Chapter Two

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

SUN YAT-SEN'S EARLY LIFE AND ACTIVITIES

The Revolution of 1911 was almost coterminous with the life and activities of Sun Yat-sen (1), its chief promoter and inspirer. Sun had the unique advantage of having had an early glimpse into the extreme poverty of rural China (he was born in a poor peasant family in a village near Canton) and intimate contact with new ideas and institutions, for he was sent for studies to his relatively prosperous brother in Hawaii when he was a young lad. Both these experiences made a lasting impression on his young and sensitive mind; the first one made him acutely aware of the need for rural reform in order to rejuvenate China and the other of the rottenness of the existing socio-political structure and the superiority of Western learning and institutions. The first one made him something of an economic reformer and the other a political revolutionary, a democrat who had little use for a despotic monarchy, an anti-

(1) Among the biographies of Sun Yat-sen in English the best one still is Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning (New York, 1934). Reference may also be made to Stephen Chen and Robert Payne, Sun Yat-sen: A Portrait (New York, 1946), and Paul Linebarger, The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen - An Exposition of the San Min Chu I (Baltimore, 1937). Of course the best source of studying Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy is the collection of his writings and speeches by Hu Han-min, Hu Han-min (edit.), Tsung-li ch'uan-chi 4 (Shanghai, 1931). A recent edition was published in 1960 in Taiwan.
Confucian iconoclast whose roots, unlike those of K'ang Yu-wei were not dug into traditional China, and a nationalist whose theories of race-nationalism (Min-tsu chu-i) gradually spread in China. (2) It was over a period of years, particularly during his sojourns in America and Europe during 1895-1905, that his political ideas and revolutionary philosophy matured but the seeds had already been sown by the Hawaiian stay. His studies in a missionary school there fostered the inculcation of new ideas and his virtual conversion to Christianity was a symbol of his break with traditional China. When he was sent back in 1882-3 by an angry brother who got afraid that the young lad was losing his Chinese moorings, Sun was already a "non-believer" and was beginning to be dissatisfied with the shortcomings and backwardness of China. (3)

The subsequent period of study of medicine, first at Canton and then at the Alice Medical College in Hongkong, was also a period of revolutionary incubation. He met youngmen after his heart - Cheng Shih-liang in Canton, and Ch' en Shao-pai, Yang Huo-ling and Yu Shao-wan in Hongkong. Revolution was their constant theme of discussion at Hongkong and earned for them the nickname of the "bandit quartet". (4) This also became Sun's first source of contact with secret societies since Cheng Shih-

(2) For Sun Yat-sen's own exposition of his theory of race-nationalism see Tsung-li ch' uan-chi, I, 1-82.

(3) Ch' en Shao-pai hsien-shang ai-ssu lu (Canton, 1937), as in Hsin-hai Ko-ming (HHKM) 8(Shanghai, 1957), I, 21-3, hereafter referred to as Ch'en Shao-pai. The pagination follows that in HHKM.

(4) Tzu-ch' uan (autobiography) in Tsung-li ch' uan-chi, n.1, I, 2.
liang was a member of the San-tien-hui, more popularly known in the West as the Triad, whose slogan was fan-Ch'ing fu-Ming (Oppose the Manchus and restore the Mings). (5) Whether or not Cheng Shih-liang advised him on the usefulness of secret societies in the fight against the Manchu regime, there is no doubt that Sun Yat-sen quite early in his revolutionary career grasped the significance and utility of these societies and made common cause with them.

After graduating from the Alice Medical College Sun Yat-sen set up his practice in Macao and Canton, but medicine for him was only an instrument in the furtherance of his political objectives. (6) His first major attempt at political action came in 1894 when he decided to take a trip to Tientsin to present a petition to Li Hung-chang, urging him to undertake steps (outlined in the petition) for strengthening China. (7) Sun had gone to Shanghai where he secured a letter of introduction to one of Li's subordinates through the good offices of Cheng Kuan-yang, the author of the famous book "Sheng-shih wei-yen" (Warnings to a Prosperous World). (8)

The mission to Li Hung-chang was unsuccessful. The war with Japan had intervened and Li was too busy to take notice of the unsolicited advice of an unknown youngster. The memorial was

(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) The text of the petition is given in Tsung-li ch'uan-chi, I, 41-103.
(8) Ch'ien Shao-pai, n. 3, 28.
pigeon-holed. Sun Yat-sen returned to Shanghai disappointed but determined to continue the struggle. It has been suggested by a critical biographer of Sun Yat-sen that his mission to Li Hung-chang had been partly motivated by the desire to secure a reasonable career for himself, if only Li had the foresight to become his patron and had utilized his talents. (9) There is, however, no sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. Sun's trip to Tientsin had little to do with considerations of a personal nature. Sun's most trusted confidant of the time, Ch'en Shao-pai, has written that Sun wanted to give the memorandum to Li Hung-chang because Li was acknowledged to be an outstanding man and that if he could be persuaded to Sun's thinking, there was a possibility of "saving the country". (10) Rather presumptuous of a young man of Sun's age and position, no doubt, but certainly there is no hint here of any idea of personal advancement. Indeed this was not the only attempt by Sun to get the co-operation of Li Hung-chang. He was to make another but equally unrewarding attempt later in 1900. (11)

(9) Sharman, n. 1, 33-4.

(10) Ch'en Shao-pai, 28-9. Tsou Lu, who is regarded as the official party historian, has mentioned that Li Hung-chang expressed great interest in Sun's ideas of reform. But in this regard the evidence of Ch'en Shao-pai who was an active participant in the events of those days in the revolutionary camp appears to be more reliable.

(11) In 1900 at the time of the Boxer revolt Sun Yat-sen tried once again, with the help of the British Governor of Hong Kong, to persuade Li Hung-chang to declare the independence of Kwangtung (where Li was posted as Viceroy) so as to make it a base for spreading the democratic movement in China. Li, however, refused to comply. Ch'en Shao-pai, n. 3, 65-7.
Sun now went to Hawaii where with the help of his elder brother and a few other relatives he organized his first political party - Hsing-Chung-hui (Arise China Society). There is some confusion about the date of the establishment of the Hsing-Chung-hui. One of the historians of the revolution put it as 1892 and the place at Macao (12), but most accounts accept 1895 as the time of the establishment of this organization. (13) Sun also drafted a manifesto of the Society. Later in 1895, the Society was established in Hongkong too, and a similar manifesto, with some changes, was adopted. Both the manifestos remarked upon the decline of China with 400 million people, thousands of miles of fertile land and an ancient civilization, as a result of an outdated and imperfect political system, and warned against the danger of being sliced into bits by foreign powers; but the second manifesto was more explicitly and vigorously anti-Manchu and expatiated upon the corruption and degeneration of the Manchu Court and officialdom and called upon all those sons of the soil who wanted to free themselves from the slavery of an alien race to unite and regenerate China. (14) This slight difference in

(12) Tsou Lu, Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang shih-kao, 4 (Shanghai, 1948) I, 36. The organization at Macao, however, whatever its name, was not the revolutionary organization founded by Sun Yat-sen in Honolulu. It was a reformist organization which Sun joined at that time but was unconnected with the organization set up later by Sun himself.

(13) Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming 1-shih, 5 (Shanghai, 1948) I, 1; Ch'ien Shao-pai, n. 3, 29.

(14) For texts of the two manifestos see HHKM, n. 2, I, 85-9.
tone between the two manifestos must have been due to the impact of the stinging defeat in the war against Japan and Sun's decision to stage a revolt in Canton with Hongkong as the base of operations.

The Hsing-Chung-hui of Hawaii was a modest affair, with only a few members - mostly a few relations and some other close friends of Sun Yat-sen's brother (15), but it signified the establishment of the first revolutionary organization with overseas Chinese support and one which gradually added to its strength and effectiveness. Sun Yat-sen returned to Hongkong in 1895 to organize his first armed revolt against the Manchu dynasty which was fated to result in his separation from his homeland for the next 15 years. The crushing defeat which China suffered at the hands of Japan and the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki shocked and shamed Sun Yat-sen as they did most of his other compatriots, but, characteristically, Sun Yat-sen decided that the opportunity be utilized for an armed uprising at Canton. With the help of his other colleagues - chiefly Cheng Shih-liang, Ch' en Shao-pai and Yang Chi-yü (16) - preparations were undertaken both in Hongkong and Canton, and the support of the Triad, which had considerable following in Kwangtung, was secured through the instrumentality of Cheng Shih-liang. This also marked the first use that Sun made of

(15) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 13, I, 22-3.

(16) For a short biographical sketch of Yang Chi-yün see Tsou Lu, n. 12, IV, 1226-7.
secret societies - a co-operation that grew with time. Sun and his colleagues were also able to interest in their organization and mission the Editor of China Mail, John Reid, as well as a well-known doctor of Hongkong, Ho Pi. Between them they prepared an English manifesto of Hsing-Chung-hui and were closely associated with the formulation of plans for the seizure of Canton. It was to be Reid's function to secure British recognition of the Revolutionary Government of China proposed to be set up at Canton. (17) Here we see the first manifestation of Sun Yat-sen's willingness -- revealed time and again in subsequent years - to accept foreign help from any quarter for the achievement of his goals.

Sun Yat-sen, Cheng Shih-liang and Ch'en Shao-pai planned to proceed first to Canton while Yang Chi-yün was to arrive with ammunition on the day of the projected revolt -- 26th October, 1895. Yang, however, suddenly demanded formal leadership as price for his co-operation and nearly killed the whole project. (18) This incident is important as a reflection of the problem of leadership and individual ego which plagued revolutionary politics every now and then. Despite his magnetic personality and his sincere selfless, devotion to the cause of the revolution,


(18) Ch'en Shao-pai, n. 3, 30; Feng Tzu-yu gives a slightly different account. According to him, the organization was already divided into two factions: the Yang faction and the Sun faction. In order to maintain the unity of the organization, Yang was elected leader. Feng-Tzu-yu, n. 17, I, 13.
Sun Yat-sen's leadership was not always unchallenged and problems of personal vanity or provincial rivalry often led to divisions in the revolutionary ranks.

In the interests of unity and the impending uprising, Sun Yat-sen yielded to Yang's demand and Sun and his colleagues proceeded to Canton. But the revolt fizzled out because Yang turned turtle and failed to arrive with the ammunition on the appointed hour. The secret leaked out, and with a price on their heads the revolutionary leaders fled from the clutches of the Manchu authorities. Sun's colleagues rushed to Hongkong while Sun himself first headed towards Macao and then, much to the relief of his comrades, arrived at Hongkong. Since Hongkong did not provide sufficient security from the long arm of Peking, they repaired towards Japan and decided to stay at Yokohama. Soon afterwards Sun Yat-sen went to Hawaii and then on to his maiden tour of America, England and Europe. (19)

SECRET SOCIETIES

Secret societies have been endemic in China. They have been the only means available to the poor, particularly the peasantry, to register their discontent and their protest against an oppressive government or its harsh measures, or sometimes against the tyranny

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(19) Ch'en Shao-pai, n. 3, 31-2.
of despotic landlords. (20) They often used religious ceremonies and superstitious rituals and the members were bound to one another by a secret oath. Following the establishment of the Manchu dynasty, a number of secret societies, called hung-men organizations (proper name of Triads), had sprung up with the slogan of opposing the Manchus and restoring the Mings (fan-Ch'ing, fu-Ming). (21) In the beginning when the Manchu Court was strong and its leadership able, there was a long spell of peace and prosperity during which the fortunes of these secret societies fluctuated, but as Manchu power declined and law and order became disturbed, they grew in strength and influence.

