Chapter VII

RADICALISM IN REPEAL
Chapter VII

RADICALISM IN RETREAT

I

The Initial Nervousness

With the receding of the crises of 1956, there came to an end the most radical phase in Indian diplomacy. During this time, a genuine policy of non-alignment enabled India to make independent assessments of all issues and to contribute to world peace through her opposition to West's moral crusade against communism. But since 1957 a growing foreign exchange crisis and subsequently a deterioration in Sino-Indian relations induced a turn towards conservatism again. And unfortunately, due to the continued presence of all these factors radical trends could not again be revived in Nehru's life-time. In the mid fifties experiments with the public sector projects with the aid from the socialist countries had inspired a confidence which to a great extent supported the radicalism of this period. However, since 1957 and up to the end of the decade economic dependence on the western aid produced a more cautious and conservative approach to diplomacy. With the beginning of the sixties, as the results of India's industrial policy of the mid fifties were getting realized, and an industrial base established, India tried to regain her initial confidence. But the border war of 1962 ended the possibilities of such revival. India was overwhelmed by panic after the military defeat from China. And the consequent total dependence on the west for military aid and also an internal revolt against Nehru's foreign
policy of the mid fifties ensured a virtual no-return to the radical days. The remaining days of the Nehru period was merely a record of this utter defeat of non-alignment.

West lost no time in taking advantage of India's difficulties. As soon as this new phase of India's relations with the West began, India was asked to come to terms with Pakistan on Kashmir. At the end of 1956, the Constituent Assembly for Jammu and Kashmir finalised the constitutional framework formally endorsing Kashmir's accession to India. Pakistan and her protectors made this an issue to launch a fresh campaign against India. In January 1957, Security Council passed a resolution reminding India that by these acts India was flouting the earlier decision of the Security Council which required a plebiscite to finally determine the status of Jammu and Kashmir. The Western Powers paid no heed to Krishna Menon's contention that, firstly, Kashmir's accession to India had preceded the border war of 1948 and the present dispute over the status of the State. And secondly, according to the Security Council resolution, a plebiscite on Kashmir could take place only after Pakistan had withdrawn from the occupied part of the Kashmir. Nevertheless, a resolution regretting India's annexation of Kashmir was passed and two emissaries were sent to India to have dialogues with the Indian leaders over the issue.


2 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1971), pp. 488-90.
India resented these moves by the Western Powers. Kashmir had been the most sensitive issue of Indian politics since 1948, as it covered an area of strategic importance to India's security. America's military aid to Pakistan and the formation of SEATO and Baghdad Pact with the participation of Pakistan complicated the situation. These alliances disturbed the balance of power in the subcontinent, which India now sincerely apprehended was getting to its disadvantage. Nehru, therefore, demanded in parliament that any future negotiation or talks on Kashmir must first of all take note of these changed circumstances. It was generally believed in India that though Pakistan had been made a base to fight Asian communism, the ultimate objective behind United States' giving military aid to Pakistan was to strengthen her military position and thereby increase her bargaining power vis-a-vis India. Hence, the new resolution of the Security Council was looked upon as an attempt by the West to impose solution on India while the balance of power in the subcontinent was supposedly in favour of Pakistan and while economic difficulties kept India dependent on the West.

But despite this realization India could not express her resentments in stronger terms than "shock", "distress" or "pain". "It pains me", Nehru said in a public speech, "that countries which are friends of ours ... should have considered this question

in so casual a way". In a speech in Majya Sabha, he regretted the fact that foreign interference had prevented these two countries from sorting out their mutual problems. But he hastened to add that he was "not for the moment criticizing outside countries because they have acted with goodwill in this matter". To assuage his feelings perhaps Nehru lashed out at the other allies of Pakistan, specially those countries which belonged to "military alliances like Baghdad Pact". "It is possible", he said, "that these military alliances account for the strange resolutions that have been passed in regard to Kashmir". He ridiculed these countries for calling themselves members of the Free World without following any democratic norms in their internal politics. "It is the free world which calls for elections and plebiscite", he said sarcastically, "when these countries have themselves no election and have authoritarian systems of government". It was obviously ridiculous that some insignificant allies of Pakistan were made the representative of the free world and the targets of Nehru's attack and criticism. But the very absurdity of the situation revealed how helpless he felt under the circumstances so that knowing everything he took such a ridiculous position on this issue. This was definitely not for the consumption of his parliamentary

4 Ibid., p. 235.
5 Ibid., p. 237.
6 Ibid., p. 235.
colleagues or for his countrymen. The position of the Western Powers on the question of Kashmir was known to everyone. Nehru's statements were an assurance for the West that under the given condition India would not disoblige her donors. Hence, in spite of his shock and resentment at the attitude of the Western Powers, Nehru did not forget to announce India's gratitude towards West for the "financial help" she had received from them. It was reported even in foreign press at the time that Nehru appeared to be "more concerned... with the successful fulfilment of India's five year plans than with any other problem", which explained his reluctance to antagonize his creditors.

Pakistan, however, tried to utilize every forum to bring pressure on India. In late June 1957, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers assembled in London for their yearly conference. Kashmir was not raised as a formal item on the agenda. But Suhrawardy tried to mobilize opinion in the West through his various public statements. In London, speaking to the Pakistani students, he said, "would a larger country be permitted to usurp the rights of a smaller country and to defy the orders of the nations of the world?" The Pakistani Prime Minister was helped in this endeavour to a great extent by the unkind British press campaign about Nehru's double-standard on Kashmir. Nehru was reported to have several meetings with the British Prime Minister.

9 New Age (New Delhi), 14 July 1957, p. 3; The Times (London), 4 July 1957, p. 7.
Macmillan on the Kashmir problem where presumably informal pressures were exercised on Nehru and criticisms made against India's stand on Kashmir. In a press statement made on 3 July, Nehru tried to answer his critics "in England and elsewhere". "I speak," he said, with "a certain anguish in my mind and heart". "I am not conscious of any such variety of standards in my head or my action", of which I am personally accused of.

However, Nehru ultimately succeeded in assuring his critics in the West who were on the whole happy with his softer attitude towards them. They welcomed his readiness to offer explanations for his controversial foreign policy of the previous year. Nehru explained that India's policy in regard to the Hungarian crisis was dictated by the fact that India seriously apprehended a world crisis to develop out of the situation there and "did not wish to say or do anything which might add to the possibility of a big fare up". He further assured his critics that the Suez crisis had not done any irreparable damage to the "close and friendly relationship between United Kingdom and India". "The mere fact that we had survived that strain and crisis showed there was something abiding, much stronger than mere sentiment that kept us together". Nehru was reported to

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10 The Times (London, 3 July 1957, p. 10; New Age (New Delhi), 14 July 1957.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
have taken a similar attitude on Suez crisis inside the conference meetings. Manchester Guardian reported "Nehru is generous". "He showed no resentment about the events of the last October ... nor did he criticise the actions of the United Kingdom Government". According to a similar report of the Daily Mail, "The policies of Nehru at the Downing Street Conference are providing abundant surprises for other premiers. The Indian leader refrained from a criticism of the Suez and toned down his objections to Western military pacts". They did not miss the opportunity to mention the reason behind Nehru's shift in attitude towards the West. "Nehru is in a very chastened mood", News Chronicle reported, "He has sobered up by India's financial situation".

The final communiqué, like the conference deliberations, bore marks of Nehru's submissions to the West. The policy in regard to the admission of Communist China to the UN had been the bone of contention between Nehru and his Western critics since the early fifties. However at the end of the 1957 conference it was announced that there was a "general agreement" that China's admission to the United Nations should not be pressed at the present, in spite of the fact that there was also a general consensus that "China's position and growing influence is the major factor in the Far Eastern situation and that making relations with China is broadly desirable."

14 New Age (New Delhi), 14 July 1957, p. 3.
15 The Times (London), 6 July 1957, p. 6.
However, the same press reports revealed also that Nehru tried to register his disapproval of West's cold war approach to world problems. A London Times report of 28 June said that Nehru did not welcome the military implications of the Eisenhower doctrine though he was prepared to endorse the economic aspect of it. New Age, the CPI weekly of India also claimed, basing its report on a PFI despatch, that Nehru tried and achieved deletion of "an approving reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine" and "blistering attacks on the Soviet Union", from the Draft Communiqué.

Perhaps this was a concession to Nehru's sentiments, which Britain and her Western allies did not grudge knowing that Nehru was no longer in a position to indulge in any serious opposition to the West. In fact Eisenhower Doctrine did not provoke the same expression of opposition from Nehru, which SEATO had done a few years back. This was evident from the equal treatment he offered to a set of Soviet proposals that emerged in the wake of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the doctrine itself. After the Anglo-French withdrawal from Suez in late 1956, United States moved in to fill up the power vacuum in the Middle East on the pretext of increased Russian desire to dominate the region. In January 1957, President Eisenhower formally sought authority from his Congress to undertake programmes of military assistance where desired and

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16 New Age (New Delhi), 14 July 1957, p. 3.
to use American armed forces when requested "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism". In response to this policy declaration by Eisenhower, Soviet Union, whose leadership was now toying with the idea of a policy of detente, sent a note to America proposing a four-power declaration renouncing the use of force in the Middle East and an embargo on the shipment of arms to the area. Washington rejected these proposals. In March 1957, Nehru in one of his foreign affairs speeches dealt with the problem. Firstly, he termed Eisenhower doctrine as just "proposals" from the United States. Never before had Nehru made such an understatement about publicly declared military policies in the United States. He considered these two sets of proposals as of equal value and merit. "I do not presume, at this stage", he said, "to discuss or criticise any of these proposals. I have no doubt that both were meant to advance the cause of security and peace". At the end of his speech he tried to put in a mild dissent saying that power vacuum theory "is a dangerous approach", and instead suggested a summit of USA and USSR. But immediately he added that "this is not a question of favouring any particular proposal or not favouring it". He in fact commended the Eisenhower proposal "that a great deal in President Eisenhower's proposals, more especially the part dealing with economic help, is of importance and of

Nehru showed a similar reluctance for any confrontation when the Eisenhower Doctrine was applied against the pro-left and pro-Soviet Arab nationalisms of the Middle East. Jordan became the first victim. In February 1956 the pro-Nasser anti-western group in this country became powerful after a general election. The new government thereafter set on a path of pushing Jordan closer to the Soviet Union. In April 1957 they succeeded in purging the Hussain loyalists completely from the civil service of Jordan. The process was then halted at this point when the nationalists were suddenly outmanoeuvred by the royalists. The new cabinet resigned after a severe political crisis enabling Hussain to call for American help. The King complained that international communism and its followers were creating trouble in his country. The United States responded with the immediate despatch of its Sixth Fleet from the French Riviera to the Eastern Mediterranean and a subsequent sum of $10,000,000 for the economic support of the royalty.

