Chapter 3

Non-Proliferation Challenges
The US, the first country to go nuclear, was always unfavourably disposed towards the possession of nuclear capabilities by any second nation, be it the British, the Communists, or any other. In this context, Senator John Glenn had commented:

"Halting proliferation (of nuclear weapons) is not an option for us—it is an absolutely essential objective of our national security and a crucial factor determining our country's future. It is, one might say America's new Manifest Destiny".  

In the post-Second World War era, the US attention was drawn to the nuclear proliferation issue for the first time when the People's Republic of China demonstrated its nuclear capabilities by detonating a nuclear device in September 1964. The Chinese nuclear test occurred amidst continuing Sino-US tensions. While no military action was contemplated against the Chinese, four years later, the US unfolded its strategy for thwarting further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the form of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Six years after the conclusion of the NPT, in 1974, India triggered off a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' (PNE). It was the second country in Asia and the sixth in the world to demonstrate nuclear capability. The act was a source of considerable concern for the Johnson Administration, which realized the need for

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2 Despite the fact that in 1970 the US had come up with a policy statement that it "would consider it incompatible with existing US-Indian agreements for American nuclear assistance to be employed in the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices". However, a month after the Indian PNE, the US agreed to reschedule India's foreign debt and increase economic assistance to India in cooperation with other allies by about US $200 million, in Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The US-India Conflict (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), p.169.
shaping a new and stronger US nonproliferation policy so as to ‘influence the
decisions of individual nations, such as India and Japan, which now have the
capacity of developing nuclear weapons’.³

Soon the US Congress enacted certain legislations for using American
foreign assistance as a potent tool for discouraging nuclear proliferation. The
Symington Amendment of 1976 to the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(Section 669) prohibited aid for non-nuclear weapon states importing uranium
enrichment technology or equipment but refusing to place its nuclear installations
under IAEA safeguards.⁴ The Glenn Amendment of 1977 to the US Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 670(a)(1)(A)) prohibited aid to any country
importing reprocessing technology or equipment and to any non-nuclear weapon
state receiving or detonating a nuclear explosive device or transferring such
devices to any non-nuclear weapon state.⁵

The enactment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act by the US Congress in
1978 was an extremely significant step in the evolution of the non-proliferation
policy of the US. The Act made it difficult for India to buy fuel for the Tarapur
nuclear reactors under the 1963 Indo-American Agreement. Purchase of nuclear
fuel from the US was now contingent upon India’s agreeing to IAEA safeguards
on all its nuclear installations.⁶

³ It must be pointed out that India and Japan had serious reservations against the NPT (Japan had
accepted extension of the American nuclear umbrella over its territory but ratified the Treaty only
in 1976), In Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S. India Conflict (New Delhi: Orient
376.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Chintamani Mahapatra “US Approach to Nuclear Proliferation in Asia”, Asian Strategic Review,
It is important to note that when the Western reaction to the Indian PNE was still strong, and the US Congress was busy enacting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, Pakistan had already embarked upon its clandestine nuclear build-up. The build-up was, however, overlooked due to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. But after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, the US changed its position on Pakistan's nuclear activities. The Bush administration could no longer certify Pakistan's nuclear 'virginity' to the Congress by way of the Pressler Amendment.

The period from December 1979 to September 1989 was characterized by an inward-looking US nuclear non-proliferation policy, which focused almost entirely on achievement of US national security objectives and refrained from taking a balanced view of the challenges of nuclear proliferation, especially posed by tactical alliance partners.

**Agni**

Soon after becoming the forty-first President of the United States, George Bush had to face new challenges in South Asia. As the former Soviet Union was making preparations for winding up its military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India were getting their respective acts together for establishing their credentials as missile powers in the region.

On 11 February 1989, Pakistan conducted its first test launches of the HATF-1 and HATF-2 missiles having ranges of 80 and 300 kms respectively. These missiles reportedly could carry payloads of up to 500 kg ('HATF' is the

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7 Pakistan had begun to construct the 'pilot plant' at Sihala, which went operational in 1979.
Arabic term for ‘deadly’ and was the name of the sword used by Prophet Mohammad).\textsuperscript{8} This was more of a reaction to India’s first launch of the \textit{Prithvi} missile on 18 February 1988, approximately a year before the Pakistani \textit{Hatfs}.\textsuperscript{9}

Pakistan’s missile programme must be viewed in the backdrop of its nuclear programme as a necessary deterrence against a more powerful India. Stephen Cohen had, in fact, argued that ‘a Pakistani nuclear capability paralyses not only the Indian nuclear decision but also Indian conventional forces and a brash bold Pakistani strike to liberate Kashmir might go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive’.\textsuperscript{10}

There was also a wider dimension to Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the erstwhile Pakistani Premier and the man responsible for the Islamic bomb had said:

> ‘we know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christians (and the) Jewish and Hindu...also have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic world was without it, but that position is about to change.’\textsuperscript{11}

Dr A.Q. Khan further stated:

> ‘All the western countries, including Israel, are not only Pakistan’s enemies but also enemies of Islam...All this is part of the crusades which the Christians and Jews initiated against the Muslims 1,000 years ago. They are afraid that if Pakistan makes obvious progress in this field the whole

\textsuperscript{9} However, the Indian missile had serious problems and had limitations as a military useful system, In Perkovich, no.8, p.295 for details of its technical problems.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{The Times of India}, 4-7 July 1984.
Islamic world will stand to benefit."12 (Emphasis added).

