Chapter- 3
THE UNITED STATES - PAKISTAN RELATIONS:
PERCEIVED COMPULSIONS AND REALITIES

The emergence of Pakistan as an independent nation was the culmination of decades of debate and divisions among Muslims in the British India regarding their collective future. The privileged status that the Muslims found themselves under the Mughal rule was gradually disappearing with the consolidation of British rule in India. However gradually in the course of the nationalist movement a section of Muslim leaders realized the fact that they owed a special identity that ethnic and territorial nationalism, centered primarily on the Hindu majority in India, would erase over time, as such uniting under the banner of All India Muslim League led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, these Muslim nationalist asserted that India’s Muslim constituted as separate nation which led the creation of a separate country ‘Pakistan’. But soon after its birth the Pakistani leaders were confronted with an uncertain future in the wake of the events of post-partition, Kashmir, mighty size and resource of India etc. Thus from its very inception Pakistan was fully aware about its weak military, diplomatic, geographical, strategic position from India and in order to maintain its status-quo with India, Pakistan was desperately in search for an ally in and outside of the region. Similarly it was the era when after the war United States had shedded off its policy of isolation and was one of the key players in the cold war international politics, fighting against communism which led the division of the global politics into two blocks. Thus it was Washington’s desperate move to curb and contain communism and Pakistan’s search for a super power ally for the sake of its survival and settlement of scores with India, brought the two nations closer to each other and what resulted was a relationship of necessity between the two.

Where Pakistan has often benefited from the American tendency to ignore and focus only on immediate goals, similarly the Americans have often perceived that building up Pakistan’s economic and military capacity provides them leverage even after periodically finding out the limit of United States influence. Thus both sides have their own perceptions towards each other, which can be traced back to the emergence of Pakistan as an independent nation. Pakistan’s motive in pursuing its alliance with the United States was driven by its quest for security against its much larger neighbour, India. Pakistan has repeatedly turned to the US as its most significant source of expensive weapon and economic aid. Although in its hope for winning US’s support for Pakistan’s regional aim, Pakistani leaders have assured US officials
that they share the United States’ global security concerns, Pakistan has been repeatedly disappointed because the United States does not share Pakistan’s fear of Indian hegemony in South Asia. For its part the United States also chased a different threat when it assumed that, over time, its assistance and support to Pakistan would endanger a sense of security among Pakistanis, leading to a change in Pakistanis priority and objectives. The United States initially poured money into Pakistan in hope of building a major fighting force that could assist in defending Asia against communism. However Pakistan repeatedly failed to live up to its promises to the United States by not providing any of the troops that the United States fought against communist forces instead they used American weapon in its war and settling its scores with India.\footnote{Haqqani Husain; \textit{Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, The United Sates and an Epic History of Misunderstanding}; Public Affairs; New York; 2013; pp-2}

Furthermore the United States hope of persuading Pakistan to give up or curtail its nuclear weapons programme or to stop using Jihadi militants as proxies in regional conflicts similarly proved to be futile.

Over the decade there has been a misconception that the United States -Pakistan relationship emerged during the period of 1950’s as the mere demand of security reasons. However the reality tends into something else, in fact it was Quaid-i-Azam Md. Ali Jinnah, who for the first time foresaw the urgent need to build up and equip its armed forces since September 1947. It has been speculated that Pakistan agreed its defense share “blocked by India in preparation for an armed conflict it had planned to inflict on the young sate in October 1947 and to smother Pakistan in its crib before it can get going on a practical basis”\footnote{Hussain, Noor A; \textit{Pakistan-U.S. Security relations: Arms Sales, Bases and Nuclear Issue in} Rose and Husain eds; \textit{United Sates-Pakistan Relations}; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 1.}. Moreover Jinnah was also aware of the historical threat from the North Western region especially doubting the intentions of Stalin’s Moscow, who might have questioned the very concept of Pakistan and had instigated Kabul to question the legality of the Durand Line which had been reaffirmed buy five successive Afghan Regime. Though in the same year Quaid-i-Azam send a special emissary to US but unfortunately it evoked a very little response from Washington. Nevertheless President Truman in his message to Jinnah on their Independence Day avowed that ‘I wish to assure you that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm
friendship and goodwill of the United States of America.\textsuperscript{301} Meanwhile a comprehensive effort of the Joint Strategic planning committee on South and South West Asia approved by the Joint Chief Staff on April 29, 1947, was materializing. The assessment had stressed the strategic importance of the area ‘not only because of the existence of great oil resource and processing facilities, but also because of its possibilities for direct contact with our ideological enemies.’\textsuperscript{302} At about the same time Defense Secretary, James Forrestal was deeply concerned about the Soviet threat to the oil producing states of West Asia and had talked of the possibilities of the emerging Arab-Israel conflict and its impact on ‘other parts of the world where U.S. interest were affected such as Egypt, Pakistan and North Africa.’\textsuperscript{303} Secretary of State’s George Marshall, in a memorandum to President Harry Truman on July 17, 1947, referring to Pakistan said: ‘Pakistan with a population of seventy million people will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world.’\textsuperscript{304}

\textbf{(3.1) Post World War World Order and Status of Pakistan:}

The post World War II international system was marked by the cold war and an intense super power rivalry. Where on one hand the United States entered into security arrangement with, a provided economic and military assistance to, Western Europe, Turkey, Iraq (till 1958), Iran, Pakistan and a number of other Asian States as a part of their strategy to contain and stop the spread of Communism and to isolate the growing power of Soviet and China. Similarly on the other hand to counter the rise of US, USSR also started cultivating its strong hold and connections with the nations of Europe and Asia. The impact of this super power rat race and

\textsuperscript{301} Department of State Bulletin No. 336, August. 17,1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947); in Hussain, Noor A; Pakistan-U.S. Security relations: Arms sales, Bases and Nuclear Issue in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 34.; pp 1.

\textsuperscript{302} JCS 1769/1, dated April 24, 1947, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1 (1947): 738-50 in Husain A Noor’; Pakistan- US Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, and Nuclear Issue, in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 2.

\textsuperscript{303} Millis Walter; eds; The Forrestal Diaries ; New York; Viking Press; 1951; pp-440

\textsuperscript{304} Memorandum to President Harry S Truman; Papers of Harry Truman Library, Independence; Missouri; in Husain A Noor’; Pakistan- US Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, and Nuclear Issue, in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 2.
rivalry to control the part of world became so intense that the foreign policies of other nuclear states especially in Asia and Africa, Latin America and Middle East were studied with reference to or from the standpoint of, the super power policies. Neither these independent states were able to remain aloof from the power politics of the two blocs nor could they exercise individual initiatives and judgment on world affairs.

This change in the world politics post world war during the decade of 1960’s due to decolonization brought forth a series of changes in the international politics as well as in the domestic politics of nations in Asia and Africa, Latin America and Middle East. Three major development which were observed due to this were; First, these newly bron nations for the sake of their national interest and preservation of national security got themselves entangled in the power bloc politics of the two super-powers; Secondly, these states diverge in colonial experiences, size, resource, orientations and culture making the international system heterogeneous and, finally these newly born states outnumbered the traditional and well-established members of the international system.

However certain vital developments were taking place during the particular period. On one hand US’s inability was showed on issues relating to bowing down the North Vietnamese, overthrow of the pro-American Pahalavi dynasty in Iran and the Islam oriented upsurge led by Imam Khomeini, proved that there was a limit to what a super power could do for its ally in the Third World. Similarly, the Afghanistan crisis and the Soviet invasion, persistence of civil strife in Africa and Iraq-Iran war demonstrated that some problems have local and regional dynamics which could not be regulated by the super powers, although they have at one time or other have supported and maintained one side or other to protect and promote their own interest.

Likewise factors like the US-Soviet rift, rise of newly independent decision making actors like Western Europe, Japan, China and the birth of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) etc were of no less significant. Although none of these could hamper or challenge the predominance of the two superpowers but in the course of time these factors posed some serious challenges for the two super powers to dominate the international system as they used to do it in the early years, during the late 40’s and the Cold War era; they were now compelled to negotiate with the lesser actors rather than direct and command them as these newly independent nations played a very vital role in the strategic policies.
In the given environment Pakistan like most of the Third World nations, recognized the fact that it is neither feasible nor sensible to stay isolated in the present day interdependence and complex world. Rather for the sake of the preservation and maintenance of its national security and national interest and to pursue its domestic socio-economic development it needs to interact with other sovereign states, international and regional organizations and supranational actors. Thus Pakistan felt it extremely desirable and necessary to manipulate the immediate international environment to its advantage or at least reduce its vulnerability to external pressure. On the similar tune United States was desperately searching for an ally in South Asian Region to curb and contain communism from its roots. The following are some of the major events and incidents which actually bridged the gap between the two nations.

(3.2) Pakistan’s Fear Psychosis:

Among the several multidimensional and heterogeneous factors and reasons which made Pakistan so close with the international regime especially the US since from the time of its birth, one important factor remains its ‘search for security’. Pakistan’s first and foremost focus has always been a search for an ally which could provide security to its sovereign national identity, not only from the challenges of external threat but from internal factors like feeble politico-economic institutions, ethnicity, language, region, economic inequality and religious sectarianism, and inefficiency of political leadership to perform its requisite function in an efficacious manner.

Pakistan’s external security dimension was however related to the distrust and acrimony that developed between Indian and Pakistan in the early years of independence which reinforced the feeling in Pakistan that India wants to use its size, resources, technological advancement and military superiority to reduce Pakistan to a status of vassal state. There three main factors which intensified Pakistan’s fear psychosis from India: first Pakistan suffered from a number of security handicaps in relation to its neighboring nation India. Moreover Pakistan feared that the open borders and lack of territorial depth might make it easy for India to move their troops and lodge a heavy armored attack on it. This geographical contiguity was further more serious and handicapped in the pre 1971 period. Secondly, the clear-cut traditional military sheer and superiority of India over Pakistan in terms of man power, weapon and equipment, industrialization, area, location and especially defense industry made Pakistan realize the fact since independence that India might challenge its geographical existence. Thirdly, was the leadership potential and pretentions India always exhibited in South Asia in the tune of
regional peace and stability through India’s preponderance gave Pakistan leaders the feeling of insecurity with them.

Moreover, it was not only the Indian standpoint and Pakistan’s feeling toward the situation rather there were also some other factors which were playing a very important role during the period of time which led Pakistan to stick to its ideals of search for security. Apart from this the claim by Kabul’ irredentist claim on its territory and the patronage of Soviet and India to such claims further exaggerated its problems. Thus Pakistan’s external security dilemmas were centered on two main factors- counterbalancing the mighty military superiority of India and the border claim of Afghanistan. These developments were further more aggravated with the Communist invasion in Afghanistan in December 1979. The rising Soviet pressure through the deployment of its troops on Pakistan’s border and its overt and covert support to the pro groups in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan looked more credible than ever and thus Pakistan was in serious state of affair.\(^{305}\)

Pakistan in this situation was desperately in search for a strong all weathered ally for the preservation and maintaining of its national security and to overcome its security predicaments which it got by aligning itself with the western led power bloc. Moreover the pro-western orientations of Pakistani elite and leaders and especially the military played a very decisive role in shaping such strategy of alignment. This led to Pakistan’s participation in the US- sponsored defense pacts which made it possible for Pakistan to obtain weapon and economic assistance.\(^{306}\)

### (3.3) Indian threat to Pakistan’s Security:

Since its independence as an independent nation Pakistan has judged India as its primary enemy in the continent. Although it also had outstanding border issues and domestic problems too with its neighboring nation Afghanistan but those problems were considered as mere irritants. Rather the Pakistani ruling class, considered India as a threat. Not only were its border problems complicated, but the inherited border between the two nations constituted a major source of security problem among them. Further Pakistan’s strategic environment was in such a way condition by its perception of a security threat from India that it is still

\(^{305}\) Rizvi Askari, Hasan; *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A study of foreign policy*; MacMillan Press; Great Britain; 1993; pp 10.

perceived as a major threat to Pakistan’s continuation as an independent state. Thus it is very much clear that a natural balance has not existed between the two nations. Moreover the creation of Pakistan was a result of conflicting Hindu and Muslim nationalist movements. The polarization occurred between India and Pakistan was neither because of the irreconcilable incongruities or any deep routed animosity between the two rather it was because of the separate identity and culture. However the large loss of life and property at the time of the partition created certain problems for Pakistan which played a significant role in the development of its defense and security policies, which was mainly because of the apathetic and hastily desire and departure of British from the subcontinent. This desperate withdrawal of the British left various issues unsettled which exacerbated the mutual distrust between the two nations like refugee rehabilitation, financial and military assets, princely state dispute, Indus water sharing etc (The previous chapter deals with these issues in a detailed manner). Looking into the facts there was a prevailing sting of through among some scholars and political leadership that once the passion of Pakistan gets subsided, Pakistan would come back into the folds of India. This idea was further emboldened by expressions and sentiment which were publicly and privately remarked by various important Indian leaders. Mr. Acharya Kriplani, who was the President of Congress in 1947 declared. ‘Neither the Congress nor the nations has given up its claim of a united India’ for him the day of creation of Pakistan was a ‘day of sorrow and destruction for India’ Similarly Sardar Patel Indian Home Minister, emphasized that sooner or later ‘we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country’. In the later years, Congress leader openly conceded that they had accepted Pakistan with mental reservations. Jawaharlal Nehru for instance further told United

307 Lawrence Ziring, South Asian Tangles and Triangles, in Lawrence Ziring (eds) The Subcontinent in the World Politics: India its Neighbour and the Great Power; Praeger; New York, 1982, pp.29

308 Roy, A; The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal Princeton University Press; Princeton, NJ; 1983, pp-64-67

309 Khan, Mohammed Ayub; Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography; OUP; London; 1967; pp 115-116

310 Khan, Mohammed Ayub; Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography; OUP; London; 1967; pp 115-116

311 Khan, Mohammed Ayub; Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography; OUP; London; 1967; pp 115-116
Nations representative Joseph Korbel: “We want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. If it will be in four, five, ten years I don’t know”.  

Nehru also once stated that “Pakistan is a medieval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It should not have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind the foolish idea of Mohammad Ali Jinnah”.  

Maulana Azad also once reviled that among others Sardar Patel: ‘was convinced that the new state of Pakistan was not viable and could not last. He thought that the acceptance of Pakistan would teach the Muslim League a bitter lesson”  

Moreover not only were the leaders and policy makers in India maintained and articulated their thinking on the birth and future of Pakistan but at one point of time even Gandhi also had the notion that “We Muslims and Hindus are interdependent on one another: we cannot get along without each other. The Muslim League will ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Nehru to come back and he will take them back”.  

In this regards, relations between India and Pakistan has turned into having an obsessive antipathy toward each other. As C.A Salahuddin observed that there are ‘complex of social, religious, historical, political and physiological factors all tending in a sinister combination to antagonize the two states.’  

Even Arshed Husain the former Foreign Mister of Pakistan also hold the same view as he says that ‘I am not exaggerating when I say that in  

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312 Sherwani, Latif Ahmed; India, China and Pakistan; Council for Pakistan Studies; Karachi; 1967, pp 46

313 Pakistan’s Search for Security; The Concept, Vol. 3, No. 1; Islamabad, January 1983, pp46 in in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 33.

314 Azad, Abdul Kalam; India Wins Freedom; Orient Longman; New Delhi; 1959;pp207

315 Pakistan’s Search for Security; The Concept, Vol. 3, No. 1; Islamabad, January 1983, pp:46 in Hussain,Noor A; Pakistan-U.S. Security relations: Arms sales, Bases and Nuclear Issue in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 33.

