CHAPTER – 7

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it must be reminded that, Rawls did seek to reconcile the liberties of the ancient with the liberties of the modern. The publication of John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* in 1971 was not only a landmark in ethics and political philosophy, but has also proved to be a decisive contribution to research in the philosophy of law, political sociology, and social psychology, and, to a less obvious degree, in ongoing discussions in metaphysics, moral epistemology, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of mind.\(^1\) As it has become quite known in the debate opposing universalist and communitarian models of moral reasoning in political philosophy, Rawls conceives of an original position as an attempt to model the considerations that determine the principles of justice for a well-ordered society, in which public criteria for judging the feasible, basic structure of society would be publicly recognized and accepted by all. Hence the procedural device of rules or public criteria which parties in the original position would endorse prudentially is to be constructed from behind a veil of ignorance, so that the parties know nothing specific about the particular person they are supposed to represent.

The main objective of the theory of justice proposed by John Rawls was to

\(^1\) Economists, Sociologist, Psychologists, Jurists, Political Thinkers, Moral Philosophers, all have taken an interest in his writing and are contributing to ever growing literature on Rawls.
bring a compromise between the two conflicting trends, that is, capitalism and socialism. Rawls emphasized on the social arrangements of modern democracies in order to bring a balance between these two trends. This attempt lead to a proposal for a drastic change in the whole set up of the social arrangement. He feels that by modifying the social structure the ills of the liberal democratic society can be removed completely. Rawls Theory of Justice got a large pragmatic value, in spite of the theory being hypothetical.

The inequalities in wealth, talent and position in the current state of the society are established facts in contrast Kantian’s theory appears to provide a humanistic conception of justice to limit these inequalities. His conception of justice unable to connect the ever-widening distance between the haves and the have not’s. He perpetuates the difference between the two classes. The bourgeois remained as bourgeois and proletariat as proletariat. Rawls ultimate fact is to upload the self-respect of the under-privileged securing their protection and security from the authority of the privileged ones.

The thesis has been divided into seven chapters and I have tried to examine Rawls’s Political Philosophy as a whole to find out whether it is a coherent unity or a mere realistic compromise of diverse ideas. Another aspect which has been investigated is the narrowing of claims to validity of his theory. Earlier he thought his theory of justice to be of universal applicability. But now with political liberalism its validity seems to have been narrowed to liberal democracies only. As the law of peoples indicates the international evolution of peoples in terms of violation of human rights is questionable. And I have also tried to investigate whether it is a correct stand.

In chapter one, which is the Introduction, an attempt has been made to
systematically study the state of literature on Rawls’s Political Philosophy, his idea of Political Liberalism and his methodology of Reflective Equilibrium. Rawls calls his version of liberalism ‘Political Liberalism’. Rawls’s political Liberalism introduce important modification into the idea of justice presented in the ‘Theory of Justice’. Rawls understands his political liberalism as a doctrine whole central goal is to make possible an agreement on a political conception of justice. A political conception of justice is understood as a conception independent of comprehensive religious, moral or philosophical doctrine and found in the political culture of democratic societies.”

In chapter two, “Concept of Person and Society”, the two specific intuitive ideas on which Rawls focuses his attention to develop his arguments are a view of society as a fair system of cooperation and a conception of the person as possessing two moral powers, that is abilities to form and revise one’s own conception of the good and to live on fair terms of cooperation with others. Because these particulars conceptions of the person and of society are built into the structure of the original position, selection of principles of justice under these conditions identified them as the most suitable principles for free and equal citizens, possessing the two moral powers, who seeks to live on fair terms of cooperation with others. The complex conception of person and society that Rawls makes use of in his political philosophy is that of a moral person as free and equal citizen who enters a well-ordered society by birth and exists by death and lives his life in it. For Rawls his

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3Ibid, P. 523.

conception of person represents how the persons conceive of themselves and their social relations in the public political culture of a liberal democratic society.