The statement clearly shows that Pakistan was claiming to represent the Islamic world and aspire to lead it too. Further, there were also numerous reports of Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.13 The two missile tests reflected a new dimension in the Indo-Pak military competition at a time when the US was leading an international effort to block missile proliferation.14

A few months after the Pakistani missile tests, India test launched its first intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the 1,500-mile-range Agni ('Fire') on 22 May 1989, off the Chandipur Interim Test Range on the coast of the eastern state of Orissa.15 Earlier, India had test fired a shorter range Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM), the 'Prithvi', which like Agni could carry a nuclear payload. India's rapid strides in the nuclear field were the outcome of the 'dual use' of the civilian space technologies for military ends.16

Before the launch of Agni, V.S. Arunachalam had informed the US ambassador to India, John Gunther Dean, about the test. Dean persuaded Arunachalam to call off the test. The advice of the US Ambassador was unlikely to be heeded by the Government of India for two reasons. First, Pakistan had flexed its missile muscle just a few months earlier. Secondly, the US was not

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14 In April 1987, after years of discussions between the US and the other major Western technology-supplier countries, the MTCR was formed to extend the international non-proliferation regime to missile delivery systems.
16 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, In Chellaney, no.19; pp.55-56.
known to have given similar advice to Pakistan. The *Agni* test of 22 May was successful, though, it had failed in the first attempt on 18 May 1989.\(^\text{17}\)

Congratulating the scientists and the nation after the launch of *Agni*, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proclaimed:

"We lost our independence two centuries ago because we were disunited on the home front and not vigilant on the external front. We must remember that technological backwardness also leads to subjugation. Never again will we allow our freedom to be compromised."\(^\text{18}\) (Emphasis added).

After the successful test firing of *Agni*, Abdul Kalam, the head of the Indian missile programme, commented, '*Agni* is a technological strength. Strength respects strength. Weaklings are not honoured. So we should be strong.'\(^\text{19}\) It was believed by some that *Agni* was the first weapon system that could hit targets deep inside China. However, some foreign intelligence sources concluded that the *Agni* could fly approximately 800 km, not far enough to reach China.\(^\text{20}\)

During the initial months of the Bush Administration, the Indian subcontinent appeared to be an arena of missile competition, which rapidly enhanced the strategic volatility of the region.\(^\text{21}\) The heightened military arsenal build-up and the growing uncertainty that accompanied it were however not

\(^{17}\) In the Congressional testimony on 18 May 1989, the CIA Director William Webster stated that there was growing concern over regional arms race and intelligence indicates that India was seeking 'thermo-nuclear weapons capability', In Barbara Gossette, “India Reports Successful Test of Mid-Range Missile”, *New York Times*, 23 May 1991, p. A9, In Perkovich, no.8, p.549.


\(^{21}\) According to one of the experts closely involved with the *Agni* launch, interviewed on 18.5.02, neither *Hatf I* or *Hatf II* rendered the South Asian region volatile. Further, he was of the opinion that the Pakistani tests did not tilt the nuclear balance in the region.
unexpected. A section of the American strategic community had already anticipated during the early 1980s that the technological momentum in Pakistan and India was certain to accelerate in coming years. This anticipation had led to discussion and debate on three possible alternative scenarios:

- **Status quo:** India and Pakistan could retain their present policies of calculated nuclear ambiguity but continue to strengthen weapons capabilities and work on various component programmes of a nuclear deterrent.

- **Weaponisation:** India and Pakistan could build limited nuclear arsenals for deterrence, but no nuclear arms race breaks out in the subcontinent.

- **Arms race:** India could become involved in a dual nuclear arms race with China and Pakistan. It seemed likely however, that Pakistan and India would, at some point in the not-too-distant future move from their present policies to overt weaponisation.  

India began its nuclear explosives programme seriously only after the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, although India built Asia’s first research reactor outside the Soviet Union (*Apsara* in the mid-1950s).

When Pakistan and India test launched their missiles in late 1980s, the Cold War was yet to be over. The Soviet Union still existed. Soviet troops were stationed in Afghanistan. Pakistan continued to be a strategic partner of the United

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23 India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) programme was launched in 1965 but was then shelved for a few years. Paul F. Power, "The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy", *Asian Survey*, warned by Washington in a 1970 classified aide-memoir that development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices would be considered ‘tantamount to the development of nuclear weapons.’ The aide-memoire was declassified 19 September 1980, by the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, In Chellaney, no.19, p.61.
States. These factors had, thus, considerable influence in shaping the general US perception of Indian missile tests.

The Agni test signaled unresolved conflict in Indo-American interests and evoked mixed response. Washington was already annoyed with India since it had disregarded the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) invoked in April 1987 by test-launching Prithvi. After years of discussions between United States and other Western technology-supplier countries, the MTCR was formed to extend the international nonproliferation regime to missile delivery systems. The member countries had agreed not to export missiles capable of delivering 500-kilogram payloads more than 300 kilometers and other covered items to any other country and if they did it at all, the members agreed to negotiate strict end-use assurances.24

Though the Indian and Pakistani systems tested fell far below the limit set by the MTCR guidelines, Bush government could not ignore the tests because most of the technologies used were of dual use, thus implying that they could be used both for civilian and military purposes. The fear was that countries such as India, seeking to modernize their economies, could become their potential competitors in the field by becoming lucrative markets for their wares.25

The Agni further added fuel to the fire. There was much furor in the US Congress. Twenty-two Senators wrote to the President immediately after the test decrying it as 'a highly destabilizing development in the region' and demanding that the administration do more to stop the Indian missile programme.26

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24 Perkovich, no.8, p.300.
25 Perkovich, no.8, p.300.
and American officials were scheduled to meet a week following the test. While the Bush administration did not call off the meeting, Congressional pressure compelled the Administration to reverse course and deny in June 1989 an export license for a US $1.2 million rocket-testing device that simulated the heat and vibration of re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere (Combined Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System). 27

Earlier, Ling Electronics Inc., a California-based company, had legally shipped a larger such device to India in 1988, which had given rise to press and Congressional charges that the Commerce Department had not adhered to MTCR guidelines. 28 American concerns over missile proliferation also led to additional delays and conditions on the sale of a new supercomputer to India, the Cray XMP-22, which was twice as powerful as the previously sold XMP-14. 29 The US $50 million XMP-22 export was not approved until December 1990. 30

Further following the test, Washington tried to discourage India’s space programme by instituting technology control regulations. On 16 June 1992, the US Department of Commerce amended the Export Administration Regulations by modifying a list of countries to which no American company could export any product that would be used for missile design, development, production and end-use. India’s Agni, Prithvi and other Space programmes, such as the SLV, ASLV, PSLV and GSLV were specifically included in the amendment. 31

29 Perkovich, no.8, p.302.
30 Kux, no.27, p.431.
After the Agni tests in 1989, the US came out with a three-pronged non-proliferation strategy aimed at (i) strengthening existing multilateral agreements and arrangements (ii) expanding the membership of technology control cartels and the NPT and (iii) promoting new initiatives such as regional arms control and a chemical weapons convention.