One of the most important and well-known of these societies was the Ke-lao-hui, or the Elder Brothers' Society, which had its branches even among overseas Chinese. Its greatest strength was in the Yangtze Valley. The hung-men organizations used different names in different places but their symbols and, at least originally, their aims were the same -- that is, opposition to the Manchu dynasty. There was, for instance, the Chung-nan-hui which spread from Hunan to Kiangsi to Chekiang and Fukian and which wielded considerable influence. (22) One of its branches,

(20) For instance a secret society called P'ing-yang-tang was started in the Central Provinces during the Manchu period because the leader wanted to take revenge for the murder of his father by a local landlord. See T'ao Ch'eng-chang, Che-an chi-lueh as in HHKM, n. 3, III, 21, hereafter referred to T'ao Cheng-chang and the pagination follows that of HHKM.

(21) Tzu-ch'uan (Taung-li ch'uan-chü), n. 1, I, 6.

(22) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 19-20.
Lung-hua-hui with its headquarters in Chin-hua, became a powerful organization in its own right and invited severe repression of the Manchu authorities. (23) In the South, another powerful secret, hung-men society was the San-tien-hui (mentioned earlier). Another school of secret societies (different from the Ke-lao-hui organizations) was that of Ssu-fan - it existed in a number of districts in the Yangtse area. This was an organization of the salt merchants so formed to protect themselves from the squeeze and maltreatment of the officials. (24)

The value and significance of these organizations for his revolutionary purposes could not have been lost on Sun Yat-sen. In a situation where peaceful or open political activity was neither understood nor tolerated and where there was complete absence of even the rudimentary freedoms of speech, publication and assembly, these secret societies were the only available instrument of mass action against the government. They were the closest to what may be called the common people, with particularly strong roots among the poorest sections of the peasantry. The achievement of Sun Yat-sen was that he provided these organizations with political and enlightened leadership and turned their vague hostility to Manchu rule towards the cause of revolutionary republicanism. Many of them had lost all idea of their original purpose and had been reduced to their normal function as "mutual aid societies". Sun Yat-sen activized them, infused in them a

(23) Ibid., 20.
(24) Ibid., 20-1.
sense of mission and supplied them with a concrete political objective. (25) Since the members of many of these societies came from the lowliest sections of society, they were often illiterate and innocent of the complicated art of politics and state affairs. Sun and his comrades provided them with educated leadership and lifted them from the plane of ignorant, blind action. (26) Each of them had been carrying on its lone existence for years believing only in its separate action; Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues brought them together under the banner of their revolutionary organization and served as a link between one secret society and another.

However, it may also be noted on the debit side that for these very reasons republican and democratic ideals and institutions which Sun Yat-sen had at heart were not thoroughly understood by them and since they played an important role in the 1911 Revolution, they were not entirely the fittest instruments for ensuring the success of those ideas.

Sun Yat-sen's first contact with the secret societies through Cheng Shih-liang has been noted. The more intimate links were to follow later. Sun Yat-sen had returned to Japan after about a year's tour of America, England and Europe and had made his headquarters there. He had made many Japanese friends including Miyazaki Torazo, who became one of his closest associates


(26) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-li ch'uan-chhi), n.1, I, 6.
for the next decade and influential Japanese like Inukai were taking interest in Sun's activities. (27) The next five years were a period of preparation and expansion of the influence of Hsing-Chung-hui. It was during this time that durable contacts were established with secret societies. Sun had despatched agents to the Yangtse area to lay the groundwork for such co-operation. (28) In 1899 Ch'en Shao-pai and Miyazaki, as representatives of Hsing-Chung-hui took a trip to Hongkong where also assembled leaders of the two most important secret societies - the Ke-lao-hui and San-tien-hui. There was unity of the three organizations for the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty. As to what actually transpired in their meetings the accounts of the two revolutionaries differ in some material aspects.

Ch'en Shao-pai in his memoirs makes no mention of any difficulties encountered in these negotiations and merely records that in order to unite forces with them, it was necessary to join them, and so he first joined the San-tien-hui, the premier secret society in Kwangtung, and became its Commander-in-Chief, and then joined the Ke-lao-hui (most powerful society of the Yangtse area) which selected him as its Supreme Leader. (29) Miyazaki, on the other hand, has stated that the talks met with an initial hurdle because of the presence of an agent of K'ang Yu-wei's monarchist party, who was trying to sabotage the negotiations by spreading

(28) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-li ch'uan-chi), n. 1, I, 6-7.
(29) Ch'ien Shao-pai, n. 3, 60-1.
false rumours. Only after he was sent away did the talks proceed smoothly. But, according to Miyazaki, the three organizations decided to merge into one and that it was Sun Yat-sen who was elected the leader of the united organization. (30)

Be that as it may, the two major secret societies came under the influence and direction of Sun's revolutionary organization and these links were not snapped until the 1911 Revolution. Apart from the mainland, Sun Yat-sen also concentrated attention on the secret societies among overseas Chinese. During his subsequent visits to South-east Asian countries and America, he cultivated the hung-men organizations among Chinese communities there, re-interpreted to them the real meaning of their original slogan of fan-Ch'ing fu-Ming, won them over to the cause of the revolution, and made them a valuable source for funds for his uprising. (31)

One of the earliest concrete manifestations of this new unity of forces was the revolt in 1900 at Waichow - 100 miles east of Canton. As a result of the Boxer rebellion, the country had been seized by an anti-foreign frenzy, foreign troops had entered Peking and the Manchu court had fled to Siam. The revolutionaries decided to avail themselves of this opportunity and staged an uprising under the leadership of the redoubtable Cheng Shih-liang at a place called San-chow-t'ien (half of which

(30) Huang Chung-huang, Sun I-hsien (translation of part of Miyazaki's "The Dream of Thirty Three Years"), as in HKM, n. 3, I, 110-2, hereafter referred to as Huang Chung-huang.

(31) See the section on Overseas Chinese.
was under British control for the safeguarding of Hongkong). The plan of the revolutionaries was to march eastwards from there to Fukian where reinforcements would be sent from Formosa by Sun Yat-sen. (32) This also marked the peak of collaboration between Sun and the Japanese authorities. Sun was promised help by the Japanese Viceroy of Formosa General Kodama, but at the last minute the promised help was not forthcoming for, in the meantime, the policy of the Japanese government had changed. (33) A little known fact is that confusion within the revolutionary camp had added to the difficulties of the Hsing-Chung-hui members. This was caused, once again, by the dubious role of Yang Chi-yün, who had earlier apologised to Sun Yat-sen for his behaviour during the first Canton revolt and been readmitted into the revolutionary ranks. Yang went to Hongkong along with another supporter with the brief that the officialdom in Kwangtung was greatly alarmed and had proposed through them peace with the revolutionaries. Yang even drew up peace conditions which would enable the revolutionaries to become officials in Kwangtung. His argument for this course of action was that this would facilitate their task of strengthening their position in the country. Yang even spread the rumour that Sun Yat-sen had agreed to his proposals. It was only the intervention of Ch'en Shao-pai and a letter from Sun Yat-sen that scotched Yang's move before it could do further mischief. Ch'en told Yang Chi-yün

(32) For a detailed account of the Waichow uprising see Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-tzu hui-chow ch'i-i chi," (Chien-kuo yueh-k'an) as in HHKM, n. 3, I, 235-45.

(33) Jansen, n. 27, 83, 96-7.
that he had no authority to draw up peace conditions and that the aim of the revolutionaries was not to become officials but to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. (34)

To coincide with the Waichow rebellion and as a diversionary move, so as to enhance the chances of the success of the Waichow uprising, a youthful revolutionary with an "angelic face" (35), Shih Hsien-ju decided to kill the Viceroy in Canton. Shih Hsien-ju slipped into Canton from Hongkong, took up quarters near the Viceroy's yamen, and tried to blow up the place, but failed and instead of making good his escape lingered on in Canton unmindful of the consequences. Shih Hsien-ju's idealism and self-sacrificing deed made a great impression on other revolutionaries. (36) The Waichow uprising was also quelled and the revolutionaries straggled back to Hongkong.

EARLY REFORMS

The Boxer fiasco and the flight of the Court from Peking had finally brought home the realization to the Empress Dowager that China could no longer be governed in the old ways and that some measures would have to be taken calculated to appease public opinion and rehabilitate the Imperial prestige among foreign powers. A penitential decree was issued in January 1901 in the


(35) That is how Miyazaki described him on seeing him for the first time. Huang Chung-huang, n. 30, 112.

(36) Ch'ien Shao-pai, n. 3, 71-3.
name of the Emperor promising reforms in administration and careful preparation for gradual advance towards constitutional government. (37) This signalled the ushering in of the period of what has been described as Manchu reforms. (38) Tz'u-hsi's motivation and intentions in proclaiming the reform policy have lent themselves to various interpretations. One scholar has lauded the sincerity of purpose behind Tz'u-hsi's efforts in this direction and only lamented her passing away before the programme for a constitutional government could be carried through (39), while another has dismissed the Empress Dowager's pompous declarations as an attempt to fool the people, and not backed by any effective deeds. (40) One ingenuous explanation by a Chinese writer is that Tz'u-hsi embarked upon this policy out of spite for her nephew, the Emperor. She knew that the sands of time were running out for her. Power would then pass into the hands of Kuang-hsü whom she hated. So in order to restrict his enjoyment of total power after her death, she adopted the policy of reforms. The sharing of power with the

(37) For relevant excerpts from the decree see J.0.P.Bland and E. Blackhouse, China Under the Empress Dowager (London, 1910) 376-81.

(38) Neither space nor the scope of this thesis allow a detailed examination of Manchu reform measures. Here they can only be mentioned in bare outline in the context of their impact on the political forces and domestic opinion at that time.


people could come only after his death; she saw to it that the duration of the period of preparation and education was left sufficiently vague and flexible. (41)

Be that as it may, the Empress Dowager officially committed the Manchu Government to a policy of reforms. For the next five years certain changes were announced in administrative, military and educational fields. Among them were the abolition of the old-style civil service examinations, the establishment of schools and the despatch of students abroad and abrogation of the ban on marriage between Chinese and Manchus. Many of these reforms were the result of memorials from powerful governor generals like Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i. (42) The proclaimed policy of reforms was to some extent a response to the mounting crisis in China. The mood of the people was changing, from one of implicit obedience to the supreme power of the rulers to that of demanding changes and participation in the process of governance of their country. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 in which a country with a constitutional monarchy triumphed over a country with a despotic monarchy greatly spurred the growth of ideas of constitutionalism. (43)

(41) Ts'ang Fu, "Li-hsien yün-tung chih chin-hsing," Tung-fang tsa-chih, 7(1914), as in HHKM, n. 3, IV, 4.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Ibid.; also see the section on Deepening of the Crisis and Manchu Measures.
REFORMERS VS. REVOLUTIONARIES

In many respects reformers were the predecessors of the revolutionaries. It was they who started the movement for absorbing Western learning and reforming Chinese polity so as to make it more serviceable for meeting the challenge of the West. Their failure in 1898 paved the way for the emergence of more radical elements who wanted to overthrow, instead of reform, the dynasty. However, their expulsion from the mainland threw them together with the revolutionaries abroad and posed the question of their mutual relationships. Would they unite and co-operate with each other or would they cross each other's ways and become sworn enemies?

When K'ang-Yu-wei and his followers fled to Hongkong in 1898 after the coup of the Empress Dowager they came into contact with the revolutionaries. Amongst the first to meet K'ang and his followers was Miyazaki (who advised K'ang's pupils in Hongkong to unite forces with Sun Yat-sen's men and work for the expulsion of Manchu rule which was beyond any hope of reform. K'ang Yu-wei related to Miyazaki the story of the coup in Peking and laid all the blame for the ills of China at the door of the Empress Dowager. If only she could be removed from the scene, perhaps by a Japanese man of valour, K'ang suggested to Miyazaki. Miyazaki scoffed at K'ang's suggestion: surely the reformers could find one such selfless person amongst themselves who would be prepared to lay down his life to execute K'ang's suggestion. (44) The

(44) Huang Chung-huang, n. 30, 98.
incident bears eloquent testimony to the fact that despite all that had happened K'ang's loyalty to the Emperor and faith in monarchy still remained undiminished.