A second attempt at interference was made in Syria during this time. This country had already moved closer towards Soviet Union and was receiving Soviet arms and economic aid in heavy dose since the Egyptian defeat in 1956. In August 1957 the pro-Soviet forces entrenched their position by a left-wing

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coup. The United States decided that it was another threat to the free world from international communism and therefore arms should be immediately flown to Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Intensive diplomatic and military activity directed against the new ruling group in Syria was reported from Washington at the time. Turkey mobilized its forces and conducted manoeuvres on the Syrian frontier. This was followed by exchange of threats between USA and USSR and Dulles' White House statement committing the President to uphold Eisenhower doctrine in the Syrian crisis. But despite efforts, the Eisenhower Doctrine suffered a setback in Syria as the United States watched helplessly Egypt and Syria joining themselves into an economic and political union named United Arab Republic.

The doctrine, ultimately, succeeded completely in Lebanon. A struggle had been brewing in this country between the pro-American President Chamoun and his anti-Western opposition. In June 1957, Chamoun rigged the elections in Lebanon achieving a successful elimination of his political opponents and the return of a parliament of his liking. The new parliament was prepared to approve his public acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine and amend the constitution permitting him to serve at least for another term. These high-handed acts on the part of the president threw the country into a state of civil war which enabled Chamoun to appeal for American help. Washington only waited for an opportunity to respond to this appeal. In May 1958 Lebanon alleged U.A.R. intervention in her
internal affairs and sent a written complaint to the Security Council. The United Nations observers patrolling the Lebanese borders, however, found the allegation unfounded. The first attempt to build up a pretext for American intervention was thus frustrated. It was, however, soon provided by the revolution in Iraq. Immediately, the United States armed forces were dispatched to Lebanon, followed by the British landing in Jordan. President Eisenhower explaining this decision of the United States announced that the American forces "will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the independence and integrity of Lebanon, which (America) deem vital to the national interest and world peace".

In India Nehru's usual survey of international situation did not pay much attention to the initial crises in Jordan and Syria, except for a casual reference to the Syrian situation in a Rajya Sabha speech describing it as "dangerous". The British and American landing in Lebanon and Jordan, however, invited more serious comments from Nehru as the happenings in these two countries created a war crisis inviting Soviet Union to declare that it "will not remain indifferent to the acts of unprovoked aggression in an area adjacent to its frontiers". But even these were far from encouraging for the Third World. When the world was


20 Ibid., p. 230.
poised for a confrontation between the two super-powers.

Nehru's comment to this Lok Sabha was merely that "it was unfortunate and harmful for foreign troops to be sent there." He identified the cause of tension in the Middle East as the struggle between nationalism and imperialism and regretted that "all the revolutionary changes in Asia and Africa have only been grudgingly recognized by the countries in Europe and America". But immediately he qualified his statement by saying "I am not criticising anyone because it is always difficult to adjust oneself to a changing situation and the fact of the matter is that the situation in the world today from any and every point of view is one which change rapidly and basically."

One wonders if Nehru had ever shown such tolerance for imperialism's lack of adjustment with Asian African resurgence. In an obvious attempt to dissociate himself from the Soviet resolution on the issue introduced in the General Assembly, Nehru declared "so far as we are concerned, it has never been our policy to condemn through these resolutions even though we might think that a country had erred". A more reassuring statement for the West was "who are we to denounce? Who are we to hold forth the light to others? We have enough darkness in our own


23 Lok Sabha Debates, n.21, col. 1651.
minds". In a similar fashion the Indian representative at the UN also assured the West that India had "no desire to engage in invectives or even in criticism", though she broadly supports Arab nationalism.

II

The Crisis in Sino-Indian Relations

In 1959, a visible decline in Sino-Indian amity pushed India closer to the United States. In the early part of the year, the Khampa revolution that was brewing in China for a couple of years spread into Tibet and developed into a serious resistance movement against Chinese authority there. In late March civil war broke out in Lhasa which prompted Dalai Lama to cross into Indian territory and seek political asylum to the Government of India.

India's reaction to the Tibetan crisis brought to the surface the antipathy between these two countries. As has been noted above, in the early fifties India had acquiesced to the Chinese presence in Tibet out of pragmatic considerations. She might not have accepted a fait accompli so easily under different circumstances. But still there was a lingering hope that Tibet would be treated as an autonomous region and there would not

24 Ibid.


26 See Chapter VI, P. 338
be any immediate attempt to assimilate this religious and tradition ridden country into China. The way Peking, however, reacted to this revolt proved that Tibet was regarded as much a part of China as any other territory within the mainland and the exercise of Chinese authority in Tibet was to be in the same degree as it would be in any other part of the country. For India this meant that a strongly entrenched enemy was showing off its strength from a much closer distance than it was expected to do so.

India had inherited from British imperialism an undemarcated boundary with China on the west, and her protectorate, Tibet on the east. In the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, Britain had tried to stretch the boundary of her Indian empire as far as possible. But her territorial ambitions were never properly delimited as the foreign office in both London and India was alternately dominated by the advocates of forward and moderate schools of thought regarding Britain's boundary policy. Though, both the schools aimed at creating a linear boundary between British India and her northern neighbours, their conflicting claims prevented the development of a properly delimited boundary between these two countries. In the Western sector the situation was completely indeterminate when India became independent in 1947. In the Eastern sector, however, there was an attempt in the 1913 Simla Convention to delimit the boundary. The McMahon line, which emerged out of this conference, was agreed upon by Britain and Tibet as the boundary
between British India and the latter country. But China, whose suzerainty over Tibet was recognized, did not agree to this arrangement.

In the fifties India's attention was mainly concentrated on the eastern sector. This was firstly because on the West, the British had left not only an undemarcated boundary but an arid, uninhabitable land, the approach to which required considerable effort. On the East, however, lay a delimited, though not a demarcated boundary below which was the tribal area where the British had tried to penetrate politically and administratively. The second and the more important reason was that the Chinese arrival in Tibet compelled India to decide how it should deal with the fact that China had repudiated the McMahon line. The border policy that emerged out of these considerations was derived from India's policy towards new China. India was to hold forth the territory bequeathed to it. But it was decided that it would be unwise to raise the question of McMahon line with the Chinese at the time as India was not in a position to defend her claim. So India would simply treat McMahon line as the boundary, leaving it to China to protest if she liked. "We felt that we should hold by our

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27 To this effect was the answer given to the retired Secretary General, Sir C. S. Ba'pai's suggestion to the External Affairs Ministry that India should take the initiative in raising the question of the McMahon Line with the Chinese government. He warned

(footnote contd.)
position", Nehru told Rajya Sabha later, "and that the lapse of time and events would confirm it, and by the time the challenge came, we would be in a much stronger position". Hence the issue of India's north-eastern border was never raised with China despite the fact that India was provided with at least two occasions by the Chinese themselves, when an exchange of views by the two countries on the matter could have taken place. The first occasion came in 1951 when Chou En-lai suggested to the Indian ambassador in Peking that the question of stabilisation of Tibet border should be taken up in tripartite discussions between India, Nepal and China. The second occasion came in 1956 when Chou En-lai visited India. On both the occasions Chou En-lai left sufficient hints that though China did not accept a boundary imposed by the imperialists, she was prepared to accept it now because "it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, India and Burma". Yet all

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that McMahon line might be one of those "sears left by Britain in the course of her aggression against China, (who) may seek to heal or erase this scar on the basis of frontier rectifications that may not be either to our liking or and interest". But Nehru, in consultation with K.M.Panikkar, the then ambassador to China, decided against this suggestion. Neville Maxwell, India's China War (Bombay, 1973), pp. 76-77.

28 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 377.
29 Ibid., p. 360; and Neville Maxwell, n. 27, p. 76.
30 N.Maxwell, n. 27, p. 93; and Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Speeches, vol. 4, p. 209.
31 Ibid.
these indirect assurances did not remove India's apprehensions and she still preferred to keep silent and rather pursue her own border policy not only in the eastern sector but also in the western sector; though the implementation of the policy was not carried out with equal interest in both the sectors.

This border policy required a loose political control over Tibet which, however, the Chinese made clear they were not going to allow. And India looked upon this assertion of Chinese authority in Tibet as a threat to her territorial integrity. All of India's reactions followed from this assumption of threat, which only made obvious how much India had desired autonomy of Tibet. Dalai Lama and his entourage was not only granted asylum but was formally received at the border by an Indian officer and allowed to make two anti-Chinese statements from the Indian territory. Nehru declared before his Parliament that "we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their helpless plight". He did not accept the Chinese version of the cause of the crisis. He

32 Nehru had dictated a secret memorandum in July 1954, three months after the conclusion of the Tibetan agreement. The memorandum said: "Both as flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our agreement with China, this (northern) frontier should be considered a firm and definite one, which is not open to discussion with anybody. A system of checkpoints should be spread along this entire frontier. More especially we should have checkpoints in such places as might be considered disputed areas". N. Maxwell, n. 27, p. 86.