Such a strategy led to both conflict and cooperation with India. While the potential for further conflict was apparent from the attempts to slowdown the Indian nuclear and missile programmes, there was a parallel and paradoxical prospect for US-India cooperation on non-proliferation issues, underscored by India’s emergence as a second-tier supplier. The US faced a policy dilemma. It could not pursue an effective non-proliferation strategy without receiving cooperation from a country like India that itself had been a major target of Western technology control regimes.

In contrast to the strong reactions in Washington following the 1989 Agni test, the US came out with a short muted criticism of the Agni test of 1992. Around this time America was seeing India as a 'rising power'. On the day the Agni flew east over the Bay of Bengal, American naval forces to the West, in the Indian Ocean, were conducting their first joint exercises with the Indian fleet. This signaled that Washington around this time was prepared to advance friendship with India despite irritants. Given the choice between little progress on

35 Perkovich, no.8, p.328.
nonproliferation and poor relations with India and Pakistan, or little progress on nonproliferation and good relations with them, American policymakers appeared to have preferred the latter and were keen on maintaining good ties with both the countries. However, certain issues like technology transfer continued to prick the newfound relationship, though the US partially eased the ISRO sanctions and allowed shipments to India of supplies that had been blocked prior to the sanctions.

Technology Denial

India has always wanted cooperation in the areas of high technology from the US. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on transfer of technology signed in 1984 was implemented without any major constraint since the Cold War was on and Washington was aiming at cultivating India by reducing its dependence on Soviet Union and weaning it away from the Communist regime.

But with the end of the Cold War, Washington’s priorities began to change. The annual review meeting in 1989 sought to streamline certain procedures for high-technology ‘controlled’ equipment from the US. In November 1991, President George Bush signed into law the US missiles export sanctions act, which stated:

“if the US Government determines that a firm, government entity, or individual in a non-MTCR adherent country has participated in the transfer to another non-MTCR adherent country of items regulated by the regime, sanctions are to be regulated

36 Author’s contemporaneous discussions with American State Department and National Security Council officials, Perkovich, no.8, p.329.
against those involved, with the severity of the sanctions depending on the item transferred."

It was an indication that US-Indian cooperation in high technology trade would soon be affected by the new initiatives of the Bush Administration. While the cooperation in the fields of agricultural and medical sciences continued more or less satisfactorily, the rising US concerns on nuclear and missile proliferation impeded the high technology trade between the two countries. As a result, the Cray XMP-14 supercomputer at the National Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasting in New Delhi was upgraded by the US to Cray XMP-216 (also discussed in Chapter II).

But the proliferation concerns heightened by the Gulf crisis and the subsequent coalition war against Iraq made the US more stringent in trading dual-use high technology items. India was one of the victims of stringent American rules and the negotiations for a second supercomputer for the Bangalore based Indian Institute of Science did not bear fruit with Washington insisting on 'intrusive and restrictive security and end-use conditions'.

Kashmir and Human Rights

It is important at this juncture to focus upon the US attitude towards Kashmir, historically. The Kashmir policy of the United States never intended to solve the problem. Issues like abuse of human rights and the nuclear developments in the subcontinent were instrumental in shaping Washington’s

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38 *Arms Control Reporter*, 1996.
views on Kashmir issue. The reason behind the apparent lack of ‘purpose’ in the US policy on Kashmir was its reluctance to antagonize Pakistan, which was a ‘frontline’ state for America in so far as the Cold War dynamics of South Asia was concerned.

The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in the US perspectives of South Asia and its constituent states. The change was evident in the reformed US posture towards Pakistan. In clear departures from past trends, the Bush Administration decided to act tough with Pakistan on certain issues of far-reaching significance. One of the important examples was the declared unwillingness to support Pakistan’s long-standing demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

During a Congressional testimony in Washington on 6 March 1990, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, John Kelly, was forthright in declaring the US disinterest in supporting Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. Besides, in a clear condemnation of Pakistan’s attempts to fuel insurgency in Kashmir by provoking religious fundamentalism, US threatened to discontinue disbursement of aid to the country, if it was found guilty of “aiding and abetting state terrorism”.

Further with regard to human rights, the Bush Administration listed human rights as a major US South Asia policy concern, and the State Department carried a number of reports on human rights abuses in the region in its Annual Country

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41 Kashmiri militancy took birth after the formation of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1989 with the assistance and encouragement of Islamabad. Since JKLF demanded independence of Kashmir, Islamabad began encouraging other groups with pro-Pakistani tilt.
Reports on Human Rights Practices. Many in the Congress expressed reservations with what they perceived to be a ‘lack of effective action by the State Department on the issue’. The present Administration, following its current position, preferred to treat the issue as an internal matter of India and pretended to show reluctance to become directly involved with Kashmir. Many members in the Congress proposed various resolutions deploring human rights violations in India, seeking access to troubled areas of India for human rights monitoring organizations. However, in 1989, a bill linking development aid to India with an improved human rights situation in Kashmir and Punjab and access for Amnesty International was narrowly defeated.

It was realized that cutting off or reducing aid on account of human rights violations could have sent a ‘message’; but it likewise could have also inhibited US access to the offending government and would have made it difficult to promote other policy goals for which aid could have been an important prerequisite.

The US reluctance to extend support, arguably due to the changed strategic priorities in South Asia that emanated from a gradually unfolding post-Cold War scenario, was quickly realized by Pakistan. The country responded by asserting its identity as a nuclear state in the region. Given Pakistan’s intentions to impart a decidedly prominent nuclear dimension to the strategic facet of the subcontinent, it was only natural that India would react in a similar vein.

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44 Ibid, pp.28-29.
46 Pakistan’s ability to utilize its nuclear capabilities for military purposes was evident after the launch of HATF-I and HATF-II missiles (February 1989).
47 India test launched AGNI (IRBM) in May 1989, shortly after the HATF missiles.

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Nuclear Confrontation

While the Bush Administration was confronted with the issue of 'missile proliferation' in South Asia in 1989, it faced a perceived bigger challenge in 1990—a possible nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.

