian Government that "it must bear responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression". (97) Two days later, on 9 September, the Chinese Premier and Vice-Premier issued yet another statement supporting Pakistan and denouncing India. (98) On 16 September, China also gave a three-day ultimatum to India to dismantle certain defence installations which, it alleged, India had put upon Chinese territory across the Sikkim border. (99) In fact, Bhutto

(94) Pakistan Times, 16 August 1965.
(95) Ibid., 30 August 1965.
(96) Dawn, 5 September 1965; also see Peking Review, 10 September 1965, p. 5. In a statement issued on 3 September the New China News Agency supported the Pakistani version, Dawn, 5 September 1965.
(97) The text of the Chinese Government's statement is given in Peking Review, 10 September 1965, pp. 6-7.
acknowledged China's support in Pakistan's National Assembly on 20 November 1965 in these words: "... the support which the People's Republic of China in this great crisis gave to Pakistan is, indeed, a matter of great significance." (100)

Pakistan's intimate relations with Indonesia which lasted till the coup d'état in Indonesia on 30 September 1965 and its growing collaboration with Iran and Turkey under the Regional Development Plans also made it sanguine about international political support for its action. Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey, in fact, did sympathize with Pakistan during the September conflict, Indonesia most of all. (101)

(7) Pakistan miscalculated the opinion of the Kashmiris. On the basis of the discontentment shown by the Kashmiris during the Hazratbal incident in 1963-64 against the State Government and the resentment expressed by a section of the Kashmiris against some measures taken by the Union Government of India and against the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in May 1965, Pakistan thought that the whole of Kashmir was seething with disaffection and that a spark was all that was needed to blow the whole thing off. It was with this notion that it made the armed infiltration almost coincide with 9 August, the day which the Plebiscite Front had decided to observe as a day of protest against the detention of Sheikh Abdullah.

(8) The language riots in India early in March 1965 and the food riots of July-August 1965, the apparently unstable position of the Shastri Government, and Fateh Singh's fast for the Punjabi Suba

made the Pakistanis think that the Indian nation was breaking up. To quote Pakistan's Information Minister and Leader of the National Assembly, Abdus Sabur Khan: "... What is India to-day? ... hunger and sufferings are rampant there, and industrial growth has been completely stopped, and India is at the verge of ruin." (102) Bhutto, moreover, said: "The death of Nehru ... has released in that country centrifugal forces on an unprecedented scale. How long will the memory of Nehru inspire his countrymen to keep alive a polygot [sic] India, that vast land of mysterious and frightening contradictions ...?" (103) A similar assessment was given by Malik Allah Yar Khan to the Pakistani National Assembly on 13 July 1965 and repeated by many others. (104) For Pakistan, therefore, it was the right moment to strike.

(9) Finally, the Pakistani action of August-September 1965 could have been designed to activize the Kashmir issue in the forums of the United Nations and to bring to the notice of the world that it was a live and a dangerous problem and that Pakistan would not


(104) See Malik Yar Khan's speech in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 2, 13 July 1965, pp. 1341-2. Also see Qureshi, n. 22, p. 361. As Eastern Examiner (Chittagong) of 10 June 1965, in fact, wrote: "... India, in her current state of economic, political and moral bankruptcy will crumble at the first impact of violence. ... India will be the first country to lose its fight without firing a shot." Quoted in Government of India, n. 89, p. 28.

Some Western observers also thought likewise. See Victor Anant, n. 84, p. 308. He felt that "Pakistan is unquestionably more stable of the two countries" and so it was the time for it to make a final bid for Kashmir.
allow it to become a dead issue by reconciling itself to the status quo. In the words of David Holden, "It is possible that Pakistan may have felt that the only way to keep the Kashmir issue alive was to promote some serious internal unrest." (105)

SITUATION CREATED BY THE INFILTRATION: THE POSITION UNTIL 31 AUGUST 1966

The situation in the Beginning

The infiltrators in the initial stages of their intrusion created a very serious problem for both the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Government of India. In fact, these Governments were "caught napping" because they had not expected an armed intrusion in such a form. (106) Even the Kashmir Chief Minister, G.M. Sadiq, was not in the State when the first infiltrators were discovered. (107) The result was that by 9 August 1965 the infiltrators reached the neighbourhood of Srinagar where they clashed three times with the Indian security forces. (108) There were also attempts to cut the Srinagar-Leh road. (109) The deterioration in the situation was also recognized by the Chief UN Military Observer, General Nimmo, who cabled to the Secretary-General of the United


(106) Rangaswami, n. 59.

(107) He rushed to Srinagar from Delhi on 8 August only after receiving the news about massive infiltration of Pakistanis. See The Statesman, 9 August 1965.

(108) Ibid., 10 August 1965. See also Rangaswami, n. 59.

(109) Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 61.
Nations on 9 August to this effect. (110) There were attacks on some bridges, petrol and lubricant dumps, and pickets of the Indian armed forces by the infiltrators. (111) Serious clashes were reported in the Chhamb, Kargil, Poonch, and other sectors. (112) India's Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, admitted that the infiltrators had a measure of success when he said that "they were able to make some advance into our territory in the initial phase" and "were able to inflict some casualties on policemen guarding vital points". (113)

However, nothing of the kind reported by the Pakistani newspapers happened. No "Revolutionary Council" or "National Government" was set up as reported by Pakistan. (114) Nor was Srinagar sealed, Jammu cut off from the rest of the state, a big area near Baramula captured, Poonch airport isolated, various Indian posts seized, and many Indian battalions routed by the infiltrators as claimed by Pakistan. (115) "All this was clearly borne out by the Secretary-General's report of 3 September 1965"

