Chapter 2

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF IDEOLOGY AND THE FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINES IN THE SOVIET UNION: MARX, LENIN AND STALIN

In this chapter the key ideological and theoretical precepts having bearing on the Soviet Foreign Policy since the inception of the Soviet socialist state are identified. First, the theoretical treatment by Marx and Engels on international relations is reviewed. This is followed by international relations. Thereafter, Stalin's interception of the Marxist-Leninist ideology in areas affecting the Soviet foreign policy is examined. Major landmarks in the Soviet foreign policy theory and the environment in which the practice took place are identified and linked to the Soviet ideology.

I. MARX AND ENGELS

Although Marx and Engels did not deal with international relations as a separate category, they dealt at length with such central concepts as class, capital, nation, state, war, violence, revolution, world market, etc., which had crucial bearing on the
international relations theory. Marx's historical materialism, which seeks to explain the course of human development would certainly touch upon international behaviour which is just one aspect of the human behaviour. Therefore, it is possible to explore as to how international relations theory would look like in Marxism.

Class Struggle

For Marx classes are bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production and class-struggle provides the motive force of human behaviour and indeed history. For the purpose of class-struggle, Marx held that all classes could be divided into two; the ones which controlled the means of production and the others which did not. This led to class antagonism which in turn led to class struggle and its attendant consequences, most notably the existence of State. Marx maintains "every form of society has been based on the antagonism of...

1. There has been a considerable debate in the West on whether or not Marx and Engels had a precise theory of international relations. For the view that Marx did not concern himself with international relations in particular, see V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of International Relations, (London, 1980), pp.12-62. For a rejoinder to this view see Fred Halliday, "Vigilantism in International Relations: Kubalkova and Cruickshank and Marxist Theory", Review of International Studies, March 1989, p.114. (Buttersworth)

oppressing and oppressed classes". The immediate corollary to this assertion is that the various facets of the society are the result of the existence of the class struggle and undergo changes as the struggle proceeds.

In the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels recognise the existence of two classes in the 'present' epoch; the 'bourgeois' i.e. the capital owners belonging to the oppressing class, and the 'proletariat' the oppressed class. The Manifesto goes on to say, "what the bourgeoisie, therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable." Thus, the final victory of the proletariat is predicted by Marx on the strength of the logic of the class antagonism between the two classes.

All working class members are not 'communists'. Marx identifies communists as the "most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country".

Marx was clear that communists did not tie themselves to a particular nation or a particular nationality in the accomplishment of their tasks. He drew a clear distinction between the 'communists' and the other working-class parties. Marx believed in the unity amongst the proletariat declaring that

4. Ibid., p. 44.
5. Ibid.
"working man have no country". The tenet of Marxism viewing proletariat's actions as cutting across national and state barriers was fundamental to subsequent theory of Soviet foreign policy.

In Marx's view the proletariat would emerge as a victor in its contest with the bourgeois and on attainment of such a victory, it "would have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and classes generally". Thus, in place of old bourgeois society, there would appear "an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all". Such a classless society was the final aim of communism.

It is clear from the foregoing that state or nation was not regarded as a fundamental unit of international relations by Marx. In fact, the state itself emerges as a by-product of class struggle.

State

For Marx and Engels, the state represented the interests of a dominant class. The state arose out of conflicts in the society and assumed the role of a power above the society. The society

6. Ibid., p. 49.
7. Ibid.
created its own organs to look after its own interests. 8

Engels, in his preface to Marx's *The Civil War in France*, writes: "In reality, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another ... and, at best, an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victories in struggle for class supremacy ..." 9 Thus it emerges that even when the proletariat is in power, the state remains an 'evil'. This conclusion was later on drastically modified by Stalin in favour of the continuation of state.

The instruments used by the state are as hateful as the state itself. Engels, in *The Housing Question* severely attacks the common (i.e. un-Marxist) conceptions of justice, natural right, law etc. He maintains that these concepts are invented by the state to perpetuate its own existence. These notions do not reflect the economic basis of the society and tend to become abstract. 10

8. Engels, in his *Origin of Family, Private Property and State*, thus explains the necessity of the state: "... it(State) is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction within itself, that it is left into irreconciliable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of "order", and this power, arisen out of society, but placing above it, and itself increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state". *Ibid.*, vol.II, p.289.


Marx and Engels were acutely aware of the significance of nationalism, but they did not deal with the subject in any systematic manner. In their earlier writings, they also underestimated the explosive force of nationalism. It was only later that Bauer (1907) and Stalin (1913) and Lenin (1914) took initial steps to systematise the Marxist view of nations and nationalities.\(^\text{11}\)

Unlike the concept of State, that of Nation did not easily lend itself to the idea of class-struggle. In the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels declared that the working men had no country. And yet, they exhorted the proletariat to first become 'leading class of the nation' and to constitute itself as 'the nation'.\(^\text{12}\) Thus it was recognised that in practical terms, it was advantageous, indeed necessary for the proletariat to identify itself with the 'nation' that it was in, although in final analysis the working men had no country and the bonds of class transcended all national boundaries. The essential Marxist view was that proletarian movements should be freed from narrow nationalistic tendencies. Internationalism should be emphasised over nationalism.


\(^{12}\) Marx & Engels, n.3, p.49.
Although for practical considerations, Marx and Engels accepted the existence of nations, they believed that the bourgeois 'nation-state' was a transitional phenomenon which bore seeds of its own destruction. In their work *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels declared: "original isolation of separate nationalities" would break down under the impact of the 'division of labour' between modern developed nations.¹³

Marx and Engels supported nationalistic strivings only if these promoted the revolutionary cause. Thus, they condemned the minor Slav peoples of the Habsburg empire for their role during the revolution of 1848-49 and recognised that nationalistic sentiment in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe could endanger the bourgeois-democratic revolutions elsewhere. Accordingly, Marx and Engels came out in favour of revolutionising the advanced nations rather than waiting for the revolutionary potential in the backward parts of Europe to mature. Thus, Engels was critical of Slav sympathy for Tsarist Russia, regarded by them as an epitome of reaction.

In these circumstances, for Marx and Engels, the principle of national self-determination depended mainly on the potential of the nation or the nationality concerned. "The very first conditions of national existence" included "large numbers and compactness of territory", and additional requirements, were resources, ability, ability.

specialisation, so as to facilitate creation of a rich and proliferated society.\(^{14}\)

In accordance with these criteria, the smaller nationalities had no right to self-determination. Marx also regarded the nationalism of the middle classes as largely a reactionary phenomenon, describing it as a feature of Bonapartism.\(^{15}\)

In the later years, however, some of these ideas on nationalism and national self-determination were modified by Marx and Engels. Exceptions were made as it was realised, for instance as in the case of the Poles, that they could not be won over to a revolutionary cause unless they were promised an early independence. Despite these modifications, the essential Marxist negativism to the nationalistic tendencies remained.

**Revolution, War and Violence**

Clearly, in the situation of an ongoing class struggle both with nationalities and between nations, conflict is but natural. However, generally speaking, both Marx and Engels were strongly opposed to war. All wars were unjust except those of the oppressed against the oppressor and the defensive wars of the various kinds. They regarded 'force' as the midwife of change. According to them ideas became a material force when a vast majority of people began to follow them.

---


A study of Marx's theory of revolution brings out that Marx and Engels often viewed the use or violent or peaceful methods as being a matter of strategy. In the earlier phases of their career they believed in the inevitability of violence in the overthrow of the bourgeois order by the proletariat. However, subsequently they seemed to recognise the possibility of capture of power by the proletariat by using the bourgeois institutions and thereby bring about a peaceful change in such circumstances. But, in places where the bourgeois institutions, customs and traditions had not taken roots, violent struggle remained the only way to bring about social change.  

World Market

For Marx, all empires existed within the framework of the World Market which leads to the "more and more" vanishing of the "national differences, and antagonisms between peoples". The World Market made the bourgeois vs. proletariat struggle universal and led to the dissolution in practice of all stable, time-honoured bourgeois institutions. The World Market and the division of labour were inseparable. National differences and


antagonisms tended to vanish, owing to, interalia, development of the world Market.\textsuperscript{19} Marx also regarded the capture of World Market by the industrial bourgeoisie as a precondition for ruling the world.\textsuperscript{20}

Marx regarded world market as an area to which class-struggle would be extended on attainment of communism. Marx seemed to believe the world market would be transformed rather than abolished and man will control the world market rather than be a slave to it unlike under capitalism.\textsuperscript{21}

Thus, the phenomenon of world market and the division of labour were bound to have significant impact over international relations. For instance, the less advanced societies are drawn willy-nilly into the orbit of world market which is created by the capitalist of the industrially advanced countries. Similarly, the manufacturing countries are left with no option but to cater to the demands of the world market which they themselves have created. But how precisely would the inter-state relations be determined by the evolution of world market with its eventual control by the communists is not envisaged by Marx.

\textsuperscript{19} "Communist Manifesto" in Ibid., vol.I, p.49.
\textsuperscript{20} "The Class Struggle in France 1848-1850" in Marx and Engels, n.3, vol.1, p.139.
\textsuperscript{21} This is only an extrapolation of Marx's views on the world market and not a categoric assertion by Marx on the subject.
Marxian Model of International Relations

Although, Marx and Engels have not given a 'theory of international relations the 'laws' of socio-economic development propounded by them were supposed to have universal application. Attempts have been made to reconstruct a theory of international relations based on the writings of Marx and Engels. 22

(i) Relations Amongst Capitalist States

In the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', Marx and Engels maintain that the fear of the international proletariat will lead the world capitalist states to unite. At the same time, Kubalkova and Cruickshank point out that Marx and Engels regarded wars as natural to capitalism and asserted that inter-capitalist relations were based on conflict. The linkage between capitalism and wars was emphasised by Marx and Engels.

It would not be appropriate to regard Kubalkova's view as final on the Marx's reading of inter-capitalist relations. True, war and capitalism are linked. But the possibility of cooperation between the capitalist states is clearly foreseen by Engels. Consider, for instance, the following passage in Engels' Introduction of 1891 to the Civil War in France:

"And has not the prediction been proved correct that the annexation of Alsac-Lorraine would force France into the arms of Russia. Has not Bismarck for fully twenty years vainly wooed in favour of the Tsar".23

Clearly, the possibilities of both conflict and cooperation amongst the capitalist state was foreseen by Engels.

