Chapter I
The Theoretical Framework:

State and Ethnicity

"The abstraction of the State as such belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times".

-Karl Marx

At the outset it is pertinent to have a clear understanding of the theoretical and conceptual areas of first, what is 'State'; its role and function in the context of ethnic relations. Secondly, what is 'ethnicity'; how it operates in terms of seeking political space, sharing of economic resources, or mere search and/or or preservation of identity, particularly in the context of transitional societies, such as Central Asia? A modest attempt has been made to bring in the synthesis of existing theories available on State and ethnicity in this chapter.

History of State Formation

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the belief that a new democratic age has dawned is widespread. Paradoxically, however, many people are sceptical and cynical about the ability of government, even a democratic one, to provide peace and prosperity. This paradox is reflected in two common, but divergent, responses: while some people are embracing a world of multicultural connections by throwing off national identities in favour of global ones, others are retreating into more and more privatised worlds in which they cut themselves off as much as possible from people different from themselves. It is an interesting paradox of unification and diversification in international and nation-state arena. Despite the simultaneous celebrations of globalism and retreats from public life, States still

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persist in capturing the political imaginations and allegiances of vast numbers of people around the world. States continue to collect taxes, manage economies, organise collective identities, and make war. Moreover, it is still primarily states, or groups aspiring to form states, that make war, although in important ways this is no longer exclusively the case.

States, in significant and troubling ways, are also expanding their powers of surveillance and coercion. Some categories of people are being imprisoned by the states in which they live at ever-increasing rates. In many, censorship is on the rise, private communications are being monitored more frequently, as aspects of state’s coercive behaviour (shall be discussed in the fourth chapter in the context of Uzbekistan in detail). In spite of the end of the Cold War, the military budgets of the major protagonists have not fallen dramatically. The “peace dividend” many expected has not been realised. States continue to represent the world to their citizens as a dangerous place requiring a strong national defence and “the next generation” of advanced weaponry. States continue to exaggerate and fabricate external threats in order to present others as ‘enemies’. Not to speak of over generalisations and sweeping conclusions related to terrorism giving cover to all contradictions in foreign policies and domestic policies. Nationalism and patriotism show few signs of abatement.

What is a State? This is a difficult question to answer because the idea of the State conjures multiple meanings and associations. Sometimes the State refers “primarily to an institutional apparatus: bureaucracies, armies, ministries, police, legislatures, political parties, and the like. At other times it signifies something broader, more in keeping with its reference to a territorial entity. And still other times it refers to its legal and symbolic character as sovereign power. Defining the
state in terms of any one of these alone; institutionally, sovereignty, territoriality—
would be a mistake. Moreover, the history of the State is not a simple or linear
process. Its development has been rather messy and unpredictable, complex and
open to a multiplicity of possible trajectories. Here attempt is made to give a
historical approach that interprets how these different meanings of the state are
constructed and interpenetrate to constitute the abstraction referred to as the
"State".

The State and Sovereignty

History is important because only by examining the state in historical
perspective can it be shown that the state is not universal and given, not an
immanent part of human nature. A history of the state reveals how it was created
by people acting within the boundaries of the understandings and structures of their
time and place, as well as through contingent conditions and circumstances. The
State is an effect of the way peoples live. A historical approach reveals, for
example, that sovereignty, although a crucial component of States, is not identical
to the State. Sovereignty is instituted, as Hobbes said, not by States as if states pre-
existed sovereignty and took possession of it, but as part of the State's
development. Therefore, the historical specificity of sovereignty, the way it is
formed, instituted, and reproduced at particular times and places are important to
an account of the State.

Other important benefits of a historical approach are, first, that social
constructions that appear to be universal, fixed, or given, such as the distinction

Introduction to Contemporary Politics (New York, 1998).

4 Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches," American Political
between State and society, the relationship between domestic (internal) and international (external) politics, the connection between institutions and ideology, and the separation of public and private, can be shown to be creations of particular historical State-sovereignty formations. Second, a historical approach also permits the inclusion of insights drawn from areas usually understood as outside the theory of the state, such as international relations. Third, a historical approach also allows the examination of the mutual embeddedness of the state in economies, religions, and everyday traditions, without collapsing the State into any one of these. As one scholar has put it:

A construct like the state occurs not merely as a subjective belief, incorporated in the thinking and action of individuals. It is represented and reproduced in visible, everyday forms, such as the language of legal practice, the architecture of public buildings, the wearing of military uniforms, or the marking out and policing of frontiers. The cultural forms of the state are an empirical phenomenon, as solid and discernible as a legal structure or a party system.

The historical treatment of the State has both continuities and discontinuities over time. It will show that the sovereign, territorial nation-state is a fundamentally different ensemble of governing practices from city-states and traditional imperial states. The city-State is a territorially small, independent urban conurbation that constitutes an autonomous political entity. It represented itself within an ensemble of governing practices that involved an intensive logic of place. That is, its representations of power and authority invoked a history and mythology of its distinctive place. The best historical examples of such entities are

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5 Walter C. Opello Jr. op cit. n.3
6 Timothy Mitchell, op cit. n.4, p.81. See also David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford, 1989) for a somewhat different view of the embeddedness of the state in economic and social networks.
the city-states of ancient Greece (Athens, Sparta, etc.) A contemporary city-state is Singapore.

The modern nation-state is also different from the traditional imperial state. The central government of traditional empires, such as the Roman, Chinese, Indian, Inca, Syrian, and Zulu, had only limited, sustained authority over the extensive territory of the empire, which was internally fragmented and ethnically heterogeneous, being composed of numerous culturally distinct societies. Empires governed through a representation of space as extending out from the centre, not necessarily the same in all areas of the empire. Because the central government did not have a monopoly of coercive force, it required its army to take the field regularly against local warlords, armed tribesmen, and bandits. Ordinary people within such empires had very little contact with imperial officials, except at taxpaying time. By and large, these empires did not interfere in economic life, although there were important exceptions. They did not exhibit a sense of what today would be called 'nationalism'. The frontiers of traditional empires were not internationally recognised as boundaries are today. Boundaries were simply the limits of military expansion that could be moved outward at will, through additional conquests. Thus, there was no recognition of "inter-imperial" rights or law, that is, no globalised system of empires.7

The modern nation-state is a unique creation of specific historical, political, social, and economic circumstances. It is different from city-states and traditional empires in that the nation-state claims sovereignty over a fixed territory, both attributes being recognised, in principle, by other nation-states that are members of a globalised system of nation-states. Nation-states represent territory as an empty

space to be filled in by the representations of the State’s power and authority. Through their governing practices and artefacts, nation-states diffuse a singular identity within the bounded space their borders arbitrarily but legally enclose.\(^8\) The sovereign territoriality of a state is represented by a capital city, a flag, an anthem, a passport, a currency, armed forces, national museums and libraries, embassies in other sovereign states, and usually a seat in the United Nations.\(^9\) Today’s global order comprises about 203 recognised nation-states.

As the sovereign territorial state is a historical creation, theories to explain its existence as well as the way it functions are themselves part of the history of the state. The connection between the history of the State and theories of the state will be explored in detail later in this chapter.

**Theories of the State**

Two approaches are very prominent in the contemporary realm of State analysis: ‘functionalism’ and ‘pluralism’. *Functionalism* emphasised how social roles, norms, and individual psychology functioned to create social and political order. *Pluralism* sought out the ways in which the diversity of social interests, organised into pressure groups, could produce an ordered and fair distribution of collective goods and services. Both viewed the “State” as too ambiguous a concept for political science because it could not be defined in a way that eliminated all value judgements and, hence, could not be studied empirically. Moreover, both approaches assumed that society was separate from the state and established society as the primary focus. States did what societies wanted or pressured them to

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do. In short, politics was to be explained by what happened in ‘society’, not the State.

The focus on society and individual psychology was connected to the extension of Western liberal democratic model of state and society. A “general” theory was to explain how societies, no matter where they were, could function smoothly, if their economies, politics, and social structure were integrated and balanced. Disequilibrium among these balanced parts, it was feared, would create an instability that could be exploited by leftist groups in their bids for power and, thus, increase the influence of the Soviet Union.  

Ironically, the disinterest of the discipline of political science in the State was, in part, a product of the State’s success. In the advanced capitalist states, such as the United States, Japan, and the states of Western Europe, the state more or less successfully managed increasing economic prosperity and steady advances in the welfare of their subject populations. Public policies considered ‘Socialistic’ when initially proposed, such as social security, health care for the poor and aged, unemployment insurance, and the minimum wage, became staples of these states. The welfare state did not need serious analytic attention from political scientists because it seemed to provide a common good that few questioned. This positive view was reinforced by the fact that Western European states and the Japanese state had successfully transformed war-ravaged economies into prosperous, dynamic capitalist powerhouses.

