CHAPTER VI

THE KOREAN WAR AND US–PAKISTAN RELATIONS
Pakistan's attitude on a number of issues arising out of the Korean War was a significant factor in promoting friendly relations between the United States and Pakistan. From the American viewpoint, the North Korean aggression could hardly be treated an isolated incident. To Americans it appeared to be the culmination of a series of Communist probings in Europe and Asia. The ending of America's monopoly of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union and the establishment shortly thereafter of a Communist regime in Peking had greatly affected the power balance both in Europe and Asia. On top of these traumatic developments came what seemed to the US Government and people a flagrant act of aggression by North Korea.

The Truman Administration decided that the Communist challenge must be met by armed forces. The President said:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond doubt that Communism had passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed subversion and war. (1)

The President, in an extraordinary move, ordered American combat troops into action. Soon after, the American delegation in the United Nations sought to win for the President's action the approbation and support of the member nations. Ernest Gross, Chief US Delegate, appealed to the members to condemn North Korea for her

aggression and compel her to withdraw. Declared Gross: it is a threat which must inevitably be of grave concern to the governments of peace-loving nations. It is an invasion upon a State which the United Nations itself, by action of its General Assembly, has brought into being. It is armed aggression against the government elected under United Nations supervision. Such an attack openly defies the interest and authority of the United Nations. Such an attack, therefore, concerns the vital interests which all the member nations have in the Organisation. (2)

The Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet delegates, promptly condemned the aggression in Korea and ordered the North Koreans to withdraw. The North Koreans, however, refused to do so. Consequently, the Security Council, in its second resolution of 27 June 1950, requested the member nations to repel aggression and restore peace and security in the area through UN military force. Speaking on this resolution American delegate Warren Austin again forcefully advocated the necessity for defending the most important provisions of the UN Charter which, he asserted, had been violated by North Korea. (3)

**Pakistani Support to America in the UNO**

The United States was anxious to obtain support for her stand from the largest possible number of countries in the World Organization. Support for the United Nations action readily came from her European allies. The real

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(2) Ibid., (25 June 1950) 4.
(3) Ibid., (27 June 1950) 3.
problem was one of enlisting the support of Asian countries which were not committed to either of the power blocs. Of them, India and Pakistan were regarded as specially important. Pakistan was not then a member of the UN Security Council. But the views of her Government were communicated to the Secretary General:

... the Government of Pakistan regard the hostilities now in progress in Korea as a clear case of aggression on the part of North Korea. They will give full support to measures proposed in the Security Council resolution to stop hostilities. (4)

Public attention in the United States was focussed more on India's reaction than on that of Pakistan. However, the prompt and unequivocal reaction of the Pakistani Government created a favourable impression on the American Government. Zafrulla Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, reiterated in the General Assembly his Government's wholehearted support to the Security Council's action. He characterized it as "a bold reply to the challenge, so grave and impudent, to the authority nay, to the very existence of the United Nations." (5)

On 29 August 1950, Pakistan informed the Security Council that she could not spare any ground troops to help fight the war in Korea because of the grave dangers that confronted her. (6) Pakistan shrewdly sought to spread

the impression in the United States that unlike India, she was ready to send troops to fight alongside of the UN soldiers in Korea but that only her difficulties with India stood in the way. She offered 5,000 tons of wheat as her contribution to the United Nations' war effort.

"United Action For Peace"

In the context of what appeared to them to be the somewhat halting policy of India, Pakistan's response seemed to Americans to be a clear proof of her "trustworthiness." This was confirmed when Pakistan supported the United States' sponsored "United Action for Peace" resolution in the General Assembly in November 1950. The resolution called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly on 24 hours' notice on the vote of any seven members of the Security Council or a majority of the members of the United Nations, if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members, failed to act in any case where there happened to be a threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression. The importance of this resolution in the context of the situation created by the Korean War can hardly be overrated. It aimed at stopping Soviet obstructions to the policies pursued by the United States in the Security Council. The United Nations action in Korea had been rendered possible only because of the
temporary absence of Soviet Russia from the Security Council.

