CHAPTER - III

CANADA, CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
The People's Republic of China's representation in the United Nations had been a contentious issue for twentyone years in the Sino-Canadian relations. China was a founding member of the UN and a permanent member of the Security Council. When the Chinese Communist forces achieved victory in 1949 and proceeded to claim diplomatic recognition from other countries and the privileges of being the 'Government of China', the issue came up at the UN. Unfortunately, the issue arose at a time when the East-West conflict was at its peak and the issue of Chinese membership in the UN became entangled in that conflict.

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Technically, the Chinese membership in the UN was "a matter of credentials, closely tied to the problem of recognition: which of the rival Chinese regimes was to be treated as the Government of China, entitled to participate on behalf of that state in the United Nations and affiliated organizations". The Soviet Union supported the immediate seating of the Communist Chinese representatives. On the other hand, the United States supported the continued seating of the Nationalist Chinese. During the end of 1949 and early 1950, Canada's Liberal Government under the Prime Ministership of St. Laurent virtually refrained from any

1 On 15 November 1949, Zhou Enlai, Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed the President of the UN General Assembly that the Nationalist Government of Jiang Jieshi was no longer qualified to represent the Chinese people and the PRC was the sole legal Government of China. People's China (Beijing), vol.1, 1 January 1950, p.32.

As with the issue of recognition, there was a definite desire by the Canadian Government to act in unison with its allies. Moreover, for the greater part of this period, the question of Chinese representation revolved around the issue of diplomatic recognition.

In September 1950, for the first time the question of whether to seat the representatives of the Beijing Government was put before the General Assembly of the United Nations. During this period a number of major events had already taken place. The Soviet delegation had boycotted the UN sessions since January 1950 in protest over the failure to seat the Chinese Communist representatives in place of the Nationalists. The Communist bloc strongly supported the entry of the PRC to the UN, thus causing a major division in the UN. In June of that year, the Korean War had broken out causing considerable concern, tension and hesitation over the status of the PRC. Finally, from October 1949, due to a number of domestic and international causes, the United States' opposition towards the PRC had increased immensely. Under this conflicting environment, Canadian policy towards the PRC's entry to the UN moved cautiously.

At the opening session of the General Assembly on 19 September, 1950, a proposal was presented by India asking for a positive decision with regard to seating of Beijing in the UN. It was defeated the same day by a vote of 16 in favour, 33 opposed.

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3 See, L.B. Pearson, Canada, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 7 March 1950, p.517.
with 10 abstentions.\textsuperscript{4} Canada, along with France, had cautiously abstained from the voting. The two Soviet resolutions for removing the Nationalists and seating the Communists in the UN met with the same fate. During the debate the US spoke out strongly against the seating of Mao Zedong's Government.\textsuperscript{5} It was in this situation that the Canadian delegation, headed by Lester B. Pearson, put forward a resolution calling for the establishment of a General Assembly Committee to study the question of the seating of the PRC.\textsuperscript{6} This seven-nation Committee was to make recommendations to the Assembly for its approval. While the Indian and Soviet resolutions were rejected, the Canadian resolution was given a strong favourable vote of 42 in favour, 9 opposed with 6 abstentions.

Undoubtedly, the Canadian plan was a compromise. In keeping with Canada's desire not to isolate China, the issue was not shelved indefinitely in the international organisation. At the same time, it was not an offensive to the strong American opposition to seating the PRC in the UN. In the meantime, the Canadian proposal suggested the continued seating of the Nationalist Government in the General Assembly, with the same rights as the other members, pending a decision by the Assembly. The resolution also specified that the Committee would not report their recommendations on the PRC until the Cuban proposal of

\textsuperscript{4} United Nations General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Session 5, Plen. Mtgs.27, 19 September 1950, p.15.

\textsuperscript{5} The Globe and Mail, 20 September 1950.

\textsuperscript{6} GAOR, n.4, p.16.
'criteria' which the UN could apply in recognizing the representation of member states had been discussed. In effect, discussion of the PRC's seat in the UN was postponed.

The seven-nation committee, composed of Canada, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Mexico, the Phillipines and Poland met on 16 December, 1950. However, the Committee adjourned almost immediately, leaving further meetings to the discretion of the Indian Chairman. It was clear that the members involved in bringing about a cease-fire in Korea - L.B. Pearson, Canada; Sir Benegal Rau, India; and Nasrollah Entezam, Iran - did not want to get involved in the intricacy of the problem, while knowing fully well that any recommendation for replacing Taipeh from the UN would not be acceptable to the US at any cost. It may be said that, the creation of the committee was ill-timed.

The participation of the Chinese Communist forces in the Korean War on 26 October, 1950, and the subsequent resolution passed at the UN General Assembly labelling China an "aggressor" on 1 February, 1951, made the question of seating the PRC more complicated. The relations between Canada and China were further jeopardised as Ottawa found it difficult to decide about the strategy to be adopted. Under pressure from Washington, Canada had reluctantly voted to condemn the PRC as an aggressor in the Korean War. Pearson, however, had believed that such a move was premature and unwise because negotiations with Beijing had not been exhausted. The next day he stated in the House of Commons that

7 Quoted in Canada and the United Nations 1950, (Department of External Affairs; Ottawa) 1951, p.43.
the Chinese Communists "should not think that they can bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the United Nations."\(^8\) Similar sentiments were expressed by Canada throughout the Korean War.

If Canada was so committed to avoiding a large scale conflict, why had Pearson co-sponsored the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution and later branded the PRC as aggressor even though earlier he had opposed the Chinese aggression resolution as irrevocable.\(^9\) In the first place, Pearson had believed that with a multilateral action by the UN there was a chance to exert a moderating influence and consequently lessen the chance of starting Third World War over Korea. Canada had asserted throughout the War that the UN forces were supposed to bring back normalcy to the situation, not to unify Korea by force and in no way intervene in China. Once the UN had been committed to repelling the North Korean aggression and Pearson sincerely believed the North Korean attack to be an aggression, he was compelled to make every possible effort to maintain the integrity of the UN, not only by supporting it morally and materially, but also by trying to prevent this "police action" from becoming a crusade to abolish Communism in China and the USSR. Moreover, the increasingly bellicose mood of the US and Zhou Enlai's demand for liberation of Taiwan, withdrawal of the UN forces from Korea and China's admission to the UN, caused Pearson to fear that the USSR

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\(^8\) L.B. Pearson, Canada, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 2 February 1951, p.55.

might have its way and that an all-out war might ensue which he considered to be the greatest danger to peace and freedom of the nations.\textsuperscript{10} Thus, Canada's main aim was to provide every chance to the UN to prove itself as an organization committed to prevent an all-out war, but not to the extent of paying the unrealistic costs of extermination of the Communist world. Although, this might not have been successful but certainly it would have exacerbated the relations among the countries concerned.

During the Korean War the PRC had represented a somewhat more difficult problem for Canada. On 1 October, 1950, Zhou Enlai had warned that China would not permit the extinction of North Korea by the UN forces.\textsuperscript{11} For the Chinese it implied:

that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea and that the Korean people should be allowed to settle the Korean question themselves. It was only because the U.S. Government unscrupulously and repeatedly refused to accept this, continued to extend the aggressive war in Korea, directly threatened China's security and jeopardised China's peaceful construction, that the Chinese people could tolerate the situation no longer. They volunteered to resist America, aid Korea and defend their homes and Motherland, an act which was in complete conformity with justice.\textsuperscript{12}

Canada's diplomatic initiative, was somewhat different from that of the US. On the one hand it respected the UN and its allies and on the other hand it wanted to contain the conflicts and maintain the contacts between the UN and China. The Canadian

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{11}Peter Cheng, A Chronology of the People's Republic of China (New Jersey, 1972), p.8.
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initiative paid dividends when the discussions initiated in July 1951, finally led to the armistice in July, 1953. The Chinese by then had dropped their earlier preconditions regarding Taiwan, their admission to the UN and troops withdrawal from Korea, and were willing to stop fighting before the talks.