(110) See report of the Secretary-General of 3 September 1965, S/6661, n. 1, p. 6.
(111) Ibid., pp. 10-18.
(114) See Pakistan Times of 9 and 11 August 1965 and Dawn, 9 August 1965.
(115) See reports about sealing off Srinagar in Pakistan Times, 12 August 1965; cutting off of Jammu, ibid., 21 August 1965; about capture of big area near Baramula, ibid., 22 August 1965; about isolation of the Poonch airport, ibid., 23 August 1965; about seizing of several Indian posts, ibid., 15, 20 and 21 August 1965; and about the wiping out of Indian battalions, ibid., 12 and 28 August 1965.
which made no mention of those news. As Chavan said: "... the claims made by Pakistan Radio and newspapers, have been so exaggerated and so fantastic that one is clearly led to believe it is what Pakistan had expected rather than what has actually happened that Pakistan has published." (117)

It is true that in response to a call given by the Kashmir Plebiscite Front, a hartal was observed at Srinagar on 9 August to mark the twelfth anniversary of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest of 1953. (118) It is also true that some local people in the outskirts of Srinagar, where an ammunition stock had been recovered, did help the infiltrators. (119) But nothing like a "revolt" took place. Moreover, once the Indian forces started their combing up operations (120) and exterminating the infiltrators and took the offensive, the whole story of a big commotion and "revolt" in Kashmir collapsed. In fact, as viewed by the foreign observers "not unfriendly to Pakistan", the entire Pakistani attack failed as a "Kashmiri Bay of Pigs". (121) This view was also substantiated


(117) Chavan, n. 113, col. 131.


(119) Ibid., 12 August 1965. Also see David Holden, n. 105;

(120) The Statesman, 11 and 12 August 1965. On 11 August Kashmir's Chief Minister, G.M. Sadiq, also urged the hidden infiltrators to surrender or face "complete annihilation". Ibid., 12 August 1965.

(121) See David Holden, n. 105.
overwhelmingly by other foreign observers. (122)

Abortive Intervention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

After receiving a cable from the Chief UN Military Observer in Kashmir, General Nimmo, on the morning of 9 August about the situation in Kashmir, the Secretary-General personally saw the Representatives of Pakistan and India in the United Nations the same day. He asked the Pakistani representative to convey to the Pakistani Government his "serious concern" about the situation that had developed in Kashmir, "involving the crossing of the CFL [cease-fire line] from the Pakistani side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian military positions on the Indian side of the Line, and also my strong appeal that the CFL be observed". He asked the representative of India to convey to the Indian Government his "urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side". These "appeals" were orally repeated by the Secretary-General in subsequent days. (123) While the Indian Government gave an assurance of restraint to the Secretary-General,

(122) See report of the Delhi correspondent, The Times, 11 August 1965; also report from Srinagar by a correspondent, Baltimore Sun, 10 August 1965 (quoted in Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 68). Also see Paul Harmuse's despatch in Chicago Daily News, 12 August 1965, n. 15; report of Donald Chesworth, who had travelled in the Kashmir Valley during August 1965, The Guardian (Manchester), 17 September 1965; Emry Bracy's reports in Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 13 August 1965, as quoted by Parthasarathi, n. 1, p. 76; "Pakistan Can't Win", The Economist, vol. 216, 4 September 1965, p. 853, where it wrote: "The guerrillas from across the cease-fire line have taken a beating"; and Kingsley Martin, "The Kashmir Crisis - I, Heading for War", New Statesman, vol. 70, 3 September 1965, p. 308. He writes that the Kashmiris "have shown no desire to be involved in a war between the two Republics". Also see Woodcock, n. 15, p. 726.

(123) For his requests to the Pakistani and Indian Representatives and other appeals, see his report of 3 September 1965, S/6651, n. 1, p. 6.
Pakistan remained unresponsive, (124) and, in fact, denied its involvement. (125)

**India's Reaction**

**Initial Protests** In view of the situation created in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India lodged a strong protest with the Pakistani Foreign Office against the "infiltration". (126) It also conveyed to the UN Secretary-General on 11 August its determination to repel Pakistani intrusions across the cease-fire line in Kashmir and asked the latter to persuade Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the State. (127)

**Hardening of the Indian Attitude** As no satisfactory reply was received from Pakistan, and the infiltration and their activities continued, India's attitude towards Pakistan hardened.

India reacted sharply and sternly to the infiltration by the Pakistanis in Jammu and Kashmir. On 11 August 1965 India's Home Minister, G.L. Nanda, issued the warning that India "will retaliate if any country takes liberties with our frontiers". (128) Two days later, on 13 August, Prime Minister Shastri, in a broadcast to the nation, said: "If Pakistan has any ideas of annexing any part of our territories by force, she should think again. I want to state categorically that force will be met with force and aggression against us will never be allowed to succeed." (129) He

(124) Ibid.
(125) *Pakistan Times*, 14 August 1965.
(127) Ibid. See also Chavan, n. 5, col. 132.
(129) Text see in Government of India, n. 4, p. 7.
repeated it in his Independence Day Speech at Red Fort and added: "Pakistan must bear fully responsibility for the attack." (130) Defence Minister Chavan also threatened Pakistan "with grave consequences". (131)

On 15 August Indian troops crossed the cease-fire line in Kashmir and occupied three Pakistani positions near the line, north-east of Kargil. (132) These were the same posts which India had seized from Pakistan in May 1965 and had evacuated on the assurance of UN observers that there would be no interruption of India's road connecting Leh with Srinagar. The village Awan in Pakistan was also shelled by Indian artillery on 24 August. (133) The same day certain Pakistani positions across the cease-fire line in the Tithwal area were captured by Indian troops. (134) On 27-28 August Indian security forces further crossed the cease-fire line on the Pakistani side and reached the Haji Pir Pass on 29 August. (135) India justified its capture of the Kargil posts on the ground that despite UN assurances, the Indian communications to Leh were being interrupted by the Pakistanis. (136) Other occupations were justified on the ground that it was necessary to seal off the routes of escape of the infiltrators and to prevent

