Khrushchev, taking into account the post-war realities, revised the Stalinist doctrines in significant way as he initiated destalinisation at home. Under Brezhnev, there was a throw back to neo-Stalinism as USSR embarked on a major drive to catch up with the West militarily even at the cost of economic developments at home. This had an impact on the Soviet foreign policy too. This chapter is devoted to a survey of ideology and the Soviet foreign policy link under Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Khrushchev

The 20th CPSU Congress (February 1956), taking stock of the prevailing situation since the first world war when Lenin wrote some of his most important theoretical works, and, by interpreting Marxism-Leninism 'creatively', put forward a number of new theses on such issues as war, peace, peaceful coexistence, capitalism, imperialism, national liberation movements, ideology etc. This reformulation of ideology paved the way for the refashioning of Soviet foreign policy.

At the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev reaffirmed faith in Marxism-Leninism but called for an undogmatic approach to ideology. Thus, he said: "... Only one thing is wanted -
revolutionary theory must be applied creatively, not dogmatically. He emphasized the importance of taking into account historical experience, living realities, practical work in application of theory. Like his predecessors, Khruschev was also set to initiate new policies whose justifications were to be sought in a creatively reinterpreted Marxism—Leninism.

Analysis of the World Situation

There were several new features in Khruschev's analysis of the world situation. The important theoretical point Khruschev made was that the period of building "socialism in one country" was over, the wars ought not to be regarded as inevitable and that it was possible to enter a cooperative relationship with the capitalist countries based on certain principles like that of peaceful coexistence. Khruschev said that after the second world war socialism had been able to emerge "from within the bounds of a single country". This had become the main feature of world system. Capitalist 'encirclement' had ended. "The simultaneous existence of two opposite world economic systems, the capitalist and the socialist, developing according to different laws and in opposite

direction had become an indisputable fact" (emphasis added). The notable feature of this analysis was that the stress was on the economic aspects of the two systems and their development in opposite directions. The idea of competition between the two systems was implicit in this assertion.

Khrushchev, elaborating on the theme of capitalist contradictions, said: "The general crisis of capitalism" continued to deepen. But, this did not mean that there would be complete stagnation or halt in capitalist production. Technological progress in capitalism would continue, albeit unevenly, but without easing capitalist contradictions. In fact a "simplified view of Lenin's thesis on the decay of imperialism" ought to be avoided. What capitalism has to offer in science and technology should be used for socialism. Thus, some of Varga's views on capitalism after the Second World War found official sanction at the 20th Party Congress.

Khrushchev noted global tendencies for world war as well as peace. The 'anti-communist' forces raising the spectre of 'communist threat' were craving for war, while, USSR, the socialist countries: "peace-loving European and Asian states, which were not
participating in military 'blocs' were the 'forces of peace'. These 
peace loving forces had brought about in the world 'a vast zone 
of peace'. (This concept of a 'zone of Peace' was a new one put 
forward by the CPSU). The strength of USSR and the peace-loving 
countries, was considered as an anti-dote to the bellicose 
forces in the world.

The disintegration of the colonial system was noted as a 
major trend. Ex-colonies, although outside the socialist world 
system, were offered all assistance in 'independent' development. 
Khruschev also noted "new forms of colonial enslavement under 
the guise of so-called 'aid' to underdeveloped countries" and 
mentioned US weapon supplies to the under-developed countries as 
an example.

Khruschev, like his predecessors, declared his foreign 
policy as 'peaceful' and listed improvement of relations with 
Great Powers, 'adjustment' of relations with a number of 
countries (e.g. Yugoslavia, Austria, etc.), exploration of 'new 
ways' to such questions as 'collective security system in 
Europe' as major proofs of this 'peaceful' policy. This opened 
several new fronts for the Soviet foreign policy. The need for 
good relations with USA as a factor in preventing arms race and 
bringing about peace was greatly emphasised.

6. Ibid., p.18.
As regards "some fundamental questions of present day International Development", Khruschev mentioned the following:

Peaceful Co-existence of the Two Systems

This was the major theoretical extension of the earlier ideas of peaceful coexistence which both Lenin and Stalin had practised but mostly as a tactic. It was under Khruschev that peaceful coexistence emerged as a cardinal principle of the Soviet foreign policy.

By the policy of peaceful coexistence, Khruschev gave several assurances to the West: (a) Socialist world, busy in the building up of socialism, did not want war and did not threaten the capitalist system;

(b) USSR was not interested in the export of revolutions which were anyhow the outcome of objective and subjective factors. He declared, "... establishment of a new social system in one or another country is the internal affair of the peoples of the countries concerned." Thus, Khruschev, while not jettisoning the doctrine of the inevitability of victory of communism over capitalism in the long run, declared, nevertheless, that as a principle, USSR had no intention of meddling in other countries to bring about a revolution. Thus, unlike in the days of Comintern, the USSR was unremphasizing the 'world revolution' stand of the Soviet ideology in favour of peaceful co-existence.

8. Ibid., p. 21.
Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence was certainly a more serious attempt to normalise East-West tensions though the West was not fully convinced.

(c) Khrushchev, taking Lenin's theory of imperialism and war as a point of departure, declared that "war is not fatalistically inevitable". As regards the Marxist precept that wars were inevitable as long as imperialism existed, Khrushchev said that this remained true, but, thanks to the existence of strong peace-loving forces, capable of rebuffing the aggressor, wars could be averted. The strength of the existence of world socialist system was regarded as a sufficient guarantee against war. Wars were not entirely ruled out but maintenance of peace was dependent upon strength of socialism. This view was similar to the one held by Stalin in the thirties during the days of 'capitalist encirclement'.

(d) Khrushchev also sanctified the thesis of different forms of transition to socialism in different countries. In doing so he introduced further theoretical innovations flowing from "a new approach to the question". This approach consisted of disregarding the view that without civil war no revolution was possible. He said,

"We recognise the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist society. It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists from the reformists, the opportunists. But, that did not mean that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake the society."

9. Ibid., p.22.
10. Ibid., p.22.
Further on, he said, "The winning of stable parliamentary majority could create for the working class of a number of capitalist and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes". One of the necessary conditions for social transformation was the "political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard." Thus, Khruschev, while believing in the fundamental goal of transformation of capitalism into communism, was advocating a change of tactics and trying to correct an image in the non-socialist world as a country resorting to violence and war to bring about communism.

The Programme of the CPSU adopted in October, 1961, summed up the basic Soviet ideology in the Khruschev years which was upheld even later. The salient features of this ideology as defined in the programme can be summarised as follows:

- The new epoch was defined as an epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism, struggle between the two opposing system, socialist and national revolution, break down of imperialism, transition of more and more peoples to the socialist path of triumph of socialism and communism on a world wide scale. The central factors of this epoch were the 'working class' and the 'world socialist system'.

- The aim of socialism was declared to be to "meet the growing material and cultural requirements of the people even more fully."

