CONCLUSION

Today's international system, regime and world order are based on power structure. This would remain fluid and includes key actors and problems are linked to multilateral diplomacy. It is not instructive to know that the power structure alone have major impact on modern diplomacy and foreign policy. Even very powerful states can no longer unilaterally define the issues and decide the terms of settlement within the regions of which they are a part. While addressing the major issue in this thesis, i.e., the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), much more effective multilateral negotiation and intensive coalition-building are required. As a result, issues that are subject to bargaining are growing both in number and in complexity. The colour and complexion of the threats and challenges of the Cold War era have drastically been changed. Since the end of the Cold War, the US-led unilateral diplomacy shape the world power distribution. Multilateral diplomacy has not lost its momentum and rigour for the WMD talks at times. In the period of East-West tension, the former Soviet Union played the role of troublemaker, prolonging regional conflicts and funding the destabilizing activities of pariah states. The absence now of such a powerful actor reinforces the growing consensus among all but the most extreme partisans of these conflicts that they should be settled.  

It is pertinent to quote Rudyard Kipling while mentioning the WMD issue at large and India's diplomacy on WMD in particular. Rudyard Kipling's much-quoted aphorism, "Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet", underscored his conviction that a civilizational chasm divided the Orient from the Occident, and a similar gulf characterizes differences between developing and developed countries. These generalizations are of limited applicability to India, however, since India does not conform to the stereotype of a developing country. India lies astride the developed and developing worlds. India's achievements in advanced technologies such as atomic energy, space research, aero space, information systems software and biotechnology underlie its approaches to global issues such as environmental problems, economic

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liberalization and globalization; last but not the least, disarmament. India’s pursuit of a non-aligned foreign policy after independence was designed to further its national self-interest. Non-alignment has embarked upon India to balance its foreign policy between the Eastern and Western blocs and has shaped its stands in international issues. The Western nations are generally concerned with the threat from WMD. More recently, the focus has shifted from nuclear weapons to the prospect of fissile materials leaking out of the former Soviet Republics and to the threat of chemical and biological weapons.

The three most compelling and major international events of the twentieth century paved the way for the benchmark for the most of analyses. They are: The World War II; the disintegration of Soviet Union (end of the Cold War); the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its emergence as the most powerful economic institution in the world. While pointing out the world war scenario, the international community further realized the establishment of international organization i.e., the United Nations (UN) to keep international peace and security. Under the UN auspices, the CWC successfully negotiated to prevent the chemical armament and proliferation. The UN system reflects power relations and suffered from deteriorating relations among major powers. This has left the UN to face complexities arising from the proliferation of WMD. Both developed and developing countries’ steady proliferation of weapons and weapons technology, its impact, arms flows can have on particular conflicts. These have been tested in different chapters. There are correlations between proliferation and conflicts. At stages during the Cold War, the common interest of the Super Powers to avoid nuclear conflict were strong enough to moderate hostile behaviour and create, through dialogue and confidence-building measures, some level of trust. Nothing of the like exists among the new proliferators and some of their neighbours. The world must now contemplate new and dangerous patterns of behaviour. The risks of cataclysmic war between major powers have subsided, but those of regional aggression with weapons of mass destruction have increased. Non-proliferation and disarmament

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treaties have been used as smoke-screen for clandestine weapon programs. Concerns over WMD programs in North Korea and Iraq, in two unstable regions, have proved strikingly difficult to resolve, either through cooperation or pressure.

The impact of globalization and liberalization, the liberal democracy paved the way for more engagement and mutual cooperation among individual countries. The emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) allowed more free trade and to some extent liberalization of multilateral trading system. The largest supply of arms flows across the border came into picture. Terrorism using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons has been possible for some time, but serious policymakers have traditionally seen other threats as more pressing. This perception has been changing since the early 1990s. The possibility of WMD terrorism may still be relatively high, but the probability relatively low, but it is growing with the ability of sub-state terrorist groups to master the technical challenges of developing and using these weapons, and their growing access to the very significant monies obtained from the traffic in illicit drugs. National controls on weapons-grade fissile materials were tight during the Cold War; now it is increasingly possible that non-state actors might obtain them. The prospect of WMD terrorism is particularly attaining because it would be hard to prevent and the perpetrators hard to identify.

The effects of WMD terrorism could be so severe that it must be regarded as a serious security challenge for the coming decades. Trends in political violence and a propensity toward inflicting mass casualties appear to be rising in recent years. Chemical weapons have already been used against civilian populations in internal conflicts, setting a dangerous precedent, especially when civilian casualties and displacement are war aims in some ethno-nationalist conflicts. There are mechanisms by which terrorists could disperse various types of nuclear, biological and chemical agents. Preparing for a WMD attack should consist of emergency preparedness plan, training, emergency practice drills. It should also consist alarm systems, air purification systems, water purification systems, personnel protective equipment, first aid kits, communication devices, emergency lighting, emergency food supplies, and screening instruments. An

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emergency preparation plan defines roles and responsibilities where to go, what to do, and who is in charge when an emergency situation arises. The proper execution of plans should the need of the hour. Warning devices may be used to identify potential hazards from a terrorist attack or to warn of an emergency situation. Hence, the national security component of WMD and diplomacy and its interlinkages are crucial while preserving international peace and security.

India’s diplomacy on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a product of its political, economic and strategic environment and its national security perceptions. It is equally a product of its unique historical experiences that have determined its fundamental world view. India’s nuclear diplomacy reflected deeply held views on global issues adopted by India over the decades. This approach also reflected a genuine fear of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Moreover, the concept of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" consolidates nuclear, biological and chemical weapons into one category because despite differences in their effects and use, they share enormous lethality and symbolism. The Weapons of Mass Destruction is an open-ended concept, potentially allowing for the development of other technologies of mass destruction. "Mass Destruction" is a relative term. A single WMD can cause enormous damage equivalent to that of hundreds of thousands of conventional high explosive or incendiary weapons. Hence, the WMD severely complicate calculations of aggregate military capabilities, while their great potential destructiveness, it is often argued, makes their control more pressing.

