Chapter Three

THE ENGLISH COMPANY AND THE POLITICS OF WEST COAST
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The evolution of regional identity and politics underwent a gradual process in post Rashtrakuta phase till it witnessed the crystallization of political authority in the Bijapuri state and Gujarati Sultanate. From this phase onwards, the region witnessed the emergence of an alternative state within Western India in the form of Maratha Kingdom with its progressively expanding boundaries. This factor aggravated the political instability in the region due to the advent of the Mughal's: the adoption of forward policy by Aurangzeb in 1660's culminating in the conquest of the Bijapuri and Golconda Kingdoms by the Mughal Empire. Further in addition to this the Western Coast also witnessed the shadowy sovereignty of the Portuguese, Estado-da-India over many small ports, islets and minor territories over Coastal Western India in the form of their autonomous presence in the principalities such as in Salsette, Chaul, Bassein, Diu etc. though considerably enfeebled the Portuguese still had the certain authority to issue cartazes to both merchants and political elites operating from some of the ports in Western India.

The West Coast of India thus emerged as the principal theatre of rival action between the Mughal and the Marathas on the coast in the latter half of the seventeenth century. The situation further changed in the first half of eighteenth century in the phase of the decline of the Mughal imperial authority leading to chaos and anarchy in the countryside. Many autonomous and successor states began to emerge. The western region of India was not isolated from all these processes.

On the Coast the Mughal authority had remained peripheral, at times, non-existent, and politics became a tussle for power and territory among several contenders. In the eighteenth century the revival of the Maratha power on the coast and pursuit for

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1 See details in Commissariat, M.S., History of Gujarat, II, 1573-1758, Bombay, 1957
2 For details see Richards, J.F., Mughal Administration in Golconda, OUP, 1975, also see Mughal Empire, The New Cambridge History of India (of the same author), CUP, 1993; The Mughal Maratha struggle led to the considerable damage to trade in the region especially Poona, Junnar, Vdgir as many villages were buried down and plundered, Fukazawa, H., (art.) in Cambridge Economic History of India, I, 1982, ed. Habib and Tapan Râychaudhury.
3 For Cartazes and Portuguese Rule, see Pearson, M.N., Coastal Western India, Studies from Portuguese Records, New Delhi, 1981.
power by the coastal powers on the Konkan Coast dissolved the existing political order, left the trading world of the West Coast deprived of security and institutional stability. Other tendencies, apart from the Maratha revival, which came to dominate in the first half of eighteenth century, was the revival and the resurgence of quasi-independent Coastal power like the Sidi’s, Angria’s, Savantwadis’, Desai’s including E.E.I.Co, all of whom made bid for power and status.

The realignment of the political authority and power in the region forms the significant backdrops to the changes of the period. Bombay as a fortified settlement and commercial center had to establish herself in the light of this alignment. The emergence of Bombay as a center of intense commercial activity, placed in this political turmoil, serves as a crucial adjunct to the ascendancy of English commerce on the West Coast. The various attempts of the English to take possession of Bombay were the outcome of the general policy of E.E.I.Co, which justly foresaw that British trade interest in India could not flourish unless it secured a fortified settlement, naval strength and military force sufficient to render the Company wholly independent of the intrigues and quarrels carried on between the natives and the European powers.

Bombay due to its geographical location was caught in the triangular struggle between Portuguese, Marathas and Sidi’s. It was dependent on these neighbours for most of life including trade. The Bombay’s diplomacy during the seventeenth century, revolved around these three players. This is evident from Fryer’s account. He writes “…our present concern then is with the Portugal, Sevajee, and the Mogul: from the first is derived no more than a mutual friendship from the second, an appearance only; from the last, a near commerce: the first and second became necessary for provided for the Belly, and Building; the third for the gross our trade …. Mogul brings his fleet either to winter or recruit in soon put a stop to all business, should be denied be denied; the Portugal as in league with neither to winter or recruit in soon put a stop to all business should be denied; the Portugal’s in league with neither ….especially to furnish them with guns and weapons…”

4 Fryer, op.cit, 229.
Apart from these three, Bombay also witnessed the wrath of other hostile neighbours especially French, Dutch, Angria’s and Mughal’s. Seeing the precarious condition of the island the William Thomson, Governor of East India Company wrote a letter to Lord Arlington on 27th March 1666 in which he talked about the chances of receiving help from the neighbouring princes. He writes: “...the writer see no longer grounds for confidence the great Mogul was not likely to render assistance, for his subject stood in much awe of the Dutch power at sea; the Portuguese would be slow to involve themselves to the hostilities which would only inflict further losses upon them; and even if they were willing there resources were limited. A league with Shivaji would embroil the English with the Great Mogul and possibly with the ruler of Bijapur as well. In fact should the Dutch, send a strong force, it was doubtful whether any external aid could aid the settlement.”

The condition remained the same as still under Gerald Aungier, the political prospect of Bombay was far from promising. For instance, fear of attack by the Dutch with their French allies was strife in 1672. At the same time the project of adjusting the duties of Tannah and Karanjah had failed and now could only be settled down by an application of the king to the Crown of Portugal, requiring the performance of the stipulation in the original treaty of cession. Even in 1677 Aungier wrote to the Deputy Governor that during his stay at Bombay, he has found all neighbours to deal with. The jealous and envious Portuguese had endeavored all that lay in their power to obstruct the settlement. The Governor of Surat also did not want to use this policy to undermine Bombay. The Sidi Sambhal with his fleet has been no small impediment. The Dutch with their powerful fleet designed to have swallowed the settlement of Bombay. Shivaji only proved that only for his own interest he was English fairest friend and noblest enemy.

