CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND THE POLICY OF NATIVISATION OF SOVIET APPARATUS IN UZBEKISTAN

"The establishment of satisfactory relations with the peoples of Turkestan is for the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, without exaggeration, of tremendous and world-wide historical significance. The attitude of the Soviet workers' and peasants' republic toward weak and formerly oppressed peoples will have practical effect upon all the peoples of Asia, upon the colonies of the world, upon hundreds of millions of people."

V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia
Vol. XXIV, p. 531.

Promotion of social mobility and the process of nativisation of Soviet apparatus constituted another important aspect of Soviet policy of secularisation of politics in Uzbekistan. While change in economy, political system and expansion of soviet educational system created enormous opportunities for the promotion of social and occupational mobility for the natives, Soviet Government of Uzbekistan and the Communist Party were ideologically committed for the nativisation of the Soviet apparatus in Uzbekistan so as to create harmonious political conditions for the establishment of satisfactory relations between the nationalities and Russians. Needless to say, it was a very complex and delicate task as it involved peaceful transference of political power and induction of the natives in the decision-making
process and institutions at different levels. As will be elaborated in the following pages, the Soviets faced stupendous problems in the fulfilment of their objective of creating a model society for the entire East.

(a) **Social Mobility**

Social mobility during the period under study can at best be described as restrictive. For our purpose, restrictive social mobility includes three aspects: First, the prevailing political conditions and the institutional arrangements sought to regulate and restrict natives' social mobility to the middle and higher positions of power and privilege. Secondly, continuing use of the Russian language as medium of instructions in technical and higher educational institutions put the majority of native students at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the Russians because of their poor knowledge of the language. Lastly, the natives showed some disinclination for the skilled and technical jobs in the Soviet institutions which offered not very attractive salaries; instead, the natives preferred to work in those places where they could earn something over and above their salaried income. Despite these problems, the changes that occurred in the structure of Uzbek society were wide-ranging and of far-reaching character. These were unleashed as a result of collectivisation and industrialisation of the economy, liquidation of traditional elites, mass education
and the adoption of relatively progressive nationality policy by the Soviets in comparison to the old Tsarist practices. The Soviets view these changes, as a rule, as the realization of revolutionary social transformation in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, Zh. Kasybekov, an Uzbek scholar remarks:

"Before the Revolution not many representatives of the native nationalities worked only as unskilled workers in heavy industries. During the days of Soviet power they found opportunities to acquire qualification. Before the Communist Party of Uzbekistan stood the task of creating qualified cadres of working class from the native nationalities." 1

On account of the socio-economic developmental programme and the growth of Soviet political institutions, the rate of social mobility in Uzbekistan during the second decade of Soviet power was undeniably fast enough to maintain political stability and ward off organised revolts by the natives. 2 This naturally helped the Soviets to drive home the revolutionary nature of Marxism-Leninism and thereby to consolidate and strengthen Soviet power.


2. See P.G. Galuzo, "Dva etapa natsionalno osvoboditelnogo dvizhenia v Srednej Azii (Two phases of national-liberation movement in Central Asia), Pravda Vostoka 172 (1665), 30 July, 1928; See also A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, Ocherki Panislamizma and pantiurkizma v Rossi (Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia), Moscow, 1937, pp.13-14.
Despite these gains, it must be stated that the sizeable share of the progress achieved was apportioned by the Russians whose flow towards the Soviet Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan had sharply increased. For instance, whereas, the Russian settlers constituted 5.6 per cent of the population in 1926, their percentage rose to 17.8 per cent in 1939. But thanks to the development of a centralised political system and as a result of considerable and wide-ranging benefits given to the natives by a fast developing economy, the inflow of the new Europeans (largely Russians and Ukranians) took place without socio-political tensions of any consequence. Moreover, since the need for their transference to the Central Asian republic emanated from shortages of native technicians, engineers and qualified personnel to look after the expanding educational, economic and political institutions, and not from the traditional *modus operandi* of colonial exploitation, this certainly helped in the stabilisation of the system.

In fact, an integrated and coherent programme for the drawing of the natives into the Soviet system was initiated only after the implementation of the national territorial delimitation plan in December 1924. Soviet Uzbek authors regard the period of 1925-1928 as crucial when a meaningful policy of drawing the natives into the Soviet

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3. V.I. Kozlov, *NatsionalnostiiSSSR* (Nationalities of the USSR), Moscow, 1975, Passim.
system was initiated. Until then, the Soviets were largely preoccupied with intra-party squabbles and a host of administrative and political problems such as the creation of an effective machinery to carry out decisions and directives received from the Central Party leadership. Except for the re-socialisation programme of native children and adults, the only measures which the Communists adopted towards soliciting the cooperation of the natives in building socialism were short-term courses run in clubs and public places. A Central Asian University had been established in Tashkent in 1920, but for a long time to come it catered largely to the needs of the Russians. It seems there were two main reasons responsible for this. First of all, there were not many native students who qualified for admission to the university courses. Secondly, the relations between the natives and the Russians were yet not so amicable as to generate a confidence among the natives that their interests would be protected by the new Soviet system.

