CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL LEGACY

Prior to the Russian conquest Central Asia was divided into three native Khanates of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva. The Khanates were backward feudatories ruled by the Khans and Emirs and Islam was the main source of political legitimisation. While the systems of administration, land-tenure and taxation had their roots in the Perso-Arab administration of Transoxania under the Abbasid caliphate and of the Timurids, the system of justice was based on the Islamic laws (Shariah) and the customary laws (adat). In practice, however, the dynastic rulers of the Khanates and their subordinate officials did not generally follow the accepted principles and the legal norms. The rule of the native Khans and Emirs was cruel and exploitative. A large majority of the Central Asian peoples lived in villages where they were exploited by the bais - the wealthy landlords and subordinate feudal officials. Poverty was rampant, disease and illiteracy widely prevailed. The rate of literacy was extremely low - approximately between 2-4 per cent.

1. The term Central Asia is a geographical expression which refers to vast areas lying in China, Mongolia, Iran, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Here we have used the term Central Asia interchangeably with Turkestan, Russian Central Asia and Soviet Central Asia, consisting of the contemporary four Central Asian Republics: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizia.


3. See V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogoslovsky, Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline (Moscow, 1975), pp.40-1; A Leap through the Centuries (Moscow, 1968), p.28.
the Muslim religious elite the system of education was scholastic in nature. Muslim clerics had a long history of putting up a strong resistance against any change in the system of education. The feudal elite gave full support to them in their efforts to maintain the status quo in the pattern of education.

The teachings of Islam, however, are not against acquiring secular knowledge which is the most important ingredient of the process of secularisation. In fact, the Koran and the Hadith command the Muslims to seek knowledge which speaks of its significance in Islam. For instance, one of the traditions of the Prophet runs as follows: "Seek knowledge even though be it in China." During the early centuries of Islam, Muslim scholars made significant contribution to the development of education and science. In the medieval period Islamic philosophical and medical works left a deep and enduring influence on the European traditions. It was during the twelfth century that interest in secular education in the Muslim world showed a declining trend which is attributed to al-Ghazali's work, The Revival of Religious Sciences. Since then, the concept of knowledge came to be

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interpreted in a narrow sense. This naturally had a paralyzing effect on social progress and cultural and educational development in the Muslim world. The Central Asian society could not escape from this trend which, in fact, coincided with the emergence of feudal social relations. The fifteenth century, a glorious period of Central Asian history so far as the development of sciences and secular education was concerned, also saw the development of Islamic orthodoxy. Ulug Beg, the grandson of Tamerlane and a great lover of arts and sciences, was himself an astronomer. Ulug Beg who has been described as "the greatest observer" the world ever produced, was murdered by a conservative Mullah. By the turn of the nineteenth century secular education had virtually been banished from Central Asia and Islam was used as an ideological tool for the exploitation of working masses by the exploiting feudal cliques. Barthold, an eminent Russian scholar rightly observed that "in the nineteenth century when Europe had definitely assumed cultural leadership Turkestan stood lowest of all Muslim lands on the cultural scale."


functionally sterile system of education provided the socio-cultural backdrop to the Russian conquest of Central Asia.

The Russian conquest led to the large scale colonisation by the Russians.7 Besides the colonial administration and a strong contingent of the Russian Army thousands of Russian workers and peasants and a large number of social workers, educationalists and Christian missionaries came and settled in Central Asia.8 In the following pages an attempt has been made to examine the impact of Russian colonialism on the native economy, social structure, culture and the political processes. It will be our endeavour to examine how far the native society was responsive to the western cultural current and what were the main hurdles in the way of secularisation of politics in Central Asia.

ECONOMY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Even before the Tsarist conquest of Central Asia, the process of degeneration of Central Asian society had


The agrarian economy of the region based on feudal social relations was in a state of stagnation. There were no modern industries. The use of inanimate sources of power in production activities was non-existent. The techniques of agricultural production were primitive and no significant changes had taken place for centuries. In fact, well up to the turn of the twentieth century the age-old institution of nomadic tribalism had survived.

9. On the motivation of Russian thrust towards Central Asia during the latter half of the nineteenth century various views have been expressed. Most of the Soviet authors suggest that Russian advance was determined by economic considerations. There are, however, a few Soviet authors like M.K. Rozhkova, who hold that economic motives played a secondary role in the policy of Tsarist expansion towards Central Asia. Primarily, Tsarist policy was, according to Rozhkova determined by political considerations. See M.K. Rozhkova, Economiceskie Sviazi Rossi So Srednei Aziei, 40-60e gody XIX Veka (Moscow, 1965), Chapter 7. For an opposite view see N. Khalfin (Prispedi-nenie Srednee Azii K Rossi. 60-90e gody XIX v // Moscow, 1965), p.39; See also V.V. Bartold, Istorzia, Zuchenia Vostoka V Europe i v Rossi 2nded. (Leningrad, 1925); An invaluable source of information is Notes on the Central Asiatic Question (Calcutta, 1870).

10. Much valuable information about economic conditions in Central Asia and the trade relations between the Tsarist Russia and Central Asian Khanates and the Provinces of Russian Turkestan is found in P.G. Galuzo, Turkestan - Koloniva (Ocherki istorii do revoliutsii 1917 goda) (Moscow, 1929), pp. 8-9; P.I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 revolution, (New York, 1949), p. 354, 606-611.

a) Native Khanates

During the colonial period the exigencies of colonial economy as well as gradual penetration of Russian capitalism introduced a novel catalytic element in the native economic structure. The impact of Russian colonialism and capitalism was, however, not uniform and wide ranging. The reason for this lay in the political set up which Tsardom had introduced after subjugating Russian Turkestan, as the present Central Asia was then known. Of the three native Khanates, Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva, the Tsarist Administration had completely incorporated the Khanate of Kokand in the Russian Empire, while the remaining two Khanates managed to survive outwardly after their acceptance of vassal status. Thus the survival of these internally autonomous feudatories during the colonial period led to an uneven socio-political development in Central Asia. In the semi-independent Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva the process of socio-economic development remained virtually static. Except for the extension of railways and telegraph

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12. While the Khan of Khiva had formally accepted the vassal status vide Russo-Khivan Peace Treaty of 1873. The Emir of Bukhara continued to be the de jure ruler of the Emirate of Bukhara. Formally, the Russian Government recognised the independent status of the Emirate of Bukhara. But after the extension of railways, gradually the Tsarist Administration had virtually reduced the Emirate of Bukhara to a colonial status. See Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva 1865-1924 (Mass., 1968), pp. 124-167.
which were forced on the unwilling native ruling class for the strategic and military reasons so as to control the rebellious tribes, there had been very little economic development so far as the paraphernalia of industrial economy was concerned. However, the linkage of the Khanates with the metropolis led to the development of commercial relations between Russia and the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva. Cultivation of cotton and its export to the metropolis rapidly increased, opening up avenues for growth of the native mercantile bourgeoisie.

