CHAPTER VII

THE MILITARY ALLIANCE PROGRAMME OF THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA AND THE ROLE ENVISAGED FOR PAKISTAN
The prospect of close co-operation and alliance with the Muslim world was not a subject to which American leaders had given much thought before the end of the World War II. Britain, on the other hand, had been keenly aware of the problems and potentialities of the West Asian Islamic countries. And it was from the British that the United States inherited the responsibilities and to some extent the preliminary approach concerning the region.

The British historian Arnold Toynbee, who enjoyed considerable prestige in the United States, was one of those who emphasized the importance of Islam in the context of the world situation. Religion, according to Toynbee, was a serious business of the human race and was a primary factor in the unification of people. On two historical occasions, Toynbee pointed out, Islam had been the standard under which an Oriental society had risen up victoriously against an Occidental intruder. Islam under the successors of the Prophet liberated Egypt and Syria from Hellenic influence. Under Zangi, Nur-ad-Din, Saladin and the Mamluks, Islam held the fort against the assaults of crusaders and Mongols. If a race war were to begin, Toynbee believed, Islam might be moved to play her historic role again. Toynbee's analysis was a hint to the West not to neglect the force of Islam as a possible ally in the West's struggle against Communism. (1) Islam thus

(1) Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York, 1948) 212.
could provide an important basis for an organization of the Middle Eastern countries.

The British historian did not give adequate weight to the fact that besides Islam many other factors had started exercising their impact on the people of "Islamic" countries. Pan Arabism, Anti-Zionism and economic and political nationalism constituted powerful appeals to people in the Middle East. As has been pointed out, attempts made by Pakistan to develop friendly relations with various countries in this region on the basis of their common religion during 1947-50, failed.

American strategists were, however, not especially interested in the emergence of any Pan-Islamic Union whose co-operation might be valuable to prevent Soviet expansion. They realized that no such entity was likely to materialize in the foreseeable future. But they were vitally interested in arrangements that would ensure Western access to the oil resources of the West Asian nations. On this issue, Professor M. S. Venkataramani states:

The United States was not dependent on West Asian oil and her resources were sufficient to meet her own requirements even in the event of war. But American experts were of the opinion that United States and her allies could not "carry on a prolonged war without Middle East Oil." (2)

The United States, Dr. Venkataramani points out, has

(2) M. S. Venkataramani, "Oil and Foreign Policy During the Suez Crisis 1956-57," International Studies (New Delhi), 2 (October 1960) 111.
significant economic interests both in the extraction of West Asian oil and in its refinement and distribution in Europe and elsewhere. Britain and France were the two other powers having interest in the region at the end of the World War II. The most important area from the British viewpoint, historically, had been the Persian Gulf area, South Eastern Persia, Afghanistan and North West Frontier Province (Pakistan). Traditional British policy in the region had been directed towards keeping away Russian influence and this objective was successfully implemented before, during and immediately after World War II. British power in this region decreased after 1947, but American interest in it was intensified by oil operations in Saudi Arabia and by a realization of the strategic importance of the region. That the United States was directly interested in the region and willing to assume leadership in the continuing bid to contain Soviet influence could be seen by the manner in which the United States reacted to Soviet moves in Iran in 1946.

The occupation of Iran had been considered expedient, during World War II, by the Russians, the British and the Americans; their forces were to remain in that country as long as necessary. After the hostilities ceased, Britain and America wished to withdraw, but Soviet Russia refused to withdraw before the spring of 1946.
The difficulties in Iran could be traced back to December 1945. At that time a revolt had broken out in Azerbaijan, a fertile Iranian province east of Turkey, and the declared purpose of its leaders was the setting up of an autonomous republic. (3) Troops of the USSR Government had blocked every effort on the part of the Iranian Government to suppress the revolt. Attempts made by the American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, and the British Foreign Secretary, E. Bevin, in December 1945 in Moscow, to settle the question failed. Iran had no alternative left but to approach the United Nations Security Council. On 19 January 1946, her delegate informed the Council that the USSR's interference in her internal affairs might result in international friction. After acrimonious debate, the Council, on 30 January 1946, decided to refer the matter to both the parties to the dispute for direct negotiations and settlement. But even this solution could not bring about the evacuation of the Iranian territory by the Russian forces. The matter was again brought before the United Nations in March 1946. During the prolonged debate that followed, the United States took upon herself the burden of defending the principles of implementation of "international treaties"

(3) George F. Landzowerki, Russia and the West in Iran (New York, 1949) 292-300.
and respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of states as provided in the UN Charter. Secretary James Byrnes appeared in person before the Council as leader of the American delegation. The vigorous manner in which he supported the Iranian position in Azerbaijan indicated very clearly American interest in countering expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle Eastern region. (4)

West’s Recognition of Pakistan’s Strategic Location

By and large the United States was willing to remain in the background and not to undermine such British influence as existed in the region. This was particularly the case in respect of the Indian sub-continent. Thus when India was partitioned and Pakistan became oriented to some extent towards the Middle East, the United States was in no hurry to enter into any kind of special relationship with that country. Pakistan and the sub-continent itself were still regarded as falling in the area of interest of Great Britain. There were even at that time a few American writers who sought to emphasize the strategic importance of Pakistan. Andrew Roth in an article in the Nation in

December 1947 observed:

Pakistan is...worthy of attention for it is situated where the Anglo-American and Soviet orbits touch in the strategic Central Asian theatre. (5)

South Asia contained a huge population and vast resources. The withdrawal of the British from this region resulted in the weakening of the entire defence of this area and the Middle East. This area was further torn by certain internal political conflicts and faced severe economic and social problems. To some Americans it appeared as though the area could be a soft spot for Communists.

Some of these reasons accounted for the invitation extended to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India to visit the United States. But the speeches delivered by the Indian Prime Minister in October 1949 during his visit to the United States disappointed those Americans.

(5) Andrew Roth, "Jinnah's New Republic," Nation (New York), 165 (13 December 1947) 647. The Soviet Union, however, suspected American business activity in Pakistan during 1947-48. The United States, she thought, was tenacious in her efforts to consolidate her position in Pakistan which occupied in her opinion "an important strategic location." With regard to Pakistan's desire for a loan from America, a Soviet writer quoted the Pakistan Times which had warned that Pakistan would have to grant air and naval bases to the USA in exchange for a loan. See Trud (Leningrad), 18 February 1948, excerpts in Soviet Press Translations (Seattle) 3 (1948) 326-29.
who thought that India would share American apprehensions concerning Communist expansionism in Asia. As it became clear that Nehru was determined to adhere to the policy of non-alignment, American policy-makers looked with added interest towards the other great country of the sub-continent, Pakistan. The attitude of Pakistan towards important issues of the cold war as well as the Korean war, described earlier, began to attract increased and appreciative attention. After 1951 steadily increasing attention was paid to the strategic importance of Pakistan.

It was from British writers and former civilians of the Raj that American elite groups received their education concerning Pakistan's importance and usefulness. In January 1950 appeared an article by Sir William Barton, in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs*, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Wrote Sir William:

> It should not be overlooked that the Moslem countries of the Middle East are watching with interest, the course of the Kashmir quarrel, and that a decision adverse to Pakistan would undoubtedly be resented there... As Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, observed the other day in a public address, "If strengthened, the Moslem belt in the Middle East would be a barrier to Communism." Today oil counts for much strategically; without Moslem support the oil supplies in the Middle East may well fall into Communist hands. (6)

In September 1951, *Military Review*, the journal of the US Command and General Staff College published a

summary of an article by a British naval officer, carried some time earlier, in the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*. The article spoke of the necessity of defence in the Indian Ocean area and stated that the countries bordering the Indian Ocean were incapable of defending themselves against a strong aggressor. These countries including Pakistan were to an extent dependent on sea communications and the majority of them possessed excellent potential bases. The writer further stated:

It would seem that the only answer for the preservation of the security of these countries would be the formation of an "Indian Ocean Pact." India, Pakistan, and Ceylon are the countries primarily concerned—they would form the core. It is essential, therefore, that these three countries should work together in matters of external defence. The other major party in formation of this Pact would be Great Britain....

The writer pointed out that in the two previous World Wars, the Indian Ocean had escaped attack. A third time it might not escape. He, therefore, urged greater co-operation between India, Pakistan and Ceylon and the building up of a sufficient striking force. He also emphasized the necessity of a joint planning staff so that the three services of Pakistan, India, and Ceylon would get accustomed to work together. Drawing on the experience of the British navy, the writer offered the following suggestions:

1. The need for strong bases defended and supplied.

2. The necessity for the retention of sufficient sea forces to maintain communication between those bases.
3. The value of a well trained striking force to take action, the moment war is declared.

4. The importance of complete co-operation between the services. (7)

The most cogent exposition of the value of Pakistan to the West was probably that given by Sir Olaf Caroe, a former Governor of North West Frontier Province. Caroe argued, in a book published in 1951, that a vacuum had been created in South Asia with the removal of the central pivot of the Indian Ocean system. The safety of the region, he added, could be assured only by the construction of a new system. He wrote:

But for the sake of argument, and because a political vacuum will not endure, let us rather divide the Indian Ocean theatre into three—a small circle including Pakistan with South-Western Asia and extending up to the arc of danger, another gathering Tibet, Nepal, Burma and South-East Asia in with India, and the third an Oceanic theatre based on the Australian Continent and including Ceylon. It is clear that none of these alone, could hope to stand as a stable theatre of power.... (8)


(8) Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (London, 1951) 168. In March 1949, Sir Caroe had written an article in Round Table in which he had emphasized the necessity of a new approach to old problems in the Indian sub-continent where new independent states had been established. At that time, he had considered India as the geographical centre of South Asia.
Caroe drew especial attention to the importance of Pakistan:

The horizon, seen from the air, covers the north-western part of the Indian Ocean theatre, land and sea; but it extends further west over the East Mediterranean. It includes Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan as essential segments of the northern periphery. And, as before, a circle which fails to embrace Pakistan is incomplete.

