CHAPTER III

PAKISTAN'S APPRAISAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 1947–49
Even after this goal of a sovereign state of Pakistan was attained, fear of domination by "Hindu India" continued to be the most important single factor influencing the men who formulated the new nation's foreign policy. Not on all controversial international questions, however, did Pakistan take positions opposed to those of India. On such questions as colonialism in Asia and Africa, racial discrimination, and the movement for adequate representation of the Afro-Asian peoples in the United Nations, the attitude of Pakistan was in no significant way different from that of India. The circumstances that preceded the creation of Pakistan and the problems that she confronted as a new nation with serious problems led to anxious concern in the minds of Pakistani leaders over the problem of security vis-a-vis India and profoundly influenced her diplomacy. It was Pakistan's search for security and the disappointments that she successively encountered that eventually led her to turn to the idea of a military alliance with the United States.

To become a strong nation and overcome her deficiencies as compared with her bigger neighbour was Pakistan's first objective. To accomplish it she needed friends who would be able to give her economic, political and military help. Friendship could be developed either because of community of interests or community of ideas or both. India could
have been a country with similar interest and shared common culture but the bitterness of previous years stood in the way of fraternal co-operation with her. Pakistan had community of ideas and interests with Great Britain. She had community of culture and religion with the countries of the West Asia. She could look forward to developing friendly relations with the countries of the Commonwealth and the United States. With Soviet Russia no community of ideas or interests was perceptible at the time when Pakistan came into existence.

The evolution of Pakistan's attitude towards these countries during the period 1947-49 may now be taken up for examination in some detail.

Pakistan, Britain and the Commonwealth

Pakistani leaders reposed great hopes in Great Britain. The logic of their hopes lay in history. The strengthening of separatist tendencies among Indian Muslims and the remarkable growth in strength of the Muslim League were due not a little to the attitude and activities of the British rulers. Pakistani leaders had reason to be genuinely thankful to Britain and, on the occasion of the birth of Pakistan, (13 August 1947) Jinnah stated:

...Such voluntary and absolute transfer of power and rule by one nation over others is unknown in the history of the world. It is the translation and realization of the great ideal of Commonwealth which now has been effected; and
hence both Pakistan and Hindustan have remained members of the Commonwealth which shows how truly we appreciate the high and noble ideal by which the Commonwealth has been and will be guided in future. (1)

Britain's cultural links with Pakistan were no less important. Pakistan's form of government was modelled on the English pattern. English continued to be the language of her influential newspapers and medium of instruction in her universities. Her armed forces were trained by British officers and wore British uniform and equipment. Many English officers continued to serve in the civil and military services of Pakistan. Two of the three Governors in the provinces in West Pakistan and the heads of the three military services were Britons. A good basis thus existed for cordial relations with Britain. (2) Certain developments, however, tended to give rise to some misunderstanding which affected the harmonious evolution of such a relationship.

**Pakistani Leaders' Suspicions of Labour Party's Partiality to India**

The starting point for the misunderstanding was the continuation of Lord Mountbatten as Governor General of India. Pakistanis came to believe that the British


aristocrat was pro-Indian and that he influenced the Labour Government in Indian favour. He was alleged to be responsible for alterations in the Radcliffe award. His negotiations with Princely States, it was believed, had helped their integration in India and not in Pakistan. His worst crime against Pakistan was held to be his alleged pressure on the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to India. The withdrawal by Britain of her Supreme Commander in the sub-continent, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck in December 1947, before he had completed his task of division of stores between India and Pakistan, also shocked the Pakistani leaders.

About the Labour Government itself Pakistani leaders were not free from misgivings. Despite the fact that men like Attlee and Cripps had supported the suppression of the Congress Party's movement in 1942, Pakistani leaders were of the view that Labourites were basically in sympathy with the point of view of the Congress.