11. Ibid., p.23.
12. Ibid., p.23.
15. Ibid., p.9.
Fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was defined as 'imperative' for the victory of socialism.

The experience and the theoretical labours of the CPSU were projected as 'science of socialist' construction which could be used by the world socialist system.

'People's democracy' was defined as a political organisation which was a "variety of dictatorship of proletariat".

The world socialist system was held to be a new type of economic and political relationship between countries. There was the need for "closest unity of countries that fall away from capitalism". Strengthening of relations on the basis of proletarian internationalism was essential for progress.

In the socialist countries, disappearance of class antagonisms would lead to the disappearance of 'national antagonisms' too.

As Lenin showed, during the phase of 'the building of socialism, class struggle did not disappear' (i.e. class struggle and therefore national antagonisms would continue to exist in countries building socialism). The need of the moment was to guard against nationalistic and chauvinistic tendencies.

On the Crisis of World Capitalism, the Programme made the following points:

Imperialism had entered the period of decline and collapse. This however, did not signify complete stagnation. The uneven

16. Ibid., p.11.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p.12.
19. Ibid.
development of capitalism altered the 'balance of forces' between countries and makes the contradictions between them more acute.  

There was increasing 'proletarisation' of capitalist countries. US imperialism acted as 'world gendarme' and the US monopoly bourgeoisie was the mainstay of international reaction. But, USA, the strongest capitalist power, had entered the stage of decline. Mankind did not want to, and would not, tolerate the historically outdated capitalist system.

On the International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class, the programme said: Socialist revolution, by 'peaceful means' was in the interests of the working class and people as a whole.

Where the exploiting classes resorted to violence against the people, the possibility of a 'non-peaceful transition to socialism' had to be borne in mind. For the victory of revolution, working class and its party should master the use of "all forms of struggle" including 'parliamentary and extra-parliamentary'.

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22. Ibid., p.19.
23. Ibid.,
24. Ibid., p.17.
25. Ibid., p.18.
27. Ibid.
On the National Liberation Movement, the Programme said: 28

Rise of socialism meant emancipation of oppressed peoples. Struggle against imperialism was a permanent condition for the solution of national tasks. US imperialism was the chief bulwark of modern colonialism. National bourgeoisie had a dual character. It could be progressive, or it could compromise with imperialism. World peace could be ensured if newly freed people and the socialist countries join efforts.

On Peaceful co-existence, the Party Programme made points in the 20th Party Congress. Additional points made were: 29

Socialism contrasted imperialism with a new type of international relations, the foreign policy of Socialist countries was based on peace, equality, self-determination, respect for independence and sovereignty of all countries; the issue of war and peace was the principal issue of today. The main thing was to "ward off a Thermonuclear war"; Socialist countries did not have classes or groups interested in starting the war; it was possible to avert a world war; "To abolish war and establish everlasting peace on earth is a historic mission of communism." 30 "Peaceful co-existence .... is an objective

29. Ibid., pp.25-27.
necessity for the development of human society; war cannot and must not serve as a means of settling international disputes; "Peaceful coexistence serves as a basis for 'peaceful competition' between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and constitutes a specific form of class struggle between them." 31

Flowing from the above considerations the party programme mentioned the following as the tasks of Soviet foreign policy: 32

- Prevention of war; establishment of "sound international relations" (i.e. prevent blocs, discontinue cold-war etc.);
- General and complete disarmament under international control;
- Strengthen relations and close cooperation with the countries fighting for independence and with all peoples and states advocating peace;
- Improvement and developing of relations with all capitalist countries;
- Promoting solidarity of international working class;
- Consolidating all forces against war;
- Developing international cooperation;
- Vigilance against anti-peace forces and safeguarding security of USSR and the socialist camp as a whole.

These then were the guidelines laid down for theory and practice of Soviet Union's foreign policy in the changed conditions after the Second World War. Peaceful coexistence was

32. Ibid.,
the centre piece of these guidelines. The strength of the USSR and the world socialist system was the bedrock of Soviet foreign policy. A 'new type' of international relations was the contribution which the Soviets hoped to make. All this, of course, was based on the confidence that socialism was bound to triumph over historically doomed capitalism, communism could be ushered in 'twenty' years, the peace-loving people were solidly behind the socialist camp and that socialism and peace were inseparable. The faith that the Soviet example was important for the others on their way to socialism was manifest in the Soviet pronouncements.

It is clear that despite the belief in the world socialist system and a new type of international relations, Khruschev was working towards making USSR 'more acceptable in the comity of nations. Therefore he tried to allay the fears about communism and the communist threat. Yet, the Soviet view of the international relations was much more complex than in the West. The result of these changes on the Soviet theory and practice of foreign policy was considerable.

The Soviets, for the first time, began to integrate the western concepts of state-based international relations with the vertical, class-based divisions in the world. Also for the first time, it was officially stated that the peaceful competition between the two systems was a specific form of a class struggle. The Soviet theory, while recognising the states as a unit of international relations, also gave due weight to other actors like the classes within a particular state, inclinations of a particular social grouping, the economic groupings, national
movements, international organisations and individual personalities. Thus, the analysis of international relations, for the Soviets, became much more than analysis of diplomatic relations between the states. The 'new type' of international relations were defined by one Soviet observer as representing "aggregate of economic legal, ideological and military contests and ties between classes and nations in world arena, between states and systems of states, between the main economic formations and their alliances, between the most influential political forces and organisations." And, further, "Here, class relations play the cardinal determining role". A direct result of the inter-play of these factors was the elaboration of the concept "correlation of class forces" which would characterise a given epoch. Thus international relations of a given epoch would be determined by these class correlations. A corollary to this would be that war could be removed if class and social oppression was removed. In other words, it were not the states alone which could remove war; it was the correlation of classes that alone could tell whether oppressors were oppressing the oppressed. If so, war was a possibility.

33. N. Inozemtsov, "Results and Prospects of the Development of International Relations", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11, 1961, p.15.
34. Ibid., p.15.
Thus, one very important premise of the Soviet theory was that the classes were the basis of which the world tended to divide itself into capitalist and socialist systems. Since the two systems were erected on different foundations, their approach to international relations was bound to be different. The important point however was that war could be and must be avoided as the atomic weapons did not respect class barriers.35

Another Soviet writer defined the following systems of political relations in the 'epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism':36

Relations between world socialist community and imperialist bloc; between imperial countries and oppressed nations or newly independent countries; amongst the imperialist nations themselves; between socialist countries; between socialist countries and oppressed nations or states recently freed from oppression.

The division of the world on this basis was utilised to identify as to which quarters the war threat come from. It was felt that it were the first two groups from where the threat can come from. It was also thought that the imperialist countries would not fight amongst themselves due to the fear of socialism.

The Soviet theory of international relations grew rapidly in the post-war years. This growth kept in touch with the actual foreign policy conduct.