For the defence of Western interests in the Middle East, the key country was Pakistan and not India, Caroe argued. The air age that had dawned after the first World War gradually meant that Britain had "to look away Westward from India for essentials of reinforcement and supply and a process so begun was completed by the partition of the sub-continent at the close of World War II." Sir Olaf's conclusion was emphatically stated: "India is no longer an obvious base for Middle Eastern defence; it stands on the fringe of defence periphery. Pakistan on the other hand lies well within the grouping of South-Western Asia, as seen from the air." (9)

Sir Caroe went on to point out that the revolutionary change on the strategic aspects of Asia had been brought about by two main forces, namely air power and oil which was the source of power. The next struggle, he added, would take place for the control of oil reserves of Asia and would centre on Western Asia, the Persian gulf, the approach to India both on the north-west and that on the north-east. This was also an area of great spiritual struggle of three great creeds, Christianity, Islam and

(9) Ibid., 179-80.
totalitarianism. The Western powers, he emphasized, must, therefore, maintain their influence in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and West Asia. (10)

Caroe spoke of a "northern screen" to safeguard Western interests in the region and it was his contention that the active co-operation of Pakistan in the defence of the area would be of vital importance. Stressing the fact that the United States had a growing stake in the region, Caroe indicated that the importance of Pakistan should be recognized by that country as well. (11)

In 1952, Caroe visited the United States on a lecture tour on the suggestion of the British Foreign Office. In the course of his tour, he visited Washington where he met some important officers including Assistant Secretary of State, Henry A. Byroade. Caroe's friendship with many Pakistani leaders, particularly Iskander Mirza to whom he dedicated his book The Pathans, probably contributed to their viewing with favour his thesis on the potential role of their country as a military ally of the Western nations.

American policy-makers began to have a growing appreciation of Pakistan's possible usefulness in wake of the dramatic developments of 1949-50. The first was signalled, in September 1949, by the announcement of President Truman that the Soviet Union had exploded an

(10) Ibid., 184.
(11) Ibid., 188.
atomic bomb. Shortly thereafter, on 1 October 1949, came the proclamation of the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic by Mao Tse-tung.

The loss of atomic monopoly and the extension of what came to be regarded as the Sino-Soviet bloc to the borders of the teeming peoples of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, directed the attention of American planners to the South and Southeast Asian regions—an interest that was intensified by America's own involvement in the Korean war. With the Chinese Communists vociferously denouncing the United States and fighting American troops in Korea, American planners viewed with interest and concern their problems and prospects in South Asia.

To Americans, the location of Pakistan began to appear important not from a naval point of view of Indian Ocean defence but as a base for air operations for defensive or offensive purposes. The new industrial centres of the Soviet Union beyond the Urals were 4,000 miles from US bases in Morocco and 2,700 miles from US bases in Foggia in Italy. But from Quetta in Pakistan, they were only 1,700 miles.

The initiative in approaching the United States for assistance was taken by Pakistan. One of the early visitors to the United States from Pakistan was Iskander Mirza, the Secretary in the Ministry of Defence in June-July 1949. Mirza's purpose, it was stated, was to establish liaison with the US armed forces with a view
to bringing about closer co-operation in future. While in America, Mirza inspected army installations and defence plants of the United States. In reply to a question on the relationship between Pakistan and Soviet Russia, Mirza told newsmen, "We in Pakistan hope that there will be peace in the world and there will be if the United States armed forces are kept in a state of preparedness." (12)

These views were very significant in the sense that they indicated the line of thinking of the Pakistani military high command and of the Government of Pakistan towards the United States. How far Caroe had influenced Mirza on seeking support from the United States is not known. But as indicated above, they were good friends.

Liaquat Ali's Visit to the United States

A far more significant step in this direction was taken by the US Government. In December 1949, it invited Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, to visit the United States. The invitation was handed over personally to Liaquat Ali by George C. McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State on 10 December 1949. The New York Times hailed the visit in its editorial columns on

(12) New York Times, 24 July 1949. Mirza was then Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and not Minister of Defence as described by the paper.
11 December 1949:

These new democracies are showing great vitality and keen ambition. They have been well represented in the United Nations and have been vigorous in their approach to its problems. We want to get better acquainted with them on the personal as well as political basis, and the visits of the heads of Governments help to serve that end. (13)

The Pakistani press, however, received the news with subdued enthusiasm. Dawn asserted:

We have always tried to remind President Truman of his duties as a world leader towards victims of imperialist aggression and now that he has shown unmistakable interest in the problems of Pakistan, we owe to him as well as to ourselves to state in the clearest terms that this country expects deeds and not words. President Truman has an opportunity near at hand to prove that his solicitude for Pakistan is based on enlightened and sympathetic understanding.... (14)

The Pakistanis had made no secret of their disappointment over the fact that the United States had already extended an invitation to the Indian Prime Minister. Both Pakistan and the Soviet Union reacted to this American action in a significant fashion. It was announced that Pakistani Prime Minister had accepted an invitation from Marshall Stalin for an official visit to Moscow. The visit never materialized but the announcement undoubtedly served to remind the United States that Pakistan could not be taken for granted.

In May 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan paid his official visit to the United States of America. In his speech before the Senate, the Pakistani Premier emphasized the importance

(13) Ibid., 12 December 1949.

of Pakistan and the Islamic principles on which Pakistan was founded. Expressing the sentiments towards the United States he said:

This is my first visit to your great land, but I have long been an admirer of the vigour of your enterprise, your indefatigable spirit of enquiry, your optimism, your high respect for individual effort, your belief in equal opportunities for all, your reverence for the sanctity of the home, the frankness of your speech and manner and the liveliness of your language. Above all, I have admired your zealous and uncompromising regard for the supremacy of the people's will, your firm belief that civil liberty gives man the greatest scope for his faculties and your faith that "morality is the best security of law and the surest pledge of freedom."... (15)

Vice-President, Alben W. Barkley, while thanking the Pakistani Premier for his speech, remarked:

On behalf of the Senate and through it on behalf of our country, I wish not only to express our appreciation to the distinguished Prime Minister for his visit to us but also for his constructive and eloquent speech which has just been delivered. We have had many distinguished guests who have addressed the Senate of the United States. I would not wish to draw any comparisons except to say that no address has been more inspiring, more appreciated, than this one delivered by the new Prime Minister of a new free country. It is an inspiration and a source of encouragement that from the other side of the world has come to us this distinguished representative of democracy and self-government. (16)

In various speeches Liaquat Ali sought to acquaint Americans with the values for which his country stood. In a speech before the National Press Club, he said that

(15) Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan, the Heart of Asia (Cambridge, 1950) 4.

(16) Congressional Record, 96 (1950) 6403.
the Communist way of life was different from the Islamic
way of life and that, therefore, the two systems were
mutually exclusive. He further stated that if Pakistan
could get arms and technical aid from the United States,
the purpose of both the United States and Pakistan might
be served. (17) Liaquat Ali also proclaimed his devotion
to private enterprise. (18) Pakistan, he said, would
appreciate any aid she could get in the form of public or
private loans "to build up the country and raise its
standard of living." In yet another speech he summarized
Pakistan's attitude towards foreign investment:

I do not need to remind you that there is no democracy—
in Asia more determined to lead its people along the path
of development and progress. We attach the greatest
importance to economic and industrial development—mainly
through individual initiative, private enterprise and the
good will and co-operation of free and peaceful nations
who have the technical skill and technical knowledge to
help in the progress of mankind. (19)

While discussing the role of Islam which had enabled
Pakistan, according to Liaquat Ali, to emerge as the
freest of democracies in Asia he said:

As I said earlier, we stand for stability in Asia.
We are opposed to aggression in all its forms and
cannot contemplate with equanimity disruptive forces
that might jeopardise the peaceful progress and
development of the peoples of Asia. (20)

(19) Khan, *n.* 15, 40.
There is no doubt that the views expounded by the Prime Minister of Pakistan were more to the liking of his American auditors than those of his counterpart from India. The indications that his country was desirous of developing friendly relations with America, that it was committed to the encouragement of private enterprise, and was determined to stand by democratic principles as practised in the West, gave satisfaction to Americans and evoked a sympathetic response in the country. (21) American sentiment was expressed by Walter Lippmann, the noted American journalist. "The visit," he wrote, "expressed, and was meant to express publicly, what the two governments had long believed—that though Pakistan and America are far apart in space, though they are very different in their way of life, each has great responsibilities for peace and welfare of mankind which it cannot hope to meet fully without the advice and help of the other. (22) Lippmann added that from Liaquat Ali's speeches, the Americans could know the man and the breadth and freedom of his ideas. He felt that Americans were left with a feeling that collaboration with Pakistan was not merely a pious hope "but one of the great positive elements of the modern world." The New York Times was particularly appreciative of Liaquat Ali Khan's declaration that "no threat or persuasion, no material

(22) Khan, n. 15, See preface.
peril or ideological allurement" could deflect his country from its chosen path of democracy. "Prime Minister Liaquat Ali, the paper noted, had made it plain that the Pakistanis understood their peril and were determined upon their defence. The Times further added, "This is a bold defense and should give all of us encouragement. It is... heart warming...." (23) The Christian Century was impressed by the Prime Minister's speeches and commented favourably on Pakistan's record in the treatment of Christians:

His visit has focussed American attention on the new and important nation, the fifth largest country in the world. Pakistan came into being as a result of the partition of India. World opinion and particularly opinion in the United States opposed that partition. When it became a fact, many feared that the new Moslem State would follow a policy of religious intolerance which could lead to war with India and make life difficult for its Christian minority and the missionaries at work within its boundaries. No such policy has been followed.... (24)

The visit of Liaquat Ali was, thus, generally welcomed. It evoked the first sustained discussion of Pakistan's role and problems in the American press. His speeches and statements inspired a hope among many commentators that Pakistan would side with the West in the cold war and that her differences with India could be resolved. American writers were glad to find that unlike Nehru, the Pakistani leader showed himself more responsive to American views relating to Communism.