The United Nations could not, however, depend upon such exceptional circumstances in case of any future aggression. As the US delegate, John Foster Dulles, put it, "If potential aggressors were to be deprived of all hopes of success, a reliable system would have to be created instead of matters being left to chance." (7) Dulles added that "if a new spirit were to animate the United Nations, it would be possible to avoid such local aggressions, which, as history had shown, were the prelude to general war." While opposing the views in certain quarters that the UN General Assembly could not act in a responsible fashion, he said, "the responsibility of maintaining peace was not the monopoly of great powers and that an informed world opinion was the factor most likely to affect the course of events." "There was every reason" he argued, that the General Assembly more than any other organ, would reflect "world opinion on the question of what was right in other words the supremacy of law." (8) In short, the "United Action for Peace" resolution, according to the US delegate, would


(8) Ibid., 64. Zafarullah Khan, while supporting the resolution sought to make it clear that even though the draft resolution was desirable, action under the resolution could not be taken legally.
create a more reliable system for the maintenance of world peace.

The move was denounced by the USSR as an attempt of the Anglo-American group to push through decisions in its own interests. It was an attempt to relieve the Security Council of its primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security, to eliminate the principle of unanimity and was tantamount to changing the Charter, the Soviet representatives argued.

Pakistan endorsed the American point of view. The Pakistani delegate, Zafrullah Khan, argued that the inability of the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security had been demonstrated during the previous five years when the veto had been used 50 times. What the resolution proposed was a more effective implementation of the residual right of the Assembly to make any recommendation within the scope of the Charter, except disputes or situations with which the Council was dealing. India abstained when the resolution was put to vote, thus making the Pakistani vote all the more significant as an expression of firm support for the United States on a crucial issue. (9)

(9) Ibid., 96. The Indian delegate Sir B. N. Rau felt that the wording of the resolution needed clarification. For example the wordings "because of lack of unanimity of permanent members" was not precise.
In Pakistan, the Muslim League supported the UN-US action in Korea. (10) Prime Minister Liaquat Ali, in a short speech before the Constituent Assembly, defended the action of the Security Council. His words were reminiscent of the speech by Ernest Gross in the Security Council. Liaquat Ali Khan said:

No amount of special pleading can conceal the fact that this action—the crossing of the 38th Parallel by North Korean troops—constituted a breach of peace and an act of aggression against the Government of an independent country. This Government had been lawfully established by an expression of the will of the people in an election held under the supervision of the United Nations Commission. The Security Council called upon the North Korean Government to withdraw their armed forces to 38th parallel. This was not done and the authority of the United Nations was flouted. (11)

Liaquat Ali felt that it was the duty of all peace-loving nations to support the United Nations in the restoration of peace in Korea. Shrewdly he linked up his support of the American position in Korea with a reference to his country's dispute with India over Kashmir. Expressing regret over the inability of Pakistan to send troops to Korea he asserted that even though unable to render that form of help to the United Nations' war effort in Korea, Pakistan was making an equally important contribution to the wider aim of preserving peace. Pakistani troops were fulfilling that function at home in countering a threat to the peace and security of Pakistan, he added. Thenceforward Pakistani leaders not


(11) Pakistan, Constituent Assembly, Legislature of Pakistan Debates, 2 (11 October 1950) 481.
only drew attention to Pakistan's support of the US position but also underlined the so-called aggressive posture of India.

The Prime Minister was opposed in the Assembly by Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan (of the pre-partition Unionist Party) and Mian Mohammed Iftikharuddin, publisher of the Pakistan Times. The Mian was the founder of the Azad Pakistan Party which claimed to stand for a radical programme of domestic reform. The former summed up the possible consequences of the action of the Government of Pakistan thus:

I hope that our nation will not be dragged into any war in an excess of any pseudo-international spirit. (12)

Voicing a similar sentiment Mian Iftikharuddin stated:

We have offered Pakistan to be made into another Formosa if the United Nations or America in other words feels it necessary that in their war against Russia, it is necessary to make Pakistan as their base. They have taken Formosa, a territory of China and therefore, I say, Sir, that the Prime Minister in taking this decision has done the greatest harm to this country and therefore I oppose this resolution. (13)

The strong moral support that the Pakistani Government gave to the US sponsored resolutions in the Security Council, did not evoke in the American press any special appreciation of Pakistan's stand. In comparison to India, very little space was devoted to the Pakistani attitude on the Korean issue. Indian support of the Security Council

(12) Ibid., 485.
(13) Ibid., 492.
resolution condemning the aggression in Korea was received with great satisfaction in the United States. The New York Times considered the Indian approval of the Security Council resolution, as a "recognition of evil" by the country of Gandhi. (14) The Washington Post said that the Indian action would have a salutary effect on Asia and would re-inforce the voice of mankind and not merely the Western world. (15) Similar appreciation or even notice of Pakistan's action was lacking. Whether Pakistan could exert any influence in Asia or in the Muslim World was not a topic of any serious discussion in America at that time.