But the growth of native mercantile bourgeoisie was tardy and the traditional social structure remained more or less undisturbed, with the difference that small groups of native traders had become politicised. There were a number of reasons for the lack of growth of the native mercantile bourgeoisie in the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva. Firstly there had been no change in the traditional practice of paying large tributes to the feudal lords by the native traders on account of the continuance of feudal political structures under which the rulers of the Khanates continued to wield arbitrary power. Secondly, the native traders who mostly


14. Ibid.
belonged to the groups of the Sarts and the Central Asian Jews did not have modern education and entrepreneurial qualities. Lastly, the growing export trade of cotton was largely controlled by the Russian traders who under treaty obligation enjoyed security and commercial advantages in the Khanates.

In the agricultural sector too there had been no significant changes in the cultivated area of the Khanates. On the contrary, some of the fertile regions of the Khanates had been taken away from them and incorporated into the Russian Empire. There had been no change in the mode of agricultural production. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Russians introduced the American variety of cotton seeds to procure better quality of cotton and high yield in the provinces.

15. The majority of the native traders came from the communities of the Sarts and the Jews. There is a controversy whether or not the Sarts were a distinct ethnic group. It seems they were not a distinct ethnic group; but they were treated contemptuously by the ruling elite because of their occupation. The coming of Russians created favourable economic, political and social conditions for the development of a native class of entrepreneurs. Except for a brief period Bukhara's Jews cooperated with the new rulers (i.e. Russians). On the Russian Conquest, they cooperated with the Russians against the natives. As a reward the Tsarist regime enacted legislation to confer the right of equality on the Central Asian Jews. A large number of them were even permitted to settle in Russian Turkestan and Moscow. But soon this policy was changed and many of the Jews were forced to return to the Khanates. See Encyclopaedia Judaica (Berlin, 1928-1954), IV, Col. 1127; Syod Zakonov o Sostolaniakh", 1899 edition, 1912, supplement article 828, note 2, Syod Zakonov Rossiskoi Imperii / St. Petersburg, 1914-1916 IX), See also Seymour Becker, no.12, pp.164-67.

16. See Appendices I, II and III in Seymour Becker, no.12.
of Russian Turkestan. It became very popular and replaced the old indigenous variety in other regions. However, land distribution and the land-tenure systems remained untouched. All available land was traditionally divided into three categories:

1. Land belonging to the State (The Khans and Emirs)
2. Land belonging to the beks (Landlords)
3. Land of the religious organisations (Waqfs)

The first category of land largely consisted of uncultivated land, land used by the nomadic tribes and cultivable land in possession of beks granted to them in return of certain obligations. The second category of land belonged to the civil-military nobility given to them as grant by the rulers. The nobility leased these lands to the peasants which gave birth to a native variety of dependency approximating the feudal systems of obligations. In the third category fell large tracts of land belonging to the religious institutions and organisations (Waqfs). They were managed by the members of religious elite, thereby safeguarding and consolidating the economic power of Muslim clergy.

On account of arid climatic conditions the productivity of the land largely depended upon irrigation facilities which were not only meagre but also in a state of neglect.

because of constant internecine warfare and Russian colonial exploitation. In accordance with the Islamic Canon Law (Shariah) and the Customary Law (adat) water was not a saleable commodity but had to be distributed equitably. Notwithstanding this provision, water was in actual practice often sold and unequally distributed to the wealthy and resourceful. Indeed, the condition of the peasantry which constituted the majority of the population had become worse off subsequent to the Russian subjugation of the Khanates. The rulers of the Khanates, to fulfil their various obligations emanating from their vassal status, imposed unbearable taxes on the peasantry. This resulted in frequent revolts, sometimes against the native rulers and at others against the Tsars.

b) Russian Turkestan

As against this moribund state of economic life in the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, there had been some improvements in the economy of the province of Governor-General of Turkestan consisting of Tashkent oblast, Ferghana valley, Syr-i Darya region and the Samarkand oblast. Initially, there too, the immediate impact of the annexation of the Khanate of


Kokand and Tashkent region into the Tsarist Empire and the policy of large scale colonisation of the fertile lands was negative. It resulted in total disruption of socio-economic life of the natives. As a result, there was extreme hostility between the natives and the Russians, particularly, the officials of the imperialist regime and the Russian peasants who had snatched the lands of the natives. The natives staged numerous revolts against the Tsarist colonial administration, the reasons for which are not far to seek. The indigenous ruling dynasty had lost its political power, while the position of the landed aristocracy and the native civil-military nobility had been undermined. The landed aristocracy was grumbling on account of confiscation of their lands which were given to the newly settled Russians, while the native peasantry became more destitute. Even the native traders who were later to derive the maximum advantage from the developing trade-links and the creation of processing and manufacturing industries, looked towards the colonial regime with suspicion and distrust.