There was little reference in press discussions to American aid for the new country; only Edwin C. Hill of the A. B. C. Television commented caustically that the Premier of Pakistan seemed to think that America had money to throw to the birds. (25)

American Attitude Towards Pakistan 1951-53

As has been shown earlier, Pakistan's attitude during the Korean War and on the Japanese Treaty contributed further in strengthening the relationship between that country and the United States. In his report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program in 1951, President Truman himself acknowledged the great value of Pakistan to the United States. Despite the fact that Pakistan was a young nation, the President said, she was already progressive and powerful. He indicated that her friendship for the West might become an important factor in giving stability to the Near East. Truman considered Pakistan as potentially a "valuable ally" and he was impressed by her location in the Indian Ocean area and her capacity to control land passes from Central Asia. (26)


The Truman Administration, however, did not favour military aid to Pakistan. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State and George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State, for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs were of the view that economic aid was the most appropriate form of US assistance to countries in South Asia. (27)

It has been stated that even during the closing years of the Truman Administration certain influential persons especially in the Department of Defense had begun to advocate the idea of closer military relations with Pakistan. The names of Henry A. Byroade, coming from the Defense Department to succeed George C. McGhee in December 1951, Maj. General George Olmstead, Director of Office of Military Assistance, and Theodore Tannewald, Deputy to Mutual Security Administrator Averell Harriman, have been mentioned by Selig S. Harrison, in his articles "India, Pakistan and the United States," published in the New Republic in August-September 1959. It is difficult to confirm the accuracy or otherwise of Harrison's report. It is, however, certain that a very important part in focussing American attention on Pakistan was played by the American Ambassador to Pakistan Avra M. Warren (1949-52)

(27) It may be interesting to note that in 1949 the United States had refused the sale of armaments to both India and Pakistan because of tense relations between the two states but in 1950 Pakistan purchased munitions from the United States. See New York Times, 27 March 1949; 21 May 1950.
and General Harry F. Meyers, then Counsellor to American Embassy in Karachi.

In June 1952, Ambassador Warren set forth, in an article in the Department of State Bulletin, his plea for increased co-operation between the United States and Pakistan. He described Pakistan as a dependable ally and called upon Americans to appreciate the efforts made by Pakistan towards the defence of the Middle East. These attempts should be encouraged, the Ambassador declared.

Warren continued:

Just recently, we have seen efforts by Pakistan Government to create a consultative organisation of Moslem states within which the participants, many of them having similar economic and political problems, could jointly and periodically review developments and exchange views. Here is yet another attempt by Pakistan to translate a consciousness of common destiny and kinship into terms of practical politics. But what is the objective of these practical politics...? In my opinion the foremost objective of Pakistan in encouraging the kind of organizations of which we have been speaking can be summed up in one short phrase: political and economic stability in the Middle East....

It has been suggested in some quarters that a Pan-Islamic consultative organisation of the kind envisaged by Pakistan's leaders might put the accent on "Islamic" rather than on the realities of political, economic and social problems. I am not sure this suggestion is valid. At any rate it does not square with the observable tendency in Pakistan for substantial segments of the intellectual and political leadership to go about their business in the field of politics, economics, economic development, social welfare and international co-operation in a thoroughly pragmatic fashion.... (28)

Obviously Pakistan's role in the Middle East was regarded as helpful by the United States even during the

closing years of the Truman Administration. Pakistani actions were calculated to impress upon the United States that she could be instrumental in organising the countries of the Middle East for defence against Communism. Indeed attempts were made by the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan to popularise the idea in some of the Middle Eastern countries. He was anxious to have at least some of the countries of the Middle East proclaim their determination of defending themselves against Communism. (29) This was viewed favourably in the United States. If the initiative could come even from some other countries of the Middle East, the charge of "imperialism," it was believed, might lose much of its sting.

The first step towards closer relationship with the American military establishment was taken when Shahid Hamid, Master General of Ordnance, Pakistan Army, paid a visit to the United States and held discussions with his military counterparts. (30) In November 1952, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chief of the US Naval Staff, visited Pakistan and had talks with Ghulam Mohammad, Governor General of Pakistan, and the Army Chief of Pakistan,


General Mohammad Ayub Khan. He was reported to have been deeply impressed by the friendship of Pakistan towards the United States. (31)

It seems that nothing concrete had emerged from these contacts till the end of 1952. Political changes in Pakistan and the United States in early 1953, postponed the negotiations for several months, but the changes themselves had a favourable impact on the negotiations between the two countries on the question of military assistance.

Political changes in Pakistan in early 1953, contributed a great deal in bringing the United States and Pakistan together. These changes owed their origin to the struggle for leadership since the death of Jinnah, in 1948. The growth of fissiparous tendencies in Pakistan from its very inception further contributed to the internal instability of Pakistan. Political and communal groups had come into existence and were trying to be influential. The problem of balancing all these forces no doubt created difficulties for those in power. Some of the events during 1948-53, particularly the Rawalpindi conspiracy (1951), the murder of Liaquat Ali (16 October 1951) and the removal of Khwaja Nazimuddin from the position of Prime Minister of Pakistan (17 April 1953), clearly revealed the struggle for power that was going on in Pakistan. The press in the United States

noted these developments and paved the way for American interest and concern in the stability of Pakistan and the regions of which Pakistan was a part. It would, therefore, be interesting to see the development of the US attitude towards Pakistan because of these events.

The so-called Rawalpindi Conspiracy, because it was reportedly Communist-inspired, aroused great concern in America. The alleged conspirators were led by Major General Akbar Khan, Army Chief of Staff and Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a renowned Urdu poet and Editor of the Pakistan Times, Lahore. Their aim was alleged to be the overthrow of the Government of Pakistan. But the Government failed to prove any prima facie case against them. It seems that, the arrested conspirators were dissatisfied with the Government's policies towards Kashmir and did not harbour any designs against the Government except to exert some pressure on the Government of Pakistan.

The trial and humiliation of this group received considerable publicity in the United States. (32) A reference to the anti-Communist attitude of the Government of Pakistan and the manner in which it had countered the domestic threat was made by Assistant Secretary George C. McGhee during the Senate hearings on Mutual Security Program in 1951. (33)


But a few months after the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister was murdered. The murder provoked widespread regret and concern in the United States and brought to focus the increasing instability in Pakistan. The *New York Times* mourned his death by paying homage to his friendship with the West:

He was neither an extremist himself nor willing to risk everything in arbitrament by the sword. Moreover, he was a friend of the West and a convinced adherent of the United Nations, willing to risk peaceful solutions in accordance with its principles. This made his death a particularly grievous loss.... (34)

The *Washington Post* maintained that Liaquat Ali was the balance wheel of Pakistan. It added, the danger in his murder was that it would unleash forces demanding a holy war against India over Kashmir. The *Baltimore Sun* warned that should religious extremists both in India and Pakistan get a grip on opinion in both countries, no telling where the opinion would end. That was the shocking possibility the assassination suggested, according to this newspaper. (35) Almost all observers, while commenting on the murder, agreed that the Middle East was an important area and warned that a vacuum there would only serve the interests of Communism. Consequently the need for a firm and co-ordinated Western policy in the region was emphasized.


On 17 April 1953, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin and replaced him with a man known to favour very close ties with the United States—Mohammed Ali Bogra, Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington. (36) Iskander Mirza was given the portfolio of defence in the new ministry. Three reasons were ascribed for this drastic action namely, the grave food situation, an unhealthy economic outlook in Pakistan and the danger to law and order in Pakistan. But how far the Cabinet alone was responsible for the deterioration of economic situation is difficult to say. As indicated in an earlier chapter, the Governor General had his own ideas on economic and political development of the country. He believed that the economic development of Pakistan could be assured with the help of foreign aid from the United States. (37)

Commenting on these developments in Pakistan, the New York Times wrote:

This action appears to be not so much, the result of any one clash on a specific issue as it is the symptom

(36) New York Times, 18 April 1953. Born in Bogra (East Bengal), Mohammed Ali was Parliamentary Secretary to Chief Minister of Bengal H. S. Suhrawardy (1943-45). He was also Pakistan's Ambassador to Burma and High Commissioner for Pakistan in Canada, before he went to Washington.

(37) Ibid., 22 January 1952. The report described Ghulam Mohammad as the leader of the pro-American faction in Pakistan.
of difficult times through which Pakistan is passing. After a very impressive period of early progress Pakistan has run into some heavy going.