The programme of general and complete disarmament (GCD) extended the scope of earlier disarmament proposals on the regulation and reduction of all armaments. A great deal of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly accepted the GCD as the objective in disarmament negotiations. The one arms control agreement that has worked effectively for almost six decades is being dealt many critical issues pertaining to the disarmament i.e., the 1925 Geneva Protocol. There is no doubt that the 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of chemical weapons, but not the possession of chemical weapons. As always, India called for the halting the arms race and making progress in

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6 Ibid., p.143.
7 For a detailed discussion, see Arundhati Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India’s Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament", Journal of International Affairs, vol.51, no.1 (Summer 1997), pp.239-61.
the direction of WMD disarmament invariably shows that the support of general and complete disarmament. India called for early resumption of negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Disarmament virtually affected the security interests of all nations, and obviously it would not be easy to reach agreements. It requires careful, detailed, patient and result-oriented negotiations. India favoured a speedy accomplishment of disarmament. In the absence of a time-limit, the disarmament talks might drag for years.

India’s diplomacy on weapons of mass destruction have been a major step in the field of arms control and disarmament. It is reflected in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. India held the view that the NPT is essentially a non-armament measure and does not in any way curb galloping vertical proliferation. The attempt to curb the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in no way alters or curbs the hegemony of major nuclear powers and it is vertical proliferation which continues to menace the security of mankind. In defence of this situation, it has been said that radical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament are not possible unless they are carried out by all nuclear powers and not by only some of them. India has been in favour of peaceful uses of nuclear energy which, in the ultimate analysis, being a frontier technology, treated as a common heritage of mankind because of its immense potential to improve the quality of man’s life. And in case of the CTBT negotiations, India made its position clear that India’s decision towards nuclear disarmament was based on its traditional approach to nuclear disarmament and its national security concerns. India demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1974 but given its early moral abhorrence of these weapons and had unilaterally refrain from weaponisation. India called for a transparent, and good faith negotiations to meet all concerns. When it comes to the FMCT, India maintained that the security objectives in the short and long term have to be clearly formulated, and the steps to achieve them with its own capabilities to a greater extent than before identified and implemented.

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India would participate constructively in negotiations for a non-discriminatory, multilateral and international and effectively verifiable treaty banning future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The significance of the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention emerges from the fact that this was the first multilateral treaty designed to tackle one category of WMDs. But it was designed during the Cold War period and therefore failed to receive the recognition that it should have for incorporating elements that would eventually become fundamental to all subsequent treaties relating to WMDs. The BTWC, as an arms control measure, is designed to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons. A major lacuna in the BTWC, is the absence of provisions for verification of its compliance, although efforts have been on since 19094 to negotiate a Protocol that would enable its verification. India has signed and ratified the BTWC and has fulfilled its Convention obligations. The traditional Indian position in all international treaties is that they should be non-discriminatory, and that this should be ensured in the BTWC. Besides, India also maintains that the BTWC Protocol should not hinder scientific research, industrial development and economic cooperation. On the compliance provisions in the Protocol, India maintains that they should be formulated and implemented in a manner that protects sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security concerns. Indian analysts believe that this emphasis on protection of proprietary information is designed to make the Protocol non-discriminatory; hence the industrialized State Parties have emphasized this provision. India and the US are parties to the BTWC, and the commonalities of their approach toward supporting it have been highlighted as a shared concern for working toward general and complete disarmament.

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11 Ibid.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction of 1993 is the product of the latest expression of ancient sentiment widespread throughout many cultures the fighting with poison is somehow reprehensible, immoral and wrong. This social norm had previously found its fullest expression in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits chemical and biological methods of warfare. The CWC is a global treaty that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Under this convention, each State Party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to: develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; use chemical weapons; engage in any military preparation to use chemical weapons; and assist, encourage or induce, in any way, any one to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention. In addition, each State Party undertakes to: destroy the chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control; destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party; and destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.13 These are the core components of the CWC.

Being a State Party to the CWC, India fulfilled its all obligations as envisaged in the CWC. India has viewed that the chemical and biological warfare was fraught with dangerous consequences India was in favour of complete elimination of chemical weapons throughout the chemical talks. India considered the regulation of armaments as a desirable objective but never prepared to accept it as an end in itself. It is obvious pertaining to the CWC negotiations. One of the principal aims of the United Nations is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, could be achieved only by concluding an agreement on general and complete disarmament. India tried to impress upon other countries that they should not lose sight of the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. General and complete disarmament alone could provide an effective answer to the problems faced by the arms race. Moreover, disarmament was at the very root of the principles and purposes of the United Nations. It is evident in the Preamble of the CWC with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The CWC is the first multilateral treaty designed to destroy an entire class of weapons of mass destruction with the most comprehensive verification system yet designed for a multilateral disarmament treaty. The verification component is significant because during chemical disarmament negotiations, India called for a combination of national and international means of verification. During the CWC negotiations, India initially sought to balance the CWC’s transparency and confidentiality provisions but eventually accepted its high intrusive verification provisions because they constituted a universal nonproliferation and disarmament regime. India believed that by agreeing to the unique disarmament treaty -- the CWC, the international community confirms its serious commitment to laying down the foundations of a new global security framework that is based on goodwill, understanding and cooperation.\textsuperscript{14} This is consistent with India’s position in favour of the elimination of all WMD on the basis of multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory agreements which provide for equal rights and obligations of all parties involved.

As the part of implementation measures, India enacted legislation on Chemical Weapons Convention implementation, India has established the National Authority for the effective implementation of the CWC. The National Authority is to fulfil [the State Party’s] obligations under the CWC” and "to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the organization and other State Parties. The National Authorities are therefore responsible for monitoring compliance with each of the obligations that their states have assumed, including those where the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Secretariat has no-treaty-assigned role. This might surprise those national authorities that have not yet managed to collate and submit to the Secretariat the information required by Articles III and VI. In many ways, the National Authorities are the guardians of the regime of national monitoring.

