Chapter-1

INDIA’s DIPLOMACY ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A BACKDROP

"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men the defences of peace must be constructed."

- UNESCO Preamble

Introduction

The diplomacy of India in eliminating weapons of mass destruction, like the policy of non-alignment is the product of deep and long-range thinking by statesmen and visionaries who had spent the best part of their lives in struggle against the British for the country’s independence. Above all, it was the product of the vision of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who had summed up India’s quest for self-discovery that had started in the nineteenth century under the impact of Western ideas. The spirit behind India’s nuclear policy, in particular, and the science in general, was the realization that India has a great civilization that had wandered away from the true aspirations of the people and got bogged down in false values, narrow orthodoxy, blind idolatory, superstition and obscurantism.

Every historical period is marked to some extent by change. Now, however, the pace of change seems more rapid and its consequences more profound than ever. Humankind’s efforts to control the consequences of possession and use of weapons followed quickly upon the heels of weapons development. History records negotiations between the Greek city-states of Sparta and Athens concerning limitations to fortifications in the fifth century B.C. During the middle ages, the Catholic church issued cannons proscribing violence against clerics and women, banned jousting tournaments (which tended to turn into battles), and attempted to ban weapons such as the crossbow. Early in our country’s history, the United States and Great Britain signed the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement calling for the virtual removal of armed

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1 For a detailed discussion and indepth understanding, see Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.49-63 and 289-352.


warships from the Great Lakes. The potential for devastation inherent in the armed might of newly industrialized countries prompted the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions to outlaw weapons such as dumdum bullets and asphyxiating gases, hoping to thereby mitigate the impact of future wars. World War I fully exposed the horrors and totality of modern interstate conflict and the limits to controlling arms through agreements. President Woodrow Wilson called it "the war to end all wars". Attempts to prevent the recurrence of the use of poison gas prompted the 1925 Geneva Protocol to again prohibit the use of chemical and, additionally, biological weapons. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by 63 countries, went even further by attempting to completely abolish aggressive war as a legitimate right of states. In more focussed negotiations, such as the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 and the London Naval Conferences of 1930 and 1935, treaties were made in an effort to balance the naval strength of the major powers. These agreements constrained the size of the fleets of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Italy. The limitations of such efforts were again made clear by the outbreak and massive scope of World War II. As this conflict concluded with the dropping of the first atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humankind faced an even more insistent challenge to control the possibilities for violence and destruction unleashed in the pursuit of weapons and national security.

India's general foreign policy framework pertaining to disarmament is necessarily a product of its political, economic and strategic environment and its national security perceptions, it is equally a product of its unique historical experiences that have determined its fundamental world view. India's nuclear policy, like its foreign policy was formulated to meet the fundamental problems facing the country after independence.4 In the years immediately after independence, India's leaders enunciated an ethical approach to foreign policy in general, and nuclear issues in particular. This reflected deeply held views on global issues adopted by a country that felt it had won a moral victory in addition to its political independence. This approach also reflected a genuine fear of the new weapon of mass destruction. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only provoked moral outrage, it also gave rise to a particular political perception that such a weapon was a new means by which the country's hard-won

independence might be threatened. The final objective of the United Nations disarmament efforts is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. That goal was explicitly declared in 1959, but it was implied already in the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. If the nuclear age that began in 1945 were all of one cloth, then treaty-based arms control, reinvigorated and backed by political leadership, might work again. But the structure of the nuclear age has changed too much for this to happen. The second nuclear age is a world of multi-state, not bilateral, nuclear interactions, and of actors who have radically different, strategic cultures than those of the Cold War Super Powers. These actors are poor, and this increases their dependence on nuclear deterrence, because conventional force alternatives are expensive. A number of compelling possibilities have been offered to explain India's dramatic departure from its policy of nuclear restraint. The major framework of analysis and developments include the origin of India's weapons of mass destruction programme; the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and its aftermath; the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor; the quest for a nuclear guarantee; the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war; approaches to a non-proliferation treaty; the road to Pokharan I; first nuclear test; a period of restraint; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its ramifications on security of South Asia; acquiring greater capabilities; the collapse of the security guarantee aftermath of the Soviet collapse in 1991; the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) renewal; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations; returning to Pokharan and explanations of India's nuclear behaviour.

At this juncture, it would also be worth mentioning that major international events of the twentieth (20th) century shaped international order such as the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, unification of Germany (1989), the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1990), renewal of Middle East peace process, Tiananmen Square incident (1989), the Gulf war (1991) and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (1995). As far

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5. "War knows no laws except that of might. The atom bomb brought an empty victory to the allied armed but it resulted, for the time being, in destroying the soul of Japan". Mohandas K. Gandhi, "Atom Bomb and Ahimsa", Harijan, 7 July 1946, republished in India and Disarmament: An Anthology of Selected Writings and Speeches (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1988).


7. For a detailed discussion and analysis, see Sumit Ganguly, "India’s Pathway to Pokharan II - The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program", International Security, vol.23, no.4 (Spring 1999), pp.148-177.
as Asia is concerned, the Vietnam War (1954-75), Arab-Israeli wars, apartheid regime in South Africa should be mentioned which relates to major trends in international relations. Some of the most dramatic and epochal events of the twentieth century took place during the short period of 1989 to 1991. The events can broadly be categorized under Cold War, i.e., the post-1945 political, ideological, strategic and military conflict between western allies led by the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies. The impact of globalization, science and technology on diplomacy, biotechnology, nanotechnology and the proliferation of biological weapons and its spin-off effects on bio-terrorism, chemical technology and the dissemination of chemical weapons on chemical terrorism, unprecedented advancement in the realm of research and development (R&D) setup of nuclear science impinged on nuclear terrorism; these, by and large, have been deeply influenced individual countries' national security concerns and foreign policy imperatives along with burgeoning growth of electronic media and information revolution. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence), and information warfare are the latest trends in military diplomacy. More recently, one of the greatest challenges threatens the international community witnessed was the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. It redefined countries' national security aspects to tune with contemporary realities.

**Definitional and Conceptual Aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

And when it comes to the decisive movement toward total elimination of WMD, it becomes more important than before. The term "Unconventional Weapons" designates that the category of weapons which have effects on the battlefield, population centres, or on public and political systems beyond those normally achieved by single weapon systems because of their potential use in ways that wreak mass virtually indiscriminate destruction. It is shorthand for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The United Nations designated atomic, chemical, biological weapons to be weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical and Biological Weapons were defined by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948 as weapons of mass destruction. With the advent of nuclear weapons which brought to the fore the

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distinction between WMD defined by the United Nations as "atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, and any weapons, lethal chemical or biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". Thus, chemical and biological weapons (CBWs), together with nuclear weapons, constitute the troika of weapons of mass destruction. In essence, weapons of mass destruction i.e., the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (NBC) employ for the purpose of inflicting massive damage, including the killing of large numbers of civilians. The term "weapons of mass destruction" consolidates nuclear, biological and chemical weapons into one category because despite differences in their effects and use, they share enormous lethality and symbolism. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is an open-ended concept, potentially allowing for the development of other technologies of mass destruction. "Mass Destruction" is a relative term. A single WMD when, it can cause damage equivalent to that of hundreds of thousands of conventional high explosive or incendiary weapons. The WMD severely complicate calculations of aggregate military capabilities, while their great potential destructiveness, it is often argued, makes their control more pressing. The international community has concluded treaties to eliminate the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction which stand out as models for abolition of nuclear weapons.

Certain key concepts pertaining to weapons of mass destruction receive clarifications such as "sanctions", "capping", "freezing", "roll back", "intrusive" and "non-intrusive inspections". "Sanctions" means punitive actions by one state against another to retaliate for previous objectionable behaviour. After India's Pokharan-II few countries including America imposed sanctions on India. "Capping" is more comprehensive and all-encompassing term with much wider implication as compared to 'freezing'. While 'freezing' means stopping the production of nuclear fissile materials at a level below the weapons-usable level, it does not preclude the continued production of materials of a lower grade. It also does not mean halting of production of other weapons-related materials. However, "capping" would mean complete cessation of production of nuclear


10 For a comprehensive and detailed discussion, see P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and If Telcharuzzaman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar in association with Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 1996), p.95.
fissile materials of any grade as well as other peripheral materials which are used in the production of nuclear weapons. A "roll back" actually means a progressive step-by-step dismantling of the nuclear facilities capable of production weapon-grade materials. This roll back could be voluntary, like in the case of South Africa, or enforced, as in the case of dismantling of the Iraqi nuclear installations under a UN mandate. Terms such as 'intrusive' and 'non-intrusive' inspections are also frequently used in dealing with non-proliferation and arms control related issues. 'Intrusive inspection' means inspection of nuclear facilities involving physical checking and monitoring of the production capabilities, processes and the inventory of materials produced by technical experts or inspectors, or through the video cameras permanently installed at the concerned installations, whereas a 'non-intrusive inspection' would imply monitoring of the facilities and the activities taking place in these with the help of electronic gadgets and other remote sensors without involving any physical on-site inspections by experts. ‘Non-Intrusive Inspections’ normally fall in the domain of intelligence-gathering systems and do not require the consent of the country being monitored. However, many of the activities which do not generate any distinct signatures, such as the level of enrichment being achieved in a centrifuge plant, assembling of nuclear devices, etc., cannot be picked up through this kind of inspection/monitoring while others, such as production of plutonium, or testing and deployment of nuclear devices lend themselves more easily to such detection. In contemporary times, the ongoing UN weapons inspectors’ activities to dismantle Iraq and North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programmes are remarkable examples in this respect.

It is suggested that the independence from the term "Weapons of Mass Destruction", especially in relation to the biological weapons have special characteristics that distinguish them from chemical and nuclear weapons. In many respects, biological warfare requires an altogether different approach than that for nuclear or chemical warfare. For example, counting enemy warheads for arms control or donning full protective gear in a potentially contaminated environment are relevant for nuclear and

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., pp.95-96.
13 Ibid., p.96.
chemical scenarios; but not for biological.\textsuperscript{14} Intelligence and masking requirements are different for biological warfare. Even decontaminants are different.

In the case of nuclear deterrence there will be more doubtful efficacy if it is possible to find dealing with non-state actors, domestic terrorist contingency, or an unidentifiable opponent. In those instances, whom would we threaten? Against what targets would we retaliate? And what would constitute proportionality? Moreover, even state actors may not be deterred by a nuclear threat if they believe they can mask the nature or the source of their attack (it is easier to do this with biological than with most other weapons). Or if they are already threatened by nuclear weapons and have ignored that threat when they went to war in the first place.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Biological Weapons} (BW) is a weapon containing infectious agents or living organisms, or infective material derived from them, when used or intended to cause disease or death in humans, animals or plants, as well as their means of delivery.\textsuperscript{16} But chemical weapon is a shell or other device filled with two chemicals of relatively low toxicity which mix and react while the device is being delivered to the target, the reaction product being a super-toxic chemical warfare agent, such as a nerve agent.\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Chemical Weapon} (CW) is a chemical substance -- whether gaseous, liquid or solid -- when used or intended for use in weapons because of their direct toxic effects on humans, animals or plants, as well as their means of delivery.\textsuperscript{18} But conventional weapons are not having mass destruction effects.

Weapons that employ explosive devices on nuclear reactions are referred to as \textit{nuclear weapons}. The use of nuclear weapons in war is called nuclear warfare.\textsuperscript{19} Nuclear weapons, irrespective of their size and purpose, belong to the category of weapons of

\textsuperscript{14} For a detailed discussion, see K. Bhushan and G. Katyal, \textit{Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare} (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2002), p.345.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.344.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p.xxv.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} For a complete range of information, see Steve Tulliu and Thomas Schmalberger, \textit{Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building} (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2001), p.75.
mass destruction as commonly understood. The concept of 'proliferation' has to be properly classified. There are two distinct categories of proliferation vertical and horizontal. Vertical proliferation may be defined as an increase in number and types of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear weapon states; whereas horizontal proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states or their ability to make them. Proliferation has, however, been imprecisely explained as horizontal proliferation all along, although the word proliferation, borrowed from biology, means to grow by rapid production of new parts, cells, buds or offspring. The comprehensive meaning of the term 'proliferation' was discussed by the members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) when the draft non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was considered in the mid-1960s. India, a member of the non-aligned group of nations in the ENDC, pointed out that all aspects of the term 'proliferation' not merely the horizontal proliferation "which have been variously termed as present and future proliferation, or existing and further proliferation", should be covered by the NPT. "Both of these aspects of proliferation of nuclear weapons form part of a single whole, and the problem cannot be dealt with by dealing with only one aspect of it. This element is essential and central to our concept of a non-proliferation treaty". But the three nuclear weapon powers -- the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the United Kingdom -- who sponsored the draft NPT ignored such reasoning and preferred a treaty entirely devoted to tackling the horizontal proliferation.

The "wild goose chasing" of unborn nuclear weapon states has resulted in the thick overgrowth of bizarre doctrines of horizontal proliferation which include not merely the acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives, but also the so-called "sensitive" nuclear technologies -- both the front and the back end -- the like enrichment facilities, reprocessing of plutonium, breeders and other fuel cycles which will provide weapon-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium and also heavy water. Proliferation, whether horizontal or vertical is dangerous, but to treat it as though vertical proliferation is unrelated or immaterial, is nothing but overselling horizontal

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21 Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), document no.XI ENDC/PV.370, A/C 1/PV. 1551, p.52.
proliferation. Vertical proliferation is threatening the survival of mankind whereas even after 57 years of the nuclear age (the world entered the nuclear age in 1945 -- culmination of Second World War, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (both in Japan) by the US led allies) horizontal proliferation is only a potential threat. Hence, any attempt to overlook this formidable reality is hypocritical.

Arms control principles are better stated as propositions of the ambiguous record of previous efforts to control and reduce arms in this century. Perhaps the only "principle" attracting consensus is that we should use arms control to promote our national security interests when arms control negotiations are an effective means to do. If the following summary of propositions are not principles, they constitute one way to organize the thinking about conventional arms control:

For a full discussion, see, T.T. Poulose, Nuclear Proliferation and the Third World (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982), p.3.

Arms control is a political process; it deals with the distribution of power and it affects the general warfare. Politics, Aristotle said, is the highest art because it includes everything else; each proposition advanced herein raises political challenges and obligations.

Arms control can supplement defense in achieving national security. Although they involve dealing with politically hostile nations, arms control treaties do not change ideologies or necessarily reduce hostility. If treaties reduce confrontation and improve predictability, they support diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions.

Nuclear and conventional arms controls affect each other. They interact not only in how they affect the distribution of military options but also, and often more dramatically, in how their interaction effects the perceptions of national leaders concerned with their countries' security.

Conventional arms control is more complicated than nuclear arms control. The military resources at issue in conventional talks are complex components of military capability. But the character of conventional negotiations is that they are coalition undertakings, with many nations, political and economic institutions involved in and affected by the results.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks provide lessons, not precedents. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact disagreed about the fundamental issues of exchanging data on military forces and necessary measures of verification. Still, the MBFR talks are the only examples in the nuclear age of many nations in two alliances negotiating with and among each other about the reduction of conventional forces -- a process that is, by definition, political.

NATO strategy is likely to be the NATO perspective for judging conventional arms control. Both the retention of the strategy's main elements and the modification of those elements stemming from arms agreements bear directly on the principle of political control. Nuclear weapons are and will remain a critical component of NATO's deterrent, and their possible use depends on decisions of political authorities.

Soviet intentions are still unclear but fundamentally political. The possibility that Soviet objectives may be served by reducing Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, thereby possibly improving the stability of the military balance in Europe sought by NATO, is no guarantee that NATO will remain politically cohesive. NATO ministers and parliamentarians must think beyond the immediate effects of arms treaties to the kind and quality of alliance they want in the next century.

Military criteria and judgement are essential elements of conventional arms control negotiations. Strategy joins political and military considerations. Beyond the details of military hardware and tactics, military

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Conventional arms control is a legitimate force for improving national security when it supports, but does not replace diplomacy and defense.\(^{24}\) Arms control and disarmament are distinct and often value-laden terms. Disarmament is the most stringent and Utopian term, which carries a common assumption that it means a "Zero" outcome.\(^{25}\) The term "disarmament" is used to subsume arms reductions and/or controls and simplifies an explanation that may encompass limitations (as in Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty-I or II (SALT-I, II), reductions (as in CFE - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), and disengagements (as in armistice or war termination).\(^{26}\)

Partial disarmament means "the laying aside or depriving of arms".\(^{27}\) Basically, arms control is the regulation of arms to enhance political, military, economic or other aims; could entail disarmament\(^ {28}\) whereas disarmament means the reduction or elimination of armaments.\(^ {29}\) Another definitional dimension gives us disarmament is the process or policy of reducing levels of armaments, especially in the nuclear age, with the implication that possession of arms itself stimulates conflict. It is distinct from arms control i.e., the negotiation of limits on armaments by participant states. Variants of the

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advice is always subject to political decisions because it is subject to the availability of national resources. Where strategic goals and security risks depend on calculable warfighting outcomes, unvarnished military advice should be the essential consideration.

