PART A : INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

Religion and Morality: Their Relations

I. The Scope of the Study

The question of relation between religion and morality arises in a variety of contexts, ancient and modern, theoretical and practical. An ancient debate on the problem can be found in Plato's famous Euthyphro which reads:

Does God love what is good, or command what is right, because it is good or right, or is it good or right because he loves or commands it? 1

James Collins, a modern thinker, observes that religion and morality continue to pose new problems and that there is nothing more controversial in the philosophy of religion today than the relationship between religion and morality. 2

The present study is intended to consider the relation between religion and morality with special reference to two Christian thinkers, A.G. Hogg and Reinhold Niebuhr. In Part A, the relation between religion and morality is examined from different stances of the history of philosophy, including a contemporary discussion on comparative religious ethics, in order to focus the main issue amidst pluralistic approaches to the problem. In Parts B and C, a survey is made on the philosophical and theological background of Hogg
and Niebuhr along with their praxiology and their understanding of the relation between religion and morality separately. In the concluding Part D, precise statements on the contribution of Hogg and Niebuhr to the present study with their retrospective and prospective features have been made in the form of theses, supported by expatiations.

II Definitions

Morality is derived from the Latin word *mores* and ethics from the Greek words *etha* ($\varepsilon\iota\omega\theta\alpha$) and *ethos* ($\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma$). Both these words are often considered synonymous. It is perhaps helpful to preserve some kind of distinction between them. Morality is concerned directly with practical problems. It brings out the behaviour of individuals and societies according to customs and traditions. But, ethics attempts to study the underlying ethos and pattern of the variety of moral decisions made by individuals and societies in a reflective manner. Ethics is a systematised theory in philosophy whereas morality is concerned about practical issues of behaviourism. But, both morality and ethics are concerned with harmonizing human society, philosophically and customarily. In view of the Max Weber's interpretative method of conceptual inquiry from specific situation, called *verstehende*, and the study of praxis of Hogg and Niebuhr, morality is preferred to ethics.
in this study and their synonymity is not forgotten.

Religion comes from the Latin word *religio* which describes the religious act, the verbs *relegere* and *reliquere* being two possible derivations. Cicero derives *religio* from the adjective *relegere* with the implication that a religious person gathers carefully what or whom he should worship. Cicero's derivation attempts to distinguish religion from superstition, as the former implies the worship of the true and the latter, of the false. Lactantius rejects Cicero's view on the grounds that "piety turns not on the subjective question of how men worship, but rather on the objective one of whom; that there are real obligations to be fulfilled, and this is the root of the matter." He derives *religio* from *reliquere*, which has a root meaning, "to bind."

Lactantius' derivation implies that religion means "to bind oneself" to one's goal and origin. The verb *relegere* directly means 'conscientiously observe' or 'carefully gather' various precepts, rules, rites and obligations. This derivation brings out the potentiality of man that he is capable of choosing for himself the way he ought to live. Modern etymologists suggest that there is another root *lig*, cognate with Greek *alego* (ἀλέγω), which means 'pay heed'. This is etymologically attractive, as it appears in the Latin correlative negative *neglegere*, 'to neglect' and
as it favours the derivation of Cicero.⁵ According to Lactantius and Augustine, religion is derived from the bond of piety, because God has established an inextricable relationship with man. Religion has an integrating function by binding human beings to one another and by binding them all to, even more inclusive, transcendent reality.⁶ It has to do with two bonds; first, it is a link (re-ligio) between man and the transcendent reality, constituting a vertical religatio and, secondly, with the link of man with his fellows, constituting a horizontal religatio; but morality has direct links of horizontal relationship between people. Etymologically, religion and morality are not identical though they have areas of significant overlapping in integrating man and society.

Though it is not easy to give a precise definition of religion, for the sake of operational purposes, it may be defined as faith in transcendent reality, constituting conceptual, emotional and practical characteristics. A few examples will indicate the wide range of opinions stressing one or the other of the "religion-making characteristics."⁷ Max Muller takes into consideration the intellectual and intuitive faculty of religion when he says, "Religion is a mental faculty or disposition which, independent of sense or reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and under varying guises."⁸
Schleiermacher stresses the emotional function when he says that the essence of religion is the feeling of absolute dependence. Allen Menzies describes religion as the worship of higher powers from a sense of need. To Wallace, an anthropologist, religion is "...simply a kind of human behaviour...which can be classified as belief and ritual concerned with supernatural beings, powers and forces."9

Religion is thought of as the experience of the individual by some people. To William James, religion means the feelings, acts and experiences of individuals in solitude, as they stand in relation to whatever they consider divine. Describing religion in terms of its social function, Edward Ames says that it is the consciousness of the highest social values. American sociologists, Glock and Stark, observe five distinct qualities in religious persons: "experiential, ideological (beliefs), ritualistic, intellectual (knowledge about the basic tenets of the faith and its scriptures), and consequential (the implications for practical conduct)."10 Ninian Smart defines religion comprehensively in terms of six dimensions - doctrinal, mythological, ethical, ritual, experiential and social.11

Religion is also considered to be the outward act or form by which men indicate their recognition of the existence of God or gods, having power over their destiny, to whom obedience, service, and honour are due. The feeling
or expression of human love, fear or awe of some super-human power are expressed by profession of belief, observance of rites and ceremonies and conduct of life. Christian and Spiro claim that, for religious people, the interest in religion is "more important than anything else in the universe" and religion is "an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings." The anthropologist Clifford Geertz writes that religion, as a cultural system, consists of sacred symbols which "synthesize a people's ethos - the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood- and their world-view."

These several definitions of religion highlight its complexity and the many aspects which have to be considered for a precise understanding of its phenomenon. Galloway claims the need for the response of the total man, involving his intellect, feeling and will - Jnana, bhakti and karma, to give the parallels in Indian thought - in the diverse religious experience of mankind. Man's faith, according to Galloway, is in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and achieves stability in life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service. The general mental and moral attitudes of the people resulting from their faith in the power beyond themselves bear fruit in the lives of the individuals and
the community. A religious person lives with an earnest commitment to a life of faith in response to what he has understood as the meaning of his very existence. MacGregor illuminates this understanding of religion further as follows:

Religion is a commitment to a kind or quality of life that purports to recognize a source beyond itself (usually but not necessarily, called God) and thus issues in recognizable fruits in human conduct (e.g., law, morality), culture (e.g., art, poetry) and thought (e.g., philosophy).\textsuperscript{16}

In short, there are two prominent qualities in the traditional forms of religious phenomena—an acceptance of transcendent reality and a commitment to responsible behaviour in the community.