The CWC was a first in itself for many reasons. More than twentyfour years of bilateral and multilateral effort, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) sent the Convention the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for its acceptance. The CWC proposed a truly non-discriminatory treaty with universal application. It also sought to develop a verification activities conducted at multilateral level by the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), or developed bilaterally under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaties. The organizational structure -- the OPCW also give uniqueness to the CWC. The OPCW is the body which oversees the implementation of the CWC. Another unique aspect of the CWC relates the role and participation of chemical industry in arms control. Other unique factors which, shape the CWC as a model Convention pertain to verification mechanism, treaty compliance, use and sharing of intelligence, and the flexibility of the Treaty itself.

Maintaining and reinforcing the WMD non-proliferation regimes is vital to global peace and security. Despite increased membership, key states remain outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Implementation measures have strengthened verification of the CWC, and the BWC verification protocol remains distant. Compliance challenges generate increasing concern, and there is no accepted multilateral processes for assessing and enforcing compliance, despite an array of non-proliferation norms, treaties and institutions. Political issues also divide the parties, including the pace of disarmament, commitments to peaceful cooperation, and the specific regional challenges of implementing a Middle East zone free of WMD and missiles.

National security component is one of the essential prerequisites for this study because of its sensitive, encompassing, political nature relating to preservation of peace under the CWC. Moreover, the CWC is a security agreement. National security can be conceived of as the preservation of core values and vital interests critical to the nation-state from external and internal challenges and threats. Although we distinguish between the external and internal, in fact the two spheres are closely related. The political, economic, social and military spheres are mutually dependent. Conventional wisdom has tended to treat national security and national defence as synonymous, but whereas defence is primarily concerned with military preparedness to combat external threats, national security covers a much broader spectrum of challenges, threats and responses. The greatest global challenge facing the international community is individual countries' national security.

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India is an original party to the CWC and the BWC, in keeping our commitment to comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory approaches to disarmament.\textsuperscript{16} The objective of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is to arrive at a non-discriminatory treaty that will end the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes, in accordance with the 1993 consensus resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). India was willing to work for the early conclusion of such a treaty.\textsuperscript{17} It does not instruct India’s research and development (R&D) programmes nor does it jeopardize in any manner the safety and effectiveness of India’s nuclear deterrent in the years to come.

The May 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan have significantly changed the global non-proliferation and disarmament picture. Their message runs counter to wide expectations and hopes that the end of the Cold War would make nuclear weapons relics of the past. Instead, the tests signal that nuclear weapons could be a growing part of the strategic landscape of the future. They raised doubts about the extent to which nuclear weapons were linked only to the singular historical circumstances of the Cold War. They also pose a fundamental problem for the regime based on the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by creating two states with demonstrated nuclear weapon capabilities but no recognized status. Achieving NPT universality under these circumstances is extremely difficult. Many countries that acceded to the NPT assuming there would be only five nuclear-weapons states (NWS) resent India’s and Pakistan’s tests as a challenge to their own policies of restraint. These tests, as well as complementary missile flight tests, greatly increase nuclear dangers in an area where for major conflicts between India and Pakistan, and one between India and China have been fought since 1947. A capacity for mutual destruction does not ensure restraint. We should learn experience from it and there should have a strategic thought and culture. In essence, India lacks a strategic culture.

On 4th January 2003, the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) came into being. The NCA consists of a two-layered structure, it is responsible for the management of its weapons. The NCA comprises a Political Council and an Executive Council. The


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p.204.
Political Council was chaired by the Prime Minister, and "is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons", whereas the Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister and it provides inputs for decision-making by the NCA and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council. During that time, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved the appointment of a "Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command", who would be responsible for the administration of the nuclear forces. Taken together, these administrative arrangements from the crucial link between the civilian and military leadership on nuclear decisions and their execution. The CCS is responsible to review progress in implementing India's nuclear doctrine, the state of readiness of its strategic forces and the procedures for their command and control. The main highlights of the CCS meeting in the first week of January, 2003 were building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; a posture of "no-first use"; retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the civilian political leadership through the NCA; non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states; in the event of a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons; a continuance of controls on export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in the FMCT negotiations; and observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.

While India has consciously chosen not to use nuclear weapons first, it warned potential adversaries that the nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. It also emphasized strict control over the export of sensitive technologies and materials, readiness to join multilateral arms control agreements, continued observance of the moratorium on tests and a commitment to global disarmament. This broad framework was affirmed in the draft nuclear doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) set up after the May 1998 tests. The draft doctrine was released by the NSAB in August 1999. With the CCS announcement more than four-and-a-half years after declaring itself a nuclear-weapons power made public a set of political principles and administrative arrangements to manage its arsenal of atomic weapons confirmed the essence of that draft as official policy. The only new element in the doctrine is the interesting caveat it has introduced to its "No-first-use" posture. India said its arsenal aimed to deter threats not just from nuclear weapons, but also those from chemical and biological weapons. The US has
retained a similar option to prevent nations with chemical and biological weapons from assuming that the use of these WMD will not invite a nuclear response. The CCS, however, does not tell all. Missing from its statement is the actual composition of the NCA at its Political and Executive levels. The Government also mentions that it has "reviewed and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities". This is a reference to a situation in which the Prime Minister may be incapacitated during a crisis. But the CCS did not reveal how the power to press the nuclear button will move down the political chain in the event of such a contingency.

