While 'ideology' has a positive meaning in the context of Marxism-Leninism practiced in the Soviet Union, the term has generally had a negative connotation in the context of the political ideas particularly in the West. This chapter begins with a brief enquiry into the evolution of the term 'ideology'. It then examines the place of ideology in Marxist-Leninist theory and its link with policy. This is followed by a discussion on the Marxism and International relations and the place of ideology in the Soviet Union's foreign policy, where 'deideologisation' of international relations and of inter-state relations has been the direct outcome of the 'new political thinking' on which the Soviet foreign policy is now based.

Hegelian Concept of Ideology

Hegel postulated that the world is a unity and is conceivable only with reference to a perceiving mind having a 'consciousness' which experiences and takes cognizance of the infinitely variegated world. This assumption modified the earlier view that the world existed objectively and independently of the perceiving subject. According to Hegel, the subject, as the carrier of the "unity of consciousness", was a
wholly abstract super-temporal, super-social entity: "consciousness in itself". This idea on further development gave rise to other Hegelian concepts like "world spirit", "absolute mind", etc.

Marx and Ideology

Marx took a decisive step when he debunked these Hegelian concepts and gave instead a materialistic interpretation of ideology. He wrote: "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life".¹ In his critique of the German Ideology he pointed out that morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, no longer retain the semblance of independence as assumed in the Hegelian thought and the 'Historical School'. Life was not determined by the consciousness, as assumed by Hegel, but consciousness by life. Thus rejecting the "consciousness in itself" as a motive force of history, Marx pointed out that it were the classes, as determined by the division of labour, which shaped history. Thus the idea of 'world spirit' was turned

¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, The German Ideology (Moscow, 1947), pp.247-55.
upside down by Marx and replaced by that of class-struggle as the basis of historical development.²

**Particular and the Total Concept of Ideology**

German Philosopher Karl Mannheim maintains that we do not yet possess an adequate historical treatment of the development of the concept of ideology. He says that the particular and total conceptions of ideology can be distinguished from each other. Mannheim begins with the assertion that the mistrust which man has experienced towards the other man at all stages of historical development should be taken as a "NOTION" the which is forerunner to the concept of ideology. When this distrust becomes explicit and takes a formal form, it becomes "ideology". Thus Mannheim's understanding of "ideology" is basically a negative one. "We begin to treat our adversary's views as ideologies only when we no longer consider them as calculated lies and when we sense in his behaviour an unrealiability in which we regard as a function of the social situation, which he finds himself".³ Mannheim regards this concept of ideology as a "particular" concept as it refers to a "sphere of errors,

---


4. Ibid., pp.15-16.
psychological in nature, which, unlike deliberate deception, are not intentional, but follow inevitably and unwittingly from certain causal determinism”. 5 Building upon the concept of 'error' as a basis for the earlier notions of 'ideology', Mannheim points out that Bacon's theory of 'Idola' and "false notions" may be regarded as a forerunner of the modern conception of ideology.

This psychological observation, that ideology could be a source of error, was probably owing to the close relationship that has existed between "ideology" and politics. The concept of ideology was being influenced not only by psychological factors but also by political, sociological, philosophical and historical factors. A synthesis of the various tendencies which were at work has given rise to what Mannheim calls the "total conception" of ideology. Mannheim identified three principal stages in the evolution of the "total" concept of ideology: a) the development of the philosophy of consciousness in Germany which demolished the objective ontological unity of the world and replaced it with a unity imposed by the perceiving subject; b) the efforts to view the concept of ideology in historical perspective which meant that the unity of the world as imposed by perceiving mind was in a process of continual historical transformation. In this scheme of things the historical - political elements get incorporated into the conception of

5. Ibid.
ideology. Thus the notion of 'ideology' ceased to remain merely a psychological or philosophical notion. The idea of nationally differentiated 'folk spirit' took shape at this stage. Thus the transition from abstract concept of 'consciousness in itself' gave way to more concrete idea of 'folk spirit' which took into account the national specifics and political developments; c) The final step in the creation of the total conception of ideology took place when the Marxist concept of class consciousness replaced the concept of 'folk spirit'. The concept of 'class ideology' was a natural outcome of this substitution. The net effect of the evolution of the 'total' concept of ideology was that instead of the unchanging, absolute, static concept of 'consciousness in itself', a new conception, which varied in meaning in accordance with the historical development, nations and social classes came into being.