(ii) Coexistence Between the Capitalist and the Socialist States

Kubalkova and Cruickshank point out that Marx and Engels ruled out the possibility of co-existence between the capitalist and the socialist states except fleetingly, as in their belief, revolutions were to occur simultaneously all over the world. To them the concept of revolution in one country did not make theoretical sense.

This conclusion needs to be seen in its proper perspective. It is true that Marx and Engels regarded the impending revolutions to be of universal nature. But, it must also be mentioned that they were aware of the possibility that the revolutions might not start everywhere at the same time. This is implied in the following admission by Engels:

"It (i.e. the revolution) will start in all the civilised countries of the world, or at least in Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany, but not at one and the same time. It will take a longer or shorter time in each of these countries, according to the degree of industrial development in the respective countries". (Emphasis added)24


It would appear that Engels did admit of some time variation in the starting of revolution even in the industrially advanced countries of the world, there is also an admission that revolutions in the rest of the world, outside the industrially advanced countries, would only be 'hastened' by the revolutions in the advanced countries. No time was indicated as to when revolutions would begin in these countries. Although Marx and Engels hoped for a quick revolutionary tide engulfing the whole world in a short span, they did not categorically rule out, on practical considerations, the possibility of short term co-existence of 'capitalist' and 'socialist' states. How fleeting this co-existence was to be, was not considered by Marx and Engels.

(iii) Relations Between Capitalist States and Pre-Capitalist Social Formations

Marx and Engels regarded the industrially advanced nations of Europe and the USA as ripe for revolution. As regards the rest of the world (e.g. Asia) where the production relations were still in the pre-capitalist stage, the revolution would come only when capitalism would have developed. The impact of European capital on the Asian societies (e.g. that of U.K. on India) was regarded as being generally positive: "England has to fulfil a double meaning in India, one destructive, the other regenerating - the annihilation of old Asiatic society in Asia". 25

---

25. Ibid., p.38. For Marx's views on revolutions in China, Russia etc. are considered in detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
(iv) Relations Between Socialist Countries and Backward Areas

Kubalkova and Cruickshank referring to Marx's letter to Marx thought that Kautsky point out that on assumption of power, the European proletariat would have to take on the responsibility of taking control of the former colonies and assist in the development of capitalistic relations there before conditions for revolution would ripen. Thus, according to Kubalkova, in Marx's view, Colonialism, whether operated by the European capitalists or the European socialists, offered a way out for the backward areas' development.

(v) Relations Amongst the Socialist Countries

There is no explicit reference in Marx to the existence of distinct socialist states and to the kind of relationships that might exist amongst them. And yet the existence of a socialist state in which there is a dictatorship of proletariat is well recognised by Marx and Engels. However such dictatorship, though an improvement over capitalist states, nevertheless, would represent the interest of the ruling proletariat class and would represent a horizontal division of the society.

An important question that remains to be tackled is whether in the post-capitalist world, when classes would have withered away, will there be differences and diversity between these states? If so, will this diversity be antagonistic or non-antagonistic? In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx and Engels seemed to
accept the possibility of non-antagonistic diversity. Extending this to the realm of world politics, the possibility of existence of socialist state has to be admitted. The important point however is that even if the diversity which was tantamount to inequality between the socialist states were non-antagonistic, would this not lead to existence of hegemony?

The alternative post-capitalism scenario is that instead of socialist plurality of independent socialist states, there would exist an "economically integrated world still consisting of separate nations". What would be the nature of such a world? Although Marx did not give an answer to this question, R.N. Berki in his seminal article on Marx and International Relations written in 1971, pointed out that in such a world, where the national differentials in terms of resources, relations of production etc. continued to exist, development of differential in living standards, wealth, armed strength and in turn, warfare and ultimately relations of domination among the separate units would be unavoidable.

Thus, even in the socialist world, war, domination, hegemony could not be ruled out. Of course, it must be reiterated that this was not Marx's conclusion; it is only an analysis of Marx's teachings.

26. Ibid., p.40.

Marx and International Relations: Summary

Although Marx did not treat international relations as a separate category, his analysis of the society and the world had a deep bearing on international relations. The reason for this is not far to seek. The conventional theories of international relations begin with the state as a unit and go on to divide the world horizontally into states and then examine the inter-state relations. However, in Marx, an absolute unity of mankind is postulated as an ideal. The horizontal divisions into states therefore get relegated to the background and instead the concept of class and class-struggle which exists internally within a state or a nation but cuts across the state frontiers is advanced. Thus, in Marx, international relations are treated differently from the conventional approach. Nations, for Marx are merely historical entities, and, therefore, ephemeral. What is permanent is the class-struggle and inexorable march towards a classless, and hence, stateless society.

Berki's conclusion about Marx and international relations is particularly apt:

"The Marxian ideal of socialism appears either in the shape of hegemony, as the domination of strong nations over weak ones; in this case it is no longer tinged with the features of capitalism, but neither is it the realisation of a higher human freedom. Or, it appears in the shape of a community of independent nations, in which case it may come to represent freedom and progress over capitalism proper, but remains a system still visibly bearing the birthmarks of capitalism".28

28. Ibid., p.105.
II. LENIN

Lenin, while adopting Marx's historical materialism did not follow Marx slavishly. He applied Marx's theories to the conditions prevailing in Russia and in the world and propounded new laws of socio-economic development (e.g. law of uneven development of capitalism). In the context of international relations and the foreign policy of the socialist Russia, Lenin's theoretical treatment of such concepts as party, state, nations, imperialism, war and peace, co-existence etc. are of interest.

Marx underplayed the role of man and consciousness in history-making. And yet, the Communist Manifesto spoke of a communist party. It was Lenin who gave a cogent theory of party, underlining the reasons for its need, its revolutionary task and setting down the principles to guide its conduct. Demise of capitalism and a stateless, classless society were pre-ordained by the laws of economic development. The victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie was a foregone conclusion of history.

For Marx, proletarian consciousness would grow on its own, thanks to the prevailing economic conditions in the society. But Lenin, analysing the reasons for the repeated failure of the revolutionary movements, emphasized the role of workers' consciousness. Revolutions were pre-ordained but needed a helping hand. He felt that workers would have to be trained to develop the consciousness. Left to itself, Lenin wrote, "the working class can develop only trade-union consciousness".  

Lenin conceded that workers had 'spontaneity' but it was not enough to bring about proletarian revolution. Lenin thus introduced an element of voluntarism in Marx's theory of economic determinism. Lenin's conception of the party derived from this acknowledged superiority of consciousness over the spontaneous movement of the working class. The party was to consist of those who had gained consciousness. The revolution making was to be entrusted to these party members. This had far-reaching consequences not only for theory but also for practice. Through further developments, the Party came to be recognised as the sole arbiter of the policies of the State not only in the USSR but elsewhere too.

The State

Lenin in his work *State and Revolution* elaborated on the concept of State. The key conclusions drawn by Lenin from the writings of Marx and Engels on State can be summarised as follows:

State is an organ of class rule and also a reflection of irreconcilability of antagonisms. Liberation of oppressed classes would be impossible without a violent revolution, without 'the destruction of the apparatus of state power created by the ruling class.' The replacement of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The

abolition of the proletarian state, i.e. of state in general is impossible except through the process of 'withering away'. The proletarian state needs power, the centralization of force, the organisation of violence, both to crush resistance of the exploiters and to lead the enormous mass of the population - the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the semi proletarians - in the work of organizing socialist economy.

Lenin admitted that the proletarian state would also, by definition, be oppressive as it would have to crush the exploiters. But he equally believed that the 'proletarian democracy' would be "million times" better than the bourgeois democracy.

Since the proletarian state could only 'wither away' unlike the bourgeois state which had to be abolished, the dictatorship of the proletariat' was a must. According to Lenin, the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was the true essence of Marxism: "Only he is a Marxist who extends recognition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is what constitutes the most profound difference between the Marxist and the ordinary petty( as well as big) bourgeois. This is the touch stone on which the real understanding and recognition of Marxism is to be tested." Thus Lenin imparted an emphasis to the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' which was missing in the Marxist thought. Lenin believed that the

32. Ibid., p.120.
transition from capitalism to communism could take place in different forms, "but the essence will inevitably be the same, the dictatorship of the proletariat". 33

As regards the 'withering away' of the proletarian state, Lenin maintained that this process started as soon as the liberated people began to suppress their oppressors, who were reduced to a minority. The majority found itself in a position to directly fulfill the functions of state power. Thus, the withering away of the proletarian state begins with the victory of the proletariat.

Lenin clearly foresaw a phased transition to communism. In the first phase of communism, he wrote, "bourgeois right" was not abolished (emphasis in the original). 34 But this phase was not communism as the state had still not withered away. "The state withers away in so far as there are no longer any capitalists; there are no longer any classes, therefore, to be suppressed. But the state has not yet completely withered away, since there still remains the safeguarding of "bourgeois right" which sanctifies actual inequality." 35

Lenin envisaged a long period when the state would wither away after the world-wide victory of socialism. But his belief, like Marx's, in the withering away of state remained intact.

33. Ibid., p.126.
34. Ibid., p.176.
35. Ibid.
Nations, National Question, National Self Determination

Unlike Marx, Lenin laid great emphasis on national liberation movements and recognised the revolutionary potential of national liberation movements. He noted that "the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of nation-states" (emphasis in the original).

Lenin defined self-determination as "the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, the formation of an independent national state". Amplifying this further, Lenin wrote that self-determination of nations would mean "political self-determination, political independence for the formation of a nation-state". Lenin laid down the principles as to which demand for self-determination should be supported and which one should be rejected. Firstly, such demands had to be evaluated 'from the angle of the class struggle of the workers'.