III. Religion and Morality: Related but Distinct

Religion has a co-ordinating and integrating function in the long history of human civilization. The social life of primitive man is the common matrix in which both the moral and religious tendencies were initiated. The interpenetration of the sacred and the secular was so intense in primitive human society that the demarcation of the boundaries between them made little sense in the ancient religious context.\textsuperscript{17} Woodburne writes, "Undifferentiated social consciousness was the matrix out of which both the moral consciousness and the religious consciousness developed."\textsuperscript{18} Further, religion and morality are indistinguishably
interrelated not in a speculative way but in factual and historical situations and both are together developed within the sphere of social attitudes of the undifferentiated continuum of human civilization. The rules and regulations of behaviour are worked out on the basis of indissoluble union with the unseen, giving the code of conduct a magico-religious authority. A continual interaction thus prevails between the moral experience and the religious beliefs of people. What they have in common is that they are fundamental to the way of life of an individual or a society. Both religion and morality are universal phenomena and as such they affect many a side of man's culture and life. In fact, belief and behaviour mutually modify and support each other. There is a well marked tendency "both for the concept of the supernatural to become moralised and for the morality to acquire a religious sanction." One could hardly come across a religion without moral values. A religion is considered to be "higher or lower according to the kind of morality it engenders in its followers." Chatterji argues that "morality culminates in religion and religion finds its practical expression in morality."

Religion and morality closely resemble each other and both control human behaviour considerably. Morality has been known for its progressiveness in the sense that it has contributed to gradual purification of many of the crude
forms of religion. Religion, with its sacred sanctions and symbols, has strengthened the role of morality. It is usually claimed by religious people that morality cannot survive long without the support of religion. For, it is religion which validates moral values and undergirds moral attitudes. In other words, religious beliefs and commitment of the people of a faith "give a 'point' to moral endeavour."2

In the history of philosophy many views on the relation between religion and morality have been expressed by various philosophers. An appraisal is made of only five views in the present study. They are as follows: (i) Religion less morality is a possibility. (ii) Religion is an aspect of morality. (iii) Religion is an essential part of morality. (iv) Religion and morality are disjointed. (v) Religion and morality are not disjointed. These five views are illustrated in a simple diagram in Appendix 1.

Despite the interrelationship and seeming inseparability of religion and morality, it is important to know the points of distinction between them for the present study. Geisler enumerates four significant differences between them claiming that religious commitment is broader in scope, different in kind, higher in order and greater in its impact upon the lives of people.24 Fromm substantiates Geisler's point of view when he says that mystical experiences
of religious traditions cannot be easily formulated and that they go "beyond the purely ethical." In the history of human civilization with all its ambiguities, complexities, openness and possibilities, the relationship of religion with morality may be stated as having areas of significant overlapping and congruity between them in practice, if not in theory as well, although they can be distinguished from each other.

IV. The First View: Religionless Morality

There has been a long historical connection between religion and morality. Now that man has come of age and has made spectacular strides in the development of human thought, science and technology, some philosophers have expressed their view that morality could replace religion, performing the functions formerly assigned to religion. Further, religion is gradually losing its plausibility to provide a cohesive moral pattern. Records of the past history of religion have information of conflicts with morality and human welfare. To give a few examples, sati, jihad, crusades, were all some of the moral atrocities carried on in the name of religion. People, especially in the developed countries, gradually reject religious bigotry. Further, man loses his freedom when he becomes committed to religious observances, and is often treated as means in religious morality.
the basis of some of the criticisms mentioned above, thinkers like Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Herbert Spencer, and Margaret Knight express their opinion against any connection between religion and morality, and advocate 'religionless morality', 'secular morality', scientific humanism, and altruistic principles which can really build concrete solidarity within human society.

Human beings are basically involved in the development of both religion and morality. If there have been moral atrocities carried out in the name of religion, it shows that man is sinful in nature and that religion has been used by evil men to validate their evil ways. It may be pointed out that, in Niebuhrian analysis of human nature, man suffers from pride and selfishness, though he has the possibility to transcend himself and transform the society with religious resources of grace and love. Human nature, being what it is, cannot provide proper foundation, without a source of grace and power available outside man's capabilities in the rich religious heritage, for building a stable universal brotherhood. Secular morality and scientific humanism, without a proper religious or metaphysical basis, cannot really bridge the gap between man and his neighbour. Undoubtedly, man has many intellectual achievements. Yet, he cannot really sacrifice love and live without selfishness unless there is a strong motivation which he derives from
religious experience. Human tenderness, compassion, suavity of manners and amiability of temperament are often only the habiliments of basic values of love, inculcated in religious traditions. Fairness may be considered to be the apex of secular morality. But it has limitations since every one in the modern society has the tendency to claim his/her rights. But the sacrificial love, agape (αγάπη) taught in the religious traditions goes beyond the demands of duty and rights. In response to Russell's religionless morality, MacGregor says, "Intellectual acumen alone does nothing in itself to empower a man to experience the sacrificial love apart from which religion is warped and morality emasculated."

While discussing the interdependence of religion and social morality, R.S. Downie puts forward a "metaphysical thesis" to show how morality points beyond itself and exists for the sake of some greater end. Downie illustrates his thesis on the basis of Good Samaritan story recorded in the New Testament. The Samaritan comes across a Jew in great need, robbed, stripped, beaten, and left half dead. In his excessive altruism, the Samaritan attends to him and takes care of him, overcoming all man-made barriers, which existed between a Jew and a Samaritan based on religion, race and regionalism. Doubtlessly, the Samaritan helped the Jew in distress, as he was moved with universal altruism of the Brotherhood of Man. Then, as Downie observes, there is an
additional reason for such noble action of the good Samaritan, when this pericope is observed in its right context. The story illustrates the answer to the question of a lawyer "Who is my neighbour?" The Samaritan helps the man in distress, as he comes across a Son of God who commands to love his neighbour as himself. In other words, the story brings out a metaphysical thesis that the ideal Brotherhood of Man is motivated by the implications of the Fatherhood of God. Secular morality has a firmer foundation in religious morality. This gives a clue that ethical systems, under close scrutiny reveal that they have appealed in one way or other to the authority or insight of a religion. Tillich puts the stress on ontological dependence of morality on religion, as he argues that the relation between religion and morality is "not an external one, but that the religious dimension, source, and motivation are implicit in all morality, acknowledged or not."