33 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 316-17.
refused to believe that "a number of upper strata reactionaries in Tibet were solely responsible for this." Rather he thought that the revolt in Tibet was based on a "strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only the upper class people but others also". And for this upsurge of nationalism, he held China mainly responsible since he believed that it had resulted from wrong handling of this ancient country. Nehru even challenged the Chinese version of the immediate cause of the crisis. "I should like to have a little greater confirmation about them", he said. He did the greatest harm to Sino-Indian relations by expressing doubts that the seventeen point agreement between Tibet and China might have been an "agreement under compulsion". These observations by Nehru and also the anti-China campaign that was indulged in by some sections in India, made significant contribution to the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations at the time. Nehru was aware of this. The Chinese also traced the cause of this "deplorable abnormalities" in Sino-Indian relations to the "outcry in India about the Tibetan rebellion and to the demonstrative welcome given to the Dalai Lama by the Indian Government". But they reached this conclusion

34 Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Speeches, vol. IV, p. 191.
35 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 315.
36 Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Speeches, vol. 4, p. 211.
37 Maxwell, n. 27, p. 105.
via a class analysis of the Indian Government and its leaders. In India they thought the comprador and big bourgeoisie was gaining predominance over the national bourgeoisie through the intrigues of powerful domestic and international forces. In 1959 they found Nehru, a national bourgeoisie leader, captive of these reactionary forces who were guiding him to the right. The anti-China frenzy and the particular attitude taken by the Government of India on Tibetan issue was thus considered to be the sinister consequences of the preponderance of right reaction in India. And this was also thought to be cause of worsening Sino-Indian relations.

Apart from this theoretical antagonism against Indian bourgeoisie the Chinese border policy also contributed substantially to the falling out of India and China. Just as India approached the problem of undemarcated boundary from the position of a weaker state, China approached it from the position of a potential stronger neighbour, and decided to raise the issue categorically at a time of her convenience. There was, therefore, no formal attempt on China's behalf also to open the issue of the undemarcated boundary with India. Chou En-lai, however, on two occasions had made a cursory reference to the McMahon line in the East; but he also gave sufficient hints that China had very little interest in the eastern sector and would be amenable to an agreement endorsing the alignment. The Chinese interests in fact lay in Aksai Chin in the Western sector,

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38 New Age (New Delhi), 17 May 1959, pp. 8 & 9.
through which ran the ancient trade route linking Sinkiang in China with Western Tibet. They had reportedly marched into Lhasa in 1950 through this way. Later in 1956 and 1957 they built a motorable road on this route. But China made no disclosure of her intentions thus penetrating the western sector, despite the fact that she was well aware of India's counter-claim to this territory. In India this act of China was looked upon as unfriendly and even treacherous. Undoubtedly there was some basis in this charge in so far as India had publicly stated her claim to the McMahon line in the eastern sector, where her interests lay, despite her official policy. But China never let India know where her interest lay or that she was in fact using the territory which fell within the map claim of India. In 1951, Chou En-lai mentioned only the problem of eastern sector to the Indian ambassador. In 1956 also Chou En-lai, did the same, taking advantage of India's concern with McMahon line.

In 1959 serious border clashes ensued from these rival claims of India and China. In one of those incidents in the Ladakh area nine Indian policemen were killed in the exchange of fire and ten taken prisoners by the Chinese. These developments, which unfortunately showed no sign of abatement, hardened the position of both sides, and specially that of India since

39 N. Maxwell, n. 27, p. 87.
40 Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Speeches, vol. 4, p. 206.
she felt threatened and bullied by a stronger neighbour. Chances of negotiations receded further and further as the two parties based their cases on contradictory sets of facts and refused to compromise on their basic premises. These developments culminated into the border war of October 1962 between the two Asian neighbours who had only a few years back vowed to respect the territorial integrity of each other and set an example of peaceful coexistence between a communist and a non-communist system.

The failure in this experiment had important consequence for India's foreign policy. Non-alignment was a challenge against imperialism. It was a revolt within the world-capitalist system, though it did not amount to a total break with it. India demanded political freedom to operate independently of the system, yet maintained the economic links. This had resulted in severe strain in India's relations with the West. The West had virtually written off the political support of the largest democracy in Asia despite the economic links India had with them and despite its use at times as a means to influence India's political decisions. India's falling out with China was thus welcomed with great enthusiasm, as it signified the failure of Nehru's paradigm of coexistence with communism. The West was encouraged by Nehru's expressed disillusionment with Communist methods which he was convinced by now, was inferior to peaceful democratic methods of evolution. Averill Harriman wrote in 41

Ibid., pp. 114-23.
His report on India - "The best news in India today is that its leaders are finally aware of the menace of Red China. Impressed by its methods they are now facing up to the fact that the world's most populous democracy is in crucial competition with the world's most populous dictatorship. Either they or the Chinese will become the model of Asian awakening peoples. This has been the underlying theme in all the talks I have had with India's top leaders, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as well as local officials."

The beginning of Sino-Indian friction could not also be better timed for the West as India's financial crises had already put important levers in their hands; and these were now readily used to temper the "immoral" non-alignment. Efforts were first made to bring India and Pakistan under common defence programmes under the patronage of United States of America. Ayub Khan, was made to offer "joint defence" to India against China. Pakistan's ambassador to United States said in a speech in New York in April 1959 "if our great neighbour were to view the facts of life in their correct perspective, and were to desire it, Pakistan could well become its defensive shield lying, as it does, across the historic invasion routes to India in the northwest and the approaches to that from the southeast." One may express the hope, he continued "that recent developments on

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42 New Age (New Delhi), 8 March 1959, p. 4.
India's northern borders may perhaps lead to that realization". President Ayub Khan repeated the offer a few months later when he visited India and wrote a letter to General Cariappa expressing Pakistan's keen desire to co-operate with India and settle all disputes "peacefully". The Americans also made direct hints to this effect and often made them significantly at times when negotiations were going on with India for financial assistance. For example in the joint economic conference held in Washington in early May 1959 to survey India's financial needs for the third five year plan, Chester Bowles gave a call for a Nehru-Ayub summit. He confidently said that the chances for Indo-Pak reconciliation are probably better today than at any time since the partition of British India in 1947.

Nehru of course spurned these offers by Pakistan as he understood that this demanded a fundamental revision of India's foreign policy. "We do not want to have a common defence policy" he declared in a Rajya Sabha speech, "which will be almost some kind of military alliance. The whole policy we have pursued is opposed to this conception". This was indeed too great a demand made on India. But short of fulfilling this demand India gave every indication that she now desired a greater

43 Ibid., 24 May 1959, p. 4.
44 Ibid., 6 September 1959, p. 4.
46 Ibid., 10 May 1959, p. 1.
proximity with the west, and was ready to pay a reasonable price for that. This was indicated by Eisenhower's visit to India in late 1959 and also by the Canal Waters Treaty signed with Pakistan in 1960. At the civic reception to President Eisenhower in New Delhi, Nehru said: "We received you warmly because you are a great man and the representative of a great country and nation. The very ideals which are at the root of your country have been admired by us and have given strength to us". In September 1960 India finally signed the Canal Water Treaty "accommodating Pakistan to a considerable extent", and incurring a burden which was assessed by Nehru in a press conference as "financially overwhelming" for India.

During this period India also showed extreme conciliation to some other proteges of the United States. In the summer of 1960 when Nehru visited Turkey, a joint communiqué was issued from Ankara in which the two premiers remembered "with pleasure the co-operation between the two countries at the Bandung Conference". Recalling the frequent and often better polemics that Nehru had with the Turkish delegation at Bandung

47 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 601.
48 Ibid., p. 481.
49 New Age (New Delhi), 24 May 1959, p.2.
51 See Chapter VI, pp. 258 - 274
one wonders at such contradiction of facts, which perhaps could only be explained by India's keen desire to buy peace with the West at the time. The same feeling also prevented India from resisting the extension of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in South Vietnam, whose presence was definitely frustrating the objectives of the Geneva agreement.

However, India's non-alignment was put to a hard test when the Congo crisis erupted in the summer of 1960 and when imperialist manoeuvring against Congolese nationalism had almost compelled India to revert back to her total anti-imperialism.

The Belgian Congo was granted independence on June 30, 1960. But from the very beginning it became apparent that independence would be circumscribed and conditional as imperialism had high stakes in having a pro-Western and conservative regime in the independent Congo. From the economic point of view, Belgium's concern was the greatest. Societe Generale de Belgique, the most important financial group in Belgium, controlled seventy per cent of the Congolese economy and its subsidiary Union Minière du Haut Katanga had exclusive mining rights over a large area of Katanga until March 1990. Belgium's concern for the events in Congo was therefore based on her corporate stake in the region. After Belgium, Britain had the largest investment stake in the Congo. France, West Germany and Italy too were leading consumers of Katanga copper and other

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52 New Age (New Delhi), 26 June 1960, p. 2.
minerals produced in the Congo and therefore had an understandable concern about having a sympathetic regime there. Lastly, the United States of America, though not having any direct investment interest had an important access interest in the region which accounted for her involvement in the Congo crisis. Katanga alone provided in 1960 approximately three-quarters of the cobalt imported into US and one-half of the Tantalum. Both minerals had important strategic uses in aerospace production, and were mined in only small quantities in the US. Copper was the third important mineral for which the US had access interest. It was obvious therefore that the Western Powers did not encourage the growth of radical nationalism in Congo. Even outside the economic interests, politically too they had no reason to be sympathetic to any such regime. Belgium was not prepared to lose its hold on its ex-colony completely. Britain and France, who either had colonies in the neighbourhood or had strong influence on their ex-possessions, were reluctant to let Congo - the heartland of Africa - be the base of black nationalism and set a bad example to the neighbouring territories. And United States with its traditional conservatism had no reason to be apathetic towards her allies' interest.