Support from governments and public is needed to make arms control worthwhile. Military advisors and arms control negotiators can propose; political leaders must dispose in an atmosphere of an aware and alert public which, in a democracy, is the final arbiter of the value of all political processes.


Hallenbeck et al., n.23, p.71.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., p.537.
policy include unilateral and multilateral, partial and complete, nuclear and conventional disarmament.30

While international community looks at broader perspective on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, throughout the Cold War, the primary concern with WMD focussed on the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the Soviet Union and the United States. Considerable debate and deliberation went into the development of an appropriate strategy and force structure to deter attack by the Soviet Union. From 1960 through 1990, close to 15 per cent of total U.S. defense spending went toward building and maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent posture. While several other nations openly, and in some cases covertly developed nuclear weapons and long range delivery systems, their holdings were a small percentage of those of the two Superpowers. Efforts to limit deployed nuclear weapons were almost exclusively conducted in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.31 With the end of the Cold War, the situation has changed. The United States and Russia are reducing their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to about one third of their earlier stockpile during 1990s.

The number of countries capable of obtaining weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological, and chemical -- is growing. Despite several notable success in impeding and actually reversing WMD proliferation, the post-Cold War environment is characterized by an increasing number of states seeking to acquire such weapons and their delivery systems. For this reason, preventing and protecting against WMD and missile proliferation has become one of the highest national priorities for the United States.32

Pertaining to the WMD proliferation, the international community and policy makers are faced with a new set of challenges. A strategy to deter a nuclear strike against the United States is still critical, but no longer sufficient. As Moscow and Washington implement the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) and move toward START-II levels of nuclear forces, it is necessary to consider the implications of no longer having a nuclear force that dwarfs those of medium-sized powers such as China.

32 Ibid., p.4.
Moreover, possession of WMD by new regional powers will greatly complicate the US ability to deter such countries from aggressive actions, as well as the ability to deploy forces to those regions. The Persian Gulf and Korea are examples of places where weapons of mass destruction in the hands of hostile regimes put US forces at grave risk in crises or conflicts. Likewise, possession of WMD and the prospects for covert delivery by rogue states (possessing WMD capability and it threatens international security) or terrorist groups present new security threats to the US homeland. The present Bush Administration categorized rogue states as "axis of evil", i.e., Iraq, Iran and North Korea. And Millennium Declaration of the United Nations (UN) states that "we will spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than 5 million lives in the past decade. We will also seek to eliminate the dangers caused by weapons of mass destruction".  

In the present day world the greater and imminent threats arise out of the inadequacy of control over immense stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the nuclear weapon states, the reduction in reaction and response times flowing from vertical proliferation and the consequent increase in automation of decision-making, and the increased risks of terroristic diversion of nuclear devices and materials from the unsafeguarded military facilities in the nuclear weapon states. New developments in conventional weapon technologies are eroding on the nuclear thresholds. The use of nuclear weapons as international currency of power and their spatial proliferation around the globe have contributed significantly to interventionism by the nuclear weapons powers in the developing world and to the increased sense of insecurity in the latter. These are the real issues relating to nuclear proliferation, and these are the issues by which the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be judged. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was sponsored by the USA, USSR and UK in 1968, India believed that the treaty was seriously flawed and did not really aim to bring about non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hence the real problem of proliferation is continuing -- qualitative and quantitative proliferation of nuclear weapons by the sponsors of treaty.

33 Ibid.
34 For wide ranging information, see Millennium Declaration, 2000, United Nations, New York, 2000.
36 Ibid.
India's Disarmament Diplomacy in Early Years

India's concept of disarmament was endorsed by the Belgrade Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned States. The Declaration issued at the time of conclusion of the Conference on 6 September 1961, stated: "The Heads of State or Government point out that General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) should include, elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for the purpose of international security, and the total prohibition of production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermonuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and the installations for the delivery and placement and (National) operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories".\(^{37}\)

General and Complete Disarmament

The Soviet Union is generally given the credit for putting forward (on 18 September 1959) a programme of the GCD for the first time in the history of the United Nations. It was, however, India which, "perhaps for ethical reasons", had earlier pressed the position that the mere balanced reduction of arms - "popularly accepted connotation of disarmament" -- was no longer sufficient. In his statement before the Tenth anniversary meeting at San Francisco, V.K. Krishna Menon stated that disarmament was only a step towards a warless world.\(^{38}\) What was required was the outlawing of war, where nations would be able to live in a society where war would no longer be an instrument of settling disputes. This goal, he remarked, was accepted by the United Nations only in 1959, when we moved to the conception of a warless world, i.e., the abandonment of arms not in the sense of cutting the size down but "the total abandonment of all equipment, of all forces and defence administration of military training and things of that character, which was dismissed as being Utopian in the old days".\(^{39}\)

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\(^{39}\) Statement in Lok Sabha, 23 November 1960, Lok Sabha Debates, 23 November 1960, 1843-59.
The programme of GCD extended the scope of the earlier proposals on the regulation and reduction of all armaments (including the control of atomic energy and nuclear weapons) and disarmament negotiations as a whole. Though connected with GCD, it brought in the new issues that were not necessarily relevant for reaching an agreement on the regulation and reduction of armaments.\footnote{J.P. Jain, \textit{n. 38}, p.130.} After a great deal of discussion at its 14th session, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) accepted GCD as the objective in disarmament negotiations by adopting resolution 1378 (XIV), co-sponsored by 82 countries, including India. In that resolution, the world community declared that the question of GCD was "the most important one facing the world today" and called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of that problem. However, the two sides pursued the negotiations for GCD "only reluctantly and not seriously, so as not to lag behind in reaping the fruits of propaganda value". In 1959 and 1960, Moscow stressed that the Western powers were not seriously committed to the goal of GCD. On the part of the Western countries, that they were not interested in GCD, the Soviet Union would be willing to consider partial and other measures if it was indicated. One can presume from this impression that the Kremlin expected the White House to reject the goal of GCD. It is pointed out that the Western powers reluctantly went along with the idea of GCD, not making any positive commitment to it for two years, for equally propagandistic reasons.\footnote{See R.K. Kapur, \textit{The Post-War Disarmament Negotiations: A Study of the Narrowing the Differences Between the East and the West}, (New York: New York University, 1966).}

The programme of GCD, proposed in the Declaration of the Soviet Government (A/4219), envisaged the realization of the programme within "as short a time limit as possible -- within a period of four years" in the following three stages:

1. The forces of the USSR, the USA and China would be reduced to 1.7 million, that of the UK and France to 650 thousand, and the forces of others to be reduced to unspecified but agreed levels;
2. All armed forces would be disbanded and all military bases eliminated; and
3. All stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and bacterial weapons would be destroyed and all military organizations, expenditures and training would be abolished.

During 1959, the First Committee in the debate on the item on GCD, several speakers expressed doubts regarding the time limit of four years suggested by the USSR for
general and complete disarmament. Some even expressed the view that the proposal was unrealistic and Utopian. The United States repeatedly expressed its conviction that no proposal for disarmament could succeed without effective international control. The speakers also suggested that the Disarmament Commission should consider the problems that might arise and, in particular, the question of setting up an international police force and also international law which would prevail then. The representative of the United Kingdom suggested that the Disarmament Committee should consider the question of comprehensive disarmament in stages. A French delegate spoke of the consideration of disarmament proposals, the highest priority should be given to the question of the production and use of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{42}

The advent of nuclear weapons, the World War II scenario, disarmament negotiations, the emergence of the USA and the USSR as the most powerful states in the post-war period guided by the then existing military situation in which Washington privileged the nuclear monopoly in the initial few years and Moscow had the preponderance in conventional armed strength. Moreover, their views had to be seen in the political context of the Cold War, which had remained the dominant feature of their relations until recent times. The Great Power unanimity was visible in the first part of the First Session of the UN General Assembly in January 1946 in their joint sponsorship of the resolution proposing the establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the revolutionary discovery of atomic energy. The differences came to the surface in the second part of the first session itself in October 1946 when Molotov of the Soviet Union lashed out, after the presentation of the Baruch Plan in June 1946, against what he called "atomic diplomacy" and "dollar diplomacy".

The Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946 creating a 12-member Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was highly commended, which was adopted by 46 votes to none against with one abstention. In the discussion, some representatives expressed the view that the Commission, which was to consist of the members of the Security Council plus Canada and to report to the Council, should be more widely representative of the UN as a whole but no formal amendments were moved. The Commission, thus established, was charged with the duty to enquire into all the phases of the problem raised by the

\textsuperscript{42} For French suggestions, see UN Document A/C. 1/821, 1959.
discovery of atomic energy and to make recommendations, inter alia, for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.43

The US proposal, known as the Baruch Plan, was approved by a majority of 9 members of the Atomic Energy Commission. It provided for the setting up of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA), which would own, operate and manage all facilities for handling dangerous amounts of the fissionable material and directly control all atomic energy activities throughout the world which might become a potential menace to world security. For activities of a less serious character, a licensing and inspection system was proposed. The majority plan also contemplated autonomous powers for the proposed Authority including powers of enforcement and of action against countries guilty of violations and evasions - the decisions of which were not subject to Big Power Veto. In other words, it meant that before Washington would cease to have its own nuclear weapons all other nations should forgo the right to develop their own nuclear weapons. They should also submit to the strict and unrestricted inspection procedures of an international authority and thereby give convincing proof of their bonafides in the matter to the satisfaction of the USA.44

Thus, the AEC resolution of 5 April 1948, which reflected the US position, asserted that it was a completely unrealistic to expect any nation to renounce atomic weapons without any assurance that all nations will be prevented from producing them".45

An essential feature of the Baruch Plan was the establishment of a veto-free, powerful supranational body, dominated and controlled by the Western powers. Moreover, the representatives of that body possessed "unimpeded rights of ingress and access for the performance of their inspections and other duties into, from and within the territory of

every nation, unhindered by national or local authorities". The USSR could not obviously accept that arrangement. Kremlin, therefore, condemned the majority plan as unwarranted infringement of the national sovereignty of states and designers to secure control for the USA over the new materials for atomic energy throughout the world, through the intermediacy of the proposed world authority which was bound to be of pro-American views. The Soviet Union accordingly rejected the one-sided US proposal and laid stress on the prohibition of atomic weapons "in any circumstances whatsoever" and the destruction of all existing stocks of such weapons. Under the Soviet proposals, the functions of the international control commission would have been confined to periodical inspections and special investigations in cases in which there was suspicion of clandestine activities. Atomic energy would continue to be developed exclusively by the individual states and not primarily by an international authority as envisaged in the Baruch Plan. The power of punishment for violations was similarly to reside in each nation itself. Moreover, such an international authority, as provided for in the Soviet Plan, was to come under the jurisdiction of the Security Council where Moscow had veto power.

A sub-Committee was set up for the consideration of various resolutions before the Assembly. India's efforts were successful in consolidating the French proposal recommending the establishment of an international police force under Article 43 of the UN Charter and the Egyptian proposal for the immediate withdrawal of armed forces stationed by the members of the UN on the territories of other Members without their free consent and the Indian amendment in that regard was accepted unanimously. This was one of the successes of India's diplomacy during those periods. It formed para 7 of resolution 41(1) of 14 December 1946 (India had not attained independence in that period though an interim government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru was established). Under the compromise solution, which was India's first modest attempt

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48 Art.43(1) of the UN Charter states that, "All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreements or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."

49 At that time India did not take any stand on the Bäruch Plan.
to act as a moderator and to find common ground among different positions. The Assembly recommended to the Security Council to accelerate, as much as possible, the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter. It also recommended to the Members to undertake a progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking into account the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal, without delay, of their armed forces stationed in the territories of members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements. Under para 6 of the resolution, the provision of a veto on the day-to-day work of the inspection agencies was not implied as the control organs derived their powers and status from an international convention or conventions. It, however, implicitly accepted the Security Council jurisdiction, with Great Power veto, over the punishment of violations discovered by an international system of control and inspection because that international inspection system was to be established within the framework of the Security Council".

When it comes to India's negotiating stance and diplomatic strategy at the very beginning of our independence from Britain, to be precise, just one month after -- in September 1947, pertaining to India's disarmament diplomacy, India's the then representative Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit referred disarmament in the general debate in these words: "There is an uneasy awareness that things are perhaps moving towards some new and annihilating disaster and...not enough is being done to check the trend". It was in 1948-49, at the third session of the United Nations General Assembly that India was seen firmly putting forward views on the problem of disarmament. India took firm stand on issues affecting vital national interests and played the role of a mediator. Thus, the Indian representative, Mrs. Pandit, speaking in the general debate on 25 September 1948, described the problem of atomic energy control and disarmament as "one of the most important items" and "momentous questions" for discussion. The efforts made by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had proved fruitless and, it was facing a deadlock and no progress had been made on the question of disarmament. The threat of war could not be banished from the world unless the present race for armaments was abandoned. Mrs. Pandit expressed the hope that the

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50 See UN Document A/PV 85, 19 September 1947, p.134.
deliberations between the opposing sides would result in reconciliation and disarmament. She also emphasized that almost as important as the elimination of atomic weapons was the outlawing of biological and chemical warfare, which was said to have been perfected to such an extent as to threaten the very existence of mankind. These three points -- the stress on the abandonment of the arms race, the necessity of continuing negotiations with a view to reach an agreement and the banning of the weapons of mass destruction (the ABC -- atomic, biological and chemical weapons) -- have constantly figured in the subsequent Indian attitude or posture on disarmament. On the question of atomic energy control, Mrs. Pandit expressed India's keen interest, as an underdeveloped country, in its utilization for peaceful and beneficent purposes.

Speaking in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) on 2 April 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said on crusade against weapons of mass destruction:

"A new weapon of unprecedented power, both in volume and intensity, with unascertained and probably unsustained range of destructive potential in respect to time and space, what is, both as regards the duration and the extent of consequences, is being tested, unleashing its massive power for use as a weapon of war. We know that its use threatens the existence of man and civilization as we know it. We are told there is no effective protection against the hydrogen bomb, and millions of people may be exterminated by a single explosion and many more injured and perhaps still many more condemned to slow death or to live under the shadow of the fear of disease and death".

This was a horrible prospect for nations and peoples everywhere, whether involved in wars and power blocs or not. That is why Prime Minister Nehru stressed: "Mankind has to awaken itself to reality and face the situation with determination and assert itself to avert the calamity". Though another atomic bomb has not so far been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki (both in Japan) nuclear technology, which is part of overall military technology, has become more and more sophisticated. Efforts are in progress to produce bigger and more destructive weapons and delivery systems. The race for nuclear arms and sophisticated innovations in the delivery systems may well result in the extinction of life on our planet. That is why Nehru called for a "prohibition of such..."
weapons by common consent and immediately by agreement amongst those concerned, which latter is at present the only effective way to bring about their abandonment.\textsuperscript{55}

While analyzing sophisticated innovations in the delivery systems and military dimension of diplomacy, the impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a case in point. Judging by the record, avoiding the use of weapons of mass destruction has thus far not proven to be very difficult. Nuclear weapons have not exploded in a war. Since 1945 and we have no evidence that numerous occasions have arisen in which their use was seriously considered. The US put its strategic forces on high alert only twice, the Soviet Union apparently only once.\textsuperscript{56} There are conflicting reports as to whether India and or Pakistan put nuclear forces on high alert in 1990. The Soviet Union hinted at using nuclear weapons against China in 1969 (but this may have been a bluff), and possibly Chinese nuclear weapons were on high alert as a result. Israel has not indicated whether its nuclear weapons were ever on high alert, for example in 1973 according to some experts, because it never admits to having the weapons.\textsuperscript{57} Chemical weapons have been used by Iraq and Iran, and earlier by Egypt in Yemen, but otherwise not in inter-state warfare and rarely in internal warfare. (This does not cover accidents with chemical weapons). Also, on a possible use of it with skeptics on the "yellow rain" controversy about the Afghan war. Biological weapons have apparently been used only once in combat, by Japan in China during World War II (apparently as many as 250,000 people were killed).