The spring of 1990 came uncomfortably close to the eruption of such a crisis. Indo-Pak tensions snowballed to a critical extent over Kashmir. The challenge to Indian governance in the Muslim-majority Kashmir was followed by 1987 rigging of elections in Jammu and Kashmir by Congress (I)-National Conference. The resulting resurgence of Islamic militancy in Kashmir, and Pakistan’s dedicated support to the perpetrators of terrorism (notwithstanding the strict pronouncements from Washington), had the inevitable fallout of escalating tension over Kashmir.

War rhetoric was quite high when the Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and promised a ‘thousand-year war’. The Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Aslam Beg made a trip to Tehran where he claimed to have gained Iranian support that would ensure a Pakistani victory in the event of war breaking out in Kashmir.

48 A little before this, Benazir Bhutto was immensely praised by the US government in 1989, when she visited the US. She had charmed the President and the Administration seemed to think that because of her background and education, it would be easy to impress upon her. This would enable her to usher in democracy in Pakistan and the US could have a say in its nuclear policy, “US Senator Solarz Praise Benazir’s Courage and Intellect”, Public Opinion Trend (Pakistan Series), vol.17, Jan-Feb 1989, p.224, ‘for war rhetoric’, see Perkovich, no.8, p.98.

49 Robert Oakley, interviewed by Perkovich, 14 January 1998. Oakley sought to disabuse Beg and President Khan of illusions that Iranian support would be decisive against India, In Perkovich, no.8, p.550.
The US could not remain indifferent to the alarming situation evolving in the subcontinent. It tried to placate both the nations into peaceful moderation. Responding positively to US concerns, New Delhi accepted the initiative of US Ambassador William Clark and authorized American military attaches to travel to the LOC in Kashmir and the conventional military staging areas in Rajasthan to see for themselves that no Indian mobilization of troops for invasion of Pakistan was occurring. Still, escalating rhetoric and earlier troop movements raised fears in the US Embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad that the 1987 Brasstacks scenario might be repeated. Washington sent messages to the governments of China, the Soviet Union and some European countries asking them to urge India and Pakistan to exercise restraint.

The situation began to look grim when US intercepted a message to the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) ordering it to assemble at least one nuclear weapon. The US National Intelligence Office for Warning cautioned that an Indo-Pakistani war could break out involving the use of nuclear or chemical weapons. Intelligence officials wanted the administration to consider a possible response to nuclear weapon use, before it happened. 'That some type of inaction in South Asia [as in Iraq] where you have two nuclear capable nations on the brink of nuclear war will be disastrous.... Not only in terms of war-related death

50 Exercise Brasstacks, July 1986-87(Feb.) was the largest and most ambitious military exercise in the subcontinent’s history to develop, test and demonstrate India’s capacity to conduct mobile armored warfare, with close air support, integrated by new communications and command and control system. The operation was carried out in the desert area of Rajasthan-Sindh along the Pak-India border and both India and Pakistan reached a military crisis., In Perkovich, no.8, pp. 277-279.

51 Interviews by Perkovich with then-US ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley and then-National Security Council official Richard Haass, 14 and 23 January, 1988, respectively, Perkovich, no.8, p.308.
and destruction, it will also irrevocably damage our position as leader of the free
world’, one US source said.52

As Paul Wolfowitz, the then Under Secretary of Defense told Mitchell
Reiss, ‘We knew that Pakistan assembled a nuclear weapon’.53 Knowledge of this
mobilization set American officials in motion to defuse the crisis.54 Soon in the
third week of May a high level team was sent comprising of National Security
Council aide Richard Haass and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and
South Asian Affairs John Kelly with Deputy National Security Adviser Robert
Gates.55 The main focus of the mission was to encourage both India and Pakistan
to defuse the crisis. As Gates told Seymour Hersh, the main problem was that both
the governments were ‘too weak to stop a war… There was the view that both
sides were blundering toward a war’.56

The meeting took place in Pakistan on 20 May, between Gates and Robert
Oakley, the then US ambassador to Pakistan. The Pakistanis were told that there
was not a single way they could win.57 The team also made it clear that the
Pakistani’s nuclear programme was already detected by the US and would force

52 “South Asia Nuclear Zone”, Arms Control Reporter, vol.11: 7, July 1992, ISSN 0886:3490
53 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p.188, In Perkovich, no.8, p.309.
54 Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge”, p.94. He asserted that three additional alarming
activities were detected: “Sometime in May … an orbiting American satellite relayed photographs
of what some officials believed was the evacuation of thousands of workers from Kahuta”; “satellite
and other intelligence later produced signs of a truck convoy moving from the suspected
nuclear storage site in Balochistan to a nearby Air Force base”; finally, intelligence detected that
Pakistan “had F-16s prepositioned and armed for delivery-on full alert, with pilots in the
aircraft”. These latter three assertions have been contested by the US ambassador and military attaches then
stationed in Pakistan and must be doubted. Then-US-Air Force attache Colonel Don Jones, in
Krepon and Faruqee, “Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The
56 Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge”, Perkovich, no.8, p.67.
57 PM Benazir Bhutto was on a Gulf tour and would not cancel her trip to meet the American team.
the US to invoke the Pressler Amendment, cutting off economic and military aid to Pakistan. The possible nuclear war between the two South Asian neighbours and the waning leverage of the US to contain such a crisis, further strengthened the US resolve to slap the Amendment on the Pakistanis. Further, President Bush was aware that certifying Pakistan’s nuclear virginity in the wake of a possible nuclear war in South Asia would raise serious questions amongst its domestic nonproliferation critics.

However, President Ishaq Khan and General Beg protested saying that America was overlooking India’s bellicose behaviour. In the end, the Pakistan government had to promise to consider closing of training camps for Kashmiri insurgents. In exchange, Gates promised to raise Pakistanis concerns with India. Gates gave the Pakistanis a list of confidence-building measures that could be undertaken with India, and said the same paper would be given to their Indian counterparts.