The War had convinced St. Laurent and Pearson that keeping the PRC out of the UN was not wise. The Canadian argument was that the admission of China to the UN where it could be made accountable would be better for world peace. This line of thought was not acceptable to the US. In 1953, both the US President, Eisenhower and the Secretary of State, Dulles, made it explicit that the Americans would not allow the entry of China to the UN. Moreover, the US commitment to the defence of Taiwan during and after the War had completely changed the situation. The Taiwan problem not only became the focal point of Sino-American antagonism but also a stumbling block to the Sino-Canadian relations regarding the UN representation issue as well as the recognition issue. Canada's stand was that the destiny of the Island should be left to an international conference after an armistice, taking into account the wishes of the Formosans. Thus the Sino-Canadian relations became complicated by the Taiwan problem, inspite of Canada's efforts to keep the door open for future contacts.

Events of 1954, at the Geneva Conference indicated that both Canada and China had showed some interest in atleast opening the way for closer relations.\(^{13}\) The Chinese, particularly had showed

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13 Earlier discussed in Chapter 2.
some accommodative postures. However, in early September, hardly a month after the Indo-China Agreements had been signed at Geneva, the Chinese Communists started shelling the Off-Shore Islands of Matsu and Quemoy, which was a warning to the Nationalists and to the US not to attempt an invasion of the PRC.  

By April 1955, the Off-Shore crisis had passed, and a somewhat less hostile thinking prevailed among the Americans and the Chinese Communists towards each other.

The Off-Shore Islands crisis, however, had a lasting impression on the Canadian Governments' attitude towards China's entry to the UN. The emphasis of Canada's China policy began to shift towards the UN. The Canadian Government began to perceive the UN as an useful device for closer relationship with the PRC. Consequently, the issue of PRC's admission to the UN was separated from the issue of diplomatic recognition by the Canadian Government. In early 1954, Pearson asserted that diplomatic recognition was not a matter of approval, but rather a matter of "national interest", whereas China's admission to the UN might suggest approval of the Communist regime.

Towards the end of 1954, Pearson further asserted that recognition might encourage China's aggressive behaviour, but the admission to the UN would provide a way to deal with the PRC's


15 ibid, p.30.

aggressiveness. In a more general statement in Ottawa in December 1954, he further stated that the UN would benefit if it included "more of the sovereign states which exercise influence in their parts of the world". By then, Canada had recognized China's regional status in the Far East and had come to realize that it was impossible on the part of the UN to stabilize the Far Eastern situation without the acquiescence and probable approval of the PRC.

The change in Canada's attitude towards China was probably a result of influences from the external inputs. The Korean War, the ensuing difficulties at Geneva, and the Off-Shore Islands crisis, had demonstrated to the Canadian Government that it was in its interest to deal with the Beijing Government through some sort of international organization where the diplomatic maneuvering with China could be possible and easier. Moreover, this strategy would provide Canada with more leverage against the increasingly rigid position of the US towards the PRC.

However, the inflexible opposition of the US leaders to the PRC's entry into the UN discouraged Canada's strategy towards China and thus acted as a stumbling block in Sino-Canadian relations. The American opposition was confirmed when St. Laurent and Pearson met the US President, Eisenhower in March 1956, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. The US was adamant on any move which would facilitate China's entry into the UN.

18 *ibid.*
Eisenhower categorically stated in the meeting that he opposed the Chinese Communist regime, "whose hands were dripping with the blood of Americans killed in Korea". It may be stated here that by that time Canada was well aware of the US's hostile attitude towards the PRC but St. Laurent had brought up the issue in the meeting as he had been strongly influenced by India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru's wish for bringing mainland China into the UN. Canada had genuinely begun to consider taking an initiative in that direction.

Eisenhower warned the Canadians that if Canada supported China's admission to the UN, other Western nations would soon follow suit and soon Mao Zedong's regime would acquire the seat in the UN which would prompt retaliation by the US against the UN. The Canadian Prime Minister promised not to create any difficulty over the issue for the US, at least until the Presidential election was over. Moreover, the US domestic reaction on the UN seat for Beijing was worsened by an unanimous US Senate resolution opposing Chinese Communist representation. There was a fear that Washington might withdraw from the UN if China's admission was forced, which would mark the demise of the UN. In the wake of such a hostile US posture, there appeared to be no other alternative for Canada. St. Laurent and Pearson explained Canada's reason for sticking to the status quo on the issue to

20 ibid.

Nehru at the 1956 Commonwealth Conference. On July 1956, Pearson ended the UN representation issue by declaring that the PRC as still "an unrepentant aggressor" which broke the rule of the UN Charter, thereby not deserving a UN seat. He further admitted that if the PRC was admitted to the UN, then a rift between the US and its allies would split the West. This would cause irretrievable harm to the UN. In such a situation the issue of recognition became secondary and the Chinese representation would have to precede bilateral recognition if Canada was to avoid problems with its neighbour, US. Despite personal preference for recognition and the UN seating for the PRC, both St. Laurent and Pearson could not concretize their wishes into a policy. It seemed convenient for them to let it lie for the moment.

Despite China's exclusion from the UN, its initial policy at the time of establishment of the PRC was positive, active and relatively defensive. On 15 November, 1949, China's Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai in a cable to the President of the UN General Assembly questioned the legal status of the Nationalist delegation in the UN and affirmed that the Central People's Government was

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24 ibid.
the sole legal Government of China. 25 Although the UN had showed its negative attitude, the PRC was not discouraged. During the following months Beijing kept on sending cables to the UN for immediate replacement of the Nationalist Government delegation with the new delegation appointed by the PRC. "If Peking ever had a favourable opinion of the U.N., it was during this early period before its active and direct contacts with the U.N. turned its high hopes into frustration." 26 It may be stated here that the only demand Beijing had made during this initial period was about its claim on the UN seat held by the Nationalist Chinese. However, as it turned out, this single demand of Beijing got linked with the Korean War, sovereignty of Taiwan and East-West conflict for which the question of Chinese representation in the UN remained undecided for two long decades.

The outbreak of the Korean War and the sudden change in US behaviour towards the PRC forced Mao Zedong to show his determination to meet the challenge. However, Beijing did not lose interest in the UN. On the other hand Beijing took a new posture by which offensive charges were lodged against the US through the UN. 27 Beijing's optimistic view regarding its seat in the UN quickly dissipated and there was a change in its attitude. While earlier it had taken a relatively defensive posture, now it became much more offensive.


The shift in the Chinese posture was manifested in many ways. When the UN intervened in the Korean crisis, Beijing started to make a distinction between the Charter and the UN. While Beijing supported the former, it denounced the latter as an instrument of US "imperialism". It also declared that all decisions made by the UN without its participation were "illegal and consequently null and void." Beijing had further stated that without its participation, it would be impossible to settle any major international questions, particularly questions relating to Asia. Therefore, it had claimed that it was essential to restore its legitimate rights in the UN for safeguarding world peace and international security. On this question, Canada and China had expressed similar viewpoints. Thus it may be stated here that this shift in China's stand was due to the new developments in the international arena.

In the post Korean War phase Beijing attached more importance to the Taiwan problem. In 1954, it realized that in order to liberate Taiwan and to enter the UN it must wage a protracted struggle. It was clear to Beijing that things had become complicated and the US interests would work against her expectations. Thus it thought of formulating a long-term strategy. During this phase, the PRC was well aware of its weakness and a sense of mistrust for the UN developed in the minds of China's leaders. Furthermore it had started sensing its

28 This was stated in a telegram sent to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General of the UN on 16 September, 1950. China Monthly Review (Shanghai), Supplement, vol.119, no.2, October 1950, p.5.
inability to get its wish accepted by the UN under the prevailing circumstances. Its strategic moves were characterised by a defensive posture - the first stage of the protracted struggle. Furthermore, the PRC instead of requesting or demanding its legitimate rights in the UN, concentrated upon creating world opinion. For example in 1955 at the Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai tried to convey to the leaders of the developing and underdeveloped countries that Beijing believed in peaceful co-existence.

The Chinese had thought that if they could influence the newly independent countries, they later on could gradually support her entry into the UN. Indeed it was a tactical move by the PRC. The fact remains that as the membership strength expanded by the admission of newly independent countries, the number and percentage of votes favouring Chinese representation in the UN increased after 1954 and the US influence gradually declined in proportion. In such a situation Zhou Enlai had stated, "More and more countries realize that the time has now come to improve the present situation in the United Nations". It seems Beijing might have thought at that point of time that gradually, the US domination in the UN would decline and it would replace the Nationalist Chinese, as a great power.