316 Salahuddin, C.A.; Pakistan’s Policy in the United Nations on the Political Settlement of Italian Colonies; Journal of Social Science; Columbia University; Vol-; Winter 198; pp72; Hussain,Noor A; Pakistan-U.S. Security relations: Arms sales, Bases and Nuclear Issue in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California;
the whole range of Pakistan’s international relation, these with India constitute the most important sphere.’

As per Pakistani political analyst soon after independence, Pakistan’s policy of non-commitment developed some resentment over western powers’ preferential treatment towards India, which was reflected in Commonwealth decisions to let India remain a member regardless of its Republican character, and the invitation of US President Harry S. Truman to Indian P.M Jawaharlal Nehru. However was very much desirous of enhancing her importance for the western world and the Soviet Union intended to exploit this situation to bring Pakistan out of the Western orbit. To achieve its basic foreign policy objectives, Pakistan began a desperate search to make fast and firm friend. Keith Callard described that situation of Pakistan as “…a tendency to look for blood brothers rather than plain friends.”

It first turned to Britain and other members of the Commonwealth, hoping that these might be particularly helpful in pressurizing India to settle Kashmir and other outstanding disputes with Pakistan. But unfortunately this hope was shortly lived and it came as a disappointing letter for Pakistan.

(3.4) Containment of Communism and the US-Pak nexus:

Pakistan’s desire for allies was not however fulfilled and its relations with India were strained to breaking point. Meanwhile during this point of time it moved toward the nations of the Muslim world in belief that it would be supported because it had opposed the establishment of Israel and has maintained a strong vocal and cry for the Islamic cause. In 1949, an

317 Hussain Arshad; *Pakistan Affairs Supplement*; Pakistan Council of Foreign Affairs; Karachi; June 1968; pp-07

318 Hussain,Noor A; *Pakistan-U.S. Security relations: Arms sales, Bases and Nuclear Issue in Pakistan-U.S. Security relations: Arms sales, Bases and Nuclear Issue in Rose and Husain eds; *United Sates-Pakistan Relations*; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California;; pp 34.

319 Callard, Keith; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Interpretation*; Institute of Pacific Studies Relations; New York; 1957; pp12

320 Britain and the other members of the commonwealth…avoided the discussion on matters in dispute between member countries. No one wished to give offence to India, especially as the Commonwealth had no machinery for enforcing its action. None of the argument related to Kashmir or any other dispute between India and Pakistan turned out as fruitful and satisfactory for Pakistan.

321 *United Nation General Assembly Official Records (1950-1960); The UN library Documents; UN Documentation: General Assembly; http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/or*
International Economic Conference of Muslim country was convened in Karachi and Pakistani Finance Minister urged the Muslim countries to develop a system of “Collective Security Bargain” and “form a group of nations that by natural cooperation in economic filed are able to help themselves by assisting each other”.322 He also added that “we don’t want to be dragged into the whirlpool of power politics and we have no implicit faith in the western democratic system nor can we commit ourselves to communism.”323 On the diplomatic level too Pakistan also exploited spiritual and moral affinities to attract the Islamic world but unfortunately in this case also it did not get that reciprocated response which it expected. Many of the Muslim nations seemed more interested in cultivating their friendship with India rather than Pakistan. The most disappointing era came when no Islamic nation supported or offered any over whelming support to Pakistan’s cry for Kashmir.324

However the regional geo-politics started turning in favour of Pakistan’s long drawn security concern since from the mid of 1949, as American policy makers started taking Pakistani concern seriously, which was visible in an internal report prepared by the South Asia section of the Department of States in November 1949 where it illustrated a slight but a very significant shift in the US attitude towards Pakistan. The report pointed out that in her short history, Pakistan has demonstrated a high degree of political stability and vitality and was seen as emerging as the strongest military power in Asia between Japan and Turkey.325 The report also highlighted the vital position of Pakistan being its close proximity to the Soviet heartland and was said to be the best possible and closest base available near the Soviet. Observing the proximity of Pakistan and its closestness of relations with the oil producing Middle East nation of the world the report also focused that the Pakistani army consisting of many of the best units of the Second World War was fully capable to shoulder the entire

322 The New York Times (26, November, 1949); pp 01 in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 34.

323 The New York Times (26, November, 1949); pp 01 in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 34.

324 Hussain, Noor A; Pakistan-U.S. Security relations: Arms sales, Bases and Nuclear Issue in Rose and Husain eds; United Sates-Pakistan Relations; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; 1985;California; pp 34.

burden of defending the sub-continent from the spread of communism. The report prepared by the State Department however stated that even though the American realized that Pakistan was totally dependent on the outside world for her defense requirement and finally it concluded that if Pakistan was not assisted by the United States, then not only could the US not expect any Pakistani support in the future, but also might lead Pakistan to sign a deal with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{326}

On June 1949 Liaquat Ali Khan received an invitation from Moscow during his trip in Tehran. However before he could accept the invitation and establish a diplomatic relation of friendship between the two, Pakistan accepted the invitation of United States which created considerable good-will for Pakistan and laid the basis for future economic assistance. Meanwhile the things were seen a bit favorable in the side of the growing relation between US and Pakistan as it was the same year which brought a thaw in the Indo-America relations in the wake of Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s official visit to the States on October 1949. Basically after the PRC got established and the growing clout of Soviet Union in Asia the American had a hope that Nehru can be the best trump card in the subcontinent for countering Communism. Unfortunately Nehru seriously disappointed his hosts by refusing to agree to any pact or formal military agreement with the US. As a repercussion of which when US President Harry Truman met the US ambassador of Pakistan Avara Warren he said that he had a ‘disagreeable’ time with Nehru and felt that the attitudes adopted in the Indo-Pak dispute were ‘silly’. He went to say that he had not been able to observe ‘any inclination on the part of Mr. Nehru to be reasonable in the Kashmir Dispute.’\textsuperscript{327} On the other hand Truman was very much inspired by the attitude that Pakistani foreign Minister Khan maintained towards the US. Inspired by the ‘apparent reasonableness of the Pakistani attitude’ he assured for looking forward to meet Liaquat Ali Khan and work out for the settlement of Indo-Pak dispute and specifically the Kashmir Issue.\textsuperscript{328} On May 1950 during his official visit to United


\textsuperscript{327} Bajwa, Farooq Naseem; \textit{Pakistan and the West: First decade 1947-195}; OUP; Karachi; 1996; pp 15.

States, Khan told in the National Press Club of Washington that: “Our strongest interests, therefore, are firstly the integrity of Pakistan.”\(^{329}\) His speeches were later published by the Harvard University Press under the title “Pakistan the Heart of Asia”. Liaquat had a high level talks with the President, Secretary of States, Defense Secretary and senior Pentagon Officers, and he created a favorable impression on them who had feared that Pakistan like India too will adopt a neutralist stance. Liaquat stated his countries desire that it would maintain stability in Asia ‘Stability in Asia is not only important for our freedom but also for the maintenance of the world peace’.\(^{330}\) This attitude of Liaquat and hint of Pakistan’s desire to be allied with US in some way or other made the Americans clear about the Pakistani intentions and they were highly inspired and satisfied by it. Later on, this same view was maintained by the successors of PM Liaquat Ali Khan like President Ayub Khan, PM Zulfiqar A Bhutto and others who maintained that the basic principle and objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy remained to be concentrated on security, development and preservation of its ideology. Thus gradually it was basically due to the relationship of necessity that brought the two nations of the world closer to each other.

(3.5) Role of United States in the Kashmir Dispute:

During the partition of the Indian Sub-continent; Lord Mount Batten spelled out in May 1947, that the Indian princely States theoretically would regain their full independence after the termination of British Raj. However the princes were strongly urged upon to join either India or Pakistan after taking into account their geographical position and the religious composition of their population. Jammu and Kashmir with its strategic location in the mountainous north most point of the sub-continent was the largest of the 564 Indian Princely states, it had a Hindu ruler with 80 percent of its Muslim population. In view of Kashmir’s large Muslim majority and the fact that the State’s transportation was economically linked with Pakistan, it was highly expected that it would join and accede to Pakistan. The Hindu maharaja however was hesitant to take its decision before India and Pakistan became independent and hung the issue of its accession. In order to maintain the status quo, the Maharaja jailed the two major political groups of its states- the conservative Muslim conference, which favour for joining Pakistan and the leftist Nation Conference who

\(^{329}\) Quoted in Liaquat Ali Khan; *Pakistan: The Heart of Asia*; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1950; pp 11

\(^{330}\) Khan Liaquat Ali; *Pakistan, the Heart of Asia*; Harvard University Press; 1950; pp.83
expressed its desire of joining India having a close link with the Indian National Congress. By the fall of 1947, Hindu-Muslim communal riots and violence spilled over from the Pakistani borders of Kashmir. On October 1947, the rebels proclaimed the state of Azad (Free) Kashmir and sought to overthrow the Maharaja. The rebels which were fully supported physically materially and financially by the Pakistani army, which was under at that point retreating British Army generals assisted by some 2000 armed Pathan tribe forces from the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Their goal was to capture the city of Srinagar and the surrounding Vale, the political heart of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{331} The panicked Maharaja fled from his capital on October 26, 1947 and sought New Delhi’s help. The same day, he signed the instrument of accession to India. India, accepting the accession the Indian government indicated that Kashmir’s ultimate fate would be decided by a plebiscite to be held after the raiders were driven out of the occupied Kashmir area and the fighting between the two is ended.\textsuperscript{332}

However, unfortunately neither India nor Pakistan was able to sort out the problem and resolve the Kashmir dispute bilaterally. Finally the Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to Governor General Mountbatten’s suggestion and brought the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council. Senior British Officials-Commonwealth Relations Secretary Philip Noel-Baker, UN Representative Sir Alexander Cadogen, and Lord Hasting Ismay, formerly Mountbatten’s chief of staff- met Acting Secretary of State’s Lovett in Washington in January 1948, before the start of Security Council deliberations of Kashmir and urged America to step forward to take the lead and settle the dispute.\textsuperscript{333} But unfortunately Secretary of State’s Lovett stepped back as it believed that the United States is “spread very thinly in its

\textsuperscript{331} Kux, Dennis; \textit{The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies}; OUP; New York; 2002; pp22.

\textsuperscript{332} The extent of Pakistan’s involvement in these events had long been disputed. The British high commission in Karachi, Sir Lawrence Grafftey- Smith informed the BBC that he found no proof of Pakistan’s Central Government planning in the incursion. However he argued that ‘likely the individual Pakistan officials up to the level of District Commissioner (in Peshawar), did back the raiders by furnishing them with petrol trucks, etc.’ (Embassy New Delhi to the States Department, December 29, 1947, 845.F.00/1-248, DSR, NA. ; in Kux’ Disenchanted Allies)

Even such believe was also made by the U.K. Foreign office in a message to its diplomatic mission that the Pakistani authorities in the NWFP “No doubt helped them with respect of supplies and transport….and the Pakistani Government did not attempt to stop (the) incursion. They may have known in advance what was intended but there is no evidence that it occurred on their initiatives.” (Foreign office to British Diplomatic Missions, January, 2, 1948; DO 22/3162, Public Record Office (PRO); London; in Kux’ Disenchanted Allies)

\textsuperscript{333} Kux, Dennis; \textit{The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies}; OUP; New York; 2002; pp23.
present commitments” and argued that the U.S. involvement in the issue might attract Soviet interest and it will make issues more complicated.\textsuperscript{334} It should be stated here that there are multiple versions of the genesis of Kashmir crisis and the role of western powers in it.

Thus followed by the lead of the British the American Diplomat in the Security Council met on early 1948. The UN deliberations revolved around four major concerns: the control of the Kashmir administration during the plebiscite (Pakistan wanted this in UN hands; India insisted that Sheik Abdullah remain in charge); the nature and pace of the withdrawal of Indian and Azad Kashmir forces; India’s desire to label Pakistan an aggressor and Pakistan’s wish to condemn its overall treatment by India. Like India and Pakistan neither Washington nor London wished or favoured an independent Kashmir. Apart from worrying about further Balkanization of British India, there was a concern that Kashmir’s political and economic weakness, as well as its strategic location, would invite communist interference and fuel further the regional stability. As such by March 1948, the Security Council had settled on a draft resolution proposed by China on the Kashmir issue. However India, but not Pakistan favoured the proposal because it left Sheikh Abdullah in office during the plebiscite in conveying his views to the US embassy, Jinnah stressed that a fair plebiscite was impossible if Abdullah, “a Congress Quisling” remained in power\textsuperscript{335}. The Governor General went on to beg the United States not to be misled by the British claims that ‘they knew the situation better than we did.’\textsuperscript{336}

The main reason for such an attitude of Pakistan was mainly because of the fact that since its inception Pakistan’s only dilemma was to strengthen its security and modernize its armed forces in a tune with its developmental programmes. As a weak state it could not physically coerce with India to fulfill its strategy on Kashmir. Pakistan’s basic aim was to offset India’s military superiority and mobilize world opinion in order to compel India to hold a fabricated

\textsuperscript{334} Memorandum of conversation of meeting with Acting Secretary of State’s Lovett, January 10, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol.5, Pt.1 pp276-78. In Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp23.

\textsuperscript{335} Embassy Karachi to States Department, March 1, 1948, 845F.003-148, DSR,NA in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp25.

plebiscite in Kashmir which would favour. And realizing its inability to counter India it used all available diplomatic channels in order to seek redress in the Kashmir issue. As, for Pakistan the acquisition of Kashmir is important to justify the two nation theory and its creation as an Islamic state. Moreover economically Kashmir contained major rivers-Chenab, Indus and the Jhelum upon which Pakistan agriculture was determined. Due to these factors Pakistan became the bone of contention and touchstone of its security policy and it tended to judge its international friends and enemies against the Kashmir issue.

However despite of all the endeavors which Pakistan did for tilting the decision of UN towards its favour but in the end the United States joined Britain, Belgium, Canada and China to support a modified formulation of the problem and the Security Council unanimously decided and adopted the resolution on April 21st, 1948, which neither made satisfied India nor Pakistan. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan argued that the “Kashmir resolution showed complete lack of understanding (of) Oriental psychology, (and) that as long as Abdullah remained in charge (of the) Kashmir Government (the) Populace would not dare risk voting against him”337; and this iconic resolution of UNSC became an symbol of Pakistan’s policy in the succeeding years.

On September 11, 1948 Quaid e Azam of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Jinnah died after falling seriously ill and he left behind him politically instable Pakistan. Meanwhile the UN worked hard to achieve a cease-fire and lay the ground for a plebiscite in Kashmir. United States’ Klahr Huddle was made a member of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and he had little to choose in between the two. US policy was to end the threat that the Kashmir dispute posed to peace, not to take side between India and Pakistan or to pass judgment about who was to blame. Moreover, in October 1948, Liaquat met with the Secretary of State, Marshall during the UN General Assembly secession. Liaquat outlined the problems his country faced, stressed that it was unthinkable that Pakistan could fall prey to the communism since (communism was) against Islam and urged US to provide economic assistance for Pakistan and the nations of the Middle East as it did for European nations. Moreover the Prime Minister thought the Kashmir problem could be solved by a plebiscite.

but making sure that there must be no coercive force present. Marshall was highly inspired by the anti Soviet and positive attitude of Liaquat toward the peaceful solution of the regional problem.