Indian Attitude Deplored

A change began to occur in the attitude of the American press after Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, suggested that the People's Republic of China should be admitted to the United Nations in order to create a favourable atmosphere for solving the Korean problem. (16) The Indian Prime Minister despatched notes


(15) Washington Post, 1 July 1950. A Post editorial on 8 July 1950 did contain a reference to the support of Pakistan and of India to the United Nations resolution which, the paper said, had made the UN action truly universal. The Post went on to criticize the American Government for what it described as a failure to bring about a solution of the Kashmir question which would have enabled India and Pakistan to send their excellent troops to fight in Korea.

to the United States and the Soviet Union in which, among other things, he offered this suggestion. (17) The State Department, reportedly considered these notes ill-timed. The New York Times asserted that while the sincerity of the Indian Prime Minister could not be doubted, he had unfortunately failed to realize that no peace could be attained unless North Korean aggression was undone. The admission of Red China should not be a pre-requisite of peace, for it would be nothing but surrender to aggression and encourage further Communist demands. The paper called upon the Indian Prime Minister to understand the Western stand and not mix up the issue of admission of Red China with that of aggression in Korea. (18)

In the heat of emotions worked up by the events in Korea, American opinion was considerably irked by the nature and implication of Nehru's intervention. In such a state of mind, many Americans began to take notice of Pakistan and to question the wisdom of placating India as the leading nation of Asia. This mood intensified as the Indian Prime Minister continued his occasional pronouncements on ending the Korean War and on the admission of the Peking regime to the UN. The changing

(17) Ibid., 14 July 1950.
(18) Ibid., 19 July 1950.
US tone was indicated in another editorial in the New York Times:

Pandit Nehru purports to speak for Asia but it is the voice of abnegation; his criticism now turns out to have been obstructive, his policy is appeasement. Worst of all one fails to find a valid moral judgement in his attitude. One can feel certain that history will condemn the Nehru policy as well intentioned but timid, short sighted and irresponsible. (19)

The Washington Post, though using comparatively milder language, virtually echoed the New York Times. Nehru's efforts, the paper thought, could be useful after the aggression in Korea had been put down. To realize that objective, international unity was important, it declared. (20) Even the Christian Century, generally sympathetic to India, deplored the attitude of Nehru, describing his approach as "enigmatic and disappointing." (21) The Catholic World stated that it was a "great tragedy" that Nehru, "honest, sincere and a lover of his fellowmen, should be so solicitous about the immediate social and economic benefits of a tie-up with Red China and so little concerned about the ultimate consequences of the Soviet philosophy." (22) Business Week stated that the State Department had begun to have serious second thoughts on the advisability of relying on

(19) Ibid., 12 October 1950.
(22) Catholic World (New York), 172 (October 1950) 45.
India for Asian leadership. "Prime Minister Nehru has proved since Korea that he would not lead the non-Communist forces in Asia," it stated. (23)

In the Congress, Senator William Knowland (Republican, California) and a few others vehemently criticized India's approach on Korea. (24)

India's attitude and the reaction it evoked in the United States during this period had significant consequences in shaping the course of subsequent relations between America and Pakistan. The United States needed the support of important Asian countries. With China hostile and India taking a course regarded as friendly to China, Pakistan's usefulness as a potential Asian ally began to attract growing attention. The leaders of Pakistan were not slow in appraising how such a movement in American opinion could be turned to their own advantage. "Commented Dawn, the influential Pakistani newspaper:

The failure of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's mediation effort in Korea was perhaps a foregone conclusion though the outcome is saddening. In the American view with which Pakistan concurs, the main weakness of the Bharati [Indian] Prime Minister's approach lay in linking the Korean War with the question of seating Communist China in the Security Council though there is no relationship of cause and effect between the two. This criticism is not unjustified. The first is a question of military aggression, as the Security Council has described it, and an overwhelming majority of United Nations members


including Bharat have endorsed that verdict. The second question, that of Communist China's status, is a purely political one and Mao Tse-tung's Government and country are not connected with what is going on in Korea, whatever may be their sympathies.... (25)

Dawn's editorial was a complete endorsement of the American stand on the issues that it analysed.