By the early 1970s, however, all was not well and the State came under intellectual scrutiny and political challenge. Among mainstream political scientists a new sub-field of the discipline called policy analysis arose out of new

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10 Mitchell, op cit. n.4, ‘The Limits of the State…’
bureaucratic politics models of government and a new interest in decision-making. The second concern was the search for answers to the vexing question of how state programmes could be more efficiently managed in the face of challenges by those who deemed them wasteful. While not reviving an interest in the state per se, and while accepting the prevailing individualism and rationalism of pluralist and functionalist political science, the policy analysis approach did refocus on the activities of government bureaucracies. Eschewing a concept of the State, policy analysis drew on theories of organisational behaviour and decision-making that, in tum, were drawn from mathematics (game theory), social psychology and cybernetic engineering. As with functionalism and pluralism, the implicit normative emphasis of policy analysis was on promoting order, routine, and efficiency against the messy indeterminacy and contingency of politics.

The first political and social scientists to renew an interest in the state were crisis theorists, many drawing on various Marxist traditions. Crisis theories sought to explain why the welfare state seemed no longer able to sustain the prosperity and security of the post-World War II era. Many of these theories were inspired by Marx and traced the failures of the state to its inability to extract sufficient resources or to maintain its legitimacy in the context of a capitalist economy. The legitimacy of the state, which rested on its promotion of equality, could not overcome the class inequality produced by capitalism.


Increasingly, in reaction to functionalism, pluralism, policy analysis, and crisis theory, some political scientists began to focus explicitly and look more favourably upon the state. These scholars examined how the state had functioned historically both as an organisation of domination and as a promoter of reforms that might make good on the promises of the welfare state.\textsuperscript{13} This effort to “bring the state back in” was critical of the way the state had been subordinated to society and the economy by the functionalists and neo-Marxist crisis theorists.\textsuperscript{14} Instead, these scholars began to look at how state institutions made decisions, under what influences, and with what effects. These \textit{statist theories} viewed the state as an agent in itself, as an autonomous entity in the sense of being institutionally separate from society, which could take independent action, even against society’s wishes. Statist theories have led to fruitful studies of particular states by integrating historical sociology and political science. However, while statists have been attuned to the historical nature of particular states, they have assumed an ahistorical and reified concept of the state; states are historical but the state is not.\textsuperscript{15}

For the most part, these theorists have largely ignored international politics, although some crisis theorists did locate the state in the world capitalist economy.\textsuperscript{16} Also, functionalism had international parallels in functionalist theories of integration, which sought to identify those behavioural principles of social integration among states and international organisations capable of producing


\textsuperscript{14} Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., \textit{Bringing the State Back In} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

\textsuperscript{15} For a more detailed critique of this type, Mitchell, “The Limits of the State,” 78–81.

international peace. The statist theories that did introduce the international dimension into a theory of the state were not very successful because of their ahistorical concept of the State. Eventually, these theories accepted the point of view of realist international relations, that is, all States were, conceptually, the same; each sought to maintain sovereign territoriality against others in a systematic balance of power. Just as the state was seen domestically as autonomous because it was institutionally separate from the economy and society, the same was assumed to follow for the states-system. That is, states somehow existed autonomously from their societies, on the one hand, and from the global system of States on the other.

In the 1980s and 1990s several critical theories developed, which have contributed to a more thoroughly historical account of the State. These theories have explored how aspects of the state that pluralist, functionalist, and statist theories largely take for granted and do not explain historically are themselves historical constructs, especially the two primary aspects of the modern State: territoriality and sovereignty. These critical theories have also shown how war and violence constitute the State, and cannot be analysed simply as resources or tools used by States, as well as how the distinction between the domestic “inside” of the state (a presumed sphere of order and law) and the international “outside” (a sphere

18 The most famous rendering of this was Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). For a critique of realist international relations theory, which connects its disdain for theories of the state to its ahistorical positivism, see Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization 38:2 (spring 1984): 225–286.
19 Two forms of critical international theory prevail, a neo-Gramscian approach following Robert Cox, and a postmodernist approach following the work of Richard Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, Michael Shapiro, and James Der Derian, although these categories hardly account for the diversity of recent approaches to international relations and political economy. For a useful review see Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, et al., Theories of International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
of presumed anarchy and war) are not given ontological categories but are historically constituted of and by States. 20

Absolutist State

The modern territorial state took several centuries to become established. The Peace of Westphalia recognised the principle of state sovereignty and enshrined the concept of secure and universally recognised State borders in law. It accepted the principle of non-intervention in the territorial space of other States. The treaty also encouraged further development and use of diplomacy, that is, the art and practice of conducting relations among states through embassies and ambassadors, which had begun in the sixteenth century. 21 The Peace of Westphalia is perhaps the most important historical benchmark in the formation of the modern territorial State. Through it the principles of state sovereignty became normalised into a new political imaginary that, inside the state, sovereignty referred to legitimate, controlling authority, while outside, sovereignty referred to the reciprocal right to self-determination against dynastic or other claims, as well as to freedom from external religious interference. 22 The Peace of Westphalia created a problem: how to imagine and represent a combined religious, moral, and political authority in a secular, earthly entity confined within territorial borders and boundaries. Finding a solution was imperative given that these territorial entities were created by conventions and agreements.

20 Ibid., n.3
The latter, which was to have lasting influence, was by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in *Leviathan* (1650). For Hobbes, the basis of the state, which he called a *commonwealth*, was the interest of individual subjects in securing their own peace and protection. He hypothesised that without a sovereign, people lived in a *state of nature* characterised by a war “where every man is Enemy to every man,” which made “the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Hobbes saw the sovereign as a unity of the wills of the individual subjects who composed it: “The only way to erect such a Common Power . . . is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will.” Moreover, he argued that to create this sovereign, one consents to a “*social compact,*” a promise on the part of all individual subjects to “Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.”

This new way of imagining and representing the sovereignty of the state had two primary effects. First, it rendered the state more abstract and enacted the dualistic structure (inside/outside) of the Westphalian settlement. The sovereign treated his subjects inside the territory as a collective being, a *population* to be regulated and moulded for the good the state. At the same time, it mediated their estrangement from those outside (who were increasingly presented as threats), which required the internal organisation of the subjects by the sovereign. The head/soul (sovereign) needed to organise, co-ordinate, and regulate the physical body (subjects, territory) to protect it from the outside.

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24 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.120.
The second effect of the new way of imagining sovereignty was to deepen the patriarchal domination of women. The State, or collective body, comprised a robust public life in which war, intrigue, and the pursuit of wealth were reserved largely for men. States now protected something increasingly referred to as "society". Increasingly, the State depended on a *private sphere* in which male subjects were socialised to participate in public activities, such as owning property, serving in the state bureaucracy, or fighting in the army—activities reserved for men. In this private sphere, men learned to be *individuals*, to cultivate their particular talents, which could then be appropriated and used by the sovereign.

The world *absolutism* (from the Latin *absoluta*, meaning unbound) usually refers to rule by an all-powerful, all-embracing monarch who faces no checks or control on his power. The absolute monarch rules his realm directly through a staff of administrative officials whom he has rendered totally dependent upon him. The assembly of estates has been "put to sleep" by the crown; that is, it has been suppressed and is no longer consulted by the king. Moreover, local entities have been brought under the direct authority of the crown. Power is exercised without the concurrence of the estates, and the monarch has become absolute territorial sovereign. Monarchical absolutism was generally justified by the theory of "divine right of kings."\(^{25}\)

Absolutist monarchies as a form of the early modern state are usually counterpoised to parliamentary monarchies—that is, to a form of the early modern state in which the estates have won the struggle for power with the crown and the king’s ability to rule his realm on his own has been reduced or eliminated completely. In place of the feudal constitutional order of joint or mixed rule, an

assembly embodying the estates, called a parliament (from the French verb parler, meaning to speak), has defeated the king and become the territorial sovereign.²⁶

**The Liberal State**

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, developments in capitalism and reactions to absolutism (both in absolutist monarchies and absolutist parliamentary States) combined to produce a new imaginary of sovereignty and a new form of the State. We call this new formation the liberal State, at the centre of which is a new imaginary of sovereignty as inhering in the people. The focus of this chapter is on the way liberal States arose out of the dilemmas faced by early modern states, especially the dilemma of procuring the resources needed to make war and managing the expanding capitalist economy while maintaining the legitimacy of State power.

As the modern state came to be more highly developed, the problematic of instituting sovereignty shifted. Sovereignty came to be seen as inhering in the population of a territory, and not in the ruler (the king) or ruling assembly (parliament). This new imaginary of sovereignty, which came to be called popular sovereignty, had roots in the republican theories of the Renaissance, especially those of Machiavelli, which described the common good of the state as the necessary outcome of political power.