29 Weng, n.26, p.93.
In June 1957 a new Progressive Conservative minority Government under the Prime Ministership of John G. Diefenbaker came to power in Canada. The change from a Liberal to Conservative Government brought about a new trading relationship with the PRC but no change in policy regarding Chinese representation in the UN, apart from perhaps a stronger concern for protecting the position of Taibei. On the other hand, during the early years of Diefenbaker as the Prime Minister, China's approach towards the UN was comparatively aggressive. After the 1961 General Assembly resolution, for the first time, the PRC's attitude towards the UN turned from positive to negative or from an appeal to threat, which continued till the launching of Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Ever since 1950, Canada's Conservative Party had emphasised the aggressive nature and policies of the PRC as prohibiting its admission to the UN. During the Korean War and while Communist led guerillas were active in Indo-China in 1953-54, the spokesmen of Conservative Party had repeatedly stated that the PRC should not be rewarded with admission to the UN due to its exercise of power and force. Diefenbaker had stated, "that no international thug should be allowed to shoot its way into the United Nations." Later, in 1961, Conservative policy was very precise in its indictment of the PRC. It was stated then that not only was the PRC branded as an 'aggressor nation' by the UN, but that it was

32 Canada, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 24 March 1954, p.3336. Also see, ibid, 25 March 1954, pp.3359-60.
still at war with the UN since no peace treaty had been signed in Korea, except an armistice; that the PRC had violated every article in the UN Charter; that the PRC was supporting armed aggression in Southeast Asia; and finally, that the PRC had been condemned in a UN resolution for committing genocide in Tibet.33

No doubt, the Conservative Government's anti-Communist ideology, and sympathy towards Taiwan and the Taiwanese people were greater than the previous Liberal Government under St. Laurent.

Chinese behaviour and other international events were the stumbling blocks in the Sino-Canadian relations. The US opposition to any Canadian positive posture in the UN on the China issue remained firm. Diefenbaker's meetings with Eisenhower and Dulles in September 1957 and July 1958 reaffirmed the US objection to China's entry into the UN.34 Further tensions increased in August 1958 in the Formosa Straits due to heavy shelling of the Off-Shore Islands by the Chinese Communists.35 The official Canadian position on the second Off-Shore Islands crisis hardly changed from the first crisis. Once again Canada stuck to its non-commitment and non-intervention policy with regard to the Off-Shore crisis. However, the aggression by the Communists became the main reason for Sydney Smith, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Deifenbaker's Government, to support shelving the Chinese representation issue at the thirteenth UN General

33 ibid, 7 September 1961, p.8098.
34 Raabe, n.23, p.50.
35 Earlier discussed in Chapter 2.
Assembly. The incident and other belligerent Chinese actions such as the Chinese troops' forcible dominance over Tibet in March 1959 which forced the Dalai Lama to seek asylum in India, eroded the popularity of the Chinese among the Canadians.

Diefenbaker's and Smith's world tour in the Fall of 1958 provided an opportunity to clarify the Canadian Government's position on the China issue. Particularly in New Delhi, he showed a little flexibility while discussing with Jawaharlal Nehru about the problems involved in bringing the PRC into the UN. During the meeting Nehru's argument had some effect on Diefenbaker's thinking, as they had on St. Laurent and Pearson. In the New Delhi Press Conference he admitted the tremendous potentialities of the PRC and encouraged trade and other contacts with the Chinese. Moreover, he became convinced that the first step towards Sino-Canadian relations should be the solution of the Chinese representation problems in the UN. On the contrary, the Liberal Government strategy was that the question of Chinese membership in the UN should be preceded by the question of final recognition. After the tour, Smith appeared to develop a concern for the China issues and his differences with Diefenbaker became publicly noticeable.

38 Raabe, n.23, pp.51-52.
40 Globe and Mail, 10 January 1959.
It is pertinent to state here that Sydney Smith was more positive on the China issue than Diefenbaker. As a result, there emerged a more visible division in the Canadian Cabinet during the tenure of Smith than in the St.Laurent-Pearson period. Smith cited a number of reasons why China should be brought into the mainstream of international politics. Nevertheless, he urged caution and prudence in developing closer relations with China.\textsuperscript{41} Smith's opinions were somewhat different from that of Diefenbaker's. The Opposition leader L.B. Pearson shared Smith's attitude on China and until Smith's sudden death in March 1959, it appeared that Canada had been moving along the path marked by Pearson towards a more positive posture on China. Diefenbaker had even accepted the idea of permitting Canada to vote in favour of including the China issue in the UN agenda.\textsuperscript{42}

The death of Sydney Smith restored harmony on the UN and recognition issue in the Diefenbaker Cabinet. The new Minister for External Affairs, Howard Green, agreed with the Prime Minister on Canada's China policies and supported his more negative view of the PRC. As a result Canada's attitudes towards China stiffened. For the Canadian Prime Minister, as the Chinese Communists were still unrepentent international outlaws who had not expiated their wrong doings in Korea, it was judicious to shelve the Chinese representation issue until a later time.\textsuperscript{43} However, this was in contradiction to Diefenbaker's position in November 1958 when in

\textsuperscript{41} For details see, Canada, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 26 February 1959, pp.1405-7.

\textsuperscript{42} Montreal Star, 29 May 1959.

\textsuperscript{43} Globe and Mail, 16 August 1959.
Kuala Lumpur he had stated, "the subject is never closed." Thus, during Sydney Smith's term as the External Affairs Minister, the China issue did not appear to be closed, whereas during the term of his successor Howard Green, there seemed little hope for any change in Canada's stance regarding the UN issue.

The status of Taiwan was an important issue that had become associated with the UN and the Chinese representation question. Canada's Conservative Government was more concerned about the status of the Taiwanese than the previous Liberal Government. Some form of self-determination for the Formosans was considered as their essential right. This concern was expressed by Howard Green on behalf of the Canadian Government when he asserted that:

.... there are a great many people living on Formosa who are native Formosans. No one is anxious to have them turned over to Red China. I think this would be a disastrous move to make, yet Red China is not interested in recognition or entry into the United Nations unless her right to take over Formosa is accepted. This, of course, has been one of the very big obstacles in the way of taking steps to change the present situation. Eventually, the wishes of Formosa will have to be an important factor. In considering this whole question I suggest that it would be wise for Canadians not to forget the important factor of Formosa in the whole picture.

Moreover, Diefenbaker declared in the context of China's entry into the UN that the Canadian Government would "attach particular importance to the right of the people of Taiwan to decide their own future, and the right of the government of

44 Vancouver Sun, 28 November 1958.
45 Canada, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 26 April 1961, p.4028.
Taiwan to be represented at the United Nations.\textsuperscript{46} In fact, Canada's concern over Taiwan led to its support for a \textit{de facto} "two-China" policy by 1961.

On the other hand, China rejected the Canadian view on Taiwan. Liu Jen, commenting on China's stand on Taiwan, had said:

\textit{...Taiwan has been Chinese territory since ancient times and forms an inalienable part of China... We resolutely oppose the crimes of aggression of the United States. We will certainly liberate our sacred territory of Taiwan, smash U.S. imperialism's plot to create 'two Chinas', and complete the great cause of the unification of all Chinas...}\textsuperscript{47}

Thus while Canada thought of protection for the status of Taiwan, the PRC was neither interested in recognition nor entry into the UN unless her right to take over Formosa was approved. The adoption of this stance by the Chinese became an excuse for Canada in shelving the UN representation issue as well as the recognition question.

The period 1957 to 1961 seemed to characterize Beijing's impatience to move towards the second stage of the protracted struggle. Now its approach towards the UN was comparatively aggressive. On 19 October, 1960, \textit{Renmin Ribao} commenting on the fifteenth session of the General Assembly said in its editorial that the session was in a "very favourable international situation characterized by the prevailing of the East Wind over the West

\textsuperscript{46} ibid, 20 September 1961, p.8592.