Secondly, if the demand was made in the context of the fight of the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the oppressing one, such a demand was to be supported. But if the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stood for its own bourgeoisie

37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p.568.
39. Ibid., p.576.
nationalism, they were to be opposed. Thus, for Lenin, proletarian class struggle and struggle against oppression were the key criteria in evaluating the demand for national self-determination. 40

**Proletarian Internationalism**

The supremacy of the unity of class-struggle over nationalism leads to the concept of 'proletarian internationalism: Lenin was aware that the demand for national self-determination could degenerate into plain and simple chauvinism and that an urge for national self-determination should not become an end in itself. For him, the question of national boundaries was of relatively minor importance than the question of strengthening the proletarian unity for the cause of revolution. 41

Clearly, in Lenin's theory of national self-determination, proletarian internationalism and right of self-determination were inextricably tied up, with the former acting as the touchstone for the latter. Lenin, adding on to Marx's theory of nations and taking

---

40. Ibid., p.586.

41. In a letter (1920) addressed to the Ukrainian workers and peasants on their victory over Denikin, Lenin said: "If we fail to maintain closest alliance with one another ..., the capitalists will be able to crush both the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia". In order to overcome the mutual distrust between the Great Russian and the Ukrainian communist, he said that the Soviet Russia wanted "a voluntary alliance of nations" and that the question as to how to delimit the state border was a "moral one". Thus for Lenin, Ukraine could have a political sovereignty but what was important was that the workers of Ukraine and Russia should have a close alliance against the capitalists. See *Essentials of Lenin*, n.36, vol. I., pp.549-51.
note of the revolutionary potential of national liberation movements, developed a concrete theory on the national question which was later on incorporated into Soviet foreign policy, *mutatis mutandis*, as a fundamental principle.

**Imperialism**

Marx in his time could not have yet perceived fully the development of capitalism and it was left to Lenin to extend Marxist theory of capitalism to include imperialism into it. He used the Marxist theory flexibly to examine how the prevailing situation could be explained using Marxist theory and amending or extending it.

Lenin's theory of imperialism, propounded in his *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, first published in 1917 but written during 1914-16, concerned itself with the functioning of capitalism on a global scale. Lenin, by analysing the most advanced stage of capitalism, set a tradition of analysis followed by the subsequent Soviet analysts and policy makers to this day: to relate world policies to the nature of existing capitalism or imperialism.

The revolution as predicted by Marx failed to take place in the advanced capitalist countries of the world and the 'insoluble' contradictions of capitalism seemed to have eased. Lenin explained this phenomenon in the following way: thanks to the growth of modern industry, capitalism grew into monopoly capitalism which in turn became finance capitalism, and finally, state (monopoly) capitalism. Capitalism became imperialism at a definite and very high stage of
development, when certain of its fundamental attributes began to be transformed into their opposites. Economically free competition, the bedrock of capitalism, transformed into monopoly, its exact opposite. Monopoly, however, did not abolish free competition but lived alongside thereby giving rise to "a number of very acute antagonisms, frictions and conflicts". Imperialism which could be defined as monopoly capitalism nevertheless had five other attributes too, notably, (a) monoplies played decisive role in economic life, (b) existence of finance capital, (c) export of capital, (d) sharing of the world among the international capitalist monopolies, and (e) the territorial division of the whole world among the greatest capitalist powers.

Politically, imperialism so defined meant 'super-profits' for 'a handful of very rich countries' creating the possibility of 'corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat'. The monopoly and the state capitalism, by using a part of super profits to bribe the proletariat, tried to neutralise the proletarian movements. Thus the State monopoly capitalism was able to divide the workers into 'upper' and the 'lower stratum', neglecting in the process the latter.

43. Ibid., p.108.
44. Ibid., p.106.
45. Ibid., p.130.
46. Ibid., p.126.
47. Ibid., p.128.
Lenin, however, maintained that the imperialist nations were always searching for new markets which becomes more and more difficult as the 'division of world' had already been completed. Therefore, the divisions created by the imperialists in the workers movement would only be temporary as the 'irreconciliability between opportunism and the general and vital interests of the working class movement' would aggravate under such conditions.  

Lenin was confident that under imperialism, the fundamental contradictions of capitalism would accentuate further rather than ease. This is because the political features of imperialism "are reaction all along the line, and increased national oppression ...". Thus, like Marx, Lenin predicted the doom of capitalism as imperialism could not permanently save capitalism in all the crisis that it generates. Lenin described imperialism as 'capitalism in transition or moribund capitalism'.

Lenin's theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism had an impact on the nature of international relations in the conditions of imperialism. This monopoly capitalism existed on a global scale, it brought into existence a contradiction between the rich and the backward states leading to tensions. In this view, the class-struggle concept is globalised and also gets linked to the national question. Thus the concepts

48. Ibid., p.131.
49. Ibid., p.134.
50. Ibid., p.152.
of State, nations which were underemphasized by Marx are thrown into sharp relief. State, unlike in Marxism, emerges as a fundamental unit of international relations. Imperialist rivalries and wars are also regarded as inevitable.

Although Lenin did not himself formulate in precise terms a dialectics of backwardness, a number of his colleagues (e.g. Trotsky, Bukharin etc. as well as others after him) have tried to deduce from Lenin's writings precisely such a theory of backwardness. Specifically, mention may be made of two theories which Lenin's writings imply: (a) The Law of Uneven Development of Capitalism, and (b) Theory of Combined Development.51

The "law of uneven development of capitalism", in contrast to Marxist precept, stated that capitalism grew unevenly. The important consequence of this is that for Lenin, backwardness could become a strong factor of change in history. The backwardness of Russia in fact, unlike for Marx and Engels, placed this country at centre-stage as far as change was concerned.

Through the theory of Imperialism, a link was also established between nationalism of the backward nations and modern socialism. Thus national liberation movements embodied both backwardness as well as nations which were to play decisive role in the overthrow of imperialism. Backward nations became underdogs of imperialism and were destined to build new societies.

Imperialism affected the internal processes in backward nations. The study of these internal structures in a backward nation led to the hypothesis of "combined development" i.e. all backward societies combined features characteristic of different stages of development.

In such societies, not only did the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeois societies raged, the bourgeois itself was engaged in a struggle against feudalism, aristocracy, etc. According to the theory of 'combined development', the two-class struggles went on simultaneously and the two revolutions had to be fought simultaneously. According to Lenin, such a telescoping of non-contemporaneous features occurred when a backward society was drawn into the orbit of imperialism. Thus imperialism brought about a highly revolutionary situation both within a backward society as well as globally.

Attitude Towards War

Closely linked to the concepts of imperialism and nationalism is the key issue of war. For Lenin every war required "an historical analysis to determine whether it was legitimate or just".52 Lenin held wars of liberation as just but the "wars between reactionary empires that oppressed many nations" were unjust.53 As to wars which ought to be denounced, Lenin focused

52. V.I. Lenin, A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism, (Moscow, 1965), p.11.
53. Ibid., p.15.
on the World War I, which was the product of the growth of imperialism. Lenin regarded the World War I as an imperialist war, undertaken by the imperialist countries to 'safeguard the intensity of finance capital and rob and oppress colonies and foreign countries.'

Proceeding from such an analysis and classification of wars, it was logical for Lenin to criticise those who defended the World War I on the nationalistic, patriotic grounds and debunk the 'defence of fatherland' argument adduced by the socialists of belligerent countries to justify the participation of their respective countries in that war. He accused the socialists in the belligerent countries of trying to substitute socialism by nationalism by advocating the 'defence of fatherland' and ignoring the imperialist nature of the World War. This, he said, was tantamount to "repudiating the class struggle and its inevitable transformation into a civil war at certain moment".

Lenin worked on the premise that a war between the imperialists could be taken advantage of in furthering the cause of the revolution by converting such a war into a civil war. To support this contention he referred to the experience of the Paris Commune, and the Second International's Basle Resolution of 1912. He exhorted the socialists in all the countries to work in this direction.

54. Ibid., p.12.
56. Ibid., vol.1, p.625.
The attitude of war and the economic analysis of the imperialist epoch and the national question led him to a classification of states. He identified three different types of states: "First type: the advanced countries of Western Europe, where the national movement is a thing of the past. Second type: Eastern Europe, where it (i.e. national self-determination) is a thing of the present. Third type: Semi-colonies and colonies, where it is largely a thing of the future."

On these grounds, the wars between the countries of the first type where these wars could not be those of self-determination, were unjust. The wars arising out of the self-determination of countries of the second or the third type were clearly justified.

It can also be observed that Lenin was not a pacifist opposing all wars. A war had to be analysed on the basis of 'class-struggle'.

Like Lenin's theory of imperialism, Lenin's theory of war was also a considerable advance over the Marxist theory. Imperialist wars provided an opportunity to backward countries to reach the goal of revolution even though they had not reached the advanced stage of capitalism. This set up a new task for the international social revolutionaries. They were required to wage a constant struggle against the ruling classes in their countries to take advantage of the capitalism's propensity to wage wars. Lenin, who described second international as opportunist became convinced

57. Ibid., p.17.
that a new international body to coordinate activities of all
the social revolutionaries would be required to facilitate world
revolution on global scale.

Much of Western analysis is based on the premise that
Lenin held wars to be inevitable. But Lenin saw proneness in
capitalism towards wars as capitalism's contradictions
intensified, but, at the same time, he was also aware of the
tendency of the capitalist countries to stay together. He also
recognised that the first socialist state had to live in peace
with other capitalist countries even though the struggle between
capitalism and socialism was inevitable. Lenin was against war
if it weakened socialism and did not overthrow capitalism. Lenin
was acutely conscious of the staying power of capitalism as the
emergence of state monopoly capitalism which led to the weakening
of the inherent contradictions of capitalism, even if temporarily,
had shown. Therefore, while recognising war as a powerful agency
for change, Lenin was not categoric or doctrinaire in his
attitude towards war.

Ideology and Lenin's Foreign Policy

Notable trends of the Soviet foreign policy during 1917-1924
were: efforts at peace with the imperialist powers, seeking
recognition from other countries, and establishing diplomatic
relations with them, concluding mutually beneficial peace treaties,
advantageous trade agreement, carving out a place for the USSR in
international affairs, and promoting national liberation movements
in other countries, particularly in the East. It may be noted that
the emphasis on the various elements making up Soviet foreign policy varied with situation and time. While there were strong ideological tones in the foreign policy pronouncements of the USSR leaders, the actual acts of foreign policy did not always overtly bring out their ideological content.