However, penetration of Russian capitalism and the Tsarist policy of development of cotton cultivation to feed the growing textile industry of Russia ushered in an era of boom for the native traders. Construction of the Transcaspian railway connected all the important cities of Central Asia with

the metropolis. It considerably reduced the transportation charges of cotton and thus gave an impetus to the cotton exports to Russia. The following figures vividly illustrate the phenomenal growth of cotton exports to Russia from 1888 to 1907.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Turkestan Cotton Exports to Russia</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>873,000 puds23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>1,470,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2,673,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-96</td>
<td>4,300,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-96</td>
<td>4,900,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>10,700,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To give further boost to the cultivation of cotton in Turkestan, Tsarist Russia planned to construct Turkestan-Siberian railway so that which could bring Siberian wheat to Turkestan and the area under cultivation of cereal crops could be diverted to the cultivation of cotton. However, the project could not be completed before the October revolution, though a beginning had been made for the construction of Turkestan-Siberian railway.24

The growing cotton cultivation and its export to Russia however did not improve the lot of the native peasant. In many cases, in fact, it had the adverse effect on the small cotton grower as he was placed in a position of dependence on the metropolitan market for the sale of his crops. Middle-men

23. A pud = 36.11 Lbs.
and agents exploited him and he was compelled to dispose off his harvest when prices were low. The rich peasants (bais) derived immense profit from the expansion of cotton trade in Russian Turkistan. Besides producing the cotton, the rich peasants had also entered the field of cotton trade by taking to the profession of export agents and money-lenders. 25

Another important development directly related to the increasing cotton cultivation and its export to Russia was the emergence of numerous small industrial establishments engaged in cotton processing and cotton ginning activities. By 1917 the number of manufacturing and processing establishments in Turkistan had reached 702 in which 21,000 workers were employed. Of these, 16,000 workers were of native origin. 26 While the native traditional handicrafts industry was in a state of gradual decline, ginneries, tanneries, silk-production factories, a small mining industry and oil mills were flourishing. 27 There were, however, as yet no heavy industry in Russian Turkistan. A large number of processing and commercial establishments were owned by the newly emerging class of native bourgeoisie. 28 The rise of

27. Ibid.
industrial economy generated the process of urbanisation and the spread of secular education thereby paving the way for cultural and behavioural changes.

In the wake of the beginning of industrial economy there emerged a class of native proletariat. Confiscation of the lands of native peasantry and the gradual destruction of feudal relationships between the landed aristocracy and the landless peasantry swelled the labour market and thus cheap labour was abundantly available. According to one source, the number of industrial proletariat by 1915 had risen to about 60,000, of which about 80 per cent, almost all of them non-skilled and semi-skilled, were natives.29 The native working class on the eve of the October revolution, however, constituted a microscopic minority of the total population of the Russian Turkestan (about 0.35 per cent).30 Russian workers were mostly employed in Railways and a large majority of them were skilled. The following Table31 shows the percentage of the native and the Russian workers in industry and railways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of total labour force in industry</th>
<th>Percentage of skilled labour force in industry</th>
<th>Percentage of skilled labour force outside (Railways etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natives (mostly Muslim)</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. Ibid.
31. Ibrahim Luminov, Iz Istorii Razvitiia Obshestvenno-Filosofskoi Vysli v Uzbekistane (Tashkent, 1957), p. 23; See also Zafar Imam, "Origin and Development of Socialism..."
Thus, the overwhelming majority of the native people still depended on agriculture for their livelihood, so much so that by the end of 1916 about 80 per cent of the population was dependent on agriculture and nomadism, out of which only 2 per cent were Russians who owned agricultural land.32

Such economic and social changes that occurred during the colonial period had only marginal effect on the social composition of society. However, the increasing interaction between the Russians and the natives led to a decline of religious fanaticism and the growth of native bourgeoisie. The native urban dwellers got increasing opportunity to go to Russia. Some of the natives went to Russia for pursuing higher studies in the Russian universities where they came into contact with the prevailing ideological and cultural currents. A contemporary observer reported that "during the last half century the position of the Ishans (dervishes) in society has changed significantly. Earlier the people of Central Asia bore themselves with superstitious fear towards representatives of the Ishans... one may say with certainty that by this time the religious fanaticism of the natives has weakened in a significant measure..."33 In fact, the declining influence of the Ishans


32. Ibid.
33. P.G. Galuzo, no.10, p.144.
and religious fanaticism can be attributed to the large number of native students going in for western secular education. Many of the well-off natives sent their children for higher education to Moscow and Petrograd. They brought with them new ideas. Secondly the Russian Christian missionaries and social workers also left their influence on the working masses, though the conversion activities of the missionaries were generally resisted.

A section of the emerging native bourgeoisie sought to modernise the socio-cultural institutions with limited success. Whether or not their efforts would have led the Central Asian Society to a different path after 1917 cannot be precisely answered. But the difficulties which confronted them were enormous and the ideology with which they sought to mobilise the masses was romantic-traditionalist. In addition to the backward economy, three major problems confronted them:

(1) The existence of colonial rule.
(2) The survival of nomadic tribalism and feudal polity.
(3) The existence of backward educational system.

(1) The Existence of Colonial Rule

Before we discuss the role of the newly emerging native bourgeoisie in Russian Turkestan in bringing about socio-cultural reforms and its political ideology, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the colonial
policy of the Tsardom towards the native religious and
cultural institutions. It is generally described as conserva-
tive protectionist. Lord Curzon, who visited Central Asia
towards the end of the nineteenth century, observed:

"The Mullahs have been allowed to teach and
preach the Koran; the dervishes alone have
been restrained in their fanatical impor-
tunities; mosques have even in some cases,
been repaired by Russian means; and at one
time the Government actually went so far
as to build itself..."34

Contrasting the educational policies of England and Russia
towards their colonial subjects Lord Curzon pointed out
that whereas England had recognised a special and primary
obligation to shower the benefit of modern education, "the
Russians have proceeded upon very different lines. The
educational habits and institutions of their Mussalman
subjects have been left untouched."35 In the same vein
Alexandra Benningsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay observed:

"As their religious and educational policy,
the Russian administrators sought to preserve
the archaic form of Islam and Islamic culture.
The large class of prosperous and influential
clerics was kept in being thanks to the main-
tenance of the Waqfs properties, and it was
supported by the Russian authorities in its
struggle against the Tatar Turkish reformist
- Quranic schools of the most conservative
types were favoured and protected against any
non-colonialist influence."36

The Tsarist colonial policy was, in fact, more subtle than
portrayed by the contemporary Western observers or historians.