Briefly examined below are the events in Hungary in October-November 1956, and the Sino-Soviet split to highlight the interaction between Khruschevian foreign policy conduct and the ideology.

Hungarian Events of 1956 and Proletarian - Internationalism

The Hungarian events leading to Soviet military intervention in Hungary highlighted the complexity of interplay between ideology and praxis in a socialist state. At the 20th Party Congress, it had been noted that in the 'people's democracies' the existing class struggle continued to operate, and therefore, it was necessary for the working class to be extremely vigilant against reaction. Hence the uprisings in Hungary in 1956 were proclaimed as "counter-revolutionary". But, it must be emphasized that the first official statement of the Soviet Government issued on October 30, 1956, had seen in the origin of Hungarian events the Hungarian working people's "right" desire to "eliminate the serious shortcomings in economic development".

This 'just and progressive movement' was later on hijacked by the 'dark forces of reaction and counter-revolution' to "undermine the foundations of people's democratic system in Hungary". The Soviet

government sent its troops to Hungary at the 'request of Hungarian peoples' government. The statement also expressed Soviet governments' readiness to withdraw its troops from Hungary as soon as the Hungarian government considered it necessary.

This statement was important in several aspects as it laid down certain practical guidelines for conduct of relations between the socialist countries:

(i) The policy of 'peaceful coexistence' between the two systems was extendable even to relations between socialist countries. "The policy of peaceful coexistence .... finds its most profound and consistent expression in the relations between the socialist countries". 39

(ii) This policy, in effect would mean that the relations between the socialist countries would be bound by (a) proletarian internationalism, and (b) full equality, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each others internal affairs. This "presupposed close fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, political and cultural fields". 40 It was clear that equality etc. as basis for relations were to be seen in the context of the principles of proletarian internationalism and close cooperation. In other words peaceful coexistence between socialist state, in contrast to that between different social systems, was considered to be proletarian internationalism plus equality etc. plus close-cooperation. This in short was the principle of 'Socialist Internationalism'.

(iii) In order that principles of national sovereignty etc. were not violated, the Soviet government expressed willingness to discuss these matters with other socialist countries. In particular, Soviet Union offered negotiations on the contentious issues of the presence of Soviet advisers including Soviet troops in other socialist countries. The statement, however, drew attention to the commitments undertaken by the socialist countries under the Warsaw-Treaty regarding "mutual security". The statement laid down the general principle:

40. Ibid.
"... that the troops of Warsaw powers may be stationed in the territory of another Warsaw Power by agreement of all Treaty members, and solely with the consent of the country in whose territory the troops have been stationed at its request, or are proposed to be stationed."

Thus, ... in the interest of mutual security troops of one socialist country could have to be stationed in other socialist country in case of need. For this, the agreement of all the Warsaw powers was a 'must'.

In the aftermath of Hungary, the Soviet authors began to attack nationalism more severly. It was held that "the enemies of working class want to poison this well (i.e. proletarian internationalism) with nationalism". And this was being done in the garb of 'national communism' which concealed narrow nationalism behind communist phrases. Thus, while the 20th Party Congress recognised different roads to socialism, the Soviet Union showed great sensitivity to the uprisings in Hungary, which were actually started by the working class, and came up with the principles of 'Socialist internationalism' which would govern the relations among the socialist state.

The events in People's democracies, particularly in Hungary and Poland, raised the question of ideological purity of policies particularly those of 'proletarian and socialist internationalism' and

41. Ibid., p.2.
42. V. Khvostov, "The Leninist Principles of Foreign Policy", International Affairs, no.4, 1957, p.20.
unity amongst the socialist ranks. Twelve Communist parties of the socialist countries held a conference in Moscow in November 1957 and issued a Declaration in which they more or less endorsed the views of the 20th Party Congress and called for struggle against 'revisionism' as well as 'dogmatism'. Revisionists were defined as those who denied the necessity of a proletarian revolution and that of a dictatorship of proletariat during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, they denied the leading role of the Party and the principles of proletarian internationalism. The Declaration described unity in the revolutionary ranks as a guarantee of the accomplishments of the tasks of the revolution. 

The Conference statement laid down that in view of the events of 1956-1957 threatening the unity of the socialist camp, the Communist and workers' Parties should close their ranks. The Conference Declaration was tantamount to a rebuff to Tito in Yugoslavia (who did not sign the declaration) and also a complete rejection of the concept of 'national communism'. In effect, by coming down heavily on the 'revisionists' and 'dogmatists', as well as upholding the righteousness of the path travelled by the CPSU, the conference was sending two signals: (a) that there prevailed a unity of principles amongst the participants, and (b) that no deviations from the laid down path would be tolerated. It was a different matter that these principles could not convince either the Albanians or the Chinese to accept the Khruschevian world-view or the

modifications made by him in ideology. The Albanians and the Chinese were in turn to accuse Khruschev of revisionism.

I. IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES IN SINO-SOVIE'T SPLIT OF 1963

The Sino-Soviet conflict of the sixties was also based on differences on ideology. The ideological differences as in the Soviet perceptions, that led to the Sino-Soviet split of 1963, were as follows:

- The Soviets regarded the contradiction between socialism and capitalism as the fundamental contradiction in the world while the Chinese regarded the contradiction between national-liberation movement and imperialism as the principal contradiction in the world. In the Soviet view national liberation movement could not alone shatter the domination of monopoly capitalism.

- The Chinese rejected the Soviet thesis on peaceful co-existence, laying stress on the further development of world revolutionary process. The Chinese held the position that so long as imperialism existed, war could not be ruled out and that peaceful coexistence could not be a general principle of the foreign policies of socialist states as it hampered revolutionary struggle. The Soviets rejected the view that world revolutionary prospect lay only through wars.44

- The Chinese underestimated the danger of a thermonuclear war, calling the atomic bomb a 'paper tiger' and advocated efforts to put a quick end to imperialism, regarding at the same time, the loss of millions of lives in the process 'a secondary question'. The CPSU rejected these views and also the contention that 'a thousand times higher civilisation' could be created on

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44. "The Ideological Struggle and Present International Relations", International Affairs, no.8, 1963, pp.1-41. (under this heading the journal carried a number of articles by prominent experts).
the "corpses of hundreds of millions of people".45 The CPSU all put forward the principle of first non-use of the atomic weapons ... "if we are not attacked, we shall not be the first to use their weapons" ... 46

- The Chinese leadership accused the CPSU of capitulating to the US imperialism at the time of the Cuban missiles crisis in 1962. In CPSU's view the Soviet missiles in Cuba served to demonstrate the world socialism's strength and facilitated an "agreement on the peaceful solution" of the crisis. The CPSU also criticised the Chinese view that capitalism vs. Socialism contradictions could be resolved only through the 'use of force' and by ruling out "all talks and agreement".47