In chapter three, that is, ‘Original Position and The Idea of Social Contract’, Rawls’s idea of Social contract⁵ and Original Position which is a hypothetical situation⁶ articulated by him as a thought experiment to replace the imagery of a savage state of nature of prior political philosophers like Thomas Hobbes has been explained and elaborated. Rawls has constructed what is perhaps the most abstract version of a social contract theory.⁷ It is highly abstract because rather than demonstrating that we would or even have signed to a contract to established society, it instead shows us what we must be willing to accept as rational persons in order to be constrained by justice and therefore capable of living in a well ordered society. Rawls in one hand talk of a contract in which a person in a hypothetical original position agrees to the provisions of a contract that define the basic rights and duties of citizen in a civil society and yet on the other hand he appeals to an overlapping consensus in a liberal society where everyone is free to express his opinion and beliefs. Here it is not clear that how is Rawls going to reconcile that demands of real

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consensus in a given liberal democratic society with the ideal agreement in imaginary
original position.

Like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, Rawls belongs to the Social contract
tradition. However, Rawls social contract takes a different form than that of previous
thinkers. Specially, Rawls develops what he claims the principles of justice through
the use of a deliberately artificial device, which he calls the ‘Original Position’, in
which everyone decides principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance.¹ This
‘veil’ is one that essentially blinds people to all facts about themselves that might bias
the notion of justice that is developed. Ignorance of these details about oneself will
lead to principles which are fair to all. Rawls claims that the parties in the Original
Position would adopt two such principles, which would then govern the assignment of
rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages
across society.

In chapter four, ‘The Two Principles of Justice’, Rawls conception of the two
principles of justice has been explained and evaluated.² Rawls made a significant
contribution to his political philosophy in his A Theory of Justice. It is Rawls attempts
to solve the problem of distributive justice by utilizing a variant of the familiar device
of the social contract. The resultant theory is known as justice as fairness from which
Rawls derives his two famous principles of justice: the liberty principles and the

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²Rawls, John, “The Principles of Justice”, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge,
difference principles. Rawls’s primary objective in *A Theory of Justice* is to provide a solution to the problem of political obligation. To put it in another way, his aim is to explain why and under what circumstances citizens are obliged to obey the laws which the state imposes.

Rawls advocates two principles of justice which have undergone many modifications to become the following principles. In the first principle each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system, of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. And in the second principle social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just saving principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.¹⁰

The importance of the general conception outlined above is that it is part of Rawls’s acknowledgement that justice can fully operate only under sufficiently advanced social conditions. What is the precise condition for the two principles are, is not defined. But the intuitive idea is compelling: before reaching a certain stage of development say, for example, industrialization – a society can legitimately infringe on individual liberties to reach that stage of development which will enable the principles of justice to operate fully.

In chapter five, Rawls idea of “Overlapping Consensus and Public Reason”, which is applied to a liberal society where everyone should be free to express his

opinion and belief, has been explained and examined. The term overlapping consensus is coined by John Rawls in his Political Liberalism.\textsuperscript{11} The term refers to how supporters of different comprehensive doctrines can agree on a specific form of political organization. In Rawls case, this is applied to a liberal society where everyone should be free to express his opinion and beliefs. Again, Public Reason is another important concept of Rawls, which is used by him to refer to the common reasons of all citizens in pluralist society. Public Reason is contrasted by Rawls with the nonpublic reason employed by citizens as members of religious associations or as adherents to particular moral and philosophical doctrine.\textsuperscript{12}

Chapter six is about Rawls’s idea of “The Law of Peoples”. In the Law of peoples, Rawls claimed that “well-ordered” peoples could be either ‘liberal’ or ‘decent hierarchical’.\textsuperscript{13} The law of peoples consists of eight principles. They are 1. Peoples are free and independent, and there freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples, 2. People are to observe treaties and undertaking, 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them, 4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention, 5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but not right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense, 6. Peoples are to honor


\textsuperscript{12}Ibid

human rights, 7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war, and 8. Peoples have the duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.\textsuperscript{14}

The actors in Rawls’s Law of people are not individuals but societies. A people is a group of individuals ruled by a common government, bound together by common sympathies, and firmly attached to a common conception of right and justice. ‘People’ is a moralized concept, and not all states currently on the world map qualify as such. To believe that Rawls’s vision is possible is to believe that individuals are not merely selfish or amoral, and that international relations can be more than a contest for power, wealth and glory. The practical goal of Rawls’s Law of Peoples is the elimination of the great evils of human history, unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, genocide and mass murder. The limits of this ambition mean that there will be much in the world to which Rawls’s political philosophy offers no reconciliation.