Even the moral philosophers who deny any logical or conceptual relation between religion and morality agree on the relevance of religion to practical purposes of morality. Sociologists agree that the beliefs and cultic practices of a group are intimately connected with the group's moral values. Norms of morality of any given group may be traced to a belief in an immediate divine decrees, with the continued observance of those laws acting as "a most powerful cement of a moral community." Modern societies are complex
and considerably secularised. Therefore, religious derivation of the moral and legal codes are less direct and not clear. Elizabeth Nottingham writes, "The moral codes which appear to be secular now were originally sanctioned on religious grounds, even though their religious origin may be forgotten."\(^{34}\)

Further, W.E. Arnott writes that some moralists who have concluded that there is no logical relation between religion and morality claim that religion is justified as "an indispensable support of morality," as it is "instrumentally necessary and altogether effective as a psychological or sociological means of strengthening moral beliefs and encouraging patterns of beneficent behaviour."\(^{35}\) Religionless morality is not an acceptable proposition for the following reasons: First, love (\textit{agape}) becomes an essential criterion for both religion and morality. Secondly, morality is ontologically dependent on religion and the religious virtues are already implicitly present in morality. The ideal brotherhood of man is motivated by a proper understanding of the Fatherhood of God. Thirdly, the secular morality has its origin in religious premises though modern man fails to accept it due to his preoccupation with secularism.

V. The Second View: Religion is an Aspect of Morality

This view can be called the reductionist view. It exalts the role of morality considerably at the
expense of religion, as the latter is deemed as an aspect of the former. There have been attempts in assimilating religious expressions to moral assertions. According to the reductionist view, the moral element is the only element of value and it is the essence of religion and all other aspects of religion are excrescent and hence, expendable. Matthew Arnold's definition of religion as morality tinged with emotion is one of the classical expressions of this view. In a similar sense R.B. Braithwaite writes that the many fables, rituals and other paraphernalia of religion obscure the fundamental moral aspect of religion. From an empiricist's point of view, any hypothesis of the scientist or the religious teacher has value only in so far as it is verifiable by actual experience. Religious statements invariably do not have place in the trichotomy of statements about matters of empirical fact, scientific hypothesis related to empirical facts and the logically essential statements of logic and mathematics. Therefore, the logical positivists find nothing but meaninglessness in the volumes of religious and metaphysical statements. The moral statements, however, are meaningful since they spell out the "conative intentions" or the way one proposes to act. Religious principles have to be reduced to moral principles, assigning no special meaning to myths, liturgies and other unverifiable categories of religious paraphernalia. In Braithwaite's reductionist view,
religion can be described "as morals helped out by mythology."

What is significant for the human civilization is a conative rather than an emotive theory. Braithwaite epitomizes the religious statement, "God is love", and appeals to the mental attitude and commitment of the religious person to a new order of the agapeistic way of life. In Braithwaite's own words "agape refers partly to external behaviour...yet being filled with agape includes more than behaving agapeistically externally; it also includes an agapeistic frame of mind." That is, the impact of the self-giving love, agape, is "from judgment of conduct to judgment of character, from rightness to goodness, doing to being, rule to virtue." The agapeistic way of life implies not only external conduct but also an internal transformation with an agapeistic frame of mind. The core of religious teachings has these two basic emphases. In addition to these tenets, there are religious stories which serve as a powerful psychological aid in making religion a moral dynamic. In Braithwaite's own words:

A moral belief is an intention to behave in a certain way; a religious belief is an intention to behave in a certain way (a moral belief) together with the entertainment of certain stories associated with the intention in the mind of the believer.

A brief assessment of Braithwaite's reductionist theory becomes necessary. First of all, Braithwaite seeks "a common ground" between religious
thinkers and logical positivists and explains his position from a non-theological standpoint. Further, he succeeds in his attempt to an extent at establishing high analytical standards, using the tools of symbolic logic and the analysis of science, in studying the problem of the philosophy of religion. Bishop Ramsey observes that Braithwaite's method of assimilation between religion and morality certainly illuminates the very nature of religious belief.

Having noted the contribution of the reductionist theory, it is essential to consider the inadequacy of the methodology employed by Braithwaite. First of all, religious literature has a variety of information and it is too narrow for the religious thinkers to reduce religion to a morality "coloured and reinforced by a particular tale." Secondly, the doctrines of any religion should be taken with the basic tenets of the founder and the scripture as their basis. Commitment of a believer in the Christian faith is primarily not "to agape or to agapeistic way of life" but to Christ, the way, the truth, and the life. Thirdly, though we cannot give up the logic and power of argument in issues pertaining to philosophy and religion, it should be admitted that religious experience need not provide sense-data for verification according to empiricism nor the simple concepts to satisfy human logic. Macquarrie is right in his appraisal of the reductionist view that Braithwaite has "exaggerated his
thesis beyond what is plausible." Braithwaite's methodology is inadequate and consequently the view that religion is an aspect of morality is inappropriate.

VI. The Third View: Religion is an Essential Part of Morality

According to the third view, morality is autonomous and religion is an essential part of morality. Kant's definition of religion as the recognition of all moral imperatives as divine commands falls into this category. Kant does not accept the religion of mere sentiment which leads only to mystical experiences. His conception of religion has far reaching implications. Kant vindicates religious beliefs by analysing its moral value only. Though Kant insisted that human knowledge is knowledge only of phenomena and not of noumena or things-in-themselves, in practice, there is in man's consciousness a sense of unconditional moral obligation that makes sense only if God, freedom and immortality are postulated. To Kant,

Religion is the law within us, given added force by a law-giver and judge above us; it is a morality applied to the recognition of God; it is the recognition of all our duties as divine commandments.

In Kantian outlook, true religion must promote morality and the very value of a religion should be measured by the yardstick of its moral content. Religion is of value as a means of leading a good moral life. Even the highest form
of piety must be expressed in a moral life and all other aspects of religion such as revelation, dogmas, rites and even religious experience are secondary. He makes an assessment of religion from moral standpoint, rejecting all psychological implications associated with religion.

Kant has laid the foundations for ethics in his short but influential *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*, written with deep insight. His stated objective is "nothing more than the investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of morality." In Kantian thought all persons are entitled to equal rights and they should under no circumstances be treated as means. Each person is unique, uniquely precious, and should always be regarded as end in himself/herself. According to Kant, pure religion needs no systematic doctrine except for two fundamental articles of the Christian faith namely original sin, witnessed as radical evil in human nature and moral perfection or the guilelessness of the historical Jesus. It is religious to look at duties as divine commands. Knowledge of the supersensible or *noumena* is out of the question. Yet, the categorical imperative, which says, 'thou shalt do this' or 'thou shalt not do that' whatever the consequences be, requires (i) a *God* who is eligible to command 'thou shalt'; (ii) that 'thou shalt' can be said only where 'thou canst' can also be said, hence freedom also must be postulated; and (iii) that, since moral
perfection cannot be attained within the bounds of this life, **immortality** must be postulated. A postulate is much more than a mere hypothesis and much less than the principle of morality. 

