INTRODUCTION
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From time immemorial, the past has always played a role in the present in myriad ways - from explaining life itself to charting the destiny of man. It has been used to adapt, control or modify the present, to justify or reverse a course of action, to provide exemplary patterns of behaviour for men and institutions, to validate or invalidate theories - social, economic and political - or to instill certain values and ideas. In all societies, the past plays a role in the present in varying degrees and each society tackles and utilizes it differently in accordance with its requirements. In developing societies with a backward economy and with large populations, the majority of which are illiterate, the continuing presence of the past in the form of outmoded customs and traditions and belief in superstition, becomes a serious problem - particularly for a leadership which desires to bring about fundamental and revolutionary changes in society. But obviously, the past is not history - for history involves a logical, systematic, scientific and objective analysis and interpretation of men, events and ideas of the past.

The subject taken up for investigation - historiography - is extremely complex with a multitude of factors social, political, economic, cultural and of course, historical, converging on it. This however begs the question whether there is any subject which is not shaped or influenced by a variety of considerations. The interdependence of things is no longer a matter of academic debate, but an unchallengeable reality which has transformed the nature of all scholarship. Nonetheless, for purposes of research, one must needs identify a particular problem which forms the focus of inquiry and take due cognizance of the manner in which it is influenced by various factors.

In broad terms, historiography could be defined as "the study of the history of historical study," 1 and, one may add, of historical writing. Properly speaking, the present work is not an interpretive analysis of communist historiography from a historian's point of view. Rather, it is an examination of the manner in which historical

issues are enmeshed in Chinese politics and vice versa. The frankly political nature of Communist history writing raises questions which have a direct bearing on Chinese politics and ideology such as what is the role of history and historical knowledge in society, how does an awareness of history shape or affect the social and political order, how can history and historiography be utilized to promote desired ideas and attitudes, what is the meant by a 'sense of history' in the context of revolution. These are questions which a scholar of China just cannot sidestep or ignore - particularly because in China, the association or link between history and politics is not just important but an extremely long standing one. It is as much true of China, as of other societies, that any event or development in the present is conditioned by a long tradition with different values, ideas and behaviour patterns which can at best be transmitted or transfigured in three decades of revolutionary effort, but not eradicated. Historiography in particular, stands out as a striking instance of this continuity. It would probably be difficult to conceive of two more radically divergent - and at times seemingly convergent - methods of history writing than the traditional and the communist. But one glance at the tremendous flux in historical circles in China since the Communists came to power is enough to convince even the most ardent believer in the new era inaugurated by the Communists, that the 'new' historiography in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has not yet laid the 'old' to rest.

Obviously, the question that arises is, why Kongzi (the Latinized form of one of China's greatest philosophers, Kongzi (551-479 B.C) is Confucius) in the study of historiography? Chinese history says Dr Balazs, was written by officials for officials. This class of officials -- the scholar-gentry-official class has been one of the most enduring features of Chinese society and was mainly responsible for chronicling the events of one of the longest recorded histories in the world. Without going into an analysis of this social group, suffice it here to say that this group comprised an elite minority possessed of wealth, leisure and status. The vast Chinese bureaucracy drew its recruits largely from this group and there is no aspect of Chinese civilization where the influence of this class cannot be discerned. This scholar-gentry-official class adopted Confucianism as its guiding ideology for it accorded best with their way of life and more importantly, upheld the status quo of a strict hierarchy in which they occupied a privileged place of honour. Although Confucius advocated such precepts as harmony, benevolence, justice, reciprocity and democracy, these were only for determining relations within the

ranks of the educated minority. For the vast illiterate majority, the supreme virtue was obedience.

Without depriving Confucius of his pre-eminent role in shaping Chinese culture therefore, it should be borne in mind that Confucianism was the culture of the elite in China and by the turn of the century it had become identified with the culture of an effete and degenerate group which had stifled all initiative, kept the vast masses in bondage and above all, which had been mainly responsible for keeping China backward. In searching for the factors which formed the source of strength of the Western powers, the Chinese intelligentsia discovered the twin pillars of the modern nation-state: Science and Democracy - two attributes which had been suppressed by the dominance of Confucianism. Such a belief perforce demanded an iconoclastic solution. It could possibly be stated with some justification that had not Confucianism been so completely and definitely identified as the culture of the elite which had fostered a narrow, clannish outlook resulting in widespread stagnation in society, it would not have been so prominent a target of attack.