India was aware that atomic destruction was not the only form of destruction.\textsuperscript{58} It is common knowledge that even the conventional weapons of today are so powerful that, if used on a large scale, they can destroy entire nations. The progress made in recent years in the use of projectiles, high explosives, and armour has increased the power to

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p.188.
\textsuperscript{56} For a wide range discussion and analysis, see, Patrick M. Morgan, "The Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs", in Eric Herring (ed.), Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: Frank Cross, 2000), p.132.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Speaking before First Committee, V.K. Krishna Menon said: "India was aware that atomic destruction was not only form of destruction. It did not want to separate conventional weapons from any other weapons. It would make the necessary contribution towards any form of disarmament that might take place." See UN-General Assembly, First Committee, 12th Session, 16 October 1957, p.37.
kill. Speaking in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 28 September 1953, V.K. Krishna Menon expressed India’s concern over the development of the napalm bomb and various other weapons by which human beings are gradually tortured and are burned to death. He called for efforts to control "the destructive power by the idealism of man’s spirit and wisdom of his mind". This implied that once man was by nature peace-loving, he could, if only he would make serious efforts, control the destructive power of the weapons which were, after all, his own creation. It would certainly be a victory for the human spirit if the nations of the world through their collective wisdom agreed not to spend further on engines of destruction. It would also pave the way for the establishment of permanent peace in the world. On the contrary, continued development of all manner of weapons of mass destruction would push the world towards self-annihilation.

Militarism, even after the Second World War, loomed large in the minds of men. War was still very much a means of national policy. The United States and the Soviet Union had emerged as Super Powers (i.e., capacity to intervene with military presence, nuclear repertoire, arsenals, economic strength, manpower and technology, so on and so forth) welded to opposite ideologies and held differing, and often conflicting views on international issues. Their expenditure on armaments was ever on the increase. Scientific research was extensively being used to manufacture new and dangerous types of weapons. This would result in annihilation of the whole world. The situation was well assessed by Jawaharlal Nehru when he said: "We live in an age of crisis, tortured humanity hungers for real peace, but some evil fate pursues it and pushes it further away from what it desires most."

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59 Although incendiary weapons had been used in air attacks on cities before the Second World War, few people anticipated the scenes of utter devastation that followed their use during that war. Around thousand tons of bombs were dropped on 60 Japanese towns and cities, practically all of them incendiaries. Ninety per cent by weight of the incendiaries were napalm bombs, the remainder magnesium or thermate. The raids killed 260,000 people and injured another 412,000. Nearly two-and-a-quarter million homes were destroyed, and 9.2 million people rendered homeless. In Germany, 1.35 million tons of bombs were dropped on population centres, forty-nine towns and cities being singled out for largescale attack. There are estimated to have been 1.4 million civilian air raid casualties in Germany, of whom 600,000 were killed. Civilian air raid casualties in the United Kingdom amounted to 147,000 including 61,000 dead. Since the Second World War, incendiary air attacks against population centres have continued to be practiced. One major example occurred during Korean War, when a large part of the city of Pyong Yang was destroyed by incendiaries in January 1951. See, Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use (New York, UN, 1973), pp.46-47.

60 U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), Plenary Meeting, 8th Session, 28 September 1953, p.200.

61 Nehru, n.53, p.182.
The horrors of war and the destructive capability of modern weapons after the Hiroshima tragedy made the people of the world think in terms of disarmament. India also adopted a well-defined and systematic policy towards disarmament and attached the highest importance to it. This is evident from the following statement by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru speaking in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) said:

In regard to foreign affairs, the most important thing today is disarmament, looking at it from the world point of view, because, if there is no disarmament, the world will naturally drift more and more towards conflict, towards war; and undoubtedly, if there is war, it will be a nuclear war, and a possible war like that brought on without even a declaration of war.62

A nuclear war did not present the possibility of either a victory or a defeat. It only presented the possibility of complete destruction. Therefore, Nehru considered, disarmament "the most important thing" because the question of the very survival of the human race was linked with it. The feeling prevailed those days that support for disarmament proposals helps in winning friends in the world. However, the Indian attitude towards the problem of disarmament does not seem to have been motivated by any desire to achieve a propaganda advantage. Nehru was quite categorical about the importance of disarmament for saving humanity from total destruction. During this period, some members of Indian Parliament were not showing excessive enthusiasm and were skeptical pertaining to general and complete disarmament. But Jawaharlal Nehru had a well-thought out, well-conceived, clear cut viewpoints regarding disarmament and he said: "The question of disarmament is more important than any other problem, internal and external, mentioned or international, because it is a national problem, apart from being an international one. The whose future survival of India and every Indian depends upon it".63 Hence, national security component of diplomacy has and would always have an edge, tilt and upperhand over any other area because of its political nature, political power, and security compulsions of the country and so on.

**Personality Factor in India’s Diplomacy**

While analyzing India's disarmament diplomacy, especially in its initial period, the personality and leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru is worth mentioning. Strongly influenced by British socialist perspectives, Nehru adhered to a combination of liberal

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62 Quoted by V.K. Krishna Menon in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, ENDC/PVS, 20 March 1962, p.34.

63 India, Lok Sabha Debates, 23 November 1960, pp.1937-40.
internationalism and the idea of a strong state, including its domination of the "commanding heights" of the economy. His views, also showed by the pre-World War II British Left, included a skeptical view of the United States, on cultural as well as ideological grounds. Nehru also held a sympathetic, even romantic image of the economic and social accomplishments of the Soviet Union — although he rejected Soviet totalitarianism — and he admired the way that Moscow stood up to Western pressure. Many of Nehru's generation saw this as a model for a weak, recently independent India. Above all, India's first Prime Minister was sympathetic to the anti-colonial movements then stirring around the world, and he made this a central theme of free India's diplomacy. What all these invariably suggest that the liberal values of Nehruvian vision articulated over the years on India's foreign policy and a socialist mould of his personality. This mould, style of personality had a strong clout and compelling bearing on India's foreign policy generally and evolving a strategic thought on disarmament diplomacy in particular.

Nehru's ambiguity about his special place in Indian history and his charismatic appeal are amply reflected in his speeches and statements. A bit of self-criticism, first published under a pseudonym, then reprinted as part of his autobiography, is revealing:

Jawaharlal ki jai! [Hail Jawaharlal!] The Rashtrapati [state leader] looked up as he passed swiftly through the waiting crowds; his hands went up, and his pale, hard face was lit up with a smile... The smile passed away and the face became stern and sad... Men like Jawaharlal, with all their great capacity for great and good work, are unsafe in a democracy. From the Far North to Cape Comorin he has gone like some triumphant Caesar... He calls himself a democrat and socialist... but a little twist and he might turn into a dictator... It is not through Caesarism that India will attain freedom, and though might prosper a little under a benevolent and efficient despotism, she will remain stunted and the day of the emancipation of her people will be delayed.

Nehru also held that India's interests are relatively permanent and unchanging (since the state is an enduring entity with extensive territory and civilizational roots). He claimed only to have given "voice" to Indian policy:

I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the condition of the Indian mind during the freedom struggle and inherent in the circumstances of the world today.

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64 For an interesting presentation on this, see, Stephen P. Cohen, Emerging Power: India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.38.
65 Ibid.
I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these few years I have represented that policy as foreign minister. I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in charge of the foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy. 67

Thus, under Nehru, India's foreign policy was seen to be inevitable because it was grounded in the geostrategic realities of India. Nehru's supporters argued that to the degree that he failed, it was because, being only human, he may have misread these realities or was led astray by flawed advisors, such as his right-hand man, Krishna Menon, or was tricked by India's foes, especially the Chinese. 68

In some cases, the burden of national problems is so heavy that they do not want by any means to involve their countries in international problems. It is in this light that we must view the statement made by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. By calling disarmament a national problem, and by linking it to the future survival of India and that of every Indian, he expressed India's genuine and sincere interest in achieving disarmament. 69 India looked upon nuclear weapons as a symbol of evil and brute force. It had shown a new way to deal with brute force, with a new weapon, with the weapon of non-violent resistance. In fact, it won its freedom from alien rule of about two hundred years by following the path shown by Mahatma Gandhi. The Gandhian principle of purity of means was the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. By making disarmament a part of foreign policy, India wanted to make sincere effort to extent the principle of non-violence to international relations. This is evident from a statement made by Nehru:

All the peoples of the world have a right to life and progress and the fulfillment of their destiny. They have the right to peace and security. They can only preserve these rights now by living peacefully together and by solving their problems by peaceful methods. They cannot convert each other by force or threats of force, for any such attempt will lead to

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67 Nehru, in his reply to debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha, 9 December 1958, in India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1961), p.80.
68 The most complete presentation of Menon’s views and influence is in Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). One of India’s leading foreign policy experts, Jagat Mehta, has made a strong case that Nehru’s errors are due to too rich and sophisticated a vision of the problem and warns against the emergence of an Indian “national security state”. See “Nehru’s Failure with China: Intellectual Naivete or the Wages of a Prophetic Vision?” Paper prepared for a Conference on Nehru and the Twentieth Century, University of Toronto, October 1989.
69 For details, see Ashwani Kumar Chopra, India’s Policy on Disarmament (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1984), p.5.
Nehruvian internationalism is "realist" in its assumption that the world is not necessarily friendly to a weak and vulnerable state such as India, and that national interests must shape the foreign policy of any state. But Nehru was also a liberal and thought that states can rise above "the rigors of anarchy and fashion at least seasons and locales of peace and cooperation. They must do so because power politics is flawed and will end in catastrophe". In its two most materially powerful forms, as scientific reason (the project of trying to bend the natural world to human purposes), or as social reason (the project of trying to use human institutions -- above all, the state -- to remake society), reason was a tool for altering the natural and human worlds, for better or ill. Yet this tactical aspect did not exhaust the resources of reason. He saw that reason was not a western import - there was a long and refined Indian history of reasoned argument, about ethical life and action. The act of reasoning about history and experience was a way of discovering moral truths: through such testing and questioning, personal identity was shaped, and moral commitments were discovered. To put it differently, moral commitments and beliefs had to be argued for, they had to be held up to the harsh light of history and experience. Nehru lived through with varying distance, some of the darkest periods of twentieth century history, perhaps of human history: the First and Second World Wars, the Holocaust, the Atom Bomb, the Partition of India. For someone as sensitive as he was to history and the historical past, this inevitably

72 Nehru himself wavered continually between idealism and national egoism, or realism, arguing that idealism was, for India, a pragmatic and realistic policy. Under this reductionist realism, virtuous and wise leaders (such as Nehru) would be led to pursue realistic policies that advanced the national interest; these policies included a measure of idealism, or liberal internationalism. In brief, India would do well by doing good, and when it could not do good, the essentially just and moral India could, when necessary, use force to protect its vital interests. As in other great states, this national egoism permeates Indian foreign policy. Nehru certainly recognized the instrumental power of reason. 34th Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture by Prof. Sunil Khilnani on "Nehru's Faith" on 13 November 2002, New Delhi, India, p.4.
73 Ibid.
shadowed his sense of what was prospectively humanly possible. Nehru tried to use to the utmost, that capacity all of us have - the capacity to reason.

The Nehruvian core was also influenced by Gandhi, directly through the Gandhi-Nehru relationship and indirectly through the influence of the Mahatma on Indian thinking at large. Although there are still vestiges of this legacy even fifty years after Gandhi's death, no significant element of foreign policy community in India would claim to be "Gandhian" without some important qualification.

For Nehru, on the other hand, the moral life was a pursuit, which had to allow testing and revision, through the exercise of reason. The scientific inquiry and scientific temper impinged on Nehru's personality, and the establishment of nuclear facility in India under the scientific leadership of Homi Babha. To suggest these foregoing analysis of several shades of Nehru's personality had a profound bearing and strong clout shaping and articulating India's diplomacy in general and disarmament diplomacy in particular over the decades. The point is that for any successful diplomacy along with other factors, the role of personality and leadership always have an upperhand and edge. In this respect non-aligned movement is a case in point and classic example of Nehru's leadership quality. India's strategic vision, strategic thought and strategic perspective dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru's view of India and the world - whether it is weapons of mass destruction or other.

Analyzing India's foreign policy and disarmament diplomacy, the Nehruvian transition had an indelible mark over the decades. Jawaharlal Nehru was not only India's chief foreign policy theoretician, he was its dominant, almost sole, practitioner for nearly

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74 Ibid., pp.4-5.

75 To understand further Nehru's personality and a comparison with Gandhi and Tagore are quite remarkable. Prof. Sunil Khilnani points out that -- If Nehru was unusual as a politician in the depth of his moral commitments, it is necessary also to see how he was entirely ordinary in ways that Gandhi for instance was not. Gandhi was unique. He developed extraordinary qualities of character, intensities of self-denial what seem almost freakish. Nehru was not like that: he was in an important sense, like any one of us -- teeming with human appetites, often bewildered by life's choices, self-doubting, indecisive, short-tempered, needy, sometimes downcast. Unlike Gandhi, he set himself no superhuman moral feats. But like Gandhi, he possessed a remarkable steadfastness of faith: his own faith. Ibid., p.6.

76 See Stephen P. Cohen, n.64, pp.40-41.

77 Nehru wrote on hearing news of Tagore's death, 'I loved his love of life, and all things beautiful; with him, I was a Pagan'. But Tagore had a sharp sense of the limits of science and scientific inquiry. The fact that Science dealt in statistics and numbers, that its logic was probabilistic, meant that the domain of moral questions escaped it: moral questions required certainty, not probabilistic answers. See, Prof. Sunil Khilnani, n.72, p.11.
twenty years. Nearly forty years after his death, his ideas and policies remain influential, partly because the environment of Indian foreign policy did not change much for twenty years. The international system of bipolarity remained in fact, India's struggle with Pakistan has been a constant, and the conflict with China in 1962 which crushed Nehru personally -- was already underway before his death in 1964. Furthermore, Nehru's views persisted because he was succeeded in power by individuals who were either unskilled in foreign policy (Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister from 1964 to 1966), or who were committed to Nehruvian principles. Among the latter were his daughter, Indira Gandhi, who served as prime minister in 1966-77 and 1980-84, and Nehru's grandson, Rajiv, who succeeded her from 1984 to 1989. Both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi made many changes in foreign policy but they and the Congress party establishment insisted that a national consensus on foreign policy based on Nehruvian principles was in place, even as they departed from them. This long innings of Congress party rule created two generations of Indian politicians and bureaucrats committed to Nehruvianism.

During Nehruvian period, the pursuit of peace, security and international cooperation was a cornerstone of India's diplomacy; it has a highly philosophical connotation while explaining the problem of disarmament. Indian representative speaking before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on disarmament, described it as a moral one and traced India's attitude towards the problem to Emperor Ashoka's philosophy of peace and morality described as in Rock Edict XIII. Emperor Ashoka waged a short but sanguinary war against the Kalingas in Eastern India and was afflicted by repentance on seeing the death and destruction that he had caused by resorting to war for the fulfillment of personal ambition. He then renounced war for ever and became a votary of peace. Rock Edict XIII declares:

King Priyadarshi considers moral conquest, that is conquest by Dharma, the most important conquest. This Edict on Dharma has been inscribed so that my sons and grandsons, who may come after me, should not think new conquests worth achieving. Let them consider moral conquest as the only true conquest. 79

In the modern age such as moral conquest could be achieved only through disarmament. The philosophy of moral conquest governed India's attitude towards the problem of

78 Ibid., p.37.
disarmament. Emperor Ashoka was not alone in espousing the philosophy of moral conquest. Philosophers and statesmen in other lands too proclaimed the need to make this philosophy the basis of international and inter-human relations in spite of their efforts the world community did not recognize the importance of disarmament. The Indian delegate reiterated the importance of accepting the philosophy of moral conquest by promoting disarmament. He said: "Despite the precepts and practices, however, the society of nations as a whole did not accept feeling that the only hope of survival of our civilization and of progress lay in general and complete disarmament." 80

Speaking before the First Committee of the General Assembly on 2 November 1959, India's representative, Krishna Menon, strongly supported the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament, and said: "The only choice was between general and complete disarmament, which would free the world from the fear of war and limited disarmament which would inevitably lead to the kind of rearmament which the world had experienced after the world wars". 81 He said before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, that: "Today, therefore, disarmament has become not a question of reducing armaments by 10 per cent, 15 per cent, 20 per cent or 25 per cent. If this basic fear remains it does not matter how much you reduce it because it does not require, as figures are given, the thousands of nuclear bombs possessed by nuclear powers, a quarter of them are enough to wipe off the world or the other country. So the only answer to armament and the menace of war is total disarmament. There is no way of mending this situation but only of ending it." 82 So far as India was concerned, disarmament meant elimination of all national military forces, leaving each country with nothing more than the domestic police or militia. "Disarmament" was a comprehensive and universal term. It applied to conventional, nuclear, and other weapons of mass destruction: it included all kinds of armed forces and all nations. It called for elimination of the war-making capacity of all nations on earth.