For Kant, morality is founded upon practical reason itself. The Human contention is that belief in God is speculative and, therefore, it should always be kept apart from our conduct. But, for Kant, speculative belief has little value, though moral belief in God is firm and "indispensable to practical existence." Nevertheless, it is clear that Kant does not want to build a moral theory with God as a motivating source of every moral action. There is an expressed need for the independent moral law. And in order to maintain that moral law, God becomes indispensable. Kant asserts the autonomy of the moral law which is universally valid and is inherent in reason itself, **a priori**. God, freedom and immortality are necessary postulates only. To be moral, for Kant, is to consider moral imperatives as divine commands. This tendency of Kant has certainly exalted the role of morality, but it has very much reduced the role of religion. The Kantian view that religion is an essential part of morality has to be rejected mainly because God — the very ground of our being, to use Tillich's expression — is treated as a tool for the sake of upholding moral law. Further, God is considered one of three postulates,
each postulate being less than the principle of morality.

VII. The Fourth View: Religion and Morality are Disjointed

According to the fourth view, morality and religion do not depend on each other. Religion and morality are not identical; nor is one a part of the other. They are mutually exclusive. Alexander's position is not far from this view, as he claims that religion and morality are two distinct "sentiments".\(^{55}\) He goes on to say that religion and morality were not distinguished in the primitive mind even as all branches of science had their beginning in philosophy; but now "the sentiment of religion and the sense of moral value are distinct, in a far greater degree than philosophy is distinct from physics which was separated out of philosophy."\(^{56}\) In other words, according to Alexander, there can be religion without morality and morality without religion and they are two distinct sentiments however closely they might have been once related.\(^{57}\)

Following Kent and Moore, A.C. Ewing discusses the possibility of "autonomy of ethics" when he says that ethical concepts can neither be "reduced" to theological concepts nor can ethical judgments be "deduced formally" from theological judgments.\(^{58}\) From the time of David Hume, it has become a familiar dictum that one cannot deduce a statement containing the term 'ought' from any set of statements not
containing a cognate term. In Ewing's words, "There is no valid formal way of deducing the 'good' or the 'ought' from the 'is'." The issue of the logical relationship between "is" and "ought" is perhaps considered to be the central problem of Moral Philosophy, as it examines the validity of deriving moral statements from non-moral premises. In other words, if the premise is descriptive, how can the conclusion be evaluative? W.K. Frankena deals with this question with a view to clarifying the relation between religion and morality under the caption, "Is morality logically dependent on religion?" He observes, from the following example, that to reason from a theological premise to an ethical conclusion is not possible without an enthymematic argument:

Consider (a) God loves us

(b) We ought to love those whom God loves

(c) Therefore we ought to love one another.

A theologian suppresses (b) and argues from (a) to (c), causing an enthymematic argument. Theological writings reflect little awareness of logical difficulties in moving from the "indicative" to the "imperative". Having stated the problem in the logical relationship between religion and morality, it becomes necessary to consider the argument that religion and morality are not mutually exclusive. Gene Outka puts it emphatically, criticising Frankena's position, that it is certainly "bizarre and unintelligible" to hold that God is
love and that we ought to hate our neighbours!  62  For a believer it is perfectly intelligible and appropriate to accept that God is love and we should love our neighbours, though the connections between the two statements are not strictly followed inductively and deductively.  63  Hare substantiates Outka's claim, saying:

Some who are used to religious language have not been able to give a very convincing account of its use just as some gardeners can grow very good vegetable without being able to tell us clearly or correctly how they do it. 64

In Hogg's analysis of religion, an attempt is made to remove the gap between the 'is' and the 'ought'. In the contemporary comparative religious ethics, David Little and Sumner Twiss have structured religious and moral action-guides accommodating both authoritative and practical components into them simultaneously. 65

In general, doctrines of religious traditions are such that "ises" are built into the "oughts". Religious facts cannot be tested by types of procedure, leading to empirical verification and falsification. By incorporating moral propositions into the fabric of religious expressions, moral action gain solemnity and "double significance". For example, in the religious teaching, murder is not only wrong, it is also sinful and impious; marriage is more than an institution, as it is regarded as a sacrament; and apartheid is not merely injustice, but it is also blasphemy.
Maclagen says that morality cannot exist or sustain itself apart from religion which gives a distinctive "flavour" or "tang", with its massive support for man's endeavour from prayer and worship. Ewing himself admits "Theism can add a new tone to ethics, but it cannot create ethics" and full autonomy of ethics without qualification can be misleading.

Ewing raises another question stating, should not God's actions presuppose, as logically prior, the recognition of ethical principles? After scrutinizing the truth of language that God is good, Kai Nielsen answers Ewing's question claiming that goodness is partially definitive of Godhood as much as youngness is partially definitive of puppyhood. Goodness is a concept which could be used independently, without any constraint. Conscientiousness under most circumstances is good even if it is not linked with God and religion. In other words, linguistically speaking, morality without religion, is quite possible. "An understanding of goodness is logically prior to and is as such independent of any understanding or acknowledgement of God."

Religion also gives importance to individual conscience which does not seek its own welfare. Man should be free from fear and favour in order to make right and responsible decision in any given situation. Popper writes, "The doctrine of the autonomy of ethics is independent of the
problem of religion, but compatible with, or perhaps even necessary for, any religion which respects individual conscience." Independence of morality from religion is one of the extreme theoretical positions, but it may be used for mutual benefit of both religion and morality. According to Tillich, disjointedness between religion and morality is only artificial, as they are ontologically related. Tillich claims:

Religious values such as forgiveness and acceptance, the conditions of the fulfilment of the law, must come from something above the law, or more precisely, from something in which the split between our essential being and our existence is overcome and healing power has appeared.

Macquarrie agrees with Tillich when he says, "In one form or another, phenomena such as sin and grace, faith and hope, are known far beyond the boundaries of an explicit theology." Having noticed the many difficulties in accepting the view that religion and morality are disjointed, it is but natural that one should consider the next view that religion and morality are not disjointed.