**Pakistan Refuses to Condemn China as Aggressor**

There were, however, some issues, which though connected with the Korean War, were not looked upon with the same enthusiasm in Pakistan as the United States would have desired. For example, in later 1950, when the General Assembly discussed the question of the admission of People's China in the United Nations, it had been reported that the Chinese had intervened in the Korean War. Despite the direct involvement of Paking in the war, the Pakistani delegate at the United Nations advocated the admission of the People's Republic of China, thus supporting the India-sponsored resolution on China. (26) Even more noteworthy was the fact that Pakistan abstained when an American-sponsored resolution to brand China as an aggressor was adopted by the General Assembly on 1 February 1951. The US resolution, according to Liaquat Ali Khan, "closed doors for negotiations and peaceful settlement of the Korean problem." Asked

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whether the American resolution was a threat to peace, Liaquat Ali replied, "Every upheaval is a threat to peace." (27) Pakistan became a party to the 12 nation Arab-Asian resolution on Korea which had called for a Far Eastern conference with the participation of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, India, Egypt and the People's Republic of China. This resolution, according to Liaquat Ali, if passed, would have brought peace in Korea. The Karachi newspaper, Dawn, expressed sympathy for the sacrifices made by Americans in Korea, but added that every possibility of a peaceful settlement with China must be explored. (28)

Pakistan's attitude on these issues was not very different from that of India. But since India took the centre of the stage in mobilizing opposition in the United Nations to the US move to brand China as an aggressor, she attracted to herself much of the adverse criticism directed by the American press and politicians. Pakistan's attitude—the seating of Peking in the UN and branding

(27) Dawn, 8 February 1951.

(28) Ibid., 2 February 1951. Dawn argued that with the rejection of the Arab-Asian sponsored resolution, the sentiments of the people of Asia and the Middle East had been disregarded thus "giving twist to an Asian situation of greatest complexity." Therein lay, according to Dawn, the justification in Pakistan abstaining from branding Red China as an aggressor. It felt that the United Nations, instead of provoking China, could have followed a more realistic attitude towards the latter especially when on previous occasions the United Nations had been partial to "aggressors" in Palestine and Kashmir.
China as an aggressor—was virtually unnoticed while reference was often made to her "sturdy" support to American stand against aggression in Korea.

When a resolution backed by the United States on the question of putting an embargo on the export of strategic materials to China was adopted on 17 May 1951, Pakistan again abstained. On that occasion Dawn came out with a severe criticism of the United Nations as well as the United States, characterizing their policy "a drift towards a more dangerous Far Eastern situation."

On the American decision to give aid only to those countries that certified that they had not sent strategic materials to China, Dawn commented sarcastically, "For the first time the price of American aid has been officially quoted." (29)

Pakistan's attitude probably stemmed from a certain fear of a widening of the Korean War in Asia. Her leaders had become conscious of the growing strength and influence of China in Asia. Pakistan was thus desirous of joining other Asian and African States in advocating a negotiated settlement of outstanding Asian problems. Another reason was probably the hope that China may, in time, provide a good market for Pakistani cotton, which could not be exported to India because of political differences. Besides, Pakistan was at this time not a major recipient of American aid and a little needling of the United States

(29) Ibid., 20 May 1951.
might have been viewed as a reminder to the United States to loosen her purse strings.

However, because of her economic needs and her unrelenting search for security against India, Pakistan could not afford to adopt this attitude categorically or permanently. The need for American aid was increasingly realized by Pakistani leaders. When cease-fire talks on Korea began in late 1951, Pakistan could well see that the Korean war would remain localized and not flare up in to the nightmare of a larger war. Under such circumstances the leaders of Pakistan began to take account of the advantages of a policy more in line with that adumbrated by the United States. On 16 July 1951, Pakistan deftly changed its posture on one issue when she placed a ban on the export of strategic goods to China in accordance with the United Nations resolution of 17 May 1951. Even on the question of seating People's Republic of China in the United Nations, Pakistan compromised her position a few years later when on 20 September 1955, in the UN General Assembly, Pakistan voted for the American resolution for postponement of the issue.