The Congo, unfortunately, was not in a position to face

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this challenge. It had been under one of the worst colonisers Europe had produced and had rarely had the benefits of colonial civilization. The overlay of modern institutions had little effect on the society below so that a hopelessly divided tribal society where pre-mordial ties had successfully prevented the development of nationalism prevailed in the Congo. Political parties were essentially based on ethnic and regional loyalties. It was an ideal situation for imperialism to step in and dictate its own terms to this tradition ridden fragmented society. But paradoxically out of this situation there still emerged one national party - Mouvement National Congolais - the party led by Patrice Lumumba, a militant nationalist. Possibly the paradox of its existence in the given milieu explained its quick disappearance also but at the time of independence it was the only national organization in the prevailing chaos which emerged as the strongest single party in the country in spite of securing only one-quarter of the seats in parliament. Lumumba was the only politician who tried to rally the entire country under the banner of nationalism on account of this. Initially Lumumba was allowed to form a coalition government for Congo as the Western Powers, specially the United States and Great Britain believed that he only could provide the necessary stability and order, the absence of which would have been inimical to their interest. But soon the Western Powers became concerned about leftist tendencies in Lumumba and his cabinet. Lumumba's sympathy with Ghana-Guinea brand of
left nationalism and his keen interest in cultivating the friendship of Soviet Union encouraged the Western Powers to aid the pro-Western politico-ethnic faction in Congo in subverting Lumumbist nationalism.

The first offensive against Lumumba was launched by Moise Tshombe, the Conakat leader from Katanga. Within less than a fortnight of the gaining of independence Katanga declared secession from the central government. It was done under Belgian inspiration and vicarious support from US who totally sympathized with the Belgian policy in the Congo. Katanga's secession was significant since West's imperial interests were concentrated in the mining province, and secondly since Katanga was the most important source of revenue for the Central Government, its recalcitrance could be used to pressurize the Central Government. Imperialism thus got itself entrenched in the southern province of the Congo, which was henceforth used as a base for its manoeuvrings in the rest of country.

United States provided the leadership in these manoeuvrings and since the UN at the time was "a satisfactory vehicle for American policy" the intervention was carried on with the active connivance of the world organization. UN complicity

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54 Ibid., p. 69.
55 Ibid., p. 60.
explained the softness shown by the Secretariat in dealing with the Katangan secessionist and also the incorporation of the paragraph four of the Security Council resolution of 9 August which was done by the Secretary General personally. In early September, Lumumba with his cabinet was dismissed by Kasavubu, the President, according to a plan financed and organised by CIA and the American embassy in Leopoldville with the co-operation of the O.L.U.C officials in Congo. Joseph Ileo emerged as the prime minister out of this coup. But soon the Americans found out that Ileo was a bad substitute of Lumumba and was ineffective in the situation. Lumumba had still the confidence of his parliament and was out to utilise it fully. Therefore, similar interventions by the US and UN officials in Congo produced a second coup d'etat within a fortnight and brought in Colonel Joseph Mobutu and his College of Commissioners as the new authority. After installing such protégés at the Centre, UN and the western powers then sought

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56 Paragraph 4 stated "that the UN force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise" - Security Council Resolution adopted on 9 August 1960 - S/4426 Security Council Official Records, 15th yr, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, pp. 91-92.

57 Stephen A. Weissman, n. 53. pp 85-91

58 Ibid. pp 85-91
to bring back the secessionists to the fold of Congolese federation. The task was now simple as Tshombe and Mobutu were agents of the two close allies of NATO-Belgium and the United States.

In the United Nations Soviet Union and her allies opposed this policy of conspiracy against Congo. But apart from making a couple of sensational statements, threatening to come to the aid of the Congolese nationalism, and supplying a few planes to the Lumumba regime, Soviet Union in fact could not contribute much to reverse the course of events in Congo. The Afro-Asian states were not quite aware of the happenings in Congo initially and therefore had full confidence in United Nations operations there. After two successive coup d'etats the Afro-Asian nations became disturbed by the role played by the West and United Nations officials in the Congo. But still they were not yet prepared to condemn the UN operation and go over to the Soviet side. The Afro-Asian countries were more concerned about the future of Congo and believed that withdrawal of UNUC would plunge that country into disastrous civil war. Therefore, instead of indulging in recrimination, this group endeavoured to bring a change in the present policy of the UN and enforce the original objectives of the first and the second Security Council resolutions. This attitude of the Afro-Asian group was vindicated by the resolution passed in the emergency special session of the General Assembly on September 20, 1960. On the one hand, the
resolution stated clearly that the UN operation should assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration of law and order and territorial integrity of the country, suggesting thereby that the UN should have no dealings with the regimes established either by Mobutu or by Tshombe. On the other hand the resolution emphasized support for the organization and Hammarskjold and the need for continued UN operation. By setting out precise measures which the Afro-Asians expected would lead to conciliation, the resolution also tried to give a definite shape to the UN mandate in the Congo.

It was alleged, frequently by the communists in this country, that India did not show much interest in the Congo crisis during the initial months. Referring this issue in a Lok Sabha speech Hiren Mukherjee said: "I regret to have to say that we have missed the role of our Prime Minister which he used to play so ably earlier. The Prime Minister of our country used to be hailed as the voice of freedom of Asia and Africa. Now, we get a feeling these days that, unfortunately, that voice nowadays is very faint, somewhat hushed". Catherine Haskyns made a similar observation in her book, suggesting that Nehru did not evince any interest on the problem initially.

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60 New Age (New Delhi), 11 September 1960, p. 8.

Her assessment of the Indian diplomacy at the time also endorsed the contention of the communists that a shift from this indifference was first visible in Nehru's address to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly where he emphasized that the function of the UN should be "to help this parliament to meet and function so that out of the deliberation, the problem of the Congo may be dealt with by the people themselves." A New Age report covering Nehru's address interpreted it as a shift from a support to Hammarskjold to a support to Lumumba and attributed this to the influence exercised on Nehru by Sekou Touré, Nkrumah, and Nasser. Whatever the reason was, India at the time was frankly expressing her dissatisfaction over the role played by the UN operation in Congo. The Kairur AICC session held in October/November 1960 adopted a resolution emphasizing that the UN assistance "must be exercised in the interest of the Congo only". India's involvement in the problem therefore started precisely at the point where Afro-Asian concern about UN operation began. It was evident that India definitely shared the understanding of this group regarding the problem. C. S. Jha, for instance,

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62 General Assembly Official Records, Fifteenth Session, 882nd plenary meeting, p. 327.
63 New Age (New Delhi), 23 October 1960, p. 5.
64 Ibid., 6 November 1960, p. 2.
while stating India's position on the General Assembly resolution of 20 September, said before the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the Assembly that India believes that "despite possible shortcomings ... the UN mission itself must continue so that conditions in the Congo do not worsen". But he reminded the delegate that "entire basis for UN responsibilities in the Congo is the request by the Central Government. This government must, therefore, at all times be upheld".

India was dragged into greater involvement by Rajeshwar Dayal's controversial role in the Congo operation which had generated bitter anti-India feelings in the Congo and in the Western capitals. In September Rajeshwar Dayal was appointed by Hammarskjold as the head of the Congo operation to pacify the Afro-Asian group who complained about the over-representation of Westerners, specially the Americans, in the administration of the ONUC. This, the Afro-Asian nations, believed was preventing co-operation between the UN officials and the Congolese authorities in Leopoldville. Dayal's leadership gave a new orientation to ONUC which obviously did not look favourably to the role of imperialism in the Congo. In his famous report of November 2, 1960, submitted to the General Assembly, he

66 Catherine Hoskyns, n. 61, p. 178.
emphasized the overwhelming presence of Belgians in the Congo and especially in Katanga and South Kasai which he considered as a "purposeful return" of Belgian imperialism to this country. Even more damaging for western powers was his second observation that since ONUC was committed to the principle of legality, it should on the one hand refuse to recognize the regimes founded only on military force and on the other hand help the Congolese parliament in finding a political solution for itself. These observations coupled with Dayal's initiative in preventing the arrest of Lumumba caused a furore in Congo and outside it and Dayal was variously described as "partial", "stupid" and a pro-Communist striving to bring Lumumba back to power and turn the Congo into a Soviet state. In Washington an official communique released from the State Department said:

"We have every confidence in the good faith of Belgium in its desire to be of assistance in the Congo. We are therefore unable to accept the implication to the contrary contained in various parts of this report". The US was more repulsed by Dayal's suggestion that Congolese parliament should be let to find its own solution as it was well known that Lumumba still enjoyed the confidence of the majority in Parliament. Therefore, the communique emphasized parliament's inability to act "because

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68 Catherine Hoskyns, n. 61, p. 254.
of existing conditions" and stated that US would only accept a return to parliamentary government "under the nominee of President Kasavubu for Premier" that is, under Lleo, not Lumumba.

This was possibly one of the rare occasions and certainly the first time since the UN had become ceased of the Congo problem, that United States publically disagreed with the UN Secretariat. The stakes were obviously considered to be high in Washington. And the way the US now moved to prevent what she apprehended to be the restoration of Lumumba sharpened the contradiction between the policy of the Americans and that of the Afro-Asian group, which no doubt included India, over the Congo issue. Simultaneously with the report of Hajeshwar Dayal was tabled a resolution by Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco and UAM which decided "to seat the representative of the Central Government of the Republic of Congo immediately, pending General Assembly's decisions on the report of the Credentials Committee". Alarmed by Dayal's report and by these Afro Asian moves, Americans encouraged Kasavubu to fly to New York and demand recognition for his own representatives. Confronting the physical presence of Kasavubu which had an adverse influence on many delegates,

69 Stephen R. Weissman, n.53, p. 103-104.
the Afro-Asian now changed their strategy and sought the adjournment of the debate on the ground that a choice by the Assembly at this point might prejudice the work of the Conciliation Commission and of the UN. On 9 November General Assembly accepted by 48 votes to 30 with 18 abstentions a motion proposed by Ghana for an adjournment sine die.