Finally on December 11, 1948, after reaching a consensus on the cease fire arrangement were made on the appointment of high level administrator. Both nations accepted the UN plan of cease fire and on January 1, 1949 the cease fire between India and Pakistan was declared and a call for plebiscite was made. On March 1949, UN Secretary Trygve Lie was appointed as the administrator of the Kargil plebiscite. But soon it became evident that reaching a peaceful agreement would not be easy. India started raising a variety of problems including its desire to disarm and disband all Azad Kashmiri forces and to challenge Pakistan’s continued control over Gilgit and Hunza territories in North Kashmir which had joined Pakistan on their own initiative August 1947. After struggling without success for six months, UNCIP proposed that India and Pakistan submit their differences to arbitration. President Truman endorsed the idea in personal appeals to Liaquat and Nehru. Truman’s message to Liaquat was to the point: “I am sure you will agree that peace and cooperation between your Country and India are essential to the continuance of social and political progress on the subcontinent. The Kashmir dispute is the greatest threat to such peace and cooperation. My government is therefore deeply interested in an early settlement of this dispute....... In the interest of your own nation and in the interest of the world community, I urge to accept the recommendation for arbitration of truce terms”.

Liaquat agreed to arbitration and in a reply to the US President he said that “had the proposal not hinged around the eminent personality of Admiral Nimitz and had it not been so emphatically sponsored by the President of United States my government would have felt considerable hesitation in accepting it.......” However Nehru, turned down the proposal of

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Truman, he claimed that the basic problem was the anti-Indian attitude of the Pakistani leadership which had made the matter so serious. Moreover he said that he was not opposed to arbitration but rather he found the proposal; insufficiently ‘precise and defined’. The particular incident marked an important historical milestone the US perception of the Kashmir Dispute. Until, before the incident the Americans found it little to choose between the conduct of India and Pakistan and the view the Indian leadership maintained spurned up a series of proposals to remove impediments to the plebiscite. Moreover the perception also came to the US official that Prime Minister Nehru, giving his family roots as a member of the Kashmiri Brahmin community, was the principal barrier to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This perception grew within the US policy maker as the Indian leadership did not bow down to the US administrators for containing Communism and made Kashmir more an issue of ego. McGhee commented that “Nehru was the stumbling block” and “if he had cooperated, the Kashmir problem could have easily been solved”.

The final phase of stalemate on Kashmir stated in the year May 1950’s while Liaquat had visited the US rejecting the invitation of Soviet Union. It was during this time that Sir Owen Dixon was taking up another UN effort to resolve the dispute. After shuttling between Karachi and Delhi Dixon concluded that a statewide plebiscite was no longer a feasible approach. Instead he put forward an idea of settlement which was forwarded by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary-General of India’s Ministry of External Affairs. The proposal was given to both the nations to keep the portions of Kashmir that they have controlled, except for the Vale, where a plebiscite or some other arrangement, possibly partition, would settle matters. After considerable difficulty, Dixon gained the agreement of Liaquat and his cabinet colleges in Karachi. Hopeful that he had a solution to the dispute Dixon met Nehru; but unfortunately the India P.M again rejected the proposal, as the situation in the valley has changed.

341 Embassy New Delhi to States Department, September, 8, 1949, FRUS, 199, Vol-6; pp 1739-38; and interview with Mc Ghee in in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp30.


Dixon was succeeded by Dr Frank Graham as the UN’s negotiator of Kashmir dispute. Graham however was not as active as its predecessor and made a very substantive progress after he took up the assignment and having a long talk with Nehru he concluded that “it is useless for his mission to remain longer in South Asia”\(^{(344)}\). Graham eventually reported on his lack of progress to the Security Council on October 16, 1951 and unfortunately on the same day Liaquat was assassinated while addressing a public meeting in Rawalpindi. Liaquat was succeeded by Governor General Nizamuddin and he was assisted by Ghulam Mohammed who became the Finance Minister of the state—both men of moderation and pro-western nature.

Up till the beginning of 1952 the Kashmir question remained outside the preview of the Cold War. In keeping with its cool and distant relationship between India and Pakistan, the Soviet had steered clear of the issue in the UN deliberations. However a significant transformation was observed in January 1952 when Jacob Mallik, the Soviet representative to the United Nation reviled the shocking report that Graham was a US-UK ‘secret agent’ and charged that the West “intends to transform Kashmir and Pakistan into (a) military springboard against USSR and the New China.”\(^{(345)}\). With Graham’s efforts going nowhere, the Pakistanis were becoming more and more downcast and a month later the shocking incident when Nimitz decided to resign as the plebiscite administrator was a blow to the process of rapprochement. As stated by Dennis Kux, Nimitz held the opinion that “No mediation effort in Kashmir going to succeed as long as Mr. Nehru maintain his present understatement like attitude”.\(^{(346)}\)

In June 1952, when it looked as if Kashmir discussions were going in vain and was reaching a dead end, Prime Minister Nazimuddin informed Warren that Pakistan was ready to break the deadlock by offering a major concession on the question of troop withdrawal of ratio. A delightful State Department responded that it was “gratified at (the Pakistani government’s)


\(^{346}\) Memorandum of Conversation between Admiral Nimitz and Acting Secretary Bruce, May 28, 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, Vol:09; pp1251; Embassy in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp41.
willingness (to) offer concessions in (the) hope (of) achieving demilitarization and (the) 
entrance into office of (the plebiscite administrator) and regarded (the Pakistani) proposal as 
statement like act.”347 But unfortunately Nehru turned town Bowles and the Indian leaders 
refused to budge from their previous position on the troops issue, asserting that “ratio were 
not the way to approach the problem since the implied (the Pakistanis) had definite right in 
Kashmir which Indian’s has constantly denied”.348

Despite set back Graham soldiered on through a round table of India- Pakistan ministerial 
talks in Geneva, Switzerland, in fall of 1952 but unfortunately nothing turned into a fruitful 
discussion. In the word of Dennis Kux the US government viewed that after 5 frustrating 
years of wrestling with Kashmir problem, Hickerson and Byroad (who had replaced 
McGhee) hold that “The Department of States” considers Nehru the key figure in the 
settlement (of the) Kashmir issue. Until he is willing (to) make some agreement there of 
course can be done. When he indicates a sincere desire to make (a) settlement it probably will 
follow”.349

(3.6) United States-Pakistan Security Relations:

The idea of US-Pakistan military relationship first came under serious consideration in 
Washington in 1951, at the same time that General Ayub Khan was thinking of the United 
States as a source of military equipment. The US Air Force during the period was deeply 
interested in possible sites for air bases; other military strategists considered the man power 
the Pakistani Army might furnish for use in elsewhere in Asia. There was a vague but general 
feeling that by extending military assistance Pakistan’s friendship could be won and its 
opposition to the Communist regime can be further strengthened.

Selig Harrison has traced official American thinking on defense of the subcontinent in the 
writing of Sir Olaf Caroe, the former Governor of the NWFP. In his book ‘Wells of Power

347 New Delhi to States Department, June, 26, 1952, FRUS, 195-1954, Vol-9; pp 1263-1264; 
in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New 
York; 2002; pp41.

348 Embassy Karachi to States Department; July, 12; 1952, FRUS, 195-1954, Vol-9; pp-1279; 
in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New 
York; 2002; pp41.

349 States Department to Embassy New Delhi; November 20, 1952, FRUS; 1952-1954; Vol: 
09; pp 1304-0306; in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted 
Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp42.
(1951)’ Olaf set forth his argument, which was openly directed to the Americans, that Western defense of the Middle East had previously been based upon control of the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{350} It was basically his arguments that gave the Americans for the first time a vague idea of thinking on strategic issues in unfamiliar lands.\textsuperscript{351}

The next step which further marked a step ahead in strengthening the relationships between the two nations was the appointment of Brigadier General Henry A. Byroad as Assistant Secretary of States for the Near East, South Asia and Africa in December 1951. However after the appointment of Byroad Pentagon was given approval by the States to discuss with Pakistan a limited arms assistance program and meanwhile talks were held the following spring, and agreement in principle was apparently reached by mid-1952.

The India Government soon came to know about the intentions of the Americans and they privately made serious objections toward the issue. Even Bowles, US Ambassador to New Delhi also strongly opposed any arms and aid for Pakistan. He argued that if the United States extended military assistance to Pakistan, it would be exacerbating the difference and tense relationship between India and Pakistan, partly by upsetting the established balance of power and partly by adding difference over their approaches to the cold war and to their formidable antagonism. Moreover he also argued that the non-aligned policy which India and other nations of the world had adopted toward the issue might take a dynamic shift with such steps of the US towards any specific Asian Nation. Ambassador Bowles also argued that the military assistance toward Pakistan would also antagonize Afghanistan, which in turn might make it closer to the Communist Russia. Even Gorge F. Kennan and Secretary of State’s Dean Acheson similarly vehemently opposed the idea and were enthusiastic toward the policy.\textsuperscript{352} Meanwhile during the period Truman administration was in its last months and, because of the objections from Bowles, Kennan and Acheson, the United States held off on its final decisions.\textsuperscript{353}


\textsuperscript{351} Sir Olaf Caroe originally had looked to India as the key nation in this scheme, but soon recognized that Indian Non-Alignment made that impossible.

\textsuperscript{352} U.K officials were also divided on the wisdom of extending military assistance to Pakistan, with those officials oriented toward India dubious or critical of such programme despite the arguments of Sir Olaf Caroe and others who held similar view.

In early 1953, the Republican Government came into power. For the Republicans the Middle East and South Asia were not of top priorities areas but soon thereafter they came into serious consideration. The visit of Secretary of State’s John F. Dulles to eleven countries in the Middle East and South Asia in May confirmed his thinking that no area-wide defense organization would be possible for some time, particularly based upon Egypt and the Suez Canal base. This idea of Dulles was evident from his speech which he gave on June 1, 1953; where he said that: “The Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. While awaiting the formal creation of a security association the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free people.”

Thus the United States gave the clear idea that it will strengthen those nations who wanted help, but western membership in a defense pact was not foreseen for some time. There were three main nations (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) in the Middle East which had a similar mind set like that of the Western powers. They desperately needed any western aid and support for their security for their identity and existence. Among the different nations Turkey was obviously the key nations in any Middle East security scheme. As it was the strongest state in the area, firmly anti-soviet, and willing to work closely with the United States and the United Kingdom to create defensive strength on its eastern borders to prevent being outflanked by a Soviet attack. Situation of Iran was also not as good as the western position in Iran was similarly on the same time as going from bad to worse, under the Mossadegh’s rule who was an anti-British and pro communist influential person. The things however changed with the fall of Mossadegh and the return of Shah’s rule on 1953, which strengthened its hold in the country and uprooted the Communist entrances from the governmental services. Beyond Iran was the nation Pakistan, which the American saw as a greater potential source of strength for the region. The American believed that if a Turko-Pakistan tie can be established were

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gradually Iran and some Arab countries to the South may join the West. American leaders apparently came to realize that the specific quarrels then in the headlines, rather than the basic antagonism between the neighboring nations were causing major problems. In order to help to alleviate the Middle East disputes, the United States tried to foster compromise settlements concerning the Islamic oil dispute, the Suez base and the Sudan; it also pulled back from Israel and tried to make more even stances in Arab-Israel affairs.

Pakistan had followed a policy of non-alignment in fact though not in name since 1947. It did not wanted to depart too far in international politics from the other Muslim states, and Arabs had generally shown their opposition to the Western defense alignments and organizations. Although the Pakistanis had no desire to antagonize the USSR, this was hardly an imperative of Pakistani foreign policy. Indeed at this Pakistan could not be too particular. Its economy was in trouble and it badly needed arms. Neither the Muslim states nor the USSR could or would provide the support which it required as such Pakistan went in forward for strengthening a relationship with the US. While Washington was moving ahead slowly in order to deal with the situation Pakistan on the other hand was becoming increasingly anxious to obtain U.S. Military and economic assistance as fast as it can.

After the death of P.M Liaquat Ali the nation experienced severe national crisis and constant political instability. Wide spread communal riots in West Pakistan in early 1953 forced the nation to declare martial law to reestablish order. The attempt to cut the army’s budget during a period of general economic retrenchment led Governor General Ghulam Mohammad Ali to dismiss the government and install a new cabinet headed by Mohammad Ali of Bogra, then ambassador to the United States, who had no substantial political following. Gradually Pakistan became under the control of the men aptly labeled their ‘hierarchs’. Among the hierarchs the most prominent of them were Governor General Ghulam Mohammad Ali, Defense Secretary Iskander Mirza and Army Commander-in-Chief Ayub Khan- all had one thing in common as they had initiated the early attempt to secure military assistance from the United States. In attempt to pressurize Washington to take early decision Pakistan leaked to the New York Times that it “was willing to consider an exchange of airbase for military equipments.”

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The initial response of the US Government to Pakistani proposal and pressure was negative. Even Washington rejected and denied the story which was put forward by Pakistani government that two nations were about to conclude arm pact and claimed that only general conversation is taking place between the two. The US President on November 18, 1953 in an interview said that the United States would be more cautious about any action that might cause trouble for India. Moreover some US officials still doubted that the value of such a pact in its effect on U.S. relations with India and to a lesser extent, with Afghanistan. There was awareness that Pakistan’s first concern was India, and there was much dispute as to what Pakistan’s attitude toward the USSR was. But although there were some official who believed that United States pact with Pakistan might work well against the anti-communist scheme of the United States in the Middle East and South Asia.

Soviet Union, China and India critically dissuade both Pakistan and United States on this issue. Nehru in a public comment on November 15, 1953 said that these developments were “intense concern to us”. India warned Pakistan that a military pact would damage the chance of reaching a settlement on Kashmir and to get United States hold back it hinted that arms aid would bring the cold war to India’s border and might cause India move closer to Soviet Union which might have a far reaching consequence in South Asia.

Meanwhile in the United States there was a wide spread indignation over the stance taken by India on the deal. Washington denounced Indian government’s deportment by in the New York Times as an act of “playing with fire”. Secretary Dulles and other leaders seemed to feel that any backing down at this point would amount to letting Nehru control American foreign policy which they just could not tolerate and they were convinced and confident about the validity of the programme. Finally on February 8, 1954, the arms deal was approved by the US National Security Council and soon the decision was generally accepted in the United States. US went ahead with its plan to aid Pakistan, though they were anxious that it would damage to US-India relations. Thus President Eisenhower wrote to Nehru, assuring him that US would come to India’s aid if Pakistan were ever to use the arms for aggression against India and also provided a sympathetic consideration to Indian request for arms. Unfortunately the letter got a negative and opposite reply as Nehru regarded such


357 Barnds, William J. India, Pakistan and the Great Powers; Council on Foreign Relations, Pall Mall Press; London; 1972; pp95
assurance as meaningless and regarded that India’s opposition to the pact was on calculations rather than on principles. Nehru said that “if we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrite and unprincipled opportunist to accept such aid ourselves.”

However while it was not clear that this treaty was an explicit condition of US military assistance, there was an understanding that Pakistan would in time move in the direction of regional defense pact which made it more appealing in the context of American’s general alliance strategy.

(3.7) SENTO:

Before the nebulous status of Pakistan could be solved out in the security arrangements of Middle East, few developments in the South Asia region led to formal alliance and pact between US and Pakistan. Actually after the defeat of the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the Geneva Conference on Indochina it was evident that France was no longer willing or able to remain a major power in the South Asia. American policy makers did not think they could leisurely approach the creation of a regional defense organization, allowing it to develop out of the effort of indigenous forces within the subcontinent. Therefore the United States decided to rally as many of nations in the area as were willing and were interested in setting up a military regional defense pact with the Western powers, to mobilize their strength and develop cohesion. The Americans hoped that such an organization would help in combating and countering the rise and spread of the communist forces and aggression in that area and in the whole game in order to deter communism Pakistan was going to play a very vital role.