K'ang Yu-wei and Miyazaki travelled together to Tokyo where they were joined by K'ang's eminent pupil Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and others. Sun Yat-sen and Ch'en Shao-pai were also in Tokyo and the stage was set for negotiations. K'ang Yu-wei had come to Japan with the expectation that he would get official support from Japan in order to restore the Emperor's power and thus continue the process of reform. The Japanese were now faced with a dilemma - to support the revolutionaries or the reformers? It was not an easy choice to make and they enthusiastically responded to the idea of unity between the two groups which would simplify matters as well as extend their influence. They were ready to do all they could to promote mutual understanding among the two groups. (45) However, it is not quite correct to conclude from this, as M.B. Jansen seems to suggest, that the unity talks between the two groups were purely of Japanese inspiration. (46) Even before the Japanese had come on the scene and, before he had made Japanese friends, Sun Yat-sen attempted to make common cause with the reformers. In 1894-5 Ch'en Shao-pai was in Shanghai staying in the same hotel as K'ang Yu-wei. There he met K'ang Yu-wei, explained to him the view of the revolutionaries that there was no alternative to changing the Manchu dynasty and expressed

(45) Jansen, n. 27, 77-9.

(46) Ibid.
their desire to work together with K'ang and his followers. K'ang reportedly nodded assent and enquired about the strength of the revolutionaries in the Yangtse area. (47)

Nothing concrete emerged from these talks but the revolutionaries continued to hope for an understanding with the reformers. In 1896 a school for overseas Chinese was opened in Yokohama with the support of the Hsing-Chung-hui people. K'ang and Liang were requested to send some teachers for the school and two of K'ang's trusted lieutenants came to take charge of the school. (48) But as K'ang's influence spread and his position in the Peking Court became more important, he refused to have any truck with the revolutionaries. K'ang's pupils in the Yokohama school severed connections with the revolutionaries and "captured" the school. This was the first blow struck by the reformers at a place of revolutionary influence. (49)

The unity talks were started in Tokyo with the equal initiative of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, but they had little prospect of succeeding. K'ang and Sun were ideologically and temperamentally poles apart. K'ang himself would not meet Sun and take part in the discussions but deputed Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and others to represent him. He still had hopes of a reversal of the recent events in Peking and the resumption by the Emperor of full power and, therefore, did not want to compromise his position by

(47) Ch'en Shao-pai, n. 3, 66.
(48) Ibid., 67.
(49) Ibid., 68.
associating with a rebel like Sun Yat-sen. K'ang swore by the authority of the emperor while Sun had no use for an emperor and was a firm believer in a democratic republic. This was a stumbling bloc which no amount of negotiations could remove. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao seemed willing to reconcile himself to see the end of the Manchu dynasty and unite forces with the revolutionaries but lacked the will to act against the wishes of his Master. (50)

The question of K'ang Yu-wei's personal position in any arrangement between the two parties was not a minor stumbling bloc either. K'ang could not play second fiddle to any one else. The revolutionaries proposed to make Sun Yat-sen chairman of the projected united organization and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao vice-chairman, but Liang was concerned about the position of the Master and sounded Sun Yat-sen about it. Sun replied that K'ang was the Teacher and that, therefore, his position was the most exalted one. (51) While Liang Ch'i-ch'ao appeared satisfied, this nebulous position could not have appealed very much to K'ang Yu-wei.

The unity talks continued fitfully but were unfruitful. Although he himself did not take part in the discussions, every point that was raised had to be referred back to K'ang, and his followers had little power to decide any matter by themselves. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Ch'en Shao-pai met again in Hongkong in 1899 to continue their negotiations. Liang asked his associate

(50) Ibid., 58-9, 64.

(51) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 17, I, 44. .
Hsü Ch'in to draft along with Ch'en Shao-pai regulations for merging the two organizations. Hsü, however, secretly informed K'ang Yu-wei about Liang's intentions. K'ang was at that time in Singapore. Prompt came the orders to Liang to proceed to Honolulu. (52) An ironic finale to this story came when Miyazaki went to Singapore in 1900 and tried to meet K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang reported to the police his apprehension of foul play at the hands of Miyazaki who was arrested and jailed and was not released until Sun came and interceded for him. (53)

The paths of the two groups separated and gradually the two became rivals for the support of the overseas Chinese communities. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao continued to show interest in the idea of unity but nothing came of it. He took a trip to Hawaii with a letter of introduction from Sun Yat-sen for his brother who, quite naturally, actively helped him since he had come with Sun's recommendation. But the net result was that Liang weaned away a large number of Sun's supporters to the camp of the reformers. (54)

Another blow had been struck by them when in 1900 Sun and his men were attempting to unite the secret societies under their banner, the reformers also made a bid for the support of these societies. An important Ke-leo-hui member in the Yangtse area T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang and some of his associates fell under the

(52) Ibid.
(53) Huang Chung-huang, n. 30, 119-23.
(54) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 17, I, 47.
influence of K'ang Yu-wei and split the opposition forces by joining hands with the reformers. They staged an independent uprising in the Yangtse area but were crushed. T'ang came to grief and lost his life. (55) This was, however, the last and the only attempt of the reformers to woo secret societies. This was a field in which the scholar-reformers could hardly be at home and the violent, secret, seditious methods of these societies were alien to the ideology of K'ang Yu-wei whose limit of political activity extended only up to constitutional monarchy.

But the struggle for the minds and hearts - and pockets - of the overseas Chinese became gradually sharper. Both groups were dependent on the same source for continued sustenance and both carried on their work of "proseletization" with renewed vigour. The battle was joined and verbal and written propaganda against each other assumed more and more violent tones. Both groups had their journals almost wherever there were Chinese communities and through them they attacked each other. In Hongkong, for instance, Ch'ien Shao-pai, Huang Shih-chung and other members of the Hsing-Chung-hui started in 1901 the Chung-kuo-pao while the reformers established the Lin-hai-pao in Canton. In 1905 K'ang Yu-wei's followers floated the Shang-pao in Hongkong to counter the propaganda of the revolutionaries. In Honolulu K'ang's disciples brought out Hsin-Chung-kuo-pao in 1904 attacking Sun Yat-sen who was compelled to hit back forcefully in the Min-sheng-jih-pao. In San Francisco the former published Ta-t'ung-pao

(55) Huang Chung-huang, n. 30, 102.
in 1904 and the latter Wen-hui-pao the same year. (56) In Singapore the revolutionaries originally had T' u-nan-iih-pao (1904) and engaged in sharp polemics with Ch'ing-i-pao and Chi h-hsin-pao of the reformers in South-east Asia. In 1907 the revolutionaries started the Chung-hsing-pao in Singapore while the reformers had brought out Nan-yang-tsung-hui-pao to meet the challenge of their adversaries. (57)

The climax was reached when Min-pao was started in Tokyo in 1906 with one of its objectives as combating the propaganda of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and others in Hsin-min ts'ung-pao published from Yokohama. Min-pao started a full-scale political warfare against the paper of the reformists, and the revolutionaries had the satisfaction of seeing the turning of the tide. Apart from newspapers, the revolutionaries also utilized the medium of libraries and reading rooms to spread their message. Hundreds of libraries and reading rooms were set up in places of concentration of Chinese communities all over Asia and these became the places of rendezvous for the revolutionaries as well as the media for the propagation of the revolutionary cause. (58)

The reformers were fighting a losing battle and as political and economic conditions further deteriorated in the mainland, the revolutionaries made headway among the Chinese abroad. The overseas Chinese, first the students in Japan and then gradually

(56) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 17, I, 52-3.
(57) Ibid., II, 105, 116-21.
(58) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 90.
the overseas Chinese merchants, veered towards the revolutionaries and tipped the scales finally and decisively against the reformers.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE STUDENTS

One of the first results of the humiliation of the Boxer fiasco and the consequent adoption of a programme of reforms was the introduction of modern education in China. The old "shuyuan" in the provincial capitals were converted into colleges and those in prefects into middle schools, while the ones in the counties were renamed as primary schools. It was estimated that the number of students jumped from 100,000 in 1900 to about 2 million in 1905. (59) Modern education opened the door to modern political theories and, of course, to revolutionary ideas, and the students were increasingly drawn towards the revolutionary cause. Even more significant was the decision of the Manchu court to send students on a large scale to foreign countries - to Japan, Europe and America, for modern education and technical training. Some went to Europe, and some to America but a much larger number to Japan because of its proximity, inexpensiveness and relative cultural affinity. What had been a trickle before 1900 soon turned into a floodtide. A few scores in 1900 grew into a few hundreds in 1902 and between 1902 and 1905 thousands went to Japan and Europe. (60) The effect on these young minds of this.


(60) Ibid., 61-2.
exposure to new ideas and values was profound and, from the point of view of the Manchus, disastrous. The backwardness of China became all too obvious; the weaknesses and inadequacies of the Manchus intolerable. Japanese and Western nationalism encouraged the growth of Chinese nationalism whose first target inevitably was the "alien" Manchu rule. Realization of the foreign menace soon turned into active hostility against the home government which was becoming a pliant tool in the hands of the foreigners. The overseas students became the carriers of the germs of the revolution and the two streams of Sun's revolutionary philosophy and preachings, and the students' mounting resentment against Manchu failings met and merged into one.

The earliest group of students in Japan started an organization named the Li-chih-hui which, interesting enough, included some Manchu students also and seemed to be directed solely against the menace of the foreign powers. (61) But the parting of the ways was not far behind and the first stirrings of nationalism were soon heard among the Chinese students. A feeling was growing that the interests of the Chinese (Hans) and the Manchus were incompatible and that the Manchus must first go. (62) In 1902 some of the more conscious students organized what they called Wang-kuo-chi-nien-hui (Meeting to Commemorate the End of the Country) but were foiled by orders of the Japanese Government.

(61) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 15.
(62) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 17, I, 14.
Li-chih-hui was split into moderate and revolutionary wings and the latter broke away and established the Ch'ing-nien-hui. (63)

Revolutionary consciousness, however, was still incipient and had not spread among the majority of students. It was the news of Russian designs on Manchuria in 1903 which shook the Chinese students in Japan out of their complacency and constituted the first major break-through of revolutionary thought among the students. The students organized themselves into a volunteer army to fight the enemy but were shocked and repelled to find that the Manchu authorities regarded them as a rebel group and demanded their suppression. (64) The support to reforms was withdrawn and gradually extended to revolution. The Manchus had blundered, the die was cast, and from then onwards revolutionary winds blew strong among the students. The drills and training of the Volunteer Army was disallowed by the Japanese and the organization was succeeded by Chun-kuo-min-chiao-yu-hui (Military Education Society) to inculcate the military spirit among students in order to achieve their objective of a nationalist revolution. (65)

During 1903-1905 a number of societies mushroomed among the Chinese students in Japan. Typically, apart from broad associations like Chun-kuo-min-chiao-yu-hui, there were also regional organizations and practically every province had its own

(63) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 15.
(64) Tsao Yeh-p'ou, Wuch'ang ko-ming chen-shih (Shanghai, 1930), (Ch'ien-pien) 25.
(65) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 16.
separate student organization in Japan. (66) Sun Yat-sen's contacts with the students were established in 1901-1904 when, except for a visit to Annam in 1903 and to Honolulu and U.S.A., he stayed in Yokohama or Tokyo alternatively. (67) He frequently associated with the Chinese students discussing revolution with them. However, Sun was not the chief inspirer of revolutionary trends among the students. This was provided by Manchu policies and the spirit of nationalism that pervaded Japan as well as other advanced countries of the world; his intimate association with them came only in August 1905 (on his return from Europe) when revolutionary feelings among the students were already at a high pitch and a united revolutionary organization, T'ung-meng-hui, was organized in Tokyo in September 1905. (68) During this period it was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who was more well-known to the students and played a bigger role in spreading the ideas of nationalism. (69)

In the spring of 1905 Sun had gone to America and then to Europe and, at the invitation of Chinese students in France, Belgium and Germany, he took trips to those countries, formed the first intimate relations with overseas Chinese students (70) and

(66) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 44.