This was again considered to be a victory of Lumumba's sympathisers. The Americans then mobilized the pro-Western states in the Credentials Committee and got a resolution passed in the Committee recommending the seating of Kasavubu delegation. "According to Afro-Asian sources, the United States used every possible pressure to get this decision, and in the period between the adoption of the resolution in the committee and its discussion in the General Assembly lobbying was intense." As a result a second motion moved by Ghana for a similar adjournment, which was supported by India and Ethiopia, was lost in the General Assembly, when it met on 18 November for debate on Credential Committee recommendations. The Afro-Asian states tried all means to prevent or delay a final vote on the recommendations. But they could not succeed. The General Assembly ultimately voted to seat the Kasavubu delegation. "After the decision there were immediate accusations that the vote had been obtained by behind-the-scenes pressures from the US and the

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71 Catherine Hoskyns, n. 61, p. 262; Stephen R. Weissman, n. 53, p. 106.
other Western countries. One Indian delegate commented that he had never before seen such a display of 'arm-twisting' and cited as an example the case of Mexico which had completely reversed its vote at the last moment. This view was also shared by some of the journalists present", for example, correspondents of Le Monde.

This battle of diplomacy, no wonder, incensed the Afro-Asian nations whose antagonism to imperialist intrigues in Congo flared up once again with the arrest and brutal treatment of Lumumba in early December. The General Assembly debate on Congo was opened on 16 December. On 19th, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, UAR and Yugoslavia tabled a resolution. It demanded release of all political prisoners, the immediate convening of parliament, complete withdrawal of all Belgians and stated categorically that "the UN must henceforth implement its mandate fully". The resolution was opposed not only by US and Britain but also by Hammarskjold who participated in the debate to explain the UN policy. Hammarskjold maintained that the tasks set forth in the resolution was not within the competence of the UN which could only work towards a solution "by the normal political and diplomatic means of persuasion and advice". Therefore he

72 Catherine Hoskyns, n. 61, p. 264.
saw no necessity either "for a widened mandate or for new means. The resolution was ultimately defeated in the Assembly by 42 votes to 28 with 27 abstentions.

India reacted sharply to the way the Afro-Asian resolution was disposed of in the General Assembly. It was clear now that United States and her western allies were dead set against any return to constitutionalism in the Congo until they have got rid of radical nationalism in that country. India resented this. In the General Assembly Krishna Menon was seen in his usual vitriolic outbursts against Hammarskjold, and the United States and Britain whom he described as "patron-saints" of President Kasavubu. Menon repeatedly asserted that the mandate given by the Security Council was enough to cover the event and perform the tasks set forth in the resolution. The UN, therefore, should fulfil the mandate. "The situation having reached its present state", he said, "it is now necessary for the UN to govern or get out". One has of course to make an allowance for Krishna Menon's pathological hatred against western powers to assess the proper orientation of India's foreign policy in its conservative phase. Menon had often been charged, both at home and abroad, of giving a distorted and over-exaggerated view of Indian radicalism. Perhaps one has to keep this in mind, specially when Nehru was

75 Ibid., 950th plenary meeting, pp. 1309-18.
taking an extremely cautious and non-committal position on Congo at home. But in December 1960, even Nehru was obliged to express his "deep anger at the things happening in the Congo". He recognized the intrigues of the Western Powers which was propping up the Mobutu regime and subverting the "objective report" of Rajeswar Dayal. "It is very extraordinary", he said, "that people will call themselves democrats and their countries democratic countries make excuses for parliament there not meeting and encouraging this kind of semi-military dictatorship". It is an equally "extraordinary situation" he said "that the General Assembly and the Security Council "do not even consider" the Dayal report, and "just put it by, because presumably, they did not like the conclusion that had been reached." In a subsequent address to the Rajya Sabha Nehru warned "if our people are not treated properly and given opportunities to do the work for which they were sent (I cannot) guarantee that the question will not arise whether it is worthwhile keeping them there or not". Krishna Menon also made a similar statement in the General Assembly, saying that India would be one of those countries which "would have to review their entire position" on the issue.

76 New Age (New Delhi), 18 December 1960, p. 4.
77 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 519.
It is evident therefore that despite contrary tendencies in general, India did oppose American and western intervention in Congo in late 1960. But it is interesting to note that this antagonism did not provoke any adverse reaction in the West where India's position on the issue was considered to be a moderate one. Of course Krishna Menon's diatribes in the General Assembly had often "left western listenders boiling mad". But they possibly could disregard that when Nehru was keen on soft pedalling India's anti-imperialism and present generally a moderate approach to the problem. The Americans and the West were convinced of this as, according to the Western commentators, India was taking a legal position while opposing Mobutu regime or supporting the Central Government of Congo. It was India's interest in the principle of legality and respect for law that encouraged them to support the legislature and the Central Government in Congo. This was a far better and reassuring approach for the West specially in contrast to the position of Guineans and some other radical African countries who were supporting Lumumba personally. This assessment about India's position was vindicated when India refused to join the Casablanca Conference called by the radical countries within the Afro-Asian group. These countries, led by Guinea, Mali and UAR decided to withdraw from the United

79 New Age (New Delhi), 25 December 1960.
80 Catherine Hoskyns, n. 61, p. 256.
Nations and take direct action in support of Gizenga, the successor of Patrice Lumumba, who was then trying to consolidate his position in Stanleyville. The Casablanca Conference met to determine a precise policy for this group. The invitation for the conference was sent to all the Afro-Asian states that had contributed to the UNLC operations in the Congo. The moderates, including India refused to join the Conference. On 21 December Nehru placed before Rajya Sabha the reasons for India's refusal. Firstly, he thought, unilateral action on behalf of a few African and Asian states outside the LN not a feasible idea, and secondly India preferred not to be a partisan in the dispute. "If such a force comes", he said, "it is inevitable that forces from other countries will come in to oppose it. We have, therefore, not viewed these proposals with favour."

It is well to remember that Nehru had also tried to dispel Western apprehension by disowning any official Indian inspiration behind Dayal's report. "I might mention", Nehru said, "that Mr Dayal was not sent there by us and was not even our choice ... during all this time he has been there, we have been practically out of touch with him. He does not report to us. We do not send him instructions. He is an international

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81 Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 519.
civil servant ... reporting to the UN". Of course apart from this the Americans were well aware of the general orientation of India's foreign policy outside the limited context of the Congo. Nehru did not support the Soviet proposal of Troika at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. India did not favour any abrupt structural change for the UN. "We wish to proceed slowly and with agreement and not to press for any change which would involve an immediate amendment of the charter, and the raising of heated controversies". Even more interesting was the statement of Krishna Menon at the fifteenth session, which in a nutshell presented the new orientation of India's foreign policy. "Non-alignment," he explained, "is not a counsel of anarchy, or a counsel against cooperation between peoples. We do not regard military alliances between Member States of the UN outside the charter, and as against another group of nations as sanctioned by Art. 51 of the Charter. But at the same time", he continued, "we have not carried on a campaign against it. As the world stands at present, these systems have come into existence and we hope that with the evolution of proposals for disarmament and collective security they will begin to disappear even though little by little."

82 Ibid., p. 513.
83 General Assembly Official Records, Fifteenth Session, 882nd plenary meeting, p. 325.
84 Ibid., 906th meeting, p. 752.
Advent of the Democrats in the USA

It is evident therefore that India's contradictions with the United States in late 1960 was marginal insofar as it had a limited context and India had been termed a moderate by the Western observers even in that context. The new African policy of the Kennedy Administration helped India to come out of the embarrassment of this contradiction too. The democrats decided to be on the side of the African nationalism so that the Soviet Union was not given a chance to exploit the latter and entrench its interests in Africa. "We have lost ground in Africa", said Kennedy in one of his 1960 campaign speeches, "because we have neglected the needs and aspirations of the African people". His main complaint against the Republicans was that they had wrongly considered all national uprisings in Africa as Soviet inspired agitations and had equally wrongly yielded to the pressures of the NATO allies on colonial issues which only helped the Soviet Union to come into the picture. The Democrats therefore decided to encourage the moderate nationalists to develop as counter forces to the pro-communists in such circumstances.

The murder of Lumumba in 1961 made the prospects for this policy brighter as the most formidable of the extreme

nationalists was removed. The Americans were now ready to support withdrawal of the Belgians and a return to parliamen
tarian politics in the Congo with the moderate nationalists in the saddle of power. This brought the United States on the side of the Afro-Asians in the United Nations where both the moderates and the radical groups were pressurising for a new mandate to fulfil these objectives. In late February 1961, therefore, the United States voted in favour of an Afro-Asian resolution which called for an immediate withdrawal of the Belgians in all capacities and the reconvening of the Congolese parliament and at last, sanctioned the "use of force" by the UN as a last resort to prevent civil war in the Congo.86

The Afro-Asians welcomed this new initiative by the UN and the American co-operation which produced this. Nehru, it seemed was greatly impressed by the general liberalism of the Kennedy Administration particularly by its third world policy. India's appreciation of the Democrats helped to heal up the wounds of previous year's contradiction and strengthen the existing relation of proximity between the two countries. In fact, India and the United States came closer and closer since 1961, which to a large extent was made possible by the mutual regard that Kennedy and Nehru had for each other. So far as the problem in Congo was concerned the change in American

policy helped the position of the moderates like India who
despite their criticism of the inactivity and passivity of the
UN, wanted the ONUC operation to continue in the Congo.

In February Nehru declared before Indian Rajya Sabha
that India was "happy to learn" that the new policy of the
Democrats "approach considerably" what India had been suggest-
ing for the Congo. In expectations, therefore, that the UN
might be able to pursue a better policy Nehru on the same
occasion expressed his willingness to consider India's contri-
buting combat troops for ONUC. India finally decided to send
such troops after the adoption of the Afro-Asian resolution in
the Security Council on February 21. Almost simultaneously
Krushchev wrote a letter to Nehru urging him to reconsider his
position. At the time Soviet Union was calling for the "termi-
nation of the operation in Congo and the withdrawal of all
foreign troops so that the Congolese people would be given the
possibility to handle their internal affairs themselves".
Khrushchev appealed Nehru to "unite the efforts" of their "two
countries in defence of the freedom and independence of the
Republic of Congo". Khrushchev's letter did not affect

87 Foreign Affairs Record, 1961, pp. 15 and 19, Ministry
of External Affairs, Government of India.
88 Ibid., pp. 16 and 19.
89 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 526.
90 New Age (New Delhi), 5 March 1961, p. 2.
India's decision. Nehru even avoided any reference to the question in his Rajya Sabha speech outlining the reply he gave to Khrushchev. Moreover in his parliamentary addresses, at the time, Nehru often referred to cold war, implying thereby Soviet contributions also, as the cause of trouble in the Congo. He of course, was not ready to accept the charge of any active Russian involvement, specially after Mobutu had seized power in the Congo. But he seemed to hold responsible for cold war the dubious Soviet "intention" which he suspected was there "previously".