The period witnessed the two important phases of Company’s diplomacy vis-à-vis native powers and other European Companies. First phase especially, up to the end of the seventeenth century was of a political isolation and neutrality and shift from

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6 Bruce Annals, II, 314.
7 Ibid, 317.
8 Ibid., 340.
9 E.R.S., II, Letter no. 279.
Thomas Roe to Josiah Child's policy. According to Roe "war and traffic are incompatible. By my consent you shall no way engage yourselves but at sea...it is the beginning of the Portugal ....yet his garrison are mean. It hath also been error of the Dutch ....it is an error to affect garrison and land wars in India.10

The advice was excellent for such places as were under the full control of the Mughal power, ideas of conquest would have been ridiculous and garrison and defences were purposeless if the Emperor's peace were firmly kept. The whole question in fact was one of police, where there was no disorder there was no occasion for a peaceful trader to go armed. Unfortunately not the whole of India was thus secure, the Carnatic, for example was never brought with in the limits of the Mughal control, and as time went on and rise of Shivaji heralded the break up of the Mughal Empire, peace became more and more contracted. Thus, it was that Andrew Cogan and Francis Day in 1639 had found it necessary to built Fort St. George at Madras, and thus too, when thirty years later the Marathas threatened to cut off the West Coast from Aurangzeb's rule.11 Later Aungier too devoted his energies in fortifying Bombay.

All this was very much recognized by those on the spot, but at home, among the Court of Committee, the Roe doctrine continued to be held, and to be applied without discrimination to all the Company's factories. For some time indeed the Court allowed its hand to be occasionally forced by the more enterprising of its servants in India. Thus, while recording the disapproval of Francis Day, it yet decided to retain Fort St. George since, it was actually built and again Aungier's doing in Bombay were not absolutely condemned in his lifetime, though they raise much grumbling among the Court of Directors.12

However, the events during the closing decades of 17th century exposed the weakness of Bombay's defence and pointed out the urgency of strengthening of forces both at land and sea. Thus English during the last quarter of the seventeenth century were confronted with four enemies' viz. the Mughal, Marathas, guided by Shivaji, Portuguese, Malabar pirates, whose lives from the very nature of their filibustering occupation were extremely precarious. The weakness of Bombay towards these

11 Ray and Oliver Strachey, Keigwin rebellion, 109.
12 Ibid.
enemies forced English East India Company under Josiah Child to acquire the status of an independent power in their relation with the neighbouring potentates.

This policy of peaceful commerce in 1680's thus was replaced by one of the active domination under Josiah Child. Josiah Child firmly held the view that the true line of action was to follow the example of Dutch enhancing the power of E.E.I.Co, on the Indian coast line, which should be sufficiently strong to repel all attacks. This would enforce respect from the neighbours even from the Mughal emperor. In this scheme Bombay was to serve the same purposes for the English as the settlement of Batavia did for the Dutch i.e. it was to be strongly fortified and provided with sufficient military and navy strengths to protect the English trade, while the cost of this was to be met from the increased rent and reduced expenditure. This scheme of Josiah Child in Bombay was carried by Sir John Child. The policy of Josiah Child however boomed and led to the mutiny in the garrison in 1683 under the Commander Richard Keigwin. Soon after the suppression of formidable rebellion the peace of Bombay was obstructed by war with Mughal's and Sidi’s.

The Directorship of Josiah, thus, presents the earliest and most signal example of the evil results of Company’s policy in India, and particularly their relations with the natives of the country, which are guided too autocratically from England. Apart from this the lack of intimate local knowledge, which has ever been the main cause of danger, was never more conspicuous among the Directors of the Company’s affairs at this time.

Thus, during this period, the Bombay Council has no alternative but to try and keep peace with both Maratha and Muslims. The Bombay Council also determined not to precipitate a struggle with Marathas, as long as they were powerful enough to seize Bombay Boats as they did in 1701\textsuperscript{13} and insisted upon making Bombay the arena of their conflicts with the Sidi Admiral of great Mughal's.\textsuperscript{14} Apart from the dangers of native powers, there were also the French alarms; reports of three French ships that lay at anchor off Old Woman’s Island, weighed and betook themselves to a clean pair of heels, and portents in the shape of Danish fleet which, cruising too near the island.

\textsuperscript{13} Campbell, I, 132.
\textsuperscript{14} Burnell, op. cit., xvii, xviii.
as reports Bombay Council that “windered our trade and made our merchants fearful of going to Sea.”

In consequence of these circumstances the population of Bombay decreased, the Company coffers were gradually depleted, the defences of the island were neglected and trade languished. The letters and documents of this period portray anxiety felt both by the Court of Directors and Bombay Council at the power of Sidi, pirates, Marathas, the Mughal government and the other European powers. With the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, matters became worse for the Company’s establishments in India as the provincial governors were becoming de-facto autocratic sovereign in different regions of the country.

The beginning of 18th century saw the change in Company’s diplomacy rather in Bombay’s diplomacy on the West Coast. It was the period when Bombay by constant exchange of presents, expressions of good will, contrived to avoid open ruptures with powers. She knew that she was not strong enough to meet on equal terms with the native. One by one the Sidi, Angria, and the Portuguese succumbed. But their capacity for opposition was very small compared with that of Marathas. Bombay also never did retaliate or directly attack the Sidi’s, instead, the Angria’s and Sidi’s were craftily encouraged to out-rival each other until finally their resources were depleted and their power undermined. Thus, Bombay government very wisely set itself to the cultivation of open friendship until they had improved the military and marine forces of the island.

This policy of Company continued and in 1730’s Bombay Government began to follow a double line policy viz. encouraging the Portuguese to continue the struggle with the Marathas and also supply the Marathas as they may require, so they may dwell as good neighbours at the conclusion of their conquests of Bassein and Salsette. The Bombay Council was thus called upon to decide what policy to adopt towards the Marathas, whom they were dependent for peace and free trade, both absolutely needed for the Company.