(67) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-li ch'uan-chih), n.1, I, 9.

(68) See the section on San-min chu-i and the Establishment of T'ung-meng-hui.

(69) For Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's position and intellectual activity see Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge, 1953).

(70) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-li ch'uan-chih), n.1, I, 10.
laid the basis for the establishment of the *T'ung-meng-hui* in Tokyo which brought Sun and the students together, and thence forward the students became an inseparable part of the revolution. The Chinese students in Europe were swept into the modern currents just like their counterparts in Japan. Most of them in France, Belgium and Germany pitched in together to raise the necessary finances to pay for Sun Yat-sen's visit to Europe. According to one revolutionary account, it was these students who had earlier decided that the *Hsing-Chung-hui* needed to be reorganized because it lacked proper discipline and invited Sun Yat-sen to Europe for discussions on the means and methods of promoting revolution. There Sun Yat-sen and the students decided on the formation of a new party which was later formally launched in Tokyo. There was some difference of opinion between them on whether to depend upon the military or the secret societies for fomenting revolution, with the students stressing the role of the army and Sun Yat-sen pointing out the utility of secret societies. It was finally decided to use both in the cause of the revolution. (71) Sun and the students took a joint oath repudiating their allegiance to the Manchu dynasty and proclaiming themselves as citizens of the republic of China.

So far as the students in Japan were concerned, the Manchu Government retaliated by urging upon the Japanese authorities a policy of suppression, and even deportation, of Chinese students who now numbered many thousands. The gap between the Manchu

(71) Ts'ai Chi-ou, *Ou-chou hsueh-shih* (Shanghai, 1958) 19.
authorities and the Chinese students in Japan widened. The new Japanese policy of control and suppression adopted at Manchu instance led to increasing antagonism between the Manchu court and the students and to strikes and demonstrations by the Chinese students. Some of the more fiery elements proposed a wholesale return to China as a mark of protest against Japanese policy and to promote revolution in China. There occurred a split between those who advocated returning to China and those who wanted to continue to stay in Japan. (72) Many students did go back and secretly plotted against the dynasty.

Despite this split, however, the revolutionary tide continued to flow aggressively among the Chinese students. The dawning of nationalist consciousness, the growing awareness of the foreign danger to China, the incompetence of the Manchu Government and the acceptance of the need and urgency of a revolution to overthrow Manchu rule as a first step towards the revival of China, all these were part of a process of transformation true of an overwhelming majority of the Chinese students in Tokyo -- and for that matter in Europe too -- and one can study the case history of Ch' en T' ien-hua as symbolizing this process.

Ch' en T' ien-hua was an outstanding Hunanese student, earnest and capable of independent political thinking. He came to Japan in 1903 with some reformist leanings, like most of his fellow students, but with no revolutionary commitments. (73) Like his

(72) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 17, I, 198.
(73) Tsao Ya-p' o, n. 64, 26.
fellow students, he was aroused by Russian occupation of Manchuria and joined the Volunteer Army and was swept into the revolutionary camp by subsequent Manchu policies. (74) He joined a new revolutionary organization, Hua-hsing-hui, formed with the purpose of fomenting revolution in Hunan and wrote his well-known tract Ching-Shih-chung (Alarm to warn the World) (75) in which he dwelt upon the decline of the Chinese race and the imminent danger to China from the foreign powers. He reflected the growing feeling of his fellow students that the Manchu regime, having been reduced to impotency before the foreign threat, was the first obstacle to be removed from the path of China's revival. (76)

And so in 1905 he joined hands with Sun Yat-sen and became an active member of the T'ung-meng-hui. In 1906, partly in protest against Japanese policy of suppression but mainly to arouse his fellow students, he committed suicide by drowning himself in the sea. (77) In his last testament he appealed to the students to work hard and prove worthy of their country and to carry on the work of the revolution which must be spread from the top to the bottom in order to make it worthwhile and enduring. (78)

(74) See Ch'ên T'ien-hua's own account in his article "Shih-tze-hou," Min-pao, 9(Tokyo) 4-6.

(75) HHKM, II, 112-19, 124-30.

(76) Ibid., 125-6.

(77) Ch'ên T'ien-hua himself wrote that he was not dying mainly because of the Japanese policy towards the Chinese students. See his last testament in Tsao Yao-p'o, n. 64, 26-32.

(78) Ibid.
The students carried the message of the revolution to their compatriots on their return to the motherland. Some of them became officials, some teachers; most of them occupied a special position in society as being part of that small vocal group which provided the leadership to the country. They were able to mould the thinking of large numbers of other people and in a society whose members were largely illiterate their influence extended far beyond what their numbers would warrant.

OTHER REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

While Sun Yat-sen was developing his Hsing-Chung-hui and promoting revolution by uniting forces with secret societies, there were also other revolutionaries working independently of him for the same goals and through similar methods. Tokyo and Shanghai became the hub of their activity - Tokyo because of the influx of Chinese students and Shanghai because of the relative safety of the international settlement. A number of anti-Manchu associations sprang up one after another in Tokyo, including the afore-mentioned Wang-kuo-chi-nien-hui (banned by the Japanese Government) and Chung-kuo-chiao-yü-hui (China Educational Society). In Shanghai Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei (79) established the Ai-kuo-hsueh-she and requested a well-known revolutionary Chang Ping-lin (also known as Chang T'ai-yen), who hailed from Hangchow, to become

(79) Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei was a well-known educationalist and later became the first Chancellor of Peking University. For his biographical sketch see Tsou Lu, n. 12, IV, 1626-52.
its chief. (80) Another revolutionary Tsou Jung (81), a native of Szechuan, came to Shanghai from Japan and along with Chang T'ai-yen started a paper called Su-pao which contained sharp anti-Manchu propaganda. Its fame spread into Chekiang and the Manchu authorities had to intercede with the foreign administration in Shanghai. Consequently the paper was banned and Chang and Chou put behind the bars. (82)

HUA-HSING-HUI

Among other significant revolutionary organizations of that time was Hua-hsing-hui formed in 1903-4 by Huang Hsing (83) and others in Ch'angsha (Hunan). (84) Huang Hsing, who rose to be the second most important leader of the revolution, was a student of Liang-Hu Academy and was sent by Chang Chih-tung to Japan towards the end of 1901. Huang Hsing was an early convert to revolution and along with Li Shu-ch'eng brought out a paper called "Hupei Student Circle" in Tokyo, containing translations

(80) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 11.

(81) For Tsou Jung's biographical sketch see Tsou Lu, n.12, IV, 1241-8.

(82) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 11-12.

(83) For a short biography of Huang Hsing see Liu K'uei-i, Huang Hsing ch'uan-chi, HHKM, V, 175-311. Liu K'uei-i was a close associate of Huang Hsing.

(84) Ibid., 276-7. Feng Tzu-yu says that the organization was established in Tokyo. Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-kuo ko-ming yun-tung er-shih-liu-nien tsu-chih, as in HHKM, n. 3, I, 503. While the idea of such an organization was discussed in Tokyo, it was set up only in Ch'angsha.
of materials concerning nationalism and people's rights. (85) The Hunanese in Tokyo decided to plan an uprising in Hunan and to mobilize the army and the students for that purpose. In June 1903 Huang Hsing went to Hupei and made a fiery anti-Manchu speech at the Liang-Hu Academy. News of the meeting reached Cheng Chih-tung who asked for the immediate expulsion of Huang Hsing. (86)

Huang Hsing headed towards Ch'angsha and in December 1903 called a meeting attended among others by Wu Lu-chen, Ch'ien T'ien-hua, Sung Chiao-jen, Hu Ying, T'an Jen-feng and Liu K'uei-i and established the Hua-hsing-hui with Huang Hsing as their leader. In his speech at the occasion Huang Hsing said that there were two ways of starting a revolution in China. They could, like the British or French Revolutions, start it at the capital. The British Revolution, however, was not really a nationalist revolution but a revolution of the merchants who were mostly in the capital. But in Peking there were only a few ignorant merchants. Moreover the alien Manchu troops were there to crush a revolt. Therefore, Huang Hsing argued, the revolution in China had to be based in some province and Hunan was selected because the revolutionary consciousness had already developed in the army and student circles there. (87)

(85) Liu K'uei-i, n. 83, 275.
(86) Ibid., 276.
(87) Ibid., 276-7.
In order to facilitate contact with secret societies another organization called *T'ung-ch'ao-hui* (Association against the Common Enemy) with Huang Hsing as Commander-in-Chief, was set up and the support of the *Ko-lao-hui* (Elder Brothers' Society) was secured. Contacts were also made with the revolutionaries in Hupei to spread the revolt from Hunan to Hupei. With about a reported 100,000 members (88), the revolutionaries made plans for starting a rebellion in Ch'angsha on the Empress Dowager's birthday when, it was expected, the officials would not be particularly vigilant. But the secret could not be kept and the Manchu authorities frustrated their plans by taking immediate action. A number of revolutionaries were caught and killed. Husang Hsing had to hide himself and was saved by some missionaries. The leader of the *Ko-lao-hui* (Ma Fu-i) also escaped but only to be caught and executed the next year. He went to the gallows shouting anti-Manchu slogans and forecasting vengeance by the Hans on their oppressors — the Manchus. (89)

**KUANG-FU-HUI**

Another influential revolutionary organization which played an independent role in the revolutionary movement was the *Kuang-fu-hui* founded in Shanghai in 1904. Its origins can be traced to the developments among Chinese students in Japan. The conflict

(88) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 84, 503.
(89) Tsao Ya-p'o, n. 64, 1-10.
between the Chinese students and the Manchu authorities as a result of the organization of the Volunteer Army by the students and the Manchu Government's attempt to suppress the students had swung the students by and large onto the path of revolution. Many revolutionary groups and organizations had sprung up among the students and they had also organized a secret terrorist group to kill Manchu officials (An-sha-t'uan). Among its members were a number of Chekiang students and one of them, Kung Pao-chin, went back and organized a branch in Shanghai. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, the prominent revolutionary leader of the Chung-kuo-chiao-yü-hui, then at Shanghai, heard about the group and offered to join forces with it. Thus was formed a new united organization called Kuang-fu-hui which was later joined by many other prominent revolutionaries including Chang Ping-ling (T'ai-yen), Tao Ch'eng-chang, Hsü Hsi-ling and Ch'iu Chin. (90) Its strongholds were the provinces of Chekiang and Anwei, and it was also influential in South-East Asia after 1908. (91)

The relations between Kuang-fu-hui and the federation of revolutionary organizations, T'ung-meng-hui went through successive phases of harmony, disharmony and reunity. In the initial period, the two organizations worked in close co-operation and with the exception of Hsü Hsi-ling, who continued to plough a lonely furrow, most other leaders of Kuang-fu-hui were also members of

(91) Ibid., 64-5, 72-3.
T'ung-meng-hui. (92) But during the troubled period between 1908-1910 the two organizations fell out and many of the Kuang-fu-hui leaders became bitter critics of Sun Yat-sen and the T'ung-meng-hui. Unity was restored only in 1911 under the impact of a new revolutionary upsurge in China. (93)

SAN-MIN-CHU-I AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF T'UNG-MENG-HUI

Sun's trip to America and Europe in the spring of 1905 marked a turning point both in the development of his political philosophy and in the fortunes of his revolutionary work. This was his third trip to these liberal-democratic countries and he had been keenly observing their political institutions -- their merits and their failings. His ideas were maturing and he now stood ready to apply them to the conditions of China. The purely negative anti-Manchu policy was supplemented by a more positive goal of the establishment of the Republic of China. Autocracy and dictatorship, Manchu or Chinese, must go lock, stock and barrel and a democratic republic take its place. But he now realized that political democracy by itself was not enough. He had observed its working in the West and had discovered that it had not been able to solve all the problems. He had seen increasing labour troubles in the West and the division of society into conflicting classes. Economic welfare of the masses, he decided, must form an integral part of any programme of nationalism.

