CONCLUSION
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Of the six Commonwealth countries, whose attitudes towards the SEATO have been studied in the previous chapters, three (Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom) are old members and the other three (India, Malaya, Pakistan) are new members of the association. The old members have common Anglo-Saxon origin (with some qualification in respect of Canada) - and Australia and Canada regard the Queen of the United Kingdom as their own Queen. On the other hand, the three new members were erstwhile British colonies and although they continue to be members of the Commonwealth, they consider the Queen as the symbol of unity of the Commonwealth. However, these facts of history did not create any uniform responses, either in respect of the old or the new members, to the South East Asia Treaty Organization.

After the Second World War, Australia's drift away from the mother country and towards the United States, has been fairly marked. Yet, Australia shared the British doubts about the desirability of taking 'united action' in Indo-China as proposed in 1954 by the American Secretary of State, Dulles. She also took a stand similar to Britain so far as the American reservation regarding aggression was concerned. It had been the common endeavour of Australia and Britain to enlist as much Asian support as could be possible. The Australian Foreign Minister, Casey's trips to Asian capitals seemed to have acquainted him with the Asian fear and suspicion of a purely military approach to the problems facing South and South East Asia. Britain too
was well aware of these feelings in Asia. Thus, it would appear, that both Australia and Britain had functioned as a bridge between the uncommitted Asian countries and the United States, although the restraining affect upon the United States policies, in whatever measure, had been more due to the efforts of the British statesmen. However, Australia was quite enthusiastic about the formation of SEATO, for it helped her achieve the aim of firmer commitments by the United States in this region. SEATO provided Australia with a platform to participate more effectively in Asian affairs, apart from the fact, that it served her security interests. The Australian decision to send troops to Malaya, as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, was a move closer to the British stand-point than the American, although Australia had been able to secure partial agreement of the United States. There had been differences in military strategy between the United States and Australia, as the former insisted on 'mobile defence' and the latter preferred 'tactical deployment'. But Australia seemed to share the US suspicion when a shift of emphasis took place from military defence to defence against subversion. Both Britain and Australia took, more or less, the same position with regard to the discussion of any intra-Commonwealth dispute in SEATO.

All the three old members of the Commonwealth shared the US anxiety to prevent the spread of communism beyond the existing frontiers. But Canada stood apart, so far as the Western scheme of security arrangement in Asia was concerned. It is significant to note that in this respect her attitude appeared to have
emanated from considerations not very dissimilar to that of Asian non-committed nations. Canada was never invited to participate in SEATO. But judging from the pronouncements of the Canadian spokesmen, it seems Canada was not very keen to get one. There was an eagerness to impress her independence of the United States, in respect of her foreign policy, at least concerning an area where her interests were not very vitally involved. In various degrees, however, all the three old Commonwealth members emphasised this independence, so far as their attitudes towards SEATO were concerned. Canada found in India something to encourage and perhaps even to sustain her policy towards South East Asia. The near identity of views between an aligned Atlantic and a non-aligned Asian could also be attributed to the distance that separates them. The fact that both are mid-ranking in their respective power positions, could have also been a contributory factor to this development. Canada's membership of the Indo-China Supervisory Commissions, is the measure of the confidence that she had been able to create in South East Asia by following a policy different from her Western allies.

The fact of geography, as well as, history coloured the attitudes of India and Pakistan towards SEATO. India was generally opposed to military pacts, but Pakistan's association with SEATO added to its vehemence. Without subscribing to the Western and particularly American motivations behind the military pacts, Pakistan decided to participate mainly to safeguard her security and territorial integrity against India. Obviously, this caused embarrassments for other members of the Commonwealth, who joined SEATO, but yet maintained quite friendly relations.
with India. Considerations of offending either country of the Indian sub-continent weighed heavily upon the formulators of policies regarding SEATO in Canberra or London. One of the many reasons why SEATO proved ineffective, could be the difficulty, or the inability, of Britain or Australia to reconcile their (India and Pakistan) mutual differences. However, Britain was in the best position to present the Indian point of view in SEATO. Britain's failure to enlist India and other Asian countries in SEATO or to sell the idea of a Locarno type treaty for South East Asia to her allies, could have been in some degree responsible for her disinterestedness in SEATO. That Britain did not pursue her earlier policy of recruiting new Asian members in SEATO, becomes obvious when Malaya did not feel encouraged to join SEATO despite her alliance with Britain. A Mutual Assistance agreement sufficed, so far as, her security interests were concerned. But Malaya could not have been oblivious of the uncommitted Asian opinion, when she chose to remain outside SEATO. There were internal reasons too, which prompted her to take this decision. Nevertheless, it would have been extremely difficult for Malaya to counter British pressures, if the latter were keen to enrol Malaya as a member of SEATO. Consequently, Malaya started treading the difficult but novel path between alignment and non-alignment.

The study reveals no uniform attitudes or reasons for those attitudes, of the respective countries, towards SEATO. They were different in each case. Neither anti-communism was
the prime consideration for those who joined. Nor adherence to non-alignment was the only motive behind keeping out. What emerged, however, as the common consideration, was the respective national interests of each country, as determined by the geopolitical situation plus the nature of the prevailing state of international relations.
APPENDIX

THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY AND THE PACIFIC CHARTER

(Manila, 8 September 1954)

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights of self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the Treaty Area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous
agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty of political independence of any Party in the Treaty Area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to
meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the 'Treaty Area' is the general area of South-East Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees
30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agree-
ment, amend this Article to include within the Treaty Area the
territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with
Article VII or otherwise to change the Treaty Area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified
copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the
other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions
carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall
be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other
signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States
which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratifica-
tion of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited,
and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on
the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any
Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of
denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the
other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September 1954.

*Signed for Australia by Richard G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs; for France by Guy La Chambre, Minister of State; for New Zealand by T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs; for Pakistan by Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister; for the Republic of the Philippines by Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Francisco A. Delgado, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Thomas L. Cabili, Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada, and Representative Cornelio T. Villareal; for Thailand by Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommunn Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Minister of Foreign Affairs; for the United Kingdom by the Marquess of Reading, Minister of State; and for the United States by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Senator H. Alexander Smith, and Senator Michael J. Mansfield.
PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE
DEFENCE TREATY

Designation of states and territory as to which provisions
of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable:

The Parties to the South-East Asia Collective Defence
Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of
the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free terri-
tory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states
and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic
measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with
the coming into force of the Treaty.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
have signed this Protocol to the South-East Asia Collective
Defence Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

The Pacific Charter

The delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan,
the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United
States of America:

Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to
maintain peace and security in South-East Asia and the South-
West Pacific;

Convinced that common action to this end in order to be
worthy and effective, must be inspired by the highest principles
of justice and liberty;

Do hereby proclaim:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favourable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional procedures;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;

Fourth, as declared in the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the Treaty Area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.