The Decree on Peace issued on 8 November 1917 was the first foreign policy document of the Soviet State which tried to strike a balance between pragmatism and revolutionary rhetoric. The decree struck an anti-war, open-diplomacy note. It also appealed "to the class conscious workers of England, France and Germany, to help us to bring to a successful end the cause of peace, and, together with this, the cause of the liberation of all who labour and are exploited from every kind of exploitation." 58

The Decree on Peace clearly brought out the essential features of the newly born socialist state:

- The first socialist state was not hesitant to deal with the imperialist states, it took care not to talk to other states in a tone of an 'ultimatum'. 59
- The Soviet state wanted immediate peace. Lenin's earlier insistence that the imperialist war should be transformed into a civil war was dropped. It was not mentioned that the continuation of war could help in precipitating revolution in other countries. Self-determination for the weak nations were implied but only feebly.

This toning down of the revolutionary rhetoric in an official document was the result of Lenin's early recognition that (a)

59. Ibid., p.2.
Peace was crucial if the revolution in Russia had to survive, and (b) the revolution in Russia needed time to consolidate itself before the expected revolutions in other countries could take place and join hands with the Russian revolution. Since the revolutions in major European countries had not occurred, the Russian revolution had to fend for itself.

Peace with Germany was the first important task if the revolution had to be saved. Lenin, against keen opposition from radicals like Bukharin and others argued, in favour of even a humiliating peace with the Germans. He criticised them on the grounds that they considered it "expedient to consent to the Soviet loss of power...in the interest of the international revolution". 60 Lenin, describing such a proposal as "monstrous and strange" came out heavily against these "pseudo-lefts" of the party, and, pointing out the utter lack of the Russian army's capability to defend Russia, said, "to refuse to sign even the vilest peace when you have no army would be a reckless folly", 61 and, "the interests of the international revolution demand that the Soviet power, having overthrown the bourgeoisie in our country, should help that revolution". 62

61. Ibid., vol.II, 282.
Clearly, Lenin the realist, was prepared to take any assistance from anywhere if that helped stabilise the Russian revolution. The Central Committee of the party even discussed on 22 February 1918 a proposal to accept French and British aid to counter the renewed German attack. Lenin who was not present in the meeting sent a note: "I request you to add my vote in favour of taking potatoes and ammunition from the Anglo-French imperialist robbers".63

Lenin's staunch advocacy of peace with Germans even humiliating peace, did not mean that he was opposed to war against Germans perse. He was simply using peace treaty as a retreat so that the revolution could stabilise. It is not that he was making any serious change in the theories of revolution or earlier imperialism or self-determination etc. that he had propounded. Like in 1902 when the RSDLP split and in 1907 when he considered an ordered retreat desirable, he was once again proposing a tactical retreat vis-a-vis German imperialism which at that time was sufficiently strong to snuff out the nascent Russian revolution. Pragmatism, which required giving supremacy to the national considerations over the international revolutionary priorities, was becoming the hallmark of the Soviet foreign policy in 1917-1918 notwithstanding the existence of a radical opinion in the party. Thus doctrinaire element in the Soviet foreign

policy was being understated while the pragmatic element was being emphasized. This duality of the pragmatic and the doctrinaire in the Soviet foreign policy has always been there. It has become sharp under Gorbachev who, has redefined the goals of the Soviet foreign policy in the light of reality than in the light of ideology or doctrine. The difference is that Gorbachev is reforming the entire ideological basis of the Soviet foreign policy while Lenin's advocacy of peace with the Germans was a purely tactical manoeuvre.

During the early months after the October revolution, seeds of policies of "peaceful co-existence" and "socialism in one country" had already been sown.

**Soviet Revolution and the Soviet Foreign Policy**

No doubt the interests of the Soviet fatherland were important in the Soviet foreign policy. But, the world revolution was considered important, both in theory and practice, although the emphasis varied from time to time.

The foreign intervention in Russia and the ability of the Russians to hold against the intervention and the revival of revolutionary upsurge in countries of Europe, led the Bolsheviks in 1919 to reassert their thesis, popular during the pre-war years, relating to the division of the world into two camps. In March 1919, Lenin, addressing the 8th Party Congress said: "We are living not merely in a state, but in a **system of states**; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one
or the other must conquer. Until this end occurs, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet republic and bourgeois states was inevitable." Clearly, even in the ongoing struggle between socialism and imperialism, a coexistence between the two was not ruled out.

The anti-imperialist stance and the world-revolution strand in the Soviet foreign policy was reinforced with the establishment of Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919. The revolutionary rhetoric of the Comintern, its close identification with Soviet Russia, and its revolutionary propaganda activities in several states alarmed the European powers. This prompted the Soviet government officials to underplay Comintern somewhat and calm the ruffled feelings of the West.

E.H. Carr points out that the long discussion on the national and colonial question at the Second Congress of Comintern corresponded with the shift in Soviet policy at that time from West to East following the victories over Kolchak and

64. Ibid., p.123.

65. For a discussion on the manifesto adopted at the First Congress of the Comintern, see Ibid., pp.130 & 133.

66. Litvinov, in a note of 27 September 1921 to Lord Curzon on allegations that Russia violated the Anglo-Russian treaty said that there was no justification for identifying Comintern activities with those of the Russian Government's simply because some Russian leaders, in their "individual capacities" worked in Comintern. See Degras, n.58, vol.I, p.258.
Denkin in the civil war. The foreign policy of the Soviet state, for the first time, amalgamated the Soviet state’s foreign policy of struggle against the imperialist countries during the armed intervention and the attitude towards the national liberation movements in the East in revolt against the colonial powers. It is significant that the turn of events after the World War I led Lenin, who theoretically saw great potentialities in the anti-colonial struggles, to give a concrete shape to these theoretical precepts and embody them in the Soviet foreign policy, making use in the process, of the Comintern. It can be said that the ideological content in the Soviet foreign policy as far as it concerned the colonial question in the East was high. The ideological justification for foreign policy support to the national liberation movements was to become a near permanent feature of the Soviet policies in the later years.

From the above, account of the Soviet foreign policy in the years up to Lenin’s death, we can surmise its ideological content as follows:

Lenin did not discard any of his theories which had a bearing on the foreign policy of the Soviet state. The ideological fervour of the Soviet foreign policy was often toned down in the interest of the survival and consolidation of the revolution. There was a nationalism-internationalism dualism in the Soviet foreign policy. The ideological content of the Soviet foreign policy concerning the national liberation movements was high. The roots of the policies of "peaceful co-existence" and "socialism in one country" could be traced to the
years under Lenin. Increasingly, the October revolution, the experience of the Soviet state in bringing about revolution and consolidating it came to be presented as models for emulation in other countries, particularly in the East.

III. STALIN

Stalin, inheriting Leninist legacy, and confronted with the task begun by Lenin himself of consolidating the revolution in Russia, developed the doctrine of "socialism in one country" and justified internal and external policies including those of terror and suppression and subordination of world proletarian movements to the interests of the Soviet stage in term of this theory.

Examined below are Stalin's views on ideological categories having a bearing on his theory of international relations and Soviet foreign policy under him.

National Question

Stalin's treatment of the national question differs from Lenin's, not so much on the fundamentals as on the emphasis on certain aspects of the theory. For instance, Like Lenin, Stalin views the national question in the light of the struggle of the oppressed vs. the oppressing and, therefore, like Lenin supports the right of national self-determination for the oppressed nations including the right of secession. But where he puts forward new ideas are: (a) In the definition of a nation, (b) The requirements for the right of national self-determination and of secession, (c) the organisation of nationalities, and (d) Extreme emphasis on the unity of the national liberation movements and the communist movements in the context of the common aim of weakening imperialism.
(a) Nation

Stalin defines nation as "a historically constitutes, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" and adds that "none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation". 67

In this view, Jews could not constitute a nation as they did not have a common territory, nor would the Germans and Letts in the Baltic region constitute a nation as they did not have a common "national character". Thus Stalin's definition of a nation was more restrictive and less than that of Lenin who merely treated nations as historical entities requiring specific analysis before their demands for national self-determination could be supported or rejected.

(b) National Self-determination and the Right of Secession

Stalin followed a dual approach with regard to nations outside Russia and to those inside it. While anti-imperialist struggles of the nationalities outside could be supported, regional autonomy but within the confines of collectivism, and, internationalism was the way to solve the national question inside

Russia. Stalin also was in favour of self determination only for
the "toiling-masses" fighting for socialism.68 Such a restrictive
and somewhat arbitrary definition, though rooted in Leninism
nevertheless emasculated its spirit.

(c) **Organisation of Nationalities**

In order to curb nationalistic tendencies Stalin emphasised:
"the international type of organisation serves as school of
fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous agitational factor on behalf
of internationalism".69

(d) **Subordination of the National Liberation
Movements to the Interests of the Proletarian
Revolutions**

Stalin also extended Leninist thesis on the anti-imperialist,
revolutionary potential of the national liberation movements. He
wrote: "the national question is a part of the general question of
the proletarian revolution, a part of the question of the
dictatorship of the proletariat".70 For Stalin the revolutionary
capacities of the national liberation movements could be used for

---

68. Stalin in Franklin, n.67, pp.80-82, Stalin in 1918 write:
"It is necessary to limit the principle of free self-
determination of nations by granting it to the toilers
and refusing it to the bourgeoisie". Cited in Richard Pipes,
The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and

69. Ibid., p.83.

70. "The Foundations of Leninism", in Franklin, n.67, p.147.
'overthrowing imperialism', the common enemy of the oppressed states and the socialism, i.e., USSR. From this followed the necessity of the proletariat of the "dominant nations" to support the national liberation movements of the oppressed.

Stalin suggested following 'theses' in solving the national question: The world is divided into 'two camps': the interests of the proletarian movements in the developed countries and the national liberation movements call for the formation of "a common front against the common enemy, against imperialism", for the formation of such a 'common front', the proletariat of the oppressor nations must support the national liberation movements and promote "the slogan of the right of the nations to secession".  

Clearly, Stalin's theses on national question imply worldwide agitation and support for national liberation movements providing they not imperialism.

Party

The process of identification of state with the party began with Stalin who exploited the Leninist theses on the party to ipso facto make "dictatorship of the proletariat" same as the dictatorship of the party.

Stalin in The Foundations of Leninism wrote: "without a party it is useless even to think of overthrowing imperialism or achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat".  