(92) Ibid., 63-4.

(93) See the section on Troubles of the Revolutionaries.
and democracy. (94) In the context of China it meant, first of all, land nationalization and amelioration of the peasants' lot. Sun's advocacy of land reforms as essential to a programme of political regeneration of China added a new dimension to the current political movements in China.

This constituted the genesis of what came to be known as San-min-chui-I or the Three People's Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood). (95) At the time these three principles were contained actually in a four-point programme: expulsion of the Tartars; regeneration of China; establishment of a republic, and equalization of land rights. It is generally believed that the enunciation of these principles came first during his trip to Europe when along with the Chinese students in Paris, Belgium and Germany he signed an oath and proclaimed these principles. In point of fact their first enunciation had come a little earlier -- during Sun's preceding trip to America. There he had contacted overseas Chinese communities, reorganized their hung-men societies, rewritten their regulations, and incorporated these principles which, later, became guiding principles for China for nearly half a century. (96)

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(94) See, for instance, Sun's article in the first issue of Min-pao (Tokyo), I, 1-3.

(95) An elaboration of the "Three People's Principles" will be found in Sun Yat-sen's lectures on these principles. Tsung-li ch'uan-chi, n. 1, I, 1-285.

(96) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 102.
Sun Yat-sen came back to Tokyo in August 1905 at the right psychological time to reap the revolutionary harvest in Tokyo. The students had been roused to a feverish pitch of patriotic feeling and various other revolutionary groups and leaders in Tokyo were also inclined towards concerted action. Sun was introduced by Miyazaki to Huang Hsing, leader of the Hunanese group, and to Sung Chiao-jen another well-known Hunanese revolutionary leader. (97) That Sun was painfully aware of the centrifugal tendencies dividing the ranks of the revolutionaries as well as their potential danger to the unity of China was evident from his remarks to Sung Chiao-jen. "We need not fear division by the foreign powers", he told Sung. "What we should fear is internal squabbles. One province wants to stage a revolt but does not want to make common cause with the other provinces, and they all give their own calls. The result will be like the wars between twenty and odd countries in China after the end of Ch'in. Various secret societies have been fighting against the Manchu Government and the Manchus cannot suppress them. But they do not have any men of ability to lead them. If there were a few hundred thousand people who could unite and if, for every matter there were some one to undertake responsibility, then there could be an uprising just in one morning and China's affairs could be settled." (98)

(97) Sung-yu 1ih-chi (The Diary of Sung Chiao-jen), part reproduced in HHKM, n. 3, II, 209-10. The pagination follows that of HHKM.

(98) Ibid., 210.
Sun's proposals for a united revolutionary organization generally found receptive ears but did not go without opposition. Huang Hsing had personally agreed with Sun's proposal but there was some opposition among his Hunanese group. Huang proposed in a meeting of their group that they formally join the new society proposed by Sun but that in spirit they maintain their separate existence. No agreement could be reached in this meeting and it was decided to give freedom to each member to join or not to join the proposed new organization. (99)

However the sentiment for united action was overwhelming. The students gave a massive welcome to Sun Yat-sen. A preparatory meeting of about 70 people was held on July 30 to lay the groundwork for the new organization. (100) The incipient but significant differences in approach and ultimate objectives were apparent even during this meeting and should be noted. Some participants were not satisfied with the proposed name of T'ung-meng-hui (literally, United Alliance Association) and wanted to add the words "anti-Manchu" (tui-Man) before it. (101) Sun Yat-sen had to explain that their objective was not merely the abolition of Manchu monarchy but also the establishment of a republic. Again while adopting Sun's four-point plank, doubts were expressed about his p'ing-chun ti-ch'uan (equalization of land rights), by which Sun perhaps meant no more than a single tax and such like reforms, but which was hardly understood by many of his associates. Sun's persuasive argument won the day.

(99) Ibid., 210-11.
(100) Ibid., 211.
(101) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 47.
and his programme became the official programme of the new unified revolutionary organization (102), but the meeting had clearly revealed the inherent dichotomy of views and goals among various sections of the revolutionaries.

On August 20 the new party was formally launched and Sun Yat-sen was elected President, or otherwise known as Director (tsung-li). (103) It was stipulated that all organizations whose purposes accorded with those of Tiung-meng-hui and were willing to unite would be recognized as members of the organization. An Executive Committee was set up with 30 members and 5 departments, established under it (Internal Affairs, External Affairs, Secretariat, Treasury, and Investigation Department). There were to be five bureaus inside the country and four outside -- all under the control of the headquarters in Tokyo. On the mainland there would be a Western bureau at Chungking, Eastern at Shanghai, Central at Hankow, Southern at Hongkong and Northern at Chefu. Outside the country the bureaus would be located at Singapore (South Pacific), Brussels (Europe), San Francisco (U.S.A.) and Hawaii, respectively. (104)

In recognition of the need for discipline and centralized guidance, the President was given wide powers. He could veto the proposals of the Committee members and he appointed all the bureau heads as well as the chiefs of the various departments of the Executive Committee. (105)

(102) Ibid.
(103) Ibid., 51.
(104) Ibid., 48-50.
(105) Ibid.
The response to the founding of the new party was very heartening to the revolutionaries. In less than a year 10,000 people joined the party inside and outside China, and branches were set up in all the provinces. (106)

A united revolutionary organization had thus been brought about and Sun's dreams came nearer realization. (107) For the first time there was an organization which would co-ordinate the plans of the revolutionaries, guide and lead various revolutionary groups and societies, and achieve that strength born of unity which alone could shake the Dragon Throne of the Manchus in Peking. It was the finest hour of the revolutionaries. Most of them had been able to overcome their parochial existence, and their separate functioning, and merge themselves into a unified body in order to achieve the objectives of the revolution. This did not mean the end of the internal troubles of the revolutionaries. The evils of individualism, factionalism and provincialism could not be wished away by the mere formation of a united organization, and many latent differences came to the surface later. But the significance of the birth of this party, acting as a directing and co-ordinating agency, should not be underestimated and its role in promoting revolution belittled.

A significant advance in spreading revolutionary ideas was made with the starting of Min-pao (People's Tribune) as the

(106) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-lij ch'uan-chi), n.1, 10.

(107) Sun himself said that after the establishment of the new organization he began to entertain the hope that his mission might be realized in his own life time. Ibid., 10.
official organ of the T'ung-meng-hui. Min-pao was started in December 1905 with a view to propagating the revolutionary philosophy and combating the propaganda of the reformers and constitutional monarchists. (108) It was charged with the task of explaining the twin objectives of overthrowing the Manchus and bringing about social revolution (min-sheng and min-ch'uan). Among the original editors were Sun Yat-sen's close associates: Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en T'ien-hua, and Chu Chih-hsin. Sun himself wrote the preface for the first issue wherein he elaborated his principle of People's Livelihood. He explained that the economic question could not be ignored in the 20th century. He noted that in America the conflict between the capitalist and labour classes had reached a serious stage. This had not yet happened in China and his aim was to bring about a social revolution immediately on the accomplishment of the political revolution. (109) Ch'en T'ien-hua followed this with an article justifying the advocacy of a democratic republic for China. (110)

After the 5th number Chang Ping-lin, now released from a Shanghai jail, came to Tokyo and assumed editorship of the paper. This marked a shift of emphasis in the paper's policy and contents. The goal of social revolution was pushed into the background and that of anti-Manchu struggle into the forefront.

(110) Ibid., 6-10.
Min-sheng, for which Chang could not have cared less, made only an occasional appearance while Chinese patriotism against alien and barbarian - Manchu rule fostered with redoubled vigour. Chang, trained in the old school and classics, reverted to the concept of "pure nationalism" (kuo-tźūi) and even advocated Buddhism to supplement the truth of the Revolution. (111)

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY

The crucial importance of the army in any attempt to topple down the existing dynasty in China was apparent to the revolutionaries. The sole alternative of an armed revolution available to the revolutionaries pinpointed the strategic position of the armed forces. The remark of one of the revolutionaries that students could not make a revolution for a hundred years whereas the army could bring about one in ten years (112) underlined a belief shared by all sections of the revolutionaries. The subversion of the army was, therefore, a supreme necessity and to this task the revolutionaries addressed themselves with assiduous persistence. (113) The Manchu decision after the Boxer failure to create a new modern-style army considerably, though unwittingly, facilitated the task of the revolutionaries, for the development of Chinese patriotism came about the same time as the development of the New Army and irresistibly affected its

(111) Ibid., V, 1-8.
(112) Ching Mei-chi, Tsui-an, as in HHKM, n. 3, IV, 247, hereafter referred to as Ching Mei-chi.
(113) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 110.
ranks. A large number of students were despatched to Japan for military training and those young cadets could no more be immunized against the contagion of "dangerous" thoughts than other students in Japan. Like their fellow students they also came under the strong influence of the revolutionaries and became the advance guard of revolutionary propaganda and activity among the armed forces. (114)

They formed groups and cells within their regiments and bided their time for opportunity to spark a rebellion. This was particularly true of the New Army in Central and South China which was also the most exposed to the new ideas and influences whereas most of the officers of the New Army in the North (Peking army) remained by and large loyal to its promoter, Yuan Shih-k'ai. Among the earliest converts in Tokyo to the cause of revolution were the well-known Generals Wu Lu-chen, who became the Commander of the Sixth Division, and Chang Shao-ts'eng subsequently Commander of the 20th Division. (115) Among the ordinary ranks also the revolutionaries made contacts and gradually spread their network. In this task the secret societies also came handy because many soldiers in the New Army were members of these societies and, consequently, came under the sway of the revolutionaries.

The importance that Sun Yat-sen attached to military training was evident from the fact that as early as 1902 he

(114) Ibid.

(115) For a biographical note on Wu Lu-chen see Tsou Lu, n.12, IV, 1433-43.
established in Tokyo an Institute for the Research of Military Affairs (Chün-shih-yen-chiu-so) and employed a Japanese military officer to train revolutionary army men. Hu Yi-sheng, Li Chung-chih, Li Tse-chung and many other revolutionaries took military training in the Institute. (116) A large number of students in Tokyo practised drill and shooting. (117) After the establishment of T'ung-meng-hui the Institute was dissolved. But as the work of contacting army students was of vital importance a Revolutionary Army School (Ko-ming-chün-shih-hsueh-hsiao) was started in the Tokyo gymnasium. (118) Huang Hsing also established a school in Yokohama to teach the skill of manufacturing bombs and secured the services of a Russian anarchist. A number of revolutionaries, including some women revolutionaries like Ch'iu Chin, underwent training there. Subsequently Huang Hsing made an extensive secret tour of mainland China under an assumed name and particularly contacted army officials. (119) The New Army in Central and South China were gradually corroded by revolutionary secret organizations. The T'ung-meng-hui performed the imperative liaison service of keeping in touch with all these groups and cells and providing central leadership. It has been estimated that at the time of 1911 Revolution there were about 800 young army officers who had had training in Japan.