The US believed that not only did Pakistan, bordering on Southeast Asia as well as Middle East Nations, seems a logical member, but its membership would also serve to link this organization with the one that Washington hoped to create in between the (NATO) North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Moreover the American believed that with only Thailand and Philippines eager to join the organization, joining of Pakistan would rather augment its Asian components. However the attitude of the Pakistani leaders towards a Southeast Asian defense organization was a bit ambiguous and uncertain. They enjoyed satisfactory and distant relationship with Communist China and had

358 Barnds, William J. India , Pakistan and the Great Powers; Council on Foreign Relations, Pall Mall Press; London; 1972; pp95
no desire to antagonize Peking. At the same time, they realistically reorganized that if contrary to the American urging, Pakistan refrained from joining the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), its claim on the US military and economic assistances and aid will be weakened. Pakistan’s leaders, who had previously been oriented largely toward the Middle East, now stressed that their country was a Southeast Asian as well as a Middle East Nation.

In the Manila Conference which set up SEATO, Foreign Minister of Pakistan Zafrullah Khan strongly opposed making the treaty applicable only to and for the Communist aggression. He even threatened to leave without signing when the United States refused to have the treaty apply to any conflict between Indian and Pakistan. Eventually the American delegation agreed that the text would simply refer to the treaty as being directed against communist aggression, but insisted on attaching an understanding that only Communist aggression would automatically be considered by the United States as endangering its own security and thus bringing the operative clause into effect. Thus with the expected change the Pakistani leaders were able to bring the treaty to their people as covering all armed aggression (for example, by India) but not being aimed by any particular country as thus not formally involving Pakistan in the cold war and became a part of the pact. When the foreign minister returned back, General Ayub Khan, the Army Chief who by that time has become the defense minister, did not see how SEATO would help Pakistan and considered it as a wrong step. Zafrullah argued that even if the treaty did not give Pakistan’s security against an attack by India, the country would be better off with the Americans if it joined SEATO. The fact that the foreign minister had initialed the draft treaty made it difficult, in any case, for Pakistan not to accede without appearing to back away from its pro-US policy. Finally, in the end, in January 1955, the Pakistan’s cabinet formally ratified its membership in SEATO.

3.8 CENTO:

The northern-tier defense arrangement, which had prompted US interest in providing military aid to Pakistan, became more tangible on February 24, 1955, after Iraq and Turkey initialed a defense pact in Baghdad, known as the Baghdad Pact and later came to be known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), formerly Middle East Treaty Organization (MEDO). During the period when the Baghdad Pact was taking shape in the Middle East, there was a growing step of treaty of friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan. Due to their distance and inability to help each other few nations came to enjoy a very vital strategic

359 Pakistan’s key aim at Manila was to have the SENTO shield including aggression from all quarters especially from India and not just from the Communist Regime.
location in the setup among them Iraq, Iran, Egypt. Iran, the geopolitical bridge, was still seeking political stability after overthrow of Mossadegh rule. Iran on the other hand was in a between prospect than Iran in contrast to the attitude of most Arabs, Iraq’s leaders saw the Soviet threat as real, partly because of the geographical proximity, but also because of fear of Communist influence within Iraq, particularly among its large Kurdish minority. Similarly Turkey was willing to enter a defensive alliance with Iraq as a step towards regional security; but it came as a problem as signing of Turkey was bound to cause trouble with Egypt which was long time rival of Iraq. Egypt regarded itself as the leader of the region and wanted all the Arab states to stand united and refuse military ties with any outside and foreign powers. Infact as the strongest Arab state, Egypt had no desire to see any of its rivals strengthened by gaining access to outside arms.

Britain enjoyed close ties with Iraqi leaders and was anxious to participate with Iraq in the emerging regional defense organization. Its military base rights in Iraq were due to expire in a few years and the only way of holding unto the base was to give them the protective collaboration of a multilateral defense organization, even though that was not working for Egypt. In April 1955, Britain adhered to the Bagdad pact and Pakistan joined on September and Iran on October 1955.

However although the pact attempts to bring in other Arab nations together failed but nonetheless it led for the emergence of a Middle Eastern Defense. Foreign secretary Eden stated frankly in his memoires, “Our purpose was very simple. I think by so doing we have strengthened our influence and our voice throughout the Middle East.”

The United States however decided not to become a full member of the Bagdad Pact and opted for an observer status. There were mainly two factors which led Washington’s action to pull back from the northern tier security group the first was the worry that becoming a full member would worsen US relations with nationalist and neutral Egypt which was vociferously against the pact and the second concern was that the alliance might take on an anti-Israel coloration and run afoul of potent US domestic political support for Israel.


361 Dann Urie; *The Foreign Office, the Baghdad Pct and Jordan*; Asian and African Studies (Tel Aviv); November; 1987; pp: 247-248.
The Pakistani elite, especially Ayub Khan, wondered if it made sense to join the pact after the Americans decided to stay out. Turkish PM Adnan Menderes and Nuri Said, however, convinced the reluctant Pakistani general that the pact would entail no new obligation for his country. Nevertheless the government in Karachi still delayed taking the final step. However when Moscow vaulted over the northern tier by sending arms to Egypt, the United States renewed its support for the pact and urged the Pakistani government to complete the accession process. Finally on September 25, 1955, Karachi became the official member of CENTO. It hedged the step, however by stating that the action implied no commitment that would detract from Pakistan’s defense capabilities or involve the country in a military engagement relating to Turkey’s membership in NATO. Finally the joining of Iran in the pact as the fourth regional nation geographically completed the northern tier defense pact. The United States indicated that it would establish close political and military liaison with the pact, but reaffirmed its decision not to be a full member of the pact.362

Throughout the twenty four years of the Baghdad pact and its successor, the CENTO, America maintained this detached posture: it worked actively in the organization and various committees and served as the pacts’ major element, without ever formally joining the alliance. However, in the end neither the Baghdad pact not SENTO amounted to much military. Specific pact forces never were designated nor were unified command structure were created. Nonetheless, by becoming a member of the two security organization Pakistan had an important consequence. Joining the Baghdad Pact and the SENTO gave Karachi a strengthened claim on the US resources and in turn, the US acquired an even larger stake in Pakistan’s well being. As Ayub Khan put in his autobiography, Friends Not Masters, Pakistan had become America’s “most allied ally in Asia.”363

Another benefit to Pakistan was the regular contact and interaction between Pakistan civilian and military officials and their interaction between Pakistani civilian and military officials and their counterparts from the other pact member and United States. Both SENTO and CEATO developed elaborate committee structures and held numerous meetings and conferences. The most significant of these were high-level annual gatherings attended by


363 Khan, Mohammed Ayub; Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography; OUP; London; 1967; pp 130
foreign ministers, defense ministers, military chief of staff and other senior officials. Whereas on the negative side, displeasure from India membership in SENTO and CEATO earned Pakistan the special ire of the Soviet Union and further barrage of brickbats from India. What hurt more psychologically was the stinging criticism that Pakistan received from Egypt and other Arab states, who favour a neutralist states and were opposed to anything that smacked of a revival of Western imperialism.

Thus the alliance was not an unnatural alliance rather in ideological terms, Pakistan felt closer to the West rather than to Communism. Moreover, the Russian had been on an expansionist course southward since the previous two centuries and had annexed vast Muslim territories in Central Asia with which the Pakistani people had age-old links. Moreover the communist involvement in the ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ also led to arouse a negative perception in Pakistan about the Russia. In fact Pakistan was quite eager to secure a military alliance with its Muslim countries friends that give it a sense of security against India and was harmony with its Pan-Islamic approach. Thus, the reality was that the decisive factor for Pakistan in joining military pacts was the need to find an equalizer against India. The Pakistani army chief, General Ayub Khan, was particularly keen to secure the latest American military equipments for the Pakistani armed forces with the conviction that whereas Pakistan had the manpower to take on India; it was only deficient in military equipment. By January 1957, Ayub Khan could declare: “We are no more short of men and material.” And only a year later, he made the confident claim that “the Pakistani Army today is the sharpest instrument of peace or war and the greatest deterrent against aggression.”

Meanwhile against the backdrop of these major Pakistani incursions into the Cold War diplomacy, the nation was suffering from acute political instability at its home. The internal clashes between P.M Bogra and Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed reached its zenith and reached a stage where the governor-general was to suspend the Constituent Assembly

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364 Hussain, Irtiza; Strategic Dimension of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; Progressive Publisher; Lahore; 1989; pp: 43

365 *Dawn*, 31 January 1957, cited by S.M Burke; pp:264 and Hussain, Irtiza; Strategic Dimension of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; Progressive Publisher; Lahore; 1989; pp: 43

366 *Dawn*, 19 September 1958, cited by S.M Burke; pp:264 and Hussain, Irtiza; Strategic Dimension of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; Progressive Publisher; Lahore; 1989; pp: 43
and call for a national emergency in Pakistan. The Times Magazine summed up events by stating, but four years prematurely: “Bloodlessly, Pakistan changed from an unstable pro-Western democracy to a more stable pro-western military dictatorship.”

Shaken by its ally’s continuing political instability, the State Department took solace that the crisis “did not seem likely to bring about a change in Pakistan’s policy of cooperation with the US.” However finally after a long up and down within and outside the nation after eight and a half year after its founding, on March 23, 1956, came to be established as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with Mirza as its President. This development of the nation to a democratic constitutional structure was also covertly and overly backed and supported by the US.

(3.9) Rift in the relations- from the ‘most allied ally’ to a ‘terrible error’:

The US-Pakistan relations started receiving a severe setback by the end of 1954. The meeting of the State Department- and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that was hold in January that year praised Ayub and his nation. As, a “potential ally of great importance” and a “trained armed force which no other friendly power can match.” But unfortunately a month later, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Struve Hensel came from Pakistan with a different view. He wrote “No member of the country Team had a clear idea of the part Pakistan was expected to play in the Middle East….At the same time it seems quite clear that the Pakistan regards India threat as much more serious to Pakistan than the Russian or the Communist China threat.” Thus it became evident to the Pentagon that the military aid to Pakistan had a very little validity and significance for their geopolitical security concern. However meanwhile sensing the problem, the Karachi embassy began to second


368 *States Department telegram to Embassy Karachi*; November 26; 1954; 611.90D/11-2654, DSR, NA; cited in Kux, Dennis; *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies*; OUP; New York; 2002; pp 41.


Pakistan complaints about the slow flow of the arms aid. Ayub was particularly upset in the advent of the following issue, since now the Pakistani army had the most to lose; his prestige was at stake.\textsuperscript{371} Taking to Ernest Fisk, the Consulate General in Lahore, Ayub warned that there would be much criticism in the Constituent Assembly “that you can’t trust the Americans”.\textsuperscript{372} Ayub went beyond American diplomats to make sure that Washington knew how unhappy he was. Under Secretary of State’s Herbert Hoover Jr. Wrote to the Defense Department that if Ayub’s view gains acceptance, “we would have suffered a serious setback in terms of our objectives in the Middle East defense and in the political stability of Pakistan”.\textsuperscript{373} Finally compelled by the situation Washington determined that not $171 million rather force-level goals, would determine the parameters of the program.\textsuperscript{374}

Quite contrary to these issues, Khrushchev had boisterously backed India and Afghanistan and made it evident that if Pakistan wanted to join the free-world group it could make the life of the US ally in the region difficult. The next blow to US-Pakistan relation was received when Eisenhower administration was in its closing era. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) painted a gloomy picture of Pakistan’s prospects and expressed doubts as to whether America’s shaky ally could provide a meaningful assistance to the Middle East defense policy of the West. The study revealed that fulfilling the October 1954 arm aid commitment to Pakistan would cost $505 million –almost three times the original estimate of $171 million. The report also found that Pakistan would need more than $100 Million a year in ongoing US assistance just to maintain the forces.\textsuperscript{375} On January 3, 1957, in its South Asian policy paper

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{371} Because by the time Pentagon was insisting on the aiding $171 million to Pakistan instead of their former demand of $301.1 million \\
\textsuperscript{372} Consulate General Lahore to States Department, October 4; 1955; FRUS; 1955-57; Vol: 8; pp-445-446; cited in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp 80. \\
\textsuperscript{373} Letter from Under Secretary of State’s Hoover to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Gordon Gray; November 5; 1955; FRUS 1955-57; Vol: 8; pp-446-448; McMahon; The Cold War on the Periphery ;pp-204; cited in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp 81. \\
\textsuperscript{374} Letter from Under Secretary of State’s Hoover to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Gordon Gray; November 5; 1955; FRUS 1955-57; Vol: 8; pp-446-448; McMahon; The Cold War on the Periphery ;pp-204; cited in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp 81. \\
\textsuperscript{375} Interdepartmental Committee on certain US aid programmes “Pakistan” June 19; 1956; NSC Series; Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records; White House Official
\end{footnotes}
(NSC 5701), three years to the day after Eisenhower had given green light to Pakistani aid, the question was raised that how a small amount of arm aid in 1954 had ballooned to a $500 million commitment. President Eisenhower confessed that in the race for looking ally “it has proved costlier to achieve the objective. This was the worst kind of plan and decision we could have made. It was a terrible error, but now we seem hopelessly involved in it”. And now in this situation cutting the military aid programme “might severe repercussion on our relations” and “even might destroy the Baghdad Pact”.

(3.10) Ayub and the Relations:

In the course of the events, Pakistan domestic politics visualized a great turmoil. Unanimity between President Mirza and Army Commander in Chief Ayub brought a new phase in the internal politics of Pakistan. Ayub Khan seized power in Pakistan in 1958, and became the next President of Pakistan. Ayub Khan was first inclined to accept the Western argument that communism was a direct threat to the subcontinent. The rarely rifts in Sino-Indian relation on border issue had also became know by the time and Ayub was hopeful that he could patch things with India enabling the two countries in defending the subcontinent against potential foes and to solve out Kashmir problem in just manner. Moreover Iran along with few other Middle East nations was also eager to conclude a bilateral accord. Thus in early 1959, Ayub Khan came forward with the proposal for a “Joint Defense Policy” of the subcontinent against any encroachment from the north. Unfortunately Nehru, firmly rebuffed the Pakistani leader, stating in Parliament on May 4, 1959, “we do not want to have a common defense policy which is almost some kind of military assistance – I do not understand against whom people talk about common defense policies”.

files, DDEL; cited in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp 83.


378 By ‘north’ Ayub was trying to mean protection from any aggression from Soviet Union and China.

379 Rajya Sabah Debates, 4 May 1959; cited by Burke S.M; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis; OUP; London; 2nd eds; 1994 ;pp 233
By March 5, 1959 the US-Pakistan bilateral security agreement was signed. The operative language in Article I “take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon”. But this agreement too did not commit the United States to come to Pakistan’s aid against attack by India- the commitment that Pakistan really wanted. On the whole it was the quest for arms aid to be used against India, rather than any real fear of communist aggression, which was the main motive of Pakistan in joining the western pacts.

On May 1959, US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled “The Outlook for Pakistan” summed up Ayub’s initial six months of office as “so far so good”, and belied that regardless of its relationship with neighboring nations Pakistan will expand its ties. On the same month, a fresh arm supply issue arose after the Pakistanis asked for supersonic F-104 fighter aircraft. In justifying the request, Ayub stressed the problems that the US intelligence facility at Badaber had caused Pakistan. He told that “the unit is looked as an actual or potential launching site for missile by the Soviet, China and India” and asserted that Pakistan needs the F-104 to counter this new threat. The initial reaction of U.S to the demand was negative, but to manipulate Pentagon, Pakistan came up with a revised moderate military policy; which endorsed continued military aid “to protect US investment in Pakistan,” and to maintain the military forces developed as a result of US help with “some modernization of equipments”. Due to such change of attitude of Pakistan, US also changed its stand and it stated that “In recognition of the need to maintain the excellence of the military units in Pakistan which we now support, it is our intention to provide military assistance to Pakistan which would logically include some modernization of equipment. This however should in orderly and

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380 See Department of States Bulletin; Vol-40 (1956); pp:416-417 for the text of the bilateral agreement signed between United States and Turkey, Iran and Pakistan March 5; 1959; ; cited in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp 102.