The creation of a NCA brings into effect a longstanding requirement. It formalizes what was essentially a set of unstructured arrangements among senior members of the politico-military-scientific establishment. Nuclear weapons place severe limits on the possessor's ability to wage war with a nuclear adversary. This implication was apparently lost sight of during the war deployment of 2002. Assessments on the Government's ability to cope with a nuclear decision after a nuclear or biological or chemical strike has taken place on India or Indian assets would, therefore, remain uncertain at best. There would continue to be doubts on the nuclear force structure which the NCA envisages. There are no indications on what shape this would have or on its interfaces with the three defence forces. A Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is to be established under a separate Commander-in-Chief. The defence services have already worked the tri-service Command in the Andaman and Nicobar. Where would the SFC fit in? Will it be under the Prime Minister or the NSA or the Chiefs of Staff Committee? Will SFC have its own forces or will its strategic regiments and squadron remain under respective service headquarters as they are now? Will the SFC build, train and sustain its own corpus of leadership and human resources? In other words, will the SFC be a special entity, as it ought to be, or will it need to hang on the apron strings of the three services. These issues are unlikely to be resolved until a Chief of Defence Staff is appointed and given the authority over the service chiefs to make the SRC truly

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operative. The NCA has left this unexplained. The far from effective precedents of the National Security Council (NSC), its Security Advisory Board (SAB) and the handling of major security crises during the last four years are examples of the ad hoc functioning of the national security apparatus.

The first meeting of the NCA in the first week of September 2003 has decided to develop India's weapons programme further. The supreme decision-making body for the development, management and authorized use of nuclear weapons, the creation of a body like NCA, which is to lay down such rules, does not guarantee that fail-safe procedures will be in place, but the absence of such procedures certainly increases the risk of nuclear brinkmanship going out of control. Yet it took the Government almost five years after the Pokharan-II tests in May 1998 to establish the NCA and it has taken another eight months for the NCA to hold its first meeting. Such a casual attitude towards the establishment and working of the NCA does not provide public comfort that there are adequate safeguards in place for the management of Indian nuclear arms.

First, the formulation of clear principles and rules for the management of a nuclear arms programme is necessary to contain the likelihood of unauthorized use of these weapons. Secondly, the NCA meeting has revealed that there continue to be many major gaps in the systems for control of India's nuclear weapons. An appropriate "command-and-control" system that specifies the rules for operation and has the necessary technology for management of these weapons is an essential element of a nuclear weapons programme. An "indication-and-warning" system is also necessary to provide correct intelligence and information during a period of military tension. Neither system is in place in India. This raises the possibility of a breakdown during a crisis in the lines of management of the arsenal, with unimaginable consequences for the country. Thirdly, the NCA has decided to expand India's delivery system for carrying nuclear bombs.

If reports in a section of the media are correct, the Government has decided to induct a leased nuclear-powered submarine, is considering acquisition of new long-range bombers, and is accelerating development of the Agni medium-range missiles. All of

20 Ibid.

21 "Nuclear Escalation", The Hindu (New Delhi), 4 September 2003, p.10.
them will be part of India's nuclear triad force. The direction that the delivery system programme is taking is not surprising; the composition of the triad was suggested in the draft nuclear doctrine formulated in 1999. But the confirmation of the shape of the nuclear triad opens the door to an extremely expensive and possibly open-ended weapons programme that the country can ill afford to carry out. In the more than five years since India and Pakistan, in that order, declared themselves nuclear weapon states, there has been no evidence that the acquisition of nuclear arms has strengthened security in South Asia. On the contrary, in the nuclear weapons era the two countries have fought one undeclared war (Kargil in 1999) and have come close to war on two subsequent occasions, in December 2001 (following the terrorist attack on Parliament) and in May 2002 (after the killings in an army camp near Jammu). On each occasion, there was a heated exchange of words on the use of nuclear weapons. This game of brinkmanship could have spiralled into a nuclear holocaust in South Asia. India and Pakistan have provided proof, if it were needed, that the so-called theory of nuclear deterrence does not contribute to peace between countries. Yet there is no sign that either country is willing to reconsider its decision to become a nuclear weapon state. The dangerous path of acquiring and assembling WMD will bring greater insecurity, not peace, to South Asia.

Further understanding of the CWC and national security involve ensuring integrity of national territory and its institutions, that it is condition in which the nation is secured from military attack and political and economic coercion and that it is a state of mind of assured safety from all threats -- all generated by a sound national security set-up and policies.\(^{22}\) Obviously then national security as the means of the survival of the state would require both a process of strategic thought and policy-making -- institutionalized and operating in a broad framework -- towards attainment of the end goal. Although in Indian context, the national security apparatus, strategic thought and policy-making are not full-fledged, there is a strategic culture evolves toward WMD and security issues. Take for instance the US -- the United States can be credited both the conceptualizing of the national security apparatus in terms of strategic thought, strategic choices and mechanisms needed to logically and sequentially analyze the national security

\(^{22}\) For a detailed discussion, see Dr. Subhash Kapila, *India's Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis* (New Delhi: SIMSID Books India, 2002), pp.69-87.
requirements. This was prompted by the nations' experiences of two World Wars and on conclusion of the latter, its expanded security commitments. This is also resulted in a vast range of literature on the subject by American intellectuals specializing in strategic thinking and warfare. The United States can also be credited with being the first country to legislate the existence of the national security apparatus, namely, the National Security Council Act of 1947. In India, we do have immense potential to develop a strategic culture with a long-term perspective. There have been positive developments in this direction.

It is, therefore, natural to think on the subject of national security and what does the whole process involve. They should involve national interests, national objectives, national security strategy and national military strategy. In the Indian context, after the analysis of whole chapters, one of the major findings, these aspects need far greater amplification as they hardly figure in India's strategic calculus or discussions and furthermore even after fifty years of independence, these have yet to be spelt out, in any Indian official document. It is national interests when enunciated, determine the national objectives and from which then emerges grand strategy. National interests are the most important wants and needs of a nation.\textsuperscript{23} Obvious from this would be the fact that since national interests define the basic needs of a nation, they are non-negotiable. Survival of the nation as a free and independent nation with its constitutional system and value systems intact would represent the overriding national interest for any country. National honour is fundamental to survival and in the Indian context needs to be sharply recognized for as a nation state. In case of the CWC, India's diplomacy proceeded in good and result-oriented direction since the CWC entered into force. At the same time, India lacks technical expertise in disarmament diplomacy. This is quite evident in India's CWC implementation measures. It has been growingly realized in advanced countries that military setbacks in the past have resulted from faulty decision-making in matters of national security. The military mistakes of the part of the national/domestic level were not because of faulty or inadequate information, but mostly due to lack of or the absence of institutionalized decision-making structures as part of the national security management process. The 1962 Chinese attack is a case in point.