Sovereignty could be represented as “popular,” that is, as inhering in the population of the State, in two primary ways. One was as a possession of the people, as a utility, a tool for the protection of their property and their private lives. This was the idea enacted by the Glorious Revolution (1689) in England. The other

representation of popular sovereignty was as the expression of the collective, or
general, will of the people. This was the idea formulated most clearly by the
eighteenth-century Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), whose ideas would
influence the French Revolution. In both cases the meaning of the State’s
population shifted from being an object of administration by the State apparatus to
being an almost organic entity endowed with a separate being and will of its own.

States based on an imaginary of popular sovereignty continued to perform
those functions performed by the early modern territorial states. Armies continued
to be raised. Such States continued to mediate class conflicts between the
bourgeoisie and landed nobility, and increasingly between the bourgeoisie and the
working class (i.e., the class of labourers dependent on wages). States based on
popular sovereignty remained dependent on their ability to impose taxes, put tariffs
on imports, and otherwise extract economic resources.

States based on the idea of popular sovereignty developed an idea of
politics as police power to regulate the population and maintain order. Police
power was needed to regulate the working classes and those caught in the often
painful and unsettling transition from rural peasant to wage labourer. Such states
also kept the inequalities of the capitalist economy from erupting into open social
conflict. Maintaining order meant not only doing what the bourgeoisie expressly
considered to be in its economic interests, but also the state’s intervening in the
direction of everyday life to ensure those social habits of behaviour that would lead
to civil order.

In short, the representation of sovereignty as popular sovereignty created a
new realm of individual freedom that weakened the absolutist state in favour of the
individual, while paradoxically subjecting the individual to new forms of power,
exercised by the State and others and aimed at moulding and regulating public behaviour. Behaviour came to be watched, catalogued, measured, anticipated, calculated, and managed.\textsuperscript{27} Rather than weakening the state to the point of near disappearance, the interpenetrating of capitalism and the state and the new imaginary of popular sovereignty made possible the expansion of state power, although in new forms.

From the late seventeenth century, attempts to reform the absolutist State to make it protective of private property rights and responsive to the freedom of individuals to pursue profit in the market became popular, both among intellectuals and the bourgeoisie. By the nineteenth century this reformist movement would be called liberalism, and its defenders would be called liberals, a term first used to refer to the party of the bourgeoisie in early nineteenth-century Spain. By the middle of the century it had spread throughout Europe, becoming a name adopted by major bourgeois political parties.\textsuperscript{28}

Liberal ideas circulated not through religious channels or through official state-sanctioned media, but through the new commercial markets of civil society, primarily in the political pamphlets and books made possible by combining the technology of the printing press with the increasing wealth of the middle class.\textsuperscript{29} Liberalism developed in opposition to dogmatic religion, arguing that all forms of knowing, including religious knowledge, should be subjected to rational (i.e., reasoned) forms of discussion and debate. To be a "subject"—increasingly used to refer to individuals not only in a political but also in a moral sense—was to be an


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., n.3
agent who acted rationally. Liberals set out self-consciously to reform the state so that it would support the private world of the individual in civil society, which they understood as the voluntary social interactions and organisations of rational individuals. They did so not only for economic reasons but for moral reasons as well. In Enlightenment liberalism, the economic and moral were intertwined. Liberalism developed a distinctive form of ideology that accepted the state only insofar as it could be justified by a rational discourse appealing to universal standards of human nature and justice.

To see how liberalism and the liberal state emerged out of the absolutist state, it is necessary to look briefly at the relation between politics and morality. During the religious wars of the seventeenth century, absolutist monarchies sought to resolve moral conflicts politically, that is, by distinguishing morals from politics and subordinating the former, especially in the form of religious beliefs, to the latter by granting to the state, the power to do what was necessary to maintain order. Although morality was considered a matter for the individual subject’s conscience (i.e., his or her inward belief), the absolutist state compelled that inward belief in the name of public order. Public order was the supreme good, and private conscience and morality were to be subordinated to it.

Against absolutism, the philosopher and political writer John Locke (1632–1704), in his On Toleration (1689), articulated a position that would later come to define liberalism. In this pamphlet, Locke accepted the idea that morals are a matter of individual conscience and that they should be determined by reason and

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30 For a graphic illustration of how the compelling of belief was central to order in the absolutist state, Michel Foucault’s recounting of the execution of Damian by the eighteenth-century French state, which comes at the beginning of his book Discipline and Punishment, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977).

not by custom, nature, or political power. Counter to the logic of the absolutist state, Locke wrote that toleration is a universal good that states should accept and that should guide their acceptance of the rule of law. Locke’s point was that the state, rather than reigning supreme over the individual conscience, as the absolutist would argue, should be subordinated to the universal principles of reason that govern the private conscience.  

Religion, Locke argued, should not dictate laws for the state, which exists in Locke’s view “for the procuring, preserving, and advancing” of the individual’s “life, liberty, health and indolence of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.”  

Neither should the magistrates of the state “forbid the preaching or professing of any speculative opinions in any church, because they have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the subjects.”  

By subordinating the territorial state to universal principles derived by reason, individual subjects and the civil society they circulated in came to be seen as existing independently of and prior to the State. This meant that subjects came to be seen in the liberal state as bearers of certain rights, which accrued, to them as autonomous individuals. To justify this, many liberal thinkers drew initially on the tradition of natural rights. Specifically, two rights, which Locke alluded to in his Letter on Toleration, were most important to liberals: the right to private property and the right to be protected from arbitrary and unfair treatment by the State.

32 Locke’s argument raised one of the most important issues of seventeenth-century philosophy and politics.
34 Ibid., p. 45.
The liberal state, then, is in one respect a minimal State; that is, it is deliberately structured not to be itself a threat to the "natural right" of property ownership, which is the ultimate justification for the dominant position of the bourgeoisie within the State. Participation is restricted by property-owning requirements to eliminate a threat to the bourgeoisie's control of the state from economically less advantaged groups from below. But this position could be challenged from the perspective of egalitarianism.

The second right that liberals considered inalienable was the right to protection from arbitrary and capricious treatment by the state. Being free of the arbitrary and capricious state power characteristic of the absolutist states meant first and foremost the application of the principle of the rule of law. Liberalism defended the rule of law, it supported the rule of law because it would protect citizens best from arbitrary and capricious personal rule and leave individuals the most freedom to pursue their own private lives and, especially, to trade and accumulate wealth and property. That is, liberalism grounded the rule of law negatively: the law should rule not because it promotes the public good but because it allows individuals the greatest freedom by protecting their private interests.

Liberals recognised that the law might itself treat individuals unequally or might contradict some of their rights; to prevent this, liberalism was committed to the equal treatment of individual subjects. Liberals reduced all subjects to a common denominator, an abstract concept of the person that eliminated his or her particular differences, the so-called abstract individual. To liberals, being protected from arbitrary and capricious power and authority meant that the state

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had to treat all individuals as essentially the same. That is, no natural attributes of birth, such as social class, sex, or race, should matter. Much of liberal political theory during the twentieth century has been concerned with defining these extralegal principles on which the rule of law is seen to rest.

**Liberalism and Democracy**

It should be noted that liberals were not, at first, democrats in the modern sense of that word. Liberals came to accept democracy only reluctantly, because it was the best way to protect individual liberty from the growing power of the State. This was the argument of utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and James Mill (1773–1836). For these liberals, the state was needed to maintain order and defence, as John Locke had argued, and in general to promote a condition of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” the main principle of utilitarian philosophy. Utilitarians did not argue against the state, but for a state in which reason, in the sense of the efficient matching of means to ends, ruled. This sort of state would continue to exercise considerable power, especially police and military power, and would continue to promote a rational society, especially by providing education for all, even if it had limited power to regulate economic activity.

In his *Essay On Government* (1820), James Mill averred that the main end of politics was to permit people to become rational and mature individuals. This can be done, he argued, only when they are able to make decisions that affect their own lives. Even though a wise and benevolent absolute ruler might make better decisions than individuals could make for themselves, a limited representative state

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would be better, he argued, because individuals would be responsible for their own mistakes. Therefore, some form of representative state would be better than an absolute monarchy, even a benevolent one.

The liberal idea of democracy, or *liberal democracy* as it has come to be called, advocates democracy not as a value in itself but as a way of checking the power of the state while subjecting it to rational debate among citizens. The most powerful defence of liberty of thought and discussion can be found in *John Stuart Mill*'s (1806–1873) essay *On Liberty* (1859). In this essay, Mill, who was James Mill's son, argued that the real threat to liberty came from irrational citizens who unquestioningly followed social norms and prejudices. A rational and well-educated public was the best guarantee against the state's becoming too powerful and violating individual rights. Indeed, when Mill did advocate a universal franchise in his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), he coupled it with a system of weighted voting so that those who were highly educated and commercially successful, which he took to be evidence of their rationality, would cast more votes.