Five rounds of negotiations also took place between Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries by the end of 1991. The two countries as confidence-building measures agreed upon certain measures:

- Agreement to notify each other of military maneuvers and troop movements along the frontier;
- An accord to prevent air-space violations by military aircraft;
- Permission for civilian over flights across each other’s territory;

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59 Pressler Amendment was invoked against Pakistan in October 1990.
60 Perkovich, no.8, pp.306-309.
A decision to try and end the silent but bloody war over the control of strategic Siachen Glacier.\(^\text{62}\)

‘Hotline’ communication links were also established between the two military operations headquarters. A major CBM was the 1991 decision to bring into force the agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities and storage sites.\(^\text{63}\)

Such an intervention by the Bush Administration helped dissipate the crisis. This led to a bilateral meeting in July 1991, between Pakistan and India whereby both agreed on building confidence-building measures as listed and suggested by Gates. ‘For the first time’, according to the then-Indian high Commissioner to Pakistan, J.N.Dixit, ‘India and Pakistan agreed to adopt to some extent a step-by-step approach in normalizing relations through confidence-building measures’.\(^\text{64}\)

Though the US could derive satisfaction from the success achieved in stemming the tension that had erupted in the region, the nuclear threat remained a matter of serious concern. The thrust of the concern pertained to Pakistan’s alleged plans in assembling nuclear weapons. A Pakistani official, in early February 1992 was reported to have acknowledged in Washington that Pakistan actually had the capacity of making at least one atomic bomb. The Pakistan

\(^{62}\) ‘Pak-India Pacts Signed’, Pakistan News, vol.11, no.11 (15 April 1991), pp.1-2. The 19,000 foot Siachen Glacier, the world’s second highest, is located where the present borders of China, Pakistan and India meet, In Chellaney, no.2, p.305.

\(^{63}\) The accord seeks to make nuclear activities on the subcontinent somewhat more transparent by requiring each side to inform the other by every January, ‘the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities’, Pakistan news; official text, vol.9, no.12 (1 January 1981), p.2, In Chellaney, no.2, p.305.

\(^{64}\) Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance, p.137, In Perkovich, no.8, p.310.
government subsequently disowned the statement. Moreover, Senator Larry Pressler remarked in a press interview in late 1992 that he had been informed by the CIA about Pakistan assembling seven weapons and had the ability to air drop one in a matter of hours.

Interestingly, the American team did not find the Indians worrying about a nuclear threat from Pakistan. The Indians were not aware of the activity detected by American intelligence and Gates did not tell them. Thus, it was the imminence of nuclear war that prompted the American mission. However, the reality was different. As Richard Haass explained:

'[o]ne of the many areas where Hersh was wrong was that the nuclear dimension was the centerpiece of our visit. It wasn’t. We wanted to be sure they would not stumble into war. We were concerned that they were on the brink of war, not nuclear war'.

The Bush Administration actually came extremely close towards declaring Pakistan a ‘terrorist’ state. In the waning days of the Bush regime, the acting Secretary of State Laurence Eagleburger, in a letter to the US Congress, specified that the Administration should take 120-160 days to decide on the issue of listing Pakistan as a terrorist state. Eventually, however, the US refrained from branding Pakistan.

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66 Ibid.
68 Interview by Perkovich, In Perkovich, no.8, p.310.
69 The Pioneer, 10 July 1993.
In retrospect, the Bush Administration’s policy towards Pakistan was marked by distinct contrasts. While it was firm in denouncing Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and the country’s covert, but committed support to terrorism in Kashmir, it held back from castigating Pakistan as a state perpetrator of terrorism. While the end of the Cold War and the extinction of the Soviet threat marginalized Pakistan’s importance to the US, thereby paving the way for a more critical approach towards Pakistan, it was evident that the country still retained sufficient importance, which forced the US to refrain from declaring it a terrorist state. While there can be several views on the reasons behind Pakistan’s continuing strategic importance to the US, it’s geographical proximity to the Persian Gulf, which made it useful as a shield for protecting the Middle East oil fields in the eventuality of hostilities in Asia, was arguably one of the most important factors. Given the Gulf War and the Bush Administration’s imperatives in protecting the precious energy reserves of the Middle East, Pakistan’s importance in securing the objective from the US perspective, can hardly be overlooked.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

The balance of US policy in South Asia was dramatically tilted in the early 1990s toward a single issue, nuclear nonproliferation. The groundwork was set in 1974, which stimulated the United States to believe that the world was on the edge of a rapid burst of nuclear proliferation. Ever since, the cardinal principle of Washington has been to deter the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and

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Way back during Carter’s presidency, nonproliferation was the centerpiece of American foreign policy (until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) when South Asia was singled out as a particularly important target, Stephen Cohen, “The United States, India and Pakistan: Retrospect and Prospect”, ACDIS Occasional Paper, (University of Illinois at Urbana, July 1997), p.7.
Pakistan or the transfer of weapons or technology to other countries.\textsuperscript{71} The India-Pakistan proliferation dynamic was the one that most directly impinged on the US interest of creating a world divided between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'. Adding to this were a series of intelligence misjudgments that gave the impression that South Asia had joined the company of such states as Libya, Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

After Washington underestimated the severity of 'brasstacks' in 1987, the intelligence community since then exaggerated the crisis of 1990 (already discussed in the previous section) and the risk that India-Pakistan tensions could lead to a conventional or nuclear war.\textsuperscript{72} There was also a strong disposition that the US should assume the leadership role in heading off this chain of events. The US was thought to have the best intelligence on these sensitive issues and it was thought to have the greatest leverage over India and Pakistan. By the early 1990s many in Washington felt that South Asia was out of control.\textsuperscript{73} All this suggested a mandate to contain the two South Asian nuclear programs.