It would however be a gross misconception if the picture of China that emerges from the foregoing is that of a land which for centuries remained calm and unchanging and which suddenly burst into hectic activity in the twentieth century as a result of contact with the West. This is however one among the many misconceptions that prevail even today and which must necessarily be set aside. Allied to this is yet another major misconception - that of the monolithic Confucian State presiding over the destinies of the Chinese people, the Confucian texts being the repositories of all that was best of Chinese wisdom and that with the Communists, a glorious Confucian utopia came to an end. This belief tends to obscure and oversimplify the many conflicts among the proponents of various schools of thought in Chinese history, the recurrent peasant uprisings, the clashes and rivalries in the courts - amidst which the fortunes of Confucianism and those of its followers, rose, fell and rose yet again.

The Confucian tradition itself, like any other, was not one uniform, intact entirety. Neither can it be reduced to a few core ideas such as filial piety, ancestor worship, the three bonds, funeral rites and a few core values such as harmony and benevolence which had formed the target of the May Fourth iconoclasts. There can be no gainsaying the fact that this oldest and longest surviving tradition in the world could not have survived without possessing the capacity to integrate, incorporate, adapt and accommodate. This capacity is reflected in its changing
responses and forms in different eras in Chinese history which has naturally laid it open to manifold claims. Its eclectic nature has made it possible to draw widely differing interpretations. But a caveat must be added: the role and presence of other prominent traditions such as Daoism and Buddhism should not be forgotten. Besides, the culture of the lower echelons of society was largely synergetic in nature and would certainly make a compelling case against the total dominance of Confucianism in Chinese culture. Another problem arises when we look to the sources of the Confucian tradition. Convention had attributed the authorship of the Six Classics to Confucius which were continually questioned from time to time throughout history and then finally discredited in the twentieth century. The only other available original source regarding Confucius' thoughts and ideas are the conversations between Confucius and his disciples which were written after his death. These conversations have also been proved to be subject to substantial alterations over the ages.

It was the Confucian tradition and its ethical principles which formed the basis of traditional historiography and it were the Confucian scholars who performed the function of history writing. In the first place, being officials of the state and holding office at the pleasure of the Emperor, they worked under the compulsion to keep him satisfied. In the second place, as followers of Confucius, their task was to propagate Confucian values and virtues and to demonstrate whether the various dynasties had affirmed and upheld those values or not. This required passing judgements on Emperors and Dynasties and in so doing undoubtedly exaggerated the Confucian nature of Chinese society as a whole. Very often too the scholars and historians resorted to distorting facts to present something in a favourable or unfavourable light depending on the requirements of the reigning Emperor. This characteristic did lead to considerable corruption of the historical records and the combination of high personal morality with ambition for wealth and status created many distortions in historical scholarship standards.3

With the advent of the communists, the most important change that came about in Chinese society was the liquidation of the elite class of scholar-gentry-official, and its various institutions. Hand in hand went drastic

changes in the role, conception and method of history and historical writing. For the Chinese Communists, history was a most important tool, because the manner in which the past was viewed was the crucial determining factor in the attainment of their goals. Marxist historiography certainly revolutionized the interpretation of Chinese history in that it imparted a dynamism to history, hitherto predominantly viewed as static and only interested in the perpetuation of tradition. The process of adapting the Marxist theories, (which were essentially the outcome of the study of Western capitalist societies) to an under-developed, agrarian, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country like China and preoccupation with broader concern with social change as the basis of political and intellectual transformation is inextricably linked with the application of historical materialism to the study of Chinese history. Thus, whatever else historical materialism achieved, by far its greatest contribution lay in considerably widening the options of the Chinese in examining their past. The basic principles of historical materialism as summed up by Engels were:

"...that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggle of these classes against one another."  

Inconclasm was no longer necessary; by utilizing a scientific method, the process of a critical assimilation of Chinese history could begin. This task was facilitated by the incorporation of the masses into the mainstream of Chinese history. From being an essentially scholarly and ethical enterprise passing judgements and providing precedents, the role of history was thereby transfigured to a necessary function of politics- and in this manner, the Communists completed and advanced on the achievements of the reformers begun at the turn of the century.