VIII (a) The Fifth View: Religion and Morality are not Disjointed

According to the fifth view, morality is so closely related to religion in practice, if not in theory as well, that both have significant areas of overlapping and congruity, although they can be distinguished from each other. This position is not much different from that of theists.
A.E. Taylor claims that moral knowledge is such that it presupposes necessarily the being of God who controls the immortality of the soul and the universe with moral purpose. According to Taylor, moral experience points beyond itself to, and is completed in, religion, and one is naturally led to theism. Taylor's attempt to move from the facts of moral experience to a religious metaphysic turns on two main considerations. First, he is keen on eternal good and not merely temporal achievements. Human aspirations by themselves are doomed to frustration. Secondly, man is guilty and sinful and without divine grace he is impotent and helpless to achieve his moral fulfilment and aspirations. Taylor puts forth his thesis that moral life finds its completion in religion and man's indefatigable attempt to reach eternal good is met by the initiative of the eternal. Moral life without religion is distorted and self-stultifying. In the theistic tradition, the understanding of the personality in God is of great significance. Clement C.J. Webb supports the Lotzean outlook that the highest conceptions of the good "lose all reality and become empty abstractions except as referred to a person." The universal category of Kantian thought, gives importance to the goodwill which, for Webb, is the kernel of a personality. Theists claim an additional dimension for communion between God and man, because "the recognition of Personality in God adds to the intelligibility and moral efficacy of...religious
Dom I. Trethowan brings out the significance of personality in God for five moral premises: First, the needed "imperative quality" goes with personality. Secondly, obedience to moral imperative becomes almost out of question, adding a further enigma if the Personal God is not there. Thirdly, human beings are incapable of exerting absolute claim of the moral imperative unless it is derived from theistic premises of the Omnipotent, Omniscient and morally perfect God. Fourthly, the phenomena such as responsibility and guilt become meaningless unless they are taken in the context of personality. Lastly, man needs supernatural aid lest he should be frustrated by his sheer self-centredness and powerlessness to live a noble life.

For theists, morality is an inevitable by-product of religion. They reject the idea of taking religion and morality as disjoint phenomena. They can never accept morality as an independent entity. Keith Ward says that one way of overcoming the dichotomy-dilemma is "to identify the will of God with the 'realm of values' which constitutes the goodness of things." N.H.G. Robinson claims that there are not two different claims, known as the divine claim and the moral claim, on human beings separately, but theists affirm that "moral obligation is the impact of divine will upon human life...and that man's moral consciousness is already an apprehension of God's will." Almost in the same line, a
Swiss theologian, Emil Brunner, says, "the good has its basis and its existence solely in the will of God." From the theistic point of view, the highest ethical rules are only the grammar of God's will for man, God commands us to do what is intrinsically right and to avoid what is intrinsically wrong. For, God is not only omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient but is also morally perfect. It is incompatible to imagine the supernatural moralist giving evil commands. Religion and morality are intimately connected with overlapping areas. Moral consciousness itself is a mode of religious consciousness. There is much meaning in stating that "genuine moral commitment is itself religious in quality." Further, man is a moral being. He cannot be justified in his going against his conscience. It is impossible to think of human life without a trace of morality. In the theistic tradition, religion can never be divorced from morality and it is more than morality, and can never be reduced to morality totally, not even to the most supreme development of the moral will. Introduction of the religious concept of the "will of God" enables the moral demand to be adequately strengthened. Sometimes, morality is thought of in a reductionist form that it is only an important dimension or an aspect of religion, but the fifth view permits distinct areas between religion and morality along with areas of overlapping. Obviously, the fifth view gives a proper basis to consider the contemporary discussion on comparative
religious ethics and the relation between Christianity and morality.

(b) A Comparative Religious Ethics

In keeping with present trends in analytic philosophy, Little and Twiss provide a methodology of conceptual analysis with the help of well constructed "action-guides" to study the interrelationship between morality and religion. The phrase action-guide is used as the most inclusive term which can be always replaced by usual expressions such as rule, principle, prescription, imperatives, counsel, advice, etc. The action-guides are generalizable, as they are applicable to any similar person in similar circumstances. The heuristic conceptual diagram of A Moral/Religious Action-Guide or a Religion/Moral Action-Guide is provided in Appendix 2. It will be referred to as the conceptual diagram hereafter.

The object of morality is to guide the conduct of persons, to constitute a shared system of regulating behaviour and to foster cooperation among self-interested, competing and conflicting persons and groups. Hence, the distinctive orientation to morality in the "action-guide" is other-regardingness which impinges on the material welfare of others and the justification of benevolent acts. Further the definition of morality is schematized with two primary
features called prescriptive and authoritative components. Little and Twiss define a moral statement as a "statement expressing the acceptance of an action-guide that claims superiority, and that is considered legitimate in that it is justifiable and other-regarding."\textsuperscript{86}

In the case of religion, the distinctive elements are problems of interpretability, posing "ontological anxieties" or challenges in terms of inexplicability of the world, its existence and purpose, suffering and death and the ambiguities and puzzles inherent in human conduct.\textsuperscript{87} Religion deals with these problems conceptually, emotionally and practically from psychological, sociological and anthropological standpoints. According to Little and Twiss, a religious statement should express, "acceptance of a set of beliefs, attitudes and practices based on a notion of sacred authority that functions to resolve the ontological problems of interpretability."\textsuperscript{88} Sacred authority is the distinctive orientation to religion since it suggests that the object is "to some degree beyond the volitional control of human beings" and it is prominent in relation to what human beings consider important.\textsuperscript{89}

It should be noted from the conceptual diagram that both religion and morality have two primary features, viz., prescriptive and authoritative components.
The prescriptive or practical component in both the action-guides directs the agent regarding the courses of action to be followed. It indicates to the agent "what to do, how to act, to whom, in what circumstances (the variables in the conceptual diagram)." The prescriptive component consists of distinctive emphasis, viz., cooperative orientation in moral action-guide and interpretability orientation in religious action-guide. The authoritative component in both the action-guides differ considerably with special conditions of "other-regardingness" in morality and "appeal to sacred authority" in religion. Little and Twiss structure these components in both the action-guides.

There is an obvious tension between the Religion Action-Guide and the Moral Action-Guide because of "the two sorts of justification, for example, between an ultimate 'other-worldly' commitment and a human 'this-worldly' obligation." Priority (strong or weak), defined according to its credibility, takes precedence over any conflicting non-moral categories. The second important feature of the authoritative component is legitimacy. Morality has the goal of guiding people such that a cooperative living is made possible. Communication, an integral aspect of social morality, permits action-guides "to become formulated, promulgated and effective." In other words, there are valid reasons to
justify or legitimately to claim a recommended action-guide. Legitimacy consists of general conditions which elucidate, with reason, the justification of people's conduct and attitudes. Some basic "customary rules of linguistic usage" are required for communication of the conditions of justifiability and inter-subjective validity in terms of meaning, truth and mutual respect.93

Generalizability is also a general condition for justifiability which claims that any agent under similar circumstances behaves in the manner as given in the action-guide and impersonality of impartiality claims that the action-guide applies, in the same way to any person under similar circumstances.94