This mandate was bipartisan in its ideological coloration, as was the larger focus on nonproliferation policy. This was the outcome of a liaison among strategic conservatives (who wanted to make the world safe for US nuclear weapons) and liberals (who wanted to get rid of all nuclear weapons, and who thought that other countries would be more susceptible to pressure than the Department of Defence).\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{71} Cronin, LePoer, no.43, p.7.
\textsuperscript{72} Cohen, no.71, p.7.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
The nonproliferation coalition had earlier succeeded in embedding into law many constraints on the conduct of US policy. These applied to all potential proliferators, even though they were less than effective in the case of states that believed their very survival was dependent upon nuclear weapons or the maintenance of a nuclear option.\textsuperscript{75}

The fact that India and Pakistan were the only near nuclear or covertly nuclear states with whom the US could have a dialogue, also explained much of the heightened interest in the region at the time. US officials could, and frequently did, travel to Islamabad and New Delhi to lecture their counterparts on the perils of nuclear weapons (as was evident during 1990, in the wake of the Kashmir crisis) --- they were unable or unwilling to do so in Tehran, Pyongyang or Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{76} As a result, India and Pakistan received official and unofficial attention from the international community aimed at ‘capping, freezing, and rolling back’ the regional nuclear programs, with very little for the motives and causes of these nuclear programs.\textsuperscript{77} In this respect, the failure of the US to take seriously, or even respond to, the 1987 ‘Rajiv Gandhi Initiative’, on regional and global disarmament when it was initially proposed, or when it was revived in 1992, was a major miscalculation on the part of the US, reflecting the assumption that Washington knew better than India (or Pakistan) what was right in the area of nuclear disarmament.\textsuperscript{78}

The Rajiv Initiative was one of the several missed opportunities to engage India over the nonproliferation issue and to work out an alternative formulation

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
that might have obtained their limited adherence to the NPT, even if it did not formally sign it.\textsuperscript{79}

With the NPT coming into force on 5 March 1970, both India and Pakistan refused to be a party to it for their own respective reasons. Pakistan’s condition was that India should sign it and only then would it become a signatory. But India had its own reasons for not signing it. India called it a ‘discriminatory’ treaty for reasons as follows:

- The Treaty did not talk about time bound global disarmament and there was no guarantee that the nuclear-have countries would not attack the non-nuclear states.

- With China posing as a nuclear threat to India\textsuperscript{80} it could not give up its nuclear option. There were also reports of clandestine transfer of technology between China and the Pakistan.

- Pakistan continued to be engaged by the US and it was threatening India’s internal security.

US realized that it was futile to ask India to be a signatory to the Treaty since China was not a promising candidate for any accord that would constrain its own nuclear arsenal or even restrain its missile and nuclear technology exports.\textsuperscript{81}

Further Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance made it impossible for the US to ignore Pakistan, despite its realization that India was an ‘emerging’ power in South Asia.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} India had fought the 1962 war with China despite the signing of ‘Panchsheel’ in 1954.
\textsuperscript{81} Cronin, no.43, p.12.
When Pakistan proposed the five power conference in June 1991, it was accepted by Washington but the changing post-Cold War dynamics prompted the Capitol Hill to understand India’s precarious position when it refused such a proposal (already discussed earlier). Instead in June 1992, approximately a year later, Washington and New Delhi acted on P.V.Narasimha Rao’s earlier proposal to conduct a bilateral dialogue on nonproliferation in lieu of the five-power conference. In this meeting the US representatives acknowledged India’s objections and requested alternative options for preventing a regional nuclear arms race. The Americans proposed for consideration of agreements not to test nuclear weapons and to cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes. India, on its part, agreed to address regional and global security issues.82

The United States was, however, greatly concerned over India’s export of chemicals that could be used to produce poison gas weapons. In September 1992, the US Government succeeded in getting Cyprus to turn back a German ship carrying Indian dual use chemicals to Syria.83

India responded partially to US and the rest of the Western criticism of its export activities by restricting the export of four ‘core’ chemicals and requiring prior notification on exports of 15 others. New Delhi, however, resisted pressure to enact broad controls on dual use chemicals, complaining that such demands represented yet another form of western efforts to control developing economies and was aimed at reinforcing market dominance of developed countries.84

82 Perkovich, no.8, p.329.
84 Ibid.
Political analyst’s belief that the US interest in preventing nuclear proliferation was linked to its interest of promoting regional stability is an issue of discussion. If this was really the case, at the first place US would not have encouraged Pakistan the way it did during the Cold War years including the hard fact that it actually turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

Past support for Pakistan’s security, thus, arguably helped promote competition in military technology between India and Pakistan, and thereby to endanger stability. Legislative sanctions that sought to deter nuclear proliferation or penalize countries for human rights violations by cutting aid sometimes had often been at variance with other goals of promoting development, encouraging economic liberalization, or controlling narcotics traffic.85

Pressler Amendment

The Pressler Amendment, enacted in 1985, specified freezing of US aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan, unless the US President certified at the beginning of each fiscal year that Pakistan:

“..did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed US assistance programme will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device” 86

Unfortunately, the law was often rendered ineffective with the successive US Administrations seeking waiver at all possible opportunities. The Amendment, however, shot into sharp focus in the year 1990. Months after the nuclear controversy over Kashmir in October 1990, President Bush informed

86 Kux, no.27, p.68
Congress that he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. The Pressler Amendment sanctions were thus invoked, cutting off economic and military aid to Pakistan.\(^\text{87}\) However, it should be kept in mind that such a step could not be deemed sudden. According to a senior diplomat, the first formal ‘warning’ was given as early as May 1990, when the President’s Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates visited Pakistan.\(^\text{88}\) Further there was ‘no one in Congress to really speak for Pakistan’, since there was no longer the ‘Afghanistan’ factor ‘to trot out in Pakistan’s favour’.\(^\text{89}\)

The imposition of the Pressler sanctions underscored the significant change undergone by US priorities subsequent to the end of the Cold War. During the decade of the 1980s, America was overwhelmingly generous in assisting Pakistan, principally with the objective of containing Soviet advances in Afghanistan. The inescapable consequence of this magnanimity was turning a deliberate blind eye towards Pakistan’s surreptitious nuclear designs. However, the changed scenario forced America to take serious stock of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. It became increasingly difficult for President Bush to certify that Pakistan could actually bypass the Pressler Amendment strictures.