4. See Pravda Vostoka, March 6, 1925; See also T.N. Kary Niazov, Ocherki istorii kultury Sovetskogo Uzbekistana, (Outlines of the History of Culture of Soviet Uzbekistan), Moscow, 1955, pp.150-55. In fact, the Soviet Government both at the Union and at the republic levels strongly feel about the tactical mistakes committed during the formative period of the Union by the Communists in Central Asia. Consequently, the documents and historical materials pertaining to that period is withheld from researchers. Recently, the Uzbek Govt. published the extracts of important government and party documents beginning from 1925 to 1970.
In view of the prevailing political situation, the short-term courses and the establishment of a University in the absence of correct nationality policy were more symbolic than real channels for promoting social mobility and the process of nativisation of Soviet apparatus. Besides, the pattern of educational development during the period from 1928-29 to 1938-38 clearly indicates that the over-emphasis on the primary level of general education, meant for the socialisation purposes of the children, continued (See Table I).

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Enrolment</th>
<th>Classes in I-IV</th>
<th>Percent-age in I-IV</th>
<th>Classes in V-VII</th>
<th>Percent-age in V-VII</th>
<th>Classes in VIII-X</th>
<th>Percent-age in VIII-X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928-29</td>
<td>166,637</td>
<td>152,108</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>12,448</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>190,932</td>
<td>172,116</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>15,914</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2,092</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>363,468</td>
<td>346,573</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>16,419</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>514,892</td>
<td>493,169</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>21,723</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>569,230</td>
<td>540,613</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>28,187</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34</td>
<td>567,512</td>
<td>538,525</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>27,787</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-35</td>
<td>611,045</td>
<td>571,233</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>37,700</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>669,440</td>
<td>609,502</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>55,602</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4,245</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-37</td>
<td>789,725</td>
<td>696,333</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>86,979</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6,413</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-38</td>
<td>917,989</td>
<td>782,211</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>125,520</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10,258</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-39</td>
<td>1,095,159</td>
<td>887,746</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>191,399</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16,014</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1938-39 as % of 1928-29

657 584 1,538 770

Source: TsSU, Kulturnoe Stroitels'tvo SSSR, Moscow, 1940, p. 53.
For instance the percentage of students who reached up to the level of VIII to X class, in fact, declined from 1.2 per cent in 1928-29 to 1.1 per cent in 1937-38. As is evident from Table I throughout the period from 1928-29 to 1937-38 the in-take in classes VIII to X did not rise in accordance with the general expansion of primary education. It was only during the school year 1938-39 that we notice the percentage of intake in VIII to X class slightly outstripping over the figures recorded during the school year 1928-29. This is, however, not to deny a considerable increase in the number of students in these classes which had risen from 2081 to 10,258 during the corresponding period. But the point worth noting is that until 1932 the rate of drop-outs continued to be as high as before.

In fact, enrolment at middle and secondary levels of education showed a declining trend from 1928 to 1930. It was only in 1933, when the nationalities pressed for rapid nativisation of the Soviet apparatus, that the growth of middle and secondary levels of education showed an upward trend (See Table II).

In fact, the number of drop-outs as a result of the pressing need of economy and various Soviet institutions for man-power and the relative neglect of the secondary and higher education kept on increasing. Unless this increasing rate of drop-outs was substantially checked, there was no real possibility of achieving a smooth and a fast-rate of
TABLE II
ESTIMATED RETENTION RATES IN UZBEK SCHOOLS
OF GENERAL EDUCATION 1928-1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Enrolment</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Middle and Secondary Enrolment</th>
<th>Middle and Secondary Enrolment as a % of Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>152,108</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>28,617</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>172,116</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>28,987</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>346,573</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>39,812</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>493,169</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>59,937</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>540,613</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>93,392</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>538,525</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>135,778</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>571,233</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>207,416</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TsSU Kulturnoe Stroitelstvo SSSR, Moscow, 1940, p.57

Social mobility so far as the members of the native nationalities were concerned. No concrete measures were, however, adopted in this direction during the first decade of Soviet power.

The magnitude of the problem of absorbing a large number of natives in Soviet institutions was more keenly felt with every passing year. In the early thirties, the native political elite exerted considerable pressure on the
Central Communist Party leadership for accelerating the pace of nativisation of the Soviet apparatus in Uzbekistan. There were a number of reasons behind the increasing demand for nativisation of Soviet apparatus. Foremost among them was the pressing need for providing some relief to those who were affected on account of the collectivisation of land and the liquidation of traditional system of education and judiciary. Rhetoric and political demagogy apart, the native society, including the top native communists and statesman, were unprepared to accept that all the members of traditional intelligentsia, the Muslim priests (mullahs) and those affected during the collectivisation programme were anti-Soviets or class enemies. Hence, the native leadership demanded immediate and concrete measures for the nativisation of the system and Uzbekification of higher and technical education.

As shown later, the Soviets did take some effective steps to meet the demands of the natives as articulated by the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and other accepted institutionalised channels. But they fell short of the requirement for a complete nativisation of the Soviet apparatus. To maintain the tempo of the developmental work in the urban areas of Uzbekistan, thousands of experts, technicians and skilled workers were sent from the European parts of Soviet Russia. For instance, the urban population of Uzbekistan
registered an increase of 150 per cent during the period from 1926 to 1939, while the corresponding growth of Uzbek population was 23 per cent only.