One should note the implications of India's sending troops to the Congo. After all the changed circumstances of 1961 really meant that the United States was now pursuing her national objectives in a more rational way. Kennedy and the group of influential liberals surrounding him who together took the initiative in changing America's Africa policy, wanted to substitute the crude conservatism of the Eisenhower Administration by a more sophisticated anti-communism and entrench the interest of the United States in the region rather than show deference to the colonial sentiments of the NATO allies like Belgium, Britain and France. To pursue this policy the United States now built up the moderate nationalists like Cyrille Adoula, who was as much a protege of the new administration as Mobutu or Kasavubu was for the previous one. And

91 Foreign Affairs Record, 1961, p. 47.
92 Ibid., p. 54.
above all the United Nations was still regarded by Washington as the instrument of carrying out its foreign policy which in 1961 had undergone only a formal change. This was evident when Adlai Stevenson, before voting for the Afro-Asian draft in the Security Council in February 1961 expressed reservations about certain omissions in the draft. On this occasion the United States did not press for amendments as the Afro-Asians were already too incensed by the murder of Lumumba in Katanga and some of his followers in South Kasai. But in November 1961, when Afro-Asians moved a similar resolution to revitalize the mandate given by the February resolution, the United States appeared to be more assertive. Adlai Stevenson pressed for a series of amendments which aimed at extending the authorization to include actions against Orientale also. This time American feelings were accommodated, though not fully, and the final resolution carried an important paragraph which declared "that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi fundamentale and Security Council decisions...." What was more important was that the new Secretary-General, U Thant gave a formal recognition to American demands at this time. "Less legalistic than Hammarskjold, he

93 Stephen R. Weissman, n. 53, 7143.
94 Catherine Hoskyns, n. 61, pp. 443-4.
indicated that Stevenson's points were implicit in either present or past resolutions". There was therefore, no difference between the policy pursued by the US and that by the UN Secretariat in the Congo, in 1961.

Under the circumstances, it can be assumed that the Indian troops were helping both the US and the UN in implementing this policy. In fact it was reported that C.S. Jha, in the Security Council "called for the neutralisation of all the private armies in the Congo including those led by Lundula...." Nehru had, however, assured his parliament that the Indian combat forces "were not to be used against any popular movement in the Congo". But it was unlikely that this was observed as the Indian troops were the main support of the ONUC after the withdrawal of the Casablanca powers from the operation. India's credibility among the Afro-Asian nations suffered as a result of pursuing this policy. A Times of India UN correspondent reported - "As a result" of this policy "our stand has been paid the very dubious compliment of being called 'truly neutral' by UN circles, which are normally very critical of our position, that is those close to the US and UK delegation. And India has had the grave misfortune, consequently, of finding herself isolated not only from the Soviet Union, but also from

97 New Age (New Delhi), 12 February 1961, p. 15.
98 Foreign Affairs Record, 1961, p. 131.
the advanced militant nations of Asia and Africa. A similar report on the Afro-Asian reactions to Indian policy in Congo was published in Hindu of June 17. A Despatch covering the Cairo preparatory meeting before the Belgrade Conference read, "The African feelings in regard to the Congo were such that India's role was viewed with distrust. President Kennedy's statement that American view on the Congo were the same as India's has been seized as proof that India was in reality working for the Western solution of the Congo problem." Unfortunately, despite these criticisms from the Afro-Asian quarters and despite the humiliation that India suffered after the withdrawal of Rajeshwar Dayal, India continued to pursue this policy. This only helped the West and the United States in suppressing the Congolese nationalism entirely and place the country in the hands of a pro-Western reactionary clique. The attitude and the disposition in foreign affairs shown by modern Zaire, under the leadership of Mobutu would vindicate this point.

India ultimately played a more positive role in regard to Laos, though her initial reactions to the developing Laotian crisis was stereotype and less than what it ought to have been.

Trouble was simmering in Laos since the days of the Geneva Agreement, when the recognition extended to the local

99 New Age (New Delhi), 12 February 1961, p. 15.
100 Ibid., 25 June 1961, p. 15.
communists was considered by the United States as a blank cheque given to China to expand its influence in the region. America's main foreign policy objective for this region was thus to undo the achievements of the Geneva Agreement and create a power balance completely favourable to her. Americans adopted a self-defeating strategy to achieve their goal, by counting the neutralists as potential communists and therefore, placing their entire reliance on a small pro-western group sustained only by a steady flow of dollar into this small country. But despite all attempts by United States, Prince Souvanna Phouma worked continuously towards reintegration of the Pathet Lao in the national community. After prolonged negotiations, which the pro-western group often successfully disrupted, Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong finally negotiated the Vientiane Agreement in November 1957, providing for a neutral Laos, under a coalition government with the Neo Lao Haksat. Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader became the Minister of Economic Planning under the new government. After making abortive attempts to prevent such a coalition, the Eisenhower Administration, finally decided in 1958 "to install a reliably pro-western regime". The CIA quickly formed a Committee for the Defence of the National Interests (CDIN) and brought back from France Phoumi Nosavan as its chief. Souvanna

Phouma was thrown out of office and was replaced by Phoumi Sananikone. In 1959, CIA replaced Sananikone by Nosavan who was possibly considered to be a more dependable ally. Souphounavong was pushed behind the bars and the Pathet Lao took to the hills and resumed the civil war.

In 1960 a young paratroop captain called Kong Le, came forward to redeem Laos' national politics from outside intrigues. In August he seized power and brought back Prince Souvanna Phouma as the head of the government. Phoumi moved the Royal Laotian army to Svannakhet in September and proclaimed a new government. At this point, the United States, it seemed was a little undecided about sending its patronage to Phouma or Phoumi, as there was a growing feeling among some sections in America that Souvanna Phouma was a more accepted leader and therefore should be helped to build the bastion of freedom in Laos against the communists. During this time Vientiane Government received the economic aid and the Svannakhet Government received the military aid from United States. However, in October Eisenhower sent J. Graham Parsons, to pressurize Phouma, "to forsake neutralism, accept Phoumi and make Laos a bastion of freedom again". Souvanna Phouma refused to abide by the instructions of Parsons and Washington decided for a second time that the pro-communist neutralists should go. "In December, ... Phoumi marched into Vientiane and with plans drawn

102 Ibid., p. 298.
up by his American advisers won the only military victory of his life". Souvanna fled to Cambodia and soon came to terms with Souphanouvong who had incidentally escaped from Phoumi's jail. Kong Le and his troops joined the Pathet Lao in the jungles and the whole communist world rallied their support behind Phouma's exile government in Pnom Penh. By rejecting a neutralist solution, the Republicans in Washington, not only threw the neutralists into an alliance with the communists but also crystallized cold war tensions in the region. This alarmed even United States' NATO allies like Britain and France who were totally opposed to involving SEATO in bolstering the position of a bankrupt leader like Phoumi Nosavan.

India obviously could not be happy about these developments in Laos. But since she was constrained to soft-pedal her anti-imperialism, she could not, as in other cases, play any effective role in this situation. Thus when in the summer of 1958, United States pressurized Souvanna Phouma to seek the withdrawal of the International Control Commission from Laos, India was a passive onlooker of the arm-twisting. On 19 July 1958 India voted with Canada, with the Polish delegate opposing,

103 Ibid.

104 Krishna Menon referred to this fact of Royal Laotian Government of Souvanna Phouma being forced to wind up the International Control Commission in Laos in his speech delivered at the general debate of the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly, General Assembly Official Records, Fifteenth Session, 906th plenary meeting, p. 747.
in favour of the decision to adjourn the Commission sine die. It remains to be disclosed how much arm-twisting worked behind India's supporting Canada against Poland as there were evidences showing India's concern at the withdrawal of the ICC.

To retrieve the situation as far as possible India claimed that the resolution adopted on 19 July 1958 was after all a procedural decision taken to adjourn the Commission sine die and did not amount to the dissolution of the Commission. It did not affect the legal status of the Commission, in implementing the tasks and functions assigned to it by the Geneva Agreements. Nehru later claimed that India had "strongly resisted the suspension of this Commission even in 1958".

But significantly the statement was made in late 1960 when the US involvement in Laos had become so obvious and so overwhelming that even United Kingdom was seeking the return of the I.C.C. and secondly, when a change in American administration was just round the corner. India had, no doubt, called for the reconvening of the ICC as early as April 1959. But since her proximity with the West had totally marginalized her

105 The Hindu (Madras), 4 February 1959.


107 The British Foreign Secretary Lord Home made a statement to this effect in British House of Lords on 19 December 1960, Documents on International Affairs, 1960 (London), p. 524.

108 The Hindu (Madras), 21 April 1959, p. 5.
role as the leader of the anti-imperialist camp India's request could be ignored and rejected by United Kingdom then, as one of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The ICC was recalled and a new Conference was convened only when the decision to do was taken by the West. There was nothing unusual, therefore, that, in analyzing the happenings in Laos, Nehru betrayed a cautious non-committance. He highlighted the present complexities rather than discuss original cause of the trouble in Laos which India had been opposing since the conclusion of the Geneva Agreements. Nehru blamed both the parties of the cold war for infringing on Laotian neutrality, without going into the question how American policy in South East Asia and their intervention against the neutralists had "provoked open Soviet aid to the Pathet Lao". Even more interesting appeared the way he tried to balance his support for Souvanna Phouma, who, he thought, represented "an attempt to keep Laos out of the cold war", by a simultaneous observation that in Laos after all it was "difficult to know who is the government and who is a rebel" and "It is a choice of any country, we or the UK or the Soviet Union or the USA calling one set of people the government and the others the rebels".