- The Chinese, criticising the Soviet views on the question of War and Peace, opposed the efforts for disarmament... The "Soviet people..." held that the Chinese slogan of "spearpoint against spearpoint" only fanned 'cold war' and helped "arms race".48 Further, "the struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence" isolated the 'most aggressive circles' from the people and made class-struggle in the capitalist countries more acute and promoted the national liberation movement.49

- The Chinese maintained that the need for the dictatorship of proletariat in Soviet Union had not disappeared. The CPSU, opposing this view, averred that "the "state of the entire people" had emerged in the Soviet Union as there remained no class to be suppressed.50


47. Ibid., pp.17-18.

48. Ibid., p.20.

49. Ibid., p.21.

50. Ibid., p.27.
The Chinese also differed from the 'common line' of the Marxist-Leninist Parties which stressed the need for an alliance of all forces struggling against imperialism, regarded the main task to be the prevention of a 'thermonuclear war', and advocated a national front approach in countries which had chosen a non-capitalist path of development.51

The above Soviet document on Sino-Soviet split was of great theoretical importance as it not only reaffirmed the line taken at the 20th Party Congress (1956), the Moscow Declaration (1957) and Bucharest statement (1960), but also joined issues with the CPC on fundamental issues of Marxism-Leninism.

To sum up, peace and peaceful co-existence ideas of Khruschev should be viewed in the context of the struggle that constantly raged between the 'bourgeoisie' and the 'socialist' ideologies. Ideological struggle was seen as an important determinant of international relations along with peaceful co-existence. Thus, peaceful coexistence principle was not devoid although this content was understated. of class content. This is an important difference, which distinguished Khruschev's peaceful coexistence from Gorbachev's deideologised approach to international relations.

Khruschev was clear that there was no place for any let up on ideological front. The 20th Party Congress, as well as the subsequent events had clearly stressed the importance of ideological purity. Destalinisation at home, the denunciation of

51. Ibid., pp.36-37.
the cult of personality, the admission of mistakes committed by
the Party in the past and even steps by Khruschev to decentralise
decision making in the party did not mean for him any deviation
from the Leninist principles concerning the party. Under
Khruschev there was alternately liberal thaw and reemergence of
control with the Soviet society. The peaceful co-existence or
considered
the peaceful competition was necessary to realise the full potential
of socialism and for this peace was necessary. Thus, under
Khruschev, despite some very novel beginnings and initiatives in
the world politics, no permanent relaxation of tensions could be
achieved as the West continued to see in peaceful coexistence etc.
the basic hostility to capitalism, which the socialist ideology
continued to preach simultaneously.

Brezhnev Years: 1964-1982

The period under Khruschev was the period of destalinisation
during which it was realised that comprehensive reforms were needed
to realise the full potential of socialism. Khruschev did realise
that party and the army needed to be reformed. The reforms were
begun but a well worked out strategy was lacking.

Khruschev's ouster led to a gradual petering out of the
reformist thrust. Thus the 1965 economic reforms in USSR and the
Socialist reform movements in other East European countries, notably,
Czechoslovakia, did not get off the ground.
During the Brezhnev years, a great stress was laid on the ideological purity both in domestic and foreign policy areas. The concept of 'developed socialism', pushing the goal of communism still further, was also used to gloss over the contradictions within the socialist society.

On the foreign policy front, USSR steadily built up its military might, achieving military parity with the US and then sought to achieve detente in East-West relations. The Brezhnev-doctrine guided the relations with the socialist countries and the anti-imperialist potential of the national liberation movements was sought to be exploited.

As the Soviet Union's influence in the world affairs grew, its concern with even the minutest developments anywhere in the world increased. This led to further development of Soviet theories of international relations which had bearing on USSR's foreign policy conduct. These aspects are discussed below.

**Developed Socialism**

Brezhnev, underemphasizing the Khrušechevian idea of reaching communism in 20 years, built upon the concept of "communist construction" through creation of the "material and technical basis of communism" for "ensuring a higher standard of living, improving social relations and educating the Soviet people in a spirit of lofty communist consciousness". 52

The 23rd Party Congress mentioned specifically the 20th, 21st and 22nd Congresses as well as the 1965 economic reforms and laid great stress on economic and social development in USSR and its international significance. The stress in the early Brezhnev years was on economic development. The foreign policy task was to create international conditions to facilitate the "Communist Construction" in USSR. The CPSU report to the 24th Congress (1971) declared that, "the developed socialist society which Lenin referred in 1918 ... has been built by the selfless labour of the Soviet people." The report to the 25th Congress considered the key economic tasks in the stage of developed socialist society as also "the party in the conditions of 'Developed socialism'." The new Soviet Constitution (1977) declared the Soviet society to be a society of 'mature socialist social relations' and held a 'Developed socialist society' as 'an objectively necessary stage on the road to communism." The constitution incorporated the Khrushchevian ideas of the Soviet state as 'the state of the whole people.

Brezhnev did not specify as to how long the road to communism would be. On the contrary, in an article written in


December 1977, he referred to Engel's views that the question of
the stages of transition to communist society was the most difficult
of any that existed. The basis of a 'mature socialist society' was
'highly developed productive forces ...' and its features were:
high level of material and spiritual life of the people,
socialisation of industry, steady drawing together of state and
collective forms of socialist property, coming closer of collective
farm peasantry to working class, the formation of a historically new
social and internation community - the Soviet people, and the
growing of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into
a socialist state of all the people. The people, wrote Brezhnev,
were now broadly and actively participating in the administration
of life in the country. The 'socialist democracy' had been
established in the USSR as a result of its having entered the stage
of 'developed socialism'. Brezhnev also wrote that in the further
development of 'socialist statehood and socialist democracy', "the
key role belongs to the Communist Party". The CPSU was not to
replace the Soviets; its task was to "strictly delimit the functions
of the party and the state organs and pursue its line primarily
through the Communists working in them." Thus, in the conditions

56. L.I. Brezhnev, "A Historic Stage On the Road to Communism",
World Marxist Review, no.12, December 1977, in
L.I. Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy and Human Rights,

57. Ibid., pp.206-08.

58. Ibid., p.216.

59. Ibid.
of 'developed socialism, the Party's role as before, continued to be that of the vanguard. The important change in party's status, however, was that the Party had become the 'party of the whole people's and not merely that of the communists. Article 6 of the Constitution guaranteed the CPSU the monopoly on power: "CPSU is the leading and guiding force of the Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state and public organisations. The CPSU exists for people and serves the people". This was unprecedented and unique in the Soviet constitutional history.

The 26th CPSU Congress, taking stock of the period since the adoption of new Constitution in USSR, indicated that implied in the nation of 'the period of developed socialism' was the "restructuring of all social relations along the collectivist lines". The social policy of the Party included perfecting the 'socialist way of life' and removing all hindrances from the path of "moulding of-the new man".