Republican Favor A Strong Pakistan

The attitude of Pakistan towards the United States during 1950-52 received increasingly favourable attention in the American press as well as in Congress. Appreciation
was especially forthcoming from politicians in the Republican Party. Clayton Knowles of the New York Times reported that the Republican Party favoured the strengthening of Pakistan by increased military assistance and her admission into the "free world's" defence system. (30) The victory of the Republican candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in the Presidential election of 1952 and the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, were widely regarded in Pakistan as favourable auguries for closer relations between Pakistan and the United States. (31)

During the summer of 1953, Pakistan received substantial food aid from the United States which eased some of her domestic difficulties. Subsequently, discussions began between the two countries on the possibility of a Middle East defence organization. These developments kept Pakistan in line in respect of issues like Korea in the United Nations.

After protracted negotiations, the shooting war in Korea was brought to an end by an armistice signed on 27 July 1953, by the commanders of the forces of the United Nations, and North Korea and the Chinese "volunteers." The Armistice agreement had recommended to the Governments of the countries concerned, a political conference, within three months, to settle through negotiations the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and

(31) Dawn, 6 November 1952.
the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It further provided that the political conference should be constituted of those members of the United Nations who had contributed armed forces on its behalf and the Republic of Korea. The participation of the USSR in the conference was also provided for. The USSR, however, desired a conference of broader composition and China too was reported to have desired the participation of both India and Pakistan. (32) But Pakistan joined America in opposing India's inclusion in the conference. (33)

The manner in which Secretary of State Dulles opposed India's inclusion was an indication of the extent to which Indian intentions were distrusted by the United States at this time. Pakistan's role, on the other hand, came to be regarded with increasing respect. Thus when after the Korean armistice the United States intensified her efforts to establish a military alliance network in Asia to counter the Sino-Soviet bloc, she turned with confidence to Pakistan.

Pakistan Supports American Approach Towards Japanese Peace Treaty

The attitude of Pakistan towards the efforts of the United States to conclude a peace treaty with Japan was

(32) Times of Karachi, 14 September 1953.
(33) Ibid., 15 September 1953.
favourable and co-operative. (34) It provided, in the view of many Americans, a sharp contrast to the response of India.

Japan had sued for peace on 10 August 1945, following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The final terms of surrender were signed on 2 September 1945. Soon after General Douglas MacArthur was installed in Tokyo as Supreme Allied Commander. The occupation of Japan was international only in name; it was actually an American occupation, though within the framework of international legal agreements. In 1947, an attempt by the United States to end the state of war with Japan failed because of Russo-Chinese obstruction.

The establishment of a Communist regime in China, the outbreak of war in Korea, and the intervention of Chinese "volunteers" had significant repercussions on the American strategy in Asia. To counter the Sino-Soviet bloc in the Far East, the United States decided to normalize her relations with Japan and build close military relations with that country. John Foster Dulles, well known lawyer, publicist and "foreign affairs expert" of the Republican party was appointed on 8 September 1950 as special ambassador to undertake the responsibility of concluding a Japanese peace treaty as early as possible.

Dulles started negotiations at the United Nations Headquarters and shortly afterwards published seven general

(34) *Dawn*, 22 April 1951.
principles as indicative of the American position. It was reported that Pakistan had quickly lined herself on the side of the United States. The New York Times carried a report that complete agreement had been reached, on 19 June 1951, on the draft treaty following discussions in Karachi between M. Allison of the Department of State and J. A. Rahim, Pakistan's Joint Secretary for Foreign Affairs. (35)

In July 1951, invitations were extended to 54 nations to meet in a conference in San Francisco to sign the treaty. Pakistan accepted the invitation while India refused it. The views expressed by Nehru on the treaty came in for sharp criticism in the American press. The New York Times described Nehru as "the lost leader." The Indian Prime Minister had proved to be a great disappointment to Americans and his leadership was no longer inspiring, the newspaper declared;

So he and India went into a limbo. It was an abnegation of greatness—and history is not likely to forget it. This is the more true because Nehru's attention was primarily turned on a local, national and intensely personal question—Kashmir. He threw his Gandhian ideals of pacifism into that vortex and has clung to a position for which virtually the whole free world has condemned him. (36)

Fifty one nations took part in the Conference at San Francisco summoned by the United States to conclude the peace treaty. The Soviet Union and nations associated with her also attended the Conference. She


(36) Ibid., 28 August 1951.
was the chief opponent of the treaty and argued that the terms proposed by the United States did not constitute a treaty of peace but preparation for a new war in the Far East.