80 Ibid., p.17.
81 For details, refer UNGA, First Committee, 14th Session, 2 November 1959, p.85.
India strongly supported General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV),\textsuperscript{83} which set the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control before the world. It also made itself a party to the unanimous adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1722 (XVI) on 20 December 1961. This resolution, which was jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States noted "with satisfaction" the report submitted to the General Assembly by the USSR and the USA on the question relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body. It welcomed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations contained in that report. Finally, it called for early resumption of negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

There is no doubt that India's support for the resolution of the General Assembly dealing with general and complete disarmament was without any reservation. India did not attach any condition while supporting and accepting such resolutions. It, however, believed that the crux of the problem of restraining and eventually halting the arms race and making progress in the direction of disarmament lay in the field of nuclear weapons. The international community had, through the United Nations, repeatedly called for giving top priority to the initiation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Indian delegate dealt with the basic problem when he called upon the Disarmament Committee to "give [the] highest priority to measures in the field of nuclear disarmament".\textsuperscript{84} The cooperation of those States which possessed nuclear weapons was vital in this regard. In the absence of their cooperation no meaningful effort was possible in the field of nuclear disarmament. Commenting on para 2(a) of the revised 8-Power resolution, which spoke of effective international control of atomic energy, on the basis of previous Assembly resolutions, "in order to make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons". The Indian representative stated:

\begin{quote}
We had always stood for the prohibition of atomic weapons, not only on account of their destructive power but also on account of the waste which their production entailed. India earnestly hoped that it would be possible to use atomic
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{83} On 20 November 1959 the General Assembly unanimously adopted General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV), which reads as follows:

The General Assembly, moved by the desire to save the present and the succeeding generations from the danger of a new and disastrous war,...expresses the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

\textsuperscript{84} Committee of Conference on Disarmament (CCD) document no.CCD/PV 488, 18 August 1970, p.7.
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in order to supplement other sources of power, which were woefully inadequate in countries such as India. 85 The efforts made to divert a part of the sums spent on armaments to the peaceful purposes of reconstruction were inspired by humanitarian considerations.

India favoured a speedy accomplishment of disarmament. Addressing the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Menon stated: "We have always advocated the speedy accomplishment of disarmament, so much so, that my prime minister when speaking to the United Nations two years ago said that it is a question of trying to achieve it not all in one fine morning or in one piece with so many stages within it for the accomplishment of whole things in short period of 4 or 5 years". 86 India, no doubt, wanted the task of the accomplishment of disarmament speedily but at the same time it conceded that disarmament was not a matter that could be achieved overnight as it were. It requires careful, detailed, patient and realistic negotiations. A world without arms, a world of justice, progress, and security was impossible to achieve at one stroke although that was exactly what China wanted to do when it refused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty. Disarmament virtually affected the security interests of all nations, and obviously it would not be easy to reach agreements. Again the prospect of a totally disarmed world was a relatively new concept. India was aware of the numerous difficulties in reaching agreement on disarmament. It, however, felt that it was essential to prescribe a time-limit for achieving the goal of signing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In the absence of a time-limit, the talks might drag on for years and years.

**India and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**

With the exception of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear arms control has been dominated by bilateral negotiations or by measures undertaken unilaterally. India held that proliferation of nuclear weapons was a big hurdle in the achievement of general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. Hence, it took the initiative in securing international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the international community. Thanks to its efforts for non-

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proliferation, it was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1964. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 5 August 1963 marked the first breakthrough in all the years of effort in regard to disarmament since 1946. It was the result of five years of patient negotiations, beginning in 1958, among the powers concerned. But both the unilateral moratoria agreed between the major Powers in 1958 as well as the Moscow Test Ban Treaty were, in no small measure, due to the efforts made by India right from 1954 onwards. The valuable contribution of India, of Jawaharlal in particular, in creating the groundwork and paving the way for the 1963 Treaty cannot be ignored. India was the first country to suggest the suspension of tests. India's approach of isolating an agreement on that issue from other arms control and disarmament measures was vindicated by the signing of the Moscow Treaty. Our continuous efforts in the rallying of world opinion in support of the suspension of harmful tests culminated in the adoption of the historic General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) which condemned all nuclear weapons tests. We had persisted in our efforts to achieve the objective of the cessation of tests with a single-minded devotion without caring for the opposition of the western powers, the USSR or all the nuclear weapon powers combined. India thus played its part in rousing the conscience of the international community.

India, however, expressed its opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as drafted jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union and finally approved by the General Assembly [UNGA Resolution 2373 (XXVII)]. It felt that the Treaty as it stood did not serve the purpose of nuclear disarmament. Addressing the General Assembly, the Indian representative stated: "The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Resolution 2373 (XXII) cannot contribute in any way to a balanced process of disarmament. It seeks to bind the hands of the powerless and to license further accumulation of armaments...which threaten our very existence. It is for that reason we remain unable to sign the Treaty". India was not prepared to sign the NPT because it felt that the treaty did not in any way promote the cause of disarmament. The treaty was completely

87 In consonance with the consistent policy that urgent steps should be taken to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons and its firm belief that an agreement on non-proliferation would be the next logical step after the partial nuclear test-ban treaty (5 August 1963), India used its influence to get the item "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" inscribed on the agenda of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, Government of India, Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs, 1964-65 (New Delhi, 1965), p.22.

silent on one aspect of proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was no provision in the
treaty to exercise any restraints on the nuclear powers in the matter of production of
arms. The treaty failed to take note of the fact that the real danger to the existence of
mankind lay in the "menacing" development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers
and not in any possible increase in the membership of the nuclear club. The arsenals
of the United States and the Soviet Union were full of nuclear weapons, and even their
second-strike capability was sufficient to destroy the entire world many times over.
They had thousands of long-range Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and
hundreds of medium and short-range missiles capable of splitting up the surface of the
earth. If the two Powers kept up their arms race, it would make the achievement of
disarmament difficult. The treaty could have promoted the cause of disarmament only
by making it obligatory for the nuclear powers to stop production of nuclear weapons.
This stoppage of production of nuclear weapons was the first step towards the goal of
nuclear disarmament. The next step would be the reduction and eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons. Once the nuclear powers stopped production of nuclear weapons and
took steps for the elimination of nuclear weapons, no non-nuclear power would be able
to embark upon a programme of acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons. In India's
opinion, nuclear disarmament was impossible of achievement through preserving the
exclusive rights and privileges of a few powerful countries.

India did not regard the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a major step in the field of
disarmament. The treaty left the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the arsenals
of the nuclear powers untouched. The only positive aspect of the treaty was that it
sought to prevent the emergence of more nuclear powers. In view of this, India held
that the treaty was at best a non-armament measure. The Indian delegate, speaking
before the First Committee of the General Assembly, stated: "The treaty is essentially
a non-armament measure and does not in any way curb galloping vertical proliferation.
The attempt to curb the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in no way alters or
curbs the hegemony of major nuclear powers and it is vertical proliferation which
continues to menace the security of mankind. In defence of this situation, it has been
said that radical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament are not possible unless they
are carried out by all nuclear powers and not by only some of them. However, we are
not told what steps are being taken by the principal nuclear-weapon powers to find a solution to this problem".  

In short, the treaty fell short of being a disarmament measure inasmuch as it conferred on the nuclear powers the privilege to proliferate at will and confined to prohibition to the non-nuclear Powers. It did not view the problem of arms race in a global context. In order to solve the problem posed by the race for nuclear arms, it ought to have contained a clause calling upon all countries, including the nuclear powers, to renounce the right to produce nuclear weapons and the delivery vehicles designed to carry such weapons. India accepted the argument of the nuclear powers that it was not possible for them to take drastic measure like stoppage of production of nuclear weapons and reduction in the stockpiles of such weapons without the participation of nuclear powers like France and the People's Republic of China. It, however, failed to understand the reason for slackness on the part of the principal nuclear powers in securing the participation of France and the People's Republic of China in an important matter like non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In other words, one may say that India favoured a Non-Proliferation Treaty which had the support of all the nuclear powers.

The treaty provided that the non-nuclear States, could, if they so desired, conclude bilateral agreements with the nuclear powers in order to avail themselves of the benefits of the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions. Article-V of the treaty says: "Non-nuclear Weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements". This provision of the treaty was not without its snags. Keller, Bollings and Klaff say that "this provision places the executing nuclear weapon powers in a privileged position to decide on its own, and possibly on a basis not entirely free of subjective judgements which solution is to be adopted and executed". They further say that "such a position could afford favoritism and untold opportunities of direct and indirect interference in the internal affairs of the respectively dependent, yet formally sovereign nations". A careful examination of the views of these

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89 See, Ambassador Hussain's statement in UN General Assembly, First Committee, 24th Session, 1706th meeting, 1 December 1969, p.2.


91 Ibid.
commentators would reveal that the provision for "bilateral" agreements was not in the 
interest of the non-nuclear powers.

Such agreements could weaken the non-nuclear states by eroding their capacity to 
bargain collectively in the matter of availing themselves of the benefits of the 
applications of peaceful nuclear explosions. The nuclear powers would be guarded by 
their self-interest in concluding bilateral agreements. They would be in a position to 
exert pressure on the applicant States to make changes in their domestic and foreign 
policies as a price for the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. A detailed study of 
Article II and V of the treaty shows that the only aim of the nuclear powers was to 
establish their monopoly over the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions and keep 
the vast majority of the developing nations dependent on them for the benefits of that 
technology. India was not prepared to accept the status of a dependent nation. This was 
also one of the reasons for its not signing the treaty. The Indian delegate speaking 
before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, stated that: "Our reasons for 
not adhering to the NPT are fundamental. They go to the very philosophy of 
international relations which we have tried to follow since we became independent, and 
one of the basic points of this philosophy is equality in international life. We have 
considered, and we continue to consider, that NPT is not an equal instrument; it is a 
discriminatory instrument; and I must categorically state here that we will not become 
a party to the instrument as they are the discriminatory character of the instrument 
remains". The NPT violated the principle of sovereign equality of all states, a 
principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. It was heavily biased in favour 
of the States possessing nuclear weapons. But, India supports Article IV of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) which states that:

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable 
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and 
in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate 
in contributing alone or together with other States or international 
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-

92 See Ambassador Mishra's observations in CCD/PV 641, July 1974, pp.15-16.
In the ultimate analysis, nuclear technology, being a frontier technology, has been treated as a common heritage of mankind because of its immense potential to improve the quality of man's life. Take the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- it epitomizes the norms and beliefs of the bizarre nuclear world order based on the dichotomy of the nuclear haves and have-nots. A definite trend of nuclear colonialism is evident from the nuclear alignments and policies of the nuclear haves. Over the years, these are, or ought to be the perceived dimensions of India's nuclear policy and diplomacy on weapons of mass destruction.

To good-faith joiners, the NPT is a valuable security tool. They can use it to show the neighbours that they are seeking the bomb, while being reassured that the neighbours aren't either. North Korea has long abused its non-proliferation promises too. Ten years ago, when it first threatened to leave the NPT, after inspectors had caught it illicitly making plutonium, South Korea, Japan and China backed off, leaving America to scramble together a "freeze" that left all other nuclear activities in North Korea dangerously unmonitored. But any deal will need proper checks on all North Korea's nuclear activities if these are not to spark stabilizing nuclear arms-race in north-east Asia. Although India and Pakistan were not members of the NPT when they blasted their way across the nuclear threshold five years ago, they still expected to face sanctions for breaking the testing taboo. Some countries like Brazil, were keen to project their importance on the world stage as India does, and having matched other proliferators get away with it, now wonder if going nuclear earns respect. Meanwhile, Pakistan was emboldened to sell its uranium technology to North Korea.

The NPT has not only legalized the military inequality between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon powers, but also formalized the technological inequality. This is evident from Articles III, IV and V of the NPT, dealing with safeguards and peaceful nuclear

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94 Ibid., p.18.

95 Ibid., p.12.

96 See, T.T. Poulouse, "India's Nuclear Policy", in T.T. Poulos (ed.), Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978), p.120.
technology. Except the nuclear power reactor technology, other weapon-related technology was simply non-existent. So, a country without a well-conceived technological infrastructure is incapable of taking any bold political decision. This is the essential difference between the Chinese and the Indian nuclear policy. When Apsara went critical (ability to sustain a chain reaction i.e., a reaction whereby duplication is possible in nuclear physics) in 1956 India was the only nuclear power in Asia. Time and again we are boasting about our advance over the Chinese in nuclear science till the Chinese bang in 1964 silenced us. Therefore, as long as technological constraints remain, political constraints are unavoidable. In one sense, these invariably suggest that for a country -- technology, trained manpower and capital are essential prerequisite for a powerful nation in shaping and sharing of world distribution of power. America should be praised not pilloried, for taking the lead in shoring up the anti-proliferation edifice. The proliferation, is a global problem that demands a global response. This should include greater efforts to safeguard potential weapons materials; plugging leaky export controls, above all in Russia and China; getting all NPT members to submit to tightened nuclear inspection rules, denying aid, trade and debt relief to countries that divert their own cash to build illicit weapons.

Pertaining to India's diplomacy on weapons of mass destruction over the years, the high watershed event in the nuclear field, was the Pokharan explosion on 18 May 1974. This was shrewdly timed. After the controversial experimental explosion at Pokharan (in Rajasthan) in 1974, Canada, the US and the Soviet Union resorted to a nuclear squeeze to make India behave. By withholding enriched uranium and heavy water supply, and imposing restrictions on certain vital components needed for the completion of the power reactors coming up in Rajasthan, Kalpakkam and Narora, these nations have been hoping to bring India to her knees, extract a promise if the pressure tactics succeeded, to give up India's nuclear option by making India to sign the NPT and then forcing India to accept full scope safeguards and inspection of all nuclear activities. This seemed to have had the desired effect on India's nuclear policy. However, the Chinese nuclear test (1964) was a turning point in India nuclear policy. Already humiliated by the Chinese war on India in 1962, there was a groundswell of concern in India about

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97 Ibid., p.120.
98 Ibid.
a possible Chinese nuclear threat to India's national security. It is one thing to admit that to this day India has not even once been threatened by a Chinese nuclear blackmail. On the contrary, China is the only nuclear weapon country, after becoming a nuclear weapon power, to publicly state about the no-first-use of nuclear weapons and also to add that China will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. According to the Chinese, their nuclear weapons were to defend the Third World. Yet, these were no consolation for a non-nuclear nation like India which had an armed conflict with China just two years before the nuclear test.

Perhaps a more fundamental political constraint is India's well-known stand in disarmament negotiations over the years. Throughout the fifties and the sixties as in the seventies we have been saying that we will not use nuclear energy for military purposes. We are opposed to nuclear weapons and that we are committed to disarmament and arms control.99 Because of the consistency shown in our declaratory statements and practice even risking our national security when the Chinese had their first nuclear test, unilateralists like Bertrand Russell, Nobel laureates like Linus Pauling and Philip Noel Barker and others were inspired by India's bold stand against nuclear tests. The Pugwash movement of world scientists against nuclear weapons found Jawaharlal Nehru a great and convincing champion of nuclear disarmament. India was the first country to bring the question of nuclear tests to the UN in 1954 when India demanded that there should be a cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The prestige and moral authority which India enjoyed in the 1950s enabled India to play the modest role of a mediator in the disarmament negotiations and to bring about some understanding and reconciliation between two rival blocs pursuing a policy of Cold War confrontation. This was indeed as much the outcome of India's policy of non-alignment as of the consistency in India's nuclear policy.

While analyzing the rationale of India's nuclear option, it is the fulcrum on which would depend the strategy of the developing nations to defeat the conspiracy of the supplier nations. It has much wider connotations and hence the tendency in India to treat it as unidimensional, purely for chauvinistic reasons, is to be discarded. India began talking about India's technical option from the time of the Baruch Plan. There are

99 Ibid., p.117.
important linkages of it to her domestic and foreign policy requirements. Primarily, it epitomizes the will of the nation to decide her national policy. At the international level, India has been opposed to an international system which is status-quo oriented, hierarchical, discriminatory, hegemonical and even monopolistic. India, therefore, during the Cold War days rejected the theory of a bipolar world and struggled for a normative world order based on equity and rule of law among nations. India's nuclear diplomacy projected a genuine in the age of a country committed to nuclear disarmament, arms control and general and complete disarmament by unilaterally renouncing nuclear weapons as an instrument of her national policy and joining the forces of peace. At one stage, the non-aligned nations led by India earned the reputation of symbolizing the conscience of mankind because of their lofty stand on various issues of Cold War. In essence, India had a modest role in 'bridge-building' between the two power blocs, and transforming the age of confrontation in an era of détente. But the two Superpowers have still very tight control over the distribution of world power in the international system and they are not willing to alter the hierarchical structure of power beyond that of a pentarchy from a diarchy which dominated the Cold War days. The military and technological hegemony of the Superpowers is one of the realities of the present international system. India's nuclear option, therefore, should be viewed as a protest if not defiance against the unjust international system.