382 Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000- Disenchanted Allies; OUP; New York; 2002; pp 104.
gradual manner as a result of natural attrition and take into account absorptive capacity as well as financial limitations.”

Meanwhile on December 1959 Dwight Eisenhower visited Pakistan in fact he became the first US president to visit Pakistan this visit played a very vital role in the relationship between the two nations and was a major event. In his visit to Pakistan Ayub portrayed a very gloomy picture of the region’s security. He urged the US President not to lower its guards as he (Ayub) has sensed a change in the USSR and Chinese policy. The Soviet were trying to penetrate Afghanistan and the Chinese were building air bases near the region, which Ayub believed might pose a “grave threat to us all” and India might collapse. In order to avoid the damage and ensure security of the subcontinent Ayub suggested that India and Pakistan must cooperate with each other and “it would be fatal if Pakistan and India remains enemies” and also emphasized on the requirement for settlement of Kashmir dispute bilaterally and peacefully. The Pakistani President urged the United States to use its “tremendous influence” on India to sort out Kashmir issue. Moreover the President also argued that it would be “disastrous” if India gets massive economic aid from Washington as it may simply divert those aids in for of military arms to settle its scores and maintain its strength in the region. Similarly justifying the need for more US arm help to Pakistan Ayub emphasized the threat China posed to the sub continent despite of the close Sino-Pakistan security ties. Ayub warned that “if Pakistan did not receive American support it was inevitable that the Chinese sooner or later would get it, as well as India.” Similarly Ayub also portrayed a gloomy picture of Afghanistan and cited it as a great threat to the region which is used by the Soviet “solely for their own strategic purpose”. After returning back to Washington Eisenhower further reviewed the F-104 request of Pakistan and after evaluating the situation gave a new


386 Eisenhower, Dwight D.; The White house Years: Waging Peace;1956-61; Garden city; New York; Doubleday; 1956; pp: 495
thought on Pakistan request to F-104. Though initially State Department Pakistan desk officer William Spengler rejected the demand but later on finally on March 3, 1960 Washington approved the F-104 based on Pakistan special military requirement.

Although the F-104 incident though pleased Ayub but soon the U-2 spy fighter plane episode created serious tensions between countries. It happened when in the summit in Paris the Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev revealed the details of the American spy plane U-2 which was shot down by the Soviet in their land. Khrushchev literally warned Pakistan in the words “to make their territory for launching planes with anti-soviet intentions: Do not play with fire gentlemen! The government of Turkey, Pakistan and Norway must be clear aware that they are accomplices in this flight”\(^{387}\) Though initially rejecting the claims Eisenhower later made a clean breast responsibility about the U-2 incident. The Pakistani realized that along with the benefits of military and economic aid that alignment with the US entails risks and danger as well as. In the words of the New York Times, the Pakistani leaders realized with a shock that “such incidents like the U-2 flight could touch off a war, that Pakistan could be a prime target and that the Soviet Union, nearly touches Pakistan’s northern border while the United States, her ally, is 9000 miles away”\(^{388}\) Perhaps for the first time the incident made the two nations realised the severe implication of each other’s acquaintance.

\(3.11\) US unequivocal support to Pakistan in the War of 1971:

In course of time United States and Pakistan started coming closer to each other despite smaller and pity differences. Gradually Pakistan again managed to retain its position in the good books of United States and became the most trusted ally in the region and the aids and assistance that Pakistan was receiving from United States was diverted to settle its scores with India instead of USSR. Meanwhile by 1970’s Pakistan was again in a severe problem as difference started emerging between the two wings (East and West) of Pakistan which culminated in the war of 1971.

The war of 1971 was basically not a direct war between India and Pakistan but it was an outcome or reaction against the East Pakistan’s armed policy against West Pakistan and the indulgence of India in favour of East Pakistan in the war against the inhuman atrocities and


\(^{388}\) *New York Times*, 4 July 1960, cited by Burke S.M; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*; OUP; London; 2nd eds; 1994; pp 267
torture by the former. Even before 1969, the rift between the two wings (East and West) of Pakistan was evident. Despite being the majority in numbers East Pakistan did not receive their due share in the decision making in Government of Pakistan. All the senior members of the administration, military regime, the army, the bureaucracy and the feudal business aristocracy were West Pakistanis; whereas only 10% of East Pakistani’s shared the position of senior officers in Pakistan top echelons. Moreover these two wings of Pakistan differed with each other in various ways, in fact there existed major ethnic, geographical, economic, and cultural differences within them. Both these two parts of Pakistan, apart from the factor of Islam, had very little in common with each other, as Coggin put it, “the only bonds between the diverse and distant wing of their Moslem nation were the Islamic faith and Pakistan International Airlines.”

Things deteriorated, with the sudden demise of Quaid e Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and assassination of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liyakat Ali Khan within first three years of its creation. The sudden loss of these leaders left serious void and contributed to the declining popularity of the Muslim League which provided a semblance of unity throughout Pakistan. The first unified cry of protest and remonstration was seen in the demand of the official language issue. East Pakistani’s proud of their language and its rich literary heritage, were greatly shocked when the Pakistani policy makers initially rejected Bengali’s claim for the recognition as a national language and attempted to make Urdu - a minority language as the only national language throughout Pakistan. Even economically the East Pakistan suffered a lot than the West Pakistan, who appeared better off from the American military and economic aids. Moreover they only received roughly 25 to 30 percent of Pakistan’s total income.

Things got worsened in the year 1969 when the fragile government of Pakistan led by General Ayub Khan, collapsed as a result of a Mass movement against President Ayub Khan’s authoritarian rule, seeking his overthrow and restoration of Democracy in Pakistan. Ayub Khan, being pressurized by the movement handed over the power to another military general, Yahya Khan, who led to the reimposition of direct military rule in Pakistan, with the promise to hold elections for an assembly to frame a new constitution, and then convert into a

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390 Appadorai; A & Rajan, M.S; India’s Foreign Policy and Relations; (South Asian Publishers; New Delhi; 1985); pp102
parliament to govern the country. Thus in 1970 for the first time general elections took place in Pakistan on basis of the universal adult franchise. After the promised elections were held in 1970, no party came up with a clear cut majority but the Bengali-nationalist Awami League acquired an absolute majority in the assembly, by getting all the seats from East Pakistan. The western leadership found this outcome of the election results simply unacceptable. The crisis was triggered by Yahya Khan, as he postponed the announcement of the National Assembly’s secession to be convened in Dacca. The Awami League perceived this as a deliberate attempt to disregard the popular mandate and they launched a campaign of Civil Disobedience under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman. The crisis quickly escalated into a major conflict and things starter to get more deteriorate in East Bengal. Broadcasting from Karachi that night, Yahya called Mujib a traitor; and blamed him for the crisis, and ordered for banning Awami League. Although the foreign press reported widespread shooting and tracer round lighting up the Dacca skies, only gradually did a picture of Pakistani army’s bloody repression of the Bengalis emerged. In its classified cables; the Dacca consulate general reported that “the Pakistani military forces were on a reign of terror. They were systematically seeking out and killing Awami League leaders and members, including student leaders and university faculties.”

Meanwhile the US Consulate General Archer Blood urged the US government to express shock at event in the East. Within a few days the US Government accepted Blood’s recommendation to evacuate some seven hundred American citizens from East Pakistan, leaving only twenty members of the Consulate in Dacca. As the evacuees began to relate the harrowing tales of army killings of Bengali civilians, Blood argued that the United States had no major national security interest at stake and, therefore, in keeping with traditional American support for human rights and self-determination, should condemn the military’s repression of East Pakistan. However when Nixon heard about this he immediately ordered the transfer of Blood as by the time for Nixon, Yahya Khan was the key and pivot role player to open a secret dialogue with China. Just as the Pakistani army was in the process of making the country an international pariah by its brutal repression of East Pakistani aspirations, the secret

391 US Policy in the Indian-Pakistan Crisis; 11, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War; NPMP. NA as referred in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 187

392 Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 187
Washington-Islamabad-Beijing exchanges were nearly reaching their climax; and knowing this Nixon didn’t wanted to change its status quo with Pakistan. The secrecy surrounding the China trip prevented the White House from revealing to officials dealing with South Asia the most important reason for its refusal to criticize Yahya about events in East Pakistan. The best explanation Kissinger could offer was to refer obliquely to ‘Nixon’s special relationship with Yahya’ and to say the President ‘does not want to be in the position where he can be accused of having encouraged the split-up of Pakistan.’

However unlike the American’s hand-off the Soviet Union did not remained silent. A week after the army crackdown, on April 2, 1971, Soviet President Nikolai Podgornoy publicly urged Yahya to take ‘immediate measures so as to put an end to bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan’

Similarly in the United States the situation was turning into something else. The public attention to the events and observing the facts that the Pakistani’s are using American military aid in order to suppress the East Bengali’s; the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously for an immediate and complete cutoff of economic and arms transfer to Pakistan. Although Nixon refused to agree to stop economic aid, he eventually endorsed the ban on arm exports. In approving it Nixon added a personal note: “To all hands. Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time.”

In keeping with Nixon’s stance, the United States in July 1971 refused to join other members of the World Bank’s Pakistan consortium in suspending economic aid, on the ground that the renewed assistance would serve little purpose in view of the chaotic conditions in East Pakistan; but the moment the press came to know about the fact pressure stated increasing on the Nixon administration.

Meanwhile, relations between India and Pakistan had deteriorated badly. Even though India did not recognize the Bangladesh government in –exile established in Calcutta, Pakistani leadership accused and alleged New Delhi to train and armed Bengali ex-Pakistani army members, which led the birth of Mukti Bahini, which mounted an insurgency and guerilla

393 Kissinger; Henry. A; White House Years; (Little Brown Publisher; Boston; 1979); pp853

394 Jackson; Robert; South Asian Crisis: India; Pakistan and Bangladesh (Praeger Publishers; New York; 1975); pp40-42

395 Kissinger; Henry. A; White House Years; (Little Brown Publisher; Boston; 1979); pp856

396 Jackson; Robert; South Asian Crisis: India; Pakistan and Bangladesh (Praeger Publishers; New York; 1975); pp 62-64
attack on the oppressor Pakistani armies and provided a significant challenge to the Pakistani military.

Meanwhile Nixon agreed that Pakistan should be pressed to do the maximum to encourage the return of the refugees in the hope of lessening the chances of War.\textsuperscript{397} Finally in the late July 1971 Yahya agreed to the permit UN supervision of relief and resettlement efforts. New Delhi was however skeptical about the role of UN and as such Indira Gandhi, who insisted on the return of all the refugees, was suspicious that UN relief programs might encourage the refugees to stay back in India as such she refused to accept the UN operation on its side of border.\textsuperscript{398}

Meanwhile sympathy about the plight of the millions of Bengali refugees and asa stand against the policy of Nixon administration on August 3, 1971, the House of Representative voted to suspend all assistance to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{399} In the meantime Indira Gandhi sprung her own surprise, by signing a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on August 9, 1971. Although short of a formal alliance, the accord provided for a bilateral consultation in events of crisis and pledged that neither country would support a third party against the other. Kissinger’s in his book ‘White House Years’ propounded that ‘with the treaty Moscow threw a lightning match into a powder keg.’\textsuperscript{400} However the Soviets‘ remain fully cautious about their role and support and it was only after the September visit of Indira Gandhi in Moscow that they provided the full political support and additional military supplies for which the Indian had been pressing.

Followed by this incident Nixon on August 21, 1971 discussed South Asia in real politick term with its Senior Review Group. The President kept the stand that the US aim must be to do ‘anything-all we can do to restrain’ those who want war. Moreover he also added that that ‘the United States must not –cannot-allow India to issues the refugees as a pretext for breaking up with Pakistan’. Continuing Nixon added that ‘it is our job to determine the

\textsuperscript{397} Kissinger; Henry. A; \textit{White House Years}; (Little Brown Publisher; Boston; 1979); pp 863

\textsuperscript{398} Rose, Leo E &Sisson; Richard; \textit{War and Secession}; Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh; (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1990); pp146-48

\textsuperscript{399} \textit{New York Times}; August 5; 1971; as referred in Kux, Dennis; \textit{The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies}; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 194

\textsuperscript{400} Kissinger; Henry. A; \textit{White House Years}; (Little Brown Publisher; Boston; 1979); pp 866-867
political future of Pakistan.\footnote{Memorandum for the Record of President Nixon’s August 11, 1971; Meeting with Pakistan Senoir Review Group; Kissinger Pakistan Cronology; NSC Files; Indo-Pakistan War; NPMA; NA; as referred in Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 196} In considering what to do with Pakistan, Kissinger and Nixon appointed Ambassador Farland to make private suggestion to Yahya such as not to execute Mujib and to build up talks with the refugees in Calcutta. Eventually Yahya agreed to its Western friend’s suggestion not to execute Mujib and gave his blessing for talks between US diplomats in Calcutta and the Bangladesh government-in-exile. Yet he refused to consider direct negotiations with banned Awami Leaders or with Mujib.\footnote{Rose, Leo E &Sisson; Richard; War and Secession; Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh; (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1990); pp193-94}

By the time these development were taking place there was ample sighs which indicated that a military show-down was approaching. Both India and Pakistan were amassing troops along their borders. Guerilla attacks against the Pakistani army in the East were increasing.\footnote{Rose, Leo E &Sisson; Richard; War and Secession; Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh; (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1990); pp213} The White House saw this action, in effect, as the start of war by India and as such it redoubled its diplomatic efforts to avert an all-out conflict. Similarly the Chinese Government passed a message to the Washington to ‘exert its influence to prevent the further deterioration of the situation.’ Following the day Kissinger accompanied with UN representative George Bush, met secretly in New York with Huang Hua, the Chinese UN ambassador, to review how the US and China could deal with the East Pakistan issue in the United Nation.\footnote{Rose, Leo E &Sisson; Richard; War and Secession; Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh; (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1990); pp227-230}

Meanwhile, on December 4, 1971, on the advice of Yahya Khan the first strike was launched by the Pakistani Air Forces on Indian on December 3, 1971.\footnote{Rose, Leo E &Sisson; Richard; War and Secession; Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh; (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1990); pp227-230} Indira Gandhi immediately reacted by providing a go ahead to the Indian Army for defending the country giving the green light for planned attack against East Pakistan. Although within few days the wars had
inflicted significant Pakistani casualties, Yahya Khan continued to exude an unrealistic air of confidence that the United States or China would come to rescue.\textsuperscript{406}

Once the conflict began, diplomatic action shifted to the UN Security Council, where the Soviet Union employed its veto to block U.S. –backed calls for cease-fire. In Washington, December 4, 1971 set the pro-Pakistan tone of the U.S reaction. Similarly, Bush who worked closely with his Pakistani counterpart, Agha Shahi, accused India as the ‘major aggressor’, similar was the tone of Bush when he said that ‘there’s quite clear aggression; it obviously quite clear’. As an act of punishment the United State even announced that it was freezing $87.6 million in development assistance to India.\textsuperscript{407} An effort to obtain a cease-fire moved to the General Assembly after the Soviets vetoed the Security Council resolution. By an overwhelming 104-11 votes, with 10 abstention, the assembly called for halt in fighting and pull back of forces- i.e., withdraw of Indian forces from the East Pakistan. Apart from Bhutan only the Soviet bloc countries supported India.\textsuperscript{408}