However, the Uzbek Government soon took some basic policy decision so as to meet the growing demands of the natives for accelerating the pace of social mobility. These can be put into two broad categories:

1. Development of Uzbek economy; and

2. Institutional measures for improvement in the qualifications and technical skill of the natives.

1. Development of Uzbek Economy

A broad survey of the economic development in Uzbekistan during the period under study will be given in Chapter VII. Suffice here to highlight the major developmental activities initiated during the period under study. The major thrust in the first two Five Year Plans - 1928 to 1932, and 1933 to 1937 - was towards modernisation of agriculture and laying the foundation of heavy industry in Uzbekistan. In the process some ancillary light industries were also developed. The other important field of economic


development in the republic was exploitation of natural resources, such as coal and oil. During the Second Five Year Plan period the pace of economic development was considerably fast. By the end of the Plan, the share of industrial production in the Uzbek economy had reached 31 per cent; while on the eve of the revolution it was barely 2 per cent. As a result, by the end of the Second Five Year Plan the Uzbek economy was reaching the take-off stage. The rapidly growing industrial sector had begun to change the traditional structure of society, the details of which are given in the following chapter. Increasing opportunities to the natives, particularly in urban areas, had undermined the traditional social order despite the seemingly cold response of the natives to take up employment in the industrial sector.

2. Institutional Measures for Nativisation and Social Mobility

The problem of drawing the native workers into the Soviet orbit was first discussed in the Tenth Congress of

7. Uzbekistan za 15 let (Uzbekistan over the 15 years), Tashkent, 1939, p.33.

the All-Union Communist Party (B) held in March 1921. The Congress addressed itself to the immediate task before the Party for the solution of the nationality question. After reviewing the problem of nationalities in Soviet Russia, the Congress emphasised the need for removing the inequalities that existed between nationalities and the Great Russians. It resolved:

"With a view to abolishing the actual inequality of backward peoples as speedily as possible the Congress considered it necessary to help them develop and consolidate their Soviet statehood, their governmental and economic institutions, judiciary, press, schools, theatres, etc., using native language to accelerate the training of the native skilled personnel."9

One of the main recommendations made by the Congress for accelerating the process of social mobility and nativisation of Soviet apparatus was adoption of the native language as the medium of instructions in higher and technical education. However, the actual implementation of this programme continued to lag behind, thus making it extremely difficult for the native masses to acquire higher technical education. In 1933, the Soviets did take certain practical measures to ease the situation, more of which will be elaborated elsewhere in this chapter.

To begin with, the Soviets started numerous short-term courses for technical training of the native workers. Apprentice training programmes in factories and plants were initiated for the unskilled workers already employed. For the semi-skilled and skilled workers the Soviets started a chain of evening schools, *rabfaks* (workers' faculties), *tekhnikums* (polytechnics) and correspondence courses. Soon after the establishment of political order in Uzbekistan in 1922, about 40 technical training centres had been started. The first batch from these Centres completed its training in 1926. No information is available on the social composition of the trainees. But it may be safely assumed that the percentage of natives in the Soviet higher and technical educational institutions was as a rule low.

Another important landmark in the process of educational developments, which is an important channel of social mobility in a society, was the establishment of a university in 1920 in Tashkent. Started at the behest of Lenin, it started full-scale operation in 1923 when 2700 students found admission in different faculties of the University. At that time there were about 200 staff

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11. All data on student enrolment has been extracted from material available in Tashkent Universitet Bulletin, del' universitet del' Asie Centrale (Bulletin of the Central Asian University) (19 Volumes, 5 in English, French and German summaries), (Hereafter SAGU Bulletin plus number and year).
members and of these 47 were professors and 165 instructors. Almost all the members of the staff and instructors were Europeans. As yet there were no qualified natives for the faculty position in the University. Neither is there any record to show whether any native applied for a position in the University of Tashkent. During the academic year 1923-24, about 719 students were admitted to the first year course of the five year university degree programme. Of these, 670 or 93.8 per cent were non-natives, 21 Uzbeks, and 23 students belonged to other native national groups, such as Tajiks and Kazakhs (6.2 per cent). Until the end of 1920s, the percentage of native students in the University remained extremely low. For instance, in 1926-27, a total of 780 students were admitted to the different faculties of the University. Only 20 of these students were Uzbeks and about 21 belonged to other Central Asian national groups. In 1927-28, that is, after a decade of the establishment of Soviet power, the number of native students admitted to the first year course in Tashkent University was barely 29. The total strength of students in the University at that time stood at 3,500. Of these only 158 or 4.5 per cent students belonged to the native nationalities.

13. Ibid.
Thus, during the first decade of Soviet power, one of the important channels for social mobility so far as the natives were concerned remained extremely restricted. The main factors were, as we have repeatedly pointed out, the over-emphasis on primary education and the large drop-outs of the native students. Consequently, the solution to the problem of nativisation of the Soviet apparatus in Uzbekistan continued to evade for a long time to come.