It would be worth mentioning about the international scenario in the domain of arms control and disarmament that had an indirect diplomatic punch on individual countries' security policies. International relations, basically, involves cross-border interactions, especially political; includes any development, governmental or private, material or spiritual, shaping these interactions. The underlying patterns in international relations have for thousands of years been viewed through the lenses of competing theories: realism and idealism. Realists describe that world politics as a struggle for power whereas idealists prescribe what could be -- international relations as a quest for law and morality. The two schools of thought give a clearer understanding of the

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100 Ibid., pp.155-56.
101 Ibid., p.156.
102 For an interesting observations and analysis, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., n.2, p.539.
dynamics and driving forces behind conflict and cooperation across borders. This is the core, quintessence and bedrock of diplomatic studies.

**India and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)**

The other major component in Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction consists of biological weapons. In arms control negotiations, considerable amount of overlapping between nuclear, biological and chemical weapons can be observed. In some negotiations, we can understand a clubbed analysis of the troika of weapons of mass destruction. At the outset, it has been mentioned that the critical and conceptual differentiation of biological weapons *vis-a-vis* other weapons of mass destruction. In Biological Weapons Convention, the intense and multi-layered diplomacy constitute major part, which spanned over decades.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of bacteriological and toxin weapons. The United States -- which had unilaterally renounced biological and toxin weapons in 1969 -- submitted its instruments of ratification to the Convention in March 1975. There are currently some 139 State Parties to the Convention with an additional 18 countries who have signed the pact but not ratified it.\textsuperscript{103} The BWC review conferences have been held since 1972. At the second review conference in 1986, the parties agreed on a set of confidence building measures (CBMs), including the exchange of data on biological research laboratories that meet very high safety standards, sharing information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases caused by toxins which deviate from the normal, encouraging publication of results of biological defense research in scientific journals, and promoting scientific contact. At the third review conference in 1991 State Parties strengthened the existing CBMs and added two new ones: declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programs, and declaration of vaccine production facilities.\textsuperscript{104} In addition, an Ad hoc Group, open to all States Parties, was created to consider appropriate measures to strengthen the convention and draft proposals in a legally binding instrument.

\textsuperscript{103} Arms Control Fact Sheet:Review of Current Major Arms Control Issues, *Electronic Journal*, no.110, October 1997, p.32.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p.33.
During World War II, all of the major powers except Germany had well-developed biological weapons programs. The United States continued its offensive weapons program after the war, and although that program was terminated in 1969, the United States still conducts defensive research. The USSR maintained its offensive biological weapons program into the 1980s even though it had signed the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which banned offensive research and weapons. Despite the official renunciation of Russia's biological weapons program by Boris Yeltsin and some trilateral inspections among the United States, the UK and Russia, some suspect that an offensive biological weapons program still exists in Russia. In order to understand why some states want these weapons, how these weapons might be used, and what effect biological proliferation will have on international politics, an analysis of these weapons and of their potential military utility is required.

Definitions of "biological warfare agents" or "biological weapons" are controversial, and no definition was included in the Biological Weapons Convention. The definition presented by Brian Beckett may be the best we can do: "Biological warfare involves the use of disease-producing micro-organisms -- bacteria, viruses, fungi and rickettsiae--in support of military or paramilitary operations". This directs our attention to the intentional use of disease-causing agents. A serviceable definition of biological warfare (BW) characterizes it as: the deliberate, spreading of disease amongst humans, animals and plants. Diseases are caused when small numbers of living microorganisms enter into the target population...[T]hese micro-organisms multiply, after an incubation period, the symptoms of the disease became apparent. In some cases, micro-

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organisms produce toxins - non-living toxic chemicals -- that cause symptoms. Depending upon the biological agent chosen, the resulting disease causes incapacitation or death of the target population.108

The reference to animals and plants, apart from humans, is of special significance for India, a large percentage of whose population is economically dependent on livestock and agricultural crops. Clearly, the 'deliberate spreading of disease' to the animal husbandry and agricultural aspects of the Indian economy would devastate its rural population no less virulently than a direct attack. The difference between biological and chemical warfare lies in the fact that the consequence of biological agents develop over time -- this detracts from the battlefield worth of biological weapons but it enables the attacker to act with relative impunity, whereas the effects of chemical agents are immediate. The Office of Technology Assessment noted in a Report submitted to the United States Congress in 1993 that "weight-for-weight, biological and toxin agents are potentially thousands of times more potent than even the most toxic man-made chemical".

Despite the moral antipathy that is said to colour attitudes towards the deliberate spread of disease, biological weapons have been used throughout history. Commonly cited examples include the use of poison arrows by aboriginal tribes in South America; the use of diseased cadavers to spread disease, as in the siege of Kaffa in the fourteenth century, the British attempt to spread smallpox to the American Indians during the French-Indian wars through the gift of blankets from an smallpox hospital; and the contamination of water supplies.109


The origin of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) can be traced back to the "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare" better known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol which was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and entered into force on 8 February 1928. The Protocol banned the use of "bacteriological methods of warfare". In conjunction with a ban on chemical weapons, efforts to ban the production of biological weapons took up many years of discussions in a variety of forums. The prevailing opinion had been that the possession of chemical and biological weapons should be prohibited simultaneously. The significance of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) emerges from the fact that this was the first multilateral treaty designed to tackle one category of WMDs. But it was designed during the Cold War period and therefore failed to receive the recognition that it should have for incorporating elements that would eventually become fundamental to all subsequent treaties relating to WMDs. India and the United States are parties to the BTWC, and the commonalities of their approach toward supporting it have been highlighted as a shared concern for working toward general and complete disarmament.

BTWC was the first US attempt to build non-proliferation architecture through the multilateral route. It was important in that it was crafted as a declaratory text, with no verification provisions, and the overall approach to the treaty was nondiscriminatory. By banning the development and production of BW agents and toxins, the treaty contributed to the goal of disarmament. These aspects of the treaty, along with its multilateral emphasis, made it acceptable to India. India did not consider the backroom wrangling between the US-Russian delegations as a defining characteristic. Remarkably, the treaty has survived through the years despite the absence of verification provision. No use of biological warfare agents and toxins in interstate conflict has been reported since the BTWC came into force. A few national incidents, however, have been reported. This includes the Sverdosk incident in the Soviet Union. A collective norm against these agents and toxins has deterred most countries.

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111 Ibid.

112 Ibid., pp.137-38.
from activating or pursuing overt biological warfare program. Iraq's BW programme is the most prominent, but there are other countries such as North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria, Israel and China that are suspected of having advanced BW programmes. India and Pakistan are also listed among countries that have BW programmes.\textsuperscript{113}

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC/BTWC) is the only legal instrument dealing with the issue of biological weapons. It enjoys large intentional support. As of June 1998, 159 states had signed the Treaty but eighteen were yet to ratify it. The Convention provides for unequivocal renunciation of biological and toxin weapons, but effective provisions for verification do not feature in it. Look at the Article VI of the Convention. It says:

1. Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the State Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

According to this above-mentioned provisions, a State Party that suspects another State Party of non-compliance may submit a complaint to the UN Security Council. But this never have been invoked, and the main reason is perhaps the intensely political nature of the Security Council itself. An Ad hoc Group (AHG) of the States Parties to the BTWC is currently negotiating a Protocol to strengthen the Convention. One of the main areas of tension is the restriction of developments in biotechnology for weapon purposes and their encouragement for industrial applications. India, as a State Party, has actively participated in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Group and favours the Verification Protocol. Article 1 of the BTWC/BWC obliges States Parties:

"Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.

2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."

India is a State Party to the BTWC and ratified it. Also, India has fulfilled its Convention obligations. Not having biological weapons remains a matter of faith. A similar assumption needs to be made about China and Pakistan, who have also ratified the Treaty. This is due to the absence of an effective verification mechanism, and the impossibility of banning research on BTWC agents. Some years ago there were apprehensions that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that was opened for signature and incorporated stringent verification measures may create incentives for some countries to acquire biological weapons. Given the fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention includes formal verification measures such as on-site inspections, a number of countries have proposed establishing a credible verification regime for the BTWC. The verification, inspection and compliance aspects are discussed at length in the coming chapters.

The debate on strategic arms control in India is concerned on nuclear weapons, and perhaps this has led to BWs being neglected. Interest in biological weapons remains confined to the Disarmament and International Security Agency (DISA) of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India, which formulates the government response to the Ad hoc Group. The Department of Biotechnology of the Government of India is involved in research, while the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has defense labs that are believed to be working on the military applications of biological agents and toxins.114 Outside the government there is very little interest in biological weapons among the strategic community, which is quite evident, apparent and clear from the paucity of research articles and research papers have been published in books, journals, occasional papers and monographs in India.

The Indian delegation has participated in the review conferences as well as in the sessions of the Ad hoc Group. The traditional Indian position in all international treaties is that they should be non-discriminatory, and that this should be ensured in the treaty. Besides, India also maintains that the BWC Protocol should not hinder scientific

research, industrial development and economic cooperation. On the compliance provisions in the Protocol, India maintains that they should be formulated and implemented in a manner that protects sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security concerns. Indian analysts believe that this emphasis on protection of proprietary information is designed to make the Protocol non-discriminatory; hence the industrialized State Parties have emphasized this provision.

India has taken keen interest in the sub-group on Measures to Strengthen Implementation of Article X of the BTWC. This Article stipulates that:

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) and toxins and equipment for the processing rise or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

In a working paper submitted to the Sixth Session of the Ad hoc Group in March 1997, it contended that the transfer of knowledge in fields like medicine, public health and agriculture would result in development and, at the same time, be instrumental in establishing linkages amongst States Parties, leading to a higher level of confidence in the Convention. India also suggested technology transfer for peaceful uses in the fields of genetic engineering and biotechnology, and collaborative research, development projects and joint ventures on bio-defence activities. With regard to Article X there does exist considerable international effort to harmonize national and international

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116 Ibid.
117 For a detailed discussion and analysis, see, P.R. Chari and Giri Deshingkar, "Putting Teeth into the BWC: An Indian View", Politics and the Life Sciences, March 1999, pp.86-91.
119 Ibid.
regulations relating to pathogens that present serious dangers to public and animal health and the environment. The guidelines for good manufacturing practices (GMP) for medicinal products issued by the European Community under the Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation Scheme and the World Health Organization (WHO) have been successfully harmonized, as observed by Graham Pearson. Pearson further suggests:

(a) Measures to facilitate the harmonization of national, regional and international safety rules for pathogens, involving both the collection of data and inspection of facilities.

(b) Measures to assist countries to adopt internationally harmonized standards for GMP pharmaceutical production and to establish national inspectorates to carry out regular inspections of pharmaceutical manufactures.

Article X offers the prospect of technology transfer and international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities for countries that do not have BWs and are not threatened by BWs. Viewed from a global perspective, countries with vastly differing capabilities do find a convergence of interest. This is likely to create a conducive political environment for long-term disarmament among these states. This position serves India's traditional approach to arms control treaties where global disarmament is the long-term goal. While Article X may be in India's long-term interests, it does have problems with the verification regime that is required to monitor compliance. A more contentious issue is the divergence of interests between the government and the pharmaceutical industry. The government would like to install a foolproof arrangement for ensuring compliance with the listed prohibitions, but industry feels that such practices could lead to industrial espionage. Industry has raised vital questions like, will private industries have the right to respond to the outcome of the inspection prior to the release of the findings? What facilities should be declared? And, it has asserted that there should be a total prohibition on the removal of in-process microorganisms from the premises of a commercial facility.

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120 In the "Protocol to Strengthen the BWC: An Integrated Regime", paper presented at Sixth International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, 11-15 May 1998.

121 Ibid.


The other major element where the United States and India disagree is the preservation of ad hoc export control and technology denial regimes such as the Australia Group. The Australia Group requires members to collectively deny export of dual-use technology and equipment relating to chemical and biological weapons to any country.\textsuperscript{124} India is vigorously opposed to this, and submits that Article X of the BTWC explicitly permits full access to equipment, technologies and related items by all States Parties for purposes not prohibited by the convention. There has been a growing concern in India that the non-proliferation aspect, which includes the perpetuation of export control regimes, is gaining greater salience than the disarmament aspects of both the CWC and the BTWC.\textsuperscript{125} The Australia Group has a list of prohibited chemicals which differs from the scheduled chemicals listed in the CWC. India supports the developing countries' demand that the Australia Group should be disbanded and has suggested replacing it with a system of multilateral monitoring of export controls, but this naturally raises questions of organizational structure and costs.\textsuperscript{126} India also opposed to the subordination of Article X, which encourages the peaceful development of the biological sciences, to the requirements of Article III. And Article III states that "Each Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention".

However, the BWC, which has an unlimited duration, called for only one review, which was held from 3-21 March 1980. A UN Resolution in November 1982 called on the signatories to establish compliance procedures. The Second Review Conference met in Geneva from 8-26 September 1986. This conference, which was generally positive, strengthened the procedures for consultation in the case of compliance concerns.\textsuperscript{127} The participating states tried to strengthen the Convention by establishing several politically binding confidence-building measures (CBMs), including annual declarations.

\textsuperscript{124} Aabha Dixit, n.110, p.138.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} P.R. Chari and Giri Desingkar, n.117, p.88.
\textsuperscript{127} For a comprehensive overview on the BWC, see Kalpana Chittaranjan, "Biological Weapons and Biological Weapons Convention", Strategic Analysis, vol.XXI, no.6, September 1997, p.883.
of high-containment biological facilities designed for work with dangerous microorganisms, and reports of unusual disease outbreaks. It also called for a meeting of experts which worked out CBM details from 31 March-15 April 1987, in particular, a call for annual exchanges of data about biological research. Pursuant to the Third Review Conference of the BWC in 1991, an expert working group has been considering means by which a verification regime for the BWC might be instituted. Balancing the degree of intrusiveness needed to detect or deter cheating with the need to protect proprietary and national-security information will be even more difficult for the BWC than it is for the CWC. Whenever states have expected to be on both sides of the verification lens, though, negotiators have looked at questions from the perspective of both the verifier and the verified. Multilateral agreement on managed access inspections for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has popularized this approach. Moreover, the CWC and BWC have the support of all the major powers. BWC support is nearly universal; Israel is the only major state that has not signed. The objective of the international community should be to enlist every nation in the world to join both conventions. But regional concerns and domestic political contexts vary widely. As always, whether it is arms control or disarmament they would remain a major issue among international community. For some, it may remain a means to the end of state security, for others, not.

Issues Pertaining to Disarmament Diplomacy at Later Stages

During the period of acute Cold War from the late 1940s to the early 1950s, almost no progress on arms control was achieved. The first breakthrough was the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, whereby states with an interest in that region, including the USA and the former USSR, agreed to reserve the Antarctica region for purely peaceful purposes. Between 1963 and 1976, there were a series of arms control agreements and treaties of varying significance, both of a bilateral (between the USA and the USSR), as well as a multilateral character. From the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, relations between

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Moscow and Washington greatly deteriorated. Despite the chill in Superpower relations, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process, which began in 1969 and resulted in the signing of SALT-I in 1972, produced the SALT-II Treaty, a second agreement on limiting strategic nuclear arms. SALT-II, signed in 1979 amid growing US-Soviet discord, was never ratified by the US Senate. During the subsequent five years of renewed Cold War, no arms control agreements were concluded, and the idea of arms control was under attack in the USA.

The SALT agreements limited only long-range (ground and Sea-based) ballistic missiles. Both Superpowers took advantage of this incomplete coverage of nuclear delivery vehicles. The main issues raised in the course of the US-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in 1987, concerned the types of delivery vehicles to be covered by the limitations, the geographic coverage of such limitations, the involvement of third-country forces and the stringency of verification measures. The INF Treaty provided for the elimination by the United States and the Soviet Union of Intermediate Range Missiles (IRMs) and Shorter Range Missiles (SRMs).\(^{131}\) On 31 July 1991, as the result of nine years of negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, subsequently called the START-I Treaty. This new agreement provides for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals but unlike the INF treaty, it does not require the elimination of an entire category of armaments.\(^{132}\) Hence, the negotiations which led to conclusion centred on counting rules within agreed limits and sublimits. For both nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads. The START-I Treaty comprises the Treaty itself two Annexes, six Protocols and a Memorandum of Understanding. There are also several associated documents: Joint statements, unilateral statements, declarations and an exchange of letters. One of the main shortcoming of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-I (START-I) was insufficient arms reductions. This was to be rendered by the US-Russian Joint Understanding reached by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on 17 June 1992. According to this understanding, the two sides' current strategic nuclear arsenals were to be cut by 65-70%. In other words, the levels projected for START-I had to be more than halved. The most outstanding feature of the new arms control agreement was the elimination

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\(^{132}\) Ibid., p.66.
of all Multiple Targeted Re-entry Vehicle - MIRVed ICBMs; hence its name, the De-MIRVing Agreement. The De-MIRVing Agreement was codified in the US-Russian Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as the START-II Treaty. This Treaty, signed on 3 January 1993, includes two Protocols and a Memorandum of Understanding.