Rawls imagines an international ‘Original Position’ in which all reasonable people are represented. He emphasize that peoples, not persons, are the units of representation and that the criterion of fairness for the law of peoples is that its principles should be acceptable. The interests of individual person are taken into account only indirectly, as they may be served by advancing the legitimate interests of their societies.

\textsuperscript{14}Rawls, John, \textit{The Law of Peoples}, Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press,1999, P. 3
In chapter seven, I have tried to summarize the findings in the preceding chapters. There are many articles and books published on Rawls work. ‘The liberal Theory of Justice’, 15 written by Brian Barry is one of its examples. But Rawls and Barry both never considered the centrality of the value of man in the study of society. They missed out this vital point in their theory. Rawls by and large in a Kartian. 16 He build up his hypothetical theory by looking into the initial state of the society as depicted by the contractualists. Rawls gave a detailed account of the methodology required to protect the liberty of man, of which the measures like the doctrine of primary goods and just constitution are among the important ones.

Rawls talked a lot about justice, he even gave two fundamental principles of justice. 17 But Rawls have never answer the questions as to why justice should be given to individuals in the society and why they should be treated equally in terms of primary good and opportunities, i.e., why shall a society be just? And is it possible to treat individuals on equal floating in respect of primary goods and opportunities because all the individuals of the society do not possess equal potentiality, so how can they get equal income and wealth? The fact that justice is a moral concept can only be explained to the human society, if human are taken as the centre of this morality,


16 Ibid.

seems to have escaped from Rawls attention.

Generally, the term “equality” implies that all men are equal and they should be given equal liberty and opportunity. They may demand identity of reward and treatment. But in actual practice, men are not equal in all respects. The term “equality” has many facts and it cannot even be defined exactly. And justice and equality cannot be understood in equal floating. Justice implies to bring about a just society. On the other hand, equality means equal opportunities to all. It is the foundation of justice. Both justice and equality are based on democracy. However there is a fundamental difference between the two. The concept of equality is to be treated in the principle of equality before law and equal protection of the laws. But justice harmonizes the needs with one another, and the functions with the needs. The primary goods of the citizens may be the same, but their functions are not equally important. The individuals who are equal in needs must be treated equally; on the contrary, those who are unequal should be treated unequally. The purpose of the society is not to remove inequality but to achieve and maintain effective equality. In this way, therefore, equality can be adjusted with justice.

Perhaps one more thing must be noted that as an exercise in political constructivism, Rawls presents the original position argument which models our fundamental and shared political conception of ourselves as free and equal citizen engaged in fair social cooperation within a well-ordered society. Because its root idea


(person qua citizens as equal, fair social cooperation, well-ordered society) are latent in our shared public political culture (that of a constitutional liberal democracy) and its aim is to settle on narrowly political principles of justice, this recast original position argument may serve adequately for us as a basis for reasoned public political deliberation even under condition of reasonable pluralism.

But controversy continues over whether John Rawls A Theory of Justice should be interpreted as ‘ruling our capitalism’\textsuperscript{19} as a justifiable social order. Ostensibly, the acceptance of Rawls difference principle should commit one is principle to the reduction of social and inequalities that are said to characterize society. As such, Rawls can be interpreted as advocating a program of economic leveling or economic redistribution to correct this unjust feature of capitalism.