71. Ibid., pp.130-51.
72. Ibid., p.171.
'dictatorship of the proletariat' as the essence of Leninism. 73

For Stalin, party and the dictatorship of the proletariat became synonymous. Amongst the specific features of the party, Stalin counted: (a) It was the advanced and organised detachment of the working class, (b) It was the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat, (c) It was an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, (d) Party's existence was incompatible with the existence of factions, and (e) The party became strong by purging itself of the opportunist elements. 74 Stalin, in putting forward this view of the Party relied upon the Leninist concept of the party propounded by Lenin during the pre-1917 period, but vulgarised to it enormously as he snuffed out inner party democracy and concentrated enormous power into his own hands.

**Strategy & Tactics**

Stalin, once again taking his cue from Lenin, focussed on the strategy and tactics of the party in the course of building up of socialism. This formalisation of strategy and tactics into a sacrosanct doctrine was to become a primer for communists all over the world.

Stalin described strategy and tactics as a 'science of leadership'. Strategy was defined as 'the determination of the
main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of revolution'. Tactics, on the other hand was defined as "the determination of the time of conduct in the comparatively short period of the flow and ebb of the movement". The essential point was that tactics could in the short term, go in a direction opposite to that of strategy, if, in the process, advance could be made towards the final goal. In other words any means were justified to achieve the end of the proletarian revolution. Stalin also laid down some guide-lines for the "strategic leadership". Concentrate the main forces of the revolution at the most vulnerable point of the enemy; select the right moment for the 'decisive blow' etc. Stalinist concept of strategy and tactics gave the leader enormous manoeuvre in the formulation and implementation of policies without the necessary accountability.

Dicktorship of the Proletariat and State

Stalin building upon the Leninist view of the 'dictatorship of proletariat' outlined three tasks for it: to break the resistance of landlords and capitalists, to organise construction in such a way as to rally all the working people around the proletariat; and to prepare for 'the abolition of classes'; to organise the army of the revolution for "struggle

75. Ibid., pp.154 & 156-57.
76. Ibid., p.160.
against the foreign enemy, for the struggle against imperialism". Stalin's analysis of the strength of the overthrown bourgeoisie in resisting the revolution lies in: (a) the strength of the international capital, (b) continued advantage of superior experience, knowledge, moveable property which remained with the bourgeoisie for some time, and (c) "Strength of small production" could which could sabotage the revolution.

Stalin foresaw a long period for the dictatorship of proletariat during which the state would become strong rather than wither away. During this period there would also be conflicts and civil wars. He said:

"It scarcely needs proof that there is not the slightest possibility of carrying out these tasks in a short period, of accomplishing this in a few years. Therefore, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to communism must not be regarded as a fleeting period of 'super revolutionary' acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organisational work and economic reconstruction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats".

In this historical era, Stalin envisages proletariat first to educating itself to govern the country and then to re-educate and remould the petty-bourgeois strata along such lines as will assure the organisation of socialist production".

77. Ibid., p.121.
78. Ibid., pp.122-23.
79. Ibid., p.124.
80. Ibid.
The traditional concept of 'withering away of state', even gradually, is not broached by Stalin. This was in sharp contrast to Lenin's views who foresaw withering away of the state gradually and beginning at once with the victory of the proletarian revolution.

Stalin is careful in not undermining, at least on paper, the role of Soviets which were to be the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, given the primacy of the party, it was obvious that the Soviets would govern only in name, the real power, in Stalin's scheme, would de facto belong to the party.

Stalin, by stressing the length of the period of the 'dictatorship': (a) Emphasized the importance of the existence of socialist state with or without external help, (b) Warned of the bloody nature of the future, (c) Justified all this in the name of theory, and (d) Held it as a model for other socialist states to follow.

**Socialism in One Country and Capitalist Encirclement**

Lenin's theory of Imperialism, the 'law of uneven development of capital', the concept of the revolution taking place at the 'weakest link in the chain', Lenin's strategy and tactics of the revolution-making were some of the concepts which contained the seeds of 'socialism in one country' later developed by Stalin. When the world revolution failed to keep date with the Russian revolution, it was easy for Stalin to drive home the simple
point, as Lenin had done during the debates over the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, that revolution in Russia had to be safeguarded, socialism in Russia had to be built by its own efforts. It was equally easy for Stalin to raise the spectre of 'capitalist encirclement' and adapt the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin to these new conditions. Apart from stamping out the opposition, Stalin also used the concept of 'socialism in one country' as a prism through which the entire body of Marxist-Leninist thought had to be re-examined. Thus took place fundamental revisions, modifications and extensions of Communist theory under Stalin. Of course, all of it was done in the name of Marx and Lenin. (In fact, despite the personality cult which glorified Stalin, the word Stalinism was never used during Stalin's own lifetime).

In his work The Foundations of Leninism (April 1924), Stalin had talked about the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries but had side by side maintained that "For the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, were insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletariat of several advanced countries are required." However, in 1924, Stalin revised his opinion and in his work The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists (December 1924) Stalin stated that the

"complete victory of socialism" was a "full guarantee against the restoration" of old order and proclaimed that Russia had all the where-withal "for building a complete socialist society". 82 This idea was adopted in the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925) which considered "the question of the victory of socialism in one country in connection with the stabilization of capitalism" and declared that "the building of socialism by the efforts of our - (i.e. Russia) is possible and necessary." 83 Stalin in his work The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Party Conference (May 1925), made the following points:

(a) Russia faced two groups of contradictions; internal and external. The internal contradictions were between the proletariat and the peasantry. The external contradiction was between socialism and capitalism. The resolution of internal contradiction was possible by the efforts of one country. The resolution of external contradiction was possible by "the efforts of the proletariats of several countries". 84

(b) Victory of socialism in USSR was possible as the country could overcome internal contradictions and had all that was required "to build a complete socialist society". 85

(c) The final victory of socialism alone in the full guarantee against attempts at intervention. "Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more, the victory of the workers for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against intervention ...". 86

82. Ibid., p. 158.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., p. 159.
86. Ibid.
Stalin propounded the thesis that the USSR could resolve its internal contradictions by building socialism in USSR through its own efforts. Further, a Socialist USSR would help resolve the Socialism Vs. Capitalism contradiction. Moreover, the task of socialist involvements elsewhere would be to help USSR resolve its external contradictions. Stalin described a person an internationalist "who unreservedly, unhesitatingly and unconditionally" was "prepared to defend USSR.

"Capitalist encirclement" the threat of capitalism to nascent socialist revolution, was a concept which Stalin used repeatedly not only to justify 'socialism in one country' but also to present a decisive circumstance which required that the teachings of Marx and Lenin could not be applied blindly. Thus, for example, Stalin opined that due to 'capitalist encirclement', there was no question of 'withering away' of state as Engels had predicted. Similarly, when in 1936 Stalin declared that socialism in USSR had been built, he still decried the idea of withering away of state invoking 'capitalist encirclement'.

'Socialism in one country' idea also soon brought the Russian nationalism to the fore during the period of 'socialist construction', i.e. collectivisation and industrialisation. Speaking at a Conference of Business Executives in 1931, Stalin, drawing pointed attention to the defeats of 'mother Russia' at the hands

of foreigners because of her 'poverty' and 'backwardness', said "In the past we had no fatherland .... But now ... that we have overthrown capitalism ..., we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and lose its independence?" 88

Lenin had regarded world proletariat's help as essential for the survival of revolution in Russia. Stalin reversed this theoretical position through his concept of "socialism in one country".

**Contradictions of Capitalism**

In Stalin's works, following sets of contradictions were recognized: between the proletariat and bourgeoisie within the individual capitalist countries; among the 'ruling classes' of the imperialist powers, between the imperialist powers on one hand and their colonies on the other, between the victorious and vanquished nations, between the capitalist states and colonial dependencies over former colonial territories, and, between the capitalist and the socialist camps.

Due to these contradictions, capitalism was regarded by Stalin to be in a State of 'general crisis' which was manifest in relations among the capitalist countries and also in their inner contradictions. The Soviet foreign policy was required to take into account this complex set of factors.

88. Stalin, n.31, p.356.
Stalin regarded 'wars between the capitalist countries', as 'inevitable'.\textsuperscript{89} He wrote: "to eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism".\textsuperscript{90}

Although Stalin believed in the theoretical tenet that contradictions between capitalism and socialism were stronger than among the capitalist countries, he also held the view that the contradictions between the capitalist countries in the wake of disintegration of the world market would sharpen. In Stalin's view, the existence of socialist USSR "puts in question, the existence of capitalism itself".\textsuperscript{91} Despite this, however, the contradictions among the capitalist countries, and particularly, the victors and the vanquished of the second world war would deepen, leading to the further wars.

Stalin also believed that capitalism's drive for 'maximum profits', would lead to tensions and wars.

The State

Stalin's views on the socialist state have already been discussed while examining his views on the dictatorship of proletariat and socialism in one country. Unlike Marx, Stalin regarded state as the basic units of international intercourse. The socialist state would continue, and, indeed, would have to be strengthened, even after the building up of socialism for the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{89} Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in USSR" in Franklin, n.67, p.469.
\bibitem{90} Ibid., p.473.
\bibitem{91} Stalin declared, "It is precisely the necessity of securing maximum profits that drives monopoly capitalism to ... the organisation of new wars". Ibid., p.471.
\end{thebibliography}
simple reason that capitalism would continue to be there despite its being in 'general crisis'. Thus the contradictions between capitalism and socialism, and the contradictions amongst the capitalist countries continue to shape the world.

Revolution from Above: Base and Super-structure

A direct consequence of the doctrine of 'socialism in one country' was Stalin's concept of "revolution from above". Referring to the successful completion of the task of industrialisation and collectivisation, Stalin said "... it was a revolution from above, because of the existing power with the support of the overwhelming mass of peasantry". 92 Stalin also propounded the view that it was possible in a socialist state to bring about revolution - i.e., abolition of old bourgeois economic system and creating a new, socialist system, by a gradual transition". 93 The concept of 'revolution from above', alien to Marxism, became a necessity for Stalin in the name of the 'dictatorship of proletariat'.

Stalin also gave a justification for the concept of 'revolution from above, and indeed, for the justification of strengthening of the state in terms of the Marxist theory of superstructure and base. Stalin, in 1950, in his polemic against Soviet linguist N.Y. Marr, who dominated the Soviet thought in Linguistics till 1934, declared that language was independent of

93. Ibid.
superstructure and did not have a class content. Using Linguistics as a pretext, Stalin built his theory of base and superstructure (to which the state belongs) as follows:

"The superstructure is a product of the base; but this does not mean that it merely reflects the base, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its base, to the fate of the classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary it becomes an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its base to take shape and consolidate itself, and doing everything it can to help the new system finish off and eliminate the old base and the old classes". 94

It was clear that Stalin was seeking a theoretical justification for the role of the state (belonging to superstructure) in building and consolidating socialism in USSR (socialist economic relations) by the state-directed policies of socialist construction (collectivisation, industrialisation, social engineering) and elimination of old order (elimination of kulaks, purges etc.)