In the late twenties, the Soviets initiated some more steps for accelerating the programme of training of lower technical cadres for the native labour force. In 1927, a number of rabfaks (workers' faculties) were started. In the three big cities of the Uzbek Republic, Tashkent, Samarkand and Ferghana, workers' universities were established. Efforts were also made to popularise a FZU (Factory Plan Apprentice) course for the guaranteed occupational mobility of the workers. The sluggish implementation programme of Uzbekification (Uzbekizatsi) of technical training, however, favoured the Russian workers. For example, during the First Five Year Plan period, although the number of trainees that pursued these FZU courses showed a phenomenal increase from 800 persons in 1927 to 6,600 in 1930,

the percentage of native trainees in these courses was about 30 per cent and that of non-natives 70 per cent. Natives representation in the courses offered by the rabfaks (workers' faculties) was, however, somewhat favourable to the natives. The natives were, in fact, in a majority in these courses and more than 9,000 workers received technical training in these crash courses during the First Plan period.

Rapid social mobility during the first decade of Soviet power in Uzbekistan was understandably enough difficult because of the backlog of extreme backwardness of the native society, economy and culture. The natives were largely uneducated and untrained to be usefully absorbed in the development programmes except in political institutions.

Moreover, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, there was inbuilt resistance to the Soviet programme of cultural transformation until the late twenties. Hence, the Soviets had to depend heavily on the induction of European skilled workers even for a moderate level of industrialization of Uzbek economy.

18. Guliamova, no. 10, p.64.

Unlike the poor response of the natives to opening opportunities in the industrial sector, they showed considerable adaptability to the teaching, judicial and medical professions. Particularly in the professions of teaching and adjudication, they fared quite well. For instance, out of 4,533 school teachers 2,296 teachers belonged to native nationalities.\textsuperscript{20} Likewise, in 1926, Soviet judicial institutions had 117 natives out of 160 judges.\textsuperscript{21} Even in such professions as nurses, physicians, dentists and pharmacists which were relatively new to the natives, they had made a beginning. By 1926, about 25 native professors, instructors, academicians found place in the University of Tashkent (See Table III).

TABLE III

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT TOTALS IN UZBEKISTAN IN 1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>No. of natives</th>
<th>% of natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors, viz. Instructors and Academicians</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>4,533</td>
<td>2,296</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe upravlenie (Central Statistical Administration) Vsesuznaia Perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda (The 1926 All-Union Census of the Population) Vol.32, Section 11 (Moscow, 1931), pp.118-155 passim.

\textsuperscript{20} See Table III.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
It seems that the Soviet Government provided greater and easier opportunities to the natives in teaching and adjudication professions with a view to counter the influence of the traditional systems of education and judiciary, which were not yet completely uprooted. In the absence of rapid nativization of these professions the Soviets would have obviously faced greater resistance to their attempts at liquidating them.

An important sector in which the natives did extremely well was political administration. After the dust of the revolution and the civil war had settled down, the members of native nationalities, in some cases despite their poor educational background, found the doors of the institutions of power and privileges in the Party and Government organisations open for them. The Party census of 1925 revealed the poor educational background of the Communist Party members in general. As for the native members, they almost all of them had no educational qualification or had only primary education or informal education imparted by the centres for the eradication of illiteracy so much so that there were only 36 persons in the Uzbek Party with higher education and about 1 in 25 had received complete secondary education. 22

Whether the natives in these Party and Governmental institutions wielded effective power has been a subject of great controversy. Western Sovietologists generally point out that the Russians had picked up pliant natives who were educationally ill-equipped to perform their jobs by themselves. In support of this line of thinking they usually cite the case of Yuldash Akhunbabaev, a poor educated Uzbek farmer who became the first President of the Congress of Soviets of Uzbekistan. It is indeed true that despite an apparent lack of formal educational qualifications a large number of natives moved into positions of power in the Party and the Government. But this does not mean that all such persons were merely tools of Russian hegemony. In fact, they acquired their positions because of their political work and long association with the Communist Party. Secondly, the doors of the Party were not closed upon the educated natives. Faizulla Khojaev and Akmal Ikramov who became leading members of the Soviet Government of Uzbekistan and the Communist Party of Uzbekistan were men of letters devoted to their work and proud of their culture and society. Their contribution and extreme sacrifices in building a socialist Uzbekistan while retaining its cultural autonomy cannot be minimised.23

23. Both Faizulla Khojaev and Akmal Ikramov were declared traitors by Stalin and were executed sometimes in 1937. Later posthumously both of them were rehabilitated. Among the natives they are very popular.
Moreover, in most of the Soviet organisations except those places special administrative training was an essential requirement, the natives were sufficiently entrenched. As early as in 1926 at the level of rural Soviets, which constituted an overwhelming majority of Soviets, the natives controlled as much as 96.1 per cent of positions and at the rayon and volost executive committees 88.2 per cent.

| TABLE IV |
| LEADING PERSONNEL IN THE UZBEK PARTY AND GOVERNMENT IN 1926 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>No. of natives</th>
<th>Percentage of natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All leading Personnel</td>
<td>5,458</td>
<td>2,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblast and Gubernial Admn.</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okrug and Uezd Admn.</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raion and Volost Executive Committee</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Soviets</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and Factory Committee</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TsSU, Vsesoiuznaia peripis'... pp.118-155, passim.