35. Ibid., p. 394.
36. Alexandra Benningsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay,
It was based on the self-enlightened interest of the imperial regime. At best it can be described as indifferent towards the interests of the native masses. Fearful of the fanatical reaction of the traditional religious elite, the Tsarist administration did not interfere in the functioning of the cultural-religious institutions of the natives. Even the traditional courts of Kazis were allowed to operate. With the creation of Russian judicial institutions the Kazi courts were, however, reduced to subordinate status. It would, however, be incorrect to say, as Lord Curzon and Alexandra Bennigsen assert that the Tsarist educational and cultural policy was to encourage the traditional-religious-cultural institutions and that it did nothing to spread the Western ideas and value system. In fact, the Tsarist policy was designed to prevent the penetration of current religious political ideas from the neighbouring Muslim countries.37 So far as the penetration of Western political and ideological currents was concerned, the increasing flux of political activists; social workers and Christian missionaries were actively involved in this task.38 Moreover, a large number of native students got the opportunity of going to Russia for higher education.39 As far as the educational development

was concerned Kaufman, the Russian Governor-General felt
that the natives in course of time would themselves realise
the importance of modern education\(^{40}\) and his assessment
proved prophetic.

(2) **Nomadic tribalism and Feudal polity**

Besides the uneven economic development imposed by
colonialism a major problem was the existence of nomadic
tribalism in Russian Central Asia. The peoples of Russian
Central Asia are descendents of various Turko-Mongol and 'Iranian
tribes.\(^{41}\) The hordes of Turko-Mongol tribes had a long
tradition of warfare. During the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries they came in waves after waves, and after defeating
the Iranians and aborigines, some of the major tribes adopted
a sedentary mode of life. Others continued to lead a nomadic
life. And thus was created a social, political and cultural
gulf among the various ethnic groups of these tribes. While
most of the Uzbeks and the Tajiks had taken to the settled
mode of life, the Turkmens, the Kara-Kirghiz and the Kazakhs
continued to pursue their traditional nomadism. The impact
of Islamic culture and the religious institutions was more
profound on the settled peoples than on the nomadic tribes.\(^{42}\)

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41. See S.A. Tokarev, *Etnografiia narodov SSSR* (Moscow, 1958),
See also L.A. Czapalicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in
History and Present Day*, (Oxford, 1918); Krader, *Peoples
of Central Asia* (Indiana University, 1962).

42. Eugene Schuyler, no.18, p. 38.
Both of these social formations, the nomadic and the sedentary population did not, however, experience any appreciable socio-economic transformation due to pre-capitalist mode of production. The Uzbeks and the Tajiks resisted change in the name of religion as they were first to encounter Russian imperialism with its modern infrastructure. The nomadic tribes traditionally considered all sedentary institutions as degenerate and effeminate. There was, thus, little consciousness among them that the expanding modern civilisation was fast closing on them. They lived in the lap of nature unconcerned with the new socio-political development, while the Tsarist administration conveniently left them untouched. Thus, concept of nationalism remained alien to them. As a result of their tangential relations with the civilised world, they lacked the consciousness that nature and the world around them could be harnessed in the service of mankind. Different tribes were divided on the basis of a deep sense of parochial tribal loyalties. Islamic universal values, because of lack of development of educational and communication systems could not replace the primitive value structures of the warring tribes. Thus the entire Central Asian society on the eve of the October Revolution was divided into two historical social formations: (i) the nomads and (ii) the sedentary population. The sedentary population was itself divided into two antagonistic racial groups: (i) the natives and (ii) the Russians. The natives in turn consisted of the following social groups:
1. The traditional feudal elite,
2. The religious elite,
3. The traders and artisans,
4. The peasantry, and
5. The industrial workers.

Likewise, the Russians were divided into three classes: (1) the ruling class, (2) the newly settled Russian peasants and (3) the Russian workers. The number of Russian bourgeoisie however, was negligible.

It is with this complex socio-economic and political setting in view that we would attempt to analyse the problems of socio-cultural change in Central Asia.

(3) Backward Educational System - The Socio-Political Structures and the Religious Hierarchy

A student of available historical and political literature on the Khanates of Central Asia is struck by the fact that they are generally described as autocratic, despotic and theocratic. The religion of Islam, which was professed by an overwhelming majority of the people, including the rulers of the Khanates played an all-pervasive role in every sphere of life. Although these generalisations may not be

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43. See, for example, Seymooz Becker, no. 12; See also Mary Holdsworth, Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva (London, 1959).
questioned, they certainly do not very much help us in an
objective assessment of the role of religion and its
relationship with the then existing political system.
Therefore, in the following pages an attempt has been made
to analyse the relationship between the socio-political
structure and the all-pervasive role of religion. Such an
effort will enable us to establish whether or not there were
some historical factors for the secularisation of politics
after the October Revolution.

Based primarily on the feudal economic structure,
the native Khanates were traditional oligarchies of the
pre-capitalist genre. The Khanates were divided into
numerous villayats or bekstvo, if one goes by the Russian
literature on the subject. The bekstvo were governed by the
beks appointed by the Emirs or the Khans. The beks were
generally closely related to the rulers either through family
ties or through clannish-ethnic bonds or by complete economic
dependency. Indeed, there were no political activities even
of symbolic nature except of course the palace conclave,

44. Edward Shills defines traditional oligarchy as a system of
government which "rest on a firm dynastic constitution,
buttressed by traditional religious beliefs. The ruler
may be provided entirely on the basis of kinship, or by
a combination of kinship and choice by those qualified
by kinship to participate in the process of selection..."
Edward Shills, Political Development in the New States,

45. See B.G. Gafurov, no.13.
manoeuvring and intrigues at high places. A powerful and organised role of consolidating the system was performed by a network of the judicial structures in the Khanates. Based on the Islamic canon laws (Shariah) and the Customary laws (adat) the judicial structure was manned by the members of the religious elite, known as Kazi. With the passage of time the Kazi ship had acquired hereditary character. The Kazi enjoyed a high social status and considerable economic privileges. Another group of religious elite was the mufti who were the exponents of Islamic Shariah. The chief mufti was the legal and spiritual head of the Khanates.46

As mentioned earlier, the life-source of this religious hierarchy was Waqfs whose allocation depended entirely on the Khan and his ruling clique; the blood and clannish-ethnic bonds further reinforced the system what then appeared to be impregnable. The function of, what may be termed as, political socialisation47 was performed by the Imams and the Mullahs - the Muslim priests who also taught in traditional religious schools. The traditional religious schools were of two kinds:48 (i) the maktab and (ii) the

46. Mary Holdsworth, no.43.

47. The concept of political socialisation has been used in the sense as defined by Herbert Hyman, Political Socialisation (New York, 1959).