By introducing 'developed socialism' as a historically necessary stage on the road to communism, Brezhnev introduced a certain uncertainty in the transition to communism and sought to prepare the people for a longer period of struggle for Communism. But conscious of the fact that peoples' living standards needed

60. The Soviet Constitution, n.55, p.28702.
62. Ibid., p.82.
improvement, he did introduce some economic reforms in 1965 and in 1979, which did not go far. There was undoubted improvement in the living standards but at high economic, social, political and environmental cost. But on the political front, the introduction of the new Constitution did not bring any grass root socialist democracy. The role of the party and the strength of the bureaucracy in fact increased after the adoption of the Constitution which heralded 'developed socialism' and the 'state of the whole people'. The economy stagnated badly and the nationality question remained unresolved despite claims to the contrary.

The Soviet World View

The main tendencies which in the Soviet view influenced the Soviet view of international relations were: the 'deepening of the general crisis of capitalism' (23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th Congresses), the 'historic' contest between socialism and capitalism and the struggle between the aggressive imperialism line and the peaceful socialist line (24th, 25th, 26th Congresses), the increasing role of the ever strengthening world socialist system in thwarting the aggressive plans of the imperialists, the change of 'corelation of forces' in favour of the world socialist system, the sharpening of class-struggle in the capitalist countries (24th Congress), the narrowing down of 'the sphere of imperialist domination' (26th Congress), further disintegration of imperialist colonial empires (25th Congress), the increasing role of the newly liberated Countries (25th, 26th Congresses), the Soviet Union's constant efforts to preserve and maintain peace and consolidation
of the principle of peaceful coexistence (25th Congress). It would thus appear that the Brezhnevian analysis of the world situation was carried out in the conceptual framework developed by Khruschev: peaceful coexistence, avoidance of war and promotion of peace, strengthening of world socialist system, cooperation with national liberation movements and increasing reliance on the strength and might of the USSR. The emphasis at a given time on a particular aspect of the analysis varied in accordance with the prevailing situation. A number of important doctrines like the 'correlation of forces' and the Brezhnev doctrine were evolved to deal with different situations.

**Ideological Struggle**

Proceeding from the premise that 'imperialism is our class enemy', Brezhnev stressed the need for "combating bourgeois ideology, revisionism, dogmatism and reformism". The ideological work of the Party had direct bearing on "the moulding of new man". Ideological work was to be closely related to the tasks in hand - e.g. communist construction, moulding of new man, development of individual etc. - lest it should deteriorate into 'phrase mongering'. Ideological work could not be neglected as serious challenges were posed to the socialist unity (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Poland) during the Brezhnev years.

63. Brezhnev, n.52, p.45.
64. Ibid., p.146.
The importance of ideology as a weapon in struggle against imperialism was highlighted in the 1969 International Conference of Communists and Workers' Parties held in Moscow. Supporting the line taken by the Communist parties in 1957 and 1960, the Conference adopted a firm stand on the ideological question. The document adopted at the conference declared:

"The policy of joint anti-imperialist actions requires that the ideological and political role of the Marxist-Leninist parties in the world revolutionary process be enhanced (and) .... the Communists will continue to wage an implacable struggle against bourgeois ideology..."

The conference endorsed the line of the 24th Party Congress of the CPSU, held after the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, in which Brezhnev had said, "we ... shall never make any concessions in questions of ideology". 66

Imperialism

Throughout the Brezhnev era, there was extreme stress on analysis of imperialism, the 'class-enemy'. While the general analysis was in the framework of the deepening of the crisis of capitalism and aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions as well as intensification of struggle between imperialism and

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66. Brezhnev, r.53, p.120.
socialism, several specific ideas were also thrown up during these years: 67 Imperialism weakens socialism by suppressing national liberation movements, and the working people in capitalist countries; it resorts to armed struggle against socialism, anti-communism has become the state policy of the imperialist countries.

By using military-political blocs and bases on foreign territory, economic pressures and trade blockades, and through armed interventions fosters tensions in a number of areas in the world; tries to weaken the unity of the world socialist system; it creates crisis and brings the world to the brink of a thermonuclear war; powerless to reverse the developments in the world today thanks to the strength of socialist world, imperialism follows the policy of "positions of strength" in dealing with socialism. 68

The Soviets theory showed awareness of the strengths of imperialism which could not be ignored. The advances in the Western countries in the economic and scientific-technical fields were explained by the fact that Imperialism had shown capability of adapting itself to the new conditions. The strengths of the imperialism which could not be ignored, were outlined by Brezhnev in his speech at the 1969 conference of the Communist and workers'
parties. Amongst these he listed: Imperialism had highly developed powerful production mechanism; it fused monopolies with state apparatus, it could programme and forecast production; state financing or scientific research helped monopolies, there had been enhancement of efficacy of social production.\(^69\) The strength of imperialism meant that its policies would become still more 'reactionary and aggressive'. A direct result of this was financial and political imperialist support to the "openly terrorist regimes of the fascist type".\(^70\)

During the Brezhnev years anti-imperialist struggle was regarded as one of the cardinal principles of the Soviet foreign policy.

**Relations with the Socialist Countries**

In world socialism's anti-imperialist struggles, the unity and cohesion of the world socialist system and relations with the socialist countries assumed great importance. It was maintained that the experience of the Socialist World since 1947, its achievements and setbacks brought to light the principles which would govern the socialist relations. 'Proletarian internationalism', when applied to relations between socialist states gave rise to the concept of 'socialist internationalism', which in turn

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70. Ibid., p.333.
incorporated the idea of 'socialist integration'. Various forms and methods of relations between socialist countries were developed both in theory and practice during the Brezhnev years. WTO, CMEA and regular meetings between the leaders of the socialist countries assumed great importance. The 'coordination of foreign policies' emerged as a recurrent theme in the Soviet pronouncements on relations with the socialist countries. 'Brezhnev Doctrine' (a Western term) and the 'theory of limited sovereignty' (another Western term) were evolved. The growing role of international cooperation in achieving the national goals was stressed. 'Nationalism' was dubbed as narrowmindedness.