Although, in urban Soviets their level of representation was not as high as in rural Soviets, it appeared to have registered a steady growth from late twenties onwards. 24

At the Central and regional levels of administration the natives did not constitute a majority but their positions during the short period had shown considerable improvement as compared to that in the pre-revolution days. As shown in Table IV, of the 5,485 leading personnel, 2,544 were of native nationalities, as early as 1926, while at the regional (okrug) and district (Uezd) levels the natives occupied 372 positions out of 837. It was only at the oblast and gubernia levels of administration and in the local and factory committees that the representation of the natives was poor. Obviously, at the gubernia and oblast level, the higher level of administration, the poor percentage of representation of the natives could be explained in terms of shortage of educationally qualified and trained natives. At the local and factory committees, it certainly showed the traditional political apathy of the native masses as well as it was due to the small number of native working class.

After 1926, rapid expansion of education and strides in Uzbek economy considerably improved the level of native representation both at the Party and State organisations.

The Census of 1926 showed that the natives preferred to work in rural areas. More than 90 per cent of the native labour force was engaged in agricultural work.25 This trend

25. See Tsentral'nnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie (Central Statistical Administration) Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda (The 1926 All Union Census of population) Vol. 32, Section 11, Moscow, 1931, p.118.
was also noted in the 1939 Census which reported that about 70.8 per cent of the population of Uzbekistan was employed in agricultural and related work. In 1926, the percentage of native workers in industry constituted 45.7; in building construction 44.8; and in railroad transport the natives constituted barely 10.2 per cent. Thus, their representation was high only in areas where least educational qualification or special training was required, such as agriculture labour or non-skilled labour in urban areas (See Table V).

### TABLE V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. of total persons employed</th>
<th>No. of natives</th>
<th>Percentage of natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total UzSSR</td>
<td>2,243,690</td>
<td>2,065,492</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers (unskilled)</td>
<td>136,221</td>
<td>102,462</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>57,052</td>
<td>53,436</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>14,321</td>
<td>6,543</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4,907</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>11,582</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The problem of social mobility of the backward social groups and the nativisation of the Soviet apparatus

continued to agitate the mind of the native communist leadership. The Central Bolshevik leadership too repeatedly emphasised the importance of the resolution of these problems for the realization of correct Leninist national policy. Several measures were suggested to resolve this issue speedily. These ranged from quickening the pace of the training of the natives for technical, administrative position to the Uzbekification (Uzbekizatsi) of the technical and higher education. As a result, since 1927-28 onwards, the intake of the native students in Universities and technical institutions showed an upward trend.

During the First Five Year Plan period the members of deprived social groups got increasing opportunities for higher education. For instance, during the academic years 1927-28 and 1929-30 the percentage of students admitted to the Central Asian State University (Srednei Aziaatski Gosudarstvenie Universitet - SAGU) showed a favourable trend in respect of those who came from the traditionally deprived classes, such as, the workers and peasants. Whereas the percentage of students coming from the urbanised middle class families of 'employees' showed a downward tendency (See Table VI).

27. See "Postanovlenie Sredazburo Tsk RKP (b) o korenizatsii apparata sovetskikh uchrazhdenii i profsouioznykh organizatsii Srednei Azii" (The resolution of the Central Asian Bureau of Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (B) on the nativisation of apparatus of Soviet Institutions and trade unions organisations of Central Asia) cited in KPSS i Sovetskoe pravitelstvo ob Uzbekistane sbornik dokumentov, 1925-1970 gg., Tashkent, 1972, pp.159-61.
TABLE VI
SOCIAL ORIGIN OF STUDENTS ADMITTED TO
SAGU, 1927-28 TO 1929-30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Total Admitted</th>
<th>Worker percent</th>
<th>Peasant percent</th>
<th>Employee percent</th>
<th>Other percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927-1928</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-29</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SAGU Bulletin, No. 18, p. 146.

Table VI clearly shows that the percentage of students coming from the social background of working class and peasantry sharply increased from 5.4 to 22.4 and from 1.4 to 5.0 respectively, whereas the percentage of students belonging to the middle class families of 'employees' decreased from 62.8 per cent to 38.0 per cent. However, the percentage of students belonging to undefined social category fluctuated between 30.4 per cent to 37.8 per cent during the period from 1927-28 to 1929-30.

The increasing demand for the nativisation of the Soviet apparatus and its articulation by the native communists, however, continued unabated, suggesting that no major break-through had been achieved. The native leadership argued that mere nativisation of the lower Soviet apparatus was not enough. The process of nativisation, they demanded,
should also progressively encompass higher levels of administration. They further argued that this could be realised only after something concrete was done to accelerate the process of Uzbekification of higher and technical education.

The Central Bolshevik leadership was thus made fully aware of the problem of nativisation in Uzbekistan. In 1931, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviets took up the issue. Accordingly, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviets, while appreciating the significant progress in the nativisation of lower organs (nizovykh organov) of the Uzbek Government, pointed out the shortcomings in the field of higher republican organs and criticised the work of the Central Commission for Uzbekification (Tsentral'noi Komissii po Uzbekizatsii); it called for raising the academic and technical standards of the workers belonging to the native nationalities, and emphasised the urgent need to hasten the process of Uzbekification and nativisation to meet the genuine aspirations of the native working masses.