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15 FHS, I, 158-160.
16 G.B.C.I., II, 90.
During this phase Bombay Council never lost an opportunity of strengthening the bonds of friendship between themselves and the government of Poona, being encouraged in their policy by the Directors of the Company in England who to their advices on the subject of alliance with the Marathas ever added a note of warning against possible acts of treachery or hostility. This period also saw the fall of 'Angria's' and the new alliance called 'Anglo-Maratha'\(^{17}\). This was the great victory to Bombay government, as now they aligned with the greatest Indian power of time on an equal footing. Thus, began the journey from commerce to territorial conquest. Coupled also with the commercial rivalry with the Dutch between 1750 and the close of the period under review, one witnesses the marked strengthening of fortification of Bombay.\(^{18}\)

The period also witnessed many other important events over the region, which had a significant bearing on the Company's future strategies and diplomatic policies. These events pertained mainly to the collapse of Surat's overseas trade. Further there occurred the decline of the city, traditional shipping activities in the western Indian Ocean and a phenomenal expansion of English Country and private trade, which spelt disaster for the ship owning Muslim merchants of Surat.\(^{19}\) All these events forced the Company to change its diplomatic stance vis-à-vis Indian powers. There began the participation of English Company in local politics.\(^{20}\) The outcome was that by the end of the period under review the E.E.I.Co. too became a 'local aspirant' for power. It in fact achieved recognition as an important political entity and a potential alternative to the local political authorities. This chapter, makes an attempt to cover various aspects of Company's policy in general and Bombay government's policy in particular vis-à-vis other native powers like Mughal's, Marathas, Angre's Sidi's and other European powers on the western coast. Here effort has been made to deal with these powers separately under different heads. The relation with Portuguese has not been dealt separately as has been discussed at length in other chapters and it will only tantamount to repetition.

\(^{17}\) See details under 11.
\(^{18}\) April 11, 1760, the morning and the evening gun were for the first time fired. There was some fear that the Court of Directors would grumble at the trifling expense and it was therefore arranged that a saving should be made by diminishing the number of honoury salutes; GBCI II Fn. 2.,110.
\(^{20}\) See Company's role in Surat castle revolution 1759. For details see Subramaniyam, Chapter II and III.
MUGHAL AND SIDI'S

The Sidi's of Janjira, they came originally from Abyssinia. These people came from the Arab El Habish, the people of north-east Africa and were known as Habshis, or more often as Sidi's, which was originally a term of respect, a corrupt form of Sayyed. Though most Habshis came to India as slaves, their faithfulness, courage, and energy often raised their positions to high trust in the Bahamani Court. According to Orme the successful Abyssinians gathered round them, all their countrymen, whom they could procure either by purchase or invitation, including Africans, from other parts of Africa, as well as Abyssinians. From their marriages, first with the natives of India and afterwards among their own families, they arose as a separate community, distinct from other Muslims. As soon as they were strong enough they formed themselves into aristocratic republic, the skill and utility of the lowest order giving them influence, and influence fostering a pride in their name which made them among the most skillful and daring sailors and soldiers on the Western Coast.

It was in 1671, Sidi Sambal was appointed as Mughal's Admirals. Aurangzeb changed their titles from Vazir to Yakut Khan, and gave him an assignment of Rs. 3,00,000 on the revenue of Surat, in February 1671. When Sambal was appointed as the Admiral of Mughal navy, Sidi Kasim seems to have received the command of Janjira, and Sidi Khairiyat of Danda Rajapore. Sidi Kasim took Sambal's place as Mughal Admiral in 1677, and Khairiyat seems then to have succeeded Kasim in the command of Janjira island, and remained as governor till his death in 1696.

As far as Bombay as an island was concerned, the island's peace was disturbed by the annual visits of Sidi's, which stated in December 1672 and continued in 1673 and 1674, when his fleet was 'wintering' at Mazagaon i.e. in staying there for monsoon months of May to September. However, Aungier made strenuous effort to prevent

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23 Orme's Fagments, 56-7.
25 Ibid., 440.
26 According to Khafi Khan, this change in the governorship was owing to the death of Sidi Sambal. But Sidi Sambal was living till 1682, at first as the commander of the Mughal fleet, and after 1677 as the commander of Maratha fleet. Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, XI, Kolaba and Janjira, Fn., 440.
this, but was hampered by the difficulty that an absolute refusal was bound to offend the Mughal Emperor and might have inconvenient repercussions at Surat.

In 1672 Sidi Sambal arrived at Bombay harbour with some thirty five vessels. Bombay in order to have goodwill of the Mughal Admiral send Thomas Niccolls, who was then chief Customs officer of Bombay, to compliment him and to make a small present. Most of the fleet consisted of vessels that had been built at Surat by the orders of Aurangzeb to assist Sidi against Shivaji and anchored off Bombay towards the end of October on their way to Danda Rajapuri. A proposal that they should be allowed, 'freedom to enter the harbour and from our shores infest Sevagees country' had previously turned down by Aungier. Since, then the fleet had done great damage down the coast by burning and plundering Shivaji's seaport and destroying over 500 of his vessels. If permission to enter the harbour was requested on this occasion, it is clear that it was considered politic to grant it, and this inaugurated the annual unwelcome visits of the Sidi’s fleet to Bombay that lasted, with intruders, till Captain Keigwin during his rebellion, forbade their continuance.

In 1673 they again asked for wintering at Bombay harbour. Seeing the consequences of last year Aungier asked the Surat Council to tell him he positively prohibited it. But this was of no avail as Sidi Sambal arrived with his fleet of six frigates and four small grabs. To smooth matters Sidi brought the 'sirpaw' (dress of Honours) for the President, in acknowledgment of the kindness received when the fleet was there last year and a letter of the Surat governor for continuation of the same treatment. After weighing the various considerations, the Council decided to receive the 'sirpaw' but refused the Sidi request of their stay at Bombay during the rains.

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28 E.F.I., 1670-77, 55.
29 E.F.I., 1670-77, 55-6. in 1672 they stayed for a month at Bombay harbour, but even during their short stay they made themselves nuisance by outrages, such as burning houses at Mazagaon and violent assaults on inhabitants. E.F.I., 1670-77, 65. According to the Company letters they burnt the houses of inhabitants towards the sea side and not those allotted to Sidi men. E.F.I., 1670-77, Fn., 65. On their way back to Surat they also plundered several boats belonging to the island, and confined the occupants, who had to be redeemed by money. E.F.I., 1670-77, 65. By the close of 1673, Sidi Admiral of the Mughal was committing again great insolence on the island of Patekas (Buther's island) and in the town (Bombay), stealing cattle as well as troubling and robbing the poor people, Ovington. op.cit, 87.
30 E.F.I., 1670-77, 65.
32 Ibid., 65.
Bombay government however, was prevailed on to permit the Emperor’s vessels to be hauled ashore at Mazagaon, and to allow a few lascars to look after them, while Sidi and his people were asked to leave for Janjira. This led to the hot argument between Sidi and Aungier, who left in some discontent. He complained to Surat governor about this treatment. The stay of ships and lascars at Mazagaon however entailed some defensive measures. A detachment of six files of soldiers and four pieces of ordinance were sent there to guard the place and the Company’s vessels.

