CHAPTER SIX
Pakistan and the SEATO

Pakistan came into being in 1947 in an atmosphere of intense hatred and suspicion. The events preceding its birth had left an indelible impression of bitterness in the minds of the people of the Indian sub-continent. Neither the Indians nor the Pakistanis could reconcile themselves emotionally to the fact of partition. The former harboured a feeling that Pakistan was virtually wrested from their hands, while the latter could not free itself of the "minority" complex in her dealings with India. What was earlier in pre-independence days a "struggle for parity" between the two communities (the Hindus and the Muslims) became a "conflict of status" between the two nations in the post-partition days. (1) Simultaneously, with this, there was a desperate search for "identity" in Pakistan and an anxiety to preserve it against the ideological onslaughts from India.

The transformation of an earlier community into a nation in Pakistan posed a basic problem. The problem was how to make a "nation" out of a "community", which was till recently a part and parcel of a broader political unit. Therefore, in the early days of independence, the internal and external policies of Pakistan were geared to this idea of creating and stressing in

(1) Keith B. Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation (Mimeograph) (New York, 1967) 11. See also Sisir Gupta's article on "Indo-Pak Relations", International Studies (New Delhi) 5 (July-October 1963) 175.
every manner possible the distinctiveness of Pakistani interests vis-a-vis India. Any attempt by India to the contrary, would have negatived the raison d'etre of Pakistan's existence. Thus, the foreign policy of Pakistan became a policy of survival. (2) Secularism of India provided the greatest ideological 'threat' to this Pakistani policy of survival, for the "two-nation" theory was the essence of Pakistan. (3) This ideological 'threat' was backed in the early years after independence by superior military and economic strength of India. (4) Therefore, it was inherent in the logic of Pakistan that India should be the kernel of her whole foreign policy. "The foreign policy of Pakistan begins at the Indian border". (5) India has been the most significant factor responsible for occasional shift or change of direction in Pakistan's foreign policy. In Pakistan's foreign policy there has been a marked preference for some kind


(3) Callard, n. 1, 5.

(4) "As a result of the division of military services and stores Pakistan was to get about one-third and India two-thirds. Pakistan's share of the army was 8 Infantry Regiments, 6 Armoured Corps Units, 8½ Artillery Regiments and 34 Engineer Units. Of the 48 Vessels of the Royal Indian Navy, 16, including 2 frigates and 2 sloops, were allotted to the Royal Pakistan Navy. Of the 10 squadrons of the Royal Indian Air Force, Pakistan's share was two. India received about 26 ordnance factories, Pakistan none". M. Aslam Siddiqui, "Can Pakistan Stay Neutral?", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), 11 (June 1958) 75.

(5) Callard, n. 1, 17.
of a twilight zone of alignment and non-alignment; and Pakistan assumed either posture as and when it suited her to wrest advantage from her great and formidable neighbour - India.

**Early Period of Pakistan's Foreign Policy**

From 1947 to 1953, Pakistan followed a policy of no-commitment to either of the blocs. (6) The initiator of this policy was Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan. Quite often he had affirmed the faith of Pakistan in deciding its policies on the merits of the issues that came up in the international arena from time to time. Speaking in 1951, he said:

> Pakistan was neither tied to the apron-strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor was it a camp-follower of the Communist bloc. It steered clear of the inter-bloc rivalry and had an absolutely independent foreign policy.... Pakistan could pursue such an independent course because it was not under the obligation of any foreign power. (7)

He was believed to have refused to commit Pakistan to any pact that tied her to a particular bloc against another. (8) Though, Pakistan was quite friendly with the USA, her relations with the

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(7) *Dawn* (Karachi), 9 March 1951.

Soviet Union till 1953 remained satisfactory. (9) Towards the end of 1949, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan received an invitation from the Soviet Government to visit Moscow (10) which however, did not come off.

Pakistan's "formulation of foreign policy was largely empirical: each problem...was tested by one simple criterion - whether this policy or that was the more likely to help Pakistan get Kashmir". (11) Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir was deep and lasting. The entanglement of Pakistan in Kashmir and her encounter with Indian military might there, landed her in all kinds of complications, which in their turn forced her to break new grounds in foreign policy. Military failure in Kashmir gave the severest jolt to the early foundations of Pakistan's foreign policy. The prospects of favourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute through negotiations having receded in view of increasing hold of India over Kashmir, Pakistan sought to create a situation in which the balance of power between her and India would not be very disadvantageous for her. Henceforward, the

(9) Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the Soviet Bloc", Pakistan Horizon, 9 (June 1956) 73.

(10) About the Moscow invitation F.M. Innes (a former Adviser to the Pakistan Government) writes:

"As late as 1949 Liaquat Ali Khan got himself an invitation to visit Moscow as a guest of the Soviet Government though this was simply a move on the political chess board; the United States had invited Nehru to pay her a visit, and, fearing that America would be captivated by Nehru's charm, Liaquat Ali Khan applied shock tactics by arranging his invitation from Kremlin. The result was that he himself was shortly afterwards invited to tour the United States. The gambit was a rather crude one but it worked". F.M. Innes, "The Political Outlook in Pakistan", Pacific Affairs (New York), 26 (December 1953) 311.

(11) Ibid., 308.
whole strategy of Pakistan foreign policy had been to undermine India's hold on Kashmir. 'Liberation of Kashmir' from India's hands was not only the vindication of the theory on which Pakistan was created, but also a 'lever' to achieve a 'status' in the international field in relation to India. In the mid and late fifties Kashmir also became a factor affecting the stability of Pakistan's internal politics.