**Dialectical and Historical Materialism**

Stalin tinkered with the core of Marxism-Leninism, the theory of Dialectical and Historical materialism. Stalin's presentation on Dialectical and Historical materialism in the *History of the CPSU(B): Short Course*, published in 1938, widely used as a basic manual of Marxism-Leninisms, was once regarded as a great creative contribution to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, but was ignored and redone after Stalin's death.

94. Ibid., p. 409.
Stalin divided the discussion of dialectical materialism in two parts: (a) Marxist dialectical method, and (b) Marxist philosophical materialism. This 'peculiar division' was abandoned by the Soviet philosophers abruptly after Stalin's death.

Stalin also reduced the three laws of dialectics given by Engels to two, leaving out of the law of negation. Stalin also omitted from discussion the Marxist categories such as "freedom and necessity", "Causality", "space and time", etc.

Stalin's view that superstructure, could also influence the base whereby he justified increased role of state institutions and belittled the economic determinism of Marx has already been noted.

Stalin's modifications of the dialectics affected a whole generation of Soviet philosophers, social sciences, scientists, political activists. This way, he provided ideological justification for social engineering - the control of society. The foreign policy was conducted within this framework of highly ideologised state engaged in bringing about a revolution from above.

Moral-Political Unity and the "motive forces" in the Development of Society

The concept of 'moral-political unity', developed in the Short Course refers to the fact that all political actions of the USSR, both on the domestic as well as the international front, are

95. Stalin, "Problems of Leninism" in Franklin, n.67, p.570.
97. Ibid., p.193.
justified as USSR is the champion of working classes and is leading them to communism. 98

Stalin also developed the concept of the development of "motive forces" in the development of the Soviet society. In classical Marxism, the only motive force for the development of the society is economic. But in his report to the 18th Party Congress Stalin spoke of 'moral and political unity' of the Soviet society, the mutual friendship of the nations of the USSR and Soviet patriotism as the "motive forces" of the development of the Soviet society. Stalin's reinterpretation did not only justified his practice, but also led to further changes in theory and practice.

**Dogmas**

Stalin freely modified the Marxist-Leninist thought to suit his own purpose. For Stalin, Marx, Engels, and Lenin were correct for their epochs, but not necessarily correct for the present epoch. This flexibility in ideology perceived by Stalin was used by him to lay down new concepts. Ironically, while he himself took liberties with Marx and Lenin, what he wrote or spoke immediately turned into dogmas for his followers. By giving utmost authority to the Party and the Party alone and by encouraging the cult of personality, it transpired that he alone became the final arbiter of ideology. This was bound to have impact on the Soviet policies including the foreign policy.

---

98. Ibid., p.192.
Ideology and Stalinist Foreign Policy

below is 
the interaction between Stalinist ideology as briefly discussed above and the Soviet foreign policy under Stalin.

1926-1929

The chief trend in the Soviet foreign policy in these years was the continuation of national vs. international dualism. Thus, on the one hand the theory continued to focus on the contradictions between capitalism and socialism, the practice was directed at achieving a co-existence with the capitalist countries. The emphasis was on establishing diplomatic relations, mutually beneficial trade and economic ties with the capitalist countries and seeking a role for the USSR in international affairs. This was considered to be in the national interests of consolidation of socialism within the country. The theoretical basis of this practice was the temporary "stabilisation of capitalism".99 The Anglo-American rivalry was seen as the most acute contradiction amongst the capitalist countries at that moment, as having "stabilisation of capitalism" was seen to accentuated the bourgeoisie - working class contradiction in many capitalist countries, for instance, in Britain. The working class of the USSR helped the British proletariat in this struggle.

The Chinese People's national liberation struggle, based on "the teaching of Marxism-Leninism" and proceeding on the tactics of "United front" bringing together all the revolutionary forces was praised. The Chinese struggle and the initial success in industrialisation in USSR was believed to have had great impact on national struggle all over the world. The national-liberation movements were viewed in the context of "the historic struggle between socialism and capitalism". All this was a straightforward application of the theory.

The theme of contradiction between socialism and capitalism was invoked to explain the "imperialists" fear of the developing might of the Soviet industry and its defence and their negativism towards the Soviet Union as, for instance reflected in their refusal to grant credits to USSR and a policy to isolate USSR.

As regards the Soviet foreign policy, it was declared to be a policy of "peace" and was aimed at foiling the designs of the capitalists. Thus, peace was equated with the defence of Soviet interests. The Soviet policy of "peace" was further "proved" by the Soviet proposal "for total disarmament by all nations". Though rejected by the "imperialists", it was received

100. Ibid., p.399.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., p.400.
"most sympathetically by the international proletariat and the working people". In this formulation attempts to rally all revolutionary forces against the imperialists could be detected. International solidarity was declared to be "a factor of prime importance in preserving peace".  

Thus we see that during 1926-29 the main Soviet foreign policy direction was to avoid any confrontation (in the interest of consolidation of socialism in one country) with the stronger countries of the West and developing mutually beneficial relations with them without diluting the theory of "contradictions" and the theory of national liberation.

1929-1932

The period of 1929-1932 saw the great depression and its consequences for the world economy, thereby providing support to the "general crisis of capitalism" Theory of the Soviets. A direct result of the crisis was held to be the aggravation of all the contradictions of capitalism. As a result of capitalism's crisis, "the entire international situation became more complicated, and the danger of war greater". Temporary "stabilisation of capitalism was declared as having ended. It was

104. Ibid., p.401. A World Congress of the Friends of Soviet Union (1927) declared that building of socialism in USSR was in the interest of revolutionary movements and proletarians of the entire world.


106. Ibid., p.256.
noted that anti-socialism of the "imperialists" as reflected in the fear of economic blockade of USSR (due to the Soviet might), as also in the 'imperialists' provocation to the Chinese to indulge in a armed conflict with USSR on the question of the Chinese Eastern railway and also in the anti-Soviet campaign on allegations of "forced labour" in the USSR. "Pan-European" like the one suggested by Briand (May 1930) were seen as attempts to keep the USSR out of European affairs.

The tasks of the Soviet foreign policy were listed as:

- to avert war so that socialism could be built in USSR unhindered;
- to strive for beneficial trade and economic relations with all countries especially the "imperialists";
- to ensure that Soviet Union did not get isolated and fall prey to the anti-Soviet "imperialist blocs";
- to pursue a policy of "peace". (Peace meant avoidance of war in which Soviet Union's interests could be jeopardised), and to safeguard USSR's security. (This led to a spate of non-aggression neutrality treaties signed by the Soviet Union with Western European countries and its neighbours).

The pattern in the Soviet diplomacy of these years was to oppose initiatives whereby the Soviets were excluded, but, to continue to work towards seeking a role in these initiatives. The Soviet diplomacy, in the name of facilitating the building of socialism in one country, attained a great deal of flexibility in the twenties and thirties. This, for instance, explained the initial ambiguity of the Soviet Union towards Hitler when he came to power.
and the indifference to the fate of the German communists under Hitler. 107

Stalin premised USSR's foreign policy on strength. At the 17th Party Congress (1934), Stalin warned against a danger of "war plans" of the perplexed bourgeois politicians and said; "In our times it is not the custom to take account of the weak—only the strong are taken into account." 108

Peace, he said, could be ensured only if USSR was strong economically and politically; it had the moral support of the vast masses of the working class of all countries; if other countries developed normal trade with USSR, and, finally, if the Red Army was strong. 109

1934-1941

Stalin characterised the period between the 17th and the 18th Party Congresses (i.e. 1934-1939) as a period in which the entire post-war system had been shaken but in which the Soviet Union had experienced growth and prosperity. 110 During this period he said, "the new economic crisis in the capitalist countries", led


109. Ibid., p.238.

110. Stalin's report to the 18th Party Congress(10 March, 1930), in Franklin, n.67, pp.335 & 338.
to the "intensification of the struggle for markets" and, most significantly, to "a new redivision of the world" by military action. 111

As regards the "new imperialist war" (the reference here was to German, Italian and Japanese aggressions in the various parts of the world in the years prior to the commencement of the Second World War in September 1939), Stalin explained its occurrence by reference primarily to the rejection of the policy of "collective security" by England and France.

Thus, in these years, "Collective security" was upheld as the cardinal foreign policy task for the Soviet Union. It also becomes apparent that though Stalin realised that the world war might lead to revolution in other countries - a desirable goal in terms of doctrine - getting involved into war was not considered advisable. Stalin declared that "any war, however small, started by aggression in any remote corner, constitutes a danger to the peaceable countries". 112 Soviet policy of avoidance of a war during those years and in which Soviet Union could get embroiled even compelled it to join the League of Nations, despite the earlier reservations. The treaties signed by USSR with France (1935), Czechoslovakia (1935), Mongolia (1936), China (1937), motivated by a desire to strengthen the Soviet security, were explained in terms of the Soviet desire for peace.

111. Ibid., pp. 335 & 338.
112. Ibid., p. 345.
Interestingly, during these years Stalin also did not invoke the socialist-capitalist contradictions as a theoretical basis for the immediate tasks of the Soviet foreign policy. He was prepared to deal with any country provided this resulted in the safeguarding of national interests. If France and Britain rejected the Soviet proposals for collective security, Soviet Union would not hesitate to deal with Hitlerite Germany, if that gave USSR time to prepare against the impending war. While ideology was used in these years to explain the general trends of peace and war, it was pure tactics and the instinct for survival which actually guided the Soviet foreign policy in these years.

The year 1933 was a turning point in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, as, during 1933, in the Soviet assessment, the possibility of an imperialist war in which USSR might get entangled began to emerge. Earlier, the Soviet assessment was that the war would take place among the capitalist countries only with the USSR being left alone. Litvinov, in his statement to the Central Executive Committee of the Comintern on 29 December 1933 laid down the principle of Soviet foreign policy which illustrated that extreme pragmatism rather than socialist ideology was to guide the Soviet diplomacy.