Another landmark was in 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated bilateral negotiations on possible restrictions regarding their strategic nuclear arsenals. One agreement concluded in the first phase of these Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-I) was the US-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile system, which came to be called the ABM Treaty (1972). The Treaty prohibits the development, testing and deployment of mobile ABM systems and components, including those that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. This ban is particularly important, because ABM systems based on mobile components would be expendable beyond the permitted sites, creating danger of sudden break-out towards the prohibited nation-wide defence. In addition, the Treaty prohibits the development, testing and deployment of multiple-launch or rapidly reloadable ABM launchers. A recommendation frequently made to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was to complement the existing restraints on supplies of nuclear material and equipment by restraints on supplies of dual-capable weapon systems, that is, systems capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear weapons. This recommendation was partly put into practice when, in April 1987, seven governments -- those of Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US -- established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR has slowed or contributed to stopping the missile programmes pursued by several countries, even though it is not embodied in a formal treaty. To make it even more complicated and more costly for countries to acquire sensitive missile technology, the MTCR must be adhered to by all missile-producing states.

The reality must be recognized that during the 1980s the focus and emphasis on nuclear disarmament was so evident that it is almost totally absent in 1990s. But it is significant that the President of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and Nobel

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133 Ibid., p.55.
Prize winner, eminent nuclear scientist (an erstwhile member of the Manhattan Project), Professor Joseph Rotblat, in his Nobel speech in December 1995 affirmed: "We have a technical means to create a Nuclear Weapon Free World in about a decade". Other Pugwash scientists believe it is feasible to dismantle nuclear warheads in about 10 years, and that the goal of global nuclear disarmament can be achieved in 20-30 years. The problem lies with inadequate political will on one side, and strategic turf on the other side. The primary objections raised against total elimination are built around a few arguments, mostly of non-technical nature. The Cold War, for example, used to be cited in justification for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, nuclear weapons are sought to be justified and retained by nuclear weapon states on the grounds that there is no Cold War now.

The two biggest milestones in the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime between April 1995 and 1998 were the successful extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to an indefinite duration and the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. A comprehensive nuclear test ban was prefigured in a pledge embodied in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty was repeated as a goal in the NPT Preamble. The UN General Assembly's adoption of the CTBT, on 10 September 1996, paved the way for a permanent ban on nuclear explosive testing to become an integral part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The rationale for the CTBT was that it would "constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security". Some opponents doubted that the treaty would totally prevent qualitative improvements of existing nuclear weapons.


135 In the mid-1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded two agreements placing ceilings on the permitted yield of an underground nuclear explosion at 150 kilotons (one kiloton is equivalent to the explosive force of a thousand tons of TNT). The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty set this limit for nuclear weapons tests while the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty set this limit for "peaceful nuclear explosions". For details, see Rebecca Johnson, "A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed but Not Sealed", ACRONYM no.10, May 1997, p.7. The conclusion of the CTBT was consistent with the Principles and Objectives agreed to at the 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference, which provided, among other things, for "[t]he completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996".

nuclear arsenals, or the development of new weapon designs, given the technological capabilities of the established nuclear-weapon states to experiment without fission testing. Other critics objected to the constraints that the treaty might place on the reliability of the US nuclear weapons stockpile, or doubted the verifiability of the treaty in other parts of the globe. Yet others objected to the uncertainties posed by complicated entry-into-force provisions. But it is widely recognized that the CTBT will be, once it comes into force, a major advance in restraining the nuclear arms competition and inhibiting nuclear weapons proliferation.

One should understand the CTBT is the culmination of 40 years of efforts to ban nuclear test explosions and thereby halt the development of new weapons of mass destruction. The Treaty is "comprehensive" in that it bans nuclear test explosions in all environments. Underground explosions, which were not banned in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the atmosphere, in Outer Space and under water (Partial Test Ban Treaty) of 1963, are now prohibited. Not only military but also non-military nuclear explosions are banned. As of 8 July 1997, 144 countries had signed it, including all five nuclear-weapons states. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva negotiated the CTBT over a period of two-and-a-half years. Negotiations began in January 1994 (based on the mandate in the December 1993 UN General Assembly consensus resolution 48/70) and concluded in the mid-1996. Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, Chairman of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee, met the deadline to complete CTBT negotiation in time for signature at the outset of the General

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137 For an analytical discussion, see "Rebecca Johnson, "A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed but Not Sealed". ACRONYM No.10, May 1991, p.78.


Assembly's fifty-first Session. The key controversies that had to be resolved concerned the scope of the treaty, whether peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) would be permitted, the conditions for intrusive verification (e.g., challenge inspections), and the terms of entry into force.

The 1978 Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the first devoted to disarmament, established the following three as part of its statement of principles for disarmament generally. The three principles are as follows:

Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed (Paragraph 31).

In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements (Paragraph 91).

In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development (paragraph 92).

In 1988 the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) agreed on 16 Principles of Verification which built on these three. By this time these principles had been well practiced and were largely accepted by the international community. While the United Nations principles do not represent any significant innovation, the fact that United Nations members were able to agree and endorse them, is strong evidence of the extent to which verification had by that state become an accepted and necessary part of arms control and disarmament. However, applying all of them fully and at once is impossible. some of the principles are contradictory, while others are difficult

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UN General Assembly Resolution 50/65 was adopted by consensus on 12 December 1995.

See Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, General Assembly Resolution S-10/2, UN document A/RES/S-10/2, 30 June 1978.

The first two principles relating to: (i) all arms limitation and disarmament agreements, the adequacy and effectiveness are important; (ii) and verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of arms control and disarmament. For an exhaustive 16 principles verification of 1988, see UN, Verification in All its Aspects: Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, UN document A/45/372, 28 August 1990, Section II.
politically. There must be compromises or trade-offs between them if verification is to function effectively and efficiently.

**India and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

A look at the significance and summary of the CTBT reveals that it requires much attention in disarmament negotiations. The Treaty bans any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion anywhere in the world; establishes a global monitoring system to monitor and verify compliance with the Treaty; has the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States and the objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.\(^{144}\) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty consists of a preamble, 17 articles, an annex containing a list of States grouped by region, an annex containing a list of States in relation to the entry-into-force provision (article XIV) and a Protocol. The Protocol sets out detailed provisions for verification, on-site inspections and confidence building measures, and contains two annexes. One annex lists the 337 facilities composing the international monitoring system (IMS) and the other annex describes parameters for standard event screening by the Vienna-based International Data Centre (IDC). The annexes to the Treaty and the Protocol and its annexes form an integral part of the Treaty. Moreover, the significance of diplomacy at multiple layers of interaction should not be belittled. Both at domestic level and international level, the role of institutional diplomacy, summit diplomacy, conference diplomacy and citizen diplomacy; the interaction and mutual trade-offs between international community in general, and diplomats, international lawyers, scientists, epistemic community and think-tanks in particular are the part and parcel of the effective implementation of any treaty. And, mass media has its own role to shape public opinion. Hence, the shadow, substance and style of multiple-level diplomacy constitute the unique blend of ends-means chain pertaining to every issue.

India was one of the Treaty's initial sponsors, but its recent insistence on linking the CTBT to the "elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework" is being

widely interpreted as an insincere ploy to subvert the negotiations.\textsuperscript{145} John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, described the strategy of linkage "as a strategy of failure", and suggested (in a thinly veiled reference to India) that those who were making the linkage were twisting the CTBT into a "misshapen and ineffectual pry-bar for other goals".\textsuperscript{146} On 20 June 1996, India's Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, the Indian delegate stated explicitly that India would not subscribe to the Treaty "in its present form".\textsuperscript{147} India's decision not to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 was based on its traditional approach to nuclear disarmament and its national security concerns.\textsuperscript{148} India's position was made clear by the end of 1995. It had demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1974 but given its early moral abhorrence of these weapons, and had unilaterally refrained from weaponization. India call for transparent, good faith negotiations to meet all concerns. On 8 July 1996, Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda said that India would not bow to any pressure to change its stand against signing the CTBT.\textsuperscript{149}

India's decision to go for nuclear weapons is the manifestation of a fast growing nation. It is also an expression of India's resentment against attempts of the recognized nuclear weapons states to deny India its rightful place in the international community. India has all along refused to play second fiddle, whether strategically or technologically, to the big powers, and would not accept a new world order in which the present P-5 countries


\textsuperscript{146} Statement by John D. Holum, Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Association, to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 23 January 1996.

\textsuperscript{147} The Times of India (New Delhi), 21 June 1996.


\textsuperscript{149} The Hindu (New Delhi), 9 July 1996.
would remain hegemons for a long time. According to R. Venkataraman, former President of India: "Pokharan-I nuclear test in 1974 was a protest against arbitrary, discriminatory and unfair NPT. The preparation made for a nuclear test during 1980s at Pokharan with which I was associated as Defence Minister was to demonstrate to the world India's nuclear capability and not because of any threat perception. India wanted to break the monopoly of the Nuclear Five..."

The United States co-sponsored with India the UN General Assembly's unanimously adopted resolution in 1993 calling for a comprehensive test ban treaty which would "effectively contribute" to the twin goal of nuclear non-proliferation "in all aspects", (that is, horizontal and vertical, qualitative and quantitative), as well as the "process of nuclear disarmament". The negotiating mandate adopted by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in January 1994 also specified the same language and objectives. American President Bill Clinton had joined Prime Minister of India P.V. Narasimha Rao in calling for the twin goals of non-proliferation and disarmament in 1994, and so had other heads of states. The treaty draft that has now emerged at the CD fails completely in meeting the terms of negotiating mandate.

The Article-1 (Basic obligations) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which says:

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

These two articles are the scope of the CTBT treaty. But the treaty will allow sub-critical tests and computer simulation to design, fabricate, and test new types of warheads. The treaty, will, in reality, legitimize a new qualitative arms race. There is also no provision to ban transfer of proven nuclear weapon design and technology by a nuclear weapon state to another state. What we are seeing is a treaty which, like the NPT, will be a license to proliferate vertically without effectively banning horizontal proliferation. In essence, it is a flawed treaty. Moreover, the treaty fails to meet the

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150 For a complete discussion on this, see B. Vivekanandan, "CTBT and India's Future", *International Studies*, vol.36, no.4, October-December 1999, p.359.


second goal of the negotiating mandate totally since it does not even attempt to contribute to the "process of disarmament". In fact, the five weapon states (and the two dozen protected by nuclear umbrella) wish to avoid any commitment to disarmament except in the vaguest terms less binding than Article VI of NPT (which remains unactioned).

The CTBT directly affects the five nuclear weapon states and the three "threshold states" (India, Israel, Pakistan). The remaining non-nuclear weapon states are already committed under the NPT to indefinitely abstain from nuclear tests. China and Russia have serious difficulties with the asymmetric capping that the CTBT will achieve and the technical operational aspects like monitoring and verification procedures which would eventually require many compromises.\footnote{153} Meanwhile, China, Britain and Russia also have been searching for a way out of the CTBT, making it contingent to India's ratification of a treaty which India has already said it will not sign. Pakistan's position, as in the case of the NPT has been predictably and consistently dishonest, even if it apparently provides its diplomatic payoffs. The British position at Geneva surprised most Indians who tend to see it as one which seeks international limelight even if momentarily, while protecting the perpetuation of its own nuclear arsenal.

The issue that dominates the closing stages of the CTBT negotiations concerned the Treaty's entry-into-force (EIF) provisions. The issue arose because Russia, China, and the United Kingdom insisted that the 3 nuclear weapon threshold states -- India, Pakistan and Israel -- must become parties to the CTBT before the treaty could take effect. Other nations, including the United States, would have preferred less demanding EIF provisions in order to facilitate early entry into force, and to deny any nation or group of nations the ability to hold its implementation hostage.\footnote{154} Chairman Ramaker's compromise formula listed 44 nuclear capable states (as identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency) that were members of the expanded CD (these included the 5 nuclear-weapon states and the 3 threshold states) that would be required to ratify the treaty as a pre-requisite for EIF. If the treaty had not entered into force within three years of being opened for signature, Ramaker's formula provided that those

\footnote{153} Ibid., p.6.


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states that had already ratified the CTBT could convene a conference to "decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law [could] be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process". 155

The Indian delegate formally objected to the EIF provision on 20 June 1996, warning that India was prepared to block a consensus on the treaty text, and thereby prevent its adoption by the CD, unless the provision was made less specific. Ambassador Ghose stated that India would not accept any language...which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to the treaty". 156 India was also opposed to the draft treaty text because it did not contain language definitively qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and committing nuclear-weapon states to a "time-bound" disarmament process. 157 The Indian delegate holds the view that the Preamble of the Treaty will have to clearly define the linkage of the CTBT to the overall framework of nuclear disarmament.

The stand was reiterated in the First Committee, when the Indian representative said on 25 October 1993:

India is heartened by the historic decision of the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993 to give its Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban a negotiating mandate. We believe CTBT would go a long way in arresting the nuclear arms race and bringing to an end the development of more lethal warheads. Another compelling reason why CTBT has become a matter of high priority is to prevent the development of 'third generation nuclear weapons'. The aim of CTBT and consequently its scope should be to prevent the testing of all nuclear weapons and thereby to inhibit in a non-discriminatory way proliferation of nuclear weapons in their horizontal as well as vertical dimensions. It must not, however, be conceived as an instrument designed to control technological progress or to perpetuate the division of the world in 'haves' and 'have-nots'. Accordingly the CTBT should be non-discriminatory in character in the sense of providing equal rights and obligations to the States Parties of the proposed treaty including equal access. India looks forward to the early commencement of multilateral negotiations for an effective and verifiable CTBT and to its conclusion in 1994". 158

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155 See, Craig Cerniello, "India Blocks Consensus on CTB Treaty May Still go to UN", Arms Control Today, August 1996, p.31. Also see Johnson, "The CTBT: Hanging in the Balance", op.cit., p.5. Note that the membership of the CD was expanded on 17 June 1996, when 23 new members were admitted for a total of 61.


158 Statement by M.M. Jacob, Member of Parliament in First Committee of the UN (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, New York), 15 October 1993, p.4.
On 28 June, at the conclusion of the second part of the 1996 CD session, Chairman Ramaker tabled a draft seeking a consensus. India maintained its opposition on the same grounds as before. Despite renewed efforts in the CD at the end of July to resolve outstanding differences, the full Nuclear Test Ban Ad hoc Committee had no choice but to report on 16 that, due to India's objections "no consensus" could be reached either on adopting the text of the CTBT or on formally passing it to the CD. In essence, the announcement meant that the CD negotiation had reached a dead end and that no further progress toward opening the treaty for signature could be made in this forum. On 22 August 1996, Australia moved that the 50th UN General Assembly itself considers and adopt the CTBT, opening the treaty for signature at the earliest possible date. The General Assembly adopted the treaty on 10 September, by a vote of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions. The Treaty was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, and on that date was signed by 68 nations, including all five nuclear-weapon states. The earliest the CTBT can enter into force is 24 September 1998. To accomplish this, however, the CTBT requires that the 44 states that were members of the [CD] as of 18 June 1996, that formally participated in the work of 1996 session of the Conference, that have research or power reactors identified by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) deposit their instruments of ratification. Moreover, the entry into force (EIF) provision has to be mentioned here:

Under Article XIV (Entry into Force), the Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the 44 states (listed in Annexure-2 to the Treaty) have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary General of the United Nations, "but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature". The list comprises the States that formally participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament, and that

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160 India, Bhutan and Libya voted against. The five abstentions were: Tanzania, Cuba, Syria, Lebanon and Mauritius. See Johnson, "CTBT: Signed but not sealed". ACRONYM No.10, May 1997, p.18. See also ACDA, "CTBT: Chronology During Clinton Administration, op.cit.