"Search For Blood-Brothers"

Having realized her incapacity to force on India, a military solution of Kashmir Pakistan tended "to look for blood-brothers rather than plain friends", hoping, "that she will find allies who will look upon her quarrels as their own" (12) and hence, exert diplomatic pressures on India to make her agree to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute through a plebiscite. Naturally, therefore, Pakistan stretched her hands of friendship to the co-religionist countries of the Middle East. Perhaps, as a 'Persian Gulf Power', more than a muslim Power, Pakistan should have attempted to find friends among the Middle Eastern countries. As Sir Olaf Caroe put it, the "area of over lap", in which Pakistan falls, "stretches in a rough arc from Kashmir westward across the North-West Frontier, Afghanistan, Persia and the Fertile Crescent to Egypt, a curve embracing the Persian Gulf as closely and neatly as the Turkish Crescent embraces the star". (13) In February 1949, a World Muslim Conference was

(12) Callard, n. 1, 10.

(13) Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (London, 1951) 158.
called in Pakistan, in which 17 Muslim countries participated. It's aim was to 'breakdown the barriers of nationalism and provincial parochialism'. (14) Another International Economic Conference of Islam was organized in the month of November in the same year, "to foster economic bonds between the countries of West Asia". This too was attended by 17 Muslim countries and it got its official character recognized by the UN. The conference had its second meeting in Teheran in October 1950. Thus, at the economic and religious levels a successful attempt was made by Pakistan to cultivate the Muslim countries. Pakistan was not enamoured of the idea of Asian unity, (15) which was enthusiastically advocated by India. Pakistan's vigorous espousal of the Muslim countries in their struggles against the West in the United Nations, helped her efforts to bring the Muslim countries closer. But this was not enough. Un-officially, Khaliquzzaman Choudhury, a former President of the Muslim League, set up in 1952 a Muslim Peoples Organization to supplement the Arab League of which Arab countries grew suspicious. (16) And on the official level the Pakistan Government extended in 1952 invitations to the Heads of the governments of twelve Muslim countries to meet at a conference "to set up a consultative body for joint Action". (17) However, this proved abortive and the


meeting could not take place. (18) This failure of Pakistan set at rest all ideas of Pan-Islamism which was being energetically pursued by the authorities. "Pan-Islam failed to provide Pakistan with the much needed forum for gaining allies in her disputes with India". (19)

In quest of Western Support

Pakistan did not put all her eggs in one basket. There were other quarters too from where it expected support and sympathy in her disputes with India. Her membership of the Commonwealth was partly motivated by this consideration. (20) The British Labour Party's sympathies with India caused much anxiety to those in Pakistan who had earlier visualised a break in the relations between India and the United Kingdom because of the latter's presumed inability to accommodate Indian nationalist aspirations. But, on the contrary, British statesmanship proved its unlimited capacity for adoptability by agreeing in April 1949 to retain a republican India as a member of the Commonwealth. Pakistan was so enraged at this novel arrangement that her Prime Minister warned other members of the Commonwealth not to take Pakistan for granted. (21) Although Pakistan

(18) *Dawn*, 2 July 1952.
(21) *The Round Table* (London), (September 1949) 365.
did not take any decision to leave the Commonwealth, it pleaded for preferential treatment to "a state which is a full member" and not just "externally associated" with the Commonwealth. (22) The Commonwealth's refusal to assume the role of an arbiter or super-national body in respect of Indo-Pakistan dispute, and even to discuss them formally, was another frustrating experiences for Pakistan. (23) In such circumstances, there was not much scope left for Pakistan to impress the United Kingdom and other members of the Commonwealth to persuade India to agree to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute through a plebiscite held under the auspices of the United Nations.

In this background of disillusionment with Pan-Islamism and the Commonwealth, Pakistan presented herself to the United States as an aggrieved nation wronged by a superior one, India. (24) The United States was too eager to respond to Pakistani

(22) Hussain, n. 20, 173.

(23) Referring to the role of the Commonwealth vis-a-vis the Kashmir dispute, the noted expert on Commonwealth affairs Nicholas Mansergh wrote:

"The Kashmir dispute gravely weakened the Commonwealth in Asia, by making impossible intra-Commonwealth cooperation between the two principal members of it and by confronting existing members, reluctant to be drawn into the quarrel.... Despite Paki­tani pressure for an award by a Commonwealth tribunal, the other governments of the Commonwealth...were agreed that no such tri­bunal should be constituted save at the wish of both parties to the dispute", Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Post-War Change 1939-52 (London, 1958) 260-1.

(24) See n. 20, 173. Another Pakistani writer commented, "...when Pakistan realised that Britain could exert no pressure on India to agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir, her faith in the Commonwealth began to weaken. This attitude was to a great

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overtures in the context of her world-wide search for allies to fit into her global strategy of encirclement of Communist countries and containment of communism. The Korean crisis had already given an impetus to the "cold war", leading to crystallisation of blocs in the early fifties. Ideological division of the world into Communist and anti-Communist or democratic camps, had begun to be considered as the logical emerging pattern in international relations. Any departure from this pattern was an act of heresy. Neutrality in 'cold war' was termed as something 'immoral'. "The United States gradually became convinced of the importance of Pakistan in Asian strategy". (25) Addressing the American people over radio and television after his visit to Pakistan the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, said in 1953: "Pakistan occupies a high position in the Muslim world. The strong spiritual faith of the people make them a dependable bulwark against communism". (26) Following Dulles's visit, the US Vice-President Richard Nixon made a trip to Pakistan and India. While in Pakistan, in an informal off-hand talk, he pledged that the United States "will in future be proud to stand with Pakistan in developing the country industrially and in protecting the country from forces that would destroy it". (27) Already, the United States extent responsible for a shift in policy towards the United States of America", Rafat Ara Jafri, "Pakistan's Attitude Towards Alliances", The Pakistan Review (Lahore), 5 (February 1957) 13.