Liberals at first believed that the right to vote and to hold office should be restricted to those individuals who owned a certain amount of property. Such restrictions were justified by the belief that the ability to decide political issues in an enlightened and critical manner was present only in individuals who owned property. Thus, when liberals gained power, the right to vote was restricted to property owners.

Under pressure from the working classes and from women in the suffragette movements, liberals eventually began to accept the universal franchise, but they always did so within constitutional frameworks that limited the power the
masses could exercise. John Stuart Mill was one of the first liberals to argue for the vote not only for the working classes but also for women. But nineteenth-century liberals like John Stuart Mill in England and Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) in France worried about the general trend toward equality that democratisation represented in modern states. They believed that this would lead to mediocrity in the population and a loss of a communal spirit and solidarity among the people.

Although women began to agitate for the franchise in the nineteenth century, women’s suffrage in most liberal states was not granted until the twentieth. Even after having been enfranchised, women still faced barriers that prevented the equal exercise of their formal rights. Some barriers were legal, such as laws restricting the autonomy of married women and their rights to own property independently of their husbands. Some were the persistence of customs and social prejudices regarding motherhood, women’s bodies, and their “proper” roles in the family; these barriers prevented women from being considered citizens with the same rights as men.

**Radical Working-Class Movements**

By the end of the nineteenth century the proletariat turned to movements that sought to take direct control over industrial capitalism by overthrowing the liberal State and making all industry, business, and agriculture the property of the proletariat rather than the original owners. These movements were animated by ideologies, such as socialism, anarchism, and utopianism, that rejected, in often provocative ways, the managerial and rationalised forms of industrial capitalism. Anarchists, such as Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) and Pierre-Josèphe Proudhon (1809–1865), called for direct action to violently disrupt the social and political processes of industrialisation. The Luddites, a semi-organised group of workers
opposed to the way industrialisation continually put workers out of work, broke into factories and smashed machines.

Various humanistic utopian socialists, most significantly Comte de Saint Simon (1760–1825), Francois-Charles Fourier (1772–1837), and Robert Owen (1771–1858), developed socialist and communal alternatives to industrial life, sometimes creating experimental communities based on Christian or humanitarian values. The latter were often romanticist attempts to return to a pure, pristine, and humane human essence in harmony with nature and now obscured by industrialisation.

By far the most influential radical theory was that of Karl Marx (1818–1883), a German economist, journalist, and political organiser. Modern capitalist economies, he argued, forced the majority of the population to live under conditions in which they were powerless. Factory owners and finance capitalists owned the means of production, and workers had nothing but their labour-power to sell. Wages were set by a market over which capitalists had complete power. Marx described the social effects of the production and consumption cycle of industrial capitalism as alienation, a process in which "the worker becomes a slave of the object" he or she produces. Specifically, "the object produced by labour, its product, now stands opposed to it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer." More generally, in his Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx characterised the general effects of the rapid changes brought about by industrial capitalism in the following way:

Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable

prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.\textsuperscript{38}

To Marx, the dependence of life on the circulation of commodities meant a life of enormous uncertainty, dizzying speeds of change, and the extreme exploitation of workers by owners of capital. But, in Marx's interpretation, industrial capitalism also opened up the possibility for people to organise and take control of the changes occurring in the areas that mattered most—the relations of production that, Marx argued, in reality governed their lives.

Marx's critique of industrial capitalism was powerfully attractive to industrial workers because it blamed their economic plight not on themselves as individuals, as did the liberals, but on the capitalist mode of production. It appealed to some feminists because it traced the patriarchal domination of men over women to the structures of industrial capitalism, and promised that with the overthrow of capitalism, men and women would not just be politically equal, as liberal feminists argued, but equal in all aspects of life.

The role of the state posed difficult questions for Marx's analysis. Although he never wrote a systematic treatise on the state, Marx began to develop an account of the capitalist state through his criticism of the idealist German philosopher, \textit{Georg Friedrich Hegel} (1770–1831). Hegel had posed fundamental criticisms of the liberal conceptions of man and state. Unlike liberals, Hegel saw the state as an active agent of change; indeed, he saw the state as the supreme agent of rational transformation of human societies. For Hegel, the state embodied the spirit of

\textsuperscript{38} The implications of Marx's theory for feminism were developed by his collaborator, Frederick Engels, in \textit{The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State} (New York: International, 1942).
human history and the realisation of a rational society. He argued that liberalism's belief that separate, abstract individuals using only their own initiative could produce a rational and just society was mistaken. Civil society, the sphere of individualistic economic interaction and voluntary social organisations, Hegel argued, realised only a truncated version of human reason, one based on instrumental calculations of self-interest and the alienation of men from other men. A fuller realisation of reason was embodied in a modern state in which men gave self-conscious direction to the organisation of their shared ethical and social life. The state, to Hegel, represented an ethical unity; sovereignty became the medium between particular human communities and the universality of the human spirit. Therefore, the realisation of human freedom was to be found in the struggles among sovereign states, leading eventually to the victory of the sovereign power that represented the most free and rational ethical life, that is, the state in which all forms of arbitrary power had been eliminated. Such a state was, for Hegel, the parliamentary state with a highly developed professional bureaucracy that administered justice fairly and universally.

Although Marx shared Hegel's rejection of liberalism's idea that the individual in civil society was the agent of human progress, he rejected Hegel's idealist view of the state, and with it Hegel's entire conception of, and allegiance to, state sovereignty. For Marx, the agent of historical change was class conflict, not the conflict between sovereign states, as it was for Hegel. Marx argued that the political order was a reflection of the class holding power. Under capitalism, the bourgeoisie created a state that promoted its needs and power. Police power kept the subordinate class of workers in check and was needed to keep order in the context of the misery and destitution caused by capitalism; the state's economic
agencies ministered to the capitalist order, providing necessary infrastructure; its judicial system secured the rights not of everyone but of property owners; its wars opened markets and secured investments abroad. In a communist system, Marx argued, the state would become unnecessary: eliminate class conflict and the need for a coercive apparatus would likewise disappear. Sovereignty, then, for Marx was a myth, a form of *false consciousness*; that is, it led people to believe their society was rational, fair, and free when it was in reality a historical creation that served the particular interests of the capital-owning class.

Russia represented one of the most repressive and absolute monarchies in Europe. Industrial development lagged behind the economic powerhouses of Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Much of Russian industry was controlled by foreigners, under contracts with the monarchy, and Russian capitalists often invested their profits abroad. Together, these limited the development of the bourgeoisie, who were portrayed as being in league with the Czar as agents of foreign powers. Owing to the ruthlessness of the Czar's regime, and the negative view held by many workers and peasants about the bourgeoisie and its so-called liberal political programmes established the conditions for the success of a Socialist political system.

The Soviet communist state emerged in the context of *World War I* (1914–1918) and on the heels of failed attempts to transform a ruthless absolutist state into a liberal state in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The war devastated Russia, as it did other states in Europe. During 1914–1916, over two million Russian soldiers were killed or wounded. The war imposed a heavy strain on the economy, which was industrially weak compared with other major powers in Europe. The economy eventually collapsed, and strikes
broke out in Petrograd in 1916. Troops sent by the Czar refused to suppress the strikers, and Nicholas abdicated on March 15, 1917.

To develop war industries and to fight the war, much of the population had been mobilised, either as soldiers or as workers in the heavy industries necessary for the war effort. This politicised the population, especially the urban working classes, which increased in size and importance as elements of the rural peasantry, moved to the cities to take industrial jobs.

The absolutist monarchy could not sustain itself in the context of an increasingly politicised population that demanded justification for state policies and even a say in governing. Indeed, after defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1905), the Czar experimented with a parliament, called the Duma, which failed. With the Duma, the Czar attempted to mediate the maintenance of the old regime with the new demands of middle-class bourgeoisie and the working classes, both of which became mobilised in political parties. Although the Duma was divided into two houses—an upper house appointed by the Czar from the nobility, the Orthodox Church, universities, and provincial councils, and a lower house elected from a fairly broad franchise—it failed to contain the political energies provoked by Russia’s military losses and an industrialising economy.

The Bolsheviks, one of the working-class parties led by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (later known by his revolutionary pseudonym Lenin, 1870–1924), took power on November 6, 1917, after a brief attempt by liberals and social democrats to establish a government. Their support came in part from radicals in the working class in important cities such as Moscow and Petrograd. But they drew more general support from other sectors of the population by promising, and delivering, a separate peace with Germany, thus ending Russia’s involvement in World War I.
The Bolsheviks called for a social and political revolution that would create a society based on equality through collective and national ownership and direction of the economy. All citizens were to have jobs; the nobility was to be abolished and land given to those who worked it; private ownership of industry was to be eliminated along with the vast inequalities of wealth, status, and influence it had produced.