Among the primary tasks of the Communists was to instill among the masses an identification of their interests with those of the state. For the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC), particularly for Mao Zedong, the major barriers to achieving that indentification were, in the first place, the illiteracy of the masses which had prevented them from playing an active role in state affairs and secondly, the bureaucracy, whose privileged status had further alienated the masses from the State. Participation from the masses, which alone could
inculcate the spirit of public and collective responsibility required them to be educated. This in turn demanded the adoption of administrative measures by a bureaucracy which would teach and learn at the same time. The role of ideology thus becomes critical and hence we see a continuous stress on raising the level of ideology in the PRC.

For our purposes, ideology could be broadly defined as a set of ideas which aim to bring about a transformation of individuals in the process of achieving certain goals. In other words, to bring about a change in established social conditions and to fulfill the necessary social tasks, requires an ideology which is a part of the social consciousness. The more crucial aspect of ideology is how it is employed in practice and Mao especially stressed the unity of theory and practice. He firmly believed that the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decided everything - and it was reflected in political action. A correct ideological line was extremely necessary in studying history - for it was an article of faith with Mao that ideas could eventually become a material force. This tenet had to be thoroughly grasped -- more so in a society where the communist revolution had brought about state ownership of the means of production, i.e. the economic forces, but the "superstructure" (political institutions, legal structures, habits, customs, conventions, philosophy, ways of thinking etc) was still dominated by the old ideas. In Marxist terminology, the Chinese leaders were faced with the contradiction between an advanced base and a backward superstructure. Only when one realizes the strength and persistence of the elitist, pedantic and bureaucratic strains in Chinese thinking, can a true appreciation of Mao's insistence on practice and on the active role of the masses in Chinese politics, come about.

Greater dangers lurked in the study of Chinese history and in the critical assessment of Confucius and his philosophy. The former was dominated by accounts of Emperors, Dynasties, Prime Ministers, Nobles and Aristocrats, while the latter had propagated and perpetuated elite notions as regards education, labour, privileges and differing perceptions regarding the duties of the officials and duties of the masses. The manner in which the masses of China viewed their past and how they evaluated Confucius on the one hand and what they visualized the future to be on the other, would very largely determine their efforts and participation in the present. Secondly, if the CPC was to spearhead the process of change taking all the people with it, the dynamics of the historical process and the lessons of history had to be thoroughly understood.

The question of the interpretation and writing of history therefore has always been an important one for
Marxists. Since 1949, the Chinese communists have dealt with it in various ways. On the one hand, there was the universal dimension. With the Marxist analytical method, it was now possible for the Chinese communists and historians to bring the Chinese past out of its 'sinocentric' cocoon and make it also a part of world history thus bequeathing universal applicability to the Chinese revolution which would now not merely be an autonomous event but a significant model for the other developing countries. On the other hand there was the nationalist dimension which has definitely influenced evaluations of Confucius. The ancient philosopher has truly posed a difficult problem - both for politicians and academicians - in the PRC. His place and role in history and his philosophical legacy were - and are - heatedly debated by the latter while his continuing and considerably pervasive influence has been for the former an obstruction to the pace and depth of revolutionary change. Mao realized only too well the corroding effect of Confucian values emphasizing social harmony, benevolence to all, superiority of mental labour, stress on family and kinship ties and the quest for privileged positions on the CPC's efforts in inculcating entirely different values. The intellectual tradition represented by Confucius was extremely pedantic giving no place to practice or original thinking; it did not encourage the educated elite to interest themselves in the problems of the masses or gain more knowledge about and from them by mixing with them. This could well become a very substantial problem in educating the youth of China who had no direct experience of revolution or struggle against the exploitative nature of the old system. It is therefore easy to understand the foundations of Mao's consistent anti-Confucianism - and the primary assertion of this thesis is that anti-Confucianism in the PRC has been primarily motivated by Mao Zedong. To ensure that anti-Confucianism was properly rooted at the mass-level, Mao urged that communist evaluations of Confucius should not be confined to the letter, but its spirit taken to the people in a gradual and protracted process of ideological reeducation. It is here that the problem of continuity of old values and traditions has to be tackled.