The fleet left Bombay for Janjira about the end of the August, but returned in a month or so. About 10th October Sidi Sambal disregarding the kindness that had been shown to him and a promise he made on oath to the President, took his whole fleet by night over to the opposite mainland and burnt and plundered several towns such as Pen and Nagotna. He then blocked up the sea passages from the mainland and prevented provisions coming to Bombay. He also gave out his intention to stay in the Nagotna creek for most of the year and to build a fort on a small island near Karanja.

These stoppages resulted in the scarcity of provisions at Bombay and this led Aungier to retaliate by prohibiting the entry of fleet into harbour, or obtaining any supplies there. Extra men were engaged to keep watch at the fort and assist the Gunner, the Revenge was recalled from Karwar. Aungier was most indignant and even considered taking violent actions against the Sidi, but the tension was relieved in November. Two junks arriving from Surat to join the fleet brought a civil message from the Governor of Surat and were allowed provisions. It was also reported from Surat that the Governor did not credit the Sidi defamation against Aungier that he was siding with Shivaji, and the President took steps to similar complaint made to Aurangzeb.

Moreover the Sidi’s malevolent aims received a check from Shivaji, who sent 3,000 men to defend his country, with the result that the Sidi thought of leaving Nagotna and wanted to be friend with Bombay again. His men however had committed ‘great

33 Ibid., 66.
34 Ibid., 65.
35 E.F.I., 1670-77, 66.
36 Ibid.
insolencies' by stealing cattle and robbing people at or near Bombay. Aungier on the other hand was firm for not allowing them to stay at Bombay and using this port.

In 1674 the Sidi again desired to stay at Bombay. The request was considered by Council but refused because of the bad experience of last year. A further strong reason for this decision was the fear of displeasing Shivaji and so interrupting the negotiations with him, which had reached a favourable point. On the other hand to refuse Sidi request meant offending the Surat governor and Mughal Emperor, with the probability of injuring the Company’s trade at Surat. Aungier however, did his best by well put arguments to persuade Surat governor that it would be to the Emperor’s disadvantage for fleet to stay at port, and sent him present of two mermaid teeth and two petrified crabs, which he desired as ‘rarities procured with much trouble’.

These events however, did not forced Sidi from coming to the island. They created disturbances at Sewri, Sion and plundered the poor people there. There were also the rumours that they intended to burn Mazagaon, accordingly orders were passed to prohibit their stay ashore at night. Troops were sent from Bombay and Sidi’s were forced to leave. Soon after 500 armed men attempted to land at Mazagaon, but the guns of the fort kept them off. Meanwhile, request was made by Sidi to Bombay through Mirza Muhammad Hasan that they should be allowed to stay at Bombay as they were too late to move to Surat. Aungier in view of recognizing the need made certain concessions, agreed its wintering in the harbour.

37 E.F.I., 1670-77, 67. one of the sufferers was the ‘Robin the butcher’ whose cattle on Butcher’s island were stolen. This shows that there were real butcher of that name, after whom the island was subsequently called ‘Robin the Butcher island’. E.F.I., 1670-77, Fn., 67.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 86. Shivaji also threatened to attack the port and burn the Sidi fleet in it, if given shelter there, as also supply Dutch 10,000 soldiers. E.F.I., 1670-77, 86.
40 Ibid.
41 E.F.I., 1670-77, 86.
42 Orme says that the Sidi’s men drove the inhabitants out of the town of Sion and ‘took possession of their houses, intending to establish their quarters there during the monsoons’. Orme Cf. E.F.I., 1670-77, 87. But factory records do not corroborate this.
43 E.F.I., 1670-77, 88.
Aungier however wanted to sign paper acceding to certain conditions on which the permissions was granted. These conditions were as follows:

- That the English would not be responsible for any damage caused to the Sidi ships during their stay by burning.
- That the Sidi and his Captains would be responsible for any mischief done by their men, such as setting fire to houses, plundering etc.
- That none of his fleet should robe merchant vessels trading to and from the port.
- That there should be no depredations on the opposite mainland.

These conditions was presented to Sidi on 15th May by Francis Day, the Secretary of the Council, and the Captain Nicholls and on its being signed permission was granted to fleet to winter at Mazagaon, conditionally on good behaviour. Accordingly the mansion of Alvaro Perez de Tavora was also put at the disposal of the Sidi and his family. In 1675 February- March Sidi again visited Bombay for a short while and returned to Surat by mid April.

In 1676 Sidi Sambal’s fleet came into Bombay harbour early in April, with the firm intention to stay till the rainy season. This prospect disturbed the Bombay and Surat Councils, but to their ‘great satisfaction’ the fleet left for Surat by the middle of the month on the receipt of a letter from Surat, presumably ordering it to go there. Consequently, Bombay had no further trouble from this source. In June of the same year Sidi Kasim was appointed to command the fleet in place of Sidi Sambal, arrived at Bombay with the retinue of some 200 men, to stay till he could leave for Janjira in August or September. Aungier though find them as a source of trouble but acceded to the importunity of Surat Governor, who promised to report this good service to Aurangzeb.