Meanwhile by this time Washington was sure off that India would continue the war in the West ‘until the Pakistani army and Airforce were wiped out’ as such immediately Nixon and Kissinger turned their attention for saving Pakistan in the West. Stepping up the diplomatic pressure, Kissinger called the Indian ambassador L.K. Jha to war against such a course. Moreover even Nixon held a secret meeting with the Soviet agricultural minister Vladimir Matskevich, where he urged Matskevich to tell the communist party leader Brezhnev, ‘a great cloud hangs over US-Soviet relations’ that can ‘poison the whole new relationship between US and USSR’. Being stringent Nixon warned that, ‘if the Indians continue their military operations against West Pakistan, he must inevitably look toward a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan.’\textsuperscript{409} Nixon kept up the pressure, informing Soviet charge d’ affaires Yuri

\textsuperscript{406} Khan; Sultan Mohammed; \textit{Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat}; (London Center for Pakistani Studies; 1998); pp368-369

\textsuperscript{407} Bernard; Gwertzman; \textit{Calling India Agressor, Washington cuts Loan}; New York Times; December 7; 1971; as referred in Kux, Dennis; \textit{The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies}; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 200

\textsuperscript{408} Kux, Dennis; \textit{The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies}; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 200

\textsuperscript{409} Kux, Dennis; \textit{The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies}; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 201
Vorontsov that Washington would honour the November 1962 pledge to aid Pakistan against an attack by India. To underscore this treatment, Nixon ordered the nuclear aircraft carrier ‘Enterprise’ to proceed toward Bay of Bengal. The ‘Enterprise’s’ mission was ostensibly to available to evacuate U.S personnel form East Pakistan, but in fact, Kissinger declared, was intended ‘to give emphasis to our warning against an attack on West Pakistan.’ \(^{410}\) Although barred from law of providing military help to Pakistan or permitting other countries to give American equipment, Kissinger told Xinhua that the administration had hold Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia and would tell Turkey that Washington would ‘protest’ but would ‘understand’ their sending military help to Pakistan. Kissinger paint a dire picture of Pakistan’s plight: ‘the immediate objective must be to prevent an attack on the West Pakistan army by India. We are afraid that if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal.’ \(^{411}\) On the similar tone Xinhua sharply criticized the Indians and Soviets, for their role in the war. Meanwhile Kissinger urged Yahya to old on in the East a while longer. He signaled that ‘the US had now sent the strongest demarche the Soviet suggesting ceasefire and negotiations,’ the national security advisor, cabled adding that the US Seventh Fleet was on the move but would not reach the area for two days. Since the White House believed that the Soviet would intervene to help India, a Sino-Soviet showdown seemed possible. President Nixon then decided that the United States would not stand idly by if the Soviets threatened China and would act in support of Beijing, but unfortunately things turned out different as Beijing conveyed its stand that it was prepared to accept a cease-fire, not that it was going to intervene militarily against India.\(^{412}\)

During wide-ranging talks on December 13, 1971, Nixon stated that ‘our strategy is to create enough pressure on Indian and the USSR so they will not pursue the war to its ultimate consequence….if the USSR and India succeeded in destroying Pakistan as a military and political entity, this can only have a devastating effect in encouraging the USSR to use the same tactics elsewhere….This would very definitely change the Balance of Power in the

\(^{410}\) Kissinger; Henry. A; *White House Years*; (Little Brown Publisher; Boston; 1979); pp 905

\(^{411}\) Kux, Dennis; *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 202

\(^{412}\) Khan; Sultan Mohammed; *Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat*; (London Center for Pakistani Studies; 1998); pp 343-348
Asian continent….A triumph of India over Pakistan would be the same as the victory of the USSR over China\(^{413}\)

Meanwhile the Indian troops continued to tighten the noose around Dacca, advancing on the capital from all sides. When the Indian military began a general assault on December 14, 1971, Gen Farman Ali and A.A.K Niazi, the Pakistani army commander in east, asked U.S. consul general Herbert Spivack to transmit a surrender proposal to New Delhi, as the Pakistanis lacked direct communication with the Indians. The next afternoon, Lt. Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, the Indian commander in East, entered Dacca to receive General Niazi’s formal surrender. That night, a triumphant Indira Gandhi proposed cease-fire in the west to take effect twenty-four hours later. Finally when Yahya accepted the proposal the war came into an end with the creation of a newly independent South Asian nation- Bangladesh and signing of the landmark Simla agreement between India and Pakistan.

(3.12) Pakistan’s ‘Islamic Bomb’ and relations with US:

Despite the unequivocal support of United States and China to Pakistan in the 1971 War, the befitting reply by India and the shameful defeat of Pakistan impacted severely on its domestic policy and global image. However Pakistan’s international stature and geo-strategic importance received a yet more decisive boost by two key developments in the late 1970’s – The Afghan Embargo and the acquisition of nuclear capability. Pakistan’s evident progress in the nuclear field and impression that Pakistan had actually developed a nuclear weapon capability-the so-called ‘Islamic Bomb’ -forced the international power brokers to upgrade Pakistan’s military importance.

On December 8, 1953, United States’ President Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, in the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953 announced the ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal to the United Nations in which he declared U.S. willingness to expedite sharing of the peaceful use of nuclear power with other countries. The Pakistani press welcomed the proposed peaceful use of atomic energy and Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan stated that Pakistan does not have a policy towards the atom bomb. However just a year later in 1954 Pakistan announced the plan for the establishment of the atomic research body, as part of a new organization for scientific and industrial research in Pakistan. In January 1955, the Pakistani government formed a 12-member Atomic Energy Committee

\(^{413}\) Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 202
chaired by Dr. Nazir Ahmed. The committee was asked to formulate an atomic energy program, identify personnel requirements and plan a survey of radioactive materials relevant to atomic energy research in Pakistan as well as advise the government on any other matter pertaining to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In the same month Pakistan and the United States signed an agreement on cooperation concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Under the agreement, the United States offered Pakistan $350,000 in aid to procure a pool type reactor. In March 1956, Pakistan announced the formation of an Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) for the “peaceful use of atomic energy with special reference to survey, procurement, and disposal of radioactive materials; planning and establishment of atomic energy and nuclear research institutes, installation of research and power reactors, negotiation with international atomic energy bodies, selection and training of personnel, application of radio-isotopes to agriculture, health, industry etc.” In the year 1962 the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) obtained a small five megawatt research reactor from the United States for the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). Pakistan’s nuclear programme gained momentum with a new patron - the Minister of Mineral and Natural Resources, named Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Meanwhile by early 1960’s it became evident that India was acquiring nuclear technology not only for peaceful purpose but also to develop weapons. Facts unmistakably pointed out to the conclusion that Indian leaders ‘sought to win for their country all the prestige, status and economic benefits associated with being a nuclear power, including the option of building a bomb if necessary. When India carried out a nuclear explosion in 1974, Pakistan stepped up its effort to develop nuclear capacity. Bhutto in his book ‘The Myth of Independence’, stated “All wars of our age have become total wars … and our plan should, therefore, include the nuclear deterrent ... If Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear programme, it would not only enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would impose a crippling


417 Perkovich George; India's Nuclear Bomb; ( California University Press; Berkley; cal; 1999); pp13
limitation on the development of Pakistan’s science and technology.” 418 Under such development taking cognizance of the emergent threat to Pakistan’ Security, and the potential for blackmailing in an asymmetrical nuclear situation, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said in 1965, ‘If India makes an atomic bomb, then we will also do so, even if we have to eat grass…an atomic bomb can only be answered by an atomic bomb.’ 419 But however his rhetoric was not matched with the official reaction. This was evident when in the year 1966, PAEC proposed purchase of a plutonium separation plant that France was willing to sell, but the Ministry of Finance and Defense opposed the proposal and even President Ayub Khan too, did not favored the idea. 420 Even apparently the military leadership believed that a strong conventional defense capability would suffice for deterrence. Pakistan vested hope on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and actively participated in efforts at the United Nations to promote its early conclusion. At its initiative, a conference of non-nuclear state recommended that nuclear- weapon state should provide ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ guarantees pledging (a) non-use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear states, and (b) assistance to a non-nuclear state threatened with nuclear weapons. Both proposals were conceded in principle, but the pledge on reduction of Nuclear weapon in NTP remained non binding, and the resolution on security guarantees permanent members, was far from reassuring. Pakistan nevertheless announced its readiness to sign the NPT, providing India did the same. India however refused to sign the treaty. Pakistan had its own reason to follow India where as India did not signed the NPT though champion in Nuclear disarmament as it wanted proliferation of all sorts sponsored by members to stop.

The disaster of 1971 further gave a fresh impetus to Pakistan’s nuclear programme it compelled Pakistan to undertake the proverbial ‘painful reprisal’ of its policy of nuclear abstinence. Pakistan’s conventional defense capacity had proved inadequate to safeguard its territorial integrity, as East Pakistan was surrendered by Indian military intervention to create Bangladesh and thus Pakistan had to devise its own means to ensure its security and survival. Soon after talking over the reins of government, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto convened a meeting of nuclear scientists at Multan in January 1972, and later at Quetta, to review the


419 Wolpert, Stanley; Zulfi Bhutto OF Pakistan; pp 112

420 Akhund, Iqbal; Memoires of By stander: A life in Diplomacy, (OUP; Karachi; 1997); pp264
nuclear programme. Participants included renowned nuclear physicist Professor Abdus Salam and Munir Ahmad Khan, a nuclear engineer serving at IAEA. Already convinced of the necessity of acquiring the weapons opinion, Bhutto’s main purpose was to discuss the expeditious acquisition fuel cycle facilities. To pursue the plan, he adopted Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of the PAEC.421 But simultaneously this time too the decision was more easily made than implemented. Pakistan possessed neither fissile material nor explosion technology. Nuclear suppliers were already strengthening controls on nuclear technology transfer. The restrictions were further tightened after India, conducted the test explosion in 1974. Ironically, the anxieties generated by India’s progress in the nuclear field had more of a fall-out on Pakistan. India did not face any significant Western disapproval and to Pakistan’s shock Washington’s reaction to the Indian Nuclear explosion was particularly muted. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided it was futile to fight the fait accompli.422 Pakistan however came under vigorous scrutiny and strong pressure, as soon as it proceeded to develop its nuclear capability. The West clearly feared that the ‘Islam Bomb’ in Pakistan’s possession might eventually pass for ideological as well as financial reasons, into the hands of some of its ‘volatile and unstable’ Muslim, Arab neighbours in the Middle East.

Canada unilaterally cancelled the cooperation agreement and simultaneously United States led other industrialised states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to tightened restriction on the export of nuclear technology. Instead, the United States now focused its non-proliferation agenda on Pakistan. The next target was the reprocessing plant Pakistan was to build with French collaboration under an agreement signed in 1973, providing for application of IAEA safeguards. Moreover, the agreement prohibited Pakistan from replicating the technology for twenty years.423 Meanwhile, Pakistan embarked on ‘imaginative diplomacy’ to counter the pressure of the United States and other industrialised countries, the landmark among them was when in 1974 Pakistan proposed a motion in the United Nation General Assembly for creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in the South Asian region.

By the November of 1972, Pakistan departed from the Western defense pact SENTO, but eager to retain a cordial relationship with the United States it however did not withdrew itself

421 Sattar, Abdul; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 146

422 Secret States Department Memorandum of 13 September 1961; quoted in Perkovich George; India’s Nuclear Bomb; (California University Press; Berkley; cal; 1999); pp52

423 Sattar, Abdul; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 147
from the CENTO. Meanwhile, the Nixon administration in March 1973 continued to manifest understanding Pakistan’s economy and security problem authorized a ‘one time exception’ for delivery of 300 armored personnel carriers Pakistan had purchased three years earlier. The bonhomie went a step ahead when on September same year President Bhutto was invited to United States. In his banquet speech Nixon said-'The independence and integrity of Pakistan is a corner stone of American foreign policy.’ United States again resumed its economic and military aid to Pakistan and an amount of $24 Million for wheat and $18 Million as AID loan was granted to the later. Further Nixon also urged the US Congress to approve an amount of $40-50 million as rehabilitation loan, and allowed procure of arms and spare parts worth $160 million. But despite such goodwill United States stick to its stand on Pakistan’s nuclear development and showed intent concerning its nuclear programme. However Bhutto made no secret of his view and was adamant, he publicly said: ‘It is vital for Pakistan to give the greatest possible attention to nuclear technology, rather than allow them to be deceived by an international treaty limiting this deterrent to the present Nuclear Powers.’ Initially United States tried to allure Pakistan by offering it 120 fighter aircraft in lieu of cancellation of its contract with France for the construction of the reprocessing plant, but when all went in attempts went in vain, the Washington started pressurizing France to cancel the agreement.  

By 1976 Pakistan embarked on a substitute plan for the manufacture of the fissile material. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistani Metallurgist, who had returned from Holland after stealing nuclear technology with information about different kind of nuclear technology than the reprocessing technology which Pakistan had received from France, was given the full hand power and authority to build up a uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. Regardless of international pressure and impediment Dr. A.Q Khan and his associates within few years succeeded in building the key centrifuges indigenously and by 1982, they achieved the capability to enrich uranium to the level required for building an explosive device. By

424 Sattar, Abdul; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 147

425 Bhutto, Z.A; The Myth of Independence; 1969

426 Sattar, Abdul; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 147

427 Quoted in A.Q.Khan, Chairman, Khan Research Laboratories; The Journey to our Tests; The News; Islamabad; Special Issue; 28 May 1999; in Sattar, Abdul; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 147
1983 PAEC manufactured the first atomic device and planned to test in a tunnel in Chagai Mountain. The Ford administration desperately sought to convince Pakistan to dispose of its nuclear programme even the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid a visit to Pakistan on August 1976 and offered to the sale of 110 A-7 aircraft. But Bhutto was adamant to his point and strait away rejected the proposal. Meanwhile the United States enacted the famous Symington and Glenn Amendments in 1977 and 1978 to the Foreign Assistance Act- under which there was economic sanctions and penalties were to be charged against the nations who are non signatories of the NPT and still pursue to import equipment and technology for production of plutonium and enriched uranium.\textsuperscript{428} Nominally aided at South Asia this law in practical singled out for Pakistan alone; as it had a built in loophole to exempt out India and Israel. The relationship between Pakistan and United States slid more when Carter Administration came in power. As Presidents Carter policy in South Asia tended to support India more became India centric, Pakistan was highly concerned that National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinsky’s concept of ‘regional influential’s’ would encourage and reinforce India’s ambitions and this so called night-mare of Pakistan came to be true after the rise of General Zia-ul Haq in July 1977. In 1979, Washington withdrew its offer to sell the A-7 aircraft to Pakistan; even President Carter decided to apply sanction against Pakistan and also decided to cut off the US aid to Pakistan of around $50million per year. Islamabad protested against this ‘act of discrimination…applying different standard to different states’\textsuperscript{429} and duality of act of United States against India and Pakistan; but It evoked no sympathy. In August 1979 even there was a report that the United States was reported to have been considered the option of destroying Pakistan’s nuclear capability by attacking Kahuta.\textsuperscript{430} Although, categorically denied by Washington but the reports illustrated a dangerous deterioration in the US-Pak relations in the succeeding days.