They were greatly irritated by occasional statements by Labourites, including members of the Labour Government, praising India as representing the forces of progress and dynamism in Asia. Their doubts could not be set at rest by statements such as the one in July 1949 by Sir Stafford Cripps, that "the stability of the Asiatic World depended largely on the leadership of India." (3)

(3) The Times (London), 9 July 1949.
During the Kashmir fighting the British attitude disappointed the Pakistanis. When the Indian Press reported that Air Vice-Marshel Elmhirst of the Indian Air Force had claimed that India was receiving more up-to-date types of aircraft from the United Kingdom, it created an anti-British atmosphere in Pakistan. Britain's handling of the Kashmir case in the United Nations also caused pain to the Pakistani leaders. Initially the British attitude seemed to be favourable to Pakistan, but a shift was noticed in 1948 by Pakistani leaders. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali, expressing his inability to understand the British attitude, asserted that "Pakistan is ready to leave the British Commonwealth, the moment she feels the usefulness of continued association with it from the point of view of world relations has vanished." (4)

Pakistan also began to harbour grievances against Britain for not coming forth with adequate help for her industrialization. The flow of British capital to Pakistan was slow. The failure of Britain to send a trade mission in 1947 or in 1948, was interpreted in Pakistan as evidence of a lack of interest in her affairs. (A trade mission was sent in 1949). British attitude towards the former Italian colonies and their Muslim inhabitants was also reported to be offensive to Pakistani public opinion. (5)


(5) Ibid., 4 August 1949.
In Commonwealth discussions Pakistan felt that her role was minimized while India's role was hailed. The concern shown by Britain to initiate changes in the structure of the Commonwealth so as to enable the retention of India as a member even after she became a republic apparently annoyed Pakistani leaders. Her Prime Minister declared after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference on 28 April 1949 that Pakistan could not be treated as a camp follower. (6)

Pakistan began to nurture the feeling that Britain had let her down. The bitter onslaught of the Karachi newspaper Dawn (8 May 1949) brings out Pakistani anger and frustration at this time:

British elements should be eliminated from civilian administrative positions and from those positions in the armed forces for which Pakistani inhabitants could be found. ... Even for those positions in which foreigners must be appointed because suitable Pakistani personnel are lacking, search should be made elsewhere than the British Isles. (7)

Within a few weeks Sir Ambrose Dundas, Governor of the North West Frontier Province, and Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of the Punjab, resigned, the latter, after bitter onslaughts on him by the press and the provincial Muslim League. As a sign of her independence from Britain, Pakistan decided in September 1949, not to

(6) The Hindu (Madras), 30 April 1949.
(7) Dawn (Karachi), 8 May 1949.
devalue the Pakistani currency in line with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

At the conference held in Bigwin Inn Islands in Canada under the auspices of the Institute of World Affairs, Pakistani leaders openly expressed their disillusionment with the Commonwealth. Pakistan, they said, had been discouraged to find that Commonwealth relations were conducted in an atmosphere of rather chilly conventionalities which, they felt, were out of place in any intimate partnership of friendly nations.

Pakistan could not feel satisfied with the way in which Britain had responded to her problems. Her feeling was that her needs were being subordinated to those of India. Reversing the habit of earlier years, Pakistani leaders sought to look elsewhere for assistance.

Pakistan and the Middle East

Having talked for years of Islam as the guiding spirit in the struggle for Pakistan, her leaders counted on encountering a similar "Islamic outlook" on several questions by the Muslim nations of West Asia. The iteration of the fact that Pakistan was the biggest Islamic state in the world could not by itself impress these countries which were preoccupied with their own economic, political and social problems and had their own divisions and animosities.
Soon after Pakistan came into existence, she established diplomatic relations with Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Afghanistan. These countries had also emerged as independent entities after years of direct or indirect foreign domination. To foster closer relations and cultural co-operation with these countries Pakistan's Ministry of Education established cultural societies. She also tried to develop her trade relations with these countries. In December 1949 an International Islamic Economic Conference was held at Karachi to emphasize the common religion and culture of the States from the Middle East participating in the Conference. It was believed that those common bonds could also serve as the basis for forging closer economic links among the Muslim countries. A second session of the Conference was held in Tehran in October 1950. Various sub-committees on banking, finance, transport and communications and agriculture were formed. Not much could, however, be achieved. Perhaps Pakistan's attempt, on the basis of her size and population, to assume the mantle as the natural leader of the Islamic world was not very much appreciated by the other participants in the Conference.