\footnote{23 See, John M. Cullins, \textit{Grand Strategy} (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1974), pp.1-3.}
The complexity of modern warfare which impinges virtually on every aspect of national existence calls for coordination of the national security effort on a very wide scale.

The debate about the nature of national security encompasses and covers every area. Throughout the Cold War, national security has been equated with military strength and well-being, a view that spread to many of the newly independent countries in the post-colonial era. Nothing has substantially been changed, except few countries' political independence. This has legitimized weapons as instruments of security and, generally, has enshrined deterrence as the purpose of military power, and the most destructive weapons as the most important elements of security. With the emergence in the 1960s and 1970s of mutual assured destruction between the two Super Powers, their military assets have been steadily devalued and arms control measures have earned growing respect as sources of security. No such trend has been in evidence in other regions of conflict, however. Yet the CWC will force states of the developing world to make choices about weapons and the purposes to which the military instrument is put. States opting to maintain a CW program will be called upon to justify their activities and to defend the strategic purpose for which the weapons are intended. This requirement will help expose states acquiring weapons for reasons not accepted as legitimate by the international community, and increase the likelihood that they will be subject to international pressure (this expectation should have a deterrent function). It may also encourage some states that have been bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction to come to appreciate that the risks and costs outweigh the benefits, at least relative to politically sustainable needs. Thus may open the door to regional arms control measures; such measures could take many forms, ranging from informal confidence building measures to force structuring agreements. The diplomacy leading up to the 1995 decision about extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) may be critical in this regard, forcing states to confront not the abstract issues of nuclear disarmament but the concrete questions of weapons and national security.

The CWC will also compel states of the developed world to acknowledge the sometimes quite different security perceptions of states of the developing world. States of the South whose security needs are accepted as legitimate by the North may find themselves the recipients of more concerted support, perhaps in the guise of collective security actions, at least as a last resort. The existence of the CWC will make it impossible, however,
for states acceding to its terms to deem legitimate any CW programs by other states, whether or not the need during them is perceived to be legitimate. This circumstance will place new obligations on the international community to help defend those interests simply for the purpose of preventing the introduction of chemical weapons.

At the broad conceptual level, the Indian and US positions in relation to the CWC and the Biological Toxins weapons Convention (BTWC) appear to converge. In the past few years, as efforts to initiate a strategic dialogue have gotten under way, the similarity of perceptions on the CWC and BTWC has been highlighted as part of the existing common ground upon which the edifice of a stronger security relationship can be built. This tendency has been greater amplification in the post-Pokharan period as well, largely on account of the differences that emerged on the nuclear front. As the ground underneath the evolving relationship started breaking, the CWC and the BTWC approaches have been used as short-term glues to keep the bilateral strategic dialogue going. But prospects for cooperation between the two countries within the ambit of the CWC and the BTWC will continue to remain limited until broad agreements can be reached over the thorny issues of technology transfer and verification. In the CWC, with operationalization of the Convention, the relative importance of differing goals espoused by the two countries may well become more apparent. The United States is likely to insist on going slow in fulfilling obligations and commitments provided under Article XI. On the other hand, the United States will attempt to highlight that the CWC, because it has become a model agreement, must retain its non-proliferation character, to ensure that future security-related treaties become as secure the CWC. Such an approach, apart from stressing the verification aspects of the Convention, will also strive for the retention of the Australia Group and other controls on exports of dual-use technologies, equipment, and materials.


25 Article XI of the CWC deals with "Economic and Technological Development" under the CWC. Under this, the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention (Article XI of the CWC, para 1). This "must-carry" clause is vital while dealing with national implementation measures under the CWC.
This will contrast with the Indian stand that the CWC given its model disarmament character, needs to be a judicious blend of non-proliferation and Confidence-Building-Measures (CBMs). This can be done by the implementation of Article XI, which would make other countries accept similar treaties to rid the world of all WMD. Such a position is presaged on the dismantling of all export-control-related restrictions external to the CWC including the Australia Group. As pointed out earlier the Australia Group (AG) is a group of thirty developed states, formed in 1985, which meets informally each year to monitor the proliferation of chemical and biological products and to discuss chemical and biological weapon-related items which should be subject to national regulatory measures/export controls. And in the BTWC context, a similar difficulty will be encountered on the verification protocol presently under negotiation. At the very root of such differences is the contrasting world vision that both countries such as the US and India hold about weapons of mass destruction and the relevance they have to national security.

Efforts to combat proliferation have to overcome impediments that range from uncooperative state behaviour to newer and larger number of actors, chemical and biological weapons. The challenge include: the dual-use nature of materials and equipment for manufacturing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; the lack of political will in some states to deal with proliferation issues; a continuing effort by non-state actors to produce WMD; the complex nature of multilateral negotiations. Current non-proliferation treaties like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the BTWC have inherent shortcomings. The NPT has been unable to prevent horizontal proliferation and is unable to accommodate the three newly-emerged nuclear states -- India, Israel and Pakistan in its treaty obligations. But the NPT norms are of practical significance in the present circumstance. The past decades witnessed the conclusion of NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and other international arms control treaties, the establishment of international non-proliferation mechanisms including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Zangger Committee* and

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* Established in 1971, the Nuclear Exporters Committee, called the Zanggar Committee after its first Chairman, is a group of nuclear supplier countries that meets informally twice a year to coordinate export controls on nuclear materials.
Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG),** and the institution of national non-proliferation legislation and export controls which are similar across countries. The international norms aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation formed and developing on that busy have prayed an important role. Reflecting global consensus and establishing standards and methods, these norms have effectively contained proliferation of nuclear weapons and significantly contributed to international peace and security, thus winning extensive international support. In recent years, the international nuclear non-proliferation norms have been further strengthened. The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) produced the Additional Protocol*** in strengthening the safeguards system and is now amending the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. What is needed is to strengthen the arms control regime to arrest proliferation of WMD and it should further enhance the effectiveness of the relevant international regime in the days of rapid scientific and technological advances and rising threat of WMD terrorism.