Professor DiQuattro defends this reading of Rawls in a recent article ‘Rawls and left criticism.’ His purpose is to reassure that ‘Rawls Theory of Justice’ is essentially compatible with socialist, including Marxist, idea of social justice, and that it is basically opposed to a capitalistic notion of justice.\textsuperscript{20} According to Hayek, Rawls is not sufficiently determinate in selecting out those distributive institutions that are compatible with, or required by, his theory. Rawls theory is more concrete in its implications for basic distributive strategies. He argues that it included (minimally) market socialism and property owing democracy, while excluding (minimally) capitalism.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
In *Political Liberalism* Rawls in effect responds to the communitarian criticism\(^\text{22}\) that his *A Theory of Justice* relies upon a controversial Metaphysical notion of the autonomous self by arguing that the principles of liberal justice as he understand them should not be embraced on metaphysical grounds, but because they can be publicly justified to the vast majority of members of a pluralist society. His own theory of justice, he explains, is an elaboration of basic, widely shared intuitions about justice among citizens in liberal democracies.

The communitarian critique of Rawlsian liberalism\(^\text{23}\) did a great service by focusing attention on dimensions of moral and political life that recent academic liberal theory had neglected. This is a genuine achievement. Right talk is now balanced by attention to responsibility and duty, leading liberal thinkers find themselves preoccupied with the context of character, and concern for the dignity and well-being of individuals has been complemented by consideration of the role that communities play in forming individuals who are capable not only of earning for themselves and cooperation for mutual advantage, but also of developing enduring friendships, sustaining marriage, and rearing of children.\(^\text{24}\)

To sum up from the above discussion, Rawls viewed his own work as a practical contribution toward setting the long-standing conflict in democratic thought between liberty and equality, and toward describing the limits of civic and of

\(^{23}\text{Ibid.}\
\(^{24}\text{Ibid.}\

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international toleration. He offers the members of his own society a way of understanding themselves as free and equal citizens within a fair democratic polity, and describes a hopeful but limited vision of a stably just constitutional democracy doing its part within a peaceful international community. To individuals who are frustrated that their fellow citizens and fellow humans do not see the whole truth as they do, Rawls offers the reconciling thought that this diversity of worldviews results from, and can support, a social order with greater freedom for all.

According to Rawls there are four rules of political philosophy in a society’s public life. The first role is practical: political philosophy can discover bases for reasoned agreement in a society where sharp divisions threaten to lead to conflict. A second role of political philosophy is to help citizens to orient themselves within their own social world. A third role is to probe the limits of practicable political possibility. A fourth role of political philosophy is reconciliation: “to calm our frustration and rage against us the way in which its institutions….are rational and developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form” 25

Unlike utilitarian, Rawls political philosophy is not simply applied moral philosophy. The utilitarian holds to one universal moral principle that is, maximizing utility, which he applies to individual actions, political constitutions, international relations, and all other subjects as required. Rawls has no universal principle: “The correct regulative principle for anything”, he says, “depend on the nature of that

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thing”. Rawls confines his theorizing to the political domain, and within this domain holds that the correct principles for each sub-domain depend on its agents and constraints.

Within each sub-domain of the political philosophy Rawls also follows a sequence: ideal theory before non-ideal theory. Ideal theory makes two types of idealizing assumptions about its subject matter first, ideal theory assumes that all citizens or societies are generally willing to comply with whatever principles are chosen. Ideal theory thus idealizes away the possibility of law-breaking, either by individual crime or by society’s aggressive war. Second, ideal theory assumes reasonably favorable social conditions, wherein citizens and societies are able to abide by principles of political co-operation. Completing ideal theory first, Rawls says, yields a systematic understanding of how to reform our non-ideal world, and fixes a vision of what is the best that can be hoped for. Once ideal theory is completed for a political sub-domain, non-ideal theory can be set out by reference to the ideal. For instance once we find ideal principles for citizens who can be productive members of society over a complete life, we will be better able to frame non-ideal principles for providing health care to citizens with serious illnesses or disabilities. Similarly, once we understand the ideal principles of international relations we will better see how the international community should act toward failed states, as well as toward aggressive states that menace the peace.27

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The most abstract aim of political philosophy is to reach justified conclusions about how political institutions should be arranged. For Rawls how justified one is in one’s political convictions depends on how close one is to achieving reflective equilibrium. In reflective equilibrium all of one’s beliefs, on all levels of generality, cohere perfectly with one another. Thus in reflective equilibrium one’s specific political judgments like slavery is unjust”, support one’s more general political convictions which support one’s very abstract beliefs about oneself and one’s world. Though perfect reflective equilibrium is unattainable, we can use the method of reflective equilibrium to get closer to it and so increase the justifiability of our beliefs.