\textsuperscript{47} Liu Jen, "Peking Militia Demonstration: We will Certainly Liberate Taiwan", \textit{Peking Review}, vol.3, no.26, 28 June 1960, p.16.
Wind", but because of the "ferocious features" of the US, a "series of shameful events" took place, such as the refusal to discuss the question of the restoration of China's lawful rights in the UN. It further went on to say that "the development of history is not determined by the U.N. voting machine. The majority in the United Nations can by no means save imperialism from its inevitable doom. Furthermore, even this U.S. voting machine in the United Nations is becoming less efficient... Today we are in a minority, but tomorrow, as we foretell you, you will be in a minority."48 It may be said here that probably the failure of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) had aroused a lot of confusion among the Chinese leadership. Moreover, Beijing had feared the adoption of a "two China" policy for solving the Chinese representation by the UN, for which Beijing took such a militant and arrogant approach towards the UN.

After the 1960 UN General Assembly session there were more compelling reasons for seeking a change in the Canadian policy. In spite of worsening Sino-Indian relations, India still supported China's entry into the UN, thereby destroying the old argument that its aggressive behaviour warranted its exclusion from the UN. In September 1960 fifteen African nations had been admitted to the UN. Moreover, in the US, John F. Kennedy was elected as the new President in place of Richard M. Nixon. With the new President in the US there were reports that the US was finally going to drop the moratorium tactic on the question of Chinese representation in the UN. However, due to severe domestic pressure, the Kennedy

administration failed to adopt a new China policy. Moreover, Beijing had tried in vain to persuade the Kennedy administration to negotiate some kind of a deal.

At the sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly in 1961, the question of Chinese representation was given a full debate for the first time since 1950. The Soviet resolution called for the immediate removal of the Chinese Nationalists and their replacement by the representatives of the PRC. It was defeated by 36 in favour and 48 against with 20 abstentions. Canada voted against the Soviet resolution:

....the Soviet resolution...was inequitable and contrary to the interests of the United Nations... In the Canadian view (the cause of justice and peace) would not be achieved by the extinction of the political identity of Formosa but would be served by the recognition of the right of the people of Formosa to determine their own future.49

The other resolution which Canada voted in favour of was the one put forward by Australia; Colombia, Italy, Japan and the US. This resolution was passed in the UN stating that any proposal intended to change the representation of China be considered an important question and consequently require a two-thirds majority vote. Canada’s Conservative Government was in full agreement with the move in 1961 for the reason that

...the question was clearly an 'important' one within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. At the same time... Canada was willing to consider carefully any proposal to settle the question of Chinese representation equitably. To this end it suggested a

full examination of all elements of the question, by whatever means might be found generally acceptable, so that by the (Seventeenth) session of the General Assembly a solution might be anticipated which would carry the general judgement and serve the cause of justice and peace.50

The US took up this strategy of "two-third majority vote" as its intention of blocking China's entry into the UN was threatened by the favourable response of the African states towards the PRC and some restlessness on the China issue by the UK and France.51 Therefore, the US in order to ensure nonadmittance of the PRC made sure that, the China issue no more should be treated as a procedural matter, with a simple majority, sufficient to admit the Chinese Communist and oust the Nationalists. The adoption of the requirement of two-third majority votes made the PRC's entry into the UN more difficult. At the same time, in order not to antagonise its major ally, Canada had supported the US resolution by advocating a "two China" solution to the China issue. Moreover, the primary reason for Canada voting against the resolution to admit the PRC into the UN and expel the Nationalists was that no provision had been made for Taiwan.52

The only realistic solution seemed to involve some variations of the "two China" formula. But since neither side was willing to countenance that prospect, nothing positive came out on the China issue. At the UN, support for the important question held firm, and successive Canadian delegations were instructed not to take an

50 ibid.
51 Globe and Mail, 9 September 1961; also, 10 February 1961.
52 Canada and the United Nations, 1961, n.49.
active role in any debate on the issue when there were more important subjects requiring the attention of the delegates. In 1962 any inclination to move on the China issue in the UN was marred by China's aggressive behaviour towards India.\textsuperscript{53} To this was added the Cuban missile crisis, which preoccupied the UN and particularly Canadian diplomats. These events overshadowed China's admission to the UN.

Hence, nothing dramatic in terms of China's seat in the UN was accomplished during Diefenbaker's tenure in the Prime Minister's Office. Canada's Conservative Government from 1957 to 1963 basically did not step out of the line it inherited from the previous Liberal Government. With the exception of Sydney Smith, the Conservative leaders' personal attitudes to China were harsher than those of the Liberal leaders. Trade expansion was launched mainly because it suited the national interests of both the countries. The US factor regarding China persisted and acted as a major hurdle in Sino-Canadian relations. Under no circumstance, would the Diefenbaker Government espouse a positive China policy which would endanger Canada's relationship with the US.

After the 1961 General Assembly resolution crushed Beijing's hope to take over its seat in the UN, China's policy towards the UN underwent a change. It took place at a time when Canada failed to make a positive move in favour of the PRC. Now Beijing shifted its thinking towards finding or creating a substitute for the UN and that was the search of an Afro-Asian world. It appealed to the

\textsuperscript{53} Hinton, n.14, p.299.
Afro-Asian countries for the creation of a new "revolutionary" world forum. The Vice-Premier Chen Yi had pointed out:

Ours is a new era in which imperialism is doomed to extinction, and the Asian, African and all enslaved and oppressed nations are determined to stand up.... The Asian and African peoples will surely sharpen their vigilance still more, strengthen their unity, hold even higher the banner of the Bandung Conference, and press on victoriously till the total and complete destruction of colonialism and imperialism.54

However, China's initiative failed. It was the period when Sino-Soviet rift had taken place and the Soviet Union was termed as a "revisionist" force. Now China was struggling not only against US "imperialism" but also Soviet "revisionism".

It seemed that by now Beijing had lost its interest for the UN seat. It realised that there was an advantage to stay outside the UN by which it made her free to oppose or support the actions of the UN. Moreover, there was little hope of solving the Taiwan problem for Beijing. Thus, there was no other choice except being patient. In 1962, during the Third Taiwan Strait crisis, the Taiwan Government gave the impression that it would recover the mainland. Beijing reacted vigilantly but refrained from taking any action. As time passed, more and more nations started stressing Taiwan's potentiality in relation to its economic progress and it became more and more difficult for Beijing to claim the re-unification of Taiwan with the mainland.

During 1962 to 1965 China's direct comments on the UN had abruptly subsided. It seemed that the only important comment on

the UN after the 1961 General Assembly session was published in an editorial of *Renmin Ribao* on 18 December, 1963, which was a rebuttal of the Soviet Union's effort to link the question of Chinese representation with that of the broadening of Afro-Asian representation in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The editorial further declared:

> Until the restoration of China's legitimate rights ... China will undertake no commitment on any activity or decision of the United Nations, including the revision or non-revision of the U.N. Charter... The Chinese Government has, however, always judged the activities of the UN on their intrinsic merits. We resolutely oppose all evil doings of the U.N., but will have no objection to the good things, if any, done by the U.N. 55

Interestingly, the PRC did not insist in this editorial, as it had done before, that any revision of the UN Charter without its participation would be illegal. Certainly, the editorial was designed to suit the taste of the Afro-Asian countries without jeopardising its own position regarding the UN.

**LIBERAL GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVES: 1963-1966**

In April 1963, Lester B. Pearson, the Liberal leader, formed a minority Government in Canada with Paul Martin as the Secretary of State for External Affairs. With the return of Liberals to the Canadian Government, there came a renewed desire to see a breakthrough on the Chinese representation question. This was somewhat surprising since Paul Martin who had opposed Pearson's attempts at the recognition of the PRC and its representation in

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55 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 52, 27 December 1953, pp. 14-16.
the UN in the 1950s, came to realize in 1963 the virtue of extending recognition and admitting Beijing into the international organization. Both, Pearson and Martin, set to move the Sino-Canadian relations in a new direction, but some factors taken over from the previous regime remained major barriers. An important factor was the status of Taiwan. Though Pearson and Martin held no special inclination for the Jiang Jieshi's regime, they could not desert the cause of the self-determination of the Taiwanese. As a result, "one China, one Taiwan" formula was developed and pursued assiduously in the UN. Ironically, until 1966 the Pearson Government retained the previous Conservative Government's posture of China's entry into the UN prior to granting recognition to the PRC. During this period the China questions were complicated by such developments as, Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN, the American involvement in the Vietnam War and the outburst of the GRCR in China.