In part to respond to counter-revolutionary activity, in part to consolidate power against rival liberal and left factions, and in part to defend against invasions from outside powers (the United States, with British backing, invaded Siberia in 1919), the Bolsheviks established a political structure that consolidated power in the party itself. The strategy was to penetrate the state apparatus, one of the defining features of the absolutist state, with loyal members of the party. The party was built on the Soviets, ad hoc groups that sprang up in 1917 in order to co-ordinate the strikes of the workers, soldiers, and peasants. The Soviets elected representatives to the national councils, which would elect party leadership and set and oversee state policy.

The second national congress in January 1918 established the Central Committee of the Communist Party as the state’s chief executive body and promised an impressive list of political and social rights, which were extended only to the working class.\(^{39}\) In January 1924, after their victory in the civil war and the reconquest of territory originally comprising the Russian Empire, a new constitution was promulgated that extended this state structure into a federal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The supreme governing body was the Congress of Soviets, which was divided into a Council of the Union chosen on the

basis of population, and a *Council of Nationalities*, composed of delegates from each union, autonomous republic, and province. The Congress of Soviets selected a *Presidium*, which handled its business between sessions, and a *Central Committee*, which directed the activities of the federal ministries. Despite having created a formal state structure, real decisional power rested with the Communist Party, especially the *Politburo* and Central Committee. Decisions were taken according to a procedure known as *democratic centralism*, which allowed for full discussion of an issue but required absolute obedience to the decision once taken.

Democratic centralism established a strategy of state construction that was *modernist*, that is, based on the same progressive character of science, technology, and rationalism that lay behind industrialisation. Modernists sought a vantage-point and vision from which they could see and understand the entire social world as a whole, and put tremendous faith in large-scale organisation directed from a central point to manage and co-ordinate the social world. Rather than persist in situating the agent of progress and modernity in civil society, as twentieth-century states influenced by liberalism did, the Soviet communist state located it in the state apparatus itself. The state would manage progress—scientific, economic, political, social, and moral—directly rather than relying on an independent *civil society*.

Therefore, the entire Soviet economy, except for individual households, was directed and administered by the *State Planning Commission for the USSR* (GOSPLAN). GOSPLAN determined production targets, wages, and prices. The state also provided a vast array of social and medical services. From the 1920s, Soviet citizens were guaranteed unemployment insurance, free medical care in
state-run clinics and hospitals, old-age pensions, and disability pay. Housing, although often in short supply and poorly constructed, was provided at low rents.

The political structure of the state together with the modernist ideology allowed the general secretary of the Communist Party to adopt extraordinary power. Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (later known by his revolutionary pseudonym Joseph Stalin, 1879–1953), who became secretary-general in a power struggle after Lenin’s death in 1924 and held this position until his own death in 1952, ruled the Soviet state with a ruthless despotism reminiscent of the Czars. In 1934, after the assassination of his likely successor, he unleashed a reign of terror over the Soviet Union, lasting until 1938, during which time he purged the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the army of “unreliable” elements and arrested ordinary citizens for “anti-state” activities. The state secret police became omnipresent. Millions lost their lives by execution or overwork in labour camps in Siberia.40

Stalin was followed in 1953 by Nikita Krushchev (1894–1971), a reformer who appealed to the humanitarian aims of communism. He was ousted by conservatives in the top organs of the party in 1964 because of his disclosures about Stalin’s reign of terror, his pro-consumer, antimilitary policies, and the humiliation caused by his retreat during the Cuban missile crisis. This ushered in approximately 20 years of conservative, bureaucratic rule. Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) was designated secretary-general in 1965 and ruled the Soviet Union until his death in 1982. Brezhnev was cautious and conservative and governed in a consensus-building bureaucratic style. During his years as secretary-general the Soviet state became increasingly corrupt, the activities of its political class

resembling those of the Mafia. He was replaced in 1982 by Yuri Andropov (1914–1984), who died the following year of cancer. Andropov was followed by Konstantin Chernyenko (1911–1985), who died from emphysema in 1985. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became what subsequent events would prove to be the Soviet Union’s last secretary-general.

The system continued until Gorbachev, who was influenced by the reforms of the Khrushchev years, instituted a comprehensive reform programme in the mid-1980’s that included democratisation, glasnost, and perestroika. Restructuring involved a radical decentralisation of control and management of the economy to the level of factories and limited private ownership of retail stores and services. By democratisation, Gorbachev meant reducing the monopoly over political power held by the CPSU, which involved the introduction, in 1989, of free elections for some seats in a new national legislature called the All-Union Congress of Peoples’ Deputies. Public openness meant ending censorship of the media and arts.41 His strategy was to introduce a civil society independent of the state while maintaining the political monopoly of the CPSU.

This strategy unleashed powerful social forces that ripped the Soviet state apart in 1991. Disengaging civil society from the party apparatus left the way open for numerous possibilities. One was a non-statist form of socialism, which anti-Soviet radicals in Eastern Germany and (in the mid-1960s) Czechoslovakia had explored. The Czechoslovakia experiments under Alexander Dubcek were ruthlessly suppressed by Soviet armies in 1968.

The Emergence of Nation-state

Through colonialism European states transferred the idea of the state to their colonies, which laid the foundation of the present global system of sovereign territorial states. A strong congruity exists between the boundary lines of the present system of independent, sovereign states and the boundaries of the administrative units of the European colonial empires, most of which were fortuitous and arbitrary markers of the limits of European conquest.

A crucial force that transformed the world of colonial empires into the world of independent territorial states was nationalism, which arose in connection with popular sovereignty and liberalism and helped generate independence movements in the colonial empires. Nationalism began to connect states with nations by inscribing the sovereign territorial state as the dominant form of political organisation throughout the world and by generating a variety of particular experiences of nationhood, depending on specific historical situations. In short, nationalism re-formed the state in an ordering of the political world that was nearly global, and created a range of challenges to European supremacy and dominance within the emerging global grid of territorial states.

Linking Nation and State

Originally, the word nation (from the Latin natio, meaning birth or place of origin) was a derogatory term that referred to groups of foreigners from the same place whose status was below that of Roman citizens. During the Middle Ages, the word was used to designate groups of students from the same geographical locations attending Europe’s medieval universities. Because students from the same regions often took sides as a group against students from different regions in
scholastic debates, the word *nation* came to mean an elite community of scholars who shared an opinion or had a common purpose.\(^\text{42}\)

During the early sixteenth century, the word *nation* began to be applied to a whole population of people from a particular geographical locale rather than to a student elite. Entire populations were elevated and made into the bearer of sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity, and the ultimate object of loyalty. One’s *national identity*, therefore, came from being a member of a certain people, which was defined as homogeneously distinct in *language, culture, race, and history* from other peoples. Thus, nation came to have its contemporary meaning: “a uniquely sovereign people readily distinguishable from other uniquely defined sovereign peoples who are bound together by a sense of solidarity, common culture, language, religion, and geographical location.”

Scholars once thought that national identity was a natural human emotion and that the world was fundamentally divided into nations based on common cultures, languages, religions, and histories. These scholars saw nationalism as the awakening of long dormant feelings of national identity. In this understanding of nationalism the nation is awakened by its irrepressible desire for freedom, self-government, and a state of its own.\(^\text{43}\)

On the contrary, there are recent scholars who view nations not as natural and primordial but as created, imagined, and invented.\(^\text{44}\) They view the nation as consciously invented in order to create the cultural, sociological, and psychological

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conditions necessary to sustain the sovereign territorial state. The development of a full-blown national identity that overrides regional, class, and religious loyalties requires the systematic effort of the state. Creating a sense of nationhood requires the breakdown of the individual’s attunement to local languages and cultures in order to create a common national culture (language, values, norms of behaviour) that inculcates in the state’s subject population a common national frame of reference across space (i.e., territory) and time (i.e., a single national history). Therefore, creating a national identity is closely connected to the formation of territorial states.

Moreover, nationalism not only re-creates the local as the national, it mediates the local and the global.

The French Revolution formally fused the idea of the nation to the state. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, which was written by liberal revolutionaries, declares that all sovereignty resides with the people. This declaration heightened feelings among the French that they were a unique people who had liberated themselves from the tyranny of absolute monarchy and were destined to liberate the rest of the world as well. Napoleon’s armies spread the radical ideology of liberalism and the idea of the liberated nation as they marched across Europe. The peoples that the French defeated and occupied in the Napoleonic Wars (1804–1815), such as Germans, Russians, Spanish, and Portuguese, grew to hate the French occupiers and developed feelings of national consciousness of their own. These feelings were encouraged by aspiring state-makers, who saw them as a way of mobilising their people more easily.