(27) Chaudhuri, n. 25. 176.
and the United Kingdom had expressed their joint agreement to include Pakistan in the proposed scheme of Middle East Defence Organization. (28) Although, the idea of organizing a defence pact for the Middle East could take a concrete shape only in 1955, America announced its decision to give military aid to Pakistan on 25 February 1954 at Washington. (29)

Mohammed Ali of Bogra, who was, until he became Prime Minister, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, described this development as "a glorious chapter in Pakistan's history" and felt that Pakistan was "now cast for a significant role in world affairs". (30) However, it is rather intriguing to find the Foreign Minister of Pakistan expressing a divergent opinion a few weeks ago. In an interview published in Le Monde of France, Arafullah Khan said that "to his knowledge there was no question of signing a military pact.... Pakistan had never and was not at present considering participating in a military alliance". (31) This statement of the Foreign Minister is in contrast to the trends initiated by Mohammed Ali of Bogra as Prime Minister, after the replacement of Khwaja Nazimuddin in 1953. The decision to enter into a military pact with the United States was not universally welcomed in Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhasani, the President of the East Pakistan Awami

(29) Ibid., 26 February 1954. See also Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954 (New York, 1955) 373.
(31) Ibid., 5 January 1954.
League, one of the constituents of the United Front which had routed the ruling Muslim League party in East Pakistan elections in early 1954, expressed his vehement opposition to this pact and regarded it as "detrimental to freedom and sovereignty of Pakistan". (32) But his colleague in the Awami League, H.S. Suhrawardy, who later on in 1956 became the Prime Minister of Pakistan, felt "that there was no harm in Pakistan accepting US military aid if Pakistan could adopt a neutral attitude in the event of a world war". (33) Following the outcome of the elections in East Pakistan, Suhrawardy also disputed the right of the Mohammed Ali Government to enter into any pact with another country as it had forfeited the confidence of the majority of the people of Pakistan. (34) Pakistan Times writing in an editorial counselled that "Pakistan should not join any military alliance or pact and scrupulously avoid being counted as the enemy of a particular bloc of States". (35)

In the SEATO Conference

Meanwhile, talks were going on in London and Washington on the possibilities of formation of a South East Asian Defence
Treaty Organisation. Horace A. Hilderth, the United States Ambassador in Pakistan declared that "Pakistan could play 'a very useful part' if a South Asia Defence Organization or anything like it came into existence". (36) Although Pakistan was favourably inclined to any proposal for a South East Asian Defence pact, she expressed her willingness to discuss the SEATO proposals across the table with other Colombo Powers. (37) And in this regard, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali had some correspondence with Sir John Kotelawala, the Ceylonese Prime Minister. However, due to Indian opposition such a meeting could not be convened. Pakistan finally decided to attend the conference to be held in September in Baguio (later on changed to Manila), to discuss the establishment of a collective security arrangement for South East Asia, but she made it clear that "her decision did not entail any prior commitment to any scheme that might emerge from the deliberations". (38) The fact that the Pakistani delegation decided to attend the SEATO conference without any prior commitment, was enough evidence of the state of indecision prevailing in the top-level of policy making in Pakistan, in face of considerable domestic opposition to such an alliance. This was further borne out by the statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who did not sound very dissimilar to that

(37) Ibid., 5 August 1954.
(38) Ibid., 16 August 1954.
of Indian or any other non-aligned country's assessment of Asian situation. Zafrullah Khan said:

The threat of aggression in South East Asia cannot be met in the same way as it was met in the Western Europe. ...The fact that Bharat, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia have declined to attend the Manila talks will leave gaps in any security arrangement which grow out of Manila. In Asia, the threat of outright aggression is subject to the infiltration and subversion.... We must eliminate conditions which permit it to flourish. (39)

The Pakistani attitude prior to the SEATO conference had been described by some as having "an air of passive hostility to the whole affair...." (40) Whether it was so or not, it did mark some measure of disconnexion and split between thought and action. (41)

Five months after signing the Mutual Assistance Agreement with the United States for economic and military aid, Pakistan became a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organization. In some quarters, the signing of the Treaty was hailed as paving "the way for an active line-up of the free Asian nations and those other democratic Powers that have interest in the region, for the common aim of strengthening their defences against attack and subversion". (42) While others felt, that "Pakistan has for

(39) Ibid., 29 August 1954. Another name used for 'India' is 'Bharat'.

(40) The Argus (Melbourne), 1 September 1954.

(41) One Pakistani writer suggested that Pakistan should have kept aloof from SEATO, at least temporarily. He also felt that Pakistan could be a 'contributory' without being 'signatory' to the Pact. See Rais Ahmad Khan, "Pakistan in the International Sphere", The Pakistan Review (January 1956) 18. See also Ahmed Saeed, "Pakistan, SEATO and Peace". Ibid., (December 1954) 10.

all practical purposes become a full member of the expanding American grand alliance". (43) However, there were some common points in the criticisms of Pakistan's involvement in the SEATO: that, the change noticeable in Pakistan's foreign policy since Mohammed Ali's nomination, had been brought to completion and that, at no stage either the people or the parliament was sought to be taken into confidence. (44) Another fact brought to notice for public criticism by Khaliquzzaman Chaudhuri, a former Governor of East Pakistan, was that the pact had been signed by the Foreign Minister in Manila, before getting the sanction of the Government. According to him, the cabinet had been left only to perform "the task of post-mortem". (45) Later on, the Prime Minister also stated that the leader of the Pakistani delegation to the SEATO conference, had put his signatures by "making reservation to transmit the treaty to Government for consideration". (46) Statements of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, during and after the SEATO conference, however, evoke certain amount of surprise. Zafrullah Khan made it quite obvious to other participants in the conference that Pakistan's objectives in joining the SEATO could hardly be achieved if the treaty discriminated between various kinds of aggression. Alluding to

(43) See editorial on "Foreign Policy", Pakistan Times, 8 October 1954. For strong criticism of Pakistani participation in SEATO, see Ahmed Saeed, n. 41, 10-12.