113. Ulam, n.107, p.203.
Litvinov made the following important points: 1933 was "a junction of two eras"; while imperialism, in its basic nature, did not change, what changed was its tactics; in the changed situation, not all capitalist states were "anxious for war"; and there were some bourgeois countries who were ready to defend peace; hostilities, which did not begin on the Soviet frontiers could nevertheless threaten the Soviet security; "Not being doctrinaire, we do not refuse to use international associations or organisations .... if ... they serve the cause of peace". 114

In the light of these principles, Litvinov justified relations with Mussolini's Italy overlooking its strident anti-communism and with Hitler on the grounds that "Marxists are the last who can be reproached with allowing sentiments to prevail over policy. The entire world knows that we can and do maintain good relations with capitalist states whatever their regime, even if it is fascist". (emphasis added). 115 Litvinov declared that Soviet Union, in its relations with Germany, would be guided "not by its(i.e. Germany's) internal but by its external policy". 116 One can see that the roots of the Nazi-Soviet pact were already present in the Soviet desire in the 1933 to conduct relations with any country, even

115. Ibid., vol. III, p. 56.
116. Ibid.
"fascist" if that promoted the Soviet security interests.

By 1934, the Soviet leaders were openly striving to become the nucleus of "peace" loving states. This was reflected in Voroshilov's (Defence Minister) speech at the 17th Congress of the CPSU (30 January 1934). He said:

"We are the agents of peace for the whole world. All those states, who do not want war, for a long or short time, are grouping themselves round us, and are bound to group themselves round us and, by grouping themselves round us these states secure themselves against attack, against war".117

The background to the Nazi-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression of August 23, 1939 and the course of events upto 22 June 1941 when Germany invaded USSR help to study the theory-practice interplay in the Soviet foreign policy.

It became evident that as the chances of collective security in Europe receded, Stalin considered it expedient to buy time by concluding a pact with Germany and to prepare for war eventually.

As if preparing a ground for eventual Soviet-German collaboration, Stalin at the 18th party Congress (March, 1939), brushed aside the question of morality in foreign policy hinting that USSR would not be concerned with internal affairs of Germany and laid stress on the virtues of pragmatism.118 Foreign minister

117. Ibid., vol.III, p.73.

118. Stalin, who was advocating "collective security", severely criticised the pacifist non-interventionist policy of UK and France towards Germany. In a reference to UK and France, he warned that USSR will be "... cautious and not allow (itself) to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of fire for them". The Nazi-Soviet pact was justified by Molotov late in terms of Stalin's guidelines at the 18th Party Congress. Stalin, n.67, p.346.
Molotov, in his speech at the 4th (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet strongly defended the Soviet-German political and economic cooperation. Not that Molotov contended that the Soviet-Germany pact would remove the danger of war in Europe. On this question he merely stated that "even if hostilities in Europe prove unavoidable, their scope will now be restricted". In other words, there would be hostilities, but USSR would be safe. Molotov also underlined yet another point proved by the pact i.e. "no important questions of international relations and still less questions in Eastern Europe, can be settled without the active participation of the Soviet Union". He, as if mindful of the possibility of the Soviet Union getting involved in war (not necessarily against Germany), referred the pact as providing "new possibilities of increasing our strength, the further consolidation of our positions and further growth of the influence of the Soviet Union on international developments."  

119. Molotov's speech was revealing for its sheer pragmatism. He justified pact with Germany invoking Lenin's peaceful co-existence: "In our foreign policy we have always been guided by Lenin's ... peaceful coexistence"; or, "the art of politics ... does not consist in increasing the number of one's enemies". See n.58, vol.III, pp.367-68.  

120. Ibid., vol.III, p.371.  

121. Ibid.
The Soviet-German pact also resulted in the ending of the Soviet-Japanese hostilities in the Far-East on 15 September 1939.

The pact's secret protocols defined the German and the Soviet "spheres of interest" in the Baltic and Poland. The Soviet Union was to considerably consolidate its defences by military and political means in the Baltic (ultimately the three Baltic states were incorporated into the USSR and a change of regime in Finland took place after a war between USSR and Finland. The Soviet Union also got back Bessarabia from Romania). Germany declared a "complete political "desinteressement" in South Eastern Europe."

The Soviet Union, in accordance with its neutrality obligations with regard to Germany, failed to denounce the German military invasion of Poland and military actions against other European countries. There was a sea-change in the Soviet official attitude towards Germany.

122. Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the USSR and Germany, quoted in Degras, n. 58, pp. 359-60.

123. Molotov, in his speech of 31st October 1939, to the Fifth (Extraordinary Session) of the Supreme Soviet on the partition of Poland between Germany and USSR declared that in the context of changed international situation, "certain old formulas are now obviously out of date and inapplicable. He said, "such concepts as 'aggression' and 'aggressor' have acquired new concrete connotations, new meaning". He praised Germany for "striving for peace", and criticised Britain and France for their refusal to conclude "peace" with Germany. The roles were changing, he said. He likened the French and British slogan for the "destruction of Hitlerism" to "religious wars of older times". Stalin, in an interview to Pravda on 29 November 1939, maintained that France and Britain could not free themselves of the responsibility of having attacked Germany, and declared, "Soviet Union fully supported Germany's peace proposals, which had been rejected by France and Britain." See Ibid., vol. III, pp. 389, 406.
Even Stalin knew that despite USSR's public support for Germany, problems between the two countries were bound to occur. Although USSR maintained that it had proceeded with its military and political actions in the Baltic etc., with prior "consultation" with Germany and strictly in accordance with the Non-Aggression pact, Germany was not satisfied. It sent troops to Bulgaria and Rumania, followed by an attack against the Soviet Union on 22 June, 1941. After the attack the Soviet position on Germany changed rapidly though Stalin defended the Nazi-Soviet pact in terms of time that was needed to prepare for war. 124

124. It is interesting that even on 13 June, 1941, a few days prior to the German attack, Soviet Union officially denied reports of disagreement between the USSR and Germany and declared that it intended "to observe the Soviet-German non-aggression pact". Stalin, in his broadcast of 3 July, 1941 reverted to derogatory references to Germany, describing it as "fascist", "treacherous", "aggressor" and called Hitler and Ribbenfrop as "monsters and cannibals". More importantly, he gave a new justification for the non-aggression pact, which has endured in the Soviet Union to this day. He, referring to the conclusion of pact with Germany, said: "was this not a mistake .... of course not"... I think not a single peace-loving state could decline a peace treaty with a neighbouring country, even though the latter was headed by such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbenfrop". Referring to the gains to the Soviet Union from the pact, he said, "we secured our country peace for a year and half and the opportunity of preparing its forces to repulse fascist Germany should it risk an attack on our country despite the pact. This was a definite advantage for us and a disadvantage for fascist Germany". See Ibid., vol.III, pp.489 & 492.
Stalin began to describe the war with Germany as "national war in defence of our fatherland" and also as a "War of liberation" of European people. And he declared; "In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have loyal allies." These "loyal allies" were, "the peoples of Europe and America, including German people". He warmly welcomed Churchill's "historic speech" and USA's readiness to render aid and expressed to them the "feeling of gratitude".\(^{125}\)

The German invasion of the Soviet Union laid the foundation of cooperation between the Soviet Union and some of the "imperialists". But within itself it also had the seeds of further conflicts and the future cold war.

To sum up, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union from 1933-1941, was characterized by extreme expediency. But, the noteworthy feature of this expediency was, that there was always a rationalising theory within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist ideology.

**Lessons of the Second World War**

The Second World War afforded opportunity to the Soviet Union, for the first time, to project itself as one of the great powers. The Red Army emerged not only as a defender of the Soviet independence, but also a "liberator" of the oppressed nations in Europe. The war also showed the possibilities of an intimate

\(^{125}\) Ibid., vol.III, pp.492-93.
cooperation between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries on the questions affecting the post-war structure of the world. And yet, the attitude of the allies convinced the Soviets of unbridgeable contradictions between themselves and the other allies. On the part of the Western countries, the rise of USSR as a major power was also seen with consternation. These mutually contradictory tendencies left their indelible impress on post-war international relations.

The main lessons drawn by the Soviet ideologues from the Second World War which had a bearing on the Soviet ideology can be summarised as follows: 126

- The victory in the "Great Patriotic war", was against "the enemies of their socialist homeland".

- The Soviet people saved the people of Europe from fascist slavery, and those of East from the Japanese imperialism.

- The Second World War aggravated the general crisis of capitalism which entered in its second state. 127

- The liberation struggle against the 'fascist' conquerors heightened the class consciousness of the proletariat and increased the influence of the Communist and workers parties amongst the people.

- The Soviet victory was owing to the inherent superiority of socialism over capitalism. 128

127. Ibid., p.583.
128. Ibid., p.584.
- The class foundation of the Soviet state— allience of the working class and the peasantry became still stronger during the war and led to "the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet peoples".

- The victory became possible, *inter-alia*, due to the "invincible might of the Soviet armed forces educated in the spirit of proletarian internationalism."

- "During the war, Soviet patriotism, proved to be a vital and powerful source of strength." 129

- "The partisan movement" which involved the whole people "was a major factor" in struggle against the enemy.

- The war outcome showed that the "Socialist ideology triumphed over bourgeois-fascist ideology". 130

- The Communist Party inspired and organised the victory. "In reality, the Soviet Union's victory in the war was won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party headed by its Central Committee". 131

- The "progressive forces of the world" played a great part in the just war against fascism. 132

For the first time Red Army was recogized as a factor having international significance.

In the post-war years, the Party was projected as the real achiever in the years of war though the role of the masses in the war was acknowledged.

---

129. Ibid., p.586.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid., p.587.
132. Ibid.
Comintern and the Soviet Foreign Policy

While under Stalin, Comintern faithfully echoed the Soviet views, often, as Degras has pointed out, the Soviet Foreign Ministry was handicapped and annoyed by the activities of Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern. In later years, the feuding Russian Communist Party factions used Comintern for their own advantage. Similarly, the 'third period' interlude in the Comintern's history was "positively injurious" to the Soviet interests as such. Comintern proved itself to be incapable of correctly analysing the intensity of national appeals and continued to harp on the 1848 legacy of 'the revolution' and 'the reaction'.\textsuperscript{133} Its analysis of 'fascism' was also wide of the marks. It was compelled to regularly modify its positions as the Soviet foreign policy changed.