48. A comprehensive account of the system of education in pre-revolutionary period is found in Serge A. Zenkovsky "Kulturkampf in Pre-revolutionary Central Asia", The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol.XIV, No.1, (February, 1955), See also S. Ari, Bukhara (Moscow, 1950); I.I. Gaier, Turkestan (Tashkent, 1909), p.29.
madrasseh. The maktabs were usually attached to mosques where the Mullahs taught the Koran to the pupils. The madrasseh were higher theological seminaries which were run by the Ulema - theological scholars and exponents. According to S. Aini, the curriculum in the madrasseh consisted of Arabic, morphology and syntax, logic rhetoric science in theological interpretation, rules of ablution, fasting, burial, pilgrimage to Mecca, purification, alms-giving, regulations for buying and selling, slave-owning and the release of slaves, marriages and divorce, etc. Mathematics and history could be studied outside. The financial support to the madrasseh came from the income of the Waqf lands.

The account of religious hierarchy would be incomplet without a mention of a network of the Dervishes or Ishans as they were popularly known in Turkestan. The Dervishes were spiritual teachers who transmitted ascetic values and other-worldly Weltanschauung to their followers. The pursuit of mundane, non-religious and material gains was discouraged and a spirit of obedience to authority was consciously cultivated. But the contradictions in the modes of life of the ruling classes and the masses in Central Asian Khanates certainly belied the Islamic concepts of equality, tolerance and brotherhood. It is, therefore, not surprising that the masses were intoxicated by the opium which was, to paraphrase

49. S. Aini, Ibid.

50. Mary Holdsworth, no. 43.
Marx, nothing but religion.

The political structure was thus closely dependent on religion and its institutionalised role for survival. Prior to the Russian conquest there was hardly any movement for change or to reform the scholastic system of education. This was in sharp contrast with the West including the Tsarist Russia where such ideas and movements had created intellectual and cultural base to sustain corresponding economic and political development. However, the need for a change, though superficially, was felt by various small groups of the newly emerging middle class as a result of the rise of the Russian Social Democratic movement in Central Asia.

CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS

The movement for socio-cultural change was initiated by a small section of intelligentsia notwithstanding the rigours of colonial exploitation. The first Russian modern school, opened in Samarkand in 1870, did not attract native students as the natives suspected it to be the centre of proselytisation and Russification. However, in the early eighties, the natives themselves started opening schools on the pattern of western system of education. Within two years their number increased to 18. By 1911 their number had risen

Besides modern subjects, there was provision for Muslim religious teachings in their curricula. This was a beginning towards a partial modernisation of native culture. On the eve of the October Revolution the number of modern schools stood at 171 in which 18,000 pupils received instructions.53

(a) Qadimists

The traditional religious elite, however, relentlessly opposed the penetration of western education based on Russian pattern. There was an organised movement known as Qadimism54 to prevent the so-called Russification of the native culture. Organised and led by the traditional religious elite, the influence of the Qadimists was very strong on the masses. It was more so in the Khanates, where the feudal oligarchy was in power. The Qadimists employed traditional religious symbols and slogans for the mobilisation of illiterate masses. Their political philosophy was based on the Islamic scriptures, the Koran and the Hadith (the traditions of Prophet Mohammed). The Qadimists were opposed to any change in the educational system, giving equal political rights to women and non-Muslim minorities. In a word, the Qadimist movement was anti-democratic.

54. Zenkovsky, no.52, pp.24-36.
and revivalist. In the name of religion the Qadimists sought to perpetuate their own vested interests. Until 1917 the Qadimist movement remained an amorphous anti-colonial movement. Under the influence of the Qadimists various groups of natives in rural areas organised innumerable revolts in the countryside.\textsuperscript{55} However, they were brutally suppressed. Patronised by the Khans, the Emirs and the rich landlords, the Qadimists branded any socio-cultural change as un-Islamic. Initially, the Tsarist administration and the Qadimists did not see eye to eye; they remained arch enemy of each other. But after the consolidation of the colonial administration, the latter gave moral and official support to the Qadimists in their struggle against the bourgeois reformist movement known as Jadidism.\textsuperscript{56} The influence of the Qadimists in the countryside, however, continued to be widespread. To further consolidate their movement the Qadimists laid the foundation of an organisation of Jamiat-i-Ulema in April 1917.\textsuperscript{57} The Jamiat-i-Ulema participated in the deliberations of All Russian Muslim Congresses in which their contribution was negative as they attempted to disrupt and block

\begin{quote}
55. P.3. Galuzo, no.20. During the last two decades of the 19th century, the Muslims of Central Asia staged 250 revolts against the Russians. Of these, revolts in the Ferghana Valley (1885), the Tashkent Cholera Riot (1892), and Andijan rebellion (1898) were widespread and of great magnitude. See also A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, no.20.

56. Jadidism literally means modernism. It was based on Usul-i-jadid (modern methods of teachings). A detailed account of the Jadidist movement is given in the following pages.

57. See Istoriiia narodov Uzbekistana (Tashkent, 1947), II, p.144.
\end{quote}
the reformist programme of the Jadidists. From the viewpoint of secularisation of politics, the Jadidists constituted a stumbling block.