About the same time the Economic Conference was held, Chowdhry Khaliquzzaman, Governor of East Pakistan, attempted to set up a Muslim People's Organization membership in which was to be open to nationals of all
Muslim countries. No great response was forthcoming to his invitation. At the United Nations Sir Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, took a leading part in the advocacy of the cause of the Arabs against Israel, and that of the Moroccans and Tunisians against France. His skill and eloquence in presenting the cause of the subject Muslim countries made him a worthy protagonist of the Muslim cause.

Pakistani hopes of building bridges to the Middle East did not stop at that. In the spring of 1952 Sir Zafrulla Khan toured some of the Middle Eastern capitals. After his return, Pakistan invited the Prime Ministers of twelve Muslim countries to attend a conference at Karachi with a view to seeing whether a system of high level consultation in matters of common interest could be formed. In taking this step certain psychological factors were not taken into consideration by Pakistan nor was the international situation properly evaluated. The Arab League countries had been defeated by Israel. They were divided not only by mutual jealousies and suspicions but also by suspicions against the West. The Arab League itself was not working satisfactorily. A wider Muslim bloc could hardly be expected to function with greater effectiveness. The Rector of Al Azhar was provoked to comment unfavourably that too many conferences had been called in Pakistan. The proposed conference was never held because the Prime Ministers of some of these countries,
even though they accepted the invitation in principle, were not able to find time for a visit to Karachi. (8)

Despite the fact that Pakistan's trade connections with these countries tended to increase every year, her dream of influencing the countries of the Muslim world in general and the Arab world in particular could not be realized. "Islamic solidarity" was seen to be a weak and undependable reed on which to lean in order to promote Pakistani security and development.

Pakistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In their pre-occupation with Britain in the years before the establishment of Pakistan and immediately thereafter, Pakistani leaders had not devoted serious attention to the role of the Soviet Union. The touchstone of their attitude to that country was India. When they felt that the United States was courting India, their reaction was prompt and predictable. An American invitation to Prime Minister Nehru to visit the United

(8) F. M. Innes, "The Political Outlook in Pakistan," Pacific Affairs (New York), 26 (December 1953) 303-17. In this article Innes supports the view that Pakistan was over-ambitious in her Middle Eastern policy during the period under review. Innes formerly of the Indian Civil Service was a correspondent of the Economist (London) and of the Manchester Guardian.

States in 1949 provided the provocation. In June 1949, Pakistani Premier Liaquat Ali Khan received an invitation from Marshal Stalin to visit Moscow. No date was set for the visit but the offer and its acceptance was widely published in Pakistan. Eventually the visit never took place.

Whether Pakistan would have aligned herself with the Communist camp if India and the United States had drawn closer to each other is a matter of conjecture. Pakistan's relations had not been very satisfactory with Soviet Russia during 1947-49. In fact Soviet Russia did not even recognize Pakistan for sometime. No felicitations from the Soviet Union were received by Jinnah on the establishment of Pakistan. Nor had trade relations developed to any significant degree between the two countries. Though the USSR had appointed M. Bakulin as Ambassador to Pakistan in 1949, he could not assume his post owing to illness. The first Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Georgievich Stesenko, formerly Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in London, arrived in Karachi only on 15 March 1950.

Several factors might have played a role in the evolution of Soviet attitude to Pakistan. Perhaps, the Soviet Union regarded the leaders of the new nation as too closely tied up with Britain. It is also possible that the Soviet Union was not too enthusiastic over the establishment of a State close to her borders claiming to
be based on Islam. It was not a concept that the USSR would have liked to spread among her own Central Asian Republics with their large Muslim population.