The BTWC lacks an effective Verification Protocol. This is being negotiated in the Ad Hoc Group, but serious issues remain, like: (a) the degree to which verification measures can detect a military programme and yet remain non-intrusive regarding industrial applications of dual-use items; (b) how to strike a balance between the Article III obligation of not assisting proliferation and the Article X obligation of promoting peaceful use and exchange of technologies. Achieving a strengthened Verification Protocol requires that all States Parties adjudge for themselves the benefits that would accrue from it. An effective review conference, combined with an effective Protocol, will ensure the setting up of international norms against the use of disease as a weapon of war against human beings, animals and plants. The Fifth Review Conference provides a final opportunity to significantly strengthen the regime for the total

** Also known as the London Club and established in 1975, the NSG coordinates multilateral export controls on nuclear materials. In 1977 it agreed the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (London Guidelines, subsequently revised), which contain a 'trigger list' of materials that should trigger IAEA safeguards when exported for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear weapon state. In 1992 the NSG agreed the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology (Warsaw Guidelines, subsequently revised).

*** The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well or additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. (Source: <http://www.iaea.org>, accessed on 18 September 2003).
prohibition and elimination of biological and toxin weapons. India continues to emphasize "there are only limited issues that need to be "fixed" and the "fix" can be found within the overall framework and thrust of the Composite Text". India has made meaningful contributions to the ongoing negotiations on the BTWC Protocol, but it will have to address these issues. South Asia is a breeding ground for some of the most dangerous non-state actors. Its counter-terrorism capabilities must encompass prevention, deterrence and management, so that BWs do not become a new mode of violence by non-state actors.

It must be remembered that the CWC and the BTWC were negotiated in a phase when India remained a nuclear-weapon-capable country. With Pokharan II, the situation has altered immeasurably. The United States is likely to find it difficult to accord a de jure nuclear-weapons status to India, but in negotiations there will be greater appreciation of India's security concerns, which in part prompted the 1998 nuclear tests. In the context of current negotiations between India and the US, it would be reasonable to assume that realistic bargains are being started. There is a talk of India signing the CTBT in its present form, and in return the US would accept, tacitly, a minimal deterrent force by India. Another complementary deal is to remove ad hoc export control restrictions on India in return for allowing civilian nuclear power plants to develop through the "islanding" concept. However, the differences in the CWC and the BTWC will fall by the wayside if an acceptable compromise or reconciliation can be agreed upon. Rather than the CWC and the BTWC becoming the catalysts for bringing about an understanding on the nuclear question, it would require tackling the nuclear question in an acceptable manner, one that will ensure that Indo-US strategic relations are based on a sense of realism. In one sense bilateral negotiations, unilateral actions and gestures are result-oriented.

To draft a successful international treaty to ban chemical weapons, negotiators must possess both skill at international diplomacy and knowledge of the international chemical industry. During implementation stages of the CWC, the chemical industry will receive much attention in future. During the CWC negotiations, very few government officials,

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26 Statement by Ambassador Rakesh Sood at the twenty-fourth Session of Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 25 July 2001, Geneva. This Statement is significant as it comes a day after the US announced that it could not support the draft Protocol.
regardless of their country, commitment, or skills, had more than a superficial knowledge of the industry. Thus, in 1978, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) requested that the American chemical industry, through the offices of the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), assist the various US government agencies involved in the negotiations. Recognizing the importance of chemical weapons ban, the board of directors of CMA immediately established a policy of cooperation with and assistance to the US government which continues to this day. The CMA’s board of directors set up a working group to address the chemical weapons issue. The US chemical industry has also established relationships with various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Pugwash group, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Quakers, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). These relationships have been very productive. For example, NGOs have been able to bring key government and industry officials together in a forum where candid dialogue has occurred on major technical and operational issues.

At the invitation of Western governments, the chemical industry has also participated in special sessions of the Conference on Disarmament. Through such participation, the US industry has clearly demonstrated to the international community that it is committed to a treaty and willing to provide valuable support. Furthermore, the industry’s productive cooperation with government at these sessions has inspired several Conference on Disarmament officials to establish effective communications with their domestic chemical industries. It has also lead to cooperation between the four chemical industry trade associations which now meet routinely to discuss the CWC: the European Chemical Industry Trade Association (CEFIC); the Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association (CCPA); the Japanese Chemical Industry Association (JCIA); and the Chemical Confederation of Australia (CCA). By pooling their knowledge and experience, these chemical trade organizations have enabled industry worldwide to respond to issues in a more balanced way. By working cooperatively, the Western chemical industry has also been able to use its resources more effectively; it has therefore been able to respond more rapidly to issues related to the treaty or to the Conference on Disarmament. Countries such as India, China, Brazil, South Africa and

* The CMA represents over 90 per cent of the chemical production in the United States.
Nigeria should realize the importance of international chemical industry in respect to CWC implementation measures at domestic level on should made effective diplomatic coalition. India was also represented in the meeting with the Chemical industry held in Geneva in June 1990 in the context of the CWC negotiations.