The distinctions made in terms of special conditions of moral and religious legitimacy need to be explained. In the case of moral action-guide, "other regardingness", based on the criteria of prescriptivity, universalizability and supremacy, plays a significant role. Following Frankena, 'other regardingness' in morality, should include principles dealing with relations of one individual to the other and with effects of one's action upon the other.95 The characteristic approach, attempted with the help of moral action-guide ensures that the investigations made on the basis of the moral action-guide, avoid ethnocentricity and are
cross-culturally applicable. "Sacred-regarding" in religious action-guide is formally similar to "other-regarding" in moral action-guide. Nevertheless, compared to moral legitimacy, religious legitimacy makes a difference in the following premises: First, the normative factor of revelation with orders from on high for the religiously inclined to obey the religious traditions of the world; secondly, the sacred standard put forward to people with the backing of the scriptures which has valuational implications for the people; thirdly, an anthropomorphic tendency with role analogy is prevalent in religious teaching (for example, father-son, master-slave, author-creature, benefactor beneficiary, promiser-promisee and so on) and fourthly, in order to have an understanding of the meaning of life in a wider perspective, and to provide an "explicit backing" to the normative factors of a religion mythic warranty is invariably taken for granted. But certain religious practices, (for example, prayer) can be justified on moral grounds, although every religious claim asserts a special distinctiveness for its object, ascribing prominence in both ontological and axiological terms with a high degree of authority.

The relation between the two action-guides, with preference to special conditions of religious legitimacy and moral legitimacy has to be considered. Religious action-
guide is formulated with reference to the problems of interpretability, involving deep-seated commitment for the welfare of persons and "fulfilling the other-regarding conditions."

Hindrey says, "In identifying the task of morality as finding a solution to the problem of human cooperation, Little and Twiss, focus on 'other-regardingness' as the prism through which religious traditions refract their particular ethics." Occasionally there arises tension between the two action-guides precisely over the question of other-regardingness. Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of the ethical" in the context of obeying God to the extent of the near sacrifice of one's son gives an example of this tension between the two action-guides. Further, religious action-guide does not meet all the criteria of the moral action-guide, although the line of demarcation between them cannot be easily drawn.

The Little-Twiss definitions of religion and morality revolve in a decisive manner around the concepts of practical justification which is given by "authorized reason for the performance of an action." The content of a code of a religion or morality is case specific, and yet its structure has a generalizable pattern of justification. There are three ascending levels of appeal in the structure of practical justification. They are situational application, validation and vindication. Situational application refers to what should be done, in what way, and it takes into account
the disposition, attitude and virtue of the agent as well. Secondly, in the process of validation, the basic norms which mark the logical end of the validating procedure are divided into teleological and deontological categories. Teleological norms prescribe or proscribe actions on the basis of consequentialist considerations whereas deontological norms are either authoritarian or formalistic and not on the consequences engendered by any action. The authoritarian norms, given by a competent authority, help a person to make right decisions. But the formalistic norms depend on the intrinsic characteristics of the person. Teleological norms may be intrapersonal, extrapersonal or transpersonal-intrapersonal, if they commend the pursuit of consequences beneficial to the agent, extrapersonal, if they enjoin the promotion of results constituting the welfare of others, and transpersonal, if they need the generation of states towards "fulfilment above and beyond the typical consciousness of the acting person." Thirdly, there are suggestive reasons apart from the logically compelling reasons which come under the third level of appeal called vindication. There are three categories of vindictory appeal viz., consensus appeal expressed in some form the fact of social acceptance, epistemological appeal invoking a theory of knowledge and cosmological or anthropological appeal based on the support of a theory of nature, of the universe or man. These three levels of appeal are diagrammed by Little and
Twiss in a helpful way and it is given in Appendix 3.

By accommodating both the prescriptive and authoritative components in the action-guides of religion and morality, Little and Twiss have challenged Nielsen's position that "A moral understanding must be logically prior to any religious assent." It should be made clear, however, that first of all a religious action-guide is not identical with moral action-guide. In fact, the definitions based on the conceptual analysis of Little and Twiss help in identifying the points of tension and conflict as well. Secondly, the conceptual explications are flexible and arbitrary in order to draw the boundary line according to situational issues and "the question of whether religious action-guides or moral action-guides take precedence can only be resolved on a case by case basis. It is an empirical matter."

In the conceptual analysis of Little and Twiss the mutual autonomy of morality and religion for the sake of analytic purposes is not ruled out. Swearer makes this point clear when he comments that despite the dual nature of a combined action-guide, Little and Twiss maintain a degree of "mutual autonomy of moral and religious justification, at least for the sake of analytic purposes." Outka and Reeder make the following comment on the work of Little and Twiss:

A moral/religious action-guide is explicitly viewed as religious, but also meets the criteria
of a moral one. In contrast, a religious/moral action-guide is one which is explicitly taken as moral but which upon examination is found to include religious elements.107

(c) Christianity and Morality

(i) An Indigenous Expression of Christianity

The religious and moral experience of the people cannot be taken out of the cultural, historical, cultic and experiential context in which the moral lives of religious persons are lived. A case study of the moral and religious experience of three exponents of Indian Renaissance, who have given an indigenous expression to Christian theology in India, highlights the overlapping relationship between religion and morality.

First, the teaching of Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1774-1833), a great exponent of Indian Renaissance and rationalism, the founder of Brahmo Samaj and a reformer, who worked towards permanent abolition of sati, may be considered. He was greatly attracted by the moral precepts of Jesus which he gleaned from the four Gospels. In Roy, the moral law is "principally inculcated" by the Christian faith.108 He lays emphasis so much on morality that metaphysics has little relevance for him. He says, "Moral doctrines... are beyond the reach of metaphysical perversion and intelligible alike to the learned and unlearned."109 He claims that his work on
The Precepts of Jesus, separated from "mysterious dogmas" was an attempt to study the intimate relationship of Christianity with morality. In his words, "This simple code of Religion and Morality...is so admirably calculated to elevate men's ideas to high and liberal notions of one God."110

The moral teaching of Jesus, especially the Sermon on the Mount, greatly fascinated this social reformer as it did Mahatma Gandhi a century later. Further, his long and uninterrupted researches into religious truth led him to the conclusion that the doctrine of Christ is better understood from his moral principles. M.M. Thomas generalises Roy's position as follows:

Men, awakened through the Gospel from the metaphysical to the ethical apprehension of reality as central, do not want to be deflected from the ethical field; the meaning of Jesus Christ must come to them in terms of the ethical, ...the communication of the Gospel of salvation has to be in terms of the nature and fulfilment of the moral life.111

Keshub Chunder Sen (1838-1884), the founder of the Church of the New Dispensation, became prominent through his lectures to the public. He speaks at length of the moral excellence of Jesus based on the two cardinal principles of forgiveness and self-sacrifice of the Gospel ethics. He finds a new approach in religion for mankind, accomplished by Jesus' self-sacrifice in the act of "supernatural moral heroism" braving even death "for the sake of
truth and God." Sen develops a kenotic theory based on Christ's statement, "I and the Father are one." Ego or aham (aham here is used in the sense of ahamkāra) is a limitation. By eliminating this aham Jesus becomes one with God. By the process of Kenosis Jesus becomes egoless or empties himself totally on the cross. Sen expounds the Kenotic theory as follows:

I find in it nothing but the philosophical principle underlying the popular doctrine of self-abnegation... in a very lofty spiritual sense... Christ ignored and denied his self altogether... Self must be extinguished and eradicated completely. Christ said so and Christ did so. He destroyed the self. And as the self ebbed away... the Spirit of the Lord filled him and everything was thus divine with him.  