Mannehim points out that several consequences flow from this concept of ideology: (a) the realisation that human affairs cannot be understood in isolation of their elements; (b) an ideology itself derives its meaning from the historical stage in which it is conceived. The Marxists can be given the credit for synthesising the various tendencies in the development of the concept of ideology and giving a 'total' concept.

The Political Ideology

In the realm of political ideology, the problem of making out what is real has always been the touchstone of
judging the worth of a particular ideology. What is 'real' is in
turn judged by a politician, a man of action, against the
existing practice. Thus, the word gives sanction to this
specific experience of a politician with reality. During the 19th
century, the word 'ideology' was being used in this sense. For
instance, Napolean contemptuously labelled his adversaries who
were opposed to his imperialist ambitions, as "ideologists".
Since Napolean was in a position of strength to deal with his
less powerful adversaries, he was able to give a derogatory
meaning to the word "ideology". Marx and Engles were interested
in investigating the 'interrelated system of false ideas' and
held that 'political ideologies were for most part post facto
justifications or rationalizations for the existing material or
economic organizations of a society'. They were interested in
identifying the vested interests behind political ideology. The
Marxists concluded that all political ideologies tended to
further directly or indirectly the interests of the ruling or the
dominant groups or classes. Lenin found no difficulty in
referring to Marxist theory and practice of ideology and viewed
it as progressive and revolutionary. The Marxist ideology was
used to fight other political ideologies, which were perceived
as reactionary or static. Thus Marxism, in Leninism, becomes one

7. Ibid., p.2.
of the ideologies which gives the 'true', the 'scientific' description of the world and the society and is thus 'superior' to other political ideologies.

The Debate about the Relevance of Ideology Today

There is considerable debate on the relevance of the ideology in today's circumstances. It was first Edward Shil who in a Congress of Cultural Freedom in 1954 put forward the thesis that in the present era ideology had lost all its relevance. This 'end of the ideology' thesis was later developed by Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset. The burden of their thesis was that in the industrialised countries of the west, 'ideology was at an end because fundamental social conflict was at an end'.

Daniel Bell, developing the thesis 'The-end-of-Ideology' makes the following points in his book:

- Ideology, in the 19th century, sought to transform society and derived its force from the passion of the adherents to change society. Today, with a rough consensus among the intellectuals on political issues - the acceptance of a welfare state, decentralisation of power, mixed economy and political pluralism etc., the main force behind ideology has declined.

- The ferment in Asia and the underdeveloped world has given birth to new ideologies which are distinct from the 18th century ideologies in the sense that instead of being concerned with 'great political' and human problems, the newer ideologies are only about 'economic development and national power' and therefore not as potent as the 19th century ideologies. Bell counts the Russian and the Chinese ideologies as representative of this newer brand of ideologies which would not be permanent.

Alastair MacIntyre criticise the 'end-of ideology' thesis and argues that 'end-of-ideology' is itself an ideology. He makes the following points in the critique of the thesis put forward by Bell, Lipset, Shil and supported by J.L. Tolmon, Sir Isaiah Berlin, Norman Cohn etc. 9

- The 'End-of-ideology' thesis is an ideology itself and is the product of the place where it took birth (i.e. the developed West) and the time when it was propounded (i.e. 1950). To this extent, it justified the Marxian tenet that the ideologies are specific to place and time.

- The postulate that there is no 'consensus' among the intellectuals, politicians on certain key political, economic issues is an incomplete one as it does not define as to who are the parties to the 'consensus'. The lack of consensus thesis is merely to justify status-quo in which the developed societies are at an advantage. The 'consensus' in fact excludes significant sections of the society - e.g. blacks in USA - who do not take part in political decision making. The concept of 'consensus' is related to the concept of 'interests'. The 'end-of-ideology' thesis represents the interests of the 'haves' in developed societies and not of those who have been left out of this consensus.

- The 'end-of-ideology' thesis proved to be highly discordant with the prevailing mood in the 1960s when the social conflicts intensified.