(116) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 77.
(117) Ching Mei-chi, n. 112, 244.
(118) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 77.
(119) Liu K'uei-i, n. 83, 282.
and that a large number of them had become sympathizers and adherents of Sun's party. (120)

OVERSEAS CHINESE

Apart from overseas students in Japan and Europe, the Overseas Chinese communities in South-East Asia, Hawaii and America could also boast of having made the realization of the revolution possible. Half the task was accomplished when the revolutionaries were able to win their - at least a large majority's - allegiance. It was their money which sustained the revolutionaries abroad. Most of the major revolutionary organizations - Hsing-Chung-hui, T'ung-meng-hui, Kung Chin-hui and many others - were first organized and/or their headquarters located in foreign lands with sizeable Chinese populations. The support of Chinese community in Japan, South-East Asia, Hawaii, and the U.S.A. made possible the continued existence and functioning of these organizations. It was their funds which enabled the revolutionaries to organize revolts inside China.

More than one Chinese scholar recently remarked to this writer, no doubt in a mood of levity, that the 1911 Revolution was made outside China! (121)


(121) The writer was in Peking during 1956-58 and this remark was made on more than one occasion in the course of discussions with some Chinese scholars.
This support was not built up in a day; it came gradually and in slow driblets. For this the revolutionaries had to work doggedly and not without resistance and setbacks. In this regard Sun Yat-sen’s role was the most outstanding and his perseverance the most notable. Sun started wooing the overseas Chinese first at Hawaii in 1895 at the time of the founding of the Hsing-Chung-hui and continued it after the failure of the Canton uprising the same year. Party headquarters became located at Yokohama and the Chinese traders there were approached for enrolment as well as financial aid. Soon afterwards Sun went to Hawaii and then to America in an attempt to interest the Chinese communities there in his cause. But these first experiences must have been frustrating. Sun found his compatriots there indifferent in the extreme. (122) It required only the unfailing patience and robust optimism of Sun to break this Great Wall of apathy and ignorance.

At about the same time one of Sun’s followers, Yu Lieh took to Singapore contacting Singapore businessmen and organized the Chung-ho-tang -- a satellite organization of the Hsing-Chung-hui. (123) He made considerable headway and enrolled many members. His success became particularly signal after the failure of another uprising in Waichow in 1900-1 when he won over to the cause of the revolution two of the richest and most influential Chinese merchants, Ch’ien Ch’u-nan and Lin I-chun, who became

(122) Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo-ch’ien ko-ming shih, n.17, I, 37; Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 102.

(123) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 85.
the financial pillars of the revolutionaries in Singapore. With their help the revolutionaries started the T'iu-nan jih-pao in Singapore to propagate their aims. (124)

Sun himself has stated that in the beginning he was regarded by his countrymen as a dangerous criminal but it was only after 1900, when the Boxer failure destroyed the authority and prestige of the Ch'ing dynasty, that their attitude towards him underwent a gradual transformation, and that he started meeting with more positive response. (125) In 1902 Sun went to attend a trade fair in Hanoi at the invitation of the French authorities in Vietnam. This was the time when the French were showing interest in Sun Yat-sen. (126) Sun took this opportunity of contacting Chinese businessmen some of whom expressed sympathy for his ideas. (127)

The efforts of the revolutionaries to elicit support among the Chinese communities in South-East Asia continued through 1900-5 although they had to contend with competition from the reformers who had set up "Save the Emperor" Party. The reformers having been expelled from the mainland had to take refuge in Japan, Singapore and other South-East Asian territories and became dependent upon the support of the Chinese communities there. Sun Yat-sen and his comrades were compelled to arouse the interest of their compatriots by giving promises of mining leases and other economic privileges. For instance, at the time of an uprising planned in Ho-k'ao in Yunnan in 1908, Sun Yat-sen

(124) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 17, II, 5-6.
(125) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-li ch'uan-chi), n.1, 8-9.
(126) Ibid., 9.
(127) Tsou Lu, n. 12, 100.
promised the Chinese merchants in Hanoi ten years' rights of mining in the entire province in return for a subscription of 100,000 dollars for the projected uprising. (128) The revolutionaries scored comparatively easy successes among the Chinese in Japan where the "wind of change" was blowing more strongly and they gradually edged their way forward in South-East Asia also.

In the spring of 1904 Sun Yat-sen went once again to Hawaii and America and was for the first time able to accomplish a major break-through among the Chinese there. By now the Chinese overseas communities were clearly more receptive to the necessity of overthrowing the Manchu Government and the unavoidability of revolutionary means to achieve it. Many years of hard work was beginning to yield results. Sun Yat-sen found the ground fertile for spreading his revolutionary doctrine. He joined the various hung-men organizations, especially the Chih-kung-tang which was the chief hung-men organization in Hawaii and America. It had come under the influence of the reformers but in 1904 Sun Yat-sen became a member in Hawaii and assumed its leadership. From Hawaii he proceeded to San Francisco where some adherents of K'ang Yu-wei tried to prevent his entry into America. On receipt of a telegram from Hawaii, the San Francisco Chih-kung-tang leaders secured Sun's entry by paying a security of 5000 dollars to the custom authorities.

(128) Ibid., 121.
Sun now became a member of the Chih-kung-tang in America and started playing the leading role in reorganizing it. (129)

He mobilized and activated its members, explained to them how, under the changed conditions, his task was essentially in conformity with the original aim of their organizations, (of opposing the Manchus and restoring the Ming) and in 1905, when he revisited America, he rewrote their regulations incorporating his principles of nationalism (overthrow of the Manchus), democracy (establishment of a republic) and people's livelihood (equalization of land rights). (130) Henceforth a valuable source of funds was assured for Sun's party and although the Chinese in America did not contribute outstanding names to the revolution, their financial contribution was very considerable.

The financial support of the Chinese in America might be distinguished in one material respect from the one that came from the Chinese in South-East Asia. The former was the help of a comparatively poor relation while that of the latter was in the nature of doles of a rich relation. In South-East Asia there were many rich Chinese merchants who contributed liberally from their plentiful coffers to the revolutionary cause, but in America there were hardly any such rich merchants. The Chinese there were mostly workmen or small shopkeepers who sent contributions to the Party out of their modest earnings. At the same time, however, this support was more steady and continuous, and therefore not the less useful, than the contributions of the

(129) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 17, I, 158-60.
(130) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 102.
Opulent merchants of South-East Asia which were irregular and unsteady. (131)

On his way back to Tokyo in mid 1905, prior to the establishment of T'ung-meng-hui, Sun's ship anchored at Singapore where he met party functionaries and heard from them accounts of substantial headway having been made among the Chinese communities there. The establishment of the T'ung-meng-hui at Tokyo marked the definite turning of the tide in favour of the revolutionaries. All their opponents continued to lose ground and the party development began leaping forward. Branches of the T'ung-meng-hui were set up in all the South-East Asian territories and in Hawaii and America and all the existing revolutionary organizations merged into the new unified one. The financial support of overseas Chinese came in increasingly larger measure and there are many touching stories of their liberal contributions. Sun Yat-sen has himself recorded, for instance, that a Chinese merchant in Paris contributed all the earnings of his shop to the revolutionaries and that a laundryman in Annam gave away all his life's savings to the cause. (132)

When the Japanese compelled Sun Yat-sen, at the instance of the Manchu Government, to quit Japan in 1907, Hanoi and Singapore became the hub of activities and Sun established the South-East Asian Bureau in Singapore. However, as a result of a series of uprisings planned by the T'ung-meng-hui, the Manchu authorities kept a close watch over Sun's activities and asked

(131) Ibid., 103.
(132) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-li ch'uan-chi), n. 1, 14.
for his expulsion by the local governments at every place. The stay at Singapore had to be terminated while the French authorities would also not permit Sun to remain in Vietnam. (133) The Bureau was moved to Penang while Sun went in 1909 to Europe, came back to Penang for a while in 1910, and again went to Europe and U.S.A. mobilizing the overseas Chinese there and securing funds for his party. (134)

SOME ANTI-MANCHU REBELLS PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION

The last decade of Manchu rule was marked by a growing number of rebellions on a large scale. The centralization of leadership and co-ordination of activities of the revolutionaries facilitated the incitement of armed revolts in various parts of the country. There were at least seven major attempts against Manchu rule after the formation of T'ung-meng-hui within the span of three years (1906-1908). None of them succeeded and, in fact, most of them failed for similar reasons, but they were all precursors of the gathering storm. One of the first outbreaks following the establishment of T'ung-meng-hui was at P'ing-hsiang, Liu-yang and Li-ling on the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi in November 1906. This revolt was not directly engineered at the orders of the Society headquarters in Tokyo but the Society members jumped into the fray as soon as news of the rebellion

(133) Ibid., 14-15.
(134) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 97-102.
reached the T'ung-meng-hui headquarters in Tokyo and tried to stir up trouble all along the Central provinces in Hunan, Hupei, Kiangsi, Anhwei and Kiangsu. (135)

P'ing-hsiang was a coal mining centre and one of the chief significances of this revolt was that famine-stricken workers of their area took a leading part in the rebellion. The year 1906 was a year of severe drought in Central China and there was famine in many of the Yangtse provinces. The price of rice - that graveyard of many a Chinese dynasty - shot up bringing starvation for the workers of the P'ing-hsiang coal mine. That is where the trouble started while revolutionaries in other places responded to this uprising. (136)

However the revolutionaries had already done much preparatory work in the area before the outbreak of this revolt. A petty army officer, Ma Fu-i (137) stationed at P'ing-hsiang, had organized a revolutionary battalion there to guard the coal mines and had formulated a revolutionary code which enjoined that there would be no killing of the people or disturbing of business. In 1905 Ma Fu-i was caught and tortured to death by Tuan-fang, Viceroy of Nanking and Anhwei (i.e. at Nanking). His supporters and comrades were enraged and stepped up their preparations for an uprising. The more than 30,000 adherents of the revolutionaries were centred in P'ing-hsiang, Liu-yang,

(135) Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Pin-wu p'ing-li ch'i-1 chi," (Chien-kuo yueh-k'an) in HKKM, n. 3, 2, 463-4, hereafter referred to as Ch'en Ch'un-sheng.

(136) Ibid., 463.

(137) See n. 89.
and Li-ling; in P'ing-hsiang a large majority being workers, in Li-ling members of the military camp there, and in Liu-yang the members of the secret society of hung-fu chi-t'ien. (138)

The Commander of the Southern Vanguard of the "Revolutionary Army", speaking in the name of the "Government of the Chinese Republic", listed the crimes of the Manchu Imperial House and declared as the object of the Revolutionary Army the "regeneration" of China (or, in other words, the Han race) and establishment of a democratic republic. The Commander's declaration said that the Manchus were an old enemy of the Han people. They were a backward race, ferocious and tyrannical in nature. They had "killed our countrymen and occupied our country, looted our property, and made slaves of our countrymen." The revolutionary army, it asserted, wanted not only to expel the Tartars but also to put an end to the political system of dictatorship of many thousand years whereby one person singly enjoyed all the power. Their aim was that many millions of their countrymen should enjoy freedom. It added, significantly, that the "social question" must be considered anew and new methods evolved, particularly in the form of equalization of land rights, so that the rich would not grow richer. (139)

This emphasis on the "social question" was a unique feature of this rebellion rarely evident in other rebellions during this period when generally only the anti-Manchu theme was played up.

(139) Ibid., 475-7.
It was obviously inspired by the famine-stricken workers of the P'ing-hsiang coal mine who formed the core of the rebels in this case.

Government troops in Hunan were defeated a number of times and the influence of the revolutionaries spread to various other places - in which a contributory factor was their exemplary behaviour towards the people. (140) As soon as the Tokyo headquarters learnt of the revolt, agents were despatched to the Central provinces to foment revolts everywhere. But the matter did not remain secret and many of them were caught and killed. (141) The revolutionary army lacked thorough military knowledge, and, consequently, while they could attack and defeat Manchu troops, they could not occupy districts and cities. Moreover, although there were not a few adherents of their cause in the New Army in Kiangsu, they could not establish mutual contacts, and so lost a valuable opportunity. (142) The revolutionaries held Manchu troops at bay for over a month but the Government, greatly alarmed, was able to rush reinforcements from Kiangsi, Kiangsu and Hupei. (143) The Imperial troops, reportedly numbering about 50,000 overpowered the rebellious army. A considerable number of revolutionaries paid with their lives in this attempt which was the biggest so far undertaken by them.