Several 'objective laws' governing socialist states economic cooperation were 'discovered'. Thus, for instance, one such 'law', applicable to all the countries was about the "deepening of international division of labour and a historic tendency of enhancing the role and share of international economic relations in extending national reproduction of each socialist country". Yet another such conclusion was: "better organisation of external economic ties becomes an ever more important function in the planning activities of the socialist state."71 In other words, cooperation amongst socialist states became an objective 'law' governing relations amongst the socialist

states. The international and external factors of production were declared to be in 'dialectical unity'. All this required 'special standards and rules ensuring national and international interests'. It was recognised that the operation of these laws i.e. conditions for objectively determined mutual assistance presupposed 'stable inter-state relations' founded on 'division of labour' which could be achieved only by "improving the system of treaty-based concerted plans."73

On the political side, 'socialist internationalism' governed relations between the socialist states. Socialist internationalism, envisaging 'economic integration' and 'international socialist division of labour' was enshrined in Article 30 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution.74

The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 shed new light on the 'principles' governing the relations between the socialist states. An authoritative Tass statement of August 21, 1968 made it clear that the military assistance to Czechoslovakia was given at the 'request' of the "party and state leaders of Czechoslovakia".75 (This formula of intervention at 'request' was used later on in Afghanistan also). The reason for this 'appeal' was made by the

72. Ibid., p.12.
73. Ibid., p.17.
74. The Soviet Constitution, n.55, p.28703.
75. For the text see CDSP, vol.xx, no.34, 11 September 1968, p.3.
Czech leaders, as per Pravda editorial was to counter the 'counter-revolutionaries' in Czechoslovakia. The editorial described the 'disturbing' situation prevailing in Czechoslovakia before the military intervention as: progressive weakening of the party, growth of imperialist and bourgeois propaganda dangerous to socialism and the "offensive against Marxist-Leninist ideology", stirring up of nationalistic passions and denigration of Soviet-Czechoslovak friend and cooperation, particularly in the economic cooperation; efforts to reorient Czechoslovakia's political and economic policies towards the West. Such a situation was seen as threatening not only socialism but also "the foundation of peace in Europe".

The military intervention in Czechoslovakia raised several question concerning the sovereignty of the socialist states. The main task at hand, as Pravda put it, was the 'correlation and interdependence of the national interest of the socialist countries and their international duties'. The article asserted that the military intervention in Czechoslovakia did not "run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of Sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination". It denounced the

76. Pravda, 22 August 1968.
77. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p.1.
"abstract, non class approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of nations to self determination". The article condemned the 'yardstick of bourgeois law and 'formally juridical reasonings' on the question of sovereignty of nations and asserted that 'in a class society' laws and legal norms were subjected to "the laws of class struggle, the laws of social development". Thus sovereignty of socialist state had a different meaning than understood in the bourgeois international law. Therefore, military intervention was completely 'legal' and in accordance with the 'laws' governing the development of socialist states.

The article also mentioned norms governing the relations between the socialist states which were termed as 'Brezhnev Doctrine' in the Western media. The elements mentioned by the pravada article were:

(i) "A Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all socialist countries, to the entire communist movement".

(ii) Marxist Dialectics demands that "... one or another socialist state, staying in a system of other states composing the socialist community, cannot be free from the common interests of that community".

(iii) "The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of world socialism, of the world revolutionary movement".

The intervention in Hungary in 1956 and that in Czechoslovakia were justified in terms of "counter revolution" in these countries threatening socialism. In Hungary in 1956, it was conceded by the Soviets initially that the working class had genuine grievances. In the aftermath of events in Czechoslovakia, explicit methods and forms of inter-socialist state relations were evolved. The additional factors emphasized after Czechoslovak episode were the limitedness of sovereignty and the danger to the security of Europe. The Czechoslovak episode reaffirmed the validity of the 'new' type of international relations that had taken shape since the advent of the world socialist system and its historic competition with the capitalist system.

It must however be recognised that the primary reason of the intervention, no matter how it was justified theoretically, was the question of security in case Czechoslovakia broke away from the socialist community and joined the 'imperialists'.

The events in Hungary and Poland in the fifties, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as problems with China culminating into military clashes raised the question of conflicts and antagonisms within the socialist countries and the methods to deal with them.

The 1969 statement of the Communist Parties had recognised the possibility of divergence within the socialist states on account of difference in levels of economic development, in social structure, national distinctions etc. These differences could and should 'be settled on the basis of proletarian internationalism', through
comeradely discussions and voluntary fraternal cooperation,"\(^82\)

This inequality, the Soviet authors maintained, could be removed by application of the "principle of equality under socialism".\(^83\) Such differences could lead to 'non-antagonistic' conflicts which only served to enhance mutual understanding. The non-antagonistic conflicts could be removed by 'comeradely discussion or by method of 'criticism and self-criticism' - provided it satisfied the criteria that it did not undermine socialism.

There was also a concern in the Soviet writings to prove that the principles of 'socialist internationalism' should be given due recognition in the international law. In fact Soviet authors have time and again declared that 'socialist internationalism' has already become a major principle of contemporary international law. All bilateral treaties between socialist states, the CMEA, the WTO etc. were based on 'socialist internationalism'.\(^84\) It was maintained that the 'proletarian internationalism' or its application to relations between socialist state - 'socialist internationalism' enriches the general international law. For instance, the principle of 'equality' in 'socialist internationalism' was supposed to have gone further than the principle of 'equality' in


\(^83\) V. Tsapanov, "Proletarian Internationalism, the Basis of Relations Amongst the Fraternal Parties and Countries", *International Affairs*, vol.9, 1972, p.24.

\(^84\) S. Sanakoyev, "Foreign Policy and the Ideological Struggle Today", *International Affairs*, no.5, 1974, p.77.
general in the international law as it includes 'the demand for actual equality and in some cases .... inequality ... in favour of less developed countries'\textsuperscript{85}. Similarly, under 'socialist internationalism', the respect for state sovereignty, it was held, went beyond the principle of sovereignty in general international law. "The entire socialist community guards independence and territorial integrity of the socialist countries. This helps to strengthen the sovereignty of each"\textsuperscript{86}.

It can be said that during the Brezhnev years an attempt was made to place relations amongst the socialist countries on the bases of 'socialist internationalism'. This required according special meanings to the traditional concepts of international law governing inter-state relations.

**Relations with Capitalist Countries**

The emergence of detente between the socialist and the capitalist countries in seventies did not require any new ideological innovations. Peaceful coexistence between different social systems could easily explain the phenomenon of detente. However, what requires examination is the Soviet view of the factors which made detente possible.

\textsuperscript{85} E. Usenko, "International Legal Principles of Relations Between Socialist Countries", *International Affairs*, no.8, 1973, p.51.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
According to the Soviet theoreticians, the emergence of the world socialist system, its growing might leading to "changing balance of forces between the two socialist systems" proved to be the decisive factor in the 'fundamental restructuring of international relations' which detente implied. Brezhnev expressed this idea in his speech of June 14, 1975 when he said: "Having evaluated the overall balance of forces in the world, we arrived at the conclusion a few years ago that there was a real possibility for bringing about a fundamental change in the international situation". This fundamental restructuring of the international situation implied exclusion of war from the practice of international life and to achieve a just and lasting peace. It may be noticed that peace based on the increasing strength of USSR and "military strategic parity" with USA was the basis of detente. If this parity was disturbed, detente would also be disturbed.

The fundamental restructuring of the international relations, in concrete terms, implied: development of bilateral relations with capitalist countries, firm rebuffs to any act of aggression and arbitrariness in international relations, disarmament, multilateral cooperation amongst state in diverse area. The restructuring of the relations, however, did not imply abandonment of class-struggle. In fact the Soviet theorists maintained that the restructuring of international relations would proceed "amidst

88. Ibid., p. 7.
mounted class struggle". Thus, the real political meaning of detente and the restructuring of international relations was the recognition of the importance of the socialist world and its natural stakes in the world affairs and a militarity parity with the West.