The paper hoped that "Pakistan will weather this storm, but Pakistan may need help and it should be given." (38)

The appointment of Mohammad Ali, as Prime Minister of Pakistan was a satisfactory development from the point of view of the United States. He held anti-Communist views which were very much appreciated in the United States. In a speech, in June 1952, in San Francisco, he said that "the Communists, should they try, will have a tough time making converts in Moslem Pakistan." (39) In an interview to the New York Times, the new Prime Minister of Pakistan raised hopes on Pakistan's collaboration with the Western sponsored schemes of defence. "Pakistan," he said, "would welcome opportunities to discuss with Western powers the immediate restoration of peace in this part of the world, including the Middle East." In answer to a question, whether he would allow the United States and Britain to set up an air base in the event of spread of the Korean and the Indo-China fighting, he replied, "If we feel that our security is threatened, we certainly would prepare to consider all questions of guaranteeing that security with countries that also think democratically." (40) The US was interested in seeing the

(38) Ibid., 19 April 1953.
new administration firmly established in Pakistan. The wheat gift to Pakistan in the summer of 1953, was a step in the direction of stabilizing the new regime. (41)

The issue of aid to Pakistan was taken up with vigour by the new Republican Administration headed by Dwight Eisenhower. Within a few days after the election, the New York Times carried a story by Clayton Knowles, that the new Administration contemplated reducing foreign aid for Europe and increasing it in Asia. It also contemplated, the reporter added, the building up of the Pakistan army and eventually the location of airfields there. (42) With the victory of the Republicans, the Pakistanis themselves expected a change in the American outlook. (43)

Some of the political changes in Pakistan noted above were timely and the new team of leaders in Pakistan stood for very close relations--political, economic and military--with the United States. The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was an old friend of Zafarullah Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister. During the debates on the Korean question in the United Nations and on the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles had

(41) For a detailed discussion of the subject, see Chapter V, "Economic and Technical Assistance to Pakistan."


(43) Dawn, 6 November 1952; 15 January 1953.
found Pakistan's attitude towards the United States very friendly. (44) Dulles also shared the evaluation of Admiral Radford that indigenous forces should be built up in non-Communist countries in Asia and that in such a programme Pakistan should play an important role. (45)

During his first visit to Pakistan from 22 to 24 May 1953, the Secretary of State, exchanged views on problems of common concern. In answer to a question on his views on these problems, he said, "We do not bring ready made solutions of these problems. Rather we are here to listen and to learn." (46) It was after discussions with various governments of the Middle Eastern States that he developed the "Northern Tier Idea" based primarily on the strategic requirements of the United States in this region. He had encouraged Zafrullah Khan in his effort to propagate the idea of a Middle East Defence Organization in various countries of the Middle East. Dulles, like his predecessor in the previous Democratic Administration, would have preferred to have scheme of Middle East defence originating from the countries in the region instead of being sponsored

(44) For a detailed discussion of the subject, see Chapter VI, "The Korean War and US-Pak Relations."


by the United States. Resistance to Communism must be the concern of states that needed defence, he believed. (47)

The attitude of Pakistan in this respect warmly commended itself to the Secretary.

The inclusion of Pakistan in the "free world defence system" was vigorously advocated by the New York Times. The newspaper wrote:

Pakistan is a logical force with which one must reckon when the strength and stability of Southern Asia are under consideration. There are good reasons for this. First is the fact that Pakistan has done a remarkable job of building since the nation became independent in 1947. It is solvent; it is at work; it is free and it is determined to remain free. Pakistan is therefore in a position of great potential strength.

A second element is the interesting fact that while part of Pakistan is close to Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, the country seems to face west, rather than east. It is, definitely, a bridge. There is no better evidence of this than that Pakistan is being talked about in relation to the Middle East rather than to any possible Far Eastern Association of states.... A strong Pakistan, aligned with a vigorous Turkey and a renascent Egypt, could well help to turn a position of grave uncertainty into an area of solid strength for the free world. (48)

As has been pointed out by Dr. M. S. Venkataramani, the United States decided to meet the geographical and locational advantages of the Soviet Union by confronting the latter with a ring of bases around her perimeter. The task of American diplomacy became one of persuading the governments concerned to provide the desired

(47) Department of State Bulletin, 28 (15 June 1953) 831.

facilities. By 1953, Soviet Russia had announced that she had developed the thermo-nuclear bomb thus achieving thermo-nuclear parity with the United States. American policy-makers were by this time well aware that Pakistan was quite receptive to suggestions towards this end from the United States. (49)

The new administration firmly believed, because of the foregoing reasons, that American security was inseparable from the security of other free nations. Overall American security, it was argued, could be enhanced if America could "contribute to building the strength of other free nations" without serious sacrifice of her own strength. "A program of American assistance, carefully adapted to the needs of the individual country," it was felt, could supply the "missing link" in the defence structure and permit that country to achieve modern balanced forces. (50)

It was precisely to achieve these objectives that the Director of the Mutual Security Program, came out with an elaborate scheme with the following characteristics:

1. Longer range planning and programming with open discussion of future requirements, subject always to the annual decisions and reviews of the Congress.

2. Earlier attainment of stronger defense capabilities through more rapid delivery of critical items and more thorough training of forces in being.

(49) M. S. Venkataramani, Undercurrents in American Foreign Relations (Bombay, 1965) 167-68.

3. Constant insistence on the importance of economic stability and expanding gross national products among the free nations as the essential foundation for sound defense.

4. Accelerated planning for the use of new weapons for the defense of free nations against threatening totalitarian thrusts.

5. Full enlistment of the co-operative defensive strength of all nations who opposed the Soviet Communist power.

6. Expanded use of the productive capacity of Europe through a combination of US and multi-nation orders which will permit efficient mass production of NATO arms and the consequent establishment of a better production base in Europe.

7. Steady development of the national resources and the peoples' capacities in the less advanced areas of the free nations.

8. Gradual expansion of fair and profitable trade between two free countries.

9. Broader co-operation in the voluntary organisations engaged in similar activities with emphasis on the "people to people" relationship.

10. Increased reliance upon private capital for all phases of economic accomplishments.

11. Alertness and willingness to adjust to any new conditions. (51)

The first problem before the new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the armistice in Korea became effective (27 July 1953), was the size and armed forces, the US should have in the light of the Soviet threat. According to Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

(51) US Department of State Bulletin 28 (25 May 1953) 742. (From statement of Harold E. Stassen, made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 5 May 1953).
The problem was to be tackled in the following manner:

Because of the unlimited nature of the Soviet threat we agreed that we must fulfill these requirements with due regard for not only military factors, but also a wide range of political and economic factors as well as the latest technological developments. Since it is impossible to forecast precisely the year and the amount of maximum military danger, part of the answer was to provide force levels which could be maintained indefinitely over an extended period of tension. Part of it was to enhance and accelerate the program for continental defense. Another part was to improve the readiness of our reserve forces to meet today's requirements for rapid mobilization. Still another part was to adjust the balance of US forces to fit best into the largest system of collective allied forces. (52)

**Military Aid to Pakistan**

It was this context that had led General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff (1953-55) to invite General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, to tour the military installations of the United States in October 1953. While introducing the Pakistani General, U. S. News & World Report stated, that he was in the United States "to get millions of dollars worth of US arms for Pakistan." It added, "He believes the US should count on Pakistan as one of its Chief Asian bastions, says his soldiers are tough fighters in the need of heavy..." (52)

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(52) US Senate, Statements by the Secretary of State..., n. 45, 48.
arms that Pakistan can not produce." (53)

According to John P. Callahan of the New York Times, a high government official declared that both countries had been exploring the possibility of a Middle East defence organization. But after two years of getting the Muslim nations together, they felt that if they could lay the ground work for a bilateral agreement, other nations including India, opposed to Pakistan's joining the proposed defence organization, would reconsider the question of partnership in the alliance.

The United States was pushing ahead with her investigation of the prospects of closer military relations with important countries of the region. These included the unannounced four day visit to Pakistan, in October, of a seven-man team of the House Armed Services Committee of the United States. This was followed a week later by the arrival of the Deputy Chief of the United States' mission in Turkey. And finally the Government of the United States invited Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor General of Pakistan for high level discussions in November 1953. Formal discussions between the United

(53) U. S. News & World Report (Washington), 25 (9 October 1953) 14. General Mohammad Ayub Khan (now President of Pakistan), born on 14 May 1907 has his home in Northwest Frontier region was educated at Muslim University Aligarh and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. Soon after the creation of Pakistan, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. On 17 January 1951, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army.
States and Pakistan looking to a military alliance were expected to follow the visit of Pakistan's Governor General to the United States, Callahan reported. (54)

The New York Times in an editorial on 5 November 1953, entitled, "Pact with Pakistan," strongly pleaded for a defensive arrangement with Pakistan. It said:

There has been some hesitation about open discussion of a defense pact between Pakistan and this country because of the probable opposition in India to any arrangement that would make Pakistan stronger. If Kashmir dispute could be resolved most of the ground for such opposition would evaporate. We and Pakistanis would be associating ourselves in the common cause of freedom's defense and that defense might well be as vital to India in the long run, as to Pakistan.

Similar views were expressed by U. S. News & World Report in an article, "A Real Ally in South Asia?: Pakistan's People are Strong, Stand with West." The paper reported in bold letters:

Found a tough and ready potential ally for the U.S., next door to neutral India.

Pakistan is the place. It has 80 million people on Soviet Russia's doorstep. It has a Volunteer Army of 300,000, mainly 6-footers. It is not neutral but anti-Communist. Its leaders are in the U.S. seeking arms.