Meanwhile, under the leadership of A.Q. Khan Pakistan steadily overcoming all the obstacles and hindrances were moving ahead of attaining its goal for a nuclear empowered state and in course of time the scientists at the PAEC were able to master the design of the nuclear device. By the mid-1980’s Pakistan despite international pressure, sanctions, domestic turmoil and

\textsuperscript{428} Sattar, Abdul; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 148

\textsuperscript{429} Sattar, Abdul; Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 148

\textsuperscript{430} Kux, Dennis; The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies; (OUP; New York; 2001); pp 220
obstacles publicly acknowledged the capability, although it disclaimed having nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{431}

The A.Q. Khan Network’s Nuclear Proliferation and Important Events in Pakistan
(Mid 1980s – 2004)\textsuperscript{432}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incidents of Proliferation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mid 1980’s</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>KRL shifts its focus from P-1 to P-2 centrifuge technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Begins to explore uranium enrichment technology.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Approaches Zia-ul Haq government for nuclear cooperation, but is reportedly rebuffed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Khan reportedly visits Iran’s Bushehr reactor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Pakistani and Iranian atomic energy commissions conclude formal agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Approaches Khan network</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Khan network and Iran close $3 million deal for centrifuge technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Khan network’s first deliveries of P-1 centrifuges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>6 October: Iraqi intelligence memo cites offer from Khan intermediary to help Iraq develop nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>November: reported agreement between Pakistan’s General Mirza Aslam Beg and Iran on nuclear and conventional cooperation in return for oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>North Korea begins to share missile expertise with Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Buhary Syed Ali Tahir offers Iran P-1 centrifuge components and drawings for more advanced P-2 machines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>December: Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto initiates deal with North Korea for No-dong missile technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>March, May: Iran begins to receive components for 500 P-1 centrifuges and P-2 drawings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>November: North Korea and Pakistan reportedly finalise No-dong deal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{431} Sattar, Abdul; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005* (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 149

\textsuperscript{432} Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 68
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Pakistan begins to receive No-dong missiles from North Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Network sends three P-2 centrifuges to Iran, according to Tahir (unconfirmed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Libyan intelligence first contacts Khan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Shipments to Libya begin (20 complete P-1 centrifuges, most components for another 200) and continue until late 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6 April: Khan tests Ghauri missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 1990s</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Khan reportedly begins delivery to North Korea of used centrifuges, drawings, depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Last acknowledged meeting between Khan network and Iranians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>March: Saudi Arabian defence minister first foreign leader to visit KRL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>US intelligence report cites North Korean enrichment programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>September: Libya receives two P-2 centrifuges, places order for 10,000 more</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>September: Libya receives 50kg of UF6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Feb: Khan network sends Libya 1,750kg of UF6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>March: Khan is removed from KRL</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>December: Tahir signs $13m contract with Malaysian company SCOPE for 25,000 centrifuge parts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Late (or early 2002): Khan network provides Libya with a design for a nuclear weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iran procures magnets for P-2 centrifuges from other foreign suppliers and claims no P-2 design work before this year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>December: deliveries of P-2 components from SCOPE to Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>March: US government places sanctions on KRL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>April: Interception of aluminium tubing shipment en route to North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>August: Iran changes story that its enrichment programme was indigenous, acknowledges to IAEA that it obtained assistance from foreign intermediaries beginning in 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>October: Interception of BBC China, ship headed to Libya with components for 1,000 centrifuges</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>December: Libya renounces nuclear weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Programme</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Libya US–UK teams begin dismantlement of Libyan programme, taking out nuclear weapon designs, UF6, centrifuges and other key equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan 4 February: Khan’s public confession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>March: BBC China delivers P-2 centrifuge parts to Libya from Turkish workshops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But by this point of time other strategic imperatives dictated a different priority to the United States, as a result of Soviet Military intervention on Afghanistan in December 1979 and due to geo-strategic importance of Pakistan soon it became in the good book of United States and the relationship between the two nations under the Regan administration took a U-turn.

(3.13) Afghan Crisis:

Apart from the importance that Pakistan gained from the development of its nuclear capability, Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance came to force during the same time due to two important developments in the regions. First it was the deadly war between anti US-Iran and Iraq which posed a serious question on the stability of the region and second was the Soviet armed intervention in the Afghanistan. Against this backdrop the importance of Pakistan acquired a new significance in the eyes of West as well as the oil-rich Gulf states and indeed for most of the non-communist world.

On the eve of the establishment of Pakistan, the Afghan Government denounced the treaty Amir Abdurrahaman had concluded in 1893, establishing the Durand Line as the boundary with British India. It launched territorial claim in the guise of support for ‘Pushtoonistan’, which it wanted to be cared out of Pakistan. When Sardar Mohammad Daoud assumed power on July 17, 1973 apprehensions of deterioration of bilateral relations rose in Islamabad, as he was known Pakistan-baiter. Aiming to use Soviet Support to consolidate its power Daoud entered into a close relationship within Soviet Union. However, soon Daoud realized that the Soviet had an agenda of its own, through penetrating in the internal politics of the country, by providing support and assistance to the revolutionary People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). To counterbalance the Soviet he embarked on to improve the relationship with Pakistan, Iran and other Muslim nations. By 1976 Bhutto and Daoud exchanged visits and bilateral relationship between the two improved and proved extremely useful. This rising graph kept on moving high with the coming up of General Zia-ul-Haq in
power. However this new policy of Daoud did not please Moscow or the PDPA the contest culminated in a coup on 27 April 1978 that the PDPA called the ‘Saur Revolution’. Daoud and his family were murdered, the constitution was abrogated and a revolution proclaimed by a clique of communist intellectuals. Nur Muhammad Taraki assumed the office of President in the name of PDPA but due to lack of ground support and rivalry between predominated rural and Pushto-speaking Khalq, and urban based Persian-speaking Parcham, Taraki was murdered and was succeed by Hafizullah Amin a strong and defiant of Soviet guidance. On 26 December 1979, the Soviet forces rolled back in the Afghanistan, eliminated Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham faction, as President in his place. This intervention of Soviet provoked a deep sense of alarm not only in Pakistan but in the entire Western Power.

By the end of II World War, alarmed by this pattern of communist expansion, the United States adopted the policy of ‘Containment of Communism’ in early 1950, which involved building military alliance including countries on the periphery of the communist bloc, but the Afghan intervention proved the fact that the ‘containment’ policy succeeded partially in holding back the tide of Communism which was evident in Vietnam, Cuba, South Yemen, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Nicaragua. The Communist take-over in Afghanistan in 1978, followed by the actual Soviet Military intervention, was not an isolated development, but part of the chain wherein Soviet inspired communism was seizing control in one country after another.

Pakistan’s reaction to the intervention was highly instinctive in nature, but in deciding its policy it sought to exercise detailed and careful steps before taking any actions, as Pakistan was ‘fully aware’ about the risk in provoking and pitting itself against the super power. But at the same time it also realized the acquiescence in the fait accompli would entail even greater danger exposing Pakistan to the nightmare exposing Pakistan to the nightmare of an Indo Soviet ‘nut cracker’. Thus initially Zia adopted a very impartial and played a very safe game in handling the issue of Soviet intervention. However although adoption a non-aligning policy and approach the initial thrust of Pakistan’s policy was diplomatic in orientation. Pakistan noted the strong reaction of the United States and the Western powers against the Soviet but apprehensive of the possible dangerous implications of the involvement in the

433 Shagi, Agha; *Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy*; Progressive Publishers; Lahore; 1988
Cold War, it hitched its diplomacy to the hope of a political resolution of the crisis through the United Nations. Islamabad without naming Soviet Union called for a resolution for unconditional immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops. The resolution was taken up by the General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure and after a short debate; it got adopted by a majority vote of 104 on January 14, 1980 which came up as a serious blow to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile in the domestic Kabul there was seen the emergence of a resistance against the alien intervention which was raised by the traditional people. The indigenous people transformed this resistance movement into a people’s war and this gave the birth of Afghan Mujahedeen who were ready to fight for their own security and survival. Pakistan was sympathetic to the Afghan cause and decided to provide discreet help to them, simultaneously the CIA also began to provide some assistance to the Afghan resistance but still things were hardly change. However this merger of commonality of interest between the two still again proved as a boon for mending up the relation between Islamabad and Washington despite the discriminatory sanction imposed by President Carter on Pakistan in 1979.  

Unknown to Islamabad, the US, National Security Council advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski recommended to President Carter to ‘review our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantee to it, more aid, and alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan could be dictated by our non-proliferation policy.’

Looking at the rise of the power of Soviet and the vulnerability of the regions geo-strategic implication in the world and Pakistan’s utmost will to surrender the Afghan Mujahedeen; Washington in the year 1980 announced an offer of $400 million in economic and military assistance for Pakistan over 18 months. As the amount offered was too insignificant to consider President Zia denounced the offer on the lieu of describing it as ‘peanuts’ that were ‘wrapped up in onerous conditions’ and could affect the pursuit of their Nuclear Programme.

Things however changed in 1981, when President Carter was succeeded by President Ronald Reagan and Washington received an offer of cooperation with Pakistan. The senior US

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434 Sattar, Abdul; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005*; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 149

435 Coll, Steve; *This Gohost War: The Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden*; quoted in Dawn; Islamabad; 19 November, 2004

436 Shagi, Agha; *Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy*; Progressive Publishers; Lahore; 1988
Officials visited Islamabad for talks. By April, the US decided on a new package, with loans and grants amounting to three billion dollars over five years.\textsuperscript{437} Even though an huge amount of $600 million per year was granted to Pakistan for strengthening and empowering its defense capabilities but yet Islamabad felt that the grant was insufficient to counter the communist threat. Thus as an earnest of US concern for Pakistan’s vulnerabilities as a front-line state and its security, it agreed to consider the sale of 40 F-16 aircraft which along with the 5-years programme generated an aura of durability around the US commitment.\textsuperscript{438} On nuclear issue the two countries sustained their official positions as before; Pakistan clearly maintained its aim to continue the research and the US sustained its stand on non-proliferation concern but it however made it clear that for Washington nuclear was no longer the issue of priority. Recognizing the past prejudice and expressing a sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan’s rationale Washington accepted Zia’s assurance that Pakistan wouldn’t develop nuclear weapon or transfers of sensitive technology.\textsuperscript{439} Thus as a binding factor and more importantly as a commonality of interest the Afghan crisis and the armed Soviet intervention again brought the two nations close to each other.

(3.14) Kargil:

The May 1998 nuclear explosions in both the nations led a major turn in the relationship and the world leaders became involved in the India-Pakistan dialogue and also projected a gloomy and dreadful picture of the region. However during the 1990’s attempts were made between to re-start India-Pakistan Dialogues. This time the initiative was taken by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Indian Prime Mister Vajpayee was quick on expressing the proposal and offered to take a bus ride on a route which was inaugurated between India and Pakistan which came to known as the- Lahore Summit. Speaking in Hindi at a regal dinner in his honour of at the resplendent Mughal Fort of Lahore, Vajpayee declared: ‘dushmani baut ho chuki. Ab dosti karni cahiye. Dosti ke liye mushkil faislay karnay hai. Dosti ke liye Kashmir pe baat karni hai’.\textsuperscript{440} Which reposted the fact that the two nations were ready to

\textsuperscript{437} \textit{Econoic Survey}; 1995-96; Finance Division; Islamabad referred in Sattar, Abdul; \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005}; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 160

\textsuperscript{438} Sattar, Abdul; \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005}; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 160

\textsuperscript{439} Sattar, Abdul; \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005}; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 160

\textsuperscript{440} Rose Leo & Husain Noor (eds.); \textit{United Staes-Pakistan Relations}; Institute of East Asian Studies; University of California; Berkeley; pp 107
eradicate the bleakly past and are ready for the bright future. Moreover the friendly bus diplomacy of Vajpayee also led the birth of the significant ‘Chenab Formula’- which was a proposed solution of the Kashmir dispute formulated by Pakistan.

But unfortunately three and a half months after the Lahore Summit the ‘peace bus’ as Vajpayee described; ‘collide with the peaks of Kargil; and was shattered to pieces.’ In the aftermath the US became actively involved in the affairs of both states fairly heavily, but the Indian reaction was entirely different. India was receptive to the US involvement. The Kargil conflict took place between 8 May 1999 when the Pakistani forces and Kashmiri militants numbering around 5,000 were detected atop the Kargil ridges. As retaliation from the Indian Army and Air Force gathered momentum and Pakistani forces atop the Kargil were about to be completely ejected, the outbreak of an India Pakistan war across the international border became a distinct possibility. Islamabad denied the facts and attributed the fighting to Kashmiri freedom fighters, recalling that after promising, at Lahore Summit, to intensify efforts to resolve all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan even recalled the UN Security Council’s resolution of June 1998 from the resumption of dialogue to remove the root causes of tensions, including Kashmir was not followed up, and that the Indian Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani had embarked on a ‘proactive policy’ in Kashmir and LoC which to Pakistan had led the rise of the Kargil Uprising. Few foreign countries credited Pakistan’s disclaimer, however, shockingly to Pakistan statements issued by the G-8, the United States, Britain, and Germany implicitly blamed Pakistan for the ‘intruders’ in Kargil. The G-8 considered the ‘infiltration of the armed intruders’ as ‘irresponsible.’ The EU called for the immediate withdrawal of infiltrators and Washington asked Pakistan to withdraw ‘its forces’ and ‘restore status quo ante’. However Pakistan got the support of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) by asking for de-escalation and dialogue. China adopted a neutral stand point with both the nations and called for India and Pakistan to respect the Line of Control.

Meanwhile since the Kargil conflict took place after the nuclear explosion, Pakistan’s calculation was that it would involve the world community, and especially the US, which

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441  Sattar, Abdul; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005*; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 231

442  Sattar, Abdul; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005*; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 231

443  Sattar, Abdul; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005*; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp231
might benefit Pakistan. But incidentally in the same manner Pakistan had miscalculated in 1967 War, much to the Pakistan’s chagrin the US held Pakistan responsible for violating the LoC and occupying the ‘evacuated position of the Indians’.444 Prime Mister Nawaz Shareef sued for the US President’s intercession to defuse the crisis. Clinton received Sharif for an emergency meeting on Sunday, 4 July- ‘US Independence Day’. He discussed the situation with Prime Minter Vajpayee over the phone and persuaded Sharif to agree to a joint statement which provided for immediate cessation of hostilities, a concrete step to be taken for the restoration of Line of Control in accordance with the Shimla Agreement, and a resumption of a Pakistan-India dialogue as began in Lahore in February 1999 for resolving all issues dividing India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. President Clinton promised to take up a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of the bilateral efforts, ‘once the sanctity of the Line of Control has been fully restored.’ Highly convinced and pressurized by Washington and projecting the fate of the unending weak war Islamabad agreed to withdraw the Pakistan personnel from Kargil by 16 July. Prime Mister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf were held ‘responsible for approving this misconceived operation’ 445 and most commentators blamed Pakistan government for losing sight of strategy in a tactical bid to awaken international attention to the festering Kashmir dispute. The misconceived policies and action not only isolated Pakistan internationally, they also gravely damaged the domestic milieu of Pakistan. Not only the Pakistani misadventure in Kargil brought a thaw in US- Pakistan relations but the Kargil episode also exposed Pakistan to international censure and it opened a breach between the Prime Minister and the Army hierarchy later resulting in a coup in Pakistan.