The detente implied cooperation between the East and the West but it did not mean any relaxation on the front of ideological struggle. Brezhnev emphasized, "the lessening of international tensions does not rule out the struggle of ideas at all. This is an objective fact."90

The Final Act at Helsinki (1975) is regarded by the Soviets as an important stage of detente. The principle of interstate relations to which the Soviets agreed in Helsinki Final Act were:

"Sovereign equality, the non-use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and the basic freedoms, equal rights and the right of peoples to be their own masters, cooperation between states and the conscientious fulfilment of obligations".91

However, they also noted that in many countries like in USA there were forces which continued to oppose detente. This was for instance reflected in the sharp increase of military expenditure in USA, and continued disagreement on strategic forces of the two countries. USA was equally blamed for having missed opportunities opportunities for promoting detente in having rejected the Soviet

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89. Ibid., p.13.


disarmament proposals in 1977 and 1978. By the 1980s, particularly after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, detente had been replaced by a fresh round of cold war. Brezhnev in his report to the 26th Party Congress in 1981 hardly mentioned detente and squarely blamed the USA for infringement of the principles of detente. He accused the West of "line of disrupting detente, escalating arms race". The main reason for the decline of detente, as advanced by the Soviet theorists, was the feverish effort by USA to upset the 'military-strategic' parity between socialist and the capitalist camp and the re-embarkation by the US on "the futile course of achieving 'military superiority' over the USSR". The Soviet Mezhdunarodniki condemned the 'anti-detenists' of sentiment in the Western countries as manifest in such Western concepts of the day as 'limited nuclear war', 'complimentary armament', "collapse of detente" etc.

Correlation of Forces

It may be noted that the Soviets have been insistent that detente became possible because the 'balance of forces' tilted in favour of socialism and it declined because the West tried to achieve 'military superiority' over the USSR and denied it 'equal


and equitable security'. The Soviet theorists have universally condemned the Western concept of 'balance of power' and instead proposed the concept of 'correlation of forces' which they regarded as one of the important factors shaping international relations. The 'balance of power' concept, integral to the Western school of political realism founded by Hans Morgenthau, was criticised on the ground that this approach totally ignored the 'the class essence' of the international relations and the 'class character of a state' foreign policy.\textsuperscript{95} Even the more refined 'bourgeois concept of "political equilibrium"' implying that a state sought by its foreign policy to 'stabilise' the system of international relations was criticised by the Soviet theorists on the grounds that, in accordance with Marxism-Leninism, the international relations at a given moment were characterised by 'a definite correlation of the struggling classes, political forces'.\textsuperscript{96}

The 'correlation of forces' concepts was a corollary to the Soviet world view of struggle between the two camps, emergence of world socialist system and the impact this has had on the international relations and the foreign policy of individual states. In its struggle with capitalism, socialism relied not only on the military and economic strengths and potentialities but also on all diverse political, social, economic forces and opportunities.

\textsuperscript{95} A. Sergiyev, "Leninism On the Correlation of Forces As a Factor of International Relations", \textit{International Affairs}, no.5, 1975, p.100.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p.102.
which tended to strengthen the anti-imperialist struggle. It was realised that the historic struggle between the two socio-economic systems proceeded not merely at the state-level but also at other, non-state, non-governmental planes. Essentially, anti-imperialism struggle was a class-struggle of which relations between states was only one component. Once the class struggle was accepted as the fundamental driving force of international relations, the "correlation of force", which meant "the correlation of class forces in the world wide system of international relations" emerged as a natural outcome.

How did the phenomenon of 'correlation of forces' work in practice? Foreign policies of states were merely instruments for achieving the class interests. "Diverse classes and political force .... come out into the world scene equipped with powerful and complicated means of foreign policy influence".97 Various states, parties and political forces 'unite into definite groups, systems of states, or political, economic or military coalitions based on common class and state interests."98 This implied that the unity, cooperation among socialist countries emerged as an important component in the correlation of forces on a global scale. So WIO and CMEA, and 'socialist internationalism' had a direct bearing on the "correlation of force". Similarly national liberation force, the important force in international relations, emerged as

97. Ibid., p.102.
98. Ibid., p.103.
"natural allies" of the world socialist system. An important implication of this concept was the relations at non-state levels which the Soviet Union maintained with the diverse political groupings, parties, personalities in the various countries around the globe. This overt feature of the Soviet foreign policy played no less part in the West to project the 'Soviet threat' and the 'Soviet expansionism' often in an exaggerated manner. 'Correlation of force' concept justified and re-inforced the 'new type' of international relations which the Soviets emphasized after the emergence of world socialist system.

**Relations with National Liberation Movements and Newly Liberated Countries**

Under Khrushchev, active Soviet involvement with the third world countries began but the main occupation of the Soviet foreign policy theory and conduct remained 'peaceful coexistence' and relations with the capitalist countries as well as development of inter-socialist state relations. It was during the Brezhnev years that a vast amount of theoretical work was done in the Soviet Union on the National Liberation Movements and it was during these years that some of the most outstanding Soviet successes in the third world were recorded. The keen Soviet interest in the national liberation movements all over the world flowed from the theoretical premise that national liberation movements, the result of decolonisation and the outcome of inner contradictions of imperialism, were 'natural allies' of the world socialist system in its anti-imperialist struggle. For the Soviets while the main
contradiction in the world remained between socialism and capitalism (unlike for the Chinese who regarded imperialism vs. national liberation movements as the main contradictions), the immense revolutionary potential of the national liberation movements could be utilised in weakening imperialism. 99

The Soviet theories on national liberation movements and the newly liberated countries dealt both with the internal processes as well as the foreign policies pursued by these countries.

An important concept evolved in the Soviet theory was that of 'National Democracy'. It had been mentioned in the 1960 statement of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties.

99. Brezhnev in his report to the 23rd Party Congress said: "The successes of the national liberation movement are inseparably bound up with the success of world socialism .... The ... alliance of these great revolutionary force is the guarantee of the final triumph of the cause of national and social liberation." The pressure on imperialism which the national liberation movements had begun to exert was recognised by the 24th and the 25th Party Congresses. Brezhnev, in his report to the 26th Party Congress in 1981, speaking of Soviet Union's relations with the 'newly freed countries', was balanced in his appraisal of the countries of the third world. He said, "After liberation .... some ... have been following the revolutionary democratic path. In others, capitalist relations have taken roots". The task of "consolidating the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movements" continued to remain important for the USSR. See n.52, p.41; n.53, p.23; n.54, p.15; n.61, pp.16 & 21.
'National Democratic' states were those states which followed an economic programme of agrarian reforms, created a state sector in the economy, followed democratic policies internally, and, their foreign policy was pro-socialist bloc especially pro-Soviet Union. In 1963, a new concept - Non-capitalist Path of Development (NCP) was emphasised. This represented a more systematic approach to the problems of the Third-World. NCP was defined as: "that stage of social (and) economic development ... in which by non capitalist means the necessary preconditions for the transition to the construction of socialism are created".