If the Treaty has not entered into force "three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature", the Secretary General of the United Nations, as Depository of the Treaty, could, at the request of a majority of States that had ratified it, convene a conference to examine the situation and to "decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process", in order to facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force.\(^{162}\)

As of 31 December 1997, 3 of these 44 -- India, Pakistan, and North Korea -- had not yet signed.\(^{163}\) Two factors are likely to determine when the CTBT will enter into force. One is the timing of the ratification of the Treaty by the five nuclear-weapon states. The other is the willingness of the two prominent holdouts -- India and Pakistan -- to reverse course, and to sign and ratify the treaty. After India's and Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear explosive tests, it may be difficult for either to adhere to the CTBT unconditionally. Two other states -- Israel (which is a signatory) and North Korea -- might also delay ratification and final adherence. When the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) rejected India's demand in the final CTBT draft, India asked: "How can we escape the conclusion that the nuclear weapon states are determined to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security and visualize the CTBT not as a serious disarmament measure but merely as an instrument against horizontal proliferation?"\(^{164}\)

Since the NWS had not committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons "it is natural that our national security consideration becomes a key factor in our decision-making. Countries around us continue their weapon programme, either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons". However, it is said that the CTBT was "not conceived as a measure towards

\(^{162}\) CTBT Text, Article XIV - Entry Into Force. See also SIPRI Yearbook 1997 (Stockholm, 1997), Appendix 12A, pp.414-31.


universal nuclear disarmament and it is not in India's national security interest. India, therefore, cannot subscribe to it in its present form.\textsuperscript{165}

Thus, by the time the CTBT negotiations ended in 1996, a disappointed India became its firm opponent. In the end, the title Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty proved a misnomer, since the treaty finally turned out to be neither "comprehensive" nor "test ban". It banned only nuclear "explosions" and allowed other forms of testing. It allowed non-explosive, laboratory-type, sub-critical tests, which gave the NWS the right to continue tests and build their nuclear arsenals further. It was clear that the whole purpose of the CTBT was to force India to remain a non-nuclear weapon state for ever. When the CTBT was finally adopted at the UN on 10 September 1996, India stated categorically that it would "never sign this unequal treaty, not now, not later".\textsuperscript{166}

Being the initiator of the Test Ban idea in the 1950s, India's decision not to accede to the CTBT might have surprised many observers. But India was constrained to do so in the larger interests of the country. India rejected the CTBT on two basic grounds: (a) It is not a nuclear disarmament measure; and (b) it is not in India's national security interests. That is not a nuclear disarmament measure is clear in the intent and political aspiration contained in the preamble of the treaty. It does not contain any commitment to a time-bound nuclear disarmament.\textsuperscript{167} In fact, during the negotiations the NWS rejected every suggestion which talked about elimination of nuclear weapons. India's proposal for discontinuing qualitative development and elimination of nuclear weapons under a time-bound framework was acceptable to them.\textsuperscript{168} Similarly, though the treaty was intended to prevent qualitative development and upgradation of nuclear weapons, it permits high-tech "sub-critical" tests which would enable the NWS to upgrade their nuclear weapons. India was insisted on a commitment to nuclear disarmament from the Nuclear Weapon States between July and December 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its historic opinion challenging the legality of the threat or use of Nuclear Weapons. In a unanimous vote including judges from the Nuclear Weapon

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., pp.104-5.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p.144. Jaswant Singh, in an article in Foreign Affairs, wrote that the CTBT "was neither comprehensive nor related to disarmament but rather devoted to ratifying the nuclear status quo". See Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.77, no.5, September-October 1998, p.41.

\textsuperscript{167} See, B. Vivekanandan, n.150, p.362.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
States, the Court stated that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring
to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects..." 169

In the most comprehensive opinion poll of elite views of nuclear issues, conducted in
autumn 1994 by the Marketing and Research Group (MARG), New Delhi, on behalf
of the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, only 6 per cent of respondents considered
the nuclear issue sufficiently urgent to be rated the first or second most important
concern facing the country. Communalism, poverty, economic stability, terrorism, the
conflict in Kashmir, and even the debate over the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) ranked above the nuclear issue for most respondents. The Survey found
substantial support for official policy. Of those polled, 57 per cent favoured New
Delhi’s policy of "strategic ambiguity"; maintaining the nuclear option while espousing
global nuclear disarmament. 33 per cent were nuclear advocates, favouring
weaponization and the outright acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability. Only 8 per
cent supported the renunciation of a nuclear option for India. Not surprisingly, the idea
of global nuclear disarmament has immense legitimacy and support among Indian elite.
Of all respondents, 92 per cent expressed total or partial support for an international
agreement to ban nuclear weapons, with only 1 per cent opposed. Among supporters
of official policy, 88 per cent indicated total support for eliminating nuclear weapons,
with a further 8 per cent expressing partial support for a combined 96 per cent
endorsement of nuclear abolition. Among nuclear advocates as well, support for a
nuclear ban was widespread, with 91 per cent indicating full or partial support for a
global disarmament agreement. 170 No sizeable correlation existed between political-
party affiliation and views on nuclear policy, although some slight differences were
noted. Supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the only national party that has
publicly advocated acquiring nuclear weapons, were less inclined to be nuclear

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169 See International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality
of the threat or use of Nuclear Weapons (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the
United Nations), (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 8 July 1996). See also Nagendra Singh,
"Nuclear Weapons and International Law Doctrines" in an edited work entitled Towards a Nuclear Weapon-
volumes were based on International Conference on "Towards a Nuclear Weapon-free and non-violent
world" which was held from 14 to 16 November 1988 in New Delhi. The Conference was unique in that
its scope covered practically the entire spectrum issues on the global disarmament agenda. It was
foreworded by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao.

170 For details, see Amitabh Mattoo, "India’s Nuclear Status Quo", Survival, vol.38, no.3, Autumn 1996,
p.46. See also David Cartwright and Amitabh Mattoo, India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear
opponents and more likely to favour the nuclear option. Supporters of the Congress (I) were more likely to endorse official policy.

In the past, nuclear issues have assumed real public significance mostly because of extraordinary external events or a perception of external pressure. Government policy, in at least its public posturing, has almost always hardened as a consequence. Three instances are worth citing. The only real debate on India’s nuclear options took place in the months after China tested its nuclear device at the Lop Nor site in Xinjiang in October 1964. Distinguished economists, political leaders and social activists participated in the discussion. It is widely believed that during this critical period, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri encouraged the Atomic Energy Commission to pursue the nuclear-weapon option. The most recent example of the heightened public concern came in the wake of renewed US pressure following the extension of the NPT in May 1995. The recommendations made a seminar on "External Pressures on India's Nuclear Options" (which included the Crème de la Crème of India's strategic thinkers, including serving officials), held in September 1995, reveal the directions this public debate is taking place.

The recommendations included:

- In this changed new situation following the permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) have also become untenable and India should oppose both these treaties unless explicitly in a time-bound framework, they are made part of total and comprehensive disarmament...

- In this changed situation the present policy position of "keeping the nuclear option open" has become meaningless. There is a need now to examine deterrence...

- India's current capabilities can take care of Pakistan but not the other larger challenges. And, therefore, even in case India decides not to resume nuclear testing we must continue developing longer range delivering systems and towards that end, expedite research and development, and testing of systems required.

- India should proceed ahead with the serial production and induction into service of the Prithvi, and with the further development of the Agni for induction into service.

India should first start by presenting its case in clearcut national security policy and start working towards developing its capabilities. Although this strategic community well known as it is, has in the short term no direct impact on government policy, it could be influential in the long term. Significantly, this shift in public attitudes was also revealed in a fortnightly newspaper's survey of popular opinion in December 1995. Although the nuclear still ranked below communication, poverty, unemployment and the Kashmir problem, 43 per cent of respondents were more inclined to support a political party that would ensure that India would have nuclear weapons. 26 per cent were less inclined to support such a party, and to 31 per cent it would make no difference. Moreover, 62 per cent would 'approve' if India exploded a nuclear bomb to develop its nuclear-weapon capability. Therefore, at least two conclusions can be drawn about Indian public opinion on the issue:

- First, in ordinary times, the nuclear issue is a non-issue, it has virtually no bearing on elections, nor does it rank high in salience. There is no great support for weaponisation at such times, but there is overwhelming support for retaining the nuclear option. The government then has considerable flexibility (and room for manoeuvre) and can make significant changes in its policy, short of giving up or 'eroding' the nuclear option.

- Second, there would be a dramatic shift of opinion in favour of weaponisation if it is perceived that external pressure in being imposed or if an extraordinary external event takes place that is viewed as a national security threat. The government has considerably less flexibility at such times, and could, in the face of severe public pressure, be forced to review its policy.

The 1994 survey revealed that 48 per cent of government-policy supporters identified a future Pakistani nuclear test as the most important factor justifying developing nuclear weapons. In an article titled "Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures between India and Pakistan". In the backdrop of ongoing Indo-Pak tension, it is striking that neither the two governments nor their respective security establishments comprising supporters of the bomb have set themselves down to the task of preparing serious perspectives on the issue of nuclear risk reduction measures between India and Pakistan. They have simply confined themselves to endorsing the principle of nuclear risk reduction measures and casually asserting that if these measures are put in place the South Asian region can be

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174 For details, see Amitabha Mattoo, n.170, p.48.
considered nuclear safe.\textsuperscript{175} Given this irresponsibility on the part of the two governments and their associated security establishments, the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) took upon itself the task of preparing just such perspectives on nuclear risk reduction. The text below was prepared, endorsed and issued publicly by MIND on 18 June at a press conference in New Delhi. Those who have contributed to drawing up the final text besides Achin Vanaik himself, Praful Bidwai, Satyajit Rath, N.D. Jayaprakash, M.V. Ramana, Rajaraman.

A number of organizations also supported the final text and endorsed its release. They were Jananeethi (Kerala), Movement against Nuclear Weapons (Tamil Nadu), Women’s Initiative for Peace in South Asia (WIPSA), Muslim Women’s Conference, Popular Education and Action Centre (PEACE), Focus on Global South, Lokayan, Indian Social Action Forum (INSAAF), Corporate Watch (India). The text aims to both show about nuclear risk reduction measures cannot do -- they are never a substitute for nuclear disarmament -- and also what they can do, that is, the dangers they do attempt to address. The text should be seen for what it is: Not the final word on such matters but on invitation to others concerned about the nuclear dangers in South Asia to reflect upon, and join, the debate on how to bring about greater nuclear sanity in South Asia and the world.\textsuperscript{176}

Nuclear conflict is most likely to break out between two nuclear weapons states at political loggerheads with each other. For the Cold War period, it was the face-off between the former Soviet Union and the US that was correctly considered the most dangerous confrontation. Though the systemic rivalry between these two giants meant involvement on opposing sides in third world wars and conflicts, the two countries shared no common border, their troops were not deployed directly against each other’s, and the ‘war’ between them remained a ‘cold’ (essentially ideological) one. Even so, it was still a close-run matter with the October Cuban missile crisis of 1962 leaving them and the world a hair’s breadth away from a nuclear holocaust. Achin Vanaik’s critical, incisive, copious analysis pertaining to nuclear risk reduction in the Indian subcontinent invariably suggests that there should have been diplomacy and its tool

\textsuperscript{175} For a critical dimension on this, see Achin Vinaik, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures between India and Pakistan", \textit{Economic and Political Weekly}, vol.XXXVII, no.28, 13-19 July 2002, p.2845.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., p.2845.
negotiation, sincerity and candour from both sides for a permanent peace and stability. "Consensus" is the key, essential prerequisite for initiation of dialogue at domestic level first, then between two sides.

"Nuclear Related Agreements and Cooperation in South Asia" postulates that a controlled increase in nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan is of value, and suggests projects that could be undertaken by India and Pakistan as a part of a process that incrementally increases nuclear transparency. The basic assumptions and arguments underlying can be summarized as follows:

- Increased nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan is a worthwhile objective, as it will lead to the irreversibility of extent nuclear agreements, increase the prospects of future agreements; and be an element of increased stability in times of crises.

- Given the current state of Indian and Pakistani relations, incremental progress in increased nuclear transparency is the most likely future outcome.

- Incremental progress can be achieved by enhancing the information exchange required by existing nuclear-related agreements.

**Draft Report on Indian Nuclear Doctrine**

Article 8.5 of the draft Indian Nuclear doctrine states that: "In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence-building measures shall be sought, negotiated and instituted". This stated commitment establishes that India is certainly interested in nuclear confidence building measures. For India, the greatest need for such measures is with Pakistan, with whom India has had three major military conflicts and long-standing border and territorial disputes. A state of low intensity conflict exists between India and Pakistan in the disputed region of Kashmir, characterized by cross-border shelling and exchanges of gunfire as a daily occurrence. Therefore, proposing steps for increased nuclear transparency between these countries could easily seem futile to the causal observer.

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178 Ibid., p.8.

However, the Indian and Pakistani relationship is complex and works at many levels. The complexity of the Indian and Pakistani relationship provides glimmers of hope that progress can occur in some areas of interaction even while there are major setbacks in others. The "nuclear transparency" dimension is highly decisive as regards Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). Studying the Indian and Pakistani relationship to nuclear agreements other than the major nuclear non-proliferation treaties, such as the CTBT and the NPT, also helps in identifying a wider range of policy options for moving these countries towards greater nuclear transparency. For instance, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) has been signed and ratified by Pakistan, but only signed and not ratified by India. The process of building greater consensus within India for signing the CTBT could begin with the international community urging India to ratify the less problematic CNS as a confidence building step towards the future ratification of more contentious treaties. When India and Pakistan are both parties to the CNS they could initiate a bilateral process of sharing the safety reports that the CNS requires. Although Pakistan has not yet submitted its national safety report required by the CNS, Pakistani representatives participated in the first Conference of Parties, and there is every expectation that Pakistan will soon submit its safety report. There are other nuclear related agreements similar to the CNS that India has signed and ratified, but Pakistan has not. These agreements offer options for nudging Pakistan towards greater nuclear transparency with India.

After India tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, pressures have been mounted on New Delhi to accede to the NPT and CTBT and join the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations. The United States and a few others have imposed economic sanctions against India to force it to roll back its nuclear weapon programme. Sign the CTBT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), and join the non-proliferation regime. They want India to follow countries like South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, which thanks to pressure exerted by the United States and others in the 1980s and 1990s, rolled back or abandoned their nuclear weapon programmes. In Iraq, the United States resorted to direct attack, under the cover

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180 See, Gaurav Rajen and Kent Biringer, n.177, p.9.
181 Ibid.
182 See, B. Vivekanandan, n.150, p.366.
of the UN resolution on Kuwait, to destroy the nuclear programme of that country. America could induce North Korea to spend its nuclear weapon programme by a promise to deliver annually 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil. In South Africa, President F.W. De Klerk secretly eliminated its undeclared nuclear weapon stockpile in 1991 and signed the NPT before the country was brought under the black majority rule.\textsuperscript{183}

\textbf{India and Fissile-Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) Negotiations}

Post-Cold War scenario has brought about another landmark with respect to arms control and disarmament. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed to convene on ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of new fissile-material principally plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) suitable for nuclear weapons in December 1993. The international community has already committed itself to further multilateral negotiations on a fissile materials production ban,\textsuperscript{184} although it has to date proved impossible to overcome the obstacles and make a start. The proposed Fissile material Ban is an arms control and non-proliferation measure, meant to be global and non-discriminatory in the sense. It seeks to stop further production of fissile material for weapons purposes, or outside of international safeguards, all over the world. In December 1996, 115 states voted for a Malaysian-sponsored resolution in the United Nations General Assembly that called for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapon convention. The history of the fissban issue has paralleled that of the CTBT. By 1992 Russia and the United States had decided to halt production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapon purposes. They brought Britain and France on board and got consensus for a United Nations General Assembly resolution in December 1993.\textsuperscript{185} The Conference on Disarmament itself decided that it was the most appropriate forum to negotiate a fissban. In order to prevent progress on this issue before the NPT conference in April 1995, the central issue of contention when adopting

\textsuperscript{183} For a wide-ranging discussion, see Waldo Stampf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement", \textit{Arms Control Today} (Washington, D.C.), December 1995/January 1996.

\textsuperscript{184} The idea of cut-off was first presented under the Atoms for Peace Conference in 1953. A fissile materials production ban ("fissban") was the subject of a consensus resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in December 1993 (UNGA 48/75L). A mandate for this was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in 1993 (CD/1299, 24 March 1995), and it was further endorsed as the second measure identified in the programme of action on nuclear disarmament, in the 'principles and objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' adopted by NPT parties on 11 May 1995 (NPT/CONF. 1995/L.5).

\textsuperscript{185} See, United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 48/752.
its mandate for negotiations: whether or not existing stockpiles should be included for consideration. The fissban subsequently became tangled in the politics around establishing a nuclear disarmament committee. However, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has still failed to convene a Fissban Committee and begin negotiations.

Depending on the stringency of the prohibition, a fissban could be a minor step towards non-proliferation or a significant measure of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Conceptually, there are four options. From least to greatest impact on nuclear proliferation and materials control, they are: A basic "cut-off" of future production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons purposes; a ban on the production and stockpiling of plutonium, HEU and tritium for weapons purposes; and a ban on the production and stockpiling of weapon-suitable fissionable materials and tritium. Each of these options has advocates and detractors. At present, the politically feasible choice is between the first two. Seen from the standpoint of India, one of the threshold states, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) although considered to be a non-discriminatory disarmament measure, global in its reach and universal in its application, is so only in intent. In real terms, it does not change the status quo nor does it in any way reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots.

The immediate objective of the U.S. foreign policy should be to encourage India and Pakistan to adopt policies that will help stabilize the situation in South Asia by capping their nuclear capabilities of their current levels and reinforcing the global effort to stem the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems. Toward these the report of an Independent Task Force calls upon India and Pakistan as follows: First, to make a formal commitment to refrain from further nuclear weapons testing by signing the CTBT; second, to participate in good faith negotiations that aim to and the production of fissile material and sign any FMCT that results; thirdly, to announce a willingness to participate in a broad-based moratorium.