(b) Jadidism

A group of intellectuals realising the futility and disadvantages of total opposition to the new socio-political developments in Russian Turkestan launched a counter cultural movement known as Jadidism. Its founder was Ismail bey Gasprinsky (1851-1914) a Tatar by birth. Educated at Crimea (Jakhchi-Sarai) and Moscow, Gasprinsky was influenced by two ideological currents: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Slavism. During his student days he came into contact with the ideas of Slavophils and Pan-Slavists. The writings of Chernyshevsky, Pisarev, Herzen and Belinsky had a profound influence on the young Gasprinsky. Pan-Islamism, as preached by Jamal-al-Din Afghani, and Pan-Turkic ideology further strengthened his conviction that the salvation of Muslims was possible by unity in nationalism based on Islamic brotherhood, modern education and intellectual development. The political programme of the Tatar Jadidists as it emerged in three underground All Russian Muslim Congresses

58. Zenkovsky, no.52, pp.
59. Ibid.
60. The first All-Russian Muslims Congress was held in 1905 and the second and third in 1906; A detailed account of their deliberations is found in Arsharani and Sabidullin, no.20, and Zenkovsky, no.53.
before the October Revolution was largely based on Fan-Islamic ideology. Although no representative from Central Asia participated in them. Their influence was well marked in Central Asia as well. First All-Russian Muslim Congress, held in August 1905, decided to organise an All-Russian Muslims Union Party. The resolutions which it adopted sought to work for:

"1. Unification of Muslim citizens of Russia for the purpose of carrying out certain political economic and social reforms,
2. Legal equality of Muslims and Russian populations,
3. Establishment of a constitutional monarchy based on proportionate representation of nationalities,
4. Freedom of press, convention, religion, etc.,
5. Inviolability of personal property. Peasants with little or no land should be given land from the State and Crown's holdings. Expropriation of landed properties would be permissible only if due recompense were paid." 61

At the Second Russian Muslim Congress held in Petersburg in January, 1906, the participants endorsed a socio-economic programme which was more or less similar to that of Russian Kadets. 62 It was decided by newly formed party "Rusul-Manzarin Ittifak" (The Union of Russian Muslims), or Ittifak as it was popularly known, to collaborate with the Russian Kadets in Election to the first Russian Duma (Parliament). 63 The third Russian Muslim Congress was held in Nizhni Novgorod in August,

61. Zenkovsky, no.53, pp.41-43.
63. Ibid.
1906. In the Third Congress the Muslim leaders openly propagated the ideas of Pan-Islamism. In his inaugural speech, Ibrahimov, an influential leader of Ittifak, said that Muslim unity should not be limited to the Muslims of Russia alone but the goal should be the unification of all the followers of Mohammed throughout the world.64

Our purpose in citing the resolutions of the Three All Russian Muslim Congresses which are rather remotely related to our subject is to show the duality of political behaviour of the politicised Russian Muslims. The resolutions of the first and the second Congresses are ample evidence to suggest that the Russian Muslims sought to participate within the Russian political system on the basis of equality. Like the other Russian bourgeois political parties, they demanded limited economic, political and social reforms. But not only the absolutist Tsarist Russia denied them the opportunity to carry out the limited reforms, the Muslims of Russia were also discriminated against in all walks of life. As a result, the Muslims of Russia, because of their minority character, found alienated from the Russian society and sought refuge in the religious unity of Muslims of the entire world which never became a reality.

Alienation of the Muslims of Central Asia from the Tsarist imperial regime was even more profound as memories

64. Ibid., pp.23-7.
of their struggle with the Tsarist Russia were still fresh. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Jadidists in Turkestan could not make a significant dent in the strong-hold of the traditional religious elite. The Qadimists continued to dominate the socio-political and cultural spheres of life and resist any change.

Opposed as they were by the Qadimists as well as the Colonial administration, the Central Asian Jadidists contribution to the modernisation of the traditional educational system cannot be minimised. Count K.K. Pahlen who visited Turkestan as the Chairman of the Senatorial Investigation Commission of Turkestan (June 1908 - June 1909) found that the Jadidists in their zeal for educational reforms and to counter the influence of the Qadimists had obtained a fetwa (a decision given, usually in writing, by a mufti or other Muslim juridical authority) from the Sheikul-Islam in Cairo. The curriculum in the Jadidists schools which were first conceived as the new-method schools at the time of Pahlen's visit consisted of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, history, literature, etc. In the new books the medieval interpretation of national history and historical subjects had been replaced by a description of the achievements of modern sciences. Thus, the foundation of secularisation of native educational system and culture had been laid by the Jadidists.

65. Richard A. Pierce (Ed.), no.37, p.44.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
Notwithstanding their contribution to the educational and cultural development, the political ideology of the *Jadidists* of Russian Turkestan was traditional religious-reformist. They worked for syncretisation of the new and the old values. The *Jadidists* sought to absorb certain traits of modernity while glorifying the virtues of Islam. For instance, Munnevar Qary who was one of the ideological mentors of the *Jadidists* of Central Asia declared:

"...Our ideas of reform are not restricted to a revival of our spiritual life in the present day, but they endeavour to achieve national freedom; yes, they go still further and seek for its resurgence of the nation in which the new way of thinking and old spiritual life should regain their former position and a deep national consciousness should come to prevail."

Another prominent *Jadidist* of Central Asia Behbud advocated the need for the training of a modern intelligentsia consisting of doctors, engineers, economists, jurists along with a large number of Muslim priests. He argued that the *Jadidists* should devote their energies and resources to the question of providing the "physical and spiritual basis to the emerging nation." It meant creation of a modern intelligentsia as well as a group of traditional religious leaders. Theoretically 'the former would not be ready to resign itself to the ascendency of a

traditionalist religious elite; its collaboration would be more reluctant, and its resistance inevitable.\textsuperscript{71} It was, however, too early to expect effective challenge to the Jadidists as the modern intelligentsia had not yet emerged. Some of the Jadidists themselves became disillusioned with the reformist programme and joined the socialist movement.