In September of 1989, a milestone in the industry-government relationship occurred when the Australian government sponsored an international government and industry conference against chemical weapons at Canberra. The Canberra conference is currently the leading example of government-industry communication and cooperation. The industry's position on the CWC was adopted at the close of this conference. This position clearly states the industry's commitment to obtaining a chemical weapons ban. There are many reasons why the chemical industry has chosen to support a treaty which will ban the development, production, storage and use of chemical weapons. Had it objected to or opposed such a treaty, the industry would have received negative publicity. Moreover, and more importantly, a treaty might have been produced without industry's support: One that would have been harmful not only to industry but also to the international community. And finally, if a viable treaty is not ratified, international trade will be restricted on a wide range of important dual-use chemicals; such restriction would create a less stable, less predictable industry environment. In such an unstable environment, developing countries would stand to suffer the greatest loss. To summarize, frequent discussions by phone, routine meetings, and exchange of written documents -- all these activities have promoted understanding, mutual respect, and an atmosphere of cooperation between government and industry. It was important to establish this constructive relationship well in advance of the time for decision-making among the various participants in the treaty process. The key point is: as far as the CWC is concerned nothing hinders selecting eradication of chemical weapons and prohibition of their use as the object and purpose of the Convention. Most of the Pertinent Preambular provisions point in that direction, as do the previously adopted General Assembly resolutions; even the title of the CWC makes it clear that the CWC is not about trade in chemicals, or economic development, but about banning chemical

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weapons altogether. In this respect, the principal debate of the CWC revolves around state as a main actor vis-a-vis the proliferation of the WMD as the main villain.

What factors do make the CWC unique from other disarmament treaties? The findings are related to as follows: The verification mechanisms, treaty compliance, the role of chemical industry in arms control, the flexibility of the treaty itself, and the effective organizational structure like the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). These features make or give the CWC one of the best model Conventions in respect to arms control and disarmament domain. Moreover, the CWC is the first ever universal, non-discriminatory and truly verifiable treaty to eliminate completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and to prevent their recurrence. Most of the States acceded to the Convention are politically committed to the principle of universal and comprehensive chemical weapons disarmament. The first Review Conference of the CWC is a case in point. No other international disarmament agreement has attracted such a wide level of support so early in its life. The Hague-based OPCW during the past years has conducted more than 500 on-site inspections in 30 countries. The OPCW inspectors have audited the inventories of declared chemical weapon sites, which totalled over 70,000 tonnes of chemical warfare agent and 8.4 million chemical munitions and containers and inspected over 60 former chemical weapons production facilities and confirmed that these sites have been closed for good. The OPCW has conducted inspections at relevant industrial sites and confirmed that these facilities are not involved in activities related to the production of chemical weapons. The ongoing destruction of chemical weapons at all locations presently active has been continuously monitored and their actual destruction certified by the OPCW. In the past five years, the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW has conducted a number of routine inspections at chemical weapon storage sites, former chemical weapons production facilities and other chemical industry plants in many States Parties to the Convention. India has also received inspections at different facilities and these have been conducted in a smooth manner.²⁶

Having declared possession of chemical weapons to the OPCW in 1997, India's destruction efforts, under OPCW inspection, have been proceeding according to the

destruction timelines established in the Convention, with the OPCW having duly taken note of the destruction plans. India has according to the timelines established in the Convention completed more than 20 per cent destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile by April 2002. Inordinate days in implementing key provisions of the Convention relating to international cooperation and assistance, along with a severe strain on the OPCW’s financial situation resulting from persistent underfunding, are matters of continuing concern for a number of member States, including India. These issues need to be addressed on a priority basis. India is an Original State Party to the CWC and continues to fully discharge the obligations assumed by it. The OPCW aims to achieve four principal objectives: the elimination of chemical weapons and the capacity to develop them, the verification of non-proliferation, international assistance and protection in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, and international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry.

The implication of the CWC relates to its effect on the tension between globalism and regionalism. The 1990s exhibit tendencies toward both. A more global world appears in the offering because of a globalizing economy, the breakdown of bipolarity, and the emergence of major global problems of the environment and demographics. As a globally oriented document, the CWC would be a natural complement to a more global agenda among diplomats. In recent times, in Asian context, there had been concerns in regard to the removal of war chemicals from China. Japan made it clear that it would act in accordance with the CWC so as to dispose of the dangerous chemical weapons as soon as possible. Many chemical agents such as mustard gas which was found at Qiqihar city in China’s Heilongjiang province, have leaked from some chemical weapons that the Japanese imperial army had abandoned there at the time of its defeat in World War II. Japan should address "the hidden peril" that had "chronically endangered the safety of the Chinese people" in this regard so that this danger could be uprooted. And Beijing would continue to advocate a good-neighbourly and friendly policy towards Tokyo. In this debate over globalism and regionalism, leadership by some major state or set of states could make a critical difference. If the United States

29 Ibid.

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does not assume the responsibility for providing or generating such leadership, the odds of sustaining a global approach decline.

The elimination of weapons of mass destruction as evidenced by the comprehensive nature of the Chemical Weapons Convention requires essentially three components. The first is the existence of an effective set of prevention and control mechanisms to ensure against the use of chemical agents in weapons or as a means to inflict harm or other people. The second is the establishment of an international implementation structure such as OPCW. The third is an effective enforcement scheme which relies on the modalities of international cooperation in criminal matters. A final implication relates to international norms. The CWC will reinforce the existing norm against the use of chemical weapons and establish a new norm against possession of them. Norms receive scant respect among foreign policy realists, who too often are ill-attuned to their relevance for real national interests. Norms are not all powerful, nor should they be dismissed. They have worked historically, although not always as intended. The just war doctrine has been very influential over time; so too has been the taboo-against the use of nuclear weapons.