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(130) Ibid., p. 10.
(131) Chavan's statement in the Lok Sabha on 16 August 1965, n. 5, col. 132.
(133) Ibid., p. 17.
(134) Ibid.
(135) Ibid., p. 18.
further infiltration. (137)

A noteworthy feature of the Indian reaction to the Pakistani infiltration was that this time everyone in India was one with the measures adopted by the Indian Government and wanted the infiltrators to be dealt with severely. Even persons like J.P. Narayan felt that the Indian Government was within its right to send its Army across the cease-fire line to meet the eventuality. (138)

Reasons behind Stiffening of the Indian Attitude. There were many reasons behind the stiffening of the Indian attitude. First, as had been clearly made out to Pakistan, India always considered any infiltration into Kashmir or a jihad move from the Pakistani side as an invasion on India, which it was prepared to deal with as such in whatever manner possible. (139) But more than this, India felt outraged when after violating the status quo in the Rann of Kutch early in 1965, Pakistan went ahead with its plan of grabbing the State of Jammu and Kashmir. As referred to in the chapter on border problems, India had already felt very much offended at the Pakistani intrusion and claim over the northern half of the Rann of Kutch.


(138) See statements of J.P. Narayan of 19 and 28 August in The Hindu, 20 and 30 August 1965; of Acharya Vinoba Bhave in Hindustan Times, 23 August 1965; of Frank Anthony in Ch. Four. On 19 August J.P. Narayan said that the Government should "eliminate the threat by all means at their command" and on 28 August he added that the Government of India "is within its rights to occupy the posts beyond the cease-fire line in Kashmir to effectively stop the evil of infiltration." Acharya Bhave similarly gave a clarion call to the people on 26 August to stand united in the face of the Pakistani aggression.

(139) See Ch. Two.
At that time it had even ordered its Army to devise suitable plans. (140) According to an observer, by accepting the British offer of mediation Shastri had "averted by a few hours the war". (141) India was, therefore, in no mood now to yield anywhere to Pakistan. (142) India was all the more shocked and hurt when it discovered that exactly when it was signing the agreement with Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch, an agreement which was not very popular in India, (143) Pakistan was going ahead with its plan of seizing Kashmir. To quote Prime Minister Shastri:

The conscience of the world would be shocked to know that even at the time that this Agreement on Kutch was being signed, Pakistan had already drawn up a plan of armed infiltrations into Kashmir and was training its personnel in Murree for the operations which were undertaken over a month later, even before the ink was dry on the Agreement of June 30. (144)

Further Pakistani Reactions

While the Indian attitude was thus hardening, there was also no change in the Pakistani designs. There was heavy and prolonged

(140) See Ch. Four.


(142) Ibid. The Delhi correspondent of The Times wrote: "Next time when it came to a trial of strength with Pakistan there could be no mediation, no negotiation; it would be fought out once and for all..." Also see editorial of The Times, 26 August 1965 which opined: "Surely Indian anger has never been more self-righteous; the refusal to give an inch never so firm". Also see Rushbrook Williams, n. 44, p. 127.

(143) See Ch. Four.

(144) Shastri's broadcast to the nation on 3 September 1965, Government of India, n. 4, p. 18; also see his speeches of 13 and 15 August and 26 September 1965, pp. 7-8, 10 and 52-53 respectively of the same book.
artillery fire by them in the Chhamb-Bhimber area on 15-16 August, and on 19, 26, and 28 August the town of Poonch was shelled from the Pakistani side. (145) The Pakistani forces also continued occupying Indian positions north of Mandi in the Poonch sector. (146)

Secretary-General’s Efforts

In view of the deteriorating situation, the UN Secretary-General wanted the draft statement about cease-fire violations to be released publicly. The Government of India accepted this move with certain modifications. But the Government of Pakistan's reply "was strongly in the negative." The Secretary-General then decided to send his Personal Representative, Ralph J. Bunche, to visit the scene of occurrence. Both India and Pakistan opposed it. The Chief UN Observer in Kashmir, General Nimmo, was thereupon summoned by the Secretary-General to the UN Headquarters on 23 August for deliberations. (147)

Reactions of the Great Powers

The Great Powers promptly expressed their concern over the trouble in Kashmir. Unofficial and friendly requests to exercise restraint in their conflict over Kashmir were reported to have been made through the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Rawalpindi. (148) The spokesman of the US State Department similarly expressed his concern and hoped that the two parties

(145) Report of the Secretary-General of 3 September 1965, n. 1, pp. 4, 16-17, and 18.
(146) Ibid., p. 4.
(147) Ibid., pp. 6-7.
"will reach a settlement" over the issue. (149) In its letters of 20 August to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan, the Soviet Government also expressed its concern over the issue, (150) Concern over it was further expressed otherwise by the Soviet Union. (151) A significant thing noticed in this connexion was a change in the Soviet attitude after May 1965. The Soviet Union was non-committal to the Indian side and merely urged the two parties to show restraint and patience. (152)

ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT: 1-5 SEPTEMBER 1965

The Pakistani Move of 1 September

The concern expressed by the UN Secretary-General and the Governments of Great Britain, the USA and the USSR could not bring

(149) Reuter's report, Ibid. Also see Ambassador Chester Bowles's concern, New York Times (city edn), 14 August 1965. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Johnson of the USA expressed concern on 27 and 29 August. See Pakistan Times of 29 and 30 August 1965. For President Johnson's concern, also see New York Times (city edn), 30 August 1965.