This influx of strangers added, as usual to the difficulties of provisioning Bombay. In April Giffard said that, owing to the extra ordinary strictness of the government in

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44 Ibid., 88.
46 E.F.I, 1670-77.122.
47 Ibid., 150.
48 Ibid., 150.
Gujarat, there had been very little corn and the provisions had grown excessively dear. This was further enhanced by the supply already given to the Sidi. The condition became tough for Bombay as many people might leave if Sidi’s continued to stay on the island as it has led to the rise in prices. In view of this rising prices, Day and Ustick in July petitioned for an increase of the monthly diet allowance of Rs. 25 given to the married members of the Council, saying it had become pittance that was insufficient to maintain their table by any frugality.\(^\text{49}\)

In October these conditions further became worse, owing to the Portuguese setting up four custom houses at Bandra, Trombay, and over against Sion, where they levied such heavy rates that people were frightened from importing any provisions. They also prohibited the transport of corn or other provisions. They also prohibited corn or other provisions from Salsette to the island. Consequently, the bazaar was in great want of batty, on which the poor mainly subsisted, as this mostly came from Salsette.\(^\text{50}\)

In 1677, an incident occurred that offended both Sidi Sambal and Sidi Kasim i.e. the Calicut *manchua*\(^\text{51}\) had been sent under Ensign Thorpe on a cruise against Malabar pirates. By the beginning of April he triumphantly returned with the report that he had taken two great prows, one of which he had brought to Bombay, other had been burnt. Unfortunately, the last one was a *galivat*\(^\text{52}\) belonging to the Sidi’s fleet, which had chased the *manchua* off Janjira, thinking she was a Malabar pirate, or a boat of Shivaji, as she bore no colours. When the Sidi’s boat approached the *manchua*, she put out her English colours, where upon the other sheered off. Thorpe however, threatened it with a musket and got its crew to come aboard. He then demanded why they had pursued him and would not accept their answer that they had taken the *manchua* or Malabar pirate. He had two of the crew up to the yard arm and threatened till they confessed they had heard their Captain say he resolved to take the *manchua*. On this he disarmed them all, attached everything of value of boat, and took the Captain and two others as prisoners down the coast. The two Sidi’s complained, demanding restitution and claiming Rs. 2,600 for cloths and money that had been lost. The Council, however found no evidence that more than Rs. 40 had been taken by

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 150-1.
\(^{50}\) E.F.I., 1670-77, 151.
\(^{51}\) A single masted vessel, much used on the Malabar coast Ibid., 171.
\(^{52}\) A war boat, generally rowed with 20 or more guns. Ibid., Fn., 171.
Thorpe, and a refund of this was offered but refused. Thorpe was deprived of commission, but was reinstated in June, on his submission and promise of future better behaviour.\textsuperscript{53}

Meanwhile, Sidi Sambal had come to Bombay with his fleet in March to stay. The Council repeatedly told him that he would not be allowed to stay at Bombay and was given notice in April to leave the port. The Surat Council too refused his request to stay, but subsequently, on the entreaty of the Surat Governor, deemed it prudent to yield and so avoid offending Aurangzeb. It stipulated however, certain restrictions, to which the Governor agreed. These limited the number of men who were to stay ashore with Sidi to fifty, and required the consent of the Deputy Governor to others coming off the ships, while the Sidi was to see that his men gave no offence to the government or to the people. Sidi Sambal place of residence was to be prescribed by the Deputy Governor and Council, who accordingly require him to go to Mazagaon.\textsuperscript{54}

In 1683 the disturbances from Sidi’s men culminated in the wounding of the two English soldiers. One recovered, but the other (Edward Harper) died of his injuries. The English garrison was incensed at this attack and at the failure of the Sidi to hand over the assailants. It was called to ‘arms’ and Ward had considerable difficulty in restraining it from marching on, and firing at, the East India House, where the Sidi resided.\textsuperscript{55} Apparently Ward was able to pacify it only by promising he would see that Harper’s murderers were punished.\textsuperscript{56}

The offender was, however, sent by the Sidi surreptitiously to Surat, and though the Governor there was at first inclined to surrender him, he never did so. This was mainly to the disgraceful incident in June 1683, when the Sidi was insulted, and the ship fired on, by Captain Consett of \textit{Berkley castle}.\textsuperscript{57} Ward had nothing to do with this, and he did his best to get redress for the murder. His hands were tied by the Surat Council’s instructions to keep on good terms with the Sidi and avoid strong actions that might bring retaliation on the Surat factory. Nevertheless, he was blamed by the English garrison for weakness in dealing with Sidi and insolence of his men.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 171-2.  
\textsuperscript{54} E.F.I., 1670-77, 172.  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{56} E.F.I., 1678-84, 129-30.  
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 131-3.  
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 143-4.
Things for the Bombay Government were still not in proper shape rather were in the deplorable state. The Bombay government under the Directorship of Josiah child decided to change their traditional policy of peaceful commerce dated since Roe’s time to that of active domination. The Company’s differences, reservation in Bengal with the Aurangzeb’s farman of 1680, their partiality for Sambhaji and their attempts to shifts their trade from Surat to Bombay was creating a wide gulf between the Company and the Emperor. 59 A dispatch to Surat dated 28th October 1685 declared: “...we have heard how shamefully our people have been abused in the late interloping times by the Mughal Governors and officers at Surat ....whilest we are at peace, we must provide for war. This is the surest way to preserve peace...”60

In order to forestall the Mughal, the Company went so far as to order the seizure of all Mughal’s ships pending an amicable settlement with the Emperor. At the same time, a letter was sent to Aurangzeb, the Mughal Emperor, setting forth their grievances against the acts and omissions of his officers in Bengal and at Surat, especially protesting against the searching of the persons of their servants journeying from Swally to Surat ‘which bath of late been practiced with such vigour and indecency ....that we can not bear. On 3rd February 1687 Sir John child asserted their determination i.e., ‘never to be enslaved by Moor’s Governor hereafter, not to be satisfied with less, or meaner privileges than our ancestors enjoyed now is our time or never to settle our head factory upon own land at Bombay’. 61

But they failed to receive any redress of their grievances and being continually harassed by the local officers of the Mughal Emperor; Company resolved to resort to arms and dispatched a fleet of ten ships with a considerable military force under Captain Nicholson to retaliate for the wrongs done to them. It was argued as soon as the fleet enters the Indian waters, the Mughal ships should be seized and the city and the territory of the Chittagong, the troops were to proceed against Dacca and compel the Nawab to cede it formally to the Company. Further, a mint factory would be established there, all their former privileges were to be restored. 62

59 Letter dated 28th October 1685 to Surat, Bruce Annals, II, 554-555.
61 Ibid, 262-263.
62 Bruce Annals, II, 689-690.
Sir John Child was vested with the powers of Director General of all the E.E.I.Co., Settlements in India to carry on these operations. In April 1686 Job Charnock assumed the chief charge of the Company’s decision to wage war against the Mughal’s. In July, a Royal proclamation was issued requiring all the British subjects to withdraw from the services of the Indian rulers, with in six months. By the end of the year almost half of the English forces reached Bengal and the arrival of the remainder was expected daily.