Historians and intellectuals in the PRC were given the task of critically summing up Chinese history - from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and inheriting "this" valuable legacy. As mentioned earlier, the shift from iconoclasm to critical inheritance is the most striking feature of assessments of Confucius in the twentieth century. Surprisingly, when the Communists came to power, despite their avowed aim of totally breaking with tradition, the expected iconoclasm did not come to the fore. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, it is stated,
"The communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas."5

Besides the revolutionary anthem, Internationale declares: "No more tradition's chains shall bind us... the earth shall rise on new foundations...." But there is an indirect affirmation of continuity elsewhere in the Manifesto. "When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence."6

Whereas Marx does not seem to have discussed in concrete terms how the Communists should deal with the intellectual and philosophical legacies of the past once they came to power, beyond general statements like those above, Lenin provides enough grounds for not only affirming the continuity of intellectual and philosophical traditions, but also advocating inheritance. In a reply to the Narodniks who accused the Soviet Communists of destroying the traditional culture, Lenin said that the Russian Marxists "are much more consistent and faithful guardians of the heritage than the Narodniks," yet they "do not guard the heritage in the way an archivist guards an old document."7 Marxism itself was a perfect example of critical assimilation of such divergent ideological currents as classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and the general revolutionary doctrines of French socialism. This feature was put in perspective by Engels:

"It is not a question of simply discarding the entire two thousand years of thought, but rather of criticizing it, of stripping away from those transitory forms, those erroneous conclusions obtained from the idealist forms that were unavoidably related to their times and to the process of development itself."8

Lenin provides an even more detailed analysis.

"If you ask me why it is that the doctrines of Marx have been able to capture the minds of millions of the most revolutionary peoples, then the only reply can be that this is that Marx relied on the firm foundation

6. Ibid., p.51.
of human knowledge obtained under the capitalist system,... that he examined with a critical attitude eve-
rything created by human society, overlooking nothing... we must clearly recognize that only by
thoroughly understanding the whole of the process of development of mankind and the culture it has
created, and that only by reforming this culture, can the proletarian culture be established... Proletarian
culture must be a complete knowledge created by mankind out of the oppression of capitalist society, of
landlord society and of bureaucratic society, in accordance with the laws of human development. 

If one accepts that there is a continuity between the ideas of one era and the next and that ideas in one era
are influenced by the one preceding it, then a case could very well be made out for inheritance - because inheritance
necessarily affirms continuity. But for the Marxists, inheritance is not a passive or automatic process; it is far more
dynamic, involving selection, revision and improvement. In the process, it undergoes a qualitative change in
accordance with the prevailing situation. It is thus a critical and dialectical process and obviously does not apply
to all ideas and values of the previous era. The dross has to be discarded and the essence retained. And that is
where the problems begin. For it is one thing to theoretically understand how the past has to be critically inherited
and assimilated and quite another to put it into practice. Lenin wrote,

"It is easy to do this in a general formula, in abstract reasoning, but in the struggle against capitalism,
which does not die at once but puts up increasingly furious resistance... this task is one that calls for
tremendous effort." 

Nonetheless, it must needs be done for although, according to Marx, the economic basis of society is the
ultimate determining factor and that as the old conditions of existence fade away, old ideas will die with it, it is also
ture that,

"When the superstructure (politics, culture etc) obstructs the development of the economic base,
political and cultural changes become principal and decisive." 

The Chinese Communists had to be particularly vigilant because, "In the ideological field, the question of who will win out, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, has not yet been really settled. We still have to wage a protracted struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology."\(^{12}\)

This premise necessitated maintaining a continuous vigilance and upholding class-struggle while making every effort to create a truly revolutionary, truly proletarian culture and enabling the masses to 'master' the cultural heritage. The CPC would provide the leadership and the intelligentsia would assist them in this task. But if they - the historians and intellectuals - persisted in viewing the classical works of philosophy and art as constituting the pinnacles of human achievement and as transcending 'class' which the ignorant masses must be taught to admire and revere, or propagated the notion of noble and upright individuals in history, irrespective of their class-category, then they would totally subvert the process of critical inheritance and the creation of proletarian culture. For it was entirely erroneous to assume that works or individuals which/who were "progressive" in their respective historical eras would or could play a progressive role in the present as well, merely by presenting them as "above classes" or in possession of "universal values," without making clear their historical role in a class society. For, as mentioned earlier, the elite character of Chinese philosophy and art had by and large excluded the masses from its mainstream and by praising them uncritically, the intellectuals and historians would not be fostering a proletarian outlook. In the long run this would undermine revolutionary interests. They had to consciously and consistently bear in mind that regardless of the merit of ancient works, the struggles of the masses in history and in the present far outstripped the ancient works in revolutionary power and inspiration. Therefore, in the process of critical inheritance,