In the colonies, rising national sentiment was linked to challenges to the supremacy of the central monarchy and even led to calls for independence.
However, kings gradually learned how to separate nationalist feelings from liberalism's claims of popular sovereignty. Therefore, states could remain monarchies and still retain sentiments of national identity, and armies loyal to the monarchical state for which they fought could be fielded.

Although the creation and sustaining of a nation require the systematic activities of the centralised, territorial state, the specific idea of a particular nation materialises out of the preoccupations of a small number of educated elites. Nationalist intellectuals often paint a heroic picture of the nation's past and present and hide the inequalities, exploitation, and patterns of domination and subordination that the creation and maintenance of a state inevitably involve.\(^{45}\)

By the middle of the nineteenth century, intellectuals across Europe were defining nationalism as the highest human value and the source of all that is good. Nationalism became an ideology in its own right. Its basic tenet was the idea that a state should share a common culture and be governed only by individuals of the same culture. The invention of a nation required hard intellectual work: dictionaries of national languages had to be compiled; a body of national poetry, literature, theatre, music, opera, painting, and popular festivals had to be created; and, most significant, a distinction was necessary from other national cultures as well as "deviant" cultures within the state that resisted identity with the nation as intellectuals had fashioned it. National rituals, symbols, and insignia, such as flags, seals, and commemorations of heroic events, had to be designed. Although the task of inventing the nation rested with intellectuals, it was by propaganda and systematic political education by the state that the local identities of the subject

\(^{45}\) Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp.126-45
population were shifted to the newly imagined nation. This aspect in detail is dealt in the following chapters in the context of newly emerging Central Asian States.

Types of Nationalism

It is useful to distinguish different types of nationalism in order to show how nationalism helped generate different states. Three different types can be distinguished: liberal nationalism, ethnic nationalism, and anti-colonial nationalism. We will discuss each of them in turn.

Liberal Nationalism

Although not all nationalists were liberals, liberal intellectuals began to organise nationalist movements. In certain cases, liberal movements demanded changes in such extant absolutist states as France, Portugal, and Spain. In others they demanded the creation of new unified states based on liberal principles where none had previously existed, as in Germany and Italy. In still others they demanded independence from a colonial power and the formation of a republic, as in the Americas. Thus, initially, nationalism went hand in glove with the spread of liberalism.

Ethnic Nationalism

In contrast to liberal nationalism, ethnic nationalism imagines a sovereign territorial state based on a shared culture, which is assumed to be primordial. Ethnic nationalism appeared within the great multilingual and multireligious empires of the Ottomans, Habsburgs, and Romanovs during the nineteenth century, and was made possible by a notable increase in literacy as well as by industrialisation, which destroyed traditional ways of life and caused a massive
movement of people from the countryside to the cities.\textsuperscript{46} Pasts were imagined and reimagined as singular cultures. Religion, language, and history were fused together in the minds of nationalist intellectuals, who made their respective communities within these empires appear to constitute nations deserving of their own sovereign states.

The overthrow of the Czar in Russia, the turmoil caused by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and the subsequent civil war created conditions that permitted a number of territories within the Russian Empire to become independent states: Finland; the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; Georgia; and Ukraine. The last two were reincorporated into the Soviet Union after the victory of the Bolsheviks in the civil war as were the Baltic states in 1940.

\textbf{Anti-colonial Nationalism}

A third type of nationalism that demanded independence arose in the large number of anti-colonial nationalist movements in the twentieth century. Independence was often granted without the need for armed struggle, although there were many exceptions. For 30 years or so after the end of World War II, a flood of new sovereign states appeared on the globe in Asia, Africa, and the Latin America.

The legacy of World War II and the subsequent Cold War enabled the achievement of independence by many colonial states. First, European states had been weakened significantly by the war, making maintenance of colonial empires expensive and logistically difficult, especially against increasingly organised nationalist opposition. Second, nationalism in colonial states itself was a

'derivative discourse'. That is, having originated among Western-educated elites in the colonies, it was reflexively incorporated into the local experience. This resulted in political programmes among the revolutionaries that sought to build states along the lines of European models. Hence, nationalist revolutionaries sought to build states suited to the conditions of their own societies and cultures as they saw them, but usually within the territorial boundaries.

Creating independent states in colonial areas according to nationalist programmes involved a particular dilemma that led to attempts to produce highly centralised states. On the one hand, newly independent states had to ensure their autonomy from former colonial powers and to counter attempts to both reassert the direct colonial control and to assert more informal dominance that would render independence and sovereignty moot. This led not only to a central role for the military in the new states, but to politico-military strategies needed to confront the often overwhelming military forces of the former colonial powers. Insurgencies, which included political organisation of sympathetic civilian populations, charted not only new rules of military engagement but also conditioned new forms of state power.

In Asia the first colony to become independent under these terms was British India. As a parting gesture of colonial power, and in an attempt to limit widespread ethnic/religious bloodshed, which the British had earlier encouraged in order to divide Hindus and Muslims, the British partitioned India into two new states: the northwest and most of Bengal in the east becoming Pakistan, led by its own nationalist leader, the Western-educated Muslim lawyer Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), and the remainder becoming India.

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Ethnicity

“Ethnicity” covers a wide and fluid variety of notions and experiences. On one level, an expression of ethnic group identity is made up of many diverse factors, constructed from cultural elements that can be placed on a wide spectrum ranging from apparently objective markers to more obviously subjective identifications of varying salience and intensity. The variety of markers of difference in use has prompted theories, which distinguish between an “ethnic group” or category, one defined by cultural markers such as language, dialect, dress, custom, or religion; and “ethnic community”, in which markers consciously serve internal cohesion and differentiation from other groups. However, such a simple distinction is deceptive and misleading.

Primordialist Approach

In crude terms what has become known as primordialist theories of ethnicity define ethnic difference in relation to social structure and the form and features of a given society's cultural morphology. Such theories emphasise the existence of a tangible foundation to ethnic identification based on a deep and permanent “primordial” attachment to a group or culture. The bases of ethnicity are seen to lie in what is objectively “real” and observable. Factors often presented in this light might include a community's racial, religious and linguistic characteristics. The implication of such an approach is that ethnicity is an immutable fact, rooted in biological phenomena and/or cultural products, values and practices. Such basic elements of identity are represented as permanent, defined through and embedded in the objective structure of society. A central argument in this context is that ethnic groups are, or are like, extended kinship groups based on descent. As such, an ethnic group will operate as quasi kinship
group in terms of timeless intra-group attachments that are further reinforced by
“natural loyalty” or a sense of mutual-obligation, trust, and similarity of collective
purpose.\textsuperscript{48} Here, the kinship analogy also creates assumptions about the important
influences of shared history and outlook, and a community’s perception of the force
of enduring common ties and interests, which extend from the past into present and
future.

\textbf{Instrumentalist approach}

The alternative position, usually termed \textit{instrumentalist}, places primary
emphasis on ethnicity as a socially created and culturally constructed
phenomenon.\textsuperscript{49} Most often ethnicity is viewed in relation to a deliberate pursuit of
some strategic objective in the context of individual and collective self-interest. A
central argument is that ethnicity offers a valuable strategy for securing power,
advantage and access to resources. The cultural forms, social characteristics, values
and practices of ethnic groups are considered as little more than strategic resources
open to manipulation by existing or would-be political elites. Instrumentalist
approaches examine the various ways in which cultural characteristics and
practices become symbolic reference points for the ethnic identification of the
members of a group versus other communities. In this regard, other communities,
whether viewed as ethnic or not, are actual or potential competitors or enemies in
the same struggle for advantage. Ethnic identity, constructed on the basis of
historical or political myths, is considered as a collective reaction to a community's
political position whether that might be one of dominance under threat, or one of
resistance to enforced marginality. Whenever ethnicity matters in any social

\textsuperscript{48} See Antony D. Smith, op cit. n.11

\textsuperscript{49} See Benedict Anderson, op cit, n.13, Paul Brass et al.
context, in the sense of being given significance and predominance by the communities concerned, it is viewed as a deliberate and calculated political creation. Such theories treat ethnicity and the claims of ethnic groups as wholly instrumental and utilitarian products of power struggles. By implication, ethnicity depends on a kind of collective fictional definition of group identity, rooted in a people's imagination, rather than objective reality.