The Bush Administration had indicated its displeasure at Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme in the year 1989 itself. Benazir Bhutto, during her visit to Washington in June 1989, was made to understand that the US knew more about Pakistan’s nuclear build-up than Pakistan thought it actually did. President


\(^\text{89}\) Ibid, p.526.
Bush, according to Seymour Hersh, told Bhutto that the US would not be able to certify in 1990 that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device unless Pakistan could assure the US that it would not enrich uranium above 5 per cent and would not manufacture cores for nuclear bomb, with the hope that existing cores would be destroyed. 90

Around this time, following Army Chief of Staff General Beg’s trip to Washington for meeting top US officials, Pakistan agreed to ‘freeze’ the nuclear programme by not enriching uranium above the agreed level and not manufacturing cores. 91 However, there was hardly any noteworthy change in the Pakistani posture. 92 The May 1990 Kashmir episode made the Bush Administration upset at Pakistan’s nuclear activities and prompted the imposition of the Pressler Amendment.

Notwithstanding the sanctions, the Bush Administration did supply some military spare parts and equipment to Pakistan on a commercial basis by providing a self-serving interpretation of the Pressler Amendment. 93 The aid cutoff left a number of loopholes for the Bush Administration that apparently was not anticipated by Congress when it adopted the Pressler Amendment. The Administration continued to allow commercial sales of munitions and spare parts for cash on a case-by-case basis; on grounds that there was precedent in similar situations for doing so. As of mid-1992, the State Department reportedly had issued export licenses totaling more than US $100 million. 94 Apart from munitions

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90 Perkovich, no.8, p.303.
92 Perkovich, no.8, p.303.
94 Cronin, no.43, p.10.
and spare parts, a partial easing of the terms of the Pressler, under Section 562 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, permitted the limited restoration of food aid and development aid provided through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 95

'From now on, for policy planning, both India and Pakistan have to consider each other 'de facto' nuclear weapon powers', K. Sundarji wrote. 96 Pakistan discovered the discriminatory nature of the Pressler Law only after it was imposed. In the past, no comments were made regarding the discriminatory nature of the law, on any of the several occasions, when Presidents Reagan and Bush kept on overlooking Pakistan's eligibility for sanctions under the Amendment. 97 It was conveniently forgotten that this amendment was actually enacted in 1985 in the backdrop of a series of US intelligence reports about Pakistan's clandestine efforts at making nuclear weapons. 98

Right from the beginning of 1990, the growing displeasure of the US over Pakistan gradually became evident and the imposition of the Pressler was one such example. From early January the US was considering a sharp cut in assistance to Pakistan and the Bush Administration had tentatively decided to

95 Ibid, p.50.
96 K. Sundarji, "Declare nuclear Status", India Today, 31 December 1990, p.163
97 Interestingly, in late 1992, Senator Larry Pressler reportedly stated in a press interview that he had been told by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Pakistan had assembled seven weapons and could air drop one in a matter of hours. Reuters report of 3 December 1992, citing a 1 December 1992 NBC News Broadcast. On 2 December, NBC News reported that during the spring of 1990 Pakistan reacted to Indian Army war game maneuvers near its border by preparing to drop one of seven weapons from a specially configured C-130 cargo plane. According to former Prime Minister Bhutto, this alleged event coincided with the decision of the military to have the President of Pakistan dismiss her government. Pakistan denied the reports. Reuters, 3 December 1992, In Richard P. Cronin, Barbara, Leitch, LePoer, "93-243: South Asia: US Interests and Policy Issues", Congressional Research Service Reports (CRS Issue Brief), 12 February 1993, p.6.
98 Chintamani Mahapatra, no.93, p.492.
slash up to US $160 million for Pakistan, the fourth largest recipient of US assistance.\textsuperscript{99}

Measures like the imposition of Pressler Amendment and cutting down of aid to Pakistan were clear signals to Pakistan about its gradually reducing importance to the US in the changing world scenario. New considerations and fresh priorities were replacing the old ones, marking a paradigm shift in the US calculations of the post-Cold War years.

**India and Nuclear Exports**

After dealing with Pakistan's nuclear policy by imposing the Pressler Amendment, the Bush Administration was confronted with yet another challenge from India. One of the significant changes to occur in India's nuclear sector during the early 1990s was the stated intention to open up the sector for commercial purposes. The move, arguably, can be seen as an extension of the overall restructuring process initiated in the Indian economy. In February 1991, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) announced its decision to export nuclear technology, expertise, plutonium reprocessing and other services.\textsuperscript{100} The decision was followed by export overtures made to Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Syria and Iran by the nuclear establishment.\textsuperscript{101} The move did not go down well with the US since all the mentioned states contained threat perceptions for the US with respect to nuclear proliferation.

\textsuperscript{101} Perkovich, no.8, p.322.
India made public a list of technologies and equipment that it was willing to offer for sale and aimed for the markets of other developing countries.\textsuperscript{102} India had a comparative advantage in indigenous nuclear items due to its ability to produce at low costs. While the objective of exporting nuclear products and services to developing countries could have enhanced South-South Cooperation, it also contained the risks of nuclear proliferation. India’s 235 MW commercial nuclear power reactors were attractive exports for other Third World nations on account of the latter’s smaller electricity grid structures. India also offered to build smaller capacity nuclear research reactors, which was favourably looked up to by several developing countries.\textsuperscript{103}

At a global level, Indian nuclear technology emerged as a coveted option for developing countries, which found it difficult to import nuclear technology due to the West’s refusal to part with the relevant know-how, and Iraq’s seemingly clandestine approach to its own nuclear programme. India held out the potential of emerging as a second-tier supplier in exporting sensitive nuclear materials, components and equipment.