A progressive section of the Jadidist intellectual recognised that the key to the amelioration of the misery and backwardness of the working people lay in the spread of secular modern education and it was felt that the removal of illiteracy would sound the death-knell of the traditional oppressive socio-political structures. Seeing the extreme inequality in every walk of life that was rampant in Russian Turkestan and the Khanates a progressive poet Awaz expressed his reservation on the existence of an omniscient compassionate God.\textsuperscript{72}

In fact the Jadidists were the intellectual vanguard of the emerging native bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{73} Until the first decade of

\textsuperscript{71} Edward Shills, no.44, pp.34-5.

\textsuperscript{72} See Tuzmuhamedov, no.26, pp.61-37.

\textsuperscript{73} There has been some disagreement among the historians of Russian Central Asia over the characterisation of the Jadidist movement. Whereas, most of the Western authors describe it as a progressive nationalist movement, some Soviet authors and Marxists project it as a conservative reactionary movement. Geoffrey Wheeler, a prolific writer on Central Asian affairs believes that the Jadidist movement

Contd...
the twentieth century they continued to devote their resources to the development of education and cultural reforms. In 1909, the Jadidist laid the foundation of an organisation, the activities and objectives of which were stated to be cultural social reforms. In fact, it was a political organisation. But as the Tsarist Colonial administration did not permit the functioning of political organisation the Jadidists propagated their political ideals under the cover of a cultural organisation. Subsequent to the February 1917 revolution, during which the Tsar Nicholas was forced to abdicate, the Provisional Government in Moscow did allow the political organisation to

Footnote 73 continued

was essentially a modernist movement of the newly emerging Uzbek middle class. Zenkovsky, a Russian emigre author describes it as "Uzbek liberal movement". In the same vein Alexandra Benningsen and Lemercier Quelquejay highlight the progressive character of the Jadidists of Central Asia. Other prominent Western authors, such as Richard Pipes and Michael Rywkin, have also noted the liberal-nationalist character of the Jadidist movement. R. Vaidyanath believes that it was an Uzbek nationalist movement in its formative stages of growth. The Jadidists of Central Asia cherished and worked for the achievement of self-rule. Devindra Kaushik, however, feels that the Jadidist movement in Central Asia was a reactionary movement. More or less similar views have been expressed by some Soviet authors, such as, M.G. Vakhabov, Arsharuni and Gabidullin, and M. Faiziev. In recent times there has been a reassessment of the characterisation and contribution of the Jadidists in Central Asia. For instance, R. Tuzmuhamedov observes that the prominent Jadidist thinkers and poets Behsudi, Sayeni, Chokar-Hutrib, Mugoni and Fakiri were enlighteners of the people of Central Asia and that they are still held in high esteem by the Central Asian people.

74. A. Benningsen and Ch. Lemercier Quelquejay, no.36, p.47.
operate in different parts of the Russian Empire. Accordingly, the Jadidists came out openly and formed their political party "Shuro-i-Islamio" in March, 1917. They participated in the All-Russian Muslim Congress held in May, 1917. During the course of the deliberations of the Congress it came to light that there were two strong factions within the Jadidists. One faction was that of the traditionalist-conservatives and the other faction consisted of the liberal nationalist intellectuals. The representatives of the conservative faction believed that the Muslims of Russia constituted a nation. Accordingly, they sought to mobilise them in the name of Islam. Zaki Validov Togan, who belonged to the group of liberal nationalist, rejected the idea that the Muslims of Russia could constitute a nation on the basis of religion alone. He argued that the Muslims of Russia were divided on ethnic, racial, linguistic and economic considerations. Therefore, he observed that a rational and pragmatic course would be to demand "national-territorial autonomy". In the second Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress the political leaders of Russian Turkestan demanded the creation of an "Autonomous Turkestan Federated Republic" within the framework of the Democratic Republic of Russia. The Second Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress proposed that the Central Asian Parliament should have a bicameral legislative organ.  

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75. Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana (Tashkent, 1947) II, p.144.  
76. Serge A. Zenkovsky, no.52, p.149.  
77. Ibid., pp.147-49.
the Senate (Makhami-Sharii) being the representative organ of
the Muslim divines. The immediate aim of both the Qadimists
and the Jadidists who had collaborated in organising the Second
Extraordinary Congress, was to gain the political power.

Obviously, the reformist programme of the Jadidists
was meant for a small group of the native middle class. Like
the Qadimists they also used religious and cultural symbols to
mobilize the illiterate masses instead of putting forward some
concrete socio-economic reforms. Nevertheless, the Jadidists
of Central Asia laid the foundation of the system of modern
education and showed the way to social progress. They tirelessly
attacked the despotic system of government and the traditional
religious hierarchy which gave support to such despotism as
prevailed in the Khanates. One of the first harbingers - Ahmed
Makhdum Donish, a Bukharian, appealed to the people to prepare
themselves for the coming revolution against the corrupt and
cruel rule of the Emir. He wrote:

"The Emir and the Vizirs, the mullahs and the aristocracy,
are all alike. You reader, should find out what kind of
man the Emir himself is, the sovereign of orthodox
Muslims and your Sultan. Look around and you will find
that he is a libertine and despot. His supreme Kazi is
a glutton and hypocrite. Of the same kind are the Rais
and the head of the police. The latter is simply a
perpetually drunk gambler and consort of brigands and
thieves."79

Such type of courage to give a call of revolt against
the traditional rulers and religious hierarchy was a new

78. Georgi Safarov, Kolnial'naia revoliutsiia: obyt Turkestana
(Moscow, 1921), pp. 55-64.
phenomenon in the history of Central Asia. Under the influence of Jadidist ideology, people questioned their blind loyalties to the rulers and the latter's right to rule. It was nothing short of a transformation of their political attitudes. Therefore, despite the limited gains of the Jadidists of Central Asia, they were heralds of a new age. As it were, some of the prominent Jadidists later joined the socialist revolutionary movement and whole-heartedly devoted their energy and attention to the emancipation of the working masses of Central Asia.