(44) Pakistan Times, 8 October 1954. See also Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "SEATO and Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon, 7 (September 1954) 139-49.


(46) Ibid., 3 October 1954.
India, he said: "Aggression is evil. There were no varieties of evil, no varieties of aggression and it was necessary to resist it, wherever it came from". (47) But subsequently, replying to a Pressmen he declared, that "he did not think the newly-signed treaty will affect his country's relations with India". For he had "no reason to believe India would attack Pakistan. Aggression between India and Pakistan would be sheer lunacy and suicide". (48) Whatever might have been the purport of his latter statement, had the Pakistan Government subscribed to this, the whole premise on which the alliance with the Western Powers was based, would have been undermined. These apparent contradictions only underlined the element of uncertainty and indecision existing then in foreign policy as a consequence of internal political instability. Pakistan made a basic shift in foreign policy at a time when her politics was passing through a state of flux and fluidity.

Pakistan and the Bandung Conference

The second conference of the Ministers of the SEATO members was held on 23 February 1955 in Bangkok. Following that, in April 1955 Pakistan also participated in the Asian-African conference at Bandung. The Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, who was a co-sponsor of the conference along with other Prime Ministers of the Colombo Powers, did not find any conflict

(47) Pakistan Times, 7 September 1954.
(48) Dawn, 10 September 1954.
between the SEATO and the Bandung conferences. To him, while the Bandung conference was only a "get-together" the SEATO was "merely an agreement between different nations for ensuring collective security". (49) Notwithstanding his assessment, Mohammed Ali had been successful in utilizing the occasion in Bandung to remove misunderstandings between Pakistan and China created by her entanglement in the SEATO. (50) The seeds of Pindi-Peking Axis, which developed into a tree, in early sixties, were first sown in Bandung. Pakistan's objective in aligning with the West, was further trimmed off by this "understanding" between her and China, in so far as it was made more obvious, that India was the chief motivating factor behind it. Besides, this "agreement and harmony" also helped Pakistan to utilize the benefits of the alliance, political and other, in rectifying her unfavourable balance of power vis-a-vis India. She was further emboldened in her belief that, in her own frame of reference, commitment to the SEATO was limited to securing advantages

(49) The Hindu (Madras), 17 April 1955.

(50) Addressing the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference on 23 April 1955 the Chinese Premier Chou-en-Lai said: "The day before yesterday, after lunch, I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression against her. I am grateful to him for this explanation, because through these explanations we achieve a mutual understanding. This creates agreement and harmony amongst us in understanding each other on collective peace and cooperation". See George McT1urnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (New York, 1956) Appendix, 57-8. See also Mohammed Absen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and East Asia", Pakistan Horizon, 10 (March 1957) 44.
against her formidable and hostile neighbour, India.

Kashmir in the SEATO

It was no surprise, therefore, that at the first opportunity after the signing of the Treaty, when Mohammed Ali's trip to New Delhi in May 1955 failed to produce desired results as regards Kashmir, Pakistan came out, with a hurt feeling, demanding unstinted support from the Western Powers on this question. A Pakistani daily wrote rather bluntly: "We have the right now to expect America to support us to the hilt on the Kashmir issue in the United Nations and also to use her good offices with her Western allies to lend us equal support". (51) Alignment with the West had roused Pakistani expectations on Kashmir. The measure of her commitment depended on the extent of fulfilment of these expectations. Western Powers were not unaware of the Pakistani objectives. But those could have been realized only as part of West's global strategy, which did not always coincide with Pakistani objectives. However, an opportunity was provided to them to prove their solidarity with Pakistan, by the declaration of the visiting Soviet dignitaries, Premier Bulganin and Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Khruschev, in India towards the end of 1955, that Kashmir was an integral part of India. (52) The SEATO Powers hurried to express their support for Pakistan in the Council's meeting at Karachi on 7 March 1956. The SEATO Council affirmed that (a) peaceful settlement of the Kashmir


dispute should be secured in accordance with UN resolutions; (b) the "Durand Line" was the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (53)

Following the Soviet declarations, Pakistan had been groaning under frustrations and disappointments. The wisdom of Pakistan's association with the West, in the face of Soviet hostility, began to be questioned. (54) While referring to this climate of despondency in Pakistan, one foreign correspondent wrote:

> It is unfortunately true, that many in Pakistan feel the Western allies have failed to give the diplomatic support that could reasonably have been expected. The Pakistanis have watched with growing bitterness the Indian Government secure Russian support for the retention of Kashmir, while their own Western allies appear unwilling to re-affirm publicly even their previous support for a free and internationally supervised plebiscite. (55)

Therefore, when the SEATO Council made a declaration of its position in favour of Pakistan on Kashmir and the Durand Line, Pakistan's earlier faith in the alliance was restored. The SEATO Powers were complimented for they demonstrated that they were "made of sterner stuff". (56) It was claimed by the Government as the "most notable achievement of the SEATO". (57) With this

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(53) *Dawn*, 8 March 1956.


(56) *Dawn*, 10 March 1956.

affirmation of the Western Powers, the process of Kashmir becoming another issue of the "cold war" was completed. However, a Pakistani writer has admitted, that "the Russian leaders' support to India and Afghanistan against Pakistan was to punish Pakistan for joining SEATO and the Baghdad Pact...." (58) At the same time, it was also made clear beyond doubt that the decisions at Karachi "were a vocal protest against the statements of the Soviet leaders on Kashmir and the Afghan-sponsored Pushtoonistan issue". (59) Even after all is said and done, the Western leaders could not completely free themselves of the dilemma presented by the Soviet offensive. They were still on the rear guard. "In fact", as a Western commentator had pointed out, "the Karachi meeting can even be said to have helped the Russian offensive in some respects". (60) In spite of Pakistan's alliance, Western political commitment to support the Pakistani stand on the Kashmir question appeared to the Pakistanis to be nominal, while that of the Soviet Union in favour of India seemed real. The Karachi declaration did not go too far to remove this impression, notwithstanding the sense of jubilation that marked the Pakistani reaction. But the jubilation did not last long.