Martin regarded Beijing's exclusion as an unfinished business. For him universality was much easier to espouse than recognition which could cost Canada something in its relations with the US. In a major and much publicized speech on 24 August, 1963, in Toronto, Martin questioned whether further isolation and containment of Beijing would be prudent in the light of the growing divergence in the Communist world. While acknowledging that Canada's relations with the Communist world should not be at "wide variance" with those of its allies, it was, nevertheless,

necessary to "proceed forward with a realistic and yet progressive attitude." 57

However, Martin could not persuade the Prime Minister to allow him to bring the subject before the Cabinet. Lester B. Pearson was concerned that it would raise unwarranted expectations, given the past US attitudes. In any event Martin was not given to having foreign policy debated in the Cabinet. Pearson was, however, willing to let Martin sound out current views in Washington. There Martin could learn that no initiative could be expected that year from the US because of the war in Vietnam. Shortly thereafter he told the French Ambassador that, consequently, none could be expected from Canada in the near future.

During the first year of the Liberal Government in Canada although more positive attitudes on the UN issue were reflected by Canada, the Taiwan issue still continued to remain as a major hurdle. Paul Martin proclaimed in the Commons, "the Canadian Government is ready to consider carefully any proposal to settle equitably the question of Chinese representation, but an equitable solution... must preserve for the people of Formosa the right to self-determination." 58 Martin later noted in his Memoirs that he was "never opposed to admitting the People's Republic to the UN". 59 It seemed there appeared to emerge a priority for the

57 *Statements and Speeches*, 63/17, 24 August 1963.


59 Martin, n.56, p.508.
solution of China's entry into the UN issue and a de facto "two China" formula by the Canadian Government. Martin cited protection of the status of Taiwan as the main reason for voting against the UN resolution for China's entry into the UN and expulsion of Taiwan from the organization.

The Sino-Canadian relations suddenly took a new turn when France recognized the PRC diplomatically on 27 January, 1964. The greatest concern for Canada was possibly the effect of such a move on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter NATO) unity and the UN. Within NATO Councils Canada unsuccessfully argued, against the US opposition, that France's action was not all that bad, as it provided a Western contact that ought to be exploited in working out a means of ending Beijings isolation. Pearson in his meeting with the US President, Lyndon Johnson, conceded that not much could be done about the French decision other than calmly accepting it and minimizing the bad impact. But the US officials, being worried about a chain reaction caused by France's action, opposed any Canadian move to do the same. Although Pearson was noncommittal on the issue at the Summit, he assured the US President that Canada would take no action without consulting Washington. In addition it was at first speculated in Canada that France and China had agreed on some type of "two China" formula as no clause requiring France's diplomatic severance with


Taiwan was included in the Communique. The speculation provided a suitable environment that wished to follow a "two China" path. But soon Canada's hopes got shattered when in February Zhou Enlai said, "The fact that France has established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China naturally implies that she ceases to recognize the so-called 'Republic of China'...". Moreover around the same time, De Gaulle said that France recognised only one China and implied that the Nationalists could retain relations with France as the Government of Taiwan. This was clearly unacceptable to Taibei and it severed relations with France.

The failure to retain diplomatic status quo with Taiwan might have convinced the Canadian policy makers that any attempt to recognize the PRC on the basis of any variation of the "two-China" policy would not be successful. Primarily for this reason, Canada undertook the strategy of first pursuing a UN seat for the Chinese rather than initiating direct diplomatic relations. The consequence of reaching a bilateral agreement with Beijing would put Canada in the same uneasy state as France while the UN admission for Beijing would not entail all the difficulties of the recognition issue.

Moreover, to take an opposite course by initiating diplomatic relations first, Paul Martin recalled, "would endanger Canada's

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64 Hinton, n.14, pp.150-51.
relations with its NATO allies, especially the United States. 65 Furthermore, Canada's approach towards China's entry into the UN was in line with the traditional Canadian middle power role in international politics - bringing the problem into the UN first, and solving it through combined effort of friendly countries, which could be the best alternative to withstand the obstacles from the US, the PRC and Taiwan. Canada, also, rightly judged that international pressure created in the UN could be fully utilized to gain a diplomatic upper hand over the US and China, and might secure diplomatic relations in better terms.

Canada's decision on China's representation in the UN had been greatly influenced by news in October 1964 that the Communists had detonated a nuclear device. 66 For the US and its Pacific allies this action confirmed the desire to keep the Communists out of the UN. Beijing would have to conform to UN standards before it could be accepted into the UN membership. The response in the Department of External Affairs in Canada was the opposite. For Canada it was now all the more important that the PRC be made internationally accountable through membership in the UN.

Moreover, the negative attitudes of the PRC towards the UN and its search for Afro-Asian unity as an alternative to the UN and other international developments caused setbacks for China's entry into the UN. On 31 December, 1964, two days after Malaysia occupied the seat in the Security Council, Indonesia's President

65 Martin, n.56, p.513.

Sukarno declared in a mass meeting in Jakarta that, if Malaysia became a member of the Security Council, Indonesia would withdraw from the UN. A week later, at another mass rally in Jakarta Sukarno announced, "from now Indonesia is no longer a member of the UN." 67

Beijing welcomed Indonesia's decision of withdrawal from the UN. The Chinese President, Liu Shao Chi "expressed great appreciations" for Sukarno's statement. He said that "the crown of independence of a country does not lie in membership of the United Nations" but "in self-reliance", and further stated that in pursuing self-reliance, Asian and African countries should rely on mutual assistance among themselves based on the principle of equality and should not depend on aid from the imperialists. 68 It was further opined by the Beijing leadership that:

It is quite understandable that newly independent Asian and African countries should have placed some hopes in the United Nations. However, more and more facts have shown that the United Nations has been increasingly reduced to a tool of imperialism and old and new colonialism headed by the United States... In its development over the past 20 years, the United Nations has reached a stage where a reappraisal of it in the light of its actual deeds has become necessary. The People's Republic of China representing the 650 million Chinese people has all along been excluded from the United Nations and now Indonesia representing 104 million people is compelled to withdraw from it. Is this not adequate proof that this so called world organisation needs to be thoroughly remoulded?... 69


69 ibid.
Furthermore, on 29 September, 1965, China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, stipulated several stiff demands upon the UN at a press conference, where he said:

How can China be expected to take part in an international organisation which calls her an aggressor? Calling China an aggressor and asking the aggressor to join, would not the United Nations be slapping its own face?... the United Nations must rectify its mistakes and undergo a thorough reorganization and reform. It must admit and correct all its past mistakes. Among other things, it should cancel its resolution condemning China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as aggressors and adopt a resolution condemning the United States as the aggressor...70

These demands were, of course, unacceptable to Canada. In the Canadian Parliament, Paul Martin strongly criticized the Chinese Communists for the stalemate in the UN. Canada alleged that such strong demands indicated Beijing's aggressive posture towards the UN. To the Canadians one of the reasons for such development was Beijing's newly found nuclear capability, and, moreover, in order to enhance its prestige, probably it might have wished to bring the US-influenced UN to its terms.

On 17 November, 1965, in the UN General Assembly session the "important question" resolution stipulating the necessity of a two-third majority for the acceptance of the Albania resolution was vetoed by 56 to 49. The other resolution proposed by Albania demanding Beijing's seat in the General Assembly and Security Council by replacing Taibei was tied with 47 in favour and 47 in opposition. Canada voted for the former but opposed the latter.

As a consequence of this development, at a NATO ministerial meeting in December 1965, Paul Martin warned of a strong possibility of Beijing's achieving a simple majority at the 1966 UN General Assembly. There was a need to find a way to bring the PRC into the UN in a smooth manner. By early 1966, the US attitude towards China had mellowed down. In such an environment Pearson in a speech at Columbia University in the middle of May 1966 voiced hope for a Sino-Canadian rapprochement. He urged for finding some ways to expand contacts and communications between the West and the PRC, though, later in the Commons, he denied any firm position on the Chinese representation in the UN.

Though Pearson favoured the "one China, one Taiwan" proposal, he did not want Martin to initiate it because of fear of rejection from Beijing and Taipei. Moreover, the US President, Johnson's, firm commitment to Taiwan made it necessary to avoid the Taiwanese expulsion from the UN. Neither Pearson nor Martin wished to desert the Formosan's right to self-determination. They recommended abstention on the Albanian resolution and continued their support for the "important question" resolution. Undoubtedly, for Canada, Washington's reaction was more vital than that of Beijing.