It was during the Brezhnev years that the concept of NCP was more fully developed and additional concepts like the "state of socialist orientation" and 'mnogoukladnost' society (multilayered society) were evolved. The NCP offered underdeveloped countries a way to change over to 'socialist construction' by skipping certain historical stages of development. It was recognised that capital would not develop in most poor countries on the classical lines and, therefore, NCP was the answer. The NCP also raised the question of substance and nature of state power in countries taking non-capitalist road. This in turn depended upon the nature of the ruling groups. Some Soviet academics endorsed the notion of 'revolution from above' when they opined that in these countries "The socialist basis is shaped with the most active intervention


from above." 102 The specific national characteristics also assumed great importance with regard to non-capitalist way. Existence of a state sector was important in a country taking the non-capitalist way.

No final view on these questions was evolved. Some researchers were prone to completely reject the NCP, while others equated NCP with socialism and thereby "admitting the possibility of socialist development without the dictatorship of the proletariat". There were some who burdened the NCP with too many reservations and restrictions. 103 Some theorists raised the question of conscientiousness that was being shaped in a complex, multi-layered societies in these countries. Other questions considered by the Soviet theoreticians were related to the precise identification of classes in the developing countries, and inter-class relations with special reference to the role of working class, peasantry, bourgeois and the petty bourgeoisie. It was generally recognised that due to low level of development in these countries, a sizeable 'working class' or a 'revolutionary bourgeoisie' did not exist. In fact, petty bourgeois was the most numerous class. Petty bourgeoisie had been regarded as anti-revolutionary in European countries but in the case of developing countries it could play

different role. The petty bourgeoisie led by the intelligentsia developed under the aegis of state and therefore could play a progressive role in the non-capitalist path of development.

The concepts of 'promezhutochny' or 'sredny sloi' were developed to explain class alignments in society capable of playing a progressive role. These intermediate levels were the combination of petty bourgeoisie, non-proletarian and semi-proletarian elements together with civil and military intelligentsia, civil servants, small traders, artisans etc.

These sophistications were necessary to describe as to how a transition to socialism could take place in these countries without a legitimate working class. In their considerations, the Soviet authors also considered the role of Armies in third world countries. Just as petty bourgeoisie have been assigned a progressive role, the armies and the military regimes, it was maintained, could also play a progressive role.

While the internal processes in the developing countries presented innumerable theoretical dilemmas to the Soviet academics, the question of the foreign policy of the newly liberated countries equally engaged the Soviets.

The most important aspect of their foreign policies was considered to be their attitude towards socialism. Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress had noted the 'motley' crowd that these countries presented. Here several principal guidelines and directions were identified by the Soviet theoreticians. The ability of a particular national liberation movement 'to combine in a
flexible manner national and international factor was regarded as a crucial problem of revolutionary process. 104

The onset of detente, growth in the might of socialist camp and the perception that it would lessen chances of war, and general improvement of international climate was considered to have exerted favourable influence on the course of national liberation movements. The Soviet Union was regarded as "the key economic, political, ideological and military factor in the national liberation movements". 105 Thus the Soviet theoretician built a 'natural' case for pro-Soviet orientation in the foreign policies of these countries. The theme of socialist countries and the national liberation movements being the 'natural allies' was built up systematically, and particularly after the Havana summit of the Non-Aligned countries in 1979 under the Chairmanship of Cuba. 106

Conclusion

An entire edifice of foreign policy theory and international relations theory on the basis of two-camp premise envisaging peaceful competition and co-existence was erected in the post-war years.


105. Ibid., pp.72 & 74.

106. These issues are considered in detail in Chapter 6.
The theoretical concepts which had far-reaching implications for foreign policy conduct - socialist internationalism, proletarian internationalism, detente, national liberation movements etc. - were developed within the framework of Marxism-Leninism and its 'creative' development, 'Theory' and practice' interacted closely and mutually influenced each other. A foreign policy without ideology was considered impossible. The link between ideology and foreign policy was emphasized again and again in the statements of Soviet leaders as in the writings of Soviet theoreticians. Cooperation with the ideological adversaries was not ruled out but ideological struggle remained a key element in the Soviet foreign policy doctrines.

It was Khruschev, more than Brezhnev who showed boldness in recognizing that Stalinist ideology had had debilitating impact on the Soviet domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, Khruschev comprehensively revised ideology but kept in tact the Marxist-Leninist edifice. Brezhnev, concerned with achieving military rather than economic parity with the West, used ideology to isolate USSR from the mainstream developments in the world in a number of areas. This led to stagnation in the Soviet internal development in the late seventies and early eighties.

Foreign policy, in Soviet Union, had always been regarded as a means to an end set by the party. Thus foreign policy has had extremely close and identifiable link with the domestic policy. This was clearly illustrated when foreign policy and diplomacy had been used to achieve goals determined by such priorities 'building of Communism' under Khruschev, 'developed socialism' under Brezhnev.
Foreign policy has also been used in the goal of the 'anti-imperialist' struggle of which struggle with bourgeoisie ideology was a component. Similarly foreign policy and diplomacy were used for the purpose of attainment of 'peace' and avoidance of war when it was realised that war would hamper socialist construction. Foreign policy had no independent standing and it derived itself from the general ideology of the Soviet state which represented class interests.

In the USSR, ideology was also used to combat ideology. For instance, it was held that anti-Sovietism was a plank of imperialist ideology and hence of the foreign policies of the imperialist countries. There was a great stress in the Soviet literature on meeting the challenge of bourgeois ideology by maintaining the purity of the socialist ideology but in a 'non-dogmatic', 'non-sectarian' way.

Under Marxism-Leninism, great importance is laid upon the analysis of the contemporary world. Such an analysis provides the basis for the foreign policy of USSR. New doctrines were evolved as the shifts in international relations occurred. Thus, neither the ideology nor the foreign policy was ever treated as being static. The dialectical method, an integral part of Marxism-Leninism again was used to explain shifts in policies or contradictions and departures from well-established guidelines.

The Soviet foreign policy was considered 'scientific' and 'law based' and therefore superior to the bourgeoisie nations' foreign policy which were criticised for not giving due recognition to the 'class' basis of international relations.
Many of the Soviet policies can be justified only in terms of dominance of superstructure over base. This fundamental revision in theory under Stalin gave the State and the Party exceptional importance. Foreign policy has also been affected by this.

Changes, developments and new foreign policy doctrines were always justified in terms of Marxism-Leninism. In fact, a standard practice in the Soviet Union was to justify policy shifts by referring to Lenin. Extrapolation of Lenin to contemporary situation has been very common. Marxism-Leninism acted as the legitimizing of the policy of the day.