(58) Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the Soviet Bloc", Pakistan Horizon, 9 (June 1956) 77.

(59) See the joint statement of A.G. Casey and T.N. MacDonald, Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand respectively, Dawn, 12 March 1956.

(60) See Philip Deane's long despatch from Karachi on the SEATO Council's meeting, Scotsman (Edinburgh) 19 March 1956.
The statements made by Dulles in Delhi, and that of Selwyn Loyd in the British Parliament, poured cold water on Pakistan's enthusiasm. (61) It was amply reflected in the discussions that were held for the first time on foreign affairs, after the SEATO agreement was signed, in the national parliament. One member disputed the claim that the treaty provided any military aid to Pakistan to strengthen its defence against India; on the contrary, he felt that it had categorically forbidden any action against India. Referring to Dulles' statement in Delhi, he remarked that "the Government must change its foreign policy in view of the fact that these pacts and these alignments will not take us very far, so far our own interests are concerned". (62) A similar point of view was more forcefully expressed, when another deputy asked, "what is the need of our going into defence pacts with any country when we have no quarrel with anyone else but India and that country is more dear to our bosses than ourselves...?" (63)

Pakistan and the Soviet Union

The year 1956 witnessed an abortive attempt by the Soviet Union to win over Pakistan from the Western bloc. Until 1953, there was no misunderstanding in the relations between Pakistan

(61) See n. 94 in the Chapter "United Kingdom and the SEATO".


(63) See Mian Jaffer Shah's speech, Ibid., p. 70.
and the Soviet Union. It was only when talks for military aid were going on in 1953, between the United States and Pakistan that the Soviet Government became critical of Pakistan. In a strongly worded note to the Government of Pakistan on 30 November 1953, it said:

The Soviet Government could not regard with indifference reports of negotiations between the United States and Pakistan concerning the establishment of American air bases in Pakistan, nor reports that Pakistan and U.S. Governments were negotiating on the question of Pakistan joining in plans to set up a military aggressive bloc.... (64)

In spite of the Pakistani denial and assurance that "it would not take any step in hostility or unfriendliness to the USSR", (65) her relations with the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate with increasing Pak-US friendship. Pakistan's participation in the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact was greatly resented by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Prime Minister declared, that the SEATO was aimed at "preservation and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of national liberation movements and interference in the affairs of...other Asian countries". (66) After the unilateral declaration of the Soviet leaders on Kashmir in favour of India at the end of 1955, attempts were made by the Soviet Union to salvage whatever was left of Pakistani goodwill for her. The Soviet Government hinted at the

opportunities for mutually advantageous economic cooperation" and sharing with Pakistan "its technical knowledge in the peaceful use of atomic energy", provided Pakistan was out of the Western alliance and the relations were built on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. (67) Mikoyan led a 40-men delegation to Karachi on Pakistan's Republic Day celebrations in 1956. Back in Moscow, he was reported to have said that, "pacts or no pacts, the Soviet Union wants cordial relations with Pakistan". (65) It was also felt in Pakistan, that despite military alliances Russo-Pakistan relations could be improved. (69) These efforts, however, failed to produce the desired results and the two countries slipped into rigid postures. The Soviet Union became more vocal in favour of India and Pakistan turned more to the Western camp for political support.

**Pakistan and China**

While Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union remained far from satisfactory, she was successful in blunting the edge of Chinese protestations to her participation in military alliances. Shifts towards polycentrism in an otherwise monolithic structure of international communism, could also be traced to the tacit Chinese condonation of Pakistani membership of the


(68) *The Pakistan Times*, 29 March 1956.

(69) *Dawn*, 29 April 1956.
Western military pacts. At the early stage of the formation of the SEATO, the authorities in Peking described it as "an aggressive military alliance hostile to the people of China and various Asian countries". (70) Even at the Asian-African conference in 1955, the Chinese Prime Minister did not make any secret of his hostility to the SEATO. Chou en-Lai thought that the SEATO was formed with "the sole purpose of obtaining man-power and ensuring the setting up of new military springboards and bases as well as to place the small countries in subordinate positions politically and economically". (71) But the meeting of the Chinese Premier and the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali at Bandung in 1955, lent the Chinese attitude a different colour. Peking started distinguishing between, what it described, the American imperialistic designs and Pakistan's needs for security. Hasan Suhrawardy, after assuming office as the Prime Minister of Pakistan in September 1956, took the earliest opportunity to visit the Peoples Republic of China to reassure its leaders of Pakistan's friendship and good neighbourliness. (72) Chou en-Lai, reciprocating this gesture, announced that "Pakistan's membership of SEATO should not be a bar to friendly relations between China and Pakistan". (73) That

(71) See Kahin, n. 50, 63.
(72) H.S. Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, went on a 12-day visit to China on 16 October 1956. The Chinese Prime Minister Chou en-Lai paid a return visit to Pakistan in December 1956.
(73) Dawn, 24 October 1956.
Sino-Pak relations were entering the new phase of deep understanding of mutual self-interest and reciprocity, even in the heyday of **Panchsheel** and **Hindi-Cheeni bhai-bhai** (in 1956), had been made more than obvious by the prophetic statement of the Prime Minister Suhrawardy. While participating in the debates on foreign affairs in his national parliament, Suhrawardy said: "...They and we, belonging though we may to separate world camps, are by no means enemies, and that I seek the friendship of China. I am not isolated. I feel perfectly certain that when the crucial time comes China will come to our assistance". (74)

It is highly significant that despite Soviet support to India on the Kashmir question, the Chinese maintained a position of judicious neutrality and calculated equivocation. The Chinese held that the dispute was a legacy of British colonialism and imperialism and that both India and Pakistan should arrive at a peaceful settlement through negotiations. (75) Thus, Pakistan could ward off a very substantial amount of opposition to her participation in the **SEATC** that could have emanated from China. To the extent Pakistan achieved success in doing so, she had been able to reduce the brunt of Indian opposition to her alliance with the **SEATC**.