The Constructivist Approach

Obviously the two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Aspects of the different theoretical perspectives and definitions converge in contemporary arguments, which recognise and treat as analytically significant all elements used in the constructions of ethnic differentiation. This more valuable, if necessarily complicating perspective on ethnic difference borrows something from both primordialist and instrumentalist arguments. What has been called a constructivist approach to ethnicity stresses how ethnicity involves groups establishing and maintaining boundaries through a mix of objective and subjective markers of difference. Ethnicity tends to be viewed as a form of social organisation maintained by inter-group boundary mechanisms, which are based on manipulations of a notion of, shared identity in different situations and contexts. If ethnicity allows for the classification of people in terms of their most inclusive sense of what is common or shared, emphasis is placed on characteristics, presumed to be determined by or associated with a community's socio-cultural background which people use to differentiate themselves from others.

Most obviously, ethnicity simply implies the existence of a dynamic relationship between several groups that co-exist in a common area. When collective identities are constructed in any context this involves the dual process of
intra-group boundary creation and inter-group boundary maintenance. There is dualism in terms of a process of ‘dichotomisation’ and ‘complementarisation’. If the former relates to the expression of difference and the latter to expressing similarity, obviously the significance of ethnicity depends on what else is happening at local level. The central features of the process both affect and are affected by the economic and political positions of groups. At the same time the range of internal or local and external or global forces in any context create further unpredictability and instability, especially when ethnic boundaries have become viewed as significant for any ideological or material purpose.

It is rare that one can identify the precise historical moment when ethnicity becomes politicised and a cultural concern with common ethnic identity shifts into a situation of inter-ethnic polarisation where hostility between communities is enacted in the name of ethnic difference. Here also it is important to recognise the dynamism and instability in the process. The characteristics or factors considered the most telling markers of difference might be transformed in different phases of inter-ethnic hostility and conflict. For instance, in Central Asia the emphasis was originally placed on language and culture as a key marker of dividing Uzkeks from Tajiks or Kazakhs from Russians as distinct ethnic groups, but following the rise of extremists/ fundamentalists agitation, religion became the critical factor defining the political game (this issue is discussed in detail in the following chapters). In a similar way, at the same moment in history, antagonism between groups may be described and understood in different terms. In other respects, the impacts of internal propaganda and external reportage provide related lessons on the problematic of understanding ethnic conflict.
Nationality is often defined in terms of majority ethnicity as Uzbekistan for Uzbeks primarily, Tajikistan for Tajiks, etc. In the post-Soviet phase a clear categorisation as being permanent majority and minority has emerged in most of the Central Asian States. In each of these particular contexts, ethnic identity has emerged as a salient defining feature of the national community, with the consequence of adding a further complicated ideological, dimension to bolster each group’s various claims for political territorial sovereignty or control of economic resources.

Issues of ethnicity are most relevant to peoples in conflict only in relation to the negative latent process of justifying and rationalising hostility towards an other party: action is taken against “those others” who are different from “us”. Claims of clear and exclusive distinctiveness involve various terms - our nation, people and race - being used interchangeably in expressions of identity and difference. As categories become blurred in the process, fundamental dichotomies are denied or mystified: cultural factors are presented as natural and biological, social ties are symbolically reinforced by notions of shared blood and common kinship.

The confusion of analytical categories at the heart of the process is an established pattern, in many cases of inter-ethnic and communal violence. It underpins numerous forms of social prejudice and discrimination often presented in related forms of the organised persecution of “minority” groups. The critical common issue is that all forms of institutionalised hostility towards “others” consistently operate through a combination of exclusive negative stereotypes based on a mix of categorically distinct racial, national, religious, or socio-cultural characteristics. In any situation of inter-communal conflict the process of defining
and demarcating “them and us” operates without distinction being made between any of these categories. What matters are that a community considers that demonstrable “facts of difference” exist which can be defined in any number or variety of ways. In such circumstances there is no clear-cut dividing line between notions of race and ethnicity, or nationalism and ethnicity, when they are used in representations of collective identity.

If a community’s sense of identity is in Anderson’s terms “imagined”, this does not make the boundaries less real in their consequences, especially in situations of inter-communal conflict. Even when attention is drawn to the fact that any explanation of ethnic conflict involves a mix of instrumentalist and primordialist perspectives, is difficult to cut free from the tendency to seek to distinguish “real” versus “imagined”, hence ‘legitimate’ versus ‘illegitimate’ community boundaries. If we consider the extent to which the same mix of issues dominate our own responses to and assessments of the rights and wrongs of war and conflict, arguably there are strong grounds for avoiding both description and analysis in relation to ethnic difference.

There is also a need to have clear meaning of the basic concepts such as “nation” and “ethnie”, as well as their epistemological interrelationships. Both concepts are extraordinarily elusive not only from a common angle, but also from a social science point of view. The concept of “nation” is interchangeably used with at least four other basic terms: “people”, “State”, “race” and “ethnie.” Anthony Smith differentiates the two concepts in the following way: “historically, the nation is a sub-variety and development of the ethnie, though we are not dealing with some evolutionary law of progression, nor with some necessary or irreversible sequence. While the ethnie is an historical culture community, the nation is a
community mass, public culture, historic territory and legal rights. In other terms, the nation shifts the emphasis of community away from kinship and cultural dimensions to territorial, educational and legal aspects, while retaining links with older cultural myths and memories of the *ethnie*. In brief, the *ethnie* could be considered as the primordial form of the *nation*: the proto-nation. As such, it represents the basic cultural unit of human diversity predating the *nation*—the latter being the modern version of the archaic *ethnie*.

Taking into account the causes of ethnic and sectarian conflict that is applicable to a growing number of countries and regions in general and Central Asia in particular, it is neither ethnic nor sectarian *per se*. Rather, it is about struggles over the *levers of power and wealth* within societies and countries in which *ethnicity and religion* provide the cultural and historical resources for mobilising popular support for particular elites. These countries are almost always caught in the throes of economic and political transformations, brought on by both internal and external factors and forces. These erode or destroy old social, political and economic relations—old ways of doing things—and conflicts follow. There are possibilities for intervention *before* violence erupts.

Few more theories of ethnicity can be identified here for contextual inquiry. These are—ethnicity is *biological*; one view argues that ethnic tensions are, somehow, "natural." James B. Rule observes, "people reflexively grasp at ethnic or national identifications or what passes for them." 50

Another view accounts for the emergence of ethnic politics and the accompanying violence by invoking "centuries" of accumulated hatreds among primordial loyalties. Indeed, as can be seen in the case of South Asia, such

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invocations, akin to a form of historical materialism, serve to "naturalise" ethnic consciousness and conflict almost as much as do genetic theories. In as much as we cannot change historical consciousness, we must allow it to work its way out.

A third theory, most closely associated with Benedict Anderson, but held by many others, is the *imagined community*. This view suggests that ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are best understood as the "intellectual projects" of a bourgeois intelligentsia seeking to establish what Ernest Gellner has called a "high culture" distinctive from other, already existing ones. Such individuals are, often, located in the peripheral regions of empires or states, excluded from the centre by reason of birth or class, yet highly-educated and aware of the cultural and political possibilities of an identity distinct from that of the centre. Ethnicity, from this view, is 'cultural', and not inherently violent.

A fourth perspective is what might be called the *defensive* one. Here, the logic of the state and state politico-economic system starts to come into play. Historically, states have been defined largely in terms of the territory they occupy and the resources and populations they control. Hence, the state must, of necessity, impose clearly defined borders between itself and other states. To do this, the state must plausibly demonstrate that the identities of other states and groups pose a threat to its specific emergent "nation." Herein, then, lies the logic for the politicisation of group identity, or the emergence of "ethnicity" and "ethnic conflict".

The last view is *instrumental*: ethnicity is the result of projects designed to capture state power and control (discussed earlier). But such projects are not totally ahistorical, as rational choice theory might have us believe. They are a response to

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the logic of the state-based system of politico-economic relations and globalisation, but draw on historical and cultural elements that are already present. They invoke the "threats" posed by other real or emergent ethnicities as a reason for their own formation.\textsuperscript{52} Efforts to provide "national/cultural autonomy" to ethnic and religious groups were tried in the past, but failed largely because they did not provide to these groups the power accorded to the dominant identity groups in those empires and their sub-units. Only through a "state of one's own" was this possible.

The problem with each of these views or theories is that each provides some element of the whole, but none, taken alone, is complete. Largely the theories on ethnicity and nationalism emanating from scholars of West have located ethnic conflicts and religious nationalism largely to post-Cold War framework. Now looking at the nationalist (or sub-nationalist) demands are usually couched in statist terms, one might define nationalism as a set of ideas about the proper relationship between nation and state, e.g. as an ideology demanding that states should be nationally homogeneous as well as exhaustive, i.e. all-inclusive. There should thus be an overlap between 'the sentimental nation' and the 'functional state'. In the real world, such an overlap is often missing, either because nations are subdivided among several states, or because they form part of multinational states. Genuine nation-states do, of course, exist but they are the exception rather than the rule. The case of multinational states may give rise to secessionist wars, where 'entrapped nations' demand emancipation in the sense of seceding from the post-colonial incongruous state formations and attempting to form their own nation-state.