(150) See a reference to it in the messages of Premier Alexei Kosygin to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan on 4 September 1965 as enclosed in the letter of the Soviet Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council dated 16 September 1965, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6685, (Memos.), pp. 2, 4; also Pakistan Times of 25 and 26 August 1965.

(151) Statement of the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union of 26 August in Pakistan Times, 29 August 1965; also the view of Pravda (Moscow) as produced in Hindustan Times, 25 August 1965.

(152) See report of the Delhi correspondent, The Times, 2 September 1965. Here one can cite a news-item captioned "Urgent Necessity Stop Bloodshed in Kashmir" by a "Commentator" in Pravda, 24 August 1965, in which strict neutrality over the Kashmir situation was maintained. It said, "we will not go into a discussion here which of these [Indian or Pakistani] versions more precisely reflects the course of events", held that "the conflict in Kashmir cannot benefit either of the parties", and talked about "sympathy and friendship for the peoples of India and Pakistan". Complete text of this news item is given in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Ann Arbor, Mich.), 16 September 1965, pp. 15-16. The concern expressed by the Tass a few days later, as mentioned in Pravda, 8 September 1965, similarly avoided taking sides. For text see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 29 September 1965, p. 12.
the situation under control. In fact, the conflict escalated further, and this time again the initiative was taken by Pakistan, which moved its armour in the ground of its choosing in the Chamb sector, not only across the cease-fire line but also across the international frontier between Pakistan and the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan moved on 1 September its infantry of a brigade strength into Chamb backed with seventy tanks and preceded by heavy shelling of the Indian positions by the Pakistani artillery. (153) This attack was reported to have been arrayed with air cover as well. (154) On the very first day, i.e. 1 September, the Pakistani infantry reached six to eight miles inside Jammu and Kashmir. (155) The place chosen for the attack by Pakistan was suitable to it because in the Chamb sector Pakistan had direct and short lines of supply and a ground to manoeuvre its tanks. (156) Finding it...

(153) See Chavan's statement in Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 45, 2 September 1965, col. 3417. Indian complaint with the UN observers, however, gave the number of the Pakistani tanks participating in its attack in Chamb to be ninety. See report of the Secretary-General of the Secretary-General of 3 September 1965, n. 1, pp. 5, 20; Shastri gave the number of tanks as two regiments. See his message of 4 September 1965 to the Secretary-General, UN, SG, General, Distr., Doc. S/6672 (Memor.), p. 2. The Hindu of 2 September 1965 gave the number of Pakistani tanks taking part in the attack of 1 September to be forty-eight Patton tanks.


(155) Pakistan Times, 2 September 1965; also see Jacques Nevard's report from Karachi, New York Times (international edn), 2 September 1965. Chavan, however, said that the Pakistanis had been able to make a salient of only about "five miles deep". See Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 45, 2 September 1965, col. 3417.

difficult to check the advance of the Pakistani Army, which had a large number of Patton and Sherman tanks. (157) India sent its Air Force into action on 1 September. (158) The Pakistani advance, however, continued unabated. By 5 September their total advance in the Chhamb sector into Indian territory was said to be seventeen miles. (159) At least they definitely advanced up to fourteen miles because All India Radio itself admitted on 5 September that the fighting had been going on in Jaurian, a place which was fourteen miles on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. (160) Pakistan also claimed to have "severely mauled" two Indian Army Brigades consisting of six to seven battalions, more than one Indian regiment of artillery, and "the best part" of a tank regiment by 2 September in the Chhamb area. (161) Two rockets were also reported to have been fired at an Indian Air Force unit near Amritsar on 5 September by a Pakistani F-86 Sabre jet. (162) The Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Mohammad Musa, thus spoke to his soldiers: "You have got


(158) See Chavan, ibid., 2 September 1965, col. 3417.

(159) See Anthony Lukas's report in New York Times (international edn), 7 September 1965. Pakistani officials also claimed that their troops had captured Jaurian on the morning of 5 September and had reached eighteen miles east of the cease-fire line. See Jacques Nevard's report from Karachi, New York Times (city edn), 6 September 1965.


(161) See the claim of the Pakistani Government spokesman as reported in Dawn, 3 September 1965; see also report of Jacques Nevard, New York Times (international edn), 3 September 1965.

(162) The Hindu, 6 September 1965; also see Chavan's statement in Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 45, 6 September 1965, col. 3953.
your teeth into him [your enemy]. Bite deeper and deeper until he is destroyed. And destroy him you will..." (163)

India, on the other hand, made further advance in Azad Kashmir. On 4 September its army occupied three more Pakistani positions to the north of Tithwal (164) and was operating in brigade strength, supported by two field artillery batteries, on a 12-mile front in the Haji Pir area. (165) On 4 September the Indian Air Force, escorted by MIG-21, was also reported to have violated Pakistani territory in strength. (166)

Thus, as the New York Times (international edn), in its editorial of 4 September 1965, said: "India and Pakistan, for all practical purposes, are at war."

 Reasons and Motives behind the Pakistani Move of 1 September

A simple reason for the Pakistani thrust into the Chamb area was to achieve what the infiltrators had failed to do. As we have noted, Pakistani attempts to seize Kashmir by sending a few thousand armed infiltrators had miserably failed. More than that, India had not only started mopping up and exterminating those infiltrators who had entered into Kashmir but had also sent its army across the cease-fire line and occupied a number of Pakistani posts between 15 and 30 August. In such circumstances, Pakistan had to do something if it wanted its plans to succeed and to save its face against


(164) See Chavan’s statement in the Lok Sabha on 6 September 1965, n. 157, col. 3954.

(165) See report of UN Secretary-General of 6 September 1965, n. 160, p. 2.