(c) Social Democratic Movement in Central Asia

Soon after the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) held in 1903 the foundation of the socialist movement in Russian Turkestan was laid by the Russian workers, political activists and members of progressive intelligentsia. To begin with, the radical Russian Communists propagated the ideology of Marxism among the Russian workers. Their activities were confined to important cities of Russian Turkestan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Kyzyl-Arvat, Ashkabad, where the Russians had a sizeable population. The Social Democrats in Russian Turkestan received considerable organisational support from Kazan, Baku and other places. However, until 1905 there were only a few native workers and intellectuals who had been attracted to the socialist movement. Prominent among them were

A.G. Rasheed, V.T. Bakrajje, M.V. Murotd, A.R. BakhiroV and A.V. Khudash. Some of the native Social Democrats are also reported to have participated in the Revolution of 1905 which was mainly organised and led by the Russian liberal intelligentsia, soldiers and a group of Russian railway workers. After the 1905 Revolution a number of Social-Democrat groups sprang up in the large towns of Russian Turkestan. In February, 1906 the first Turkestan Conference of the RSJLP was organised. The Conference decided to launch a Union of Turkestan Organisations of the RSJLP. Like in the rest of Russia, the Socialist movement in Russian Turkestan was also divided into two factions: the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, the latter being the junior partner well up to the October Revolution. The Social Democrats propagated their ideas through the legal newspapers Samarkand and Turkestan.

Thus, from the year 1905-6 onwards "one can speak of native Socialists who were mainly active in the RSJLP groupings in Central Asia. For example Muratov (Morozov) was active at Samarkand and Rasheed (Zurabov) at Tashkent. In fact, the Turkestan Muslim Bolshevik workers from the Baku industrial complex played a leading role in this early formative period of the social movement in Turkestan." The growth of the Socialist movement in Russian Turkestan received an impetus

82. Ccherki istori Kommunisticheskoi Parti Uzbekistana no.30, p.16.
83. Zafar Imam, no.31, p.198.
after 1910 as a result of the participation of some Jadidists in national liberation and socialist movements. A faction of the Jadidists under the influence of the Young Turk movement formed the Young Party. Most of the members of the Young Party belonged to the lower middle class - clerks, shop salesmen and school teachers. By 1912 there were fifty hard core activists of the Young Party. Deeply committed to the cause of liberation from the yoke of feudalism and colonialism the members of the Young Party of Turkestan worked tirelessly to enlist the support of likeminded youths in the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva. They succeeded in forming the parties of Young Bukharans and Young Khivans in the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva respectively and became a useful channel for the spread of progressive ideas in the native feudatories.

A section of progressive writers, poets and satirists made significant contribution in spreading democratic and revolutionary ideas among the Central Asian Muslims. The Young Bukharans and the Young Khivans directed their attack against the religious conservatism of the Qadimists and their political supporters, the feudal elite. Mukhimi, Abdulla Saleh, Zavki, Hamza Hakimzade, Sadruddin Aini, Ahmed Makhdom Donish, Abdul Kadir, Savdo Shamsuddin and many others made significant contribution in propagating the ideas of democracy and revolution.84

84. Ibrahim Kuminov, no.31, pp.174-86.
Similarly, among the Kirghis and the Kazakhs there were a number of progressive intellectuals and political activists who propagated their ideas in the newspapers published by them. A few radical Kirghiz and Kazakh intellectuals became extremely critical of the Pan-Islamic ideology and bourgeois propaganda of the Jadidists. After the brutal suppression of the spontaneous revolts of 1916 staged by the natives against the colonial administration, a large number of the Jadidists too joined the ranks of the Social Democrats in Turkestan.

Thus, the October revolution swept Russian Turkestan at a time when the native society was still at a pre-capitalist stage of development. The main carriers of the socialist revolution in Russian Turkestan were, by and large, the Russian workers and some units of the Russian Army. A few natives also participated in the revolution but they basically lacked the representative character. Moreover, the socialist revolution was confined to Russian Turkestan. The Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara, however, remained beyond the pale of the October Revolution though the feudal elite of the Khanates had been facing increasing hostility from the Jadidists and the Young Parties.

Could the Socialist revolution succeed in pre-capitalist conditions? What tactics should the Russian Communists adopt in

the former Tsarist colonies? Whether the Russian Communists could legitimately pursue their programme of socialist transformation in the former Tsarist colonies, such as Turkestan, where the preponderance of pre-capitalist relations were still the main determining feature? These were some of the problems which were hotly debated in the Communist Party forums. Lenin declared that the Russian proletariat should play the role of liberator and despite the objective difficulties it should inspire in the masses an urge for independent political thinking and independent political action even where a proletariat is practically non-existent. On the prospects of the socialist revolution in Russian Turkestan Lenin observed that for the success of the socialist revolution in pre-capitalist social formations it was necessary to adopt a cautious approach towards the transformation of attitude of the illiterate and backward peoples. He suggested that the victorious proletariat should adjust both Soviet institutions and Communist Party (its membership, special tasks) to the level of the peasant countries of the colonial East... This needs thinking about and seeking concrete answers. Accordingly, the first step which the Soviet Government took was to reassure non-Russian nationalities of their political status in the new system and of the inviolability

of their culture. The proclamation of the Decree on Peace and the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" were meant to draw different nationalities of the former Tsarist Empire into a voluntary and just Union of Peoples of Russia. The Soviet leadership believed that the work of socio-cultural transformation in the backward regions must go hand in hand with the drawing of non-Russian nationalities into the Soviet political system, even if it required granting certain special concessions.

Thus, on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution the Central Asian Society was riddled with many problems, economic, social, political and cultural. First of all, there was the economic consequences of Tsarist imperialism generating bitter conflict between the natives and the Russians. Secondly, the existence of feudal and colonial socio-political structure not only hindered the process of change and development but also sought to put the clock back. Both the feudal elite and the colonial administration gave full support to the conservatives who were against the process of socio-cultural change. Lastly, the native intelligentsia had not yet completely shaken off the hold of religion despite the fact that they were not satisfied with its all-pervasive role.