The preparation did not fail to attract the notice of Mughal officers. A conflict became inevitable and the Mughal Governor of Hugli in October 1686 forced a rupture by attacking the English factory. All the war like operations of the Company was unsuccessful. An attack on the Chittagong hopelessly miscarried, in spite of the reinforcement under Captain Heath. The English in Bengal were compelled to take refuge on their ships. Many fled to Madras and remained there for fifteen months.

**BOMBAY AND MUGHAL- SIDI WAR (1689)**

On the Western coast, the seizure of some Mughal vessels towards the end of 1686 resulted in the imprisonment of the English factors at Surat, and the sieges of Bombay by the Mughal forces aided by the Sidi of Janjira. In 1689, as the result of the rapture of the Mughals with the English, Sidi Yakut landed at Sewri with 20,000 men; made himself the master of small fort there, plundered Mahim, and hoisted his flag on Mazagon fort, which had been abandoned on the news of his arrival at Sewri. A fruitless attempt was made to dislodge him. By 15th February 1689, he was the master of the whole island except the castle and certain area of land to the south of it. He then proceeded to raise batteries on Dongri hill, which disturbed the garrison very much. He put four great guns in the custom house, commonly called ‘Indian house’ and raised the battery at the Moody’s house within 200 paces of the fort and in lady’s house. Hamilton on the occasion wrote, “We passed the months from April to

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63 Courts letter to the agent in Bengal dated 14th and 20th January, 24th February, 16th and 31st March 1686, Bruce Annals,II,560.
65 Ibid.
September very ill for provisions grew scarce by the addition of 3,000 Shivaji's that were employed as auxiliaries in the military service of the Company.”

The impossibility of making any headway against the invaders by force made Sir John Child sick, and he accordingly in December 1689 dispatched two envoys to the Mughal Court to sue for peace. The object was aided by certain external factors namely the jealousy of Mughal General Mukhtyar Khan, the representation of native merchants in Bombay and lastly the secret influence of Portuguese, who knew that, they would probably lose Salsette if the Sidi held Bombay. Accordingly in February 1690, Aurangzeb issued a new Farman to the Company when consented the withdrawal of the Sidi on the condition to recompense Rs. 1,50,000 should be made for the Mughal losses and Mr. Child to be expelled (Meanwhile Child had died in Bombay in January 1690). Sidi Yakut eventually evacuated Bombay on 8th June 1690. From that date Bombay suffered no further annoyance from this opponent. But according to Hamilton,” He left him a pestilence which in four months time destroyed more men than the war had done and for joy made a malicious bonfire of his headquarters, Mazagaon fort”.

In eighteenth Century with the decline of Mughal’s power, the sidi too has lost his former power and influence and was more inclined to side with the English as they were now without their protector. The Sidi’s strong hold Janjira provided the good source of beef to English. Marathas were recognized during this period by the Mughal

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68 Hamilton., op. cit., 223: For detail account of War, See Hamilton, 220-234
69 G.B.C.I., II, 84.
70 Bombay to Court, January 15, 1691, the Portuguese had actually aided the Sidi when he first landed; and on this account the Deputy Governor seized all the Jesuits land on the island after the Sidi had departed. As regards Salsette it is clear that the Company themselves coveted it for a secret letter of August 8th 1687, from the Court to Bombay remarks, “If it please God to put you in possession of Salsette, keep it with strong head and spare no cost to secure the possession of it to the benefit of this kingdom”. Bombay Council replied in 1689 that even if they took it from the Portuguese they could not hope to hold it against the Mughal’s. As cited in G.B.C.I., II, Fn.3, 84-85.
71 F.H.S.I., 213.
72 Ovington, (a Chaplain, came to Bombay in May 1690. He left for Surat in Sept. 1690 and worked there as a Chaplain for 2½ years) writes that sir John Child was net fit to be a general and failed to see and fortify the island i.e. “.... his neglect of fortifying the island till the Sidi was upon it though the Company had frequently required it from him.” Ovington, Voyage to Surat., 93-94.
73 A. Hamilton, op. cit., 227; A letter from Bombay to Director, dated 22 June 1690 states that Sidi did not leave till the 22nd June “on the 21st the Mughal sent to Governor a message that he might again take possession of Mahim, Sion and all other parts of the island occupied by the Sidi, Mr. Cooke thereupon marched out to Portuguese church will all our field soldiers and by 9 am dispatched on ensign and lieutenant with 500 men to settle Mahim and Sion”, Cf.. Edwards, Rise of Bombay.
74 G.B.C.I., II, 96-97
government in Delhi as an independent power in 1717. Sidi’s struggle with the Marathas posed the danger to the Bombay Government as it can lead to whole of the south of the Bombay passing in to the hands of Marathas. This thought made the Bombay Government to use Sidi against the Angre, the Maratha Admirals.

In 1733 the Bombay concluded the treaty of alliance with the Janjira estate against Manaji and Marathas, who were threatening to subdue all the neighbours. Thus, the political alliance was forged between the British and Sidi’s of Janjira to bring tranquility to island city ‘Bombay’ and to promote trade. In 1735, Bombay Council advanced a loan of Rs. 30,000 to the Sidi in order to prevent his making peace with the Marathas.

The struggle between Sidi’s and Marathas lasted for over three years from February 1733 to May 1736. The Marathas, though they had some spectacular successes against them, failed to oust the Sidi from Janjira and from Govalkot, due to the delay caused on account of the quarrels in the Angria family, as also to the inability of Sahu to control his subordinates and direct their movements in a coordinated manner. This was probably the last occasion on which the Bombay Council found it necessary to treat the Sidi as a possible enemy. For in 1737 they actually enlisted Sidi for the defence of Sion Fortress to repel Maratha transgressors. In the same year, Bombay marine to prevent him preying on the heavy-laden vessels returning with coffee from Mokha blockaded Sambhaji.