Pakistan forcefully supported the United States on the draft proposals. Zafrullah Khan himself headed the Pakistani delegation. In a vigorous speech he outlined the reasons why his nation favoured the treaty:

... we agree that though it contains imperfections it is a good treaty. It does not, in our judgement contain the seeds of another war; it truly seeks to establish peace. We are prepared to subscribe to it in the hope and confidence that it will justify itself in its results. True, being no more than an agreement and a declaration of principles, it constitutes only an act of faith; gives all to Japan, and more than all, that it had any right to expect. It opens to Japan the door passing through which it may take among its fellow sovereign nations a position of dignity, honour, and equality. It leaves Japan free to win through to a position of contentment and prosperity for its people. It is evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and the West as they have subsisted during the last few centuries. We welcome it as a harbinger of even happier consummations. (37)

Zafrullah Khan's performance received enthusiastic applause from the United States. James Reston, the prestigious Washington correspondent of the New York Times wrote:

A powerful man with a fierce gray beard and a slow booming voice, he declared that the peace treaty was evidence of a new departure between the East and the West and he defended Pakistan's participation in the treaty not only against arguments of the Soviet Union but against those of his neighbor, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. (38)

(37) Pakistan Affairs (Washington), 5 (28 September 1951).

American opinion, jolted severely by the Korean War, found India's attitude to the Japanese Peace Treaty inexplicable and almost insufferable. The vigorous and unqualified support of Pakistan was a factor of no mean significance in strengthening the bonds between the two nations.

Conclusion

By the time the Korean War ended, Zafrullah Khan began to make public claims to Pakistan being a staunch friend of the United States. Speaking in the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly on 18 September 1953, he showered, high praise on Secretary Dulles. (39) He referred especially to a speech by Dulles on 17 September 1953 in which the Secretary had declared that the United States wanted the United Nations "to become an increasingly effective instrument of peace." (40) This statement, the Pakistani said, had effectively conveyed the eagerness of the United States to march forward towards the achievement of goals set out in the Charter. The Pakistani Foreign Minister continued:

If I may say so without impertinence I have long admired the lofty views and noble concepts of Mr. Dulles. I have often had occasion to repeat the words with which he inspired us in San Francisco two years ago.

Avra M. Wargen, who had been appointed American Ambassador to Pakistan in December 1949, became a strong

(39) General Assembly Official Records, 8th Session, Plenary Meeting (18 September 1953) 44.

(40) Ibid., (17 September 1953) 17-21.
advocate of forging closer links between the United States and Pakistan. (41) He made speeches in which he accorded warm praise to the Pakistani record of support to the United States on the Korean issue, "the United Action for Peace" resolution and the Japanese Peace Treaty. His speeches when published in the Pakistani and the US press, had a favourable impact on Americans. With India taking a line contrary to that of America on many crucial issues, Pakistan came to receive increasingly favourable public notice. American planners began to see that Pakistan could play a very useful role in contributing to the success of a Western-sponsored Middle East defence organization. Thus in the course of hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture on the question of wheat aid to Pakistan, Secretary of State, Dulles spoke warmly of Pakistan and of his impressions of a visit to that country:

One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere friendship which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States. I was greatly impressed with their understanding of world problems. You know they will resist the menace of Communism as their strength permits. You know that Pakistan and the United States have commonly supported the same views in the United Nations and that Pakistan was a tower of strength on the Japanese treaty. (42)

(41) *Dawn*, 29 June 1952.

Pakistan's strategic location near the Soviet and Chinese frontiers had impressed other members of the team of Americans who accompanied Secretary Dulles on his visit to Pakistan. The visiting Americans responded warmly to Liaquat Ali Khan's statement that Pakistan should be "a bridge" between the East and the West.