While emphasizing the strategic location of Pakistan, the paper added, "As a base for strategic bombers Pakistan's

(54) New York Times, 2 November 1953. Ghulam Mohammad is believed to have made efforts for the creation of a Middle East defence organization during his visit to Saudi Arabia in April 1953. See Pakistan Affairs (Washington), 6 (15 April 1953).
airfields, modern and numerous, are within easy reach of Soviet Central Asia, including the Ural and Siberian industrial areas far distant from U. S. bases in the Mediterranean and Arabia." (55)

The discussions between the Governor General's party and that of the President on this issue were held from 12 to 14 November 1953. Important members of the Administration, the National Security Council and members of the Congress were present for discussions with him. They included Secretary Dulles, Allen W. Dulles, Director C. I. A.; Charles W. Wilson, Defense Secretary; George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; Joseph M. Dodge, Director, Bureau of Budget; Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State; and Senators Mike Mansfield and William Langer of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The Government of the United States was watchful in its approach towards the issue of military aid to Pakistan. This is evident from the declaration of President Eisenhower that America would move cautiously in any negotiations for air bases in Pakistan because of a danger of upsetting neighbouring nations such as India. (56)

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(56) New York Herald Tribune, 19 November 1953. In a statement in New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru while commenting on the talks in Washington, said, "This is a matter, which, constitutionally or otherwise is not our concern, but practically it is a matter of most intense concern to us." See New York Times, 16 November 1953.
The visit of Vice-President, Richard Nixon to Karachi in mid December 1953, it seems, settled the issue of American military assistance to Pakistan. The Vice-President was tremendously impressed with the welcome he received in Pakistan and with what he saw in that country. In a statement at the Karachi air port, he said:

Government officials and the people in all walks of life take the realistic view of threat to their independence which is presented by forces from abroad. They cherish their independence and realize that in order to keep their independence, it is necessary for them to join with other free nations in maintaining the necessary strength to resist aggression in the event aggression comes. (57)

On 28 December 1953, President Eisenhower was reported to have approved military aid to Pakistan. (58)

(57) Pakistan Affairs, 7 (18 December 1953). After his visit to India, Nixon was reportedly of the view that Nehru should not be allowed to veto the decision of the Government of the United States on the issue of aid to Pakistan.

(58) Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "New Frontiers of Freedom," Collier's (New York), 25 June 1954. Pakistanis also began to emphasize the importance of the location of their country before Americans. General Mohammad Musa, Deputy Chief of the Staff, Pakistani Army gave Edgar Ansel Mowrer of Collier's the following impression in early 1954:

Communism's four objectives in this part of the World are the Suez Canal, the Great Persian Gulf Oil area, Pakistan's air fields, notably Dalhandin, Pishin and Quetta and Pakistan's port of Karachi. As things stand we could not prevent Soviet occupation of the first two, though we could make it costly. With sufficient arms Pakistan alone can preserve its air fields for the war time use of American planes and prevent Karachi from becoming a Soviet Submarine base.

Musa saw only one line of defence--the Zagros mountains which ranged northwest to southeast through Iran to Pakistan with fairly high peaks. Mowrer, argued that
American Public Reaction to Military Aid to Pakistan

In December 1953 and January 1954 American commentators were nearly unanimous that a militarily strengthened Pakistan would be a valuable link in the Middle East defence command. They, however, differed on how best the US could meet the objections of India. A section of the US press urged that the United States should ignore Indian opposition to the offer of military aid to Pakistan. The Knoxville Journal, for example, saw "no reason why we should be upset because India is in a tizzy; in fact, we think that is where she belongs."

The New York Journal American cautioned that any attempt to meet Indian objection "certainly would be taken as a sign that this nation intends to go soft towards Communism in South Asia." (59)

In February and March 1954, the military aid to Pakistan, received unequivocal support from several newspapers including the Boston Herald, New York Journal American, Cincinnati Enquirer, newspapers belonging to Scripps Howard Chain, Kansas City Times, Chicago News, Baltimore Sun and Providence Journal. The New York

properly defended by a coalition of Turks, Iraqis, Iranians and Pakistanis with Anglo-American support, the Zagros mountains and the desert might be held against aggression. Thus it was, suggested that Pakistan's inclusion in the "free world" defence system was a matter of vital necessity for the defence of US interests in the region.

Journal American wondered why "some of our leaders are so afraid of offending Mr. Nehru that they are dragging their feet on aid to Pakistan." George Minot of the Boston Herald charged that "India was already in Communist orbit--an awful fact, but one we have to face."

Most of the editorials, however, while commenting on the decision of the Administration to extend military aid to Pakistan contended that while the course was less than the ideal it "seemed nevertheless about the only practical one." Among these could be mentioned, for instance, those featured in such newspapers as the Manchester Union Leader, Houston Post, Washington Star and New York Herald Tribune. (60) The New York Times commented:

If Indians feel strongly and are sure of their good intentions, why should they deny others credit for similar strong feelings or question the good intentions of Pakistanis and Americans? How do they think we should feel when anti-American sentiments are stirred up against us and when more suspicious are expressed of the United States than of Russia.

These are all questions and facts that need careful study. It has been the contention of this newspaper that military aid for Pakistan would be a good policy. Indian protests may make it impractical and hence a bad policy but this would not mean that in our opinion India was necessarily being wise or right. (61)

John Robbins in the Washington News declared that "as an ally Pakistan won't solve the basic weakness of her economy. But of one thing the American tax payer can be sure: "The Pakistanis know where the aid is coming from. They appreciate it. And they are a people with a

(60) Ibid., January 1954.

long tradition of loyalty to their friends. (62)

But other commentators recommended a policy aimed at pacifying and conciliating India. In an editorial, the Christian Science Monitor maintained:

A great wave of anti-Americanism will sweep India, it is widely predicted, if arms go to Pakistan in any appreciable proportion or the United States is given bases inside that country. Such a development in turn could call forth an answering wave of anti-Indian feelings from Americans who do not understand the natural sources of India's apprehension. It might be helpful in this connection to remember that it was a Pakistan launched invasion of Kashmir which set in motion the events that have made the explosive political dispute so difficult of solution. (63)

The editorial went on to suggest, "Certainly arms aid to Pakistan should at least be accompanied by a real gesture of consideration to India."

The number of newspapers opposing military aid to Pakistan was comparatively small. The St. Louis Post Dispatch, for example, took the lead in opposing the step. It suggested that peace and goodwill in the Indian sub-continent "could be more valuable than a hundred bases." The Washington Post questioned whether "this American effort would be wise." The New Republic argued that "a serious invasion of the Indian sub-continent could not in any case be contained by local forces." (64)

(63) Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 21 December 1953.
(64) Public Opinion Report, January 1954.
Even after the Government of the United States had decided to give military aid to Pakistan in February 1954, the *Washington Post* and the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* remained adamant in their view. They maintained that the decision was a mistake and not worth the bitterness and the inevitable economic disruption it was causing in India. The *Dayton News* demanded a formula to ensure India safety from attack by arms given to Pakistan. (65)

The question of military aid to Pakistan became a widely discussed issue in the United States. It had its supporters and critics amongst intellectuals, columnists, broadcasters, Congressmen and pressure groups. Professor F. S. C. Northrop in *Foreign Policy Bulletin* and George Sokolsky, broadcaster and columnist, defended the aid programme in Pakistan. But columnist Max Lerner, writing in the *New York Post*, persisted in calling the Pakistan agreement, "the start of a larger plan to arm the Moslem World, including the Arab States, heavily with modern American weapons." Lerner added that "if we had deliberately set out to destroy what influence we still have in Asia" the US Government "could not have chosen a more effective method." (66)

Among ardent supporters of the aid programme in the Senate were Senator William F. Knowland (Republican, California) and Senator H. Alexander Smith (Republican, New Jersey). The former told a correspondent of the New


York Times that objections raised against military aid to Pakistan by New Delhi should be ignored. (67) Senator Smith charged that neutralism professed by critics of aid was "based on an erroneous understanding of the great issues of our times." These views he expressed in his report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations after a study mission to the Far East. Smith suggested that an offer of aid should be made to India as well to prove the US impartiality. (68)

Prominent member of Congress who opposed the programme were Senator J. W. Fulbright (Democrat, Arkansas) and Representative E. I. Celler (Democrat, New York). In his criticism of the decision to arm Pakistan, Senator Fulbright said that India and Pakistan had their mutual difficulties which had threatened to lead to war. The United States, therefore, should be extremely careful in her relation with both. The Senator disclosed that many foreign service officers and experts in the State Department had opposed military aid to Pakistan but had remained silent. (69) Representative Celler called on Eisenhower to pause before consummating


the deal because of Indian opposition. (70)

A vigorous opponent of the proposal to enter into a military pact with Pakistan was Chester Bowles, American Ambassador to India. He set forth subsequently his chief reasons for his opposition. He expressed the view that arming Pakistan would "undermine the very stability which the free world has been trying to create in Asia." (71) Any aid to Pakistan, he believed, would frighten India, for she feared an attack from Pakistan. Even the position of Afghanistan, he thought, must be appreciated. Both India and Afghanistan, he argued, might be provoked to secure more aid from the Soviet Union. Aid to Pakistan, Bowles believed, would also undermine Nehru's position. (72) Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt also expressed her disapproval of military aid to Pakistan. (73)

The attitude of various religious groups on the issue of aid to Pakistan could be seen through some of their publications. America, a journal published by Catholics, described Pakistan's overtures to the US "as a God-send." It asserted that India's concern over a possible US-Pakistan security pact "should not scare us off." Subsequently, America suggested that while the US

might attempt "to quiet India's fears," it should not overlook the fact that Pakistan was a sovereign state whose freedom included the right to prepare against the Communist threat. (74) A similar view was expressed by the liberal Catholic periodical, Commonweal. It considered as baseless the Indian criticism that the Pact had disturbed the existing balance. It pointed out that the balance had already been disturbed by the Communist build up in Sinkiang and Tibet. It supported aid to Pakistan because Pakistan occupied a strategic location and because of Pakistan's eagerness to stand and fight by the side of the United States. (75) Wrote the Commonweal:

A strengthened Pakistan provided that it is also a stable Pakistan, removes one more temptation from the Soviet Union. It makes the Middle East considerably more secure against the Red Army. These advantages were weighed by the State Department and the executive against India's protests. Having decided the fact, the Americans were correct in going through with it as calmly and resolutely as they did. We cannot always be popular. What is important is to be certain as we can be that we are right. (76)

The Christian Century and the Christian Advocate, published by Protestant groups, were critical of military aid to Pakistan. The former suggested that the US would play into Moscow's hands, if it antagonized India's 400 million. The Christian Century asked whether US aid to

(74) America (New York), 27 January 1954.
(75) Commonweal (New York), 59 (8 January 1954) 345.
(76) Ibid., 59 (12 March 1954) 569.
Pakistan meant that Washington had written off India as lost to Communism. Such a supposition, the paper asserted, was without basis. (77) In another issue, the Christian Century held military aid to Pakistan responsible for suspicion in India against missionaries. (78) The Christian Advocate suggested that the best way to build up and defend India and Pakistan against Communism was to strengthen both countries socially and economically. (79)

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, in an open letter to Congress in the beginning of 1954, opposed military aid to Pakistan and asserted that Congress should carefully consider its foreign aid appropriations in order that they did not serve to increase international tensions.