From late 1991, the US began exerting political pressure for deterring India from selling a 10MW nuclear research reactor to Iran under the IAEA safeguards. The Indian Ambassador in Washington had been summoned twice to the State Department to be told of American concern over the proposed sale and the US Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Reginald

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{102} Shekhar Hattangadi, “India Aims at Third World Marketing its Nuclear Expertise”, \textit{Nucleonics Week}, 7 February 1991. India’s potential exports included nuclear power and research reactors, isotope and radiation technology, radiological safety and protection, electronics and allied instrumentation, In Brahma Chellaney, no.2, p.300.
\end{footnotesize}
Bartholomew, also discussed the issue during his 1991 visit to India. According to a State Department spokesman, the US had urged India:

"to avoid any form of nuclear cooperation with Iran even under safeguards. (This is) because there is no adequate evidence that Iran is genuinely committed to the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy."\(^{104}\)

Initially, India tried adopting a firm posture by emphasising upon its right to sell a nuclear research reactor to Iran. As the then Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, P. K. Iyenger, mentioned in an interview:

"perhaps the Western countries do not want us to get into high tech exports... the Americans had already supplied a 5 MW reactor to Iran which is still working. Our offer to Iran is exactly like the nuclear reactors set up by Argentina in Algeria and Peru and the recent offer it has made to Turkey... Perhaps only the white man has the right to sell nuclear reactors"\(^{105}\)

Later however, India relented, though the AEC had reservations in the matter.\(^{106}\)

The US Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, held out the promise of American pressure on Pakistan in halting support of terrorism in Kashmir. India, on its part, indicated its willingness

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\(^{105}\) Hindustan Times 19.11.91 In AFP 19.11.91 in FBIS-ME 19.11.91; for details see “South Asian Nuclear Zone” Arms Control Reporter, vol. 10: 7, July 1991, ISSN 0886-3490, p. 454.B.142.

\(^{106}\) Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 30 January 1992, pp.16-17.

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to consider proposals for convening the five-power conference, which was one of Pakistan's consistent demands.

Both branches of the US government embraced this proposal by Pakistan on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. The Foreign Assistance Act, P.L.102-391, established a regional accord as a US policy goal and required the President to report to Congress every six months on efforts to achieve such an accord. 108

Conscious of strong US concern about this issue, India engaged in a high level dialogue with the US in New Delhi in mid-June 1992, but no new ground was broken. The State Department also tried to initiate an indirect dialogue between India and Pakistan, with the US as the mediator along the lines of past indirect Middle East Peace Talks. 109

Cryogenic Deal

The last non-proliferation initiative of the Bush Administration was concerning the Indo-Russian cooperation in space programme. The Russian firm Glavkosmos was slated to sell a liquid-hydrogen cryogenic rocket engine and technology to the Indian Space Research Organisation. Initially, the California-

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107 In June 1991, Pakistan proposed a 5-power conference of India, Pakistan, America, China and Soviet representatives to facilitate an agreement by India and Pakistan to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, which the US, China and the Soviet Union would guarantee; In “South Asian Nuclear Zone”, Arms Control Reporter, vol. 10: 7, July 1991, ISSN 0886-3490, p. 454.B.137-454.B.138.

108 A 'policy' section subsection, 620F(b) states that: It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue a policy which seeks a regional negotiated solution to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia at the earliest possible time, including a protocol to be signed by all nuclear weapons states, prohibiting nuclear attacks by nuclear weapons states on countries in the region. Such a policy should have as its ultimate goal concurrent accession by Pakistan and India to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and should also include as needed a phased approach to that goal through a series of agreements among the parties on nuclear issues, such as the agreements among the parties on nuclear issues, such as the agreement reached by Pakistan and India not to attack one another's nuclear facilities, In Cronin, LePoir, no.40, p.11.

based General Dynamics Inc. and Ariane Space Agency of France had offered to sell this technology to India. However, the US and the French offers did not come through and in 1991, India and Russia signed a reported US $ 250 million contract for the engines.

The US had argued that the engines, and the technology for their construction, violated the MTCR guidelines to which Russia had pledged to adhere. India reacted to the criticism by pointing out that the technology was being sought entirely for the purpose of launching communications satellite into geostationary orbits and, therefore, was strictly civilian in nature and peaceful in intention.

Sanctions were slapped on India in response to the deal. The sanctions, coming on the heels of an April 1991 announcement by the Nuclear Supplier's Group that 65 classes of dual-use technology would be controlled for export to countries like India, underscored calculated efforts aiming to throttle India's technological development.

However, the idea was to basically prevent the Soviet Union, which was experiencing a severe economic crisis arising from the sweeping political transformation undergone by the country, from securing additional earnings by selling its nuclear materials, weapons, missiles and related technology. India's flight test of the short-range Prithvi missile on 5 May 1992 was yet another reason for such a strong US reaction.

110 Mahapatra, no.31, p.313.
111 Perkovich, no.8, p.327.
112 Chellaney, no.2, p.195.
113 Perkovich, no.8, p.328.
Both the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Glavkosmos were imposed with two-year sanctions on 11 May 1992 by the Bush Administration,\textsuperscript{114} which deprived them from receipt of US trade and technology.\textsuperscript{115} India was genuinely upset over the US reaction to the Cryogenic deal. It was widely believed that while the US was actively involved in strengthening itself for meeting the new challenges in the post-Cold war period, it refused to grant similar opportunities to others, especially the developing nations.\textsuperscript{116}

What was more disturbing was the discrimination shown by the US in not imposing sanctions under any head, MTCR or otherwise, against Saudi Arabia, Iran or Syria, for purchasing Chinese missiles. The sanctions against India for the Cryogenic technology deal underlined the unduly harsh treatment since the US knew fully well that the technology could not be used in missiles for military purposes.\textsuperscript{117} However, India's resurrection as a 'rising power' in the global, as well as the American perspective, principally due to its strategic significance in the changed dynamics of South Asia and its growing potential as an economic power, gradually altered matters in India's favour. By October 1992, the partial sanctions imposed on ISRO were withdrawn. The US also permitted a shipment of supplies to India that had been in the pipeline prior to the imposition of sanctions.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{114} It is worth noting that this was in sharp contrast to the US government's reluctance to take action against the Sino-Pakistan M-11 missile deal (1994) that was to take place two years later.
\textsuperscript{115} Mahapatra, no.31, p.313.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, p.320.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
The period between 1989-1992 presents a dismal picture for the nonproliferation critics. On one hand there was the threat of a nuclear war erupting in South Asia in 1991 and the US trying its best to diffuse the crisis, on the other hand it was a proven fact that by 1990 the US had ‘multiplied its weaponry far beyond the requirements of deterrence’.\textsuperscript{119} The same period also saw Washington in a dilemma, unable to decide its plan of action and position on major issues. The dynamics of post-Cold War era had set in prompting the US to engage itself with India and at the same time not antagonizing its one-time ally, Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{119} Kenneth Waltz, Perkovich, no.8, p.316.