In 1961, the situation changed appreciably with all

110 Arthur Schlesinger, n. 101, p. 298.
the dramatis persona favoring a political solution in Laos. The United Kingdom had already accepted the reconvening of the I.C.C. In early 1961 Britain even accepted the Soviet proposal of an international conference to consider the Laotian problem. In Washington, the new President taking a pragmatic view of the problem ultimately decided for a reactivated ICC guarding a neutral Laos. And of course the Russian eagerness to have a political rather than a military solution was there as usual which was caused both by the presence of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in South East Asia and the increasing Chinese influence in the region. This changed scenario no doubt was most conducive for Indian diplomacy, which was utilized by Kennedy in 1961 to facilitate the process of normalization before political negotiations took place. In March/April 1961, Nehru was asked by Kennedy to support a ceasefire in Laos which the Indian Prime Minister was reported to have done "promptly". According to Arthur Schlesinger Nehru then intervened with the Russians to extract a Soviet agreement on ceasefire appeal. The Indian good offices ultimately produced the joint statement of 24 April 1961 made by the Co-chairmen, UK and the Soviet Union, asking the parties engaged in civil war in Laos to ceasefire and also asking the government of India to reconvene the ICC on Laos. On 1 May the warring

113 Documents on International Affairs, 1961, p. 573.
parties negotiated a ceasefire. On 11 May the Control Commission appeared on the scene and reported a general discontinuance of hostilities. The next day the International Conference opened at Geneva to lay down the conditions for a neutralized Laos.

In the Geneva Conference India played an effective mediatory role. Indian diplomacy not only provided a mean between the polarized positions of the two super powers, it secured in the final protocol provisions guaranteeing a genuine independence for Laos. The United States wanted the Laotian neutrality to go beyond the post-war model of non-alignment, which the Americans had always suspected as a cover for pro-communism. Dean Rusk frequently referred to the example of Austrian neutrality which he thought would give "positive assurances of the integrity of the elements of national life" in Laos. Secondly, the Americans demanded an "effective international machinery for maintaining and safeguarding that neutrality". Their concern about Laotian neutrality and the peace in the region also made them demand a wider terms of reference for the ICC, placing it at a position higher than the Laotian Government, so that it can carry on its functions unhindered. The Americans complained that the scope of activity provided for in the Geneva Agreement was insufficient to

114 Foreign Affairs Record, 1961, pp. 142-9 and 163-72.
make the Commission an effective machinery of control. Thirdly Dean Rusk claimed that the "control body should act by majority rule with the right to file majority and minority reports. It should not be paralyzed by a veto".

The same day Gromyko submitted a separate set of proposals seeking to protect the interests of the other side. The communists were satisfied with the model of non-alignment. Hence they expected Laos to follow a policy of non-participation in military alliances. But Soviet Union demanded a categoric declaration of provisions which would be able to counter SEATO interference in Laos. Secondly, Soviet Union did not agree to a wider scope of activity for the I.C.C. giving it a status of a super state. As Gromyko said: "Laos is a sovereign country and that international controls should not be made an instrument of foreign interference in that country". Finally the communists wanted the principle of unanimity to govern the order of the work of the Commission. Their experience of 1958 when the majority decision threw the commission out of Laos, demanded the acceptance of this principle by the Conference.

India tried to rescue Laotian independence from this cross-fire of super power vested interests. Indian position revealed the absurdity of any international guarantee for Laotian neutrality, whether it be of the variety favoured by

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116 Ibid., pp. 587-8.
U.S.A. or of the variety favoured by the Soviet Union - as this would only invite the same outside interference which the Conference was trying to eliminate from Laotian politics. On 14 July 1961, a fifteen point proposal was submitted to the Conference on behalf of the Government of India. The principal suggestions were based on the assumption that Laos would have a stable national government, which already, the three Laotian princes, through their negotiations were in the process of achieving. Therefore the responsibility for the "preservation" of neutrality and the "consequent exclusion of outside interference" was put squarely on the Government of Laos. The latter was similarly entrusted with the task of proper execution of the ceasefire agreements. The International Commission was assigned only a supervisory role, which would aim at helping the national government of Laos in preserving the neutrality and keeping peace through observance of ceasefire agreements. The Commission was asked to function in "close cooperation with the Government of Laos" which in turn was expected to extend to the Commission "necessary facilities and assistance for the implementation of this Agreement". Finally, the Indian proposals tried to resolve the dichotomy between the majority principle and the unanimity principle by suggesting that "the ICSC shall decide the major questions by agreement among its members", implying thereby that the minor question could be dealt with by the majority principle.

The Final Protocol incorporated all the principal suggestions of the Indian proposal. In fact it had very little else that could give it a separate identity, and it appeared as an improved version of the Indian proposal only. The secret of India's success is not yet known. But this was the last instance of successful non-aligned diplomacy when America's imperial interests were ably prevented from getting a new entrenched position in Laos. It might be too simplistic to suggest, as it had been claimed by the communists at the time, that it was the presence of Krishna Menon and his steering of the negotiation in the conference that was responsible for India taking a consistent anti-American position and a final acceptance of India's stand by the conference. Perhaps the real reason was that the Americans had a "depressingly weak hand to play" which enabled India to stick to a radical position at the Geneva Conference, though succumbing to various degrees of pressures at other places. Galbraith would have liked to hold Krishna Menon's obstinacy in not coming to terms with the Americans as at least partly responsible for India's position on Laos. He regarded Krishna Menon as "a major stumbling bloc" to negotiations as he was a


person not "open to persuasion". But he also blamed Indians generally for being "less concerned" about the protection of neutrality in Laos and not accepting an effective control commission for the purpose. It was therefore, not Krishna Menon but the Government of India that was responsible for the policy regarding Laos. This position could only be explained by the fact that the United States was on the losing side which ultimately compelled her to accept Souvanna Phouma as the leader of the country and an "unsatisfactory compromise on the functions of the Control Commission".

By this same logic India succumbed to pressures where United States was in a position to exert pressure on this country. In late April 1961, as United States launched its invasion on Cuba. Nehru's statement in the Rajya Sabha expressed usual reactions of a non-aligned country. The landing at the Bay of Pigs was characterized by Nehru as an intervention by the United States, notwithstanding the fact of America's vicarious responsibility in the matter. "In the recent statement issued by President Kennedy", Nehru said, "he has stated very clearly that he would not permit an American armed intervention in Cuba on any account. That statement has to be welcomed but I find it a little difficult to understand the

120 Ibid., pp. 139 and 178.
121 Ibid., pp. 173 and 178.
122 Ibid., p. 223.
major difference between that type of intervention and an intervention of encouraging and supplying arms, may be training Cuban exiles to go over and invade the Island". Washington was reported to be "annoyed with New Delhi" for not "sufficiently" appreciating "the American concept of hemispheric security". And this "rather unhappy statement "by Nehru was followed, according to the accounts of Galbraith, by daily visits by the American ambassador to Nehru's residence, which he claimed, "helped take a great deal of the sting out of the situation". The results of such frequent meetings were noticed in Nehru's subsequent speeches in the Lok Sabha, which by some indirect suggestions minimized the role of the United States in the issue. Nehru took note of the existence of 100,000 Cuban exiles whose sympathies were expected to be against the Castro regime. He also observed that "President Kennedy has stated very firmly that he does not wish to intervene and that no Americans are taking part in this. We must accept that", he said. The next day Nehru seemed to retreat even more. "Addressing the All India Manufacturers Association, he said it was not for him to comment on the

125 J.K. Galbraith, n. 119, p. 96.
internal affairs of another country. It is difficult to say, he added, who was right and who was wrong. We have no knowledge of the conditions there... nor are we competent to pass a judgement...." After this Nehru assured a parliamentary committee saying that "United States Navy exercises in the Caribbean constituted, no cause for worry". He appealed for "faith in President Kennedy's assurance that the US had no intention of intervening directly in Cuba". He further stated that "India now had facts to show that no US citizen had participated in the landings...." The chapter on Indian reactions to the Cuban crisis was thus brought to an end, which Galbraith claimed was due to his "good management" of the affair.

A similar episode was repeated a few months later when the third Berlin blockade caused hot winds to blow once again between East and West. On 22 August Nehru made a statement on the problem of Germany. He first of all suggested the acceptance of West Germany's Oder Neisse frontier with Poland. Even more annoying for the West was his next statement that the occupation of West Berlin did not give the Western Powers automatic right of access to West Berlin. He cited the communique of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was issued on 20 June 1949, after the lifting of the second Berlin blockade. It

stated that "'the occupation authorities each in its own zone will have an obligation to take the measures necessary to ensure'" the continuance of the freedom of movement. "The Council of Ministers", therefore, Nehru said, "did not invoke any right of access but merely mentioned 'obligation', on the part of the occupation authorities to take the necessary measures 'each in its own'. "This right", he continued, "was secured by the Western Powers by a verbal agreement in June 1945, not as a right but as a concession from the Soviet authorities". As recorded by Galbraith, "Nehru's comments... stirred up a hornet's nest" in Washington.

The American ambassador hurried round to see Nehru. "I had brought along" recalled Galbraith in his diary, "a corrective statement with me that I had hoped he would release and which my staff was amply assured he would not.... Then to my great delight he approved my statement". All this happened during the long interview that Galbraith had with Nehru after which the American ambassador announced before a "well-addressed press conference", that Nehru had authorized him to say that his remarks "should not be taken to mean that access to Berlin may be denied or impaired, and to affirm his belief

129 Ibid., pp. 355 and 357.

that it should not be changed". On August 28, in Rajya Sabha Nehru offered a clarification of his position on Berlin which he said had led to "some misunderstanding, chiefly abroad". In this statement Nehru only emphasized the necessity of free and continued access to West Berlin from West Germany which he maintained "should be agreed and guaranteed". He did not mention any more that till then access was enjoyed by the West as a concession granted by the Soviet Union. In effect this did not alter India's basic stand on Berlin, but the Americans were happy that at least in this case they had been able to curb Nehru's penchant for finding two sides of any issue, and have made him to concentrate on their side of the story only. This was taken note of by the left opposition at home, specially the fact that the intervention of the American ambassador was the provocation behind Nehru's stated clarification in the Parliament.