Newspapers catering to business interests approved military aid to Pakistan. The Wall Street Journal, criticized Nehru for opposing aid to Pakistan. "It is one thing for a sovereign nation to have a strict neutral foreign policy; it is another thing and not so neutral to misrepresent facts of international life to those who are all too easily confused," it asserted. (80)

(78) Ibid., (7 April 1954) 420.
Pakistan Reaction to Military Aid

While anxiety was expressed by the American newspapers and pressure groups on the possibility of a hostile reaction in India against the military aid programme to Pakistan, virtually no notice was taken by the Americans of the opposition to the aid programme in Pakistan herself.

It was in East Pakistan that opposition to military aid began to develop under the leadership of Maulana Bhashari, a leader of the United Front (which included various political groups opposed to the policy of the government. (81) It was organized to oppose the Muslim League Party in the East Pakistan elections held in March 1954). The overwhelming victory of the United Front over the League in the elections showed that there was significant opposition in East Pakistan against military aid. In West Pakistan, however, no such organized opposition was noticed except amongst the Communists who opposed the US military aid in both the wings of Pakistan. The Communist Party of Pakistan was banned, in view of its opposition to government policies in July 1954. (82)

Indian objections to the aid programme to Pakistan can be described here only briefly. These objections were based on the belief that any American military arrangements

(82) Ibid., 6 July 1954.
with Pakistan were bound to bring the cold war on India's borders. (83) Indians were also fearful that once armed with modern US weapons, Pakistan would attack Kashmir. The pact, the Indian Premier argued "would upset all kinds of existing balances." He further said, "All contexts of problems between India and Pakistan changed when one of the most powerful countries in the world sponsors military aid to Pakistan." (84) These objections though serious from the Indian viewpoint, did not influence the US policy in this region.

**US Urges Turko-Pak Accord**

But before the US could sign an agreement with Pakistan, it desired that foundations of a Middle East Defence Organization must be laid down. The National Security Council, according to Dana Adams Schmidt of the *New York Times*, desired that a Pakistani-Turkey alliance should come first because the object of the US aid to Pakistan was to strengthen the defences of the whole Middle Eastern region. (85) The Pakistan-Turkish Alliance, it was believed, might serve as an inducement to their neighbours to join a broader regional grouping.

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Pakistan welcomed this move, and entered into a pact with Turkey on 19 February 1954. Pakistan's decision gratified Washington for it was a major step in the realization of the collective security concept in the Middle East. Justifying this approach, Secretary of State Dulles made some important observations before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (86) "The best way to deter aggression," he said, "is to make the aggressor know in advance that he would suffer damage outweighing what he can hope to gain." "An aggressor," he believed, "must not be able to count upon a sanctuary status for those resources which he does not use in committing aggression." The free world, he thought, must maintain and be prepared to use effective means to make aggression too costly to be tempting. It must possess, Dulles asserted, the capacity for massive retaliation without delay. In this context he emphasized the importance of allies:

The magnitude and the duration of the present struggle and the need for flexibility make it vital to the United States, as never before, that it have firm allies. A firm alliance depends not merely upon documents, although these may be important. There must also be trust, understanding, and goodwill as between the free nations. This implies not merely military commitments but good economic and cultural relations as well. It is not charity on the part of the United States to be concerned with the economic health of other nations which help to support the basic strategy which I describe....

In the long haul the United States has a profound interest in insuring that its allies and the uncommitted areas of the free world are able to maintain viable economic and political systems. That is why foreign economic aid means so much to our own security.

(86) US Senate, Statements by the Secretary of State...; n. 45, 4-49.
When asked by Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana), about the Turkish-Pak agreement, the Secretary replied, "it is a program which is to create an additional barrier to a possible break through of Communist forces into areas of Middle and Near East which are of great strategic value because of their location, their oil reserves and their people."

Soon after Pakistan had entered into an agreement with Turkey, she approached the United States for arms aid. This was made known by Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Speaking at a press conference in Karachi on 22 February 1954 he said:

The Government of Pakistan has made a request to the Government of the United States for military assistance within the scope of Mutual Security Legislation. Pakistan has made its request to the United States for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength and a higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster international peace and security within the framework of the United Nations Charter. (87)

This request was promptly accepted by President Eisenhower. While complying with the Pakistani request, the President made it clear that he would be guided by the requirements of mutual security legislation. Those included, specifically, the provision that "equipment, material or services provided will be used to maintain the recipient country's internal security and for its

(87) The Hindu (Madras), 23 February 1954.
legitimate self defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it was a part." He added:

I can say that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I will also consult with the Congress on further steps. (88)

The approach of the Administration on the issue of arms aid to Pakistan was endorsed by the New York Times. "In the interests of peace, stability and strength in a threatened area, we will give the asked assistance," the paper asserted. "At the same time we have made it clear that such an action offers no threat of aggression, and that in the event of misuse of our aid, not only will the aid be withdrawn, but the full weight of our authority will be invoked against the misuse." (89)

The New York Herald Tribune noted that Indian objections to aid programme in Pakistan introduced "uncertain factors into the already delicate power balance of South Asia." The paper added: "But...it was a question of the alternative. To have bowed to the Indian viewpoint, to have discouraged the Turkish-Pakistani


(89) Ibid., 27 February 1954.
treaty and denied aid to Pakistan would have left the United States in a difficult position throughout the whole Mediterranean and Middle Eastern world." (90)

The attitude of the American public to the Turkish-Pakistani pact was generally favourable. Americans felt that they could not afford to put an end to their own security arrangements merely to please India. They also argued that they were not stopping economic aid to India and were interested in the prosperity of India. India, therefore, should not have objections to what the US regarded as necessary for her security.

The pact was also hailed by a large section of the Pakistani press. Dawn saw the communiqué issued after the agreement as heralding "the biggest ever of Muslim and world significance since the birth of Pakistan." It added, "The great beginning has at last been made towards a concerted effort to shake off the centuries old weakness of a vital region which had once contributed so greatly to human progress but which was reduced through the vicissitudes of history to feebleness in more senses than one." (91) The Times of Karachi was jubilant at the conclusion of an alliance with another Islamic nation. (92) Commenting on

(91) Dawn, 20 February 1954.
(92) Times of Karachi, 21 February 1954.
America's intention to give assistance to Pakistan following the conclusion of the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, the paper said, "In extending your hand of friendship to Pakistan you have extended it to a people who know the value of friendship." It added, "The proposed Aid only confirms that our friendly feelings have found recognition and we rejoice in this fact." The Pakistan Times characterized the policy of the Pakistani Prime Minister and Foreign Minister as dangerous for Pakistan. "It is obviously a manoeuvre--carried out at Washington's suggestion--which is expected to clear the path for US military aid to Pakistan and the subsequent formation of a military bloc in the Middle East," it asserted. (93)

The main opposition against military aid continued to come from East Pakistan. On 22 April 1954, 162 members of the East Bengal Assembly, in a joint statement, called upon Pakistanis to raise their voice of protest against US military aid to Pakistan. (94) Maulana Bhashani, said that "the ruling clique" in America had conspired against peace, freedom and sovereignty of Pakistan in the guise of a so-called military aid pact. (95)

(93) Pakistan Times (Lahore), 21 February 1954.
(94) Ibid., 22 April 1954.
(95) Ibid., 23 April 1954.
The aim, he contended, was to exploit Pakistan's resources for war mongering activities. But H. S. Suhrawardy, another prominent leader from East Pakistan, did not consider the aid harmful if Pakistan could adopt a neutral attitude in the event of a World War. (96)

**Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan**

On 19 May 1954, the Government of the United States signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan. In the Agreement the two governments affirmed their adherence to principles adumbrated in the UN Charter and stated that their participation in arrangements for individual and collective self defence was in accordance with the Charter's provisions. The Agreement stipulated that Pakistan would use that assistance exclusively "to maintain the internal security, its legitimate self defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area, or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished." The Government of Pakistan according to article V of the treaty, agreed to:

1. (a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;

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(96) *Dawn*, 11 April 1954.
(b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;

(c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;

(d) take all responsible measures which may be necessary to develop its defense capacities; and

(e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

2. (a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of United States or such other governments as the parties hereto may in each case agree upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defense and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security;

(b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw semi-processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources and which may be available in Pakistan.

Arrangements for such transfer shall give due regard to reasonable requirements of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export.

Article VI of the Agreement provided:

In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Pakistan will cooperate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace. (97)

The President made a similar offer of aid to India. Indian Government, however, refused to accept the offer.

The signing of the Mutual Defense Agreement received wide public approval in America. American newspapers welcomed the prospect of Pakistan becoming another "bastion against Soviet expansionism" in the Middle East. On the basis of Pakistan's pledges in the pact not to use arms against India, several editorials in American newspapers, characterized Indian objections "groundless." They were regretful that India had not accepted US assurances that the pact posed no threat to her. The Christian Science Monitor still held the hope that Nehru would accept the agreement in that light. But to many the agreement was a rebuke to the neutralism of Nehru. To the Washington News, Nehru's "tantrums" and Russia's "snarls" were signs that in concluding the pact with Pakistan the US had been able to wing two birds with one "diplomatic stone." (98) The New York Times declared that the pact "promises to make Pakistan a formidable associate of NATO in Asia as the European defense community is designed to link Germany to NATO in Europe." (99) Pakistan's voice added to those of other Commonwealth countries, the paper hoped, would neutralize the Indian opposition to defense system in the Middle East.

and provide a strong inducement to prospective members of such an organization.