While the first steps of the OPCW have on balance been remarkably successful, the last few years have not been problem free. Delays in the submission of declarations by a considerable number of States Parties, incomplete declarations, as well as differences in the interpretation of treaty provisions have lead to concerns about the equal application of the Convention in all States Parties. This has caused uncertainties and created pressure on the credibility and effectiveness of the verification regime -- a matter of considerable concern. The CWC verification regime needs an in-depth study and it assumes a key area in CWC implementation phases. During the CWC negotiations, India initially sought to balance the CWC's transparency and confidentiality provisions but eventually accepted its high intrusive verification provisions because they constituted a universal non-proliferation and disarmament regime. India recognized the need for transparency and effective national implementation of its obligations under the CWC. There is also the possibility of short-notice challenge inspections at declared as well as undeclared sites to resolve concerns of possible non-compliance. Allegations of any use, or threat of use, of chemical weapons can be investigated by the OPCW, and assistance will be provided to the
victims of any such chemical attack. In the field of peaceful uses of chemistry, the CWC contributes to fostered international cooperation and exchanges in information, chemicals, equipment and technologies.

Norms will grow more important in future. Strictly speaking, there can be no legal fix to the problem of advanced armaments proliferation and use; there can be only a political fix. Rapid industrialization and innovation and a globalizing trade in high technology goods, virtually all of which has potential military applications, have rendered impossible measures that effectively curtail access to the military capabilities based on these goods and technologies. Efforts to control weaponization and use must focus not just on the capability but also increasingly on the will to pursue these activities. Norms are relevant to this task in a number of ways. They help to narrow the number of problem cases by shaping the predisposition to weapons. This is not argue that norms can prevent ambitious and aggressive leaders from acquiring or using WMD; rather, they work over the long term to shape the milieu in which leaders garner support domestically and internationally. But norms are also relevant to the task of dealing with such leaders when poised to use such weapons, because they are the foundation of the consensus upon which collective action such as sanctions and UN military engagement are based. But norms will have this effect only if they are jointly elaborated.

The regime created by the CWC is unprecedented and time-honoured in many respects, but particularly in terms of the level of transparency it provides for its States Parties through the declarations on past as well as present activities and capabilities, and the international on-site verification in both military and commercial spheres. The OPCW inspections are conducted on a routine basis as the facilities declared under the treaty. Diplomacy remains, however, the institution by which states pursue their own particular interests. At the systemic level of diplomacy might well seek to maintain international order and peace. Yet that order is often seen by individual states to be an obstacle to justice, or to the equitable distribution of wealth, or to the dissemination of a preferred ideology. Diplomacy’s most difficult task continues to be the management of changes in relative power and ideological beliefs in the international system. The CWC is not an exception to this general rule. One need not subscribe to a Machiavellian view of the world to find some truth in Frederick the Great’s statement that diplomacy without
power is like an orchestra without a score. When power and diplomacy fall out of kilter, diplomacy tends towards coercion, propaganda, and intervention. The dialogue of diplomacy then carries the threat of war rather than the promise of peace. In a time of rapid change in the states system, what lies ahead for diplomacy? Many of the conditions which made diplomacy necessary and possible in the classical age of Europe still obtain. Strangers persist in the international system (in the contemporary sense, real international systems consist of the major units of international life, their regularized relationships with each other, and vis-à-vis their internal and external environments).

Conclusion of the Convention in 1993 was accelerated by the growing threat of CW proliferation, one of the major security concerns of the 1990s, and increased understanding that chemical weapons stockpiles are both costly to maintain and pose many risks to mankind and the environment. The major achievement of the CWC -- delegitimization of chemical weapons in all their aspects linked to an obligation of total destruction -- is a disarmament undertaking which will create a much higher level of confidence among States Parties. The verification of non-production in the chemical industry is a novel achievement in the history of disarmament. The technological and technical basis for chemical weapons capability is linked to the huge chemical weapons capability is linked to the huge chemical industry which has developed over the past hundred years, and which the verification concept addresses. The Convention must cope with the entire chemical industry. The concept of challenge inspections is a new approach for a multilateral disarmament treaty, and it represents an element of deterrence against possible Convention violations. In an attempt to handle the conflict between the objectives of effective verification and the legitimate needs and rights of States Parties to protect sensitive installations and to guard commercial secrets of industries, the concept of mandatory on-site inspection, any time, anywhere was developed. The conclusion of the negotiations on the CWC proved that it is possible to remove political obstacles if there is sufficient motivation. There are weaknesses in the Convention, but the negotiation of a multilateral disarmament treaty of such complexity must be viewed as a process of achieving the best possible compromise. Cooperation is one of the most important aspects of the CWC, and the actual way in which cooperative efforts meet the obligations and requirements of the CWC will need to be tested in practical terms.
The bipolar estrangement of the Cold War may have ended, and with it some of the worst excesses of "megaphone diplomacy", but disturbingly familiar sources of conflict have arisen in what once was the Soviet Union, the Balkans, Africa, and many other places where ethnic, religious, economic, and nationalist hostilities continue to surface. Indeed, as the number of powers increases, as power itself dispenses and diffuses in the contemporary state system, and as diplomatic utterances multiply and speed up in the international communication web, one must ask whether the dialogue of diplomacy has become a cacophony. Global developments -- from multilateral summitry to a transnational Cable News Network (CNN) or British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) -- have diminished the independence and significance of the individual diplomat whose home now more than ever is everywhere and nowhere. The norm against chemical weapons use is important not because it springs forth from the European experience of chemical weapons in World War I but because it transcends cultural divides and is sustained by people of different faiths, values, and orientations. Diplomacy as an institution endures nevertheless. States continue to construct, confront, and sometimes cooperate with their alien others. As long as there is a need to communicate with strangers and to manage the movement of ideas, goods, people, and even armies across boundaries, there will be a need for diplomacy. If the CWC emerges with the wide support of countries of the developing world and a norm is firmly established against CW possession that reinforces the basic notion that issue weapons pose unacceptable risks in terms of stability and human consequences for the international community, the world will have set in place what might prove to be one of the most important ingredients of international security in the twenty-first century. Without being biased and exaggeration, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a trail-blazing regime for the whole area of global disarmament, diplomacy, peace and security.