In this critique MacIntyre succeeds in convincingly arguing that pragmatism of the 'end-of-ideology' thesis in itself gives rise to the birth of romantic ideologies in those

section of the society who do not represent the relatively comfortable section of the society which pronounced, the "end-of ideology". 10

Ideology and Policy
- The Marxist-Leninist View

In Marxism-Leninism, great stress is laid on the connection between ideology and policy of the 'revolutionary working class'. Ideology is taken to be a system of views, conviction and ideals expressing the interests of a definite class. Yu. Krusin, a Soviet theoretician, holds that there can be no policy without ideology as every type of policy covers social relations and has to pass through human consciousness before it takes shape. 11 Lenin repeatedly stressed the importance of ideology on which was based his theory of State and Revolution. The activities of the Bolshevik party were also given an ideological basis.

In the Soviet manual of Marxism-Leninism the ideological struggle is listed as one of the basic forms of class struggle of the proletariat. 12 The task of the ideological struggle are: a) creation of class consciousness among the workers and b) liberation of

10. Many in the west are euphoric about the collapse of socialist ideology in recent years.


non proletarian masses - the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligensia - from the influence of bourgeois ideas and winning them over to the socialist ideas. While working-class is schooled in the day-to-day struggle, according to the manual, that is, however, not enough. For the working class to reach a high level of class consciousness a special form of class, ideological struggle is needed. This involves working out a world outlook, a scientific theory which shows the working class the path to liberation. The struggle for immediate class interests - e.g. trade-unionism - is not sufficient to give birth to socialist views. The manual declares that the doctrine of socialism could be created only on the basis of the most advanced philosophical, economic and political theories which were in turn based on a certain class based ideology. Thus in the Marxist-leninist literature the importance of ideology for the working class to chalkout its theories and policies to achieve "liberation" is highly stressed.

These ideas were further developed and elaborated in the Soviet Union. The success of the revolution was considered to depend upon the shaping up of the 'social consciousness' of the masses, which could be aroused only through ideological propaganda. A revolutionary party of the working class was needed as it alone provided the connection between the theory of scientific socialism and the working class movements. 13 Further,

13. Ibid.
it was considered impossible to frame and implement a revolutionary policy, without the knowledge of the objective laws of socio-economic development of the society. Marxism-Leninism, as a unity of all its component parts—philosophical, economical, social, cultural, scientific, communist—was considered to be an ideology which was based on the objective laws of social development. Thus, a revolutionary party, armed with Marxist-Leninist ideology based on the materialistic conception of history, was supposed to follow a scientific policy. Thus, in the context of the USSR, the importance of ideology for the policy could not be over-estimated.

Marxist-Leninist Conception of Functions of Ideology

In the Marxist-Leninist conception, ideology belongs to the "superstructure" of the society which corresponds to the "basis" determined by materialistic relations. Although ideology, like other companions of the 'superstructure' is secondary, it nevertheless is important.

Ideology, in Marxism-Leninism, has been assigned several functions: (i) cognition; (ii) guide to action, motivation; (iii) axiological (i.e., related to values); (iv) Combating other ideologies.14

Cognition

In its cognitive function, ideology provides a framework and an orientation to understand the social reality. Ideology is used to understand and sort out the facts and use them for prognosticating the course of historical development.

Guide to Action

In its second function, ideology serves as a guide to action and also as a motivation for action. For instance, ideology is used for justifying the class objectives, for legitimising or justifying political action. Thus ideology can lead to action or quite often an action, after it has been taken, can be justified in ideological terms. The important point here is that action and ideology are closely linked.

Axiological Functions

The axiological function of ideology is no less important as ideology is used to substantiate the values of a given class. For instance, the goal of classless society cherished by the Marxists as a supremely human value has to be substantiated by a fully developed ideology.

Combative Function

Ideology combats ideology. In fact, quite often ideologies take shape and grow in response to certain other ideologies. Thus,
the ideology plays an important role in meeting the challenge of other ideologies. For instance, Marxist-Leninist theoreticians have in the past used the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the theory and practice of socialism in the Soviet Union to combat such ideological approaches as 'global consciousness' which recommends some kind of supra-ideological consciousness in the fashion of Karl Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge' free from any class-ideological framework or the 'technological ideology' idea put forward in the West which favours substitution of 'class-ideological' approach by some kind of integral, rational ideology. While the Soviet ideologues did stress the need of a dialogue between the Communists and the proponents of other ideologies, this dialogue, it was maintained, should not lead to jettisoning of the class-nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology. A cooperation between ideologies was foreseen by the Soviet theoreticians if such a cooperation was for the achievement of common goals and objectives like solving the burning problems of mankind.