Several commentators, however, disapproved on various grounds the US decision to give military assistance to Pakistan. John W. Vandercook found it a "remarkably unbusinesslike agreement" because in exchange for US promise of extensive military aid, Pakistan did not "really guarantee the US anything." (100) Bishop J. Waskon Pickett, the senior bishop of the Methodist Church in India, termed the pact, "a major blunder." By furnishing Pakistan arms, Bishop Pickett maintained, "We have antagonised India and other countries in Asia and spread alarm and stimulated anti-American feeling throughout Southeast Asia. (101)

Writing in the Nation, Michael Brecher opposed aid to Pakistan. Brecher thought that the US policy would strengthen the Communists. (102) Owen Lattimore warned that secondary consequences of US action with regard to Pakistan should be taken into account. (103)

The agreement was again criticized by Senator Fulbright during the hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1954. "I

(100) Public Opinion Report, 30 June 1954.

(101) Ibid.


think there is much to be said for strengthening Pakistan," the Senator admitted, "but the way it was handled certainly did not endear us with India." The programme was defended amongst others by Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, General G. C. Stewart, Director, office Military Assistance and several others. Henry A. Byroade's defence of the Pakistan programme deserves special mention. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, argued:

I do not believe it could be the United States interest to turn down a country that publicly places herself on record with us, strategically located, with good manpower, with a determination to maintain its independence; when it asks for assistance and I think if one lets the feelings of another nation stop us from a response such as that, we have lost a lot in this world.... (104)

In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Byroade maintained that by extending military aid to Pakistan and by making the "northern tier," a success the world would save that vital part of the world from Communist domination. (105) Nehru's views,


he thought, could not serve American purpose. George V. Allen of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State, in his support of US aid to Pakistan argued that a diversity of approach strengthened the free world. The Americans, therefore, could follow policies of military aid to Pakistan and economic aid to India simultaneously. (106)

In the House Committee on Appropriations, Harold Stassen, Director of the Mutual Security Administration put forward a different argument in support of military aid to Pakistan:

We feel that Pakistan may well become a second Turkey. They are a stalwart people and will provide another anchor in the Near East. We have one anchor in the Eastern Mediterranean, pretty well developed, and at the other end of the Near East, the protection has been very weak. Now we are beginning to develop what may be an opposite anchor in Pakistan. It may be a slow process, things might upset there, but that is the direction in which we are moving. (107)

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs (108) and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations accepted the approach of the Administration on the question of military aid to Pakistan. (109) A minority report was,

(106) Ibid., 509-11.


however, submitted by Senator Langer who condemned the entire aid programme. "A policy," he said, "which rests on other and more mysterious considerations may be suspected to be more occult than factual, and to consist at best of a pretentious tilting at windmills. At worst, it is a fraud upon the credulity of the American people, to the degree that they have been hoodwinked by it. It is my considered judgement that the so-called mutual aid constitutes just such a fraud." (110)

American Reaction to Political Developments in Pakistan 1954-58

After the signing of the Agreement the American press, understandably enough, began to evince greater interest in the affairs of their new-found ally. But the zig-zag course of Pakistani political developments and the growing rift between the eastern and western wings of that country brought forth expressions of concern, anxiety and even of doubt.

The trouble had actually started with the victory of the United Front in the elections held in March 1954 in East Pakistan. (111) The Front was able to secure 212 seats out of 237, while the ruling Muslim League Party


secured only 9 seats. Exploiting its popularity, the United Front organized a mass campaign in April 1954, for the resignation of the Central Government, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the scrapping of the constitution it was framing, the adoption of Bengali as a state language on equal status with Urdu, autonomy for East Bengal, abolition of visas on travel to and from India, the devaluation of the Pakistani Rupee and the rejection of American military aid. (112)

The campaign in East Pakistan increased tensions in the whole country. It was followed by three labour riots in East Bengal. Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister, attempted to handle the situation firmly by removing Fazlul Huq, the 82 year old Chief Minister of East Pakistan, on 30 May 1954. (113) On 5 July 1954, the Communist party, alleged to have been behind the labour riots, was banned. (114) But in early October, a crisis brewed at the Centre itself. Mohammed Ali, with the help of some members of the constituent Assembly, sought to curtail the powers of the Governor General. But he failed. On 24 October 1954, the Governor General dissolved the 74-man Constitutional Assembly and compelled Mohammed Ali to reshuffle his Cabinet to give place to

(113) Ibid., 31 May 1954.
(114) Ibid., 6 July 1954.
those who favoured the Governor General. (115)

The above developments in Pakistan raised grave concern in the United States. "How surely can we bank on this ally?" asked the New Leader. Business Week saw the crisis as "striking at the heart of US policy in the Middle East and South Asia." The Providence Journal and Christian Century thought that East Pakistan Communists were "stirring up trouble primarily to destroy" the US-Pakistan pact. The Baltimore Sun was convinced that in the event of a break between the two provinces, American thinking about Pakistan strategically would have to be altered. (116) Norman Cliff of the New York Herald Tribune, however, thought that "American military aid was a minor issue" with the United Front leaders. (117) The fact that Suhrawardy, a prominent leader from East Bengal, had not come out against American aid was viewed as significant by some commentators.

But American dislike of some of India's action led to Pakistan continuing to be viewed in a somewhat more favourable light. (118) Pakistan's membership of the


(118) Public Opinion Report, 30 June 1954. India's criticism of US policies and her refusal to permit the passage of US aircraft on their way to Indo-China were criticized by several American newspapers.
SEATO in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955, to be discussed in the following two chapters, added to her stature as an ally of the United States. Her importance to America continued to be emphasized by spokesmen of the Administration whenever criticisms were made against military aid to Pakistan in America or elsewhere.

The strong support given to Pakistan aid programme in America had a serious impact on the neighbours of Pakistan, namely, the Soviet Union, India and Afghanistan. Both Afghanistan and India began to look upon the Soviet Union for political and economic support. Russians also favourably responded to the Afghan and Indian desire to uphold their rights in the region. On the Kashmir issue particularly, the Soviet Union leaders gave a categorical statement which favoured India.

These developments in South Asia, disturbed and angered many in both Pakistan and the United States, as noted elsewhere. (119) The charge that Nehru was "flirting" with the Communists began to be hurled with greater frequency by some members of the Congress of the United States. The Indian Government was described as socialist and opposed to the creation of an atmosphere favourable for American private capital and industry. (120) The

(119) For detailed discussion of the subject see Chapter X, "A Study of the Attitudes of the United States and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue."

(120) Congressional Record, 101 (1955) 9478; A4662.
Secretary of State himself, made it clear that he disapproved of the Indian outlook on foreign affairs. On 9 June 1956, he characterized the neutralist policy adopted by India as "immoral." Such a policy, he added, was obsolete and was short sighted. Richard Nixon, the Vice-President also spoke the same language while in Pakistan in 1956. Neutrals, he believed, made no distinction between right and wrong. (121)

Pakistanis were receiving, continuously, economic and military aid and were hopeful of receiving greater benefits from their association with the Americans. During 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958 military aid to Pakistan continued to flow in Pakistan, it is roughly estimated, at the rate of about $90 million a year without encountering much opposition in America. During this period, there was not much noticeable opposition to America in Pakistan. (122)

In the US Senate, the notable opponent of the programme was Senator Fulbright. He consistently upheld the view, during 1954-58, that the decision to give military aid to


(122) The exact figures of military aid to Pakistan are a matter of secrecy with the Defense Department. See Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York, 1962) 214. Colonel Jordan, who wrote on military assistance programmes after studying them as a member of the staff of the Draper Committee, estimated that through 1960 US military assistance to Pakistan had amounted to $390-440 million. Also see Harold A. Rovey, United States Military Assistance (New York, 1965) 99.
Pakistan was "very foolish." He thought it would have been wiser in the American interest if a little more money were spent on economic aid and a little less money for military assistance. (123)

From a technical point of view, military aid to Pakistan was criticized by the Comptroller General of the United States. In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in February 1958, the Comptroller General felt that in Pakistan, programming objectives were not always realistic in terms of the capability of the country concerned and Pakistan tended to establish her own objectives. (124) "If it is necessary to equip forces in order to honor United States commitments, the motivation for including these forces in the United States objectives should be made clear at all times," he urged.