(166) President Ayub Khan’s telegram to the UN Secretary-General (received on 6 September 1965), n. 21, pp. 5–6.
Indian successes in the Azad Kashmir area. Moreover, in order to make India withdraw from the Azad Kashmir areas, captured by it between 15 and 30 August, it was necessary for Pakistan to grab some territory on the Indian side so that it might have some advantage in any forthcoming negotiations over the issue.

In fact, if Pakistan's rapid advance in Chhamb had been allowed to go unchallenged, Pakistan could not only have easily secured Kashmir but have inflicted heavy defeat on India. If the Pakistani forces had besieged Jaurian, which they actually did, the bridges across the Chenab at Akhnur would have been placed in imminent jeopardy. If the Pakistani infantry had been able to capture the strategic town of Akhnur, they could have easily cut off Jammu from Poonch, by destroying the Jammu-Poonch road, one of the two main roads linking Kashmir with the rest of India. (167) Jammu town was also only 16 kilometers from Akhnur, (168) and they were linked with each other by road. So Jammu was within easy reach from Akhnur. And the Pakistani capture of Jammu would have meant the cutting off of the Jammu-Srinagar highway, the other road linking India with Kashmir. As was aptly put by an American observer: "If Pakistan had taken Akhnur it would have severed India's supply routes along the ceasefire line. By driving still further into Jammu, Pakistan would have severed also the single tortuous highway into Srinagar and cut off some 150,000 Indian

(167) Nandan Kagal, "Towards a Position of Strength", Indian Express, 9 September 1965; also D.R. Mankekar, Twentytwo Fateful Days (Bombay, 1966), p. 91.

(168) The Hindu, 6 September 1965.
troops and armed police in the restive Vale of Kashmir." (169) Pakistan was also reported to have diverted one division of its troops from the Lahore area to the Chhamb sector in an all-out effort to achieve its objectives swiftly. (170)

Pakistan, however, denied any aggressive design behind its move. An official Pakistani spokesman described the Pakistani action of 1 September as "purely defensive" and designed as an "effective counter-action to repulse and contain Indian aggression" and to "forestell any further aggressive moves by India". (171) The same version was repeated by President Ayub Khan in his first-of-the-month broadcast on 1 September (172) and in a letter to UN Secretary-General which the latter received on 6 September. (173) Pakistan's


(170) Kagal, n. 167.

(171) Jacques Nevard's report from Karachi in New York Times (international edn), 2 September 1965; also Pakistan Times, 2 September 1965.

(172) The Pakistani President said to his people: "I am speaking to you tonight under the threat of war in Kashmir which is being forced on us by India." New York Times (international edn), 2 September 1965.

(173) The President wrote to the Secretary-General that Pakistan was "forced" to act in Chhamb "in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence" and that it was "a purely defensive measure forced on Pakistan". See Doc. S/6666, n. 21, pp. 5, 8.
Permanent Representative in the United Nations also said the same thing on 6 September. (174)

Pakistan also accused India of starting the trouble in Kashmir around May 1965 by moving its forces across the cease-fire line in the Kargil sector which captured three of the Pakistani posts in that month, by suppressing the "freedom fighters", by crossing the cease-fire line at a number of points since 15 August, by shelling the Pakistani village of Awan Sharif, and by embarking on "a premeditated course of aggression and war to seize the whole of Azad Kashmir territory and, in that process, not to flinch from even a sub-continental war". (175) In his broadcast of 3 September 1965, Bhutto further alleged that "India has launched an undeclared war across the cease-fire line in Kashmir". (176)

To Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.) of 2 September 1965, on the other hand, the whole record of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan was just "a recital of tit for tat" in which "in the latest flare-up, Pakistan apparently made the first move that

(174) Amjad Ali said, "We were forced to take defensive action in the Chhamb area of Kashmir to forestall further aggression". S/PV. 1238 (Provisional) (Mimeo.), 6 September 1965, p. 12.

(175) President Ayub's letter to the UN Secretary-General, Doc. S/6666, n. 21, pp. 1-2, 3-6. Also see the speech of Pakistan's Information Minister, Khwaja Shababuddin, who talked about a deep-laid Indian conspiracy to annex Azad Kashmir and even to march into Pakistani territory. Dawn, 3 September 1965. Telegram dated 6 September 1965 from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to the UN Secretary-General, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6669, (Mimeo.), pp. 1-2; speeches of President Ayub Khan in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 3, 15 November 1965, p. 33; of Bhutto, Ibid., vol. 3, 17 November 1965, pp. 84-86; and President Ayub's broadcast to his nation of 6 September 1965 in The Statesman, 7 September 1965.

(176) Text of Bhutto's broadcast is given in Dawn, 4 September 1965.
has provoked India into sending its troops across the cease-fire line to seize Pakistani-held positions".

**Reaction of the United Nations and Other Powers**

Immediately after the escalation of the fighting between India and Pakistan in the air and on the ground on 1 September, the Secretary-General addressed an appeal to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. (177) The Secretary-General's appeal said:

I appeal to you most earnestly ... to indicate immediately your intention henceforth to respect the Cease-Fire Agreement. Essential, of course, to the restoration of the cease-fire would be a cessation of crossing of the cease-fire line by armed personnel from both sides of the line, the withdrawal of armed personnel of each side that have occupied positions on the other party's side of the line, and to halt all firing across the cease-fire line from either side of it. (178)

On 4 September General Nimo also made an "official protest and urgent request" for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Chamb sector. (179)

Concern was also expressed over the issue by the leading countries of the world. Great Britain sent messages to India and Pakistan calling them that it viewed the Kashmir fighting with concern and supported U Thant's appeal. (180) The United States

(177) See reports of the Secretary-General of 3 September 1965, Doc. S/6651, n. 1, p. 8.