Sen applies this doctrine of self-abnegation to the practical life of the people. He takes 'self-sacrifice' followed from his kenotic theory as an important point for ethical premises. The moral influence of Christ's emptying himself by his life and death on the cross is surpassing. Sen writes:

I have always regarded the cross as a beautiful emblem of self-sacrifice unto the glory of God... The vast moral influence of his Christ's life and death still lives in human society, and animates its movements.

The second important doctrine of the "Gospel ethics which stand out prominently above all others" is the doctrine of forgiveness. Here again Sen combines religious
experience with moral behaviour. The real problem in humanity is to change people's basic nature of corruption and sin.

Unless people strive conscientiously to realize in their lives the high morality of the Gospel, their religion can become "an extreme of misguided sentimentalism, or, at best, an ethical hyperbole." The doctrine of forgiveness taught and practised by Christ continues to enhance the morale of the people. Christ taught the people to forgive those who trespass against them, to love their enemies and to pray for them who insult them. He, in the midst of his great agony on the cross, prayed for his enemies and for their forgiveness. In the same way, man could emulate Christ and follow "the inestimable riches of Christ's sublime morality." Sen admonishes, "You should try to conform fully to the glory maxim-love thine enemy, and show in your daily life the unfathomable charity of Christ." In short, Sen takes the moral teaching of Jesus as an essential aspect of the Christian faith.

Vengal Chakkarai (1820-1958), originally belonged to Vaisnava Bhakti tradition, and later became an interpreter of the Christian faith in the idioms of Indian Philosophy. First, Chakkarai gives a new interpretation to the doctrine of Incarnation in terms of Christology of the Spirit. He sees the need to emphasize the presence of the
indwelling God, who energises the lives of the bhaktas, giving a new motivation and purpose amidst contemporary challenges. With too much emphasis on the historicity of Christ in the Western thought, Christ becomes a remote personality seemingly having little influence in the lives of the bhaktas. Chakkarai, therefore, introduces Christ, functioning in the perspective furnished by the Holy Spirit.¹²⁰ He adds saying:

It is from the Holy Spirit or Antaryāmin, the Indweller, that we start our enquiry concerning the nature of the person of Jesus...Jesus Christ is the Incarnation or Avatar of God; the Holy Spirit in human experience is the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.¹²¹

The work of the Holy Spirit is a continuing part of the Incarnation and the bhaktas are given new energy to carry out the mission appointed to each one of them. The work they are expected to do is far beyond their moral and spiritual capabilities. The upward movement in spiritual and moral advancement of the bhaktas is possible, since "the positive character of Jesus...has brought out the negative character of sin as the very opposite of all that He stood for."¹²² With his new interpretation of the "Christology of the Spirit" in terms of inner experience of the Spirit, Chakkarai makes the doctrine most relevant for energising the bhaktas spiritually and morally in the contemporary situations.

Secondly, the death of Christ on the cross
has tremendous moral influence. Here again, Chakkarai brings out the fresh impact of the death of Christ upon his followers. Chakkarai writes, "From the cross has descended on men's hearts and minds the healing energy of moral and spiritual restoration." The influence of the cross gives new light and hope to the bhaktas who are in moral disorder. "Under its (cross) influence the soul shrinking from the supreme Father turns, after the long night of sin, its face to God as the lotus opens its petals to the rays of the sun." The spiritual power or 'sakti' released from the cross brings a new transformation of individuals and society. The suffering Christ has a representative character, reaching "the very foundations of our being...(and) has been the source of inexhaustible streams of moral inspiration and spiritual grandeur." The transformation taking place by the radiant sakti of Christ's redemptive sacrifice is indeed "a kriya sakti of a new world-order", motivating the people to do things which are noble and good. Borrowing the teaching of the Gita, Chakkarai claims that "the Cross is the true niskamya-karma", (action done with no personal benefit), and "the reconciliation of the law and love, karma and dharma", giving evidence from life situation of people. The Incarnation and the Cross have the dynamism to change the spiritual and moral conditions of the present world order into something wholesome and purposeful.
Having seen the overlapping nature of the relationship between Christianity and morality from the indigenous expression of a few Indian thinkers, it is of help to turn to biblical morality before the life and work of Hogg and Niebuhr are studied.

(ii) The Biblical Morality

A writer of the New Testament defines pure religion as follows: "Religion that is pure and undefiled... is...to visit orphans and widows in their affliction, and to keep oneself unstained from the world." 129 Religion, according to the above definition, ought to have the content, expressed in terms of conduct. It should guide people to an active and responsible service to the community combined with a high degree of personal integrity. Christian faith demands social and personal morality following the biblical message of both the Old and the New Testaments.

There is an ancient but fascinating account of the personal integrity of a man called Joseph in the book of Genesis. When the wife of his master, Potiphar, made eyes at him daily suggesting that he would sleep with her, Joseph was clear of his accountability in terms of personal integrity, dignity to his master and commitment to his faith in God. He did not yield to the temptation and asked a noble question, "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" 130
In this pericope, offence against social and personal morality is judged to be offence against God. Adultery is one of the most serious aberrations in any society and the understanding of Joseph of "universal human decency which is unwilling to break a trust" was possible because of his unflinching faith in God. By an infraction of a moral principle man could jeopardize the eternal enjoyment of his relationship with his Maker. Before the Kantian principles of universaliability and the Aristotelian arguments from natural law were introduced moral law had a distinctively religious authorization in the ancient cultural life-situation.