(3.15): 9/11 Attack and its aftermath:

Post Kargil episode US and Pakistan shared a brittle relationship with each other as Pakistan’s real face of sponsoring terrorism and destabilizing the peace process in the region was unveiled and exposed, which led the birth of a closer bonhomie between US and India. However it was the 9/11 incident which further again brought Pakistan in the good books of US policy makers. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 triggered a transformation of world politics and it dawned a new era of ‘War on Terror’ in international Politics. With three thousand peoples killed and material losses

444 Sattar, Abdul; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005*; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 231

445 *The News*; 18 July; 1999
amounting to a hundred billion dollars or more, the unprecedented and never imagined assault on the US mainland was not merely more destructive than the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, it traumatized the American nation and deeply hunted the pride and confidence of the United States seethed with anger and urge for revenge.

As the US media instantly pointed a finger of accusing at Osama bin Laden, naming him as the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks, and a sense of crisis and foreboding dominated the air in Islamabad, because of its geographical location and being the sole supporter of the Taliban. The entire world community reacted with shock even the President of Pakistan issued a strong statement of condemnation and sympathy and affirmed Pakistan’s readiness to join the United States in the fight against terrorism. President Musharraf who was in a tour in Karachi, returned to Islamabad on the evening of 12 September immediately attended a high-level meeting to discuss the grave situation and its implications for Pakistan. Although until then there was no communication with Islamabad and Washington but it was clearly evident that United States would take military action against the Taliban. In the word of Zahid Hussain Pakistan after the terror attack became a ‘frontline state’ in the war on terror. Recalling the Security Council resolution of December 2000 which had imposed sanctions against the Taliban under Chapter VII Pakistan was in a dead fear that its close cooperation with the Taliban controlled banks and official might pose a grave situation and problem for its existence. Pakistan feared that it too might be bracketed with the Taliban, declared a ‘terrorist state’ and its territory might be subjected to attack to neutralize resistance. Its horizons were dark as it knew that the major powers of the worlds would extend cooperation to the United States and whilst it was obvious that Pakistan’s refusal to cooperate would not be ineffectual but might also provoke US hostility. Thus, it was necessary for Pakistan to evolve a strategic approach keeping in the forefront both the national interest and the need for realist assessment of the obtaining environment. The question was not whether Pakistan could exploit its strategic locations for economic and political benefits from the United States; the weightier and decisive factor was the predictable cost of non-cooperation. At the same time, long term considerations and cultural and geographical bonds with Afghanistan precluded any actions that might offend the interest or sensibilities of the Afghan people. Meanwhile post attack the Security Council and General Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution on 12 September, which condemned the terrorist outrage, extended condolences to the United States and called for bringing the perpetrators, sponsors and organizers to justice. NATO invoked the treaty provision for joint defense. Canada, UK, Germany, France and
Denmark offered military contingents and for a coalitions force to attack the Taliban. China, Japan, Russia expressed solidarity with the coalition. Turkey and the states of Central and South Asia including India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka indicated willingness to provide logistic facilities, as did several Arab countries.\(^{446}\)

The same day on 12 September President of the United States George W Bush spoke of a ‘monumental struggle of good versus evil.’\(^{447}\) Secretary of State Collin Powell announced that the US expected ‘the fullest cooperation’ of Pakistan. In other statement on 13 September, President Bush said those who harbored terrorist would be treated as terrorist. Asked whether he made any progress in obtaining cooperation with Pakistan, Bush replied, ‘we will give the Pakistani government a chance to cooperate.’\(^{448}\) The United States were very much concerned and highly apprehensive about the role the Pakistan were supposed to be playing in the entire game as such they completely made it clear to Pakistan about their stand and the expectation they held form the Pakistan Government in Islamabad.\(^{449}\)

On September 13, the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, summoned the Ambassador of Pakistan (and the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence, then on a visit to Washington) for a meeting to convey the list of ‘seven steps’ the United Nations wanted from Pakistan to take. He was reported to have painted a stark picture: the situation was black or white. Pakistan had no choice to make. Either it was with the US or it was not. There was no half measure they had to accept the ‘seven steps’ which were:

a. To stop Al Qaeda operations at its border and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden.

b. To give the United States blanket over flight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations.

c. To provide United States with intelligence information’s.

\(^{446}\) Sattar, Abdul; *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005*; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 244

\(^{447}\) President George Bush; 12 September; 2001


\(^{449}\) As reviled in *The 9/11 Commission Report*, W.W. Norton& Co., New York; pp 330: The US records that became available later after three years confirmed the apprehensions Pakistan had anticipated. In a restricted National Security Council Meeting chaired by President Bush on 11 September, Secretary of State’s Powell said, ‘the United States had to make it clear to Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab states that the time to act was now.’ Also the NSC Principals Committee on 13 September, ‘focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against al-Qaeda (and) conclude that if Pakistan decided not to help the United Sates, it too would be at risk’
d. To provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda.

e. To continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts.

f. To cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan.

g. If the evidence implicated bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government.450

Over a period of about two weeks, President Musharraf held lengthy and interactive discussions with a dozen groups of prominent people from various walks of national life, including leaders of political parties, the intelligentsia, media luminaries, ulema and mashaikh; influential persons from adjoining Afghanistan and minorities. Their response was reassuring except the ulema (religious scholars) differed. A majority of them opposed the cooperation with US, arguing that right was on the side of Taliban, and therefore religious duty required Pakistan to support them, regardless of cost and consequences. But Musharraf having decided on its strategy in advance, Islamabad was in opposition to give a prompt and generally positive response, when the US request was received.451 However the impression that Pakistan had ‘totally’ acquiesced in is demands was incorrect. Still Pakistan made substantial concessions and President Musharraf made that point in his response, suggesting that the people needed to see Pakistan was benefitting from the decision.452

The US led coalition attacked Afghanistan on 6 October 2001, Pakistani religious parties called for a demonstration. Some misguided imams in the border areas encouraged simple youth to go to Afghanistan and fight on the side of the Taliban but this was never approved or encouraged by the Government. But the government intelligently handed the situation and the wisdom of the protest and its participation was narrowed down to narrow section of opinion. The US and the West applauded the Pakistani Government for the enlightened leadership; and manifested their solidarity by visiting to Pakistan. Never before have so many leaders came to Pakistan as in the months after September, one on the heels of the other and


sometimes on the same day.\footnote{Sattar, Abdul; \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005}; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 246} Thus soon Pakistan became in the good book of America and the entire word seriously commended the positive role and assistance which Pakistan had rendered in the war against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. Although Islamabad did not bargain for a quid pro quo, it was not unmindful of the value and importance of its contribution to the fight against terrorism, and hence of Pakistan’s enlightenment to reciprocity by the US and other Western Countries. Appreciating Pakistan’s key role as ‘frontline state’ in the war on terrorism, the United States, the EU and Japan dismantled nuclear and democratic sanctions and resumed assistance to Pakistan. The Brownback-II amendment authorized the US President to annually waive ‘democracy sanctions’ and the Akerman Amendment in 2004 waived the nuclear sanction for five years. By March 2002, Pakistan received over one billion dollar in aid and debt write-off.\footnote{Sattar, Abdul; \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005}; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 246} Resumed late on 2001, the US economic and military aid and assistance to Pakistan amounted to $1,766 million by 2003.\footnote{K Allal, Kronstadt; \textit{Pakistan-US Relations}; Issue Brief for Congress no. IB94041} In 2004 the US announced a 5 years package of $3 Billion in grant for economic and military assistance. Also the Bush administration extended low interest credits for the purchase of airliners of PIA, expanded trade access with long term benefits for Pakistan’s export that rose to nearly three billion dollar in 2004, and agreed to sell C-130 transport planes, P-3 Orion marine surveillance aircraft, TOW anti-tank missiles and other equipment for defense, valued at $1.2 billion. March 2005 the United States further decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to Pakistan.\footnote{Sattar, Abdul; \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005}; (OUP; Karachi; 2007)’ pp 247} Apart from immediate fiscal relief, improvement of relations with major countries yielded long term aid and trade benefits as well as an empathetic political environment conducive to the maintenance of peace in the region.

The post 9/11 period, Pakistan-US relations turned a new dimension of positive relationship. After the incident the US spokesman repeatedly sought to assure the nations in the region of the durability of their country’s new policy, emphasizing especially the continuity of US cooperation with Pakistan. The priorities of Bush administration in its second term was ‘further broadening of the bilateral relations with Pakistan in economic and security fields,’ said the United States Deputy Secretary of States, Richard Armitage, on the visit to
Islamabad after the reelection of President Bush. He noted that ‘Pakistan enjoyed broad based and solid support in the United States.’ Moreover the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States should make ‘the difficult long term commitments the future of Pakistan sustaining the current aid of scale to Pakistan.’\textsuperscript{457} The US congress even passed an act in December 2004 with provisions assuring continued assistance after the expiry of five-year package plans in 2009. Even the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed that ‘Pakistan has become a vital ally with US in the war on terror’. Recalling that ‘at one time in our history we did not maintain and continued deep relations with Pakistan after having shared interests during the Cold War,’ she assured her Pakistani audience during her visit to Islamabad, ‘The US will be a friend for life.’\textsuperscript{458}

\textbf{(3.16) Abbottabad Incident and US-Pakistan Relations}

Hardly the myth of Pakistan lasted for long and again with the Abbottabad incident the real face of Pakistan- a haven for organized global terrorism got exposed yet again and the US Pakistan relations plummeted to a new low. Coded as Operation Geronimo in the night of May 1, 2011 US Special Forces’ and Navy Seals killed Osama Bin Laden and his associates in a highly secretive night raid in Abbottabad, where the Al Qaeda chief was hiding in a secure and fortified bungalow, a city located just 90 miles from Islamabad. The incident, brought in serious questions regarding the manner in which Pakistani sovereignty was breached while carrying out such an operation, the role of Pakistani intelligence and how did someone like Bin Laden be living in a place so close to headquarters of military intelligence and Islamabad for years without the knowledge of the Pakistani intelligence and administration. Naturally, the true intent of Pakistan’s war on terror was questioned, which justified the action taken by the US in eliminating one of the main architects of Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{459}

However, finding Bin Laden in Abbottabad and killing him was a reminder that Pakistan was the global epicenter for Islamist terrorists. Other than Al-Zarqavi, all the top most leaders of

\textsuperscript{457} \textit{The 9/11 Commission Report}, W.W. Norton& Co., New York; pp 369

\textsuperscript{458} \textit{Dawn}; Islamabad; March 18, 2005

Al-Qaeda were and found in Pakistan. The Pakistani state is challenged by multiple militant outfits with different agendas and capacities. This is a result of three decades of misplaced policies which saw militants as tools of foreign policy.460

(3.17) Obama and US-Pakistan Relations

Post Abbottabad the relations between Obama and the Pakistani administration have been more based on mutual need than on friendship and commitment. US, during Obama, have used the carrot and stick approach all through while dealing with Pakistan. In the post-9/11 period, assisting in the establishment of a stable and secure democratic governmental setup, and affluent Pakistan actively combating the menace of organized religious militancy has turned to be been the most important vision of U.S. foreign policy. Vital U.S. interests are seen to be at stake in its engagement with Pakistan related to regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism; Pakistan-India tensions and conflict; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. As a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and as the world’s most rapid proliferators of nuclear weapons, Pakistan presents a combination that places it at the top of many governments’ international security agendas.461

In the post-2001 era the perils of organized Islamic extremist and militant forces has scathed Pakistan’s domestic stability which became increasingly dominant since 2007. The innumerable and incongruent Islamist terrorist groups there, many of which displayed mutual rivalry in the past, became more intermingled and mutually supportive after 2009.462

Although US administrators have continuously kept a pressure on Pakistani administration to take positive actions against terrorism but hardly the leaders of Islamabad could take nay coherent steps against them. However on June 2014 the Pakistani armed forces lodged a major military onslaught over the Islamist militant groups those who have taken sheltered in


the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the country, which propped up a great positive response from the US officials and raised great confidence over Pakistan.

Meanwhile some scholar also have argued that the operative wings of Islamic State is holding their active presence in some regions of Pakistan, facts and study reviles that the insurgents of Haqqani Network of Afghan have their base in some of the regions of North Waziristan and Kurram agencies of the FATA.\textsuperscript{463} However, US analysts are cynical that any qualitative conversion of state policies will be seen, given the Pakistani military’s long history of distinctive steps between “bad militants” (those that attack Pakistanis and the state apparatus) and “good militants” (those that the government has used as proxy forces against India and in Afghanistan).\textsuperscript{464}

In order to curb down the terrorists and insurgents Pakistan is employing the U.S unmanned aerial vehicles - Predator and Reaper in the remote regions of western Pakistan. Till 2010 the rate of such drone attack were at the peak with 122 attacks reported, but gradually its being declining in the days post 2010. The DC-based New American Foundation counted only 22 strikes in Pakistan in 2014, the lowest annual total of the Obama Administration. A similarly slow pace has continued in 2015.\textsuperscript{465}

The Pentagon’s biannual report to Congress states “Afghan- and Indian-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India’s superior military. These relationships run counter to Pakistan’s public commitment to support Afghan-led reconciliation.... Pakistan also seeks sufficient Pashtun representation in the Afghan government to prevent Pashtun discontent along the Afghan-Pakistan border and limit India’s influence”.\textsuperscript{466} For more than a decade the U.S. and NATO officials have grumbled the fact that the Afghan insurgents are taking safe refuge on the

\textsuperscript{463}“Pakistan Suffered Heavy Losses in Fighting War on Terror,” Dawn, December 5, 2014


Pakistani side of the Durand Line. However in the recent years, a “reverse infiltration” synonym has been witnessed as the insurgents and fugitive of Pakistan based terror organization are using the topography of eastern Afghanistan as their safe havens. has emerged as Pakistan-based militants find refuge in eastern Afghanistan. In a new twist the Pakistani officials now are reproaching the Afghan and allied forces for failing to intercept militants fleeing from Pakistan’s operations in the FATA.

Islamabad ranks in the tops among the leading beneficiary of U.S. foreign aid in the post-9/11 era. It is believed that more than $18 billion of such assistance for FY2002-FY2015, including $10.5 billion in economic development, and humanitarian aid, and over $7.6 billion in security allied aid has been provided to Pakistan since 2001. Moreover apart from this it has also been the recipient of about $13 billion in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) payments for its logistical and operational support in the U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan. Since 2001 the US Congress has allotted more than $8 billion in Economic Support Funds for Pakistan (along with another $2 billion in other forms of development and humanitarian aid). Via Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) Bill, the United States has devoted $5 billion in civilian aid in addition to more than $1 billion for emergency humanitarian response, mainly for flood recovery. The growing aid has kept Pakistan stay close to the US administration, and has been forced to formulate policies that could build in the process of promoting stability in the region.

(3.18) Assessment:

As has been mentioned before the relationship between US and Pakistan has gone through serious us and downs depending on changing geo-political nature and policy making of both the leaderships. US policy makers concentrated more on enhancing their sphere of influence and protecting their assets on the grounds where as Pakistan relationship with US was mostly built on strengthening itself against India. US used Pakistan either to contain communism, tame India when needed or to fulfill the global imperatives, which the US had launched. The Pakistani leadership including the army from the very beginning till date has not been able to

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consider US as an ally similar to that of China and has been extremely cautious while forging relationship with the super power. US however have failed miserably to access Pakistan even during the friendliest of time where finding Osama bin Laden in Abbotbad came as a shocker to them. But due to the geo-strategic location of the country US neither has been able to take stringent action on Pakistan similar to that of Afghanistan nor antagonize China by punishing Pakistan for its follies. On the Kashmir issue US can be a party to be blamed for not punishing for an amicable relation during the late forties identifying the justified claims of India and rather nurtured bruised egos and conceptualizing future battle fronts.