Contradictions could arise between ideology and reality i.e. between the ideological aspects proper and its cognition aspect. It may happen that the theoretical cognition apparatus provided by the ideology may give distorted view of reality. In such a case, ideology becomes meaningless. Quite often the contradictions appear when ideology fails to rise over and above the immediate and practical interests, to the level of world-wide
historical experience. It is, therefore, stressed that ideology or theory has to be constantly updated in the light of the day-to-day struggle of the working class. While ideology provides orientation and a guide to action, it is not regarded as deterministric in nature. The Soviet theoreticians maintained that the ideology or theory could not predict all events. For instance, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was adopted in response to the dictates of the times and was ideologically a correct decision as it furthered the cause of the working class. NEP, nevertheless, could not be predicted. The same was true of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. The creative aspect of Marxism-Leninism, the need to steer clear of sectarianism, left wing radicalism and dogmatism has all along been stressed in the Soviet literature. Today, under Gorbachev, the need to apply Marxism creatively is stressed a good deal. These examples make it clear that changes in ideology are considered normal in the USSR. Today, even the very basic ideas of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism are being reinterpreted in the light of the changes in the global environment affecting the existence of mankind.

Western Debate over Ideology in the Soviet Union

There has been a general consensus in the Western academic circles that the ideology of Marxism-Leninism play an important role in the Soviet politics. Barrington Moore in his work of 1950 examined the interplay of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet politics up to late Stalin period and established that
pre-revolutionary Bolshevik theory had shaped Soviet political behaviour. Gustav Wetter's 1952 study of *Dialectic Materialism* and his 1962 book *Soviet Ideology Today* concentrating on the philosophical basis of Soviet ideology in post-Stalin period recognised explicit link between ideology and politics. In the late fifties and sixties a number of important studies appeared including the notable ones by Richard T. de Georges', *Patterns of Thought* (1966), David Joravsky's *Soviet Marxism and Natural Sciences* (1917-1932) (1961), Herbert Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* (1958). The English journal *Soviet Studies* carried an intensive debate during 1966-68 on the function of ideology in Soviet politics. The debate was triggered off by Meyer in his "speculative essay" in which he assigned five elements to ideology in USSR: (i) Dialectical Materialism, (ii) Historical Materialism, (iii) Political Economy, (iv) Scientific Communism, and (v) Official History of CPSU. Ideology's functions were taken to be:


language of politics; code of communication; legitimisation of CPSU rule; and a means of socialisation. This description of ideology has been accepted in the Western literature though there have been further refinements too. It is recognised in the West that while ideology is important in the Soviet context, it should not be credited with "determinism". Further, with time the content of the ideology i.e. Marxism-Leninism has changed substantially from Stalin to Gorbachev. In fact Gorbachev's concept of "humane, democratic, socialism" is being used to remove some of the central features of socialism as established in USSR. This will be discussed in detail in the latter chapters.

**Marxism and International Relations**

Before the examination of the role of 'Ideology' in the formulation and conduct of the Soviet foreign policy, it will be useful to examine the treatment of international relations by Marx and Engels. There has already been a considerable debate on this. The credit for initiating a new round of this debate in the 1980s goes to Kubalkova and Cruickshank who have broken from the tradition of generally dismissive writings in the West ridiculing the Marxist attempts to give a theory of international relations.
Kubalkova and Cruickshank, adopting Hedley Bull's identification of three main philosophical traditions of international relations strive to locate the Marxist view of international relations in this spectrum. According to Bull these traditions are (i) Hobbesian tradition which describes international relations as a pure conflict state in which the states are in permanent conflict with each other to maximise their own interests. In this scenario the intervals of peace are merely the periods when one war has ended and the preparations are afoot for the next one. (ii) Kantian or the Universalist tradition where the dominant theme is that of community relationship among all men, irrespective of states or societies in which they live. There are moral imperatives in the internal relations which supposedly guide the conduct of states. (iii) Grotian traditions figuring somewhere between the Hobbesian (conflict) tradition and the Kantian (universalist) tradition. According to this tradition, conflict and cooperation co-exist in international relations.