American interest groups did not get involved in any major debate on the issue of aid to Pakistan. Walter P. Reuther, President of the United Automobile Workers of America, was among the few who took note of the development and strongly opposed the Administration's


course. In his testimony in 1956, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he spoke out on the consequences of military aid to Pakistan:

The pact does not really win us friends in Pakistan, either... I am not an expert on Asia, I don't pretend to be. But I talked to people who have a standing as really being authorities on these problems in Asia, and they told me that it is only going to be a short time before our allies are going to wind up with neutralist tag, because their basic need is not military power, it is economic assistance. (125)

Reuther added, that in the age of nuclear warfare and guided missiles, little isolated military groups were not really the decisive military factor in the world. He felt that "the pact had strengthened the momentary security interests of Pakistan, but by pushing Afghanistan closer to its Soviet neighbor and by damaging our relations with India, it has clearly undermined our own interest in the entire region." (126)

The Military Coup in Pakistan

American military aid ceased to be a major issue of controversy in Pakistan during 1955-58. Once in a while complaints were made that American support to Pakistan's policies was not as adequate as they desired. In March 1956, with the promulgation of the long debated constitution, Pakistan became a Republic. This development

(126) Ibid., 699.
received a favourable response in the United States. But soon it became evident that the trend of Pakistani politics would not be smooth. Such crucial issues as the question of representation of minorities, and the formation of one unit for West Pakistan continued to bedevil Pakistani politics. It led to a succession of Prime Ministers and their Cabinets and caused great political instability in Pakistan. (127) It was, however, significant that these permutations and combinations by various political parties in the national and provincial legislatures, as the Washington Star remarked, stemmed wholly from domestic issues. On foreign policy, the attitude of the successive regimes was considered consistently pro-Western. (128) Probably Pakistanis would have solved their political problems had they been enabled by their leaders to decide


(128) Public Opinion Report, 14 March 1958. See American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, no. 1440, (31 December 1956) 20-21. The joint communiqué issued after Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in December 1956 contained a significant affirmation by the Premiers of China and Pakistan "that with a view to promoting further the cordial and friendly relations existing between China and Pakistan due importance should be given to commercial and cultural relations between the two countries. They are happy to place on record that there is no real conflict of interest between the two countries." The Government of the United States, however, did not give sufficient recognition to Pakistan drawing closer to China, in late 1956.
the issues at the polls. Iskander Mirza, the President of Pakistan, himself was reported to be against the holding of elections. (129) In July 1958, a conference of various political party leaders, presided over by Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon, decided to hold elections before 15 February 1959. (130) On 7 October 1958, President Mirza took the extreme step of dissolving the Noon Government, the national and provincial legislatures and annulling the Constitution of Pakistan. He appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as Martial Law Administrator. In his proclamation, he said that the corruption that vitiated the political machinery had compelled him to take that step. He added:

The mentality of political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of dealing with innumerable and complex problems facing us today. (131)

Eleven years, one month and 22 days after independence, democracy bade farewell to Pakistan. On 24 October 1958 Mirza named Ayub as Prime Minister. (132) Three days later a silent but decisive struggle for power between Mirza and

(130) Ibid., 30 July 1958.
(131) Ibid., 9 October 1958.
Ayub followed. Backed by the Army, Ayub emerged victorious. (133)

The establishment of military rule in Pakistan received a mixed reception in the United States. Many commentators were, no doubt, disturbed, even though they took some comfort in the fact that the ascendancy of the generals "does not signify a change of political relations with the West." To some observers, the pattern of events suggested the need for a new orientation of US policy to assist these countries in their return to democracy. Edward R. Murrow, the well-known TV commentator, questioned whether the West was not losing out in the "rivalry for men's minds" in countries like Pakistan. Murrow argued that "what is most needed now is more technical aid and increased cultural exchanges, to encourage the restoration of democracy in those countries that have lost it." He further warned, that in Asia the US should not make the mistakes she made in Latin America of being identified with military juntas. The Dayton News declared: "We cannot afford to beam broadly on oppressors, or take petty tyrants to our bosom, just because they oppose Communism." (134) Elie Abel, writing in the Magazine Section of the New York Times observed:

The fact that the Pakistani Army, equipped largely by the United States, is rated the best fighting force

(133) Ibid., 28 October 1958.

east of Suez did nothing to save the parliamentary Government in this country. It was, in fact, the American-equipped army that did away with the parliamentary system, and Left Wing propagandists in Asia already are saying that Washington was responsible for the coup.... (135)

Even the New York Times itself, in its editorial, stated that further US aid should have a less direct military significance. (136)

Some newspapers, however, were unperturbed about the trend towards "military rule" in Asia viewing it as the only immediate alternative to Communism in many parts of Asia. Amongst this group were business and conservative journals. Barron's Weekly, for instance, concluded that for many under-developed nations, democratic self rule, "simply demands too much, too soon." In the view of Business Week, "army dictatorships rather than the parliamentary government is the only immediate alternative to Communism in many parts of Asia." The U. S. News & World Report was greatly encouraged by what it saw as an "anti-red trend in South Asia as evidenced by the recent replacement of weak and ineffective civil government by "strong military rule." (137) The Wall Street Journal voiced some misgivings when it said:

Perhaps the alliance will continue firm but the Pakistan the United States is allied with this morning, is certainly not the Pakistan it had been relying on

(137) Ibid.
for the defense of democracy. (138)

The attitude of the Administration, towards Pakistan was not, however, influenced by the developments in Pakistan leading to a military regime. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Defense Secretary McElroy, who was in Karachi the night before the military coup, said in answer to a question on democracy in Pakistan: "I am inclined to believe well of our friends." The Secretary said he agreed with the views of the Government of Pakistan that "the real threat of the world is a combination of Russia and Communist China." "The trouble that has taken place in Tibet, as a result of the revolution there, has, I think, clearly indicated that there is a genuine threat on the borders of Pakistan," the Secretary said. (139)

Conclusion

The United States initially hesitated to involve herself either in the problems of Pakistan or the region of which Pakistan was a part. American policy-makers were content to view the Middle East and South Asia as falling in the British sphere of influence. The naked fact that the Soviet Union had become strong enough to pose a


threat to Anglo-American political, economic and strategic interests in the Middle East compelled the US to look for friends and bases in this region. The strategic location of Pakistan in this context could not have been ignored. Her importanceloomed larger as India cold-shouldered American concepts of regional security.

Pakistan's desire to seek American friendship, on the other hand, sprang from her own interest. Pakistan had been facing serious political and economic problems. Most of these problems, as analysed earlier, were a direct result of the partition of India. It was to solve these problems that the Pakistani leaders attempted to increase popular awareness of the strategic location and the friendly attitude of Pakistan in America. During the initial years Americans did not show any significant response as they had not developed any interest in that country. The coming of the Korean War, however, brought the Government of Pakistan and the Government of the United States very close to each other on various issues in the United Nations, as shown in an earlier Chapter. The support Pakistan gave to the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," the US Korean War objectives and in the conclusion of Japanese Peace Treaty was appreciated in America. Besides, Pakistani leaders began to extend ardent support for the idea of a Middle East defence organization. Their espousal of the cause
of mutual security and their acceptance of US leadership of the "free world" were appreciated by many high ranking American officials and intellectuals.

Within Pakistan, the Pakistani leaders had taken steps to remove doubts about their attitude to the West. The suppression of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, the lessening of trade relations with Russia and the removal of the weak Nazimuddin Cabinet created an atmosphere which could be considered satisfactory in the United States to qualify Pakistan for military aid.

A beginning towards serious negotiations on the issue of military assistance seems to have been made in 1952, when the Truman Administration was still in office, but did not reach any conclusion. The negotiations with Pakistan became fruitful after a change of Administration in the United States. The new Secretary of State had to provide new ideas to satisfy the defence requirements of the United States. These ideas were shared by Admiral Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The change of government in Pakistan facilitated the task of the American Government. The new team in Pakistan strongly favoured a military pact with the United States.

The attitude of the US press and various pressure groups was generally to support the course of their government. Criticism of military aid to Pakistan in the United States came from a relatively small number of
Senators, Congressmen, newspapers and labour leaders and liberals. The basic theme of the criticism was not so much against the policy of military aid, but its possible reaction on India. There seems to be no evidence to indicate that the aid was designed to give any encouragement to Pakistan to attack India.

The agreement itself was couched in broad terms. It sought to serve, besides the security of Pakistan and the United States, a larger purpose. It provided an inducement to Pakistan to give the United States political support on questions involving the maintenance of peace in the region of which it was a part and join her in promoting its defensive strength and that of the "free world." Pakistan agreed to provide the United States with those semi-processed raw materials which the latter might need and to control trade with nations which threatened the maintenance of world peace.

The agreement, though claimed to be designed to promote Pakistani and American security against the threat of the Soviet Union, created great misunderstanding about American policy objectives in South Asia, particularly in India and Afghanistan. Many Indians believed that it was directed against them and would add to existing problems with Pakistan. In Pakistan, it was opposed by the Communists and the United Front leaders from East Bengal.
Pakistani official statements and the press comments indicated that the ruling groups in that country considered the danger to their security as likely to emanate more from India than from Soviet Russia or China. Security against the two latter powers might well have been a long term objective of Pakistan. With India, Pakistan had immediate difficulties on Kashmir and other issues. But, as observed elsewhere, American aid to Pakistan did not at all imply American endorsement of Pakistan's claims to Kashmir, even though Pakistani leaders harboured such hopes. In their own larger long-term interests, American leaders were not prepared to go beyond the UN resolutions on the issue. On other issues between Pakistan and India, American comment was even less significant and of no great help to Pakistan.

It must be admitted that with American aid the Pakistani armed forces became better organized and equipped to the extent of giving them a feeling of superior strength than Indian forces. Critics of Pakistan's policies have argued that her pre-occupation with defence and with attainment of military parity or even superiority vis-a-vis India hampered Pakistan's economic growth and hastened the overthrow of democracy in Pakistan. There was sharp deterioration of the civil leadership in Pakistan after military aid came to be extended. Army Generals began to exert much greater influence after they became sure
of the flow of American military equipment to Pakistan.

The immediate result of the US aid to Pakistan was that her relations with India were strained. There were of course, several Senators and Congressmen who wanted to teach India a lesson and favoured a radical cut in economic aid to India. But the Administration steered clear of such a course and strove to retain Indian goodwill by increased economic assistance to that country—to the chagrin of the Pakistani politicians.

At every available opportunity Pakistanis reminded Americans that they were their allies and as such deserving greater support than was extended to neutralists. Sometimes American leaders made statements to satisfy Pakistani sentiment. This approach was at last responsible for inducing Indians to draw closer to the Soviet Union. To the extent that Pakistan had not been attacked by a Communist power and had provided urgently needed bases and facilities to the United States, American policy could be deemed to have been successful. However, intensified intra-regional tensions and the reactions of countries like India and Afghanistan which sought to build much closer relations with the Soviet Union than ever before, were major consequences on the debit side as far as the United States was concerned.