It was indeed suggested by Soviet commentators that the partition of India had created favourable grounds for the consolidation of the position of imperialist powers in the sub-continent. The Muslim League, according to Soviet writers, was composed of "reactionary, pro-British, feudal land holding elements," who had "reached an agreement with the British." This was the Soviet explanation for Jinnah's decision to retain Pakistan in the Commonwealth. (10)

It could thus be seen why during the first two years of Pakistan's existence as an independent state, her leaders could not envisage any bright prospect of close relations with and assistance from the USSR. On the other hand, they might have begun to harbour some misgivings concerning Soviet intentions towards Pakistan. Moscow's invitation to Liaquat came as an indication of possible improvement in the relations between the two countries. The very fact that the visit never materialized is evidence that Pakistan was by no means enthusiastic about proceeding too far on the road to Moscow.

(10) V. Balabushevitch, "What is Happening in India," Trud (Leningrad), 18 February 1948, in Soviet Press Translations (Seattle), 3 (1948) 326-29.
Pakistan and the United States of America

The circumstances we have described explain how gradually Pakistani leaders came to be propelled towards the idea of establishing close links between herself and the United States. The United States had professed interest in the establishment of a free, stable and peaceful India. When the partition scheme was propounded in 1947, the US Government did not oppose it not only because it had no desire to interfere in Indian affairs but also because the scheme had been designed by the British ruling power and had the approval of the major political parties of India. The American interest, therefore, after the scheme had been accepted, was to hope that the scheme would be peacefully executed and that two stable states, India and Pakistan, would be established.

The United States was one of the first countries to recognize the new nation of Pakistan. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in his message in August 1947 to Jinnah, the President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, said:

I am confident that the constitution you will present to the people will reflect the steadfast devotion of the leaders of Pakistan to the principles of democracy and peace, and that it will serve as a living charter upon which may be based the political, social and economic progress of the people of your new nation. Your deliberations are being watched with deep interest by the people of the United States and by freedom loving peoples elsewhere. (11)

(11) US Department of State Bulletin (Washington), 17 (17 August 1947) 338.
But while the amenities were thus observed, there was no marked American interest in the problems of the new nation. The great American newspapers had little to say on Pakistan or the men who made it a reality. Many of them, as for instance, the New York Times, devoted editorials to praising British magnanimity and statesmanship. In their news stories too, India came in for more attention than Pakistan. (12)

In some periodicals writers expressed misgivings concerning Pakistan. In Current History Alice B. McGinty characterized Pakistan as "the inevitable result of the introduction of communalism into politics." "Both British and Moslem politicians must bear the responsibility for the origin and growth of communal parties in India and so for partition," she charged. (13).

As her first Ambassador to Washington, Pakistan named M. A. H. Ispahani, a leading industrialist. The appointment of a businessman rather than a politician or an official indicated that business contacts were regarded as the most important aspect of Pakistan's relations with US.

(12) New York Times, 15 August 1947. In its "the News of the Week" section the newspaper stated that Mr. Jinnah "opposes Western type democracy" and that "Pakistan's constitution will be based upon Moslem religion and Moslem Law as originally set out in Koran...." See New York Times, 17 August 1947. Other papers like the Washington Post did not have anything specific to say on Pakistan.