In fact, the problem of nativisation remained very complex. A fundamental issue was involved. While some

28. Ibid., See Postanovlenie prezidiuma Tsk SSR ob Uzbekizatsi gosudarstvennogo apparata, vovlechenii rabochikh v proizvodstvo i podgotovke kadrov v UzSSR, 23 Noiabria 1931 g. (The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, USSR, on the Uzbekification of governmental apparatus, drawing of the workers (native) in production and the training of cadres in Uzbek SSR, November 23, 1931), pp.171-73.

29. Ibid.
Russian Communists saw in the increasing demand for nativisation the manifestation of the old bourgeois tendency of separatism and narrow nationalism, the native communists interpreted the resistance to the process of nativisation in terms of traditional Great Russian chauvinism. In 1933, the problem and prospects of nativisation in the light of past achievements were thoroughly reviewed by the Plenum of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B). In a resolution, the Plenum appreciated the great achievements made in the fields of collectivization and development of rural economy, liquidation of illiteracy and the steadily increasing nativisation of working force in the industrial economy. Nevertheless, it also repeated the shortcomings pointed out by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR two years ago. The resolution cautioned the Party and the state machinery to be on guard against anti-Soviet forces (i.e., separatism and narrow nationalism and the Great Russian chauvinism) while pursuing the policy of nativisation. It further demanded the struggle to be waged on both the fronts: against the Great Russian chauvinism, which was seen as the main danger, and local bourgeois nationalism.

30. Ibid., See Iz postanovlenie plenuma sredaziuro Tsk VKP (b) o natsionalizatsi sovetskogo apparata republikakh Srednei Azii 1933, (From the resolution of the Plenum of Central Asian Bureau of Central Committee, of the All Union Communist Party (B) on the nativisation of the Soviet apparatus in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, 1933), pp. 173-84.

31. Ibid., p. 177.
In the absence of well-defined concrete suggestions, the resolution in practice amounted to giving a comparatively free hand to the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and the Government of Uzbek SSR in implementing these policy guidelines. It was, thus, no surprise that there was soon opened a second university in the historic city of Samarkand by integrating the Samarkand pedagogical institute and the medical institute. To make it a full-fledged University the following faculties were added: Physics-Mathematics, Biology, Chemistry, Social Sciences and the Faculty of Languages and literature. Named as the Uzbek State University (Samarkand), it was primarily meant to fulfil the needs and aspirations of the natives; its significant feature was that Uzbek language became the medium of instructions.

The establishment of the Uzbek State University was a step in the direction of fulfilling a long felt need. The only other University, the Central Asian State University at Tashkent drew only a small number of native students as its medium of instructions was Russian. But with the new University having its medium of instruction as Uzbek, the way

32. Uzbek SSR Narodniyi Kommissariat proveshchenii (The Uzbek SSR People's Commissariat of Education), Spravochnik i programmy ispytaniii dlia postupaiushchik v universitety i pedagogicheskie je uchitel'skie instituty Uzbekskoi SSR (Reference book and programme guide for entrance in universities, pedagogical and teachers' training institutes in the Uzbek SSR), Tashkent, 1938, p.28.
was cleared for higher education of the natives. During the thirties, the Uzbek State University provided effective channel for the natives for upward social mobility. At that crucial juncture of Uzbek history, it equipped the natives to meet the new challenges of nation-building. Moreover, it went a long way in countering a sense of despair and demoralisation among the natives who were not yet, historically speaking, ready for a social revolution. Indeed, the University at Samarkand played a crucial role in creating a new generation of Uzbek intelligentsia imbued with secular ideas and a distinct national-cultural identity.

The impact of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the recommendations of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) was even felt in the admission policy of the Central Asian State University, Tashkent. During the academic year 1933-34, the number of native students admitted to the different faculties of the Central Asian State University increased. For example, the percentage of the students of native nationalities in the faculties of Biology was 34 per cent, Physics-Mathematics 50 per cent and Chemistry 40 per cent (See Table VII). Although the number of native students was not yet in proportion to the population of various national groups vis-à-vis the Russians in Uzbekistan, the year 1933-34 was a trend-setter so far as the admission of the native students in this University was concerned.
TABLE VII
NATIONALITY OF STUDENTS IN SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES
AT THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATE UNIVERSITY, 1933-34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Biology</th>
<th>Phys. Math.</th>
<th>Chemistry</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All students</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Whom: Kazakhs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asian Jews</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uigurs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asian Total</td>
<td>97(34%)</td>
<td>65(50%)</td>
<td>124(40%)</td>
<td>285(39.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, we see that by the end of the thirties an effective network of institutional channel had been created which considerably smoothed a moderate rate of social mobility. At the political and administrative levels also the native had made a marked breakthrough, although in certain Russian circles, their commitment to the Soviets was not always entirely above suspicion. The survival of the system demanded a more balanced approach, particularly in view of the gathering storm in Europe.
This increasing trend of nativisation was also discernible in the field of technical education where the native representation had hitherto been very low. The prominent technical institution, Tash-sel-mash, engaged in the training of agricultural engineers offered in 1932, 20 different courses for the workers already employed within the plants.33