Although Canada had wanted to take some positive initiatives, the American factor remained a major obstacle. In early July 1966,

71 Amour, n.60, p.34.
72 ibid.
73 Globe and Mail, 13 May 1966.
Jiang Jieshi in a discussion with the US Secretary of State for External Affairs, Dean Rusk, vehemently objected to any type of "two China" formula. On 26 July, Rusk revealed to Martin citing opposition from the Southeast Asian countries how serious the world situation would be by admitting the PRC to the UN. On 26 August, 1966 at the Banff Conference on World Affairs in Canada, Paul Martin stated, "until now, no acceptable means of bringing Communist China into the United Nations has been offered or, indeed, has seemed possible". He further added, "the Canadian Government has long advocated and striven to encourage the establishment of mutually-beneficial contacts between Communist China and Canada, as well as with the rest of the international community."74 The Conference however only concluded with a consensus report which endorsed immediate recognition of Beijing to be ensued by efforts with regard to China's entry to the UN.

Moreover, in October 1966 the delegates of Canada's Liberal Party in a conference approved a resolution calling for the immediate recognition of Beijing and its admission to the UN. It also endorsed the diplomatic recognition of the PRC and the Republic of China (hereafter ROC) and seating of both in the UN. Canada's intention was unfortunately delivered to the US State Department on the very day that Beijing tested an atomic missile. This made the US leaders extremely unhappy. At this time, a move forward would have possibly encouraged the hardliners in Beijing. Moreover, the Canadian proposal would have rendered the Security

Council ineffective for the settling if disputes of the Communists were admitted. The US Secretary of State, Rusk, particularly made it clear that, "the U.S. would use every ounce of its influence to ensure defeat by the widest possible margin". He further warned that "this open split with its old friend would have serious repercussions on bilateral relations". 75 Rusk suggested to Canada to sponsor a study committee to which the US would render its full support. Although Canada agreed to the proposal of the US, it was not prepared to give up its own resolution.

On 22 November, 1966, in the UN General Assembly session, Paul Martin supported the "important question" resolution and declared Canada's interim solution, as follows:

first, the participation of the Republic of China in the UN General Assembly as member representing the territory over which it exercises effective jurisdiction; second, the participation of the People's Republic of China in the UNGA as member representing the territory over which it exercises effective jurisdiction; third, the participation of the People's Republic of China in the Security Council as a permanent member. 76

He further emphasized that the Canadian solution was "in no way intended to imply the existence of two Chinas", and left the issue as "an internal matter" to be resolved by the Chinese themselves and "from which the United Nations in accordance with a clear disposition of the Charter is bound to stand aside". It was a major departure from the previous Government's stance. However,

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the US was absolutely firm in its support to the ROC and supported the Italian proposal to create a committee to explore the Chinese membership question.

Canada voted for the "important question" and the Italian "study committee" resolutions while for the first time in sixteen years it abstained on the Albania resolution and worked hard at what "Martin called 'movement' towards 'universality' in this world organization." The "important question" resolution was passed 66 to 48 with 7 abstentions. The "study committee" resolution was defeated 34 to 62 with 25 abstentions. The Albania resolution scored worse than in the last year; 46 in favour, 57 against, and 17 abstentions. Paul Martin had thought that the defeat of the American endorsed Italian resolution had sent "a clear signal to Washington that it would have to move soon on the China issue, and certainly by the time the internal tumult in China had subsided."78

The US reaction to Canada's voting in the General Assembly was unexpectedly calm 79 and Canada's domestic response was on the whole favourable to Martin's initiative.80 On the contrary, Canada's initiative did not draw favourable response from the PRC. On 25 November, 1966, Renmin Ribao in an article condemning the

78 Martin, n.56, p.526.
79 ibid.
Canadian proposal as, "an exceedingly absurd '3-point plan'" alleged that:

The Canadian delegate took the trouble to explain that 'the solution we envisage is in no way intended to imply the existence of two Chinas'. But this nonsensical explanation can deceive nobody. The fact that the Canadian delegate had to resort to such clumsy self-exposing performance precisely shows his guilty conscience. 81

The article further stated:

The United Nations has long become a tool of the United States for committing aggression. The United Nations must free itself from the US domination and thoroughly rectify its own mistakes. That is the problem today. China asks no favour of the United Nations. No one can deprive China of its legitimate rights in the United Nations. Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and no one can make the Chinese people waver in their stand for the liberation of Taiwan. All forms of the 'two Chinas' scheme are doomed to be ['sic'] bankruptcy; they can never be materialized. All those in the service of this scheme of the US imperialism can only reveal their despicable features of being its tool before the people of the world. 82

Notwithstanding China's allegation, the Canadian Prime Minister defended Martin's solution to the China issue by saying that it was an attempt to find a basis for negotiation with Beijing and its purpose was "to begin a process of breaking the logjam facing the UN." Pearson emphasized that the Canadian proposal did not intend to create two Chinas but it was a modus vivendi in light of the UN's universality principle. Justifying his stand he said that if one applied the moral criteria


82 ibid.
"literally to all the members of the United Nations today" he was unsure "how many members of the United Nations would be able to subscribe to such [criteria] without some qualification". Significantly he later stated that if there was no progress on China, Canada "could consider...diplomatic recognition by bilateral negotiation". It may be said here that Canada had decided, after witnessing its proposal being rejected at the Assembly to put aside the multilateral approach in favour of bilateral recognition. The multilateral approach had always seemed to be the easiest approach for lessening US opposition to a Canadian bilateral move by drawing the support of like-minded countries, but the US pressure prevented other countries from throwing their support behind the Canadian initiative.

Although Canada had taken a positive decision towards China, no immediate action followed. Canada's threat, however, dissolved by December 1966, when it became known that Canada still had based its first priority on the UN seating for the PRC. The reason for not following through the threat was the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution the domestic events carried a much greater weight in influencing Beijing's foreign policy. It seemed that China's preoccupation with the extraordinary internal crisis had brought out an unusually irrational foreign policy stance. Indeed, this period of turmoil, which lasted from the end of 1966 to early 1969, witnessed China's

84 Montreal Star, 10 January 1967; Vancouver Sun, 10 January 1967.
withdrawal to a large extent from the international political arena and its preoccupation with the severe inner power struggle. China was so preoccupied with its domestic problems that the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong was denied entry into the PRC in December 1966. Similarly, a Canadian fact-finding mission to North Vietnam, headed by Chester Ronning was not permitted to go to Beijing for discussions on improvement of Sino-Canadian relations.85

In such a situation Beijing's approach towards the UN was particularly hostile and offensive. China's foreign relations with the West were practically affected by the Cultural Revolution. The most outstanding characteristic of China's foreign relations during the early phase of the GPCR was its isolationist tendency.86 In this context, Beijing's UN policy could not be revised. On 27 December, 1965, a lengthy editorial of Renmin Ribao denounced the UN as "a market-place for U.S.-Soviet political deals."87 The editorial said that the twentieth session of the General Assembly "was an anti-China conference, a conference which wilfully interfered in the internal affairs of sovereign states and a conference for pursuing the policy of American-Soviet cooperation for the domination of the world."88

85 Globe and Mail, 12 December 1966.
88 ibid, p.13.
Once the Cultural Revolution was launched formally, ferocious power struggle between followers of the two lines led by Mao and Lin Biao and Liu Shao Chi Deng Xiaoping groups took place. Beijing’s foreign policy during this period seemed to be overshadowed by an almost fanatic claim that Mao’s thought was the banner of a new era of world revolution and that the PRC had replaced the Soviet Union as the centre of world revolution. The August 1966 Communique of the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee spoke about Mao’s supremacy and a spokesman of the world’s revolutionary people, which caused greater difficulties in Sino-Canadian relations and also that with other countries. Moreover, the UN was one of the main targets of abuse in Beijing’s propaganda. The result of this was that China lost more friends than it had won in the last decade. A manifestation of this was a reversal in the General Assembly’s voting trend on the question of Chinese representation. Reacting to this added frustration, on 2 December, 1966, Renmin Ribao in its editorial said:

The result of the voting on the question of China’s representation at the current General Assembly session shows once again that, unless the United Nations rids itself of the U.S. control, it is impossible to expel the Chiang Kai-shek gang and restore to China her legitimate rights in the United Nations.