(178) See the Secretary-General's appeal of 1 September to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6647, (Memo.), p. 2.


similarly sent cables for an immediate cease-fire. (181) In his messages of 4 September to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub, Soviet Premier Kosygin also expressed his "concern" and asked them for the "reciprocal withdrawal" of their troops behind the cease-fire line as established in 1949. He urged them to "enter into negotiations for the peaceful settlement" of their differences in which he promised his Government's co-operation and good offices. (182) President Nasser of the UAR, President Tito of Yugoslavia, and Prime Minister Lester Pearson of Canada also expressed their concern and offered their good offices and mediation. (183)

Response of India and Pakistan

The response of the Indian and Pakistani Governments to the Secretary-General's appeals was not very helpful. Prime Minister Shastri in his reply reiterated his desire for peace but said: "What is essential ... today is that Pakistan should undertake forthwith to stop infiltrations across the cease-fire line and to withdraw the infiltrators and its armed forces from the Indian side of the cease-fire line and the international frontier between Jammu and Kashmir and West Pakistan." He also wanted to be "satisfied that there will be no recurrence of such a situation" and trusted


(182) See the texts of Kosygin's messages as enclosed with the letter dated 15 September 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the President of the Security Council, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6685, (Memos.), pp. 2-3, 4-5.

that the Secretary-General "will ascertain from Pakistan if it will accept the responsibility for withdrawing not only its armed forces but also the infiltrators and for preventing further infiltrations". (184)

The Pakistani response was still more evasive. In response to General Nimmo's protest of 4 September, the Pakistani Government contended that as India was maintaining its occupation posts on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line, Pakistan was not expected to "unilaterally halt" its "purely defensive operations". (185) President Ayub Khan wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 6 September that Pakistan's actions were "purely defensive" and that if a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute was to result from the intervention of the United Nations, "it is necessary for the World Organization to go to the heart of the tragic problem and not merely deal with its periphery. It must turn its attention to the issue of self-determination and not only to the Cease-Fire Line". (186)

**Debate in the Security Council**

In the meantime, the Security Council met on 4 September at the urgent request of Arthur J. Goldberg of the United States, the then President of the Council. The Council had before it the UN Secretary-General's appeal to India and Pakistan of 1 September and his report of 3 September on the current situation in Kashmir. (187)

(184) Shastri's communication, 4 September 1965, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6672, (Memo.), p. 5.


(187) See S/PV. 1237 (Provisional) (Memo.), 4 September 1965, p. 5.
In his report of 3 September the Secretary-General had suggested five conditions for the restoration of the cease-fire and a return to normal conditions along the cease-fire line. They were:
(a) willingness of both parties to respect the Cease-fire Agreement of 1949; (b) a readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the cease-fire line from the Pakistani side by armed men, whether or not in uniform; (c) evacuation by each party of positions of the other party and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line, including withdrawal of Indian troops from the Pakistani positions in the Kargil area; (d) a halt by both parties of the firing across the cease-fire line that had been occurring from both sides in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns; and (e) allowing full freedom of movement and access to UN observers by both parties on both sides of the line. (188)

The debate of the Council opened on 4 September with a speech by India's Permanent Representative, Gopalaswami Parthasarathi. He mentioned in detail the origin, history, nature, and object of the Pakistani infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, tried to establish Pakistani complicity in it, asserted that by condoning the Pakistani aggression of 1947-48 the Council gave Pakistan "excuse for continuing aggression and ... for perpetuating further aggression", and formally demanded that the Council "condemn Pakistan as an aggressor and to instruct it to withdraw from all parts of the

Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir". (189) In his second submission before the Council on the same day, India's Permanent Representative further emphasized the following points: (a) an acceptable guarantee from Pakistan that infiltrators across the cease-fire line would be stopped forthwith and that infiltrators and the armed forces of Pakistan would be withdrawn from the Indian side of Kashmir; (b) an acceptable guarantee that there would be no recurrence of such a situation; and (c) a starting point for any steps towards the restoration of peace. (190)

In reply, Pakistan's Permanent Representative, Syed Amjad Ali, categorically denied the allegations made by the representative of India and called them deliberate and fictitious. In the absence of instructions from his Government, he reserved his right to state his country's position at another time. (191)

Thereupon, the representative of Malaysia, Radhakrishna Ramani, introduced a draft resolution, sponsored jointly by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Uruguay. (192) The resolution was unanimously adopted the same day as Document S/Res./209 (1965). (193) The resolution took note of the Secretary-General's report of 3 September 1965, expressed its concern at the deteriorating situation along the cease-fire line, and called upon

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(189) S/PV. 1237 (Provisional) (Memor.), 4 September 1965, pp. 56-75. Edmond Taylor also wrote: "The subsequent escalation might conceivably have been avoided if the U.N., had identified Pakistan as the aggressor early in August and mobilised all the pressures at its command to halt the aggression before it provoked the inevitable Indian retaliation." See Taylor, n. 44, pp. 37-38.

(190) S/PV. 1237 (Provisional) (Memor.), 4 September 1965, p. 118.

(191) Ibid., pp. 76, 119-20.

(192) Ibid., p. 76.