The Kubalkova and Cruickshank maintain that fitting of Marx into any one of these patterns does not prove easy. At first glance, marxism can be regarded as a sub-system of Kantian


(universalist) tradition as there is a lack of emphasis in Marx on the state system and instead there is a stress on classes which cut across the state boundaries and are universalist in character. However, the similarities break down here. Unlike the Kantian tradition which makes morality as a foundation of international relations, Marx, in the spirit of historical materialism, regards materialist relations as the basis of the society including the world system. For Marx, it is the interplay of classes and the relations of production which turn out to be the motive force of history. Thus, in Marx, the principles governing class relations subsume both domestic and international relations. Any sharp distinction between the domestic and the international does not come naturally in Marxism. Therefore, Marx's connection to Hobbes or to Kantian tradition is only superficial. Perhaps the Marxist tradition of international relations like the Grotian tradition can be placed between the Hobbesian and the Kantian traditions but distinct from the Grotian which is totally antithetical to Marxism.

Features of Marxian Tradition of International Relations

The next question that needs to be tackled is as to what actually is Marxian tradition of international relations. Kubalkova identifies the following features as specific to the Marxian tradition:

It uses the method of 'political economy'. Any segregation of 'politics' and 'economy's is rejected.

Rather than the 'states', it is the classes and the class-strength which is the motive force of world politics. The crux of international relations is the inter-class relations rather than the inter-state relations.

The Foreign Policy of a state is influenced by the domestic class-structure. The ruling classes "react to the basic imperatives of production - either domestically or world wide".20

"The state-system is usually fragmented along the lines of main class formations". Mixes of Hobbesian, Kantian and Grotian features are not uncommon in individual types.21

An interesting phenomenon of the world politics is the existence of the various types of Marxist states - Soviet, Yugoslavian, Cuban, Vietnamese, etc. which differ on the specific understandings of key concepts involved, like the meaning of imperialism, capitalism, class, state, war, nation, vanguard class, role of the individual, etc. Very often, particularly in the case of decolonised countries, in the name of Marxism, a host of policies are followed which would be difficult to justify on pure Marxist theory. However, the concepts like creative application of Marxism and transitional stage of development are used to justify specific policies. For instance, the current Soviet policy of de-ideologisation of international relations and

20. Ibid., p.17.
21. Ibid.
dilution of the class nature of the world state system is explained in terms of creative Marxism and in the name of "democratic, human socialism" in which primary to universal values over narrow class interests is attached. It will not be wrong to say that there has been an attempt in all Marxist states to marry Marxism with the national specifics and produce a homebred 'Marxism'. This has been true of Soviet Union (Marxism-Leninism, developed socialism, democratic socialism), China (Maoism) Yugoslavia (Titoism) and many other countries. 

Briefly summarised below the kind of issues which arise when an attempt is made to study how Marxism, essentially a theory of society, is used to explain the specific features of world politics and international relations. These issues are among the central ones in Marxist view of international relations.

- For Marx, historical materialism, which regards relations of production as the basis on which classes are formed and class-struggle is carried out is the starting point in the study of the society. Now can this view of class-struggle be extended to the international relations? If so, with what results? What modifications, if any, of the laws of class struggle be required if this extension is to be made?

- Does the nature of a class, say the ruling class in a country, change with place and environment? For instance, what will be the relative weight of the class factors which cut across the state boundaries or the national specifics which determine the domestic environment of the class in the foreign policy of a ruling class?
March to communism is a long one. In fact, the Gorbachevian concept of humane, democratic socialism no longer talks of communism as a goal of the socialist society. What laws govern the inter-state relations in the intervening period? Among the Marxist theoreticians and practitioners there is no consensus on the stages of development of a society to the final stage of communism, much less is there agreement on the governance of inter-state relations in the intervening period.

Marxism is also required to take stock of new phenomena like the decolonisation, East-West relations, periods of cold-war and detente, nuclear armament, ecological dangers to the existence of mankind etc. Do such phenomena take place in accordance with certain well-defined laws of the development of society or do they lead to revision of the existing theories of the development of societies?