**Post - 1956 Disenchantment**

The climax of Pakistani enthusiasm for and interest in the


SEATO was reached in 1956. But, unfortunately for Pakistan, it was in the same year that the Indian Prime Minister Nehru, ruled out plebiscite as a solution for the Kashmir dispute owing to, what he called, the "change of circumstances". (76) Thus, Pakistan's association with the Western alliance in order to put pressure on India to agree to the solution of the Kashmir problem through plebiscite held under the auspices of the U.N., failed in its basic purpose. The following years, until the new regime of Gen. Ayub Khan was established in October 1958, recorded Pakistan's growing disenchantment with the SEATO. Despite the claim of the head of the Republican-Awami League coalition Government of Pakistan, Suhrawardy, that "the Treaty has given a new sense of confidence...and has served as a deterrent to those for whom our weakness was a source of temptation", (77) there was a growing awareness in Pakistan of the futility of adhering to a policy which created more enemies than friends for Pakistan. The extreme opinion was reflected by Maulana Bhasani (the President of the newly-formed National Awami Party, which broke away from the Awami League due to differences on foreign policy), when he stated, that "the policy of relying on imperialists to win Kashmir for us initiated by the Muslim League Government and now being followed with great ability by


Suhrawardy, has proved to be absolutely barren and bankrupt." (78)

The proceedings of the National Assembly in February 1957, when it debated for the first time in nine years a motion seeking approval of the foreign policy of Pakistan, bear ample testimony to the rapid erosion of faith in military alliances. (79) Even the most zealous of the supporters of the Government's policy, were constrained to ask for its revision. Writing under the title 'At the cross roads', Dawn lamented, in two consecutive articles Pakistan's association with the West. It said:

The West is now talking to Pakistan in a new voice. It is not the voice of a friend, nor an ally. It sounds like that of a hostile stranger. It is not a prelude to a big let-down; it seems as if this is the let down. Not so long ago John Foster Dulles did not like neutralists; but he thinks differently now. It would be cheap and utterly useless to accuse our so-called allies of faithlessness because in the first place we should not have put so much faith in them. (80)

Pleading for a reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy, it wrote in the second article:

...We should revise a policy that has earned for us the enmity of certain nations, without any corresponding gain to ourselves. Therefore, it is plain commonsense, that we should cut our losses and withdraw from our present position of complete identification with the anti-soviet policies and plans of the West, to the more honourable, rational and even profitable policy of judicious neutrality in the East-West cold war.... (81)

(78) Pakistan Times, 26 July 1957.


(81) Ibid., 31 March 1958.
On balance, it was realised, that Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India on the Kashmir dispute, was most unenviable. It was openly stated, that "never would Russia have used her veto and actively participated on the side of Bharat in the matter of Kashmir if Pakistan had not aligned herself so closely with the Anglo-American bloc". (82)

Rethinking in the USA

In no uncertain degree, Pakistan's cold attitude towards military alliances with the West, had been influenced by the developing close relations between India and the United States in the late fifties. Events of the post-Suez crisis period in the international field and the revolution in the nuclear weapons delivery system, reduced considerably the importance of bases and pockets in the strategic considerations of the United States. Politically, non-alignment was no longer considered to be/conflicting with the foreign policy interests of the United States. Segments of American opinion opposed to military aid to Pakistan, became more vocal and began to affect the policies of the State Department. Critical references had been made in the US Senate to military aid to Pakistan and a better appreciation of India's role in international affairs as a peacemaker was noticeable. (83) Emphasising a similar point, one writer


(83) See Senator J. William Fulbright's criticism of military aid to Pakistan, US Congressional Record, 103 (13 June 1957) 8037, 8042. Senator Fulbright criticised military
pointed out that "the rearming of Pakistan as a member of both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact has had disastrous consequences. It has alienated India.... It has turned Afghanistan towards Russia and opened the door to its penetration by Soviet influence". (84) So long as the relations between Pakistan and India remained far from friendly, any rapprochement between India and the United States could not have been relished by Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan had to pass through a period of extreme agony, which had its manifestations in the political turmoil that overtook it in 1958.

A Military Coup

A military regime brought about by a coup d'état by General Ayub Khan, sought to inject stability in internal politics and confidence and hope in external commitments. The new regime promised "to stand by the treaties...entered into with other countries". (85) The new foreign minister Manzur Qader aid to Pakistan in 1954 too. See Ibid., 100 (2 March 1954) 2351. References complimenting India's democratic experiment and her role as a peace maker in world affairs, were made by Senators. Hubert H. Humphrey, John Sherman Cooper, Mike Mansfield, Wayne Morse. See Summary of Congressional Proceedings, 10-14 (1954-8) 119-23 (15 August 1957), Issued under the authority of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (General Council) Ottawa.