In working toward greater reflective equilibrium any type of belief could in principle be relevant to one’s conclusions about how political institutions should be arranged. Metaphysical beliefs about free will or personal identity might be relevant, as could epistemological beliefs about how we come to know what moral facts there are. However, while this is correct in principle Rawls hold that in practice productive moral and political theorizing will proceed to a large extent independent of metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed as a methodological presumption Rawls reverse the traditional order of priority. Progress in metethics will derive from progress in substantive moral and political theorizing instead of vice versa.28 Rawls’s own meta-ethical theory of the objectivity and validity of political judgments, political

constructivism, will be described here after the substantive political theory from which it emerges.

If a free society citizens will have disparate worldviews. Rawls holds that the need to impose a unified law on a diverse citizenry raises two fundamental issues. The first is the issue of legitimacy: the legitimate use of coercive political power. In a democracy political power is always the power of the people as a collective body. How can it be legitimate for a democratic people to coerce all citizens to follow just one law, given that citizens will inevitably hold to different worldviews? The second issue is the issue of stability, which looks at political power from the receiving and why would a citizen willingly obey the law if it is imposed on her by a collective body many of whose members have beliefs and values quite dissimilar to her own? Yet unless most citizens willingly obey the law, no social order can be stable for long. Rawls addresses these issues of legitimacy and stability within his theory of *Political Liberalism*.

Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. The liberal principle of legitimacy frames the

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URL= <Plato.Stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rawls/>

problem of legitimacy: how any particular set of basic laws can legitimately be imposed upon a pluralistic citizenry. Rawls’s solution to this problem begins with the hope that many of the citizens of a democratic society will be reasonable.

Reasonable citizens want to live in a society in which they can cooperate with their fellow citizens on terms that are acceptable to all. Reasonable citizens want, in short, to belong to a society where political power is legitimately used. Each reasonable citizen has his own view about God and life, right and wrong, good and bad. Each has, that is, what Rawls calls his own comprehensive doctrine. There is only one source of fundamental ideas that can serve as a focal point for all reasonable citizens of a liberal society, which is the society’s public political culture. The public political culture of a democratic society, Rawls says, “comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the judiciary); as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge” 31.

Rawls’s solution to the problem of legitimacy in a liberal society is for political power to be exercised in accordance with a political conception of justice. A political conception of justice is a moral conception generated from the fundamental ideas implicit in that society’s public political culture. A political conception is not derived from any particular comprehensive doctrine, nor is it a compromise among the worldviews that happen to exist in society at the moment. Rather a political conception is freestanding: its content is set out independently of the comprehensive

doctrines that citizens affirm. Reasonable citizens, who want to cooperate with one another on mutually acceptable terms, will see that a freestanding political conception generated from ideas in the public political culture is the only basis for cooperation that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. The use of coercive political power guided by the principles of a political conception of justice will therefore be legitimate coercion.

Rawls’s hopes for a stable liberal society rest on an overlapping consensus. In an overlapping consensus, citizens support the same basic laws for different reasons. In Rawlsian terms, each citizen supports a political conception of justice for reasons internal to her own comprehensive doctrine. A political conception is freestanding: it is a “module” that can fit into any number of world views that citizens might have. In an overlapping consensus each reasonable citizen affirms this common “module” from within her own perspective.

Having seen how Rawls addresses the problems of legitimacy and stability we can return to legitimacy and its criterion of reciprocity: citizens must reasonably believe that all citizens can reasonably accept the enforcement of a particular set of basic law. It is unreasonable for citizens to attempt to impose what they seen as the whole truth on others- political power must be used in ways that all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse. With his doctrine of public reason, Rawls extends this requirement of reciprocity to apply directly to how citizens explain their political decisions to one another. In essence, public reason requires citizens to be able to justify their political decisions to one another using publicly available value and standing. Rawls’s doctrine of public reason can be summarized as citizens engaged in certain political activities have a duty of civility to be able to justify their decisions on
fundamental political issues by reference only to public values and public standards.