India had more concessions to offer. It was widely reported in 1961 in the press of home and abroad that India had considered the proposals of a non-aligned summit with marked apathy and had ultimately agreed to join the


133 New Age (New Delhi), 3 September 1961, p. 1.

preparatory conference at Cairo with extreme reluctance. It was reported that Nehru was having lesser illusions about the effectiveness or utility of such a conference "considering the diverse attitude of various neutral countries on controversial international problems". At Cairo, it was alleged, Indian position worked towards the dilution of the non-aligned solidarity, first, by asking for representation wider than that present at the Bandung, and second, by keeping the agenda confined to broad generalities like disarmament and world peace. Twenty-three countries, including the three sponsors, Yugoslavia, Egypt and Indonesia were invited at Cairo. This group contained mostly Afro-Asians, except for Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela who represented Latin America. At Cairo, "it was generally believed that Nehru would have liked the addition of" a group of white countries like, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Cyprus, Ireland, Argentina and Chile, as also the inclusion of Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria and Tunisia. It was difficult to ascertain by what standards, India of all countries, considered the above group as non-aligned. But in consistence with this position India entered into arguments with other Afro-Asians on the question of the definition of

136 New Age (New Delhi), 14 May 1961, p. 15.
non-alignment. India strongly suggested that "nations which involuntarily have foreign bases on their soil should not be deprived of attending". In further consistency with her general bias in foreign policy at the time, India opposed the presence of the Algerian nationalists and the Gizengists at Cairo. India made it clear that her plea of extended participation would not encourage increase in world tensions which precisely would be done by the presence of such controversial regimes. India encountered critical opposition on this issue from radical Afro-Asian like Ghana, Indonesia. A despatch from Cairo, published in Hindu said:

Curious enough, India seems to have been found herself at one extreme on many issues and many African countries were inclined to regard India's position as of the extreme right.... India's appreciation of the African situation and African urges has not kept pace with current developments. Many African countries felt that India was being too legalistic and some did not disguise their feelings that the Indian approach was akin to that of the West.

The Afro-Asian opinion about India, according to this report, was specially estranged by India's attitude towards the Algerian nationalists. "To them empty statements at periodical intervals proclaiming sympathy to the Algerian independence were meaningless and would in reality be helpful to France".

138 Richard Gott, n. 134, p. 373; New Age, ibid.
139 Ibid., p. 373; New Age, ibid.
140 New Age (New Delhi), 25 June 1961, p. 15.
As mentioned above, India's second tactic in underplaying non-alignment was to seek the broadest possible agenda which would not focus specific international issues and invite controversies. India was reported to have taken the stand that "world conditions can only be discussed within the framework of such agreements as the two major powers are willing to make". And "there should not be violent condemnation of one side or the other and no attempt to pass judgement on recent happenings" which could provoke embarrassing controversies between India and the other Afro-Asian countries.

Three months later, at Belgrade, Nehru reiterated this position when he asked his audience to focus their attention on the sole problem of disarmament and world peace. "The most important thing for the world today" he said, "is for the great powers directly concerned to meet together and negotiate with a will to peace". He conceded the problem of lingering colonialism in Algeria, Tunisia, Congo, Angola and various other parts of Africa. But he said, "there is no doubt that imperialism and old style colonialism will vanish". This position was interestingly similar to the one that the Americans had been wanting the sponsors of the summit to adopt at Belgrade. Galbraith had advised his counterparts from Yugoslavia and UAR in


Delhi that non-aligned countries should not waste time on ruminating over the problems of colonialism. It was wholly unnecessary, he said, "in a day when the British, French, Dutch and Belgian had all but given up, and in the decade which would always be celebrated for this fact". One could not "keep on playing a football game after the whistle even though the game had been won by a considerable score". This is not to suggest that the Indian delegation at Cairo and Belgrade or Nehru had been briefed by the Americans. They were no doubt happy to find Nehru countering the radical Afro-Asian from a moderate position. But the Indian position at Belgrade was more a result of Nehru's own realization that for survival India had to come out of the rigidity of his non-alignment model. It was a sad realization for him as Galbraith had observed in numerous meetings with him, which had kept him silent on most of the occasions when he was expected to acknowledge that his country was the beneficiary of US charity. Often the defeated leader had tried to stand up to the challenge. But he was possibly destined to surrender and be a witness to the destruction of his own dreams.

The Sino-Indian border war broke out in the later half of October 1962. The Indians were taken by a total surprise by the Chinese preparedness and the absence of it on their side.

143 J.K. Galbraith, n. 119, p. 115.
144 Ibid., pp. 95 and 413, f.n. 27.
Collapse was therefore quick, both militarily and politically. India immediately turned towards United States for military assistance. The Prime Minister told the American ambassador that India "did indeed to have aid and it would have to come from the United States". $120 million dollar of British and American military assistance flowed into India immediately. President Kennedy wrote a letter to Nehru "giving comfort and offering help".

The Americans not only sent arms and transport aircrafts but also numerous military teams to help Indians run the war. These included experts on guerrilla warfare, military communications and those who helped the Indians in tackling the problem of cold weather survival in Ladakh. Galbraith recorded in his diary

our military relations with the Indians, always distant, have become extremely intimate these last few days. Orders of the battle and other military information are being provided.... A week ago, of course, all this would have been unthinkable. (147)

The climax of the development came in November when the Chinese occupied most of the territory they had demanded in Ladakh and NEFA. Nehru requested defensive intervention by American air force. Fortunately, the Chinese at this point came to the rescue of India's non-alignment. On 21 November

145 Ibid., p. 390.
146 Ibid., p. 389.
147 Ibid., pp. 388-9 and 432.
they declared unilateral ceasefire after occupying the territory they demanded. The panic died down a little but India decided to keep up her military preparations in the apprehension of a long-term struggle with the Chinese ultimately. India, according to Galbraith asked for "a tacit air defence pact" with the United States in late November. According to this plan, India agreed to prepare airstrips and radar installations. If the Chinese came back India would commit her tactical aircraft and the American airforce would undertake the defence of Indian cities. Americans and her western allies welcomed this offer. They rightly expected this to provide a new basis for developing a closer political association with India. A joint American and Commonwealth air defence team arrived in India in early 1963 and proposed joint practice with the Indian Air Force. The joint exercise took place in November 1963. According to a Government of India press release a squadron of Royal Air Force Javeline, a squadron of U.S. Air Force F-100 supersabre, and two Australian Canberra bombers took part in the joint practice along with the Indian Air Force. About seven hundred and fifty foreign personnel from RAF, USA and RAAF participated in this.

Whither non-alignment was now the basic question debated in India and abroad. Nehru tried every means to maintain the

148 Ibid., p. 438.
149 Ibid., p. 476.
150 Foreign Affairs Record, 1963, p. 265.
The facade of independence. The primacy of US military aid was consciously played down. The request for air cover was never disclosed to the nation. Yet whatever was leaked out in the press caused a furore in Parliament. The left opposition specially, apprehended establishment of foreign military bases in India. Nehru allayed their fear by stating that the presence of the Air Defence Team and the participation of foreign personnel in the joint exercise had the sole objective of helping India in improving her defence preparations. It would by no means interfere with the independence of India. It was not disclosed that the joint exercise was to be the practice of future operations and that the American air force would undertake to defend the Indian cities against Chinese attack. Government of India's second tactic in defence of non-alignment was to publicise India's request for military aid even to communist countries. In the press note that announced the joint exercise, the last paragraph was devoted to the statement that "discussion with the USSR regarding the assistance for strengthening our air defence that can be provided by that country are going on". Nehru took care to remind the world in many of his speeches, that Indo-Soviet friendship

151 J.K. Galbraith, n. 119, pp. 403, 405 and 413.
152 Foreign Affairs Record, 1963, pp. 64, 70-71, 157-8, 180 and 200.
had survived the strains of Sino-Indian war and that the Soviet Union would neither go back on its previous economic commitments nor refuse to enter into new commitments towards India.

Yet all this could not restore India's credibility as the leader of the non-aligned world, which was now badly shaken by India's proximity with the United States. West was amazed to see the rapidity with which non-alignment crumbled down. The non-aligned world was shocked to find Nehru the fallen God of the movement. The Colombo Summit of early 1963 was organized primarily to register this defeat of non-alignment and to deliberate upon the means to restore it. As Mrs Bandaranaike said in the conference: "we are faced today with...a threat to our very existence and to nonalignment itself.... The threat is not merely confined to the fact that there has been a negation of the agreed principles of Panchsheel but that the "conflict has also afforded an opportunity for the power politics of the cold war to penetrate as it were into the affairs of the Afro-Asian world". "We should, therefore, make it our joint responsibility", she concluded "and a moral obligation which we owe to the cause of non-alignment to see that non-alignment is preserved". Sino-Indian amity was recognized as the first requirement for the restoration of non-alignment. Even Soviet Union, which by its later policies,
appeared to have chosen India as a better ally than China was alarmed by the role the United States was asked to play in India's defence preparations. This is not to suggest that Nehru did not recognize the defeat. Whatever his pronouncements on non-alignment might be, he was the first one to recognize the defeat of his non-alignment. As Galbraith recalled, it was the embarrassment of a defeated leader which was behind "his personal reluctance to ask or thank for aid". Nehru died a sad man ruminating over the end of his dreams.

156 The Soviet attitude was expressed in two Pravda editorials published on October 25 and November 5, 1962; New Age, 4 November 1962, p. 11; 11 November 1962, p. 11.

157 J.K. Galbraith, n. 119, p. 413.