(85) See General Ayub Khan's statement on 25 December 1958, Dawn, 26 December 1958. The preceding Governments of I.I. Chundrigar and Feroze Khan Noon which stayed for very brief periods in October 1957 and early 1958 respectively, also assured Pakistan's continued association with the West.
expressed himself in favour of organizing the SEATO on the pattern of the NATO. Once again pronounced pro-Western stance in Pakistan foreign policy was noticeable. Pakistan was very much concerned with the ruthless suppression of the Tibetan uprising by Communist China. She felt, that "the Tibetan situation posed definite and direct problems for the SEATO Powers and would certainly have to be discussed". (86) Pakistan was even prepared to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama. (87) Pakistan's realisation of the Chinese threat to the sub-continent could have brought the two countries (India and Pakistan) closer and it was in this context, that General Ayub Khan made an offer of joint defence on 24 April 1959. (88) However, the Indian Government rejected it outrightly. (89) Notwithstanding the Indian attitude, Pakistan's faith in the alliances appeared to have been once again boosted up by the Pakistan - United States bilateral Agreement of cooperation signed at Ankara on 5 March 1959. But this new enthusiasm failed to arouse enough confidence in Pakistan in the Western Powers. Judged by the touchstone of Kashmir, Pakistan always found those organizations wanting. The communique of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the SEATO Powers held in Wellington in April 1959, did not mention either the Kashmir

(86) Pakistani Foreign Minister Manzur Jadir's statement in Wellington, Dawn, 8 April 1959.

(87) Foreign Minister Jadir said at a Press Conference in Singapore, Ibid., 18 April 1959.

(88) Ibid., 25 April 1959.

(89) See Nehru's statement in the Rajya Sabha on 4 May 1959, Rajya Sabha Debates, 28 (1959) cols. 1675-6.
dispute (in spite of Pakistan's bid to raise the issue) or any other source of threat, besides the communist danger. This dampened the Pakistani spirit a great deal. Commenting on the Wellington communique, a prominent Pakistani daily wrote: "It has been once again made clear that beyond the calculations of the cold war we may not hope to depend on any substantial support from the Big Powers in overcoming our more immediate perils". (90)

Factors responsible for Pakistan's joining NATO

Listing the factors responsible for Pakistan's alliance with the West, G.W. Chaudhury, a noted commentator on Pakistan's foreign policy, summed up:

...These factors, the ideological attitude, the fear of Indian aggression, polarisation of power in the world, the spread of communism, particularly in South East Asia, the need for economic development, the consequent need for assistance from abroad and the desire to have allies in the international field, explain the spectacular developments in the foreign policy of Pakistan in 1954 and 1955. (91)

The three most important factors were relations with India, Pakistan's geographical position and her internal political conditions. From the discussion in earlier pages, it would be clear how India had been the most dominating consideration in the shaping of Pakistan's foreign policy. As it has been put by one writer: "...To Pakistanis the danger of going Communist or being

(90) Dawn, 18 April 1959.
(91) G.W. Chaudhury, The Basis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Pakistan's External Relations), (Karachi, 1958) 11.
conquered by a Communist Power is very remote compared with the immediate and continuing danger of forcible merger with India". (92) Whether the reasons for the fear of aggression by India were valid or not, there did exist some amount of fear and doubt in Pakistani mind about India's intentions in respect of Pakistan. And that a war was narrowly missed between the two countries in 1951, had not been entirely forgotten by the Pakistani leaders. A full-scale war between the two neighbours was not any more beyond the realm of possibility. In 1951, India was admittedly better placed, so far as the relative military strength was concerned. (93) Therefore, in the event of a war between the two countries, Pakistan felt, they would be in a very adverse position. Recognition of this fact, besides being flanked by two unfriendly neighbours on either side, India and Afghanistan, (94) drove the authorities in Karachi to the conclusion, that relying solely on her own military strength Pakistan won't be able to safeguard her territorial integrity. Moreover, as Keith Callard had observed: "Even if a war with India be regarded as out of the question, no Government likes to do business with a neighbour when both sides know that one is incapable of its own defence". (95)


(93) For a further discussion of this point see Hasan, n. 82, 56-8.

(94) See write-up by a Pakistani Correspondent, "Pakistan and her neighbours: Foreign Relations of a New State", Round Table (June 1956) 239.

(95) Callard, n. 1, 9.
Geographically and strategically, Pakistan occupies a very important position. She is a link between the West Asian region and the South East Asian belt. Her western wing touches the boundaries of India, Afghanistan and Iran. But her geographical position "does not give...any great freedom of choice in foreign policy". (96) The two parts of Pakistan are separated by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory. This makes the task of defence stupendous and the cost, for a country like Pakistan, prohibitive. Hence, to cope with the need for defence against two neighbours, alliance with a powerful ally becomes obligatory. The United States had realised the role that Pakistan could play in linking her security arrangements in the South East Asia with the Western defence system. And in fact by joining both the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan became "the most important member to co-ordinate Eastern and Western defence against Russia". (97) Thus, Pakistan tried to utilize the advantage of her geographical position, in adjusting her defence requirements with the global purposes of the United States.

The state of internal political affairs, as existing then in Pakistan, made the decision of joining the pacts more imminent. Deteriorating political situation in the country in 1953-4, had accelerated the process of Pakistan's military commitment to the


(97) Ibid., 14. For a fuller discussion see Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (London, 1951), Part three.
Western alliance system. With the dismissal in April 1953 of Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin and replacement by Mohammed Ali of Bogra, who was till then the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Pakistan changed her course from non-alignment in international affairs to a close alliance with the West. In January 1953 America and Britain expressed their joint agreement to include Pakistan in their scheme of Middle East Defence Organisation. (98) Mohammed Ali's assumption of office appeared to be the result of the decision in the highest echelons of power in Karachi, than of any popular demand to have a change in the Government. The Muslim League, the ruling party, was fast losing its earlier hold on the masses. (99) Popular discontent with the state of affairs in Pakistan, got manifestation through the increasing support gained by the United Front, led by the Awami League, in East Pakistan. The first, and also the last (so far), general and direct election, on the basis of adult franchise, was held in Eastern Pakistan in the middle of March 1954. The Muslim League had its total and complete rout in the elections and the United Front came out victorious capturing 223 seats in a house of 309. The Muslim League could manage to get only 10 seats. (100) The results of the elections in East Pakistan had shaken the morale of the League leaders who were running the Government of Pakistan in Karachi. As Keith Callard had put it, "such a massive defeat in a province containing more