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on producing fissile material; fourth, not to transfer nuclear or missile technology or equipment to any third party and to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines; fifth, not to deploy missiles with nuclear warheads or aircraft with nuclear bombs; sixthly, to implement fully and unconditionally existing bilateral confidence-building measures including regular use of hot lines and the provision of advance notification of military exercises; seventh, to negotiate and implement additional confidence building measures (CBMs) (including regular high-level bilateral meetings, increased trade and other exchanges), exchanges of observers at military exercises, and a ban on ballistic missile flight tests in the direction of one another's territory (prolonged pause confidence even more); eighthly, to initiate political, economic, and military steps designed to calm the situation in Kashmir while avoiding unilateral acts could exacerbate tensions there; and lastly, to enter into sustained, serious negotiations with each other on the entire range of issues that divide them. Temporary positive action, followed by a reversion to enmity as has repeatedly been the case in the past, has become too dangerous to be repeated in the new nuclear environment.

In the "Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the States Parties to the Treaty called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the mandate contained therein.189

The shift in the United States position and the adoption of the Assembly Resolution cleared the way for the Conference on Disarmament (CD), at the beginning of its 1994 session, to appoint Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada as Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate the treaty. Canada has long been a supporter of such a ban, which formed an integral part of the "strategy of suffocation" to curb the nuclear arms race proposed by the Prime Minister Trudeau during the first special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 (SSOD-...
At the end of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Shannon reported that there was consensus that the Conference was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty in this issue and that there was agreement in principle that an ad hoc committee should be established as soon as a mandate could be agreed. While Western and Eastern European States wanted the mandate to reflect the language agreed upon in resolution 48/75, the Conference's Non-aligned States (Group of 21) considered that the stockpiles of fissile materials for weapons purposes already in existence should form part of the remit of the new committee. The Report of the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon, on his consultation on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, presented to the 703rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on March 1995 (CD/1299).

The excerpts from the Report of the Special Coordinator Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon say that "...I have held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for (the) committee should be based on resolution 48/75 L of the United Nations General Assembly and reads as follows:

1. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) decides to establish an ad hoc committee on a "ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

2. The Conference directs the Ad hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device.

3. The Ad hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 Session. (Italics as in document).

During the course of my consultations, many delegations expressed concern about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit considerations not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to

190 Ibid., p.17.
191 Ibid.
production of fissile material (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material. "It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad hoc Committee any of the noted issues...."

On 23 March 1995, the Special Coordinator presented a report to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) which contained a mandate to establish the ad hoc Committee on prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, along with his summary of the concerns expressed by many delegations on various issues, including the scope of a future convention. The ad hoc Committee was established on 23 March 1995, immediately after the adoption of Ambassador Shannon's Report.\(^{192}\)

What and how the working, functional principle and nature of nuclear weapons give a very clearer picture and further understanding. A nuclear weapon is a device that releases large amounts of explosive energy through extremely rapidly occurring nuclear reactions.\(^{193}\) When pure fissionable materials are compressed by high explosives in implosion-type atomic weapons, the critical mass needed for a nuclear explosion is reduced.\(^{194}\) Chain reaction is the continuing process of nuclear fissioning in which the neutrons released from a fission trigger at least one another nuclear fission. In a nuclear weapon, an extremely rapid, multiplying chain reaction causes the explosive release of energy. In a reactor, the pace of the chain reaction is controlled to produce heat (in a

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192 The mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc committee called for negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. Ambassador Shannon reported also agreement by delegations that the mandate did not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Committee other issues besides a ban on any future production, such as past production and management of fissile material. Thus, the FMCT becomes a good idea. Ibid.

193 For a nuclear weapon to work, a minimum "critical mass" of nuclear materials must be present, and that material must be brought together with sufficient speed and precision for a nuclear reaction to be sustained. Critical mass depends on the density, shape and type of fissile material. Critical mass is the minimum amount of concentrated fissionable material required to sustain a chain reaction. The exact mass of fissionable material needed to sustain a chain reaction varies according to the concentration (purity) and chemical form of the material, the particular fissile isotope present, its geometrical properties, and its density. For a full range of facts and descriptions, see Randall Forsberg, William Driscoll, Gregory Webb, Jonathan Dean (ed.), Non-Proliferation Primer-Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons (Cambridge: The Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, The MIT Press, 1995), p.39.

194 The technical aspects of FMCT relate to stockpiling, processes such as reprocessing, enrichment and separation techniques, plant types and construction, verification, civilian versus military applications of plutonium; and whether the treaty should also include stockpile and spent fuel which will be a large source of plutonium. See Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory B. Koblentz, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1998), p.323, Appendix K.
power reactor) or large quantities of neutrons (in a research or production reactor). Nuclear reactions can be of two types: Fission or fusion. Nuclear fission reactions occur when a heavy atomic nucleus is split into two or more smaller nuclei, usually as the result of a bombarding neutron but sometimes occurring spontaneously; fusion occurs when lightweight nuclei are joined, typically under conditions of extreme temperature and pressure, nuclear weapons utilize either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. The nuclear material used in a nuclear weapon may be either uranium or plutonium. Uranium occurs naturally in uranium ore. Plutonium is a man-made element that has several isotopes. Uranium ore is made of two isotopes: Uranium-235, which readily undergoes the fission process needed in a nuclear weapon, and uranium-238, which does not. Thus, U-235 is termed "fissile" and U-238 is termed "non-fissile". Only about 0.7 per cent of uranium in ore is U-235, while 99.3 per cent is U-238. This is the entire story about functioning of nuclear weapons so on and so forth. Fissile materials, highly enriched uranium and plutonium are not only the most important and essential ingredients of all nuclear weapons but also the most difficult and expensive part of a nuclear warhead.

Hence, a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would imply a set of three commitments on the part of its member states: to desist from manufacturing highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separating plutonium for either the construction of nuclear weapons or research and development in that field; to refrain from assisting other states in this regard; and, to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for verification of the implementation of these commitments. The FMCT endeavours to achieve multiple objectives that may be seen differently from different perspectives. Firstly, it would limit the size of potential nuclear arsenals except where surplus stocks of such material already exist (as in the case of the USA and Russia). Secondly, it would make reductions irreversible if the fissile material is transferred from

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195 Ibid., p.323, Appendix K.
196 Randall Forsbery et al., n.193, p.39.
197 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
dismantled weapons and other unsafeguarded stocks to non-weapons use or disposal under international safeguards. Thirdly, it would strengthen the non-proliferation regime by opening nuclear facilities in all states to international inspections. Therefore, it would reduce the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime. Also, it would increase the moral, legal and practical constraints on the production of nuclear weapons by non-NPT states.\footnote{Ibid.} It is important to bear in mind that while the language of the resolution was kept restrictive in order to secure consensus, that consensus was possible largely because the initiative on which it was based and addressed a broader framework encompassing such important issues as the "elimination where possible of accumulations of stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) or plutonium" and recognized the need to address associated regional problems by mentioning the need for "more restrictive regional arrangements".\footnote{Hayat Khan, "The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty -- Addressing the Issues of an FMCT", Disarmament (New York), vol.xx, no.1, 1997, p.47.} The key actors in the FMCT negotiations are the Permanent five members (P-5) of UN Security Council and the three non-signatories to the NPT -- Israel, India and Pakistan.

India, Israel and Pakistan (the so-called "threshold countries" T-3) also have complete or semi-covert nuclear weapon programmes which they are unwilling to end or place under inspection, although they may agree to freeze them at the existing levels.\footnote{The Hindu (New Delhi), 11 November 1998.} Since Pokhara II India has indeed begun to make some major readjustments in nuclear policy. There were no surplus stocks nor were there any other countries producing such fissile materials.\footnote{Their willingness to participate in the talks is the reason for the restart of the FMCT negotiating process. The 61-member Conference on Disarmament (CD) now has the extremely difficult task of trying to forge a compromise on the treaty's scope and, above all, on its verification arrangements. Even if a treaty is signed, a weak verification regime could make it worthless. The major flashpoint on the FMCT issue has arisen on the scope of the treaty -- whether it should be confined only to future production or include existing stockpiles of fissile material also within the FMCT purview. See Savita Dutt, n.187, p.1685.} Rajiv Gandhi's interest in India's military modernization may have also contributed to South Asia's first nuclear crisis in 1987, in the wake of a major military exercise code-named "Brassstacs".\footnote{For a detailed description and analysis of the Brassstacs crisis, see Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, Brassstacs and Beyond: Perception and the Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994).} The precise dimensions of the nuclear
component of this crisis remain somewhat murky.\textsuperscript{205} Years later in 1988, the NPT also had formed part of the famous Rajiv Gandhi Plan\textsuperscript{206} for nuclear disarmament to be pursued within a time-bound framework. The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan has proposed in 1988, which mainly stipulates that a ban on the production of nuclear weapons and weapon grade fissile material, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Convention outlawing the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons, non-acquisition of weapons by non-nuclear powers in response to the above measures by the permanent five members (P-5) of the United Nations Security Council. The country should not be bound by a minimum nuclear deterrent; and that if India decided to eliminate nuclear weapons it would be in the context of total global disarmament -- a concept defined by the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for complete nuclear disarmament by 2010, which the late Prime Minister had outlined at the UN General Assembly in 1988.

In order to sign the FMCT by India, the security objectives in the short and long term have to be clearly formulated, and the steps to achieve them with its own capabilities to a greater extent than before identified and implemented. Having tested and taken the requisite steps towards weaponization, India must have a proper means-end analysis between its capability and needs. Specifically, if China rather than Pakistan is to be viewed as the primary target of Indian nuclear "deterrence", then the pressures on the nuclear weaponization may become a different character and magnitude and the important implications not only for fissile material decisions but also the attendant delivery systems. This is the key issue for India. Six possible options for India have been identified and analyzed in terms of benefits and risks. These six option are as follows:\textsuperscript{207} (i) Sign as is, (ii) Sign but with conditions; (iii) Sign with \textit{quid pro quo}; (iv) Declare moratorium on fissile material production; (v) Sign CTBT, declare moratorium on fissile material production (vi) Reject FMCT.

\textsuperscript{205} See Lawrence Lifshultz, "Doom Thy Neighbour", \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review} (4 June 1998), pp.30-34.


Speaking to the scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Trombay on 31 May 1997, the then Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, said that India would not sign the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.\textsuperscript{208} Gujral reiterated on 13 July 1997, in a press interview that the CTBT and FMCT were interlinked, one being a reflection of the other.\textsuperscript{209} But the Congress(I) supported the concept of minimum deterrence (apart from emphasizing the importance of a linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament, the central point of the Rajiv Gandhi Plan of Action). It promised its effort for total and complete disarmament. At the outset, it needs to be highlighted that what India is seeking is a non-discriminatory treaty that proposes to tackle the issue of fissile material in its totality. Secondly, the Indian position is very clear that the FMCT is not an end by itself but one step on the road leading to the eventual realization of a nuclear weapon free world.\textsuperscript{210} In September 1998, the Prime Minister of India Sri Atal Behari Vajpayee, in his address to the UN General Assembly stated that the FMCT was "a partial step". But Prime Minister predicated India's participation in its negotiation "in good faith in order to ensure a treaty that is non-discriminatory and meets India's security imperatives". Given the complicated matrix of positions of countries on the FMCT, it is uncertain as to when, and if at all, the FMCT would emerge. Pertaining to the very basis of the treaty, India needs to clearly perceive both the implications of the FMCT for the country's security and nuclear energy requirements, as well as the limitations of the proposed FMCT in order to explore possibilities of mitigating them to the extent possible. Earlier, India's ambassador to the CD, Savitri Kunnadi welcomed the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). India would participate constructively in negotiations for a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.\textsuperscript{211}

India proposed that the following initial steps in nuclear disarmament be taken:

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\textsuperscript{208} *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 1 June 1997.

\textsuperscript{209} *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 14 June 1997.

\textsuperscript{210} Manpreet Sethi, n.158, p.1388.

\textsuperscript{211} Conference on Disarmament decides to establish Ad hoc Committee to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, DCF/345, 12 August 1998.
i. Prohibition of the further use of fissionable material for military purposes which would have announced to a freeze on production of fissile materials for military use and a freeze on production of nuclear weapons;

ii. Prohibition of the transfer of fissionable material from civilian to military stocks;

iii. Non-export or conveying of nuclear weapons to other countries by those countries manufacturing such weapons etc.

India then hoped that "these proposals, if adopted, would lead to reversing of the nuclear armament race...". Thus, India's objective was always to reverse the nuclear arms race. It needs to be emphasized that the recognition or non-recognition of the so-called nuclear weapon status of India by the US Administration cannot be a substitute for a principled stand on vital issues affecting all humanity. India should re-emerge as the foremost champion in the cause of global nuclear disarmament and not just aspire to be a retrograde nuclear weapon bully. India's nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. It has not violated any international agreements, either in 1974 or 1998. This restraint has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or hesitancy. Restraint is valid only when it removes doubts, which is precisely what India's tests did. Here, the role of various forms of diplomacy assume greater significance to address nuclear issues. The action involved was balanced minimum necessary to maintain an irreducible component of the country's national security calculus. After the tests, India stated that it will henceforth observe voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. It has also indicated a willingness to move toward a de jure formalization of this declaration. The government's official line is that India aims to acquire a "credible minimum deterrent".

While explaining India's diplomacy on weapons of mass destruction, the contours of Washington's South Asian policy and its dimension is highly pertinent. Since the Pokhran-II in 1998 reflected the total eight round of negotiations between American Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh on multiple issues giving major thrust on nuclear diplomacy. The American perspective on

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this diplomatic process reveals that the United States has long-standing, enduring and broad gauge interests in South Asian region. Since the May 1998 tests, America have heard from many Indians and Pakistanis the notion that the tests will usher in an extended period of nuclear stability in South Asia, comparable to the one that preserved the peace between the US and USSR for a half a century. The US and the Soviet Union had more than one narrow escape. India and Pakistan have even less margin for error than the US and USSR did over Cuba and Berlin, if only for geographical reasons, since no ocean separates them. The goals outlined by the US and India are intended to suggest to both India and Pakistan are a path away from the nuclear brinkmanship and toward a more stable and secure world. Two principles have guided the American side to this effort. First, America remains committed to the common position articulated by the UN Security Council, the G-8 and others, notably on their shared long-range goal of universal adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). This is a crucial immutable guideline for American policy not least because otherwise, America would break faith with the states that foresaw a capability they could have acquired.

America's second principle applies to the near and medium term, and to practice of diplomacy as art of the possible. American president Mr. Bill Jefferson Clinton's trip to India on 21 March 2000 after a gap of 22 years paved the way for the softening of attitudes on strategic issues. It laid the groundwork of the subsequent series of agreements. India and the US have indeed opened a new chapter in the bilateral relationship with text of "vision statement" titled "India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century", signed by the US President, Bill Clinton and the Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, which calls for resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between India and the United States. The statement further states that, "We reaffirm our respective voluntary commitment to forgo further nuclear explosive tests. We will work together and with others for an early commencement of negotiations on a treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. We have both shown strong commitment to export controls, and will continue to strengthen them. We will work together to prevent the spread of dangerous technologies. We are committed


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to build confidence and reduce the chances of miscalculation. We will pursue our security needs in a restrained and responsible manner and will not engage in nuclear and missile arms race. We will seek to narrow our differences and increase mutual understanding on non-proliferation and security issues. This will help us to realize the full potential of Indo-US relations and contribute significantly to regional and global security". Hence, the way of substance and atmospherics is evident to forge a new dimension between two countries -- India and the US -- the world’s two largest democracies towards the efficacy of the proposed FMCT. India believes that FMCT is an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process. It would also go a long way in arresting problems legal transfers of nuclear material. In all excitement of acquiring a nuclear deterrent, India must not forget that in the ultimate analysis, its interests and principles will be furthered only through global disarmament. This assumes even greater significance now.

In summation, India can, and does, draw immense and considerable satisfaction from particular and significant international developments beyond the international arena. India attempted over the years to present the consistent and rational concerns as regards weapons of mass destruction negotiations at various forums. In the absence of a clear-cut strategic doctrine, domestic scientific and technological capabilities and bureaucratic pressures are likely to drive India’s weapons of mass destruction programme. Hence, the political leadership and most sections of India’s strategic community have eschewed any interest in developing a second-strike capability and they argued a "minimum deterrent" would constitute a sufficient deterrent. And such a deterrent should suffice against potential Chinese and Pakistani threats and contribute to stability in the region. It is necessary for India to formulate its own unique, strategic doctrine in bringing the weapons of mass destruction ban negotiations to a more realistic perspective in contrast to the earlier normative mode in the past.