(140) Ibid., 464, 470.
(141) Ibid.
(142) Ibid., 465.
(143) Ibid., 464.
The causes of the P'ing-hsiaang failure constituted a microcosm of the reasons for subsequent failures during this period: leakage of plans, paucity of arms and ammunition, lack of military discipline and training, failure of the contact work at crucial moments. Similar shortcomings accounted for the defeat of many subsequent attempts. To some extent the weaknesses were inevitable. By its very nature the work had to be secret. Since it involved a large number of people, maintenance of strict secrecy was a most difficult task. Since it was secret, military discipline could not be inculcated with a thoroughness generally associated with military operations. Moreover, in such a situation, unfailing contact between different revolutionary groups could not always be guaranteed.

With this failure in the Central provinces, the Yangtse ceased to be the hub of revolutionary activity and the attention of Sun Yat-sen and his followers became concentrated on the border provinces, first Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and then Yunnan. An important contributing factor in this change of strategy was the successful intercession of the Chinese Government with the Japanese authorities to compel Sun Yat-sen to quit Japan in February 1907 and the consequent diminution of the role of the Tokyo headquarters. Sun Yat-sen and his leading colleagues took to Hanoi, Annam, from where it was more advantageous to operate in the border provinces of Yunnan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

The next T'ung-meng-hui members' attempt was at Huang-kang in Kwangtung in the middle of 1907 where the revolutionaries planned to capture the government arsenal with the help of secret
society members. They were able to seize the town but their success proved to be temporary and Government troops quelled the revolt. (144) Two more attempts were made in 1907 in Kwangtung but proved equally abortive. This repeated failure in Kwangtung shifted the venue to Kwangsi where from a vantage point of bordering Annam Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing personally led a revolt in Chen-nan-kuan in November 1907 but because of failure to contact all the secret society members in the mountainous areas and an insufficiency of arms and men, they were finally overwhelmed by Manchu troops and forced to retreat to Annam. (145)

The Manchu Government now put pressure on the Indo-Chinese authorities to expel Sun Yat-sen from Annam. Sun had to leave Hanoi entrusting the planning and execution of revolts to Huang Hsing. The latter switched the scene of operations to bordering Yunnan and with the help of a section of the Government troops at the frontier staged a rebellion in Ho-k'ao in April 1908. But again inadequacy of reinforcements and trepidation on the part of officers in the Manchu army sympathetic to the revolutionary cause resulted in defeat and another retreat to Annam. (146)

There was one more anti-Manchu attempt of note during this period -- that of An-ch'ing (Anhwei) and Shao-hsing (Chekiang)

(144) For details see Tsou Lu, n. 12, III, 717-21.
(145) Ibid., 738-41.
(146) Ibid., 745-52.
in 1907. This was significant for a variety of reasons. It was organized without the direction of T'ung-meng-hui; it involved a woman revolutionary, Ch'iu Chin, who became a symbol of the coming regeneration of the women of China; and it led to a further revulsion of feeling against Manchu rule in Anhwei and Chekiang. Among the well-known revolutionary leaders of Chekiang provinces were T'ao Ch'eng-chang, Hsü Hsi-ling and Ch'iu Chin, a woman of great will, energy and courage. (147) They were members of Kuang-fu-hui and of them the first and the last were also members of T'ung-meng-hui but Hsü Hsi-ling did not care to become one. Hsü, according to a Chinese revolutionary leader of that period, was an individualist and would not rely on others for help. (148) He, therefore, scorned to take Sun Yat-sen's aid or accept his leadership and continued his own revolutionary work in Chekiang. Hsü was in Japan at the time of the Manchurian incident and established contacts with T'ao Ch'eng-chang and Kung Wei-sun. He went back to Chekiang and established Ta-t'ung Hsueh-hsiao (Ta-t'ung Academy) in Shao-hsing where the students were given intensive drills and lessons in military affairs, the aim being the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. Hsü and his colleagues were liberally helped by a rich Chinese merchant, Hsü Cheng-liang. (149)

(147) For a biographical note on Ch'iu Chin see T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 60-4.
(149) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, n. 20, 26-7.
Ch'iu Chin had also travelled to Japan during 1904-5 and had made the acquaintance of T'ao Ch'eng-Chang who, notwithstanding his dubiousness about the utility of a woman revolutionary, gave her an introductory letter for Hsü Hsi-ling on the eve of her departure from Tokyo in 1905. Ch'iu Chin became a member both of the T'üng-meng hui and Kuang-fu-hui. (150) Ch'iu and Hsü together made extensive contacts with secret society members and infused new vigour in revolutionary work in Chekiang. The revolutionary winds blew strong and hard in Chekiang. Hsü Hsi-ling purchased the post of taotai in Anhwei and spread his revolutionary work into that province. He got into the good graces of the governor, En-ming, and was made chief of a police academy and associate director of the provincial police department, while Ch'iu Chin assumed control of the Ta-t'ung Academy and carried on preparations for an uprising in concert with Hsü around the middle of July. (151) Ch'iu Chin, however had incurred the enmity of the gentry in Shao-hsing because of her emancipation and her military dress. (152)

At this stage the plans of the revolutionaries went awry. One of the party members was arrested in Shanghai and happening to be a friend of a leading Kuang-fu-hui member, Li Hsiung-yang, he was able to divulge the society's secrets. Tuan-fang immediately passed word to En-ming including the information that

(150) Ibid., 17-18.
(151) Ibid., 28-9, 33-4.
(152) Ibid., 41.
a revolutionary had managed to smuggle himself into government service. The unsuspecting governor instructed Hsü Hsi-ling to investigate the matter! The secret was out and Hsü decided to strike early. The time chosen was when En-ming and other officials visited the police academy to inspect the drill. The plan was to kill En-ming and the other officials. Unluckily for Hsü and his comrades, they shot confusedly and only En-ming was wounded fatally; the others managed to flee. With a band of some thirty people Hsü raided the military store but by this time government troops arrived in pursuit and a battle ensued. A dozen or so revolutionaries lost their lives and Hsü was caught and killed. (153)

Before being killed, Hsü Hsi-ling was closely interrogated by the officials about the organization and purpose of the revolutionaries. Hsü said that he alone was responsible for what had happened. He said that he and Sun Yat-sen did not have common principles and that Sun had not asked him to kill En-ming. Asked why he had killed En-ming who had been his benefactor, Hsü replied that En-ming's was a personal favour, while his killing him was an anti-Manchu act. All the Han people who did not want to be slaves of foreigners were members of his party. The Manchus, he said, were concentrating all power in the centre under the garb of constitutionalism. He wanted to kill all Manchus and traitors and revealed that after En-ming he planned to kill Tuan-fang, T'ieh-liang and others to avenge the Han people. (154)

(153) Ibid., 37-40.

(154) Tsao Ya-p'o, n. 64, 220-2.
Ch'iu Chin in the meantime had visited Shanghai and on her return, for some unknown reason, changed the date of the uprising from the middle to the end of July. The secret leaked out as some of the gentry, who hated Ch'iu Chin, informed the prefect who requested the governor to despatch troops to Shao-hsing. Ch'iu Chin was warned by the Hangchow students about the impending arrival of government troops but refused to make good her escape and was arrested and put to death. The Manchu officials resorted to a policy of severe repression and over a hundred revolutionaries lost their lives while many innocent people were implicated and put to death. (155) Ch'iu Chin's execution - on insufficient evidence and by orders of Manchu officials - sent a wave of shock among the people of Chekiang and Anhwei and further alienated the Chinese from the Manchus.

TROUBLES OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES

By 1908 the revolutionary tide had once again reached a low ebb. It was a dark and difficult hour causing frustration among T'ung-meng-hui ranks, leaving many of them disheartened and dispirited. With the departure of Sun and other important functionaries from Tokyo, the T'ung-meng-hui headquarters then had already been greatly reduced in its effectiveness. Now Sun had been expelled from Vietnam also and for a while Sun functioned from Singapore but not long after even that sanctuary was denied him as a result of Manchu intercession. There was hardly a

(155) T'ao Ch'eng-chang, 41-2.
hospitable land in South-East Asia for this implacable revolutionary and Sun had perforce to leave for Europe and America in May 1908. The successive failures of revolts served to increase the sense of disappointment and despair. They also exposed the inherent weaknesses of the revolutionaries and the "contradictions" among them - all their temperamental, personal, and ideological differences. Ambitions of leadership, provincial suspicions and animosities and programmatic differences all came to the fore.

T'ao Ch'eng-chang, Chang Ping-lin and others, mostly originally members of the Kuang-fu-hui, who were suspicious of Southern leadership and had also little attraction for Sun's economic ideas, particularly min-sheng and equalization of land rights, raised the standard of revolt against Sun Yat-sen's leadership. They went to the South-East Asian countries and set up a branch of the Kuang-fu-hui, with Chang Ping-lin as President, in opposition to the T'ung-meng-hui. They also circulated a letter accusing Sun Yat-sen of provincialism and insincerity. While in Tokyo, they alleged, Sun says "that all the merchants in South-East Asia supported the T'ung-meng-hui and when he goes to South-East Asia he tells the merchants that all the Chinese students have joined the Party. If so many capitalists supported the Party, why wasn't ever any financial aid given to Min-pao"? (156) The letter was destroyed by the "Southern comrades" who also wrote to T'ao and Chang refuting their allegations. (157)

(156) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 78.
(157) Ibid.
The Kuang-fu-hui in South-East Asia functioned as a rival organization to the T'ung-meng-hui. It showed no hesitation in attacking Sun Yat-sen and the T'ung-meng-hui and in trying to wean away its members. The split was sharp and bitter. (158) The Kuang-fu-hui was particularly effective in its propaganda against the T'ung-meng-hui in the Dutch possession of Timur, where it had the support of an influential revolutionary, Li Kuei-chung who was an active participant in the Changsha uprising of 1904 as well as the P'ing-hsiang revolt of 1906. (159) When Sun Yat-sen sent Wang Ching-wei and Teng Tu-yu to Dutch Timur and other places in 1908 at the time of the Ho-k'ao uprising to collect funds, they were actively opposed by Kuang-fu-hui followers and their mission proved infructuous. (160) Enraged, Wang Ching-wei went to Peking to kill top-ranking Manchu officials in the true Chinese tradition of attempting a spectacular deed in order to arouse attention and check the deteriorating conditions. Wang was arrested but Manchu fear of repurcussions saved his neck and he was only put into confinement.