The decree on schools with factory plan apprentice (FZU), issued on August 15, 1933, was also meant to accelerate the pace of vocational education so as to enable the workers to acquire higher technical education for further promotions. A flexible system of requirements, such as relaxation in academic qualifications and professional experience for admission was designed to give incentive particularly to the native workers for continuing their education. In the railways and textile industry, where the representation of the native workers had shown no significant increase, preferential treatment was given to the natives. For instance, since 1933 Tashkent Rail Transport, Tekhnikum, and the Tashkent Textile Plant adopted a recruitment policy of giving as much as 75 per cent of seats to the native workers and students. In the Tekhnikum and Textile Plant located in Ferghana, 75 per cent of the students were of native

33. Aminova, no.17, p. 143.
nationalities. Likewise, about 66 per cent of the total students in polytechnical institute in Tashkent belonged to the native national groups in 1934.35

As the requirements of trained personnel were mounting on account of rapid developmental activities, a large number of native students were sent for higher technical training to the European parts of the Soviet Union. In 1930, 1100 workers including 300 metallurgists, 350 textile workers, and 270 construction workers were sent for such training.36

Meanwhile, the flow of trained personnel from the European parts of Soviet Russia to the Soviet Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, increased all the more. It is worthwhile to note that with the beginning of Five Year Plans more and more skilled work force was transferred to Uzbekistan. In 1928, for instance, about 574 engineering personnel came to Uzbekistan from the heartland of Russia.37 In October 1929, 232 specialists, including 94 persons with higher education and 95 persons with secondary education, were despatched to the Uzbek SSR in order to assist and supervise the industrial development there.38 In 1930, 300 textile workers and 40 engineers and technicians joined

34. Pravda Vostoka, August 9, 10, 1933.
35. Aminova, no.17, p.228.
36. Ibid., p.145.
37. Ibid., p.151.
38. Ibid.
the growing army of engineers and technicians of European origin for setting up textile factories.\textsuperscript{39} In 1931, 45 engineers came to the republic for working in new industrial complexes established in Ferghana valley region.\textsuperscript{40} In 1932, the flow of trained personnel, including ordinary workers, from the European parts of Soviet Russia registered an unusual rapidity. About 2,443 engineers, 127 technicians and 17,000 construction workers were sent to the Uzbek SSR to provide in the words of a Soviet historian "political and moral leadership to the indigenous population, besides technical help."\textsuperscript{41}

The policy of large scale induction of non-natives was not confined to the skilled workers employed in industrial sector of the economy alone; a large number of agriculture workers and specialists were also sent to work in rural areas as well. For example, during the year 1930 about 1500 persons arrived in Uzbekistan to work in the agriculture sector of Uzbek economy.\textsuperscript{42} These included tractor drivers, machine repairmen, blacksmiths, agronomists, and political organisers. It is claimed by Soviet authors that the

\textsuperscript{39} O.B. Dzhamalov, et al. (Eds.), no.19, p.215; See also Gullamova, no.10, p.30.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., See also Aminova, no.17, p.151; Nepomnin, no.8, p.283.

\textsuperscript{42} Kh. Arifkhanova, "O promoshchi rabochego klassa v sozdani i organizatsiono-khoziastvenom ukreplenni kolkhozov Uzbekistana v 1930-32 godakh. (On the assistance of the working class in the creation and organis-

Contd....
collective farms which employed Russian workers often became models for other agricultural artels. Thus, according to Arifkhanova, the Russian work force contributed much to solving the problem of shortage of kolkhoz directors, brigade leaders, agronomists, field team leaders, tractor drivers, etc., during the period of collectivisation of land. 43

Such a large scale induction of non-natives in Uzbekistan clearly underlined the imperatives of industrialisation and collectivisation, particularly for undertakings where skilled labour force was needed. It also underscored the fact that nativization programme lagged behind the growing needs of the economy and administration. Particularly in the rural areas the programme faltered as the native masses exhibited a marked disinclination to adapt to the new mode of life generated by collectivisation of land and novel social environment created by the Soviet policy of socio-cultural transformation. Steeped in traditions, the native rural masses continued to react distastefully to attempts directed at the modernization of their socio-cultural institutions and traditions. To circumvent the Soviet legal obligations, some of them even appeared to contrive various methods, such as withdrawing their children

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43. Ibid.
from Soviet schools even before they completed primary school education. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that only a microscopic minority of students in rural areas managed to reach class IV and above of Soviet schools during the decade 1928-29 - 1938-39. ⁴⁴

A number of factors were responsible for the poor response of the rural native masses to institutionalised social mobility. First, there was traditional apathy to modern education. Generally speaking, the natives had little idea that education could be a means for advancement in social and material spheres of life, while a few regarded religious education as required for the preservation of culture. Moreover, the poor peasants and agricultural workers, the majority, could hardly afford to send their children away to schools for long duration of time. Even after the revolution, when the potential of secular and technical education had begun to be realized and the native rural masses became relatively well off, it was not easy for parents to spare their children for pursuing their education. Lastly, the native rural population displayed a marked disinclination in gravitating to urban areas.