"We should take over the rich legacy and the good traditions in literature and art that have been handed down from the past ages in China and foreign countries, but the aim must still be to serve the masses of the people. Nor do we refuse to utilize the literary and artistic forms of the past, but in our hands, these old forms, remoulded and infused with new content, also become something revolutionary in the

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service of the people.”

For the earlier Marxists in the thirties and forties, the task was comparatively easier. In times of revolutionary upheavals, one must peforce take clearcut stands - the environment is not quite conducive to subtlety. It was clear that the old had to give way to the new. But in that process, Chinese historiography was given a broader base and wider context. Immediately after liberation however, no serious or concerted attempts to evaluate Confucius were taken up. Nation-building and development, focussing on technical skill, was of primary concern. Furthermore, the immediate Chinese past - the struggle for liberation - served a much more useful role in fostering a sense of unity and identity. 'History' was only gradually to serve this purpose. It was in the mid-50s with the organization of a comprehensive and systematic Historical Department that the study and writing of history acquired legitimacy, orientation and direction. The early fifties were taken up by a study of world history. Information on that was limited and the few available works were of dubious scholarship and were non-Marxist in approach. The Chinese historians largely relied on Soviet scholarship in the matter of relating and integrating the Chinese past to the history of the world and their own revolution to the world proletarian revolution.

By the late fifties however, the Chinese historians turned to their own past - always fascinating - but now with a difference and a greater intensity. The shadow of a Sino-Soviet split, with indications of being more than a temporary strain, obviously meant that they could no longer rely on Soviet interpretations. Not only had the Chinese to look for an alternative, it seemed they also had to provide one. The Chinese past suddenly became all important and Chinese history become the major subject of concern and debate.

The concern was regarding the subtle beginnings of dissent, opportunities for which were provided by the platform of historical debates and the means were the utilization of the past to criticize the present. The method was the traditional indirect criticism of the power-holders - 'pointing at the mulberry to criticize the ash'. And interestingly, it is during this period - the fifties - that the intellectual continuities are strikingly evident. The subject of the historical debates were primarily three. Periodization of Chinese history, Peasant Rebellions and

Evaluations of Confucius. And by the beginning of the 60s, we come to the second watershed in Chinese Communist Historiography - the 1962 Conference on Confucianism.

Evaluations of Confucius have varied tremendously at different periods and like Chinese history, seem to have moved in cycles. Confucius represents a link between two sets of values - values which are different - but nonetheless lead to a conflict in the commitment of the Chinese historians and intellectuals. This conflict in commitment to two sets of values and the problems attendant on the attempts at reconciliation, characterized the 1962 Conference, leaving it open to the charge that its deliberations amounted to a de-emphasis of 'class struggle' in history and 'reconciliation rather than accentuation of differences' in Chinese society.

In analysing the revival of Confucianism, one would also have to inquire into the attitude of the Chinese historians towards their past. In such an enquiry, one discerns a definite difference in the earlier historians and those of the present day. The former were greatly influenced by Western liberalism, but also possessed an abiding attachment to their own culture. They were, however, drawn towards Marxism because it offered a way out for China in the first quarter of this century. A sense of urgency characterized their acceptance of the idea that only a revolution could free China. They wanted to unshackle their country from its orthodoxies and their resentment was directed against certain Confucian values and institutions such as that of slavery, scholar bureaucracy and scholar-gentry. The new generation of Chinese intellectuals and historians, who came of age after 1949, who have had a rather tenuous link with tradition and whose ideas on history have been tempered in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, emerged in the sixties with an extremely heightened commitment to Marxist theory - especially to the idea of class-struggle. Admittedly uncertain in scholarship, they were nevertheless politically sound and whose values were quite different from their senior colleagues. And it is these differences which have been responsible for much of the controversies and debates in Chinese Communist historiography - particularly those on Confucius and Confucianism.