(193) Ibid., p. 121.
the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire, to respect the cease-fire line, to get all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its own side of the line, and to co-operate fully with the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in its task of supervising the observance of the cease-fire line. It also requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report to the Council within three days on the implementation of this resolution. (194)

The Permanent Representative of Pakistan expressed his regret at the resolution because it did not refer to the basis of the cease-fire which had been established in Kashmir in 1949, the basis of demilitarization, and the plebiscite, and said that the omission itself could be seriously prejudicial to the position of the party which sought the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations. (195)

FURTHER ESCALATION OF CONFLICT: 6 SEPTEMBER 1965

Indian Advance towards Lahore

As noted earlier, by 5 September, a hopeless situation had developed for India in the Chhamb sector. (196) Observers had in fact started expecting that if India failed to halt the attack in the Chhamb area without delay, it would probably strike in some

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(194) For the text of the resolution, see UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. S/6657 (Mimeo.).


other section of the Pakistani border where it had a more advantageous position. (197) And the most obvious place for such an attack was the Punjab where India had the same advantage as Pakistan had in Chhamb. (198)

On the morning of 6 September India made a three-pronged attack across the West Pakistani border from Ferozepur, Gurdaspur, and Wagh-Ameritsar areas. (199) The Indian Army was reported moving towards Lahore, Sialkot, and Kasur. (200) The same morning the Indian column towards Lahore reached the outskirts of the Lahore city, about fifteen miles from the border. (201) Air battle over Lahore also started. (202)

Eventually, at length, a full-fledged undeclared war between India and Pakistan broke out. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, while addressing the National Development Council on 6 September, alerted his nation that "a grim battle" was ahead (203) and reportedly told the Executive Committee of the Congress Party the same day.


(198) Ibid.

(199) The Hindu, 7 September 1965.

(200) See General Nimmo’s information from CGS Pakistan Command in Secretary-General’s report of 6 September 1965, S/6661, n. 160, p. 3.


(203) See Indian Information (Delhi), vol. 8, 1 October 1965, p. 548; also The Statesman, 7 September 1965.
that the country faced "a full-fledged war". (204) President Ayub Khan, in his broadcast to the nation, similarly told his people on 6 September: "We are at war." (205) The same evening Pakistan further announced the call-up of all army reserves and certain categories of ex-servicemen. (206)

The New York Times (international edn) of 7 September, in fact, captioned its editorial "India and Pakistan at War". The Times also, writing its editorial under the title "War", said on 7 September: "Save for the formal declaration and the return of diplomatic representatives, it is war. President Ayub admits as much. Mr. Shastri termed the situation a 'full-scale war'."

India's Plea

India's justification for moving its army across the West Pakistan border was that this action was necessitated in order to forestall the opening of a new front by Pakistan across the international border in the Indian Punjab. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 6 September, India's Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, reported the intrusion of the Pakistani aircraft across the international boundary at Wagh, near Amritsar, and firing of rockets at an Indian Air Force unit on 5 September and said that "it was quite apparent that Pakistan's next move was to attack Punjab across the international border" and that an indication of it "was building up over some time". "In order to forestall the

(205) Text see in The Statesman, 7 September 1965; also New York Times (city edn), 7 September 1965.
(206) The Hindu, 7 September 1965.
opening of another front by Pakistan", he added, "our troops in the Punjab moved across the border in Lahore Sector." (207) Chavan's report was confirmed by a reported "master plan" said to be captured from a Pakistani officer prisoner, according to which Pakistan's First Armoured Division, with its base at Kasur and Khem Karan, was to embark on 8 September on a three-pronged drive north-eastwards along the Grand Trunk Road in three phases. (208) It was also indicated by the diary of a Pakistani Air Force bomber pilot, after his B-57 bomber had been shot down by the Indian Air Force on 7 September 1965, that as early as 20 April 1965 the Pakistani Air Force pilot had planned attacks on Adampur, Halwara, Ambala, Palam, Agra, Buch, and Jamnagar airports. (209)

The Indian plea that India moved its infantry towards Lahore in order to thwart a similar Pakistani move towards Amritsar was rejected by the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi. (210) Some observers were also inclined to be sceptical about it and noted

(207) Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 45, 6 September 1966, col. 3953. See also Prime Minister Shastri's address at the National Development Council on 6 September. Indian Information, n. 203, p. 548; message dated 6 September 1965 from the Indian Minister of External Affairs to the UN Secretary-General, UN, SC, Distr., General, Doc. 3/6673, (Memos), p. 2; and statement of the spokesman of the Indian Government as reported by Anthony Lukas in New York Times (international edn), 7 September 1965.

(208) See Mankekar, n. 167, pp. 118-19; the map indicating the proposed Pakistani action, ibid., pp. 118-19 and the plan itself, ibid., Appendix II, pp. 216-20.

(209) See the photostat copy of the relevant page of the pilot's diary with explanation in The Statesman, 12 September 1966.

that India had another strong reason for attacking the Lahore area: to relieve the pressure on the Indian forces in the Chhamb area of Kashmir. (211) This explanation of the Indian offensive towards Lahore was also given by many other impartial observers. (212)

Whatever the reasons, India's aim appeared to have been achieved quickly. As reported by a spokesman of the Indian Government on the afternoon of 6 September, the attack in the Lahore area had already started relieving pressure in the Chhamb area and the Pakistani tanks had been seen moving south of Chhamb. (213) The Pakistanis were also halted near Jaurian village and were pushed back. Pakistan was now not only compelled to recall troops of a division strength to the Lahore area from the Chhamb sector but any offensive action, which Pakistan might have been tempted to launch across the Punjab border at a time of its own choosing, appeared to have been forestalled. (214)

(211) Ibid.

(212) See editorial of New York Times (international edn), 7 September 1965 in which it wrote, "India could not stop the column that Pakistan sent in towards Jammu in Kashmir because she has no armoured force comparable to the Patton and Sherman tanks and artillery that the United States furnished Pakistan as a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The obvious military strategy for India was to use her numerical superiority and her infantry to make a thrust at Lahore". Also see report of the Delhi correspondent in The Times, 13 September 1965; Kingsley Martin, "The Asian Conflict - I, Reflections on Kashmir", New Statesman, vol. 70, 17 September 1965, p. 385; and "Breaking the Rules", The Economist, vol. 216, 11 September 1965, p. 959. It wrote: "Even if one rejects the Indian claim that it was necessary to prevent the Pakistanis launching a 'second front' towards Amritsar, the attack towards Lahore could be construed both politically and militarily as a natural reaction to Pakistan's successful drive towards Akhnur. ..."