The relation of English during this period was more focused on the affairs of Surat and Sidi relations with them became more important in this context. Meanwhile, the relation between peshwa and Angre deteriorated and peshwa in 1744 asked help from Sidi’s against Angre’s. Theses political overturns in the Maratha kingdom and their relation with Sidi was of great help to Bombay.

75 Ibid., 96-97
76 Selection from the records of Bombay government No.xxvi, New Series, Miscellaneous information, Bombay Education Society, Press 1856. 10. For details of treaty see P.D.D. 5B/ 1733, 427-32.
77 G.B.C.I., II, 97.
78 Ibid.
79 Rodrigues, op. cit., 38.
80 See details in the chapter 11.
Apart from Sidi, Bombay government has to content Dutch. On 2nd April 1666, Oxinden wrote to Cooke about the Dutch ships that were gathering at Swally and there was likelihood that Bombay could be attacked.\textsuperscript{81} Cooke replied to this on 8th April that in such events he would make the best resistance, he could, though the garrison was in 'very sad condition', owing to want of money (for this he blamed Oxinden).\textsuperscript{82} Therefore, he again solicited the cash. To this on 17th April President and Council answered that money would no longer be urgently needed as Dutch fleet had disappeared.\textsuperscript{83}

The Court of Directors writing in 1672 informed the representation in India of a great English victory over the Dutch, which temporarily claimed Aungier feat and was made the occasion of public thanks giving in Bombay on St. Stephen's day in 1672.\textsuperscript{84} But the tranquility engendered by this victory was but temporary as Dutch fleet under Rickloff Von Goen arrived in the hope of taking Bombay by surprise on 20th February 1672.\textsuperscript{85} After many skirmishes the Dutch retreated. Shortly after words on 17th February 1674, the treaty of Westminster was concluded between England and Holland, which relieved the English settlements in western India of further apprehensions.

Early in 1687 the appearance of the Dutch fleet off the Thana coast caused anxiety in Bombay. The Bombay Council wrote to the commander of the Dutch ships lying off Bombay that they should not cruise too near the island, as it hindered their trade and the merchants were afraid to go to sea because of their presence.\textsuperscript{86} But they departed without causing harm to Bombay. The Dutch relation with Bombay were occasional and Bombay' growth is hardly hampered by them. Tough they were fierce enemy in the Indian Ocean.

\textsuperscript{81} E.F.I., 1665-67, 187. A letter form Counsel Lannoy at Allepo also reported about the possible Dutch attack. He writes “the Dutch reported at Surat that they intended to assault His Majesty's island of Bombaim, which hath made Lieutenant Governor Cooke and his soldiers (being in number not more than a hundred) to put themselves in a posture of defence,; who have taken a resolution to defend His Majesty’s interest to the last men, and were drawing a line for their security to the landward.” E.F.I., 1665-67, Fn., 187.

\textsuperscript{82} E.F.I., 1665-67, 187.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} Samuel Pechel, An Historical account…….,5-6.

\textsuperscript{85} E.F.I, 1670-77,213.

\textsuperscript{86} Campbell, I, 98.
Bombay relations with the French were also intermittent, especially, in the seventeenth century but, it was in 1740's that the relation with French became worse both in India and Europe. French in this period began to play important role in Carnatic under Dupleix, this forced English too to change nature of their relation vis-à-vis Indian powers especially after the fall of Madras in 1746. Their struggle in the subcontinent decided which European power were to stay for long in the subcontinent.

Since 1671 when a fleet arrived at Vesava and their shallops sounded round the island of Karanja and about Mahim the French had caused no alarm to Bombay. However in 1675 several French ships entered Bombay harbour to winter the monsoon. Their presence made the provisions in Bombay dear.

On the 20th September 1694 the Bombay Government apprehended that the French has come with evil designs and in order to counter it wrote to the Captain Abraham Roberts of the ship Resolution to take necessary action if they encounter any such ships on their way to Surat. The letter reads as “...If you should meet with any ships of French King or his subjects in your passage or pirates that you esteem yourselves strong enough to encounter with and attack them, we would have put you their majesty’s commission in execution and advise of what you have done either to us or President and Council of Surat that so you may have the necessary orders from us or them. We do strictly require you and the Defence to keep Company in this your passage...”

In January 1696 Sir John Gayer wrote to the Surat President about the French ships that seemed to be cruising near by. He also assured President that they were prepared for French designs if they had any for Bombay. In February Gayer again wrote to President about French. The letter reads as: “... They were seen about two leagues to the northward of Bassein at anchor. On the 9th from Worli our people see four come to an anchor off Vesava. And yesterday evening there of them came about Malabar point

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87 Campbell, I, 107.
and at sunset anchored off the point of Old Woman's Island, where they yet remain. The other two we suppose are at Vesava. These three at anchor we believe may be the King's ships that probably may lie and cruise some time before the port in the hope of plunder, if they are not frightened away by the Dutch and our ships. This probably, will be very speedily, if the news we hear be true. A few weeks later the dangers which Sir John Gayer anticipated from the French fleet were more than fulfilled. It seems that the French ships moved away with out causing any harm to Bombay.

In May 1744 war broke out in Europe between England and France, which lasted with short intervals of comparative peace till 1762. The trading Companies of these two powers in the Carnatic also came to grips. As the fighting continued, it became the task of both French and English to gather Maratha sympathies in their cause, or at least to keep them neutral. On 10 Sept 1746, the French took Madras, and warning was received from Tellichery and Goa, that the next attack would be upon Bombay. The government was roused to action, and immediate measures were especially taken to strengthen Bombay's sea fortification. It was feared that the French might attack Bombay with Portuguese help, by promising them in return to recover their territories from the Marathas. Orders were sent to Surat Chief to raise army of Muslims. The news of the fall of Madras was confirmed, but no French men appeared near Bombay. In 1747, Madras made an urgent appeal for help. This was immediately responded by Bombay.