Now justice as fairness is Rawls’s theory of justice for a liberal society. As a member of the family of liberal political conceptions of justice it provides a framework for the legitimate use of political power. Yet legitimacy is only the minimal standard of political acceptability; a political order can be legitimate without being just. Justice is the maximal moral standard: the full description of how a society’s main institutions should be ordered.

Rawls constructs justice as fairness around specific interpretations of the defining liberal ideas that citizens are free and equal and that society should be fair. He holds that justice as fairness is the most egalitarian, and also the most plausible, interpretation of liberalism’s fundamental concepts. Rawls sees justice as fairness as answering to the demands of both freedom and equality, a challenge posed by the socialist critique of liberal democracy and by the conservation critique of the modern welfare state. Justice as fairness sets out a version of social contract theory that Rawls believes provides a superior understanding of justice to that of the dominant tradition in political philosophy: utilitarianism.

Again Justice as fairness aims to describe a just arrangement of the major political and social institutions of a liberal society: the political constitution, the legal system, the economy, the family, and so on. The arrangement of these institutions is a society’s basic structure. And these guiding ideas of justice as fairness are expressed in its two principles of justice. The first principle of equal basic liberties is to be used for designing the political constitution, while the second principle applies primarily to economic institutions.

According to Rawls, citizens are equal in virtue of having the capacities to
participate in social cooperation over a complete life citizens may have greater or lesser skills, talents, and powers “above the line” required to cooperate, but differences above this line have no bearing on citizen’s underlying equal status. And Rawlsian citizens are not only free and equal, they are also reasonable and rational.

Rawls derives his account of primary goods from the conception of the citizen as free and equal, reasonable and rational. Primary goods are essential for developing a wide range of specific conceptions of the good life. “And the primary goods are, the basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, and free choice among a wide range of occupations, the powers of offices and positions of responsibility, income and wealth, the social bases of self-respect” the recognition by social institutions that gives citizens a sense of self-worth and the confidence to carry out their plans. All citizens are assumed have fundamental interests in getting more of these primary goods, and political institutions are to evaluate how well citizens are doing according to what primary goods they have. It is equality and inequality of primary goods that, Rawls claims, are of the greater political importance.

Rawls’s conception of society is also defined by fairness, social institutions are to be fair to all cooperating members of society, regardless of their cast, race, gender, religion, class of origin, reasonable conception of the good life, and so on. Rawls also emphasizes publicity as an aspect of fairness. The publicity condition requires that a society’s operative principles of justice be neither esoteric non ideological screen for deeper power relations: that in “Public Political Life, nothing

Rawls’s conception of citizens and society are still quite abstract, and some might think innocuous. The original position aims to move from these abstract conceptions to determinate principles of social justice. The strategy of the original position is to construct a method of reasoning that models abstract ideas about justice so as to focus their power together onto the choice of principles. The original position is a thought experiment: an imaginary situation in which each real citizen has a representative, and all of these representative come to an agreement on which principles of justice should order the political institutions of the real citizens. And the most striking feature of the original positions is the veil of ignorance, which prevents other arbitrary facts about citizens from influencing the agreement among their representatives. And Rawls also puts forward that the original position as a useful device for reaching greater reflective equilibrium.

And finally, Rawls talked about the ‘Law of Peoples’, by ‘Law of People’, Rawls means, “a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice”. This political conception of justice is arrived although the device of the ‘original position’ – a hypothetical arrangement whereby representative of each of the peoples get together with the aim of determining principles that will govern the terms of their association.


John Rawls was a great thinker and philosopher and his political philosophy is
discussed widely. His famous *A Theory of Justice* is very much akin to the
contractarian theory of justice, specially, advocated by Rousseau and Kant. But
beholding from an abstract hypothetical angel, Rawls tries to put forth his own theory
of justice and try to depict a social structure which can uphold the basic rights and
liberties of all in equal manner for the benefit of all, specially for the wellbeing of the
least advantaged group of the society.