The bitter animosity and sharp attacks on each other continued till almost the end of 1910 when, on the strong advice of Huang Hsing, Li Kuei-chung decided to sink differences with the T'ung-meng-hui and work unitedly for their common cause, and the two organizations again co-operated with each other both

(158) Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, n. 13, III, 72-3.
(159) Ibid., 73.
in the Huang-hua-kang revolt at Canton in April 1911 and the revolution in October 1911. (161)

Sun Yat-sen's policy of concentrating on border provinces of China was also meeting with increasing resentment and opposition from revolutionaries from other provinces. The comrades from Hupei and Hunan were particularly chafing at the leash. The series of unsuccessful attempts in the border provinces reinforced their resentment. Unable to brook this indifference to their provinces, they decided to act on their own to push the revolutionary movement in the Yangtse area. A meeting was called in Tokyo in the spring of 1907, attended by leading revolutionaries from these areas, including Chiao Ta-feng, Chü Cheng, Liu Kung, Liu Ying, Yang Yü-ju and others and decided to form a separate organization called Kung-chin-hui (Joint Progress Association) in order to promote revolution in the Yangtse provinces. (162) Chang Po-yang was elected Chairman in the first meeting but subsequently Liu Kung replaced him. The Kung-chin-hui founders declared in their manifesto that they were choosing this name to convey the idea of joint and collective work. They would work together with any organization, whatever its name, which was like-minded. They lamented the fact that although since olden times their country had been inhabited by the Han people, the Manchus had forcibly occupied the country and enslaved the Han people. Their main goal was to expel the Manchus. The manifesto pointed

(161) Feng Tzu-yu, n. 13, 73-4.

to the corruption of Manchu officialdom and its oppression of the people. The Manchu rulers could only knuckle under to the foreigners and become their slaves. They had parted with Chinese territory and given away important rights like railway-building and mining. "The foreigner did not have a clean heart when he came to China, but if we kill the Manchus and reform the country, he would not dare deceive and oppress us any longer." (163)

Significantly, the plank of the new society substituted Sun's "equality of land rights" with that of "equality of human rights". (164) Ostensibly, the reason advanced was that since the intellectual level of the chiefs of the secret societies (which played a crucial role in revolutionary work in the Yangtse area) was low, they could not understand the "deep significance" of the principle of equalization of land rights. (165) Obviously, the Kung-chin-hui members themselves had little understanding of, or confidence in, the "deep significance" of the pledge of land equalization. This was only another indication of the diversity of beliefs and objectives among the revolutionaries.

The Kung-chin-hui, however, was not organized as a rival organization to T'ung-meng-hui, but only as its subsidiary organization. It continued to acknowledge Sun Yat-sen's leadership and to work in close liaison with the T'ung-meng-hui.

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(164) Yang Yü-ju, n. 162, 15.

(165) Chang Nan-hsien, Hunei ko-ming chih-chih lu (Shanghai, 1947) 179.
practically all its members were simultaneously members of the
parent organization and its leaders like Sun Wu and Chu Cheng
were also influential functionaries of the T'ung-meng-hui. (166)
Before the formation of the organization, some of its founders
took it up with Huang Hsing who opposed the formation of any
such parallel organization. But Sun Yat-sen was at that time in
Vietnam planning military matters. Huang Hsing could not conven-
iently discuss this matter with Sun, and therefore, had to put
it aside. (167)

These trials and tribulations of the revolutionaries,
however, proved to be temporary. The revolutionary tide began
to flow again after a pause. The continuous work of the
revolutionaries, particularly in the Central provinces combined
with Manchu blunders to bring about a situation in which a
revolution became a distinct probability. The Kung-chin-hui
members worked effectively in the Yangtse area and brought about
a new upsurge in the army and student circles. (168) They also
brought together various secret societies in the Yangtse area
and after their affairs were rearranged by Chio Ta-feng, they
rapidly gained in strength. (169)

Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min repaired to Hongkong from
South-East Asia and established an overall planning bureau for
the Southern region. They also organized a mutiny in the New

(166) Ibid.
(167) Ibid.
(168) See chapter 3, section on Crisis in the Wuhan Area.
(169) Chang Nan-hsien, n. 165, 179.
Army at Canton in February 1910 but like the previous ones, it too proved to be abortive. (170) Sun Yat-sen was in America raising finances and rearranging party affairs. He changed his four-point manifesto to a three-point one: expulsion of Tartars, establishment of the Republic of China, and realization of people's livelihood (min-sheng). On hearing the news of the defeat of the New Army revolt in Canton he returned to South-East Asia, first to Singapore and then to Penang, as noted above, and held conferences with Huang Hsing and other colleagues. He reorganized party affairs and drafted new regulations. Party fee was abolished and he appointed many more chiefs of local branches in order to attract more members to the Party. Local expenditure was divided among local members. He also proposed reorganization of the headquarters and the area bureaus. After this reorganization Party development was reported to have made fast progress. (171)

DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS AND MANCHU MEASURES

In the middle of 1905 Yuan Shih-k'ai sent a memorial requesting the Manchu Emperor to initiate preparations for a constitutional government and send a commission abroad to study the political institutions of various foreign countries. (172)


(171) Tsou Lu, n. 12, I, 78.

(172) Ts'ang Fu, n. 41, 4.
In August 1905 Tsai-tse, Tuan-fang and three other high-ranking officials were sent to Japan, America and Europe for this purpose. The ministers came back in 1906 and submitted their report to the throne. (173) In September an Imperial decree spelt out the graduated reforms beginning with reform of administration, and going on to the codification of law, broadening of education, reorganization of the financial structure, and military and police reforms. These were to serve as the basis for preparations for constitutional rule later. (174) But this precisely was the crux of the matter. The decree pontificated on the peripheral reforms but was "delightfully vague" about the heart of the matter -- the introduction of constitutional monarchy. The shadow was amplified but the substance was skirted. The decree failed to set any date for the establishment of constitutional government.

The disappointment caused by Ch'ing policy of procrastination was general and widespread. Manchu intentions were no longer beyond the pale of suspicion. The reform of administration actually undertaken was neither thoroughgoing nor significant. The Grand Council and Grand Secretariat were left untouched. Old wine was put into new bottles by renaming some of the old boards and by merging some others. The new cabinet consisted of 7 Manchus, 4 Chinese, 1 Mongol and 1 Chinese Banner/man. Furthermore, under cover of reforms the Manchu Court attempted to curb the power of the governor generals and concentrate it at the

(173) HHKM, n. 3, IV, 24-35.
(174) Kent, n. 39, 37-8; Ts'ang Fu, n. 41, 6.
centre. (175) Yuan Shih-ka'i and Chang Chih-tung were recalled to Peking as members of the Grand Council and in the name of military and financial reforms the Manchu rulers sought to strike at the roots of Viceregal power - which in the circumstances could only have meant its passing into the hands of the Manchu nobility at Peking.

People's hopes had been raised only to be dashed to the ground but the consequence was a growing demand for constitutional government whose pressure was increasingly felt by the Manchu rulers. In a number of provinces the gentry and the merchant class (the opinion that mattered at that time) established the so-called research institutes like the Shanghai Public Society for the Preparation of Constitution - apparently to "study" constitutionalism, but in effect to exert pressure on the Ch'ing rulers to be as generous with their deeds as with their promises. Petitions were sent to the Throne for the establishment of constitutional rule. Towards the end of 1907 various overseas Chinese organizations presented a united petition for practising constitutionalism and in September 1908 representatives from various provinces memorialized for early convening of a parliament (kuo-hui). (176)

Finally on 22 September 1908 the outline of the proposed constitution and laws governing the parliament were made known. (177)

(175) Ts'ang Fu, 6.
(176) Ibid., 5.
(177) Li Chien-nung, n. 40, 218-20.
The proposed outline of the constitution was a prototype of the Japanese constitution with one difference: it further circumscribed the powers of the people in relation to the Emperor. The Emperor's authority was defined in great detail and real power was proposed to continue to be centred in his hands, while the people would actually have only the right of discussion and making proposals. The outline also fixed a period of 9 years as preparatory period for the introduction of constitutional government.

There was deep disappointment at this decision of the Manchu rulers, for it revealed even to the proponents of retention of Manchu monarchy that Tz'u-hsi and her clansmen were only toying with constitutionalism. The Manchu attempt to eat the cake and still have it could hardly satisfy any section of opinion.

In the middle of November 1908 both Emperor Kuang-hsü and Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi died in quick succession. Emperor Kuang-hsü's nephew, eight year old, P'u-i succeeded to the throne and his father Prince Ch'un (Ts'ai-feng) was made Regent to the child-Emperor. One of the first consequences was the downfall of Yuan Shih-k'ai, a thorn in the eyes of Kuang-hsü's nearest relations. (178) Yuan was virtually dismissed and sent back to his native place, on the ground that he had a "foot disease".

(178) According to J.O.P. Bland and E. Blackhouse, Emperor Kuang-hsü left a will just before his death ascribing all his suffering at the hands of Tz'u-hsi to Yuan Shih-k'ai and asking for his death from his relatives. Bland and Blackhouse, n. 37, 460.
Many scholars of Chinese history have tended to take the view that the removal of Yuan Shih-k'ai from the scene at this stage was an unmitigated evil and the source of all future troubles, for was he not a progressive of the "proper proportion" and also, what was of more consequence, acceptable to the foreign powers? He was a "strong man" whose exit brought in its train instability, chaos and revolution. (179) This, however, is a rather superficial view of the developments and the balance of forces of that period. Yuan was a "progressive" only in an extremely narrow sense. He like Li Hung-chang and others was steeped in the old traditions and, as later events proved, was as ill-tuned to the needs of modern times as the Manchu rulers. He, no doubt, commanded the allegiance of many of the Pei-yang army officers but not that of the New Army in Central-South China and there was little probability of his being able to control and hold the South for the Manchu dynasty. What was disastrous, particularly from the point of view of the Ch'ing dynasty, was not the dismissal of Yuan as such but the decision of the Manchu nobility to monopolise all power in their own hands. This, coming at a time when the unifying and stabilizing presence of Tz'u-hsi had been removed, proved to be the proverbial last straw that broke the back of the dynasty.

On the assumption of his regency Tsai-feng had given the impression of his willingness to take steps for the preparation of a constitutional monarchy. In December 1908 he made it obligatory for every decree to be countersigned by the Grand

(179) Kent, n. 39, 43.
Councillors. In October 1909 the provincial assemblies were constituted and in January 1910 regulations for local government were announced. The National Assembly (Tzu-cheng-yuan) was convened in October 1910. (180) But these measures had a deceptive appearance for under their smoke-screen the regent and his brothers were actually concentrating power—chiefly military power—in their own hands. Acting on the age-old adage that he who controls the divisions also controls the country, Tsai-feng himself became Chief of Staff while his two brothers, Tsai-tao and Tsai-hsun headed the army and the navy respectively. (181) While they shilly-shallyed with the introduction of constitutional monarchy, the nobles of the royal house were taking no chances so far as real power was concerned.

But the more the Manchu rulers procrastinated, the more incessant became the demand in the country for an early inauguration of constitutional government. The provincial assemblies became the centres of struggle for constitutional government. In February 1910 they despatched representatives to petition the Throne in this regard and in May they mobilized provincial governments, chambers of commerce and overseas Chinese for similar petitions to the Peking Court. (182) The Tzu-cheng-yuan meeting in October 1910 also came into almost immediate conflict

(180) Huang Hung-ch'ao, Ch'ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo, portion reproduced in HHKM, n. 3, 4, 54; Ts'ang Fu, Min-kuo cheng-tang shih, as in HHKM, IV, 67-70.

(181) Powell, n. 120, 264-6.

(182) Ts'ang Fu, n. 180, 69-70.
with the Manchu rulers and demanded the convocation of a parliament and establishment of responsible cabinet. Even some of the governor-generals joined in the chorus of their demand and petitions were pouring in from various quarters. (183)

There was a groundswell of opinion in the country for early establishment of a constitutional government which the Imperial family could ignore only at its peril. Finally the Court made a gesture of acknowledging the force of the popular demand and in a decree in November 1910 the preparatory period of nine years for the inauguration of constitutional monarchy was shortened to three years, and the time for the convening of parliament was set at 1913. But this concession could hardly satisfy public opinion which was pressing for an immediate establishment of constitutional rule. At the same time whatever effect this concession was calculated to have was nullified by the announcement of a new cabinet abolishing the old cabinet, the old Grand Council, as well as the Tzu-cheng-yuan in April 1911. The new cabinet had only four Chinese members as against eight Manchus - four of them from the royal family - and one MongolianBannerman. (184) The scales were heavily tipped against the Chinese and the result could only be the aggravation of racial tension, disillusionment of those who stood for constitutional monarchy, and the strengthening of the revolutionary cause.

(183) Ibid.
(184) Li Chien-nung, n. 40, 234.