\textsuperscript{52} Uri Ra'anan, Maria Mesner, (eds.), \textit{State and Nation in Multi-ethnic Societies : The Breakup of Multinational States} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).
States may argue such claims for reunification with reference to their having, at some stage in their history, been wrongfully divided, in which case they are merely out to 'right a wrong'. However, even this historical claim raises several questions, such as how far back into history one should go? Many territories have successively belonged to different states, implying that more than one can make a historical claim to it. Moreover, it is not necessarily so that the one with the most recent claim is in the right, since the acquisition, giving rise to the claim may have been wrongful in the first place. Hence a second question, namely what 'wrongful' is supposed to mean, something that becomes increasingly murky the further back into history one ventures. By implication, most of today's borders are the product of wars that would today be regarded as impermissible. So would colonialism, as result of which the borders of most of what is today known as the Third World or to put it aptly the post colonial developing countries were drawn. Logically, most of today's states might thus claim to be 'divided' in the sense of having lost parts previously belonging to them by means that are today regarded as wrongful. This aspect is very apt to Central Asian context, since most of the border demarcation were done in the 1920's in the post-Bolshevik period by Stalin. Now in post-Soviet period all these were causing ethno-territorial tension in the region. This is also the case for the alternative mode of division, namely secession, which is usually regarded as illegitimate. The international system is skewed in favour of existing states (regardless of how they came into being in the first place), thus placing the burden of proof on the party demanding or struggling for secession.

Ethnicity and Nation

This leaves us with the question what constitutes a nation. May any group call itself a nation and invoke a right to statehood, or are there any objective criteria of nationhood? Are nations, for instance, to be defined by a common language (leading to ethnic identity), or a shared religion, or a long history, or common culture, or by belonging to the same race or other ethnic subset, or by any combination of some or all of these features? Many of the definitions suggested in the academic literature are mere pseudo-definitions, listing some or all these defining characteristics, yet without clarifying it in holistic manner. Does the alleged nation comprise everybody with at least one of the required features, or merely those who combine them all?

The exclusive definition makes for very small nations and points towards a definition of nation states, which practically no existing states would meet. It thus gives rise to several paradoxes, i.e. groups of people generally regarded as nations that should not qualify as such. What, for instance, about the inhabitants of multilingual and multi-cultural states such as in Central Asia, or multicultural states a label that would fit practically all States. The inclusive definition is much more tolerant of diversity, requiring only that one should possess some of the significant distinguishing features, but not all of them. In view of the above complexities, it is probably wiser to accept that there are no objective criteria 'out there', but that nationhood is a matter of perceptions, attitudes and emotional ties, i.e. that nations are 'imagined communities' that are constructed via social practice. Culture and shared memories plays particularly important roles in this identity formation. By implication, nations may thus be 'imagined', but they are

55 Ibid., n.
only able to imagine themselves by also imagining other nations as such, and by enjoying their recognition.\textsuperscript{56} There is, of course, some circularity to this argument, since the claim of the latter nations rests on recognition by the other nations, the claims of which rest on the same foundations, etc. \textit{ad infinitum}. Nations may, of course, find it useful to adopt 'objective' criteria for their judgements, which would certainly have several advantages. Nationhood implies certain, albeit vaguely formulated, rights to 'national self-determination', which may or may not include the right to secede and form a separate state contiguous with the nation. Several self-proclaimed nations have thus declared independence of, i.e. sovereign statehood for, the territory under their effective control and applied for international recognition, e.g. in the form of UN membership.\textsuperscript{57} The international community has vacillated in its attitude, however, sometimes granting and sometimes denying recognition, seemingly without any clear criteria. There is not even much of a pattern in this behaviour. However, the impression that they might gain recognition may motivate national leaders to 'up the ante', e.g. by vying for a statehood that they may not get rather than for a more limited form of autonomy that might be obtainable. Were it clear in advance who would be entitled to recognition and who would not, some conflicts might thus be avoided or the escalatory momentum of some ongoing conflicts more easily containable.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} For an application of Hegelian principles to IR see, Francis Fukyama: \textit{The End of History and the Last Man} (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

\textsuperscript{57} Rein Mullerson: \textit{International Law, Rights and Politics. Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS} (London: Routledge, 1994).

Anthony Smith's definition seems as good as any: a named culture-community whose members have a myth of common origins, shared memories and cultural characteristics, a link with a homeland and a measure of solidarity. 59

Several of the terms in this definition are fuzzy and hard to operationalise. Furthermore, it has to subdivide ethnic communities into ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious and ethno-political ones. It thus seems that ethnies are no more 'objective' than nations, but that they are also imagined communities, perhaps in the sense that nationalism is a subset of ethnicity. Definitions of nations such as Anthony Smith's, however, seems too narrow: a named community occupying a recognised homeland and possessing shared myths and memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and uniform legal rights and duties. 60 This definition would make nations by definition contiguous with states, which leaves not only unanswered but also unasked the pertinent question of the impact of nationalism on state-building. Can there be a nation prior to the establishment of 'its' state?

Religion rarely simplifies matters, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter. First of all, religious factors often enter into the aforementioned fuzzy concepts of nationality and ethnicity. Indeed, some have argued that religious identification is becoming more decisive than such traditional features of nationhood as ethnicity, race language, history and culture. 61

Secondly, even when kept conceptually distinct from the notion of nationhood, religion may complicate already complex problems. If a nation believes its territorial claims to be founded on divine authority, it tends to see them

60 Ibid., p.133
61 Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations' (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993).
as non-negotiable. In fact any state that has received or been promised a piece of territory 'from above' is inclined to fight for this 'with divine sanction'.

**Territory**

Overlaying all these conceptual problems is one that has (at least partly) to do with the nature of the state, as we know it, its definition and delimitation in territorial terms. A state is only identifiable— at least within the modern discourse—as 'the sovereign authority within specified spatial co-ordinates, where it enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Moreover, there seems to be an implicit international norm circumscribing how states may be spatially configured, namely that states should have what one might call, 'a neat shape and appropriate size'. Even though a criterion of national or ethnic homogeneity might, for instance, point towards 'patchwork states', this would violate the 'neat shape' criterion as well as cause numerous practical problems of how to politically unite what is spatially separate. Regardless of shape, however, the territorial constitution of states poses a continuing problem as in the case between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, among other states in Central Asia and CIS as well.

**Interactions between Groups**

Competition for scarce resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Property rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, and development allocations all confer particular benefits on individuals and groups. Whether finite in supply or not, all such resources are scarce and, thus,
objects of competition and occasionally struggle between individuals and, when organised, groups.

Politics matter, in turn, because governments control access to scarce resources and the future income streams that flow from them. Individuals and groups that possess political power can often gain privileged access to these resources and, thus, increase their welfare. Because it sets the terms of competition between groups, the state itself becomes an object of group competition. Accordingly, the pursuit of particularistic objectives often becomes embodied in competing visions of just, legitimate, or appropriate political orders.

Scarce resources and the struggle to control state policy, in turn, produce competing ethnic interests. Groups seeking resources have two options. First, they can seek national policies that increase aggregate social wealth. Each group then gets a share of a growing resource "pie". Second, they can seek group-specific benefits or "rents" that typically distort the economy. "Rent-seeking" reduces national wealth in the long run but may increase the well being of groups in the short run. In brief, groups can seek a fixed share of a larger pie or a larger share of a fixed and perhaps shrinking pie. According to the logic of collective action, large, majority groups tend to have an interest in the first strategy of increasing aggregate wealth of which they are the largest beneficiary while smaller, minority groups prefer the second strategy of increasing group wealth. As a result, the majority and the minority possess opposing policy preferences. These strategies may be reversed in cases where the commanding heights of the economy and thus

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the highest returns to economic activity are controlled by a minority ethnic group, as seen in Russians occupying disproportional positions in employment and political power in Central Asia, but the underlying policy disagreements remain. Countries with multiple minorities and no majority are likely to fall prey to redistributive conflicts, with no group supporting growth and all seeking particularistic benefits. Other issues, such as integration into the international economy, may also produce opposing policy preferences if those issues fall along existing ethnic fault lines. Thus, in nearly all ethnically divided polities, groups possess competing policy preferences.

Likewise, the state incapacity frustrates the aspirations of individual and groups, and can produce a nationalist backlash that fractures states as people seek to create political units more capable of meeting their needs.\textsuperscript{66} Diminishing resources increase competition between groups as they struggle to attain their goals.

With this theoretical background let us move to analyse the role of State in ethnic relations in the context of Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., Jack Snyder (1993)