In the post 1962 period, class-struggle was neglected even more and the universality of Confucius ethics and their relevance for contemporary China began to assume disturbing dimensions. That the CPC - particularly Mao Zedong - was much concerned about the direction these debates were taking, does not need to be spelt out. The
CPC's Propaganda Department launched a rectification campaign, the relaxed period of free debate and airing of views came to an end and on its heels came the Cultural Revolution (CR).

The period from the mid-60s was taken up by the CR with its struggle against the handful of people who were taking the capitalist road. For the Chinese historian and Communist historiography, this revolutionary phase served only to emphasize the ideology inherent in the two concepts of struggle and restorationism. The historians were being exorcised of their conservative and traditional heresies and being re-educated in accordance with the specifications laid down by the CPC. This was the revolution in historical studies and the 60s were taken up by a tremendous effort at reforming the Chinese historians.

Then came the Lin Biao affair - the former Defence Minister was criticized not only because of his restorationist tendencies - but also because of his belief in Confucian values. The anti Lin Biao campaign was then linked up with the subsequent anti-Confucian campaign in an extraordinary mass-movement which commenced in China around mid-1973. The young Marxist historians had been, for the preceding years, popularizing the notion of struggle; the intellectuals had been engaged in discrediting Confucius and his teachings - both now came together in a campaign which joined the past and the present emphasizing the continuity of class-struggle.

Two other important questions are raised when discussing Confucius in Chinese Communist historiography. The first one centres around the contribution of Mao Zedong to the evaluations of the 5th century B.C. philosopher, and the essential ambivalence which can be discerned in Mao's attitude towards Confucius in times of upheaval vis-a-vis the more relaxed periods - between total rejection in the former and a discriminating evaluation during the latter. The Anti-Confucian campaign of 1973-75 could also be viewed as Mao's last attempt at destroying the myth around Confucius - the campaign certainly went a long way in de-mythologizing the Chinese sage. The second major question revolves around the critical relationship between Confucianism and Marxism. The latter has definitely replaced the former as the basis for political, economic and social action in China today but ideological reeducation will have to be a gradual, continuous and protracted process involving the commitment of many many generations to come.
China is undergoing yet another period of transition, which is bound to affect and may be even change the direction of historiography. And the attempts to resolve the contradictions in the field of historical studies (created in a large measure by the continuing hold of the past) will carry on apace as the Chinese historians try to reach explanations and interpretations which are somewhat more indigenous to the soil of the land. Undoubtedly, they have come a long way since the early years of the Republic - in charting its course against a background of active politics, scholarship and historiography have not always benefited; in fact, many a time, intellectual independence and political commitment did not harmonize judiciously which further intensified the contradictions.

The various questions which arise at different stages of the foregoing narration generate the need for a systematic process of enquiry into communist historiography on Confucius suggesting the following framework for analysis. The first chapter would go into the origins of communist historiography and its points of departure from traditional historiography. The next chapter would evaluate the contributions of the major historians and assess the guidelines laid down by the CPC according to which historians and intellectuals were to conduct research, the attempts by the historians to gain greater autonomy and finally enquire into the developments which led to the surprising resurgence and revival of Confucianism at the conference of 1962 which shall be the focus of chapter three. The contradiction between the values which the CPC was trying to circulate and the values of the Confucian world view which a number of senior historians were advocating, as also the efforts by the CPC to combat the influence of the latter throughout the late fifties and early sixties shall also be examined. Chapter four shall discuss the stormy course of historiography during the CR and finally, the last chapter would examine Mao Zedong's last major campaign to deal with the problem of Confucius in Chinese history and politics. Considering the close relationship between politics, ideology and historiography, efforts have been made at every stage to delineate the prevalent situation, the power struggle of the time and the consequent impact of the two line struggle in history writing.

The aims which historiography and history are to serve as envisaged by the CPC, are many - particularly in its analysis of the past, present and future role of Confucius and his legacy. Given the various ideological premises, historiography in Communist China has been characterized by lengthy, heated, and intense debates. The many controversies cannot be encompassed within the confines of this research. As it is, Confucius in
Chinese communist historiography has been so much written about and discussed that it presents a formidable task. It must be admitted that the perusal of material for this study has been primarily selective than exhaustive. But it is hoped that in the course of this work, some light has been shed on an aspect of historiography which continues to excite passions and controversy, and which will undoubtedly take time to be resolved or brought to a satisfactory conclusion.