Therefore, the fundamental question now, as it has been in the past, is one of freeing the United Nations from the control of the United States and its collaborators, thoroughly reorganizing it and completely rectifying all the mistakes it has committed.

89 For details see, "Communique of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", Peking Review, vol.9, no.34, 14 August 1966, pp.4-8.

During the last phase of the GPCR Beijing's official comments on the UN were few but relatively conciliatory. On the twenty-third session of the General Assembly China's comments took the form of repeating what the delegations to the UN had said regarding the question of Chinese representation. There were no more comments from Beijing other than "China asks the U.N. for nothing". The US and the USSR were blamed by the Chinese rather than the UN itself, although there was an assertion that the session "reveals the political and moral bankruptcy of the so-called United Nations Organization". Beijing was particularly unhappy over the USSR's behaviour in the UN when it stated:

The representatives of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique again played the despicable role of a double-dealer in the recent 'debate'. At the November 13 meeting, Yakov Malik hypocritically expressed 'support' for restoring China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and 'opposition' to the idea of 'two Chinas'. But, immediately afterwards, he put the 'question of restoration of China's representation' on a par with that of admitting the two German states. The Soviet delegate was thus openly serving U.S. imperialism's scheme of creating 'two Chinas'.

It seems, while Canada was engaged in finding out ways for Chinese representation in the UN, China had kept a very close watch and made a very careful analysis of what was going on at the UN. China again showed its interest in the UN by calming down its attack on the organization, once the GPCR had come to an end.


92 Ibid, p.28.

93 Ibid.
Moreover, China's renewed interest in foreign relations successfully coincided with the new leadership in Canada.

However, during the Cultural Revolution period Canada was not prepared to move either on the multilateral or bilateral front. When questioned about Canada's attitude prior to the 1967 UN General Assembly session, Pearson replied, "This does not seem to be a very good moment to repeat the initiative we took last autumn without success". However, Canada voted against a resolution in the 1967 General Assembly session which attempted to make the Italian "study committee" an important question requiring a two-third majority vote. International initiatives by the Canadian Government were held in abeyance until after the leadership changed in the Liberal and Conservative parties, and the subsequent election of a Liberal Government, with the new leader, Pierre Elliot Trudeau as the Prime Minister of Canada and Beijing's interest in opening up to the outside world, during the post-GPCR period.

The launching of the GPCR, the domestic turmoil in China and the status of Taiwan became excuses for Canada for justifying its non-action on the China issue. Under such circumstances, during the Pearson era, except for the change of the UN vote on the Albanian resolution and Martin's initiative for seating both Beijing and Taibei in the UN, no substantial Canadian diplomatic

step was taken towards the PRC. Although Pearson and Martin were in favour of Chinese representation in the UN they never took any step that would disclaim the self-determination right of the Taiwanese or inflame the US by unilaterally taking any radical step towards the solution of China problem. It can be rightly said that for Pearson, the China issue was not the primary one into which he would put his energy and efforts during his Prime Ministership. Moreover, Pearson's foreign policy of using the UN first to solve the China problem deterred rather than spurred him on moving ahead with the China issue. Furthermore, China's hostile and offensive attitude towards the UN acted as a constraint in her occupying the seat in the UN.

**TRUDEAU GOVERNMENT: THE FINAL BREAKTHROUGH**

Before Pierre Elliot Trudeau was elected as the Prime Minister of Canada, the official Canadian 'China policy' was based on "one China, one Taiwan" principle. The initial stand taken by Trudeau was similar to the earlier Canadian position, except that he proclaimed his intention to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Beijing also showed renewed interest for its seat in the UN as well as establishing political relationship with Canada. However, it was Trudeau's initiative that broke the logjam. On 29 May, 1968, just after taking charge as Prime Minister, Trudeau in his first major speech on Canada's foreign policy stated his aim to enable the PRC to occupy the seat in the UN, taking into account the existence of a separate Government in Taiwan.96

96 *Statements and Speeches*, 68/17, 29 May 1968.
Trudeau's objective of China's entry to the UN prompted a major interdepartmental study in Canada of the possible road to the recognition. A subsequent parallel DEA study on Canada's policies at the UN concluded that the existing stalemate on Chinese representation in UN would continue and Beijing would probably continue to impose impossible conditions on its entry to the UN. By August 1968, this report was submitted to Trudeau and his Cabinet. Trudeau, now thought it wise to wait until the outcome of bilateral discussions on diplomatic exchanges before attempting any move on the UN issue. Henceforth serious thought was given by Canada to bilateral negotiations as a primary concern on the recognition issue.

The DEA of Canada recognised a "two China" policy as an impossibility that would only lead to complications in discussions with the PRC. However, taking a cautious approach, on 8 November, 1968, Trudeau gave assurances that the Canadian position on China's entry to the UN had not changed. Emphasizing his objective he said, "the government of Taiwan not be disregarded" and Canada would abstain on the Albanian resolution. However, he refrained from stating about the progress on the recognition issue. He linked Canadian voting behaviour in the UN with the progress of "bilateral endeavours" between Canada and China for establishing diplomatic relations. Canada's position on the UN General Assembly vote was, thus, clarified by Trudeau's public statement.

97 Based on discussions with Prof. B. Frolic, Department of Political Science, York University, Canada, 1989.

98 Canada, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 8 November 1968, p.2569.
The US did not delay in responding to Trudeau's public statement. In a conversation between Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, and Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the former once again threatened that the US would leave the UN if the PRC was admitted to the organization. Mitchell Sharp, like his predecessor Paul Martin, realized this to be a bluff and was not deterred from pressing ahead with the Stockholm talks leading to bilateral recognition.

A slight shift, however, took place in Canada's voting behaviour with regard to the China issue. In 1968, in his UN speech, Sharp welcomed, "any equitable proposal which would facilitate the presentation of the People's Republic of China in this organization, having regard, however, to the rights of existing members". Then the Canadian delegation abstained on the Albanian resolution, voted for the "important question" resolution but changed its vote from 'yes' to an 'abstention' on the Italian-sponsored "study committee" resolution concerning the Chinese UN entry problem. Trudeau revealing his changed position on the Italian proposal said that it would "have the effect of delaying" Canada's own possible actions with regard to China. For him, shifting of Canada's position was to "mark an orientation" of his regime "away from a path of delay in the United Nations". It was considered a necessity for Ottawa to pave the way for any action it might hope to take. The Canadian press wholeheartedly

99 *External Affairs*, vol.20, no.11, November 1968, p.446.

praised its Government's actions and urged Ottawa to "press ahead separately with its own diplomatic overtures".\textsuperscript{101}

At the first Stockholm meeting on 21 February, 1969, the Chinese placed three demands for recognition. Canada was asked to recognize the PRC as the sole and lawful Government of the Chinese people, recognize Taiwan as part of the Chinese territory and support its claim to the China seat in the UN and all its organs. Ottawa made it clear that it would be prepared to support the seating of the Communists at the UN once the bilateral negotiations had been successfully concluded. By this strategy of "recognition-first, UN-second", the UN question was effectively sidelined at Stockholm. It is pertinent to state here that the progress in the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations became a determining factor for Canada's support to Chinese representation in the UN. Though the Canadian Government voted for the Albanian resolution while continuing to support the "important question" resolution as a last resort, the PRC was not to demand the Canadian support in the UN as a precondition for recognition. In fact, Beijing never insisted on Canada altering its vote at the UN as the price for recognition.\textsuperscript{102}

Meanwhile, as the Stockholm talks progressed, Canada steadily departed from the initial "one China, one Taiwan" formula. On 29 May, 1969, Trudeau stated that "Canada has a one China policy".\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101} Globe and Mail, Editorial, 21 November 1968.