In the biblical understanding God is the very ground of justice. The prophets of Israel's religious tradition spoke of social and economic justice as the most important message of a true religion. In the context of material prosperity in Israel, the poor people were left high and dry. The rich became richer and poor poorer. An oppressive social pyramid grew up with the affluent at the top and a great population ground into poverty at the bottom. The yeoman farmer who mortgaged his land found the mortgage foreclosed and ultimately lost his property and personal independence. The small farms were swallowed up by the large estates of the rich. Those who owned them were reduced to the status of hired labourers. Public leaders, sophisticated
as they were, with their beautiful ivoried and luxurious summer and winter houses, were not in the least bothered about the poor.\textsuperscript{133} The widows and the fatherless were robbed and the law courts were used to serve the vested interests of the royal courtiers and the merchant class.\textsuperscript{134} Bribery, false balances and all kinds of fraudulent means to amass wealth were the order of the day.\textsuperscript{135} Even when the social justice of the people was jeopardized, interestingly the outward forms of religion flourished, cultic rites observed, tithes paid and sacrifices made, with the idea of securing God's blessing and sanction upon their material possessions. The flagrant social injustice was smoothed over with a veneer of religious piety. Against this rather exploited and oppressed society the eighth century B.C., prophets proclaimed the message of God demanding the people to substantiate their religious practices by their moral behaviour. The prophets are convinced that God is just and doing justice to people is an essential part of their true worship of God:

\begin{quote}
What is to me the multitude of your sacrifices... Even though you make many prayers I will not listen...cease to do evil, learn to do good, seek justice correct oppression, defend fatherless, plead for the widow...Take away from me the noise of your songs...But let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an overflowing stream...What does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness and to walk humbly with your God.\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

The prophets of the eighth century exposed
the social prerogatives of the privileged and denounced the exploitation of the poor by the rich in order to hold the intimate relation needed between the beliefs and the behaviour of the people in terms of social justice. An outstanding theologian of this century, Karl Barth writes, "God always takes His stand unconditionally and passionately...against those who already enjoy right and privilege and on behalf of those who are denied and deprived of it."

He goes on to say that God who is just, taking side with the poor and the oppressed, leads the man who lives by faith to political action for a just social order.

In the New Testament among the people committed to their faith in Christ we can note a renewed solidarity and fellowship of the spirit. They had a strong koinōnia or sense of community which helped the people to overcome all distinctions based on racialism, regionalism, economic status and sex. They cared for the less fortunate and "had everything in common." Their fellowship and love attracted many people to join their communion and to enjoy the new relationship made available in Christ with God and man.

William Barclay writes, "The most correct theology and the most faultless morality without love are not Christian." The sacrificial or self-giving love
demands the exercise of the whole man. It has much to do with the will, and is a principle by which one deliberately lives. It is unconquerable benevolence and invincible goodwill. In Pauline thought agape plays a dominant role. In fact, most of his letters have first a doctrinal section followed by a section on morality, and agape is found in both the sections, connecting the creed and the conduct of the people. The agape of which Paul writes has no ulterior motive. It never demands but gives always. The hymn of love in the first book of Paul to the Corinthians in Chapter 13 is one of the sublime passages of the whole Bible.

The commandment of Jesus combines religion and morality, as "neighbour-love involves substantive overlap with the love for God." Jesus articulates the two central principles of his ethics by combining love for God with love for one's neighbour. Jesus' Sermon on the Mount illustrates the central principles of his teaching, demanding radical obedience to God and radical concern for one's neighbour. This combination of religion with morality influences other writers of the New Testament with the linking concept of love. Paul writes "Love is the fulfilling of the law"; John says, "If a man says 'I love God', and hates his brother, he is a liar"; and James calls this commandment "the royal law", as the Mosaic law or the Ten Commandments are fulfilled by following the commandment of loving one's
neighbour as oneself. 146

The "moral" commands, known as the Ten Commandments, lay not only the foundation of social ethics, but they are also 'religious' in character demanding man that "love God with every part and fibre of his being, and that he must also love his neighbour as himself." 147 In fact, the Ten Commandments consist of two parts; the first table consists of duties to God and the second consists of duties to fellow men. Further, these religio-moral commands were given in the context of a covenant established between the people of Israel and their God YHWH on Mount Sinai. In Biblical morality reverence for God and respect for man are both parts of the same contract. Biblical religion combines both Godward and manward responsibilities; for without manward responsibility religion could become remote and unrelated to basic tenets of human solidarity and without Godward responsibility society can become introverted, materialistic and dehumanized. 148 Both these responsibilities are brought together in Jesus' teaching of the summary of the Ten Commandments by the concept of self-giving love. Within the heritage of the Bible, love (agape) can never be separated from justice. Love reaches beyond justice. Justice is a form through which love performs its work. Clinton Gardner affirms the intimate relationship between love and justice, saying, "To divorce love from justice is to turn into pious
sentimentality so that instead of being more than justice it ends up being less than justice." It is worth noting that the relationship between love and justice in a paradoxical manner is an important contribution of Niebuhr and it will be taken up for study in Part C.

Jesus proclaims eschatological message of the kingdom of God which continues to challenge the present life, with its tremendous possibility of transformation, for "the life of the kingdom ultimately transcends good and evil and raises a new man to a state in which the toils of conscience are for the time being left behind." "New creation", "Life in Christ", "New Man" are important concepts in the New Testament which have to be understood in terms of the eschatological ethics of the Christian faith. In the context of the eschatological ethics of the Bible, there is a new vision for a just order for all humans which will be God's own doing. The people who are called and committed to such hope can meaningfully involve themselves in the many programmes of the present, as advance agents, "without falling into a debilitating pessimism nor a contentless utopianism." The biblical message of hope gives a basis to Hogg as well as Niebuhr in the understanding of their mission to the society in which they lived and worked.

According to the fifth view, the distinct
areas between religion and morality cannot be ignored while emphasising the areas which are congruent. The biblical morality permits a teleological suspension of the ethical as Kierkegaard interprets the incident of Abraham's preparedness to sacrifice his only son, Isaac, justifying him teleologically in suspending the ethical obligation toward his son." 152 A purely religious experience of Abraham's faith in God is justified in the higher order of morality, demonstrating his willingness to sacrifice his unique possession to the God of his faith. The biblical morality also accepts the liberation of the people of Israel from bondage and exile in Babylon as moral and religious act in the sixth century B.C. by a Persian king Cyrus who had no connection with Judaism. As a matter of fact, the liberator Cyrus is called "God's anointed" or the Christ, the very title given later to Jesus to Nazareth." 153 A purely moral experience in this incident is thus understood theologically. Within the heritage of the Bible, a purely religious experience is justified teleologically and purely moral experience is interpreted theologically. The fifth view with its common as well as distinct areas between religion and morality is applicable to the biblical morality and consequently to the overall message of the Christian thinkers, Hogg and Niebuhr.

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