(213) Anthony Lukas's report, New York Times (international edn), 7 September 1965; also The Hindu, 7 September 1965.

(214) Kagal, n. 167.
Pakistan's Interpretation

Pakistan, however, gave an altogether different, and somewhat distorted, version of the Indian attack on West Pakistan. According to it, the Indian move was designed to exterminate the existence of Pakistan and to undo the partition of the subcontinent to which, according to the Pakistanis, India was not yet reconciled. President Ayub Khan, in his broadcast to the nation on 6 September, announced: "... the Indian aggression in Kashmir was only a preparation for an attack on Pakistan. Today they have given final proof of their evil intentions which India has always harboured against Pakistan since its inception. The Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where Muslims could build a homeland of their own." (215) General Mohammad Musa, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, likewise said in his address on 18 October 1965 at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs: "No Pakistani can be unaware of the fact that India has never reconciled itself to the emergence of Pakistan. ... It is my belief the real bone of contention is not Kashmir ... but Pakistan itself." He further added that India wanted to capture the entire territory of Azad Kashmir and to defeat the Pakistani Army on the battlefield ultimately with the object of dictating humiliating terms to Pakistan. (216) Pakistan also claimed that its apprehension that India had been arming itself with Western aid only to fight Pakistan


(216) Musa, n. 57, pp. 329, 328.
by creating a China bogey had come true. (217)

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The development of events between 5 August and 6 September 1966 in India and Pakistan demonstrated and reaffirmed the following facts:

(1) It established that India would not surrender Kashmir even in face of a threat of war, (218) and that it considered not only in word but also in deed that an attack on Jammu and Kashmir was an attack on India. (219) Although India had repeatedly stated this thing earlier, many including the British Prime Minister, had continued to believe that India would react differently to an attack on Kashmir from the way it might be expected to react when invaded elsewhere, (220) This was proved wrong. In the context of the events of September 1965, a Pakistani writer thus opined for the first time that "the only solution to the Kashmir problem which now seems feasible is some minor territorial adjustment and the creation of a separate Muslim State of Kashmir within the Indian constitutional framework, with possible provision for reconsideration after some years" and that "efforts should be directed towards finding a

(217) See Zafar in S/PV. 1240 (Provisional) (Memeo.), 18 September 1965, p. 31. See also President Ayub Khan in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 3, 15 November 1965, p. 32.


(219) Nandan Kagal, "Pakistan's Challenge to Perspective", Indian Express, 2 September 1965. Also Kagal, n. 167.

political and not a moral solution". (221)

(2) It also explained that Pakistan would not agree to the continuance of the status quo in Kashmir and would resort to every possible method and seize every opportunity to establish its hold over Jammu and Kashmir. (222)

(3) It further exploded the Pakistani myth that the Kashmiris were impatient to join Pakistan and that they belonged to Pakistan. As illustrated earlier, their plans to stage a revolt in Jammu and Kashmir came to nothing. Except for some minor help which Pakistan received from the local people, the bulk of the Kashmiris sided with the State and the Indian Government in the hour of crisis. (223)

(4) Indian secularism, moreover, successfully passed its severest test. It was believed in many foreign countries that the Hindus and the Muslims were still not united in India and that in the event of a clash with Pakistan communal violence might erupt in the subcontinent. (224) In view of the large-scale communal riots in the subcontinent in 1964 this apprehension was not altogether unjustified. But nothing of the kind happened. Not only this, as demonstrated during the undeclared war which continued

(222) See n. 218.
(223) Inder Malhotra, "Political Commentary: Pakistani Infiltrators Shaken by Reverses", The Statesman, 13 August 1965; also K. Rangaswami, "A Letter From New Delhi: Political Consequences of Pak Invasion", The Hindu, 1 September 1965. Also see earlier explanations of the failure of the infiltration move.
(224) See editorials of New York Times (international edn), of 4 September 1965 and of The Times and of Cape Times (Cape Town) of 7 September 1965.
till 22 September 1965, the minority communities of India, including the Muslims, fought gallantly against Pakistan and won many laurels. (225) The highest gallantry award in India, "Param Vir Chakra", in fact, went to a Parsee, Lt-Colonel A.B. Tarapore, and a Muslim, Havildar Abdul Hamid, both posthumously. (226) Muslims all over India also stood solidly behind their Government. (227) In Pakistan also no communal incidents were reported. This proved that the two-nation theory had ceased to have any value, a thing which the leaders of Pakistan have themselves sometimes admitted in their objective utterances. (228) (5) It was proved, moreover, that howsoever divided India might be in times of peace, it would stand united in a crisis. This fact was noticed by many foreign observers. (229) As during the Chinese invasion of 1962, so at the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the whole nation stood solid like a rock behind the Indian Government. Food riots and language riots were forgotten. Fateh Singh gave up his fast for the Punjabi Suba and persons like J.P. Narayan, who had always pleaded for a soft line towards Pakistan, now preached strong and suitable action against that country.

(225) Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Harvest of Glory (Delhi, 1965), pp. 54-56.

(226) Ibid., p. 54.

(227) See statements of Mohammad Ismail, President of the Indian Union Muslim League, The Statesman, 3 September 1965; see also concern of other Indian Muslims, ibid., 7 September 1965.

(228) See statement of Quaid-i-Azad Mohammed Ali Jinnah from his Presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947, cited in Ch. Five. Also see speech of Prime Minister Shabeed Suhrawardy in the debate on the Electoral Bill in October 1956, in Ch. Five.