To bring about swift attitudinal changes the Communist Party of Uzbekistan organised massive campaigns

44. See Table I.
throughout the republic. Orientation courses and lectures were conducted to attract more native workers to Soviet institutions. In July 1932, the Vth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan discussed various such dimensions of the problem of nativisation of the labour force. The problem of nativisation of labour force was agitating the mind of the native leadership because the large-scale changes effected during the First Plan period had made only an insignificant impact on the way of life of the native masses. For instance, the native unskilled workers and semi-skilled workers were reported to be around 50 per cent of all labour force in Uzbekistan even in 1932, but proportionately the representative of the natives constituted about 90 per cent of the entire population of the Republic. The percentage of the natives in skilled and technical cadres was still lower in the industrial establishments located in urban areas. In 1931, in heavy industrial complexes such as Ilich, Krasnovostochnyi and Tash-sel-mash, the percentage of the native skilled technical workers were only 32 per cent, 6.7 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. As a result of the Party's exhortations, however, the number of native workers, showed an upward trend in the following year. In Tash-sel-mash and Tekhnikums


46. Nepomnin, no.8, p. 284.
their percentage rose by 4 in 1933 over the figures of 1932. Likewise, in Samarkand Supply Institute and the Institute of Rail Transport Engineering the percentage of native workers rose to 39 per cent and 17 per cent respectively.

In the second half of the 1930s, the natives also fared relatively well in technical and higher education. In 1935 the percentage of native trainees in rabfaks (workers faculties) rose to 45, that is to say, out of 593 trainees in the rabfaks there were 274 trainees belonging to the native nationalities. On the other hand, between the academic years 1936-37 and 1939-40 the native scholars at higher education achieved considerable success in natural sciences, mathematics and technology.

Our investigation of the problem undertaken here will remain inconclusive unless we focus our attention on the role of native women in a changing social milieu. As pointed out earlier, a large number of native women had abandoned the traditional veil by mid-thirties. Besides,

49. See Fundament"al'naia biblioteka SAGU i gosudarstvennaia biblioteka Uz SSR (SAGU's Main Library and the State publications Library of the Uzbek SSR), Ukazatel' doktorskikh i kandidatskikh dissertatsii zashchis*chenych v Uzbekistane v 1936-1951 gg. (Index of doctoral and candidates of science dissertations defended in Uzbekistan between 1936-1951), Tashkent, 1954.
an increasing number of them had joined the ranks of workers, engineers, administrators, educators, nurses, musicians; quite a large number of them had become members of the Party, the Komsomol and the trade unions. For instance, of the total women employed in Uzbek economy during the Second Five Year Plan period about 24.2 per cent came from the native nationalities.\(^{50}\) About 83 native women were Chairmen of collective farms (Kolkhozov) and more than 600 women were workers-brigadiers.\(^ {51}\) Educational and health institutions attracted the native women in particular as about 30 per cent of all the workers/teachers in the educational institutions were native women.\(^ {52}\) In health and medical institutions and organisations their percentage was as high as 69.7.\(^ {53}\) From 1927 to 1932, the number of native women activists in the Trade Unions rose from 32,177 to 71,615.\(^ {54}\) Granting that the percentage of native women in public life was still low as compared to the number of women of European origin and, keeping in view that before the revolution native women

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51. Ibid., p. 94.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

virtually did not participate in the socio-cultural and political spheres of public life, these developments were indeed significant and contributed greatly toward the emergence of a secularised political culture and thereby to the consolidation of Soviet system in Uzbekistan.

The immediate gains of all these developments in accelerating the pace of social mobility or in the process of nativization, as discussed above, were not all that remarkable and desired as the share of trained native personnel remained disproportionate to their total number as well as need. Their importance, however, lay in signifying an increasingly favourable response of the natives to the process of change. Moreover, it also set at rest the sense of despair among the disgruntled elements of the Uzbek society that the Soviets were forcing the pace and content of socio-economic changes so as to keep their compatriots cut off from positions of power in different Soviet institutions. As has been amply demonstrated, the policy of the Soviet leadership was to move in such a way as not to alienate any community, group or nationality by pursuing discriminatory practices. Despite the complexity of the problems involved, every effort was made to associate, align and win over the hearts of the nationalities by providing them with special opportunities and opening up new avenues for their advancement. Needless to add, the consolidation
of the Soviet system being the primary objective, this brook
no opposition.

As the gathering storm in Europe (i.e., the Second
World War) began to make the Soviet leadership uneasy and
apprehensive, the native society had already gone through
fundamental changes. The traditional static social system
had been destroyed. Social mobility no more depended on
heredity as in the feudal/patriarchal system, or largely on
money, as in the capitalist system; it had now acquired new
channel and vastly improved opportunities heavily weighed
to favour the native population of Uzbekistan, as is vividly
reflected in the following Table.

TABLE VIII
NATIONALITY-WISE COMPOSITION OF STUDENTS
DURING THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1940-41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
<th>Percentage of the total students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>858,700</td>
<td>70.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>72,600</td>
<td>5.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>42,800</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakalpaks</td>
<td>30,900</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmens</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>194,200</td>
<td>15.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Narodnoi Ozbrozovanie v Uzbekistane* (Public
Education in Uzbekistan), Tashkent, 1947, p.21.