Should the world be regarded as one unit with world-economy as its basis and the state-system as its super-structure or should it be regarded as one divided into different class formations? Should the methods of political-economy be applied to the understanding of world policies or should primacy be given to one particular factor over the other?

This is only an illustrative list of questions which arise when an attempt is made to explain the international relations in terms of Marxist theory. Depending upon how these questions are perceived and resolved by a state, its foreign policy will be determined.

It is important to realise that the Soviet Union, as the first socialist state in the world, had to grapple with the objective realities of the world and formulate its own domestic and foreign policies in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, constantly
taking into account the changing situation both within the country and also outside it. This process continues even under Gorbachev when efforts are being made at the 'renewal of socialism' and certain features of capitalism are being accepted. This, in turn, has necessitated cardinal changes in the Soviet foreign policy.

It may also be mentioned that despite the existence of the laws of the development of society having a bearing on the foreign policy conduct of a state, the foreign policy acts cannot be pre-determined exactly or accurately. Very often the theories are amended in the light of experience. This is particularly true of the present times in the USSR, when a host of Marxist-Leninist principles are being revised in the light of the need felt to cooperate with developed capitalist countries where capitalism, instead of losing out to socialism, is showing new strength.

Ideology as Input to the Soviet Foreign Policy

There is considerable debate on the importance of ideology for the formulation and conduct of the Soviet foreign policy. Triska maintains that despite enormous discussion and division of opinion on the question of "ideology" as a motivating force behind Soviet behaviour in international affairs, there has been little concern for a precise definition of the terms under discussion. He rejects the concept of
"ideology" as too imprecise to be of any use in an analytical study of Soviet foreign policy behaviour. In its place, a concept of 'belief system' and 'doctrine' is introduced. The 'belief system' is conceptualised as a totality of 'personally experienced and otherwise learned attitude and conceptions' possessed by an individual. The specific set of doctrinal propositions - e.g. Marxism-Leninism - are held to be a sub-set of the belief system.

Mitchell has critically dealt with Triska's approach to ideology. He argues that precision is only one aspect ideology - foreign policy inter-play. The more important question is whether or not to treat "ideology" as a separate analytical category. Triska's "belief system" category subsumes "ideology" thus dispensing with "ideology" as a separate category. One can agree with Mitchell, when he points out that this approach is likely to present problems in analysing the Soviet pronouncements, are couched in language of Marxism-Leninism and which do not take note of a 'belief system' as understood by Triska. Treating ideology as a separate category makes it convenient to relate to Soviet writings. Dispensing with "ideology" would also present methodological problems for any observer in studying the Soviet political behaviour.


Brezezinski's definition of 'ideology' of communist ideology in particular, has been adopted by western authors. For instance, according to Brezezinski, modern revolutionary ideology has four characteristic which distinguish it from the other set of political ideas: (i) The ideology is overt and is usually contained in official 'texts' (ii) it is systemic in nature - the texts are constantly reviewed and updated; (iii) the ideology is institutionalised - the ideas are embodied in the ruling communist party and attributed by responsible authorised ideologues; (iv) it is dogmatic - the ideas are binding on all communists until officially modified by the party.

On the basis of these characteristics, A. Ross Johnson identifies three levels in a particular set of political ideas: (i) General philosophical Assumptions - e.g. dialectical materialism; (ii) doctrinal elements, indicating the general direction of political action in a given historical period e.g. dictatorship of proletariat; (iii) "action programme" Programmes of political action, specifically tied to particular historical and socio-economic conditions - e.g. Stalin's socialism in one country and Mao Tse-Tung's "modern revolution". Ross also accepts Brezezinski's conclusion that 'Doctrine' is the crucial

25. Ibid., p.486.
link between dogmatic assumptions and pragmatic action. 26

Ross also tackles the criticism that a study of ideology would entail studying theory instead of reality. He asserts that the distinction between "ideology" and "reality" is false as the reality subsumes 'ideology' in the communist world.