While presenting his credentials, Ispahani described the Pakistanis as descendents of those great Muslim Emperors of India who had come from the steppes of Central Asia and the Caucasian mountains from where, he said, the ancestors of Americans had originally come. (14) This sweep of history could hardly apply to many Pakistanis in East Pakistan and was not entirely applicable to Americans. It was probably not very flattering to many Pakistanis and Americans of non-Aryan origin. The President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, was more secular and pragmatic in his reply:

We stand ready to assist Pakistan in all appropriate ways which might naturally benefit our two countries and the world and we have profound hope for the continuing peaceful and constructive collaboration between Pakistan, her sister dominions and other countries. (15)

The American Consulate General at Karachi was raised to the rank of an embassy on 15 August 1947. Charles W. Lewis, Jr. at that time American Consul General at Karachi was appointed as Counsellor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affairs ad Interim pending the arrival of an ambassador. The announcement of Paul H. Alling as the United States Ambassador to Pakistan came in December 1947. Alling was a Foreign Service Officer and, had served as Deputy Director, Office of Near East and African Affairs, Department of State. On 26 February 1948, he presented his

(14) US Department of State Press release no. 807, 8 October 1947.

credentials in Karachi. (16) Ill health plagued the Envoy during following months and he had to return to Washington on 10 July 1948. Alling never recovered from his illness and died on 18 January 1949. The Embassy continued to be looked after by junior officials till the beginning of the year 1950 when Avra M. Warren came to Karachi as successor to Alling. Warren was also a career officer and had held assignments in Latin America and in India as well.

The tardiness of the United States in deputing senior diplomatic representatives to Karachi clearly indicates the low level of interest that the Government of the United States took in Pakistan during the period 1947-49. Most of the influential pressure groups in the United States remained indifferent to the existence of Pakistan. Pakistani overtures attracted little attention. In October 1947, for example, it was reported that oil concessions might be given to American companies in Baluchistan and Kalat. It was also stated that pipelines, mineral development in the North West Frontier Province and large irrigation projects had been discussed with American interests. American assistance for the development of Chittagong port was mentioned as a possibility. Fazlur Rahman, the Pakistani Minister for Commerce, stated in October 1948 that the United States

(16) Ibid., 27 February 1948.
and Pakistan had the same ideological outlook in many respects and that Pakistan would never go Communist. Ghulam Mohammad, the Finance Minister declared that Pakistan had a definite need of American technicians to help her in industrial development. (17)

Pakistanis thus appeared to offer attractive opportunities for American investors in Pakistan. Her attitude seemed to be more friendly than that of India in regard to American enterprise. The American journal Business Week, stated that there was too much "Henry Wallace" in India and not enough "Henry Ford." (18) Prospects for business in India were regarded as bleak. Pakistan, on the other hand, had learned from experience and had become wiser. "Best index of Pakistan's plight" Business Week continued, "is the official talk of special inducements, tariff protection and tax remissions for foreign investments in industrial lines. Four months ago government officials laughed at any suggestion that such steps might be necessary." (19) By 1950 Pakistan's attitude won praise from Foreign Commerce Weekly, an official publication of the US Department of Commerce:

...Whereas the value of the United States imports from Pakistan in 1948 and 1949 increased from $26,100,000 to $27,700,000, the value of the United States exports

(17) Ibid., 13 October 1947.


(19) Ibid., no. 957 (3 January 1948) 72.
increased from $16,900,000 to $45,500,500. The latter figure is well above the average value of pre-war exports to undivided India. From July, 1949, when Pakistan joined other Commonwealth countries, in an attempt to reduce Dollar imports by 25 per cent, there was a drop of United States exports to Pakistan. Pakistan's import licensing policy is still less restrictive than many other countries and within the bounds of its market potentialities Americans have enjoyed cordial relations with its businessmen and the Government. (20)

Conclusion

During the period under review, 1947-1949 American interest in Pakistan was hardly significant. Even less attention was given to Pakistan than was given to India. There was hardly any reference to Pakistan in the discussions of the Congress of the United States.

During the period, moved by considerations of promoting the security of their country and her economic development, disappointed in their expectation in regard to Britain and the Islamic countries, and suspicions of the motives of the Soviet Union, Pakistani leaders had begun to aspire for closer relations with the United States. The United States, however, was not very responsive and apathy towards Pakistan in that country was widespread. But after 1950 considerations of her own security were to lead the United States to have an increasing appreciation of Pakistan's role and potentialities.