It is instructive to briefly study the ideological and theoretical categories used by the Comintern to describe the world situation and how it justified the Soviet Foreign Policy of the years 1929-1943.

The Tenth ECCI plenum (1 July 1929) trenchantly criticised the League of Nations, Kellog-Briand Pact, Social-democracy, which was equated to social fascism and highlighted the world wide significance of the "Socialist Construction" in the USSR.\textsuperscript{134} During


\textsuperscript{134.} Ibid., vol.III, pp.43 & 51.
the years of Great Depression, Comintern talked about a danger of attack against the USSR (The Resolution of the 10th enlarged ECCI Presidium, February 1930).135

The 11th plenum of the ECCI (April 1931) put forward the idea of United Fronts, declaring that "the successful struggle against fascism required all communist parties to mobilize the masses on the basis of United Fronts from below against all forms of bourgeois dictatorship"136 (emphasis added). The 11th Plenum, also talked of popularising "Lenin's teachings on war" and particularly the slogan about "transforming imperialist war into civil war". Clearly, Comintern hoped that the character of the new war would be similar to that of 1914 war and would bring about similar revolutions.137 Aggravation of capitalist contradictions, and danger of intervention against USSR became a constant theme with the Comintern. In November 1934, it declared: "we are on the eve of a new world war" and that the defence of the Soviet Union was the best answer to fascism.138

Until this time, the Comintern had been severely critical of 'social democracy' and the Second International. However, in 1934-35 it abruptly changed its strategy following a similar change

---

136. Ibid., vol.III, p.159. 'Gandhism' was declared as "counter-revolutionary" at the 11th ECCI Plenum. Ibid., vol.III, p.160.
138. Ibid., vol.III, p.278.
in the French Communist Party's line. Comintern now adopted the line that in view of the "revolutionary expediency", it was possible to strike unity deals between the local communists and the social-Democrats and thereby "United Fronts from above" could be organised. Thus the tactics of united fronts from 'below' was abandoned.

Resumption of British-USSR diplomatic relations and the resultant thaw in the relation between USSR and the Western countries compelled Comintern to reverse its criticism of British 'imperialism' as well as the 'League of Nations'.

The 7th World Congress of the Comintern (July-August 1935), earlier reversing the / policy gave official endorsement to the revised policy of united fronts from 'above' envisaging collaboration with the Social-Democrats and enjoined all Communists to rapidly overcome "the survival of sectarian traditions which prevented ... approach to the social-democratic workers". This reversal was justified in the name of fighting fascism. 

139. This policy reversal was explained in an article in April 1935 in Communist International which stated, "never in the past and never in future can the interests of Soviet Union contradict ... the interests of the international working class movement". In these years Comintern began advocating good relations with all countries including the fascist ones.

140. Ibid., p.353.
described as 'the decisive link' in preparation for the forthcoming rounds of proletarian revolutions. 141

Comintern had been predicting a new war for a long time which had not occurred. USSR's growing might was given the credit for the non-occurrence of war. 142

In April 1936, ECCI adopted a May Day Manifesto, which for the first time took note of the fact that there were certain capitalist countries which were interested in peace. Hence, it said, it was possible to create "a broad front of working class, of all working people, and of entire nations against the danger of imperialist war." 143

This policy of "a broad front" against fascism once again underwent a drastic change when the Soviet Union signed the non-aggression pact with Germany. In a ECCI manifesto adopted on the 22nd Anniversary of the Russian revolution; it was stated that USSR's "amity and frontier pact with Germany" was a "new contribution to the cause of peace." Similarly, USSR's actions in

141. Ibid., p.370.

142. The 7th World Congress of Comintern (1935) declared that "The peace-policy of USSR had "not only upset the plans of the USSR, but .... laid the basis for its cooperation in the cause of peace .... with small stages to whom war represents a special danger". The reference here was to USSR's non-aggression parts with a host of states. Ibid., vol.III, p.374.

the Baltic states, etc. were defended as USSR's efforts to save the population of these countries against war.\textsuperscript{144} UK & France were criticised for their inability to accept the German peace proposals. The capitalist governments and not fascism (unlike before) were blamed for the war. Workers were exhorted to reject the war and the slogans of preservation of "national unity".\textsuperscript{145} The war itself was characterized as imperialist war, a war for the 'redivision of the world'. Following Stalin's lead, the Comintern leaders - e.g. Dimitrov - redefined the 'aggressors' and 'aggression'.\textsuperscript{146} Once again, the 'united fronts' tactics (against fascism) was jettisoned and the rhetoric against social-democracy reappeared.\textsuperscript{147} Dimitrov called once again for united front tactics from 'below', envisaging communists mobilising the masses against the war and against the social-democratic parties.

With the German attack against the USSR, the foundation of an anti-fascist coalition envisaging cooperation between the USSR, Britain and USA was laid. On the May Day of 1942, Comintern in its message spoke of 'the world front of struggle for liberty and progress', decrying the narrowness of internation revolutionary movement.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{144} Ibid., vol. III, p.445.
\bibitem{145} Ibid., vol. III, p.446.
\bibitem{146} Ibid., vol. III, p.450.
\bibitem{147} Ibid., vol. III, p.456.
\end{thebibliography}
Clearly, Comintern had been caught in the ideological contradictions and was regarded as an obstacle in promoting ties between USSR and other Capitalist countries. 148

1945-1953

The Second World war led to fundamental restructuring of the world. A number of socialist states had been set-up and cold war had also started. All this had to be explained in the Marxist theory.

A new concept: "the second stage of the general crisis of capitalism" was advanced. The manifestation of this crisis chiefly lay "in a new wave of revolutions". The appearance of Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia and the break-up of colonialism was attributed to this crisis of capitalism. While the concept of 'peoples' democracies' was advanced and developed after several hesitant starts to conceptualise the nature of East European countries, new concept (i.e. 'national democracy') had to be

148. The resolution of ECCI (15 May 1943) dissolving itself admitted "insuperable obstacles in solving the problems facing the movement in each separate country" owing to differences between the various components of the movement. Since the character of war had now changed with the Soviet Union having been dragged into, it became the 'sacred duty of the widest masses of people ...' to defeat the Hitlerite bloc. The resolution declared that Comintern had outlived its utility and therefore, was dissolving itself. Stalin justified dissolution of Comintern in an interview to Reuter on the grounds that its dissolution would facilitate common struggle against Hitler. Ibid., vol.III, pp.457, 473 & 478.
developed to classify the countries emerging from colonialism. The Chinese revolution was described as the second most significant revolution in the history of world liberation movements.\textsuperscript{149} The growing national liberation movements were perceived as reflection of the weakening of world imperialism.

The Soviet Union was given a special place in the post-war years of the 'crisis of capitalism'. "The disintegration of the colonial system was accelerated, above all, by the growing prestige and influence of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of the position of socialism on a world-wide scale."\textsuperscript{150}

Yet another manifestation of the second stage of the 'general crisis' of capitalism was seen in "the increasingly uneven economic and political development of the capitalist countries".\textsuperscript{151} This was seen in the rise of USA and the decline of Britain, France and Germany. Due to this uneven development, and aggravation of the problem of markets, it was held that capitalism failed to reach the stabilisation it needed. The struggle between the capitalist powers for markets and "spheres of influence" intensified with each passing year.\textsuperscript{152}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{149} History of CPSU, n.126, p.593. \\
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p.594. \\
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid. \\
\end{flushleft}
Yet another distinguishing feature of this crisis was believed to be the exacerbation of contradictions between "the monopoly bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the working class, the working people generally, on the other."\textsuperscript{153} This led to the "further decay of bourgeois democracy". "Thus there was intensification of class struggle in capitalist countries. The ruling circles of the bourgeois countries intensified steps to curb the revolutionary movements. The USA in particular was charged of heading "the international reaction" and itching for "world supremacy".\textsuperscript{154}

A concept of "socialist camp" was devised. It included "USSR and the peoples democracies in Europe and Asia" and was actively supported by "the entire international working class movements and all the Marxist Leninist Parties".\textsuperscript{155} Thus a new theoretical task - that of fitting the existence of a 'socialist camp' in the Marxist-Leninist theory was confronted by the Soviet ideology.

'Peace' once again emerges as a dominant theme of the Soviet foreign policy. But the Soviet view of the world remains that of conflict and dangers of war. In these conditions, as before,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p.594.
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p.595.
  \item \textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
the problem of 'peace' gets closely inter-linked with the problem of achieving Soviet national interests which were defined to include the interests of world socialism as perceived by the USSR.

Stalin, in his 1952 work on the Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, continued to insist upon the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries. He criticised those who were arguing in favour of the possibility of stabilisation of capitalism after the Second World War. 156

The Soviet economist Ye. Varga, contrary to Stalin's views argued that capitalism would stabilize itself at least for ten years and that Socialist reforms could be introduced in Western democracies without violence. The political implication of this argument was that relations between USSR and the West could be peaceful and that Western capital could help in the reconstruction of USSR. He wrote: "Relations of the capitalist countries with the Soviet Union will not be like those of the prewar period .... Before the new international organisation for the preservation of peace stands the task of not permitting different contradictions from spitting over into military struggle." 157 In this formulation, one could detect seeds of peaceful co-existence and cooperation with the West, which were developed later under Khruschev.

156. Stalin, n. 89, p. 470.

Conclusions

This historical survey brings out that there has been a strong link between the Marxist ideology and the Soviet foreign policy under Lenin and Stalin. Marxist ideology was not taken as something static by Lenin or Stalin who modified it from time to time. Pragmatism has all along been the hallmark of the Soviet foreign policy. But, the leaders have also tried to explain pragmatist policies in terms of ideology.

Stalin's "socialism-in-country" was a response to the situation in which the world socialist revolution had failed to occur and the USSR was constrained to consolidate and build socialism by its own efforts. One consequence of this doctrine was that USSR behaved like a normal nation-state in international affairs. But this posed problems both for the USSR which could not overtly jettison the internationalists characteristic of its foreign policy which often involved providing support to the national liberation movements and revolutions in other countries. It was left to Khrushchev to redefine some of the ideological parameters in 1956 to suit the nuclear realities which made peaceful co-existence as an essential principle of international relations.