\textsuperscript{103} Canada, Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 29 May 1969, pp.9212-3 & p.9273.
Nevertheless, he clarified Canada's UN policy by stating that the Canadian vote on the Chinese entry would reflect the "success" Canada would achieve in the ongoing negotiations with Beijing. Later on Mitchell Sharp told in a press conference in New York on 16 September, 1969, that Canada would not change its stand on the UN issue until diplomatic relations were established and continued to reassure that diplomatic exchange would shift the Canadian votes in the UN. On 11 November, 1969, in the UN General Assembly session the Albanian motion to admit China was defeated by 48 to 56 with 21 abstentions. The Canadian delegation abstained which was a good indication of the state of bilateral negotiations in Sweden. Moreover, Canada did not vote for Beijing's admission as that might have deprived Canada of a valuable bargaining lever in Stockholm. However, this did not create any obstacle to the ongoing bilateral negotiations on the recognition issue.

After the successful completion of the Stockholm negotiation in October 1970, Canada started fulfilling its pledge by voting for the Albanian resolution at the 1970 UN General Assembly session but upheld the "important question" resolution. The PRC protested that Canada's continued support for the "important question" proposal would be contrary to the new spirit of Sino-Canadian relations and would be seen as part of the US to block China's entry to the UN. Mitchell Sharp, however, indicated

105 Based on discussion, n.97.
Canada's changed position in his speech to the General Assembly, where he stated it was "incredible that this organization can claim any standing in today's world; when it has excluded for decades representatives of nations forming very substantial segments of the world's population." Moreover, Canada emphasized its wish to endorse the will of the majority members of the UN General Assembly and exhibited goodwill by not supporting Ghana's effort to separate Taibei's expulsion from the Albanian resolution which was passed with 51 in favour, 49 against and 25 abstentions. But the "important question" resolution requiring a two-third majority was accepted with 66 in support, 52 in opposition and 27 abstentions.

With a change in the old administration in the US, there was less objection from the US towards Canada's position on the China issue. There was no longer fear among the Canadians about the US withdrawal from the UN over the issue of China's representation in the UN. All that was asked by the US was that Canada should not drop its traditional support for the "important question" resolution. Ottawa was willing to give assurances on the China issue as long as it was not used as a procedural means of frustrating the will of the majority in the UN General Assembly. As it turned out, the Canadian changing stand on the Albanian resolution coincided with receiving support from most of the member nations of the UN.


107 This view was stated by Yvan Beaulne, Canada's permanent representative to UN, New York Times, 14 November 1970.
Moreover, Beijing showed its new interest in the UN which came through quite clearly after the Ninth Party Congress. On 16 September, 1969, a Canadian Foreign Ministry spokesman disclosed that Beijing seriously wanted Canada to support its demand for the UN membership.\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, in November, China's commentary on the twenty fourth session of the General Assembly indicated its renewed interest in the UN.\textsuperscript{109} China's revival of interest in the UN did not necessarily mean taking some drastic measures immediately for occupying its seat in the UN. It was not until the Fall of 1970 that such an active UN policy was adopted and the machinery of conciliatory diplomacy was put into operation to win support for a renewed UN bid. The timing suggests the possibility that a decision in this respect was reached at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee in August-September, 1970, where China's pragmatic leaders probably won an upper hand against the more radical elements.\textsuperscript{110} Immediately after the Plenum, a number of events signalled China's new interest in world politics. Most notably diplomatic relations were established with Canada in October 1970 on the basis of a formula relating to the Taiwan issue that China had not found completely agreeable throughout the preceding eighteen months of continued negotiations. Taking the Canadian formula into account China could now establish diplomatic

\textsuperscript{108} ibid, 16 September 1969.


relations with many other countries even without mentioning the Taiwan issue in the Communiques.111

This development was significant for China's entry to the UN as the Chinese Communists had started assuming a more active and realistic role in international affairs. A week after the China question had been voted upon in the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Peking Review published a jubilant report on the subject.112 Referring to the General Assembly's approval of the Albanian resolution, it said:

This is a big defeat for the policy of U.S. imperialism... It is an important victory for the Chinese people and the people of various countries upholding international justice. It proves that a just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little support, and that the dyke of hostility towards China built by the U.S. imperialism in the UN has begun to collapse.113

The same report also noted that the "illegal draft resolution" making the China question "important" was adopted at the General Assembly with 66 votes in favour, 52 against and 7 abstentions, but that, compared with 1969, the votes for the resolution dropped by 5, those against it increased by 4 and abstentions increased by 3.114 In 1970, it was felt that the resolution of UN debate on the China question could be reversed in

111 The Canadian formula has been discussed earlier in Chapter-2.
113 ibid, p.20.
114 ibid.
1971 if only eight nations were persuaded to switch their votes in favour of that resolution.

After the 1970 UN General Assembly session, Canada showed its disinterest in supporting the US effort in blocking China's entry to the UN by advocating a 'two China' policy. On 2 August, 1971, the US announced a 'two China' policy and suggested that the Security Council should decide whether Beijing or Taipei should be represented in the Council. This, of course, would have allowed Taipei to veto any attempt to seat the PRC in the Security Council in future. The revised US policy also advocated that the expulsion of Taiwan be considered an 'important question'.

Reacting to the US stand, on 4 August, 1971, Trudeau stated that Canada could "in no way support any recommendation, positive or negative, that would be equivalent to a two-China policy". Furthermore, he stated that all resolutions on the question should be decided by a simple majority. Although Ottawa was not pressurised to support the US position, it was asked to refrain from lobbying against it, which was agreed to by Ottawa. It informed its allies of the position it would be taking in future, that it would no longer support the important question resolution.

At the same time the PRC was still firm on its "one China" position. On 20 August, 1971, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China declared:

"Should a situation of 'two Chinas', 'one China, one Taiwan' or 'the status of Taiwan remaining to be

determined' or any other similar situation occur in the United Nations, the Government of the People's Republic of China will absolutely have nothing to do with the United Nations". It is absolutely intolerable to the Chinese Government and people that the U.S. Government has colluded with the Japanese reactionaries in obstinately clinging to the 'two Chinas' scheme.117

The statement further showed its interest as the UN warned other countries that, "If the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries' intrigues and machinations against the Chinese people are tolerated today, they will do the same against other countries".118 It is pertinent to state here that in vain Washington and its Pacific allies, looked elsewhere for support that in the end was not forthcoming.

Canada's final initiative towards China undoubtedly coincided with Beijing's more realistic foreign policies. The early 1970s witnessed after a long phase of isolation Beijing's resumption of the 'people to people' diplomacy of the Bandung period. In 1971 many foreign delegations were invited by the Chinese to the mainland while the PRC herself sent out delegations to many countries to carry out 'people to people' or 'ping-pong' diplomacy. China also launched a major drive to expand the scope of state to state relations. For example between October 1970 and October 1971 China established diplomatic relations with 14 countries. Moreover the Chinese official media gave unusual coverage to the question of Chinese representation on the eve of the twenty sixth session of the General Assembly.


118 ibid.
On 29 September, 1971, Mitchell Sharp in his address to the twenty sixth session of the General Assembly declared, "if this Assembly moves promptly and effectively to seat the People's Republic of China" it would mark "a turning-point in the history and the opportunity for a new beginning" within the UN119. Sharp's statement and China's long standing wish became a reality when on 25 October, 1971, at the UN General Assembly session, by a vote of 76 to 35 with 17 abstentions the PRC was finally admitted to the world organization and the Taiwan representatives were immediately expelled from the UN and all organizations related to it. Canada voted with the majority for the Albanian resolution and rebuffed the "important question" resolution as a majority of the countries did and effectively contributed to the transition of the China seat from Taibei to Beijing. On 28 October, 1971, commenting on the PRC's entry to the UN, Renmin Ribao in its editorial stated:

This proclaimed the utter bankruptcy of the U.S. imperialist policy of permanently depriving China of her legitimate rights in the United Nations and of the U.S. imperialist scheme to create 'two Chinas' in that organization. It is a victory for all countries upholding justice in the United Nations and for the people of the whole world.

We extend our heartfelt thanks to all the governments and people who have upheld justice in this struggle.120

The Chinese were deeply satisfied about the Canadian Government's positive role in international politics, particularly


Trudeau's initiatives towards the China problem. On 10 October, 1973, Renmin Ribao in its editorial welcoming Trudeau's official visit to Beijing rightly stated "Trudeau has long been active in promoting the relations between China and Canada" and "in recent years, the Canadian government led by Prime Minister Trudeau has made many achievements in safeguarding national sovereignty and pursuing an independent foreign policy; it has played a positive role in world affairs."121

121 SCMP, no.5480, 24 October 1973, p.76.