PREFACE

Before India and Pakistan could settle down to their independence, they got entangled in a military and diplomatic confrontation over the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, which was in Dennis Kux's words, "the unfinished business of partition." Since then, the India-Pakistan relationship has witnessed unceasing hostility, suspicion and rivalry. Despite incessant endeavours at rapprochement, the two countries remain entangled in seemingly unending conflict. In the last fifty-nine years, they have fought three major wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and one limited-scale war in 1999 against each other.

The US policy approach towards these conflicts changed from time to time depending upon its national interests, Cold War dynamics and prevailing geo-strategic considerations. Nevertheless, the US policy played a critical role in determining the course and outcomes of Indo-Pakistan conflicts in some way other. Since there were not many other external actors, which could decisively influence the course of South Asian events, the US role appeared quite prominent. With the solitary exception of the 1971 war, it was largely the US initiative, which was instrumental in ending the India-Pakistan conflicts in other occasions.

The present study is a modest attempt to make an in-depth analysis of the US policy towards India-Pakistan armed conflicts. Its scope is limited to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999, and the American policy response to those conflicts. This study traces the long-term and short-term causes of India-Pakistan conflicts leading to war between the two. It also critically examines how the American response had impinged on the course and outcomes of these conflicts.
Moreover, the study attempts to delineate the underlying factors, which influenced the US policy response.

The thesis consists of six chapters. The first one is the introductory chapter. It briefly introduces the topic, describes the rationale of the study and outlines the structure of the thesis.

The second chapter deals with the US response to the first Indo-Pakistan armed conflict over Kashmir. It makes an in-depth analysis of the origin of Indo-Pak dispute over the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, which strained their bilateral relations in subsequent years. It also discusses the factors, which initially restrained Washington from getting involved in the conflict, but later induced it to play an active role in ending the war.

The third chapter focuses on the American response towards 1965 Indo-Pak war. It discusses the Kutch conflict and Pakistan-sponsored Operation Gibraltar, which took both the countries to fight another war. It tries to answer why Washington followed a policy of 'studied neutrality' and refused to oblige Pakistan's plea to intervene in the war in her favour.

The fourth chapter examines Washington's strategic tilt towards Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. It traces the genesis of East Pakistan crisis, which deteriorated the Indo-Pak relations and eventually resulted in the fourteen-day war. The chapter makes a critical analysis of the causes and consequences of the Nixon Administration's open support for Islamabad and its decision to dispatch USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal.

The fifth chapter probes the Pakistani misadventure at Kargil sector in Jammu and Kashmir, which led to a limited-scale war between India and Pakistan in July 1999. It
evaluated the distinct shift in the US policy towards India Pakistan hostility over Kashmir. For the first time in the history of Indo-Pak rivalry, the US gave up the doctrine of equal culpability and held Pakistan responsible for violating the LoC, which led to the conflict.

The last chapter is the conclusion, which contains the main findings of the study and the overall assessment of the US policy towards the four wars, which India and Pakistan fought since their independence. It also tries to delineate the emerging trend and subtle shift in the US policy towards Indo-Pak conflicts in the new world order.