(98) See n. 28.
(99) For a detailed discussion see Callard, n. 1, 34-76.
(100) Dawn, 18 March 1954.
than half of the national population inevitably undermined the position of the Central Government". (101)

The United Front, which subsequently formed the Government in East Pakistan declared its opposition to military pacts. At a public meeting held under the auspices of the United Front in Dacca to observe 'Thanks giving day' following the victory at the polls, a resolution was passed which urged the Central Government of Pakistan not to seek American military aid, which it thought, was 'detrimental to the interests of Pakistan'. (102) Leaders of the United Front interpreted their victory as a total rejection of the foreign policy of the Government, which was according to them an issue in the elections. (103) Despite these reverses, the Central Government stuck to its earlier policy in respect of the Western bloc. On 2 April 1954, Pakistan entered into a treaty with Turkey, (104) which was already a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The character of the two Governments, the East Pakistan and the Central, were very different. While the former was a democratically elected government, having its sustenance from the people, the latter was a weak and unstable government supported by a powerful Western power. (105)

(101) See Callard, n. 1, 58.
(104) Pakistan Times, 3 April 1954.
(105) See Andrew, "East Bengal - A set-back to 'SEATO' Move", The Times of India (Delhi), 13 June 1954.
aid from a major Power sought to compensate for the lack of popular support behind the Government in Karachi. Perhaps, it was expected that the aid and the alliances which Pakistan subsequently joined, would boost up the morale and restore prestige to an unstable and decaying regime in Pakistan, as against the popular upsurge which had its manifestation in the East Pakistan elections. Pakistan's policy regarding military commitments with the West could have assumed a different character, if the forces released by the pre- and post- election developments in East Pakistan, had been allowed a free scope in Pakistan's domestic politics. However, this did not happen and the popular rule in East Pakistan was terminated within two months without allowing the Assembly to meet. In this respect, it is of significance to note the dates of certain developments, which appeared to have set new departures in Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies. The announcement to offer military aid to Pakistan Government, headed by Mohammed Ali, by the United States was made on 26 February 1954, (106) just about two weeks earlier than the elections in Eastern Pakistan. On 19 May 1954, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the USA. (107) On 30 May 1954, the popular Government in East Pakistan was dismissed by the order of the Central Government and Governor's rule was promulgated. (108)


Conclusion

Enumerating the disadvantages that have accrued to Pakistan from the pacts with the West, Sarwar Hasan pointed out:

(a) Pakistan has suffered a setback in the position that it enjoyed among the Asian-African states in the United Nations, most of those states being themselves uncommitted in the inter-bloc rivalry and opposed to close alignment with the West;

(b) Pakistan has fallen in the estimation of the Arabs, who are all strongly opposed to alignment with the West;

(c) the pact with the West, far from bringing any advantage to Pakistan in respect of its disputes with India...are believed to have made the position worse for Pakistan. (109)

This estimation of the consequences of Pakistan's alliance with the West, seems to be fairly supported by the events following Pakistan's commitment.

Pakistan did achieve a better military position than it had been before she joined the pacts. Pakistan's military weakness till 1953 had made its position very vulnerable. Any worsening of relations between India and Pakistan, similar to one that happened in 1951, might have forced Pakistan, in the absence of external aid, to concede her vital interests to India. That is to say, India because of her greater resources, human and material, would have permanently remained in a better bargaining position. As against Afghanistan too, because of her membership of the pacts, Pakistan could add teeth to her protestations.

(109) See Hasan, n. 82, 75-6.
Pakistan was able to improve her military position, without however achieving comparable political benefits. Whatever political gain Pakistan sought to get out of the SEATO Council's 'affirmation' in March 1956, was largely cancelled by the later pronouncements of the Western statesmen. But for the Soviet declaration in India's support, it was very unlikely that the SEATO Powers would have made this 'affirmation'. On the contrary, Pakistan's commitment with the West drew the Soviet Union into a dispute, on which she had maintained a sort of neutrality till 1953. Thus, it would appear, that the pacts had landed Pakistan into unnecessary and avoidable compromises and embarrassments. She seemed to be following in the mid and late fifties a policy which was unnatural to her genius and superficial to her moorings. This was not the policy ordained by the founding fathers of Pakistan.

Fortunately, however, this policy was tempered with discernable trends of independence and non-commitment. Pakistan was not ideologically committed to anti-communism or the Western estimation of the Soviet or Chinese threat. These created a dichotomy of purpose in Pakistan's foreign policy. Surrounded, as she is almost from all sides by anti-West or non-aligned countries, she could not have followed a completely pro-West foreign policy for long. Sooner than later, she had to recognize the objective situations around her. This has become more than obvious in her policies by the end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties. However, the cross pulls that the Pakistan's foreign policy was subjected to, lent her defence commitment a very unorthodox character. The chief partners and
the fellow members in the SEATO had been able to realise this fact. Seldom had the global purpose of the Western Powers and the limited objective of Pakistan's commitment converged. By and large, Pakistan had tried to maintain an anti-colonial and anti-racial outlook in her international dealings in the United Nations and elsewhere. (110) The pro-Western stance in her policies had been much pronounced only when she had found it useful to gain a point against, or to embarrass, India. It would be too far fetched to hold that Pakistan is a member of the Western camp, in the sense Australia or Canada is. Pakistan's alignment with the West is a marriage of convenience. She has no heart in it.

(110) For a detailed discussion of this problem see Hasan, n. 82, Chapter 7.