Itchell argues that Ross's conclusions about communist ideology appears to be generally consistent with the approaches followed by both Soviet theoreticians and Western scholars. 27 However, he adds a qualification. He suggests that Soviet theoreticians do not treat the philosophical foundations of their ideology as inflexible as Ross and Brezezinski suggest. Mitchell argues that the Soviet theoretician admit that the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism is incomplete and is still undergoing formation and that the internal relationship among the components of communist ideology is something of an open question. This is particularly true during the present period when Marxist-Leninist ideology is being reinterpreted in the USSR.

Important changes are afoot in the Soviet Union and the Soviet society. This has led to the questioning of Marxism-Leninism and Lenin himself. Although Lenin is under attack, the Leninist


metho:iology has not outlived its utility. Medvedev, the former Chief of the CPSU, CC's Ideological Commission observed, "when resolving the task of progressing to highly modern forms of socialism, we must put the methodological aspects of Lenin's legacy, its ruthless realism and fearless progression into the foreground." Speaking on Lenin's 120th birth anniversary, Gorbachev said: "One should be extremely cautious in discussing such a theoretical and political category as Leninism ... For us Leninism remains a live and active theoretical, ideological and moral force. (emphasis added) 28

The Ideology has played an important role in the foreign policy conduct of the Soviet Union. This position may be undergoing modifications as is suggested by the current Soviet thinking that the international or inter-state relations should be 'de-ideologised'. However, the de-ideologisation of the inter-state relations has necessitated devising of an ideology of ideologisation by relying upon a reinterpretation of Marx and Lenin without fully giving up their theoretical legacy. As has very often happened in the past, the new 'theoretical' formulations are being propounded to explain the current state of the world politics. According to the current perceptions in the Soviet Union, the foreign policy in the past has been too rigid and has cost the country dearly. The present emphasis in the USSR is to

make the foreign policy more flexible. Suitable theoretical categories and doctrines like the 'universal values', 'freedom of choice', 'interdependent and integral world', 'common European home', 'reasonable sufficiency' etc., are being worked out.

Some recent writings in USSR suggest that deideologisation does not mean "end of ideology", nor does it mean that the changes in the USSR or elsewhere should be carried out and implemented in an ideological vacuum. Similarly, the ideological inputs to the Soviet foreign policy will not cease altogether. Some Soviet scholars have argued that the world today needs programmes which will help it advance into the future. Such programmes by their very nature have to be ideological in essence. Nor is the need for the struggle of ideas, concepts, convictions is over. In fact, without such a struggle of ideologies, world cannot advance.

However, the Soviet scholars argue, there is urgent need to make such an ideological struggle constructive and not destructive. What the deideologisation of the inter-state relations and international relations means is that ideological struggle does not degenerate into destructive "holy wars". The perverted attitude towards ideologies should be avoided and healthy and normal attitudes should be encouraged. Further, the deideologisation also means that politics should not be made to take on the problems of an ideological character which cannot be solved by it in a rationally foreseeable future.  

---

29. Konstantin Nikolayev, *The End of Ideology*, pp. 8-19 & pp. 102-03. As an example of the deideologisation of politics, author says that while it is perfectly legitimate to believe in the final victory of socialism over capitalism, this should not mean liquidation of the non-socialist form of organisations.
On a more specific plane, the Soviet scholars, describing perestroika as an ideology of renewal, are making efforts to prove that the concept of perestroika is closely linked to Marxism, particularly its humanistic aspect which is inherent in the Marxist theory of alienation dealing with the ways of overcoming the alienation of the individual from property, from the fruit of his labour and the power so as to open the path to the epoch of "positive humanism". 30

Ideology, as it was practiced in USSR, influenced the foreign policy in three principal ways: through the influence of ideology on the decision makers, politicians, officials etc., through the influence of the ideology on the aims of the society and the state and its foreign policy and, through pursuance of ideological goals as at international arena as perceived by the state. To take an example, Stalinism, inherent in the concept of "socialism in one country", deeply, influenced the Soviet foreign policy. Similarly, the 'destalinisation' begun by Khruschev and 'democratisation' flowing from perestroika have influenced the Soviet foreign policy. The link between ideology and foreign policy is a close one, even in the present stage of 'deideologisation' in USSR. This is the working hypothesis of this thesis. In the following chapters an attempt will be made to assess whether this working hypothesis can be confirmed.