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91 F.H.S., I, 158-9.
94 The only battle ever fought by the French and English in Western India was the engagement between the Appolo and Anson which took place in 1747 with in the sight of beach candy.
95 F.H.S. II, 78-79. French were demanding 11 lakh ransom for Madras.
96 Campbell, I, 281-282.
97 Ibid, 284; For Sidi's the complement was returned a year later, when Sidi Masud, who had caused much trouble at Surat by his conflict with Muhammadon governor, was permitted to enlist troops in Bombay and was furnished by Marine Storekeeper with two, 4 pounders and six-6 pounder iron guns for the use of his grab, at the rate of Rs. 18 per cwt. Subsequent to this date this troublesome opponent sinks into complete in significance and confines his diminished activity to consolidating his own position in Jafarabad and Janjira.
98 Campbell, I, 284-285.
Early in 1687 the appearance of the Danish fleet off the Thana Coast caused great anxiety in Bombay and the Bombay Council wrote to the commander of Danish ship not to cruise near Bombay as it is detrimental to the interest of Bombay.99

MARATHA’S AND ANGRE’S
The first English contact with Shivaji was in early January 1660 when his General, Doroji, seized the port of Rajapore. This led to first collision with the Marathas which were mainly due to avarice and sharp practices of Henry Revington, the chief of Rajapore factory.100 On 3rd March Shivaji punished and plundered the factory of Rajapore, for supplying Sidi Jauhar, with some grenades. Shivaji also carried away Revington, the Chief of the factory, and three others.101 In 1664, when Shivaji sacked Surat, he did not harm the English there. He had no ill towards them. He only wanted. George Oxinden, writing to Company about Shivaji sack of Surat, called Shivaji, the ‘Grand rebel of Deccan’ and said that there was “neither trust in him, but a perfidious Rebell, and therefore wee would not trust him.”102 In fact, his raid on Surat was boon in disguise for English, for the Mughal King extended to the Company remission of customs at Surat subsequently to be paid to Surat, as they stood bravely against Shivaji.103

During this period, the initial intent of English was not aimed at making territorial gains in India and hence there was no reason for any direct confrontation between Shivaji and English on that score. Shivaji’s power rapidly increased after his escape from Agra, this made English anxious to secure his good will and friendship in order to secure their trading operations in Western India. It was also necessary to keep good terms with Shivaji as the jealousy of Portuguese had led them not only to ruinous traffic of 10%, on everything crossing to and from Salsette, but to prevent the

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99 Deputy Governor Mr. Wyborne and Council to Commander Danish ships, 24th March, Secretariat Outword Letter book 4 of 1677-87, Campbell, I, 98. On the 18th January Bombay wrote to the Directors about this “... Honours the King of Denmark has made war with the Moors all over India, and has already taken sunk and plundered four eminent ships belonging to merchants of Surat. Two they burned and one they have kept to their own use. The fourth they have sent in here (Bombay) with their goods, and detained their merchants and commanders on hostage for near Rs. 7,000 on board the Admiral. We hear the Danes will not stir hence until they have restitution for the wrongs done them at or about their factory of Tranqubar. This noise has put the Mughal’s fleet into tattered and distracted confusion.” Bombay to Directors, 18th January, Secretariat Outword Letter book 4 of 1677-87, Cf. Campbell, I, 97.
100 Sarkar, Shivaji and His Times, 319.
101 E.R.S., I, 22.
102 Ibid., 68.
103 Bruce Annals, II, 144-45.
importation of provisions to Bombay through their territory, so that the island depended for its very supplies, as well as its communication with the markets in the interior, on the good will of Shivaji.\textsuperscript{104}

It was the period when there was a continual warfare between Shivaji and the Mughal Emperor. This war hindered all efforts of Aungier to promote trade at Surat, and the factories of Dharangoan, Rajapore, and Karwar.\textsuperscript{105} Shivaji became ever more powerful and would have been a dangerous neighbour to the island but for Aungier’s policy of keeping friendly terms with him. The negotiation with him started in 1671 when under the orders of Surat, Lieutenant Ustick and Ramsinai (Ramchandra shenvi), the Portuguese ‘scrivan’\textsuperscript{106} were asked to negotiate with Shivaji personally. In regard to this full instruction were given to Aungier.\textsuperscript{107} However the negotiations ultimately broke down on the point of the amount of indemnity and Ustick returned to Bombay.

However, Bombay relation seems to have come to rupture when Shivaji saw Sidi fleet staying at Bombay in 1672, Sidi being his most potent enemy forced him to burn Sidi frigates during this year.\textsuperscript{108} He on the other hand complained to Aungier that siding with Sidi meant siding against him. There was a good authority for the report that, when he heard of the matter, he mentioned the Dutch overtures to him and his cooperation in an attack on Bombay, and declared that he would act differently if they come again. This naturally interfered with the progress of negotiations with Shivaji’s envoy in June.\textsuperscript{109}

In May 1673 Shivaji invaded the upper part of Kanara and plundered Hubli, where the Company had a considerable estate, and thus Company suffered losses here at the hands of Shivaji.\textsuperscript{110} Thomas Niccolls, accordingly, was sent to see Shivaji and press for restitution of Hubli losses, and continue the former negotiation regarding the

\begin{thebibliography}{110}
\bibitem{104} F.H.S.I, 120.
\bibitem{105} E.F.I., 1670-77, x.
\bibitem{106} Writer.
\bibitem{107} E.F.I., 1670-77, 29. The Company also approved Aungier’s negotiation with Shivaji regarding the opening of Rajapore factory. E.F.I., 1670-77, 29. Also see English records on Shivaji (E.R.S), letter no. 296, 1\textsuperscript{st} March 1672, 214.
\bibitem{108} E.F.I., 1670-77, 66.
\bibitem{109} Ibid.
\bibitem{110} E.F.I., 1670-77, 68.
\end{thebibliography}
opening of Rajapore factory. He left Bombay on 19th May and succeeded in having an interview with Shivaji at Rairi on 3rd June. The result was inconclusive: Shivaji disowned any responsibility for looting Hubli, and said he must await his officer's report and details of the alleged losses before he could make any answer to this demand. On the other hand he passed orders for the removal of two minor complaints relating to salt and firewood, and sent Bhimaji pundit as an envoy to continue the negotiation with Bombay.

Bhimaji was received by Aungier and as, a result of the discussions the Council deputed Narayan Shenvi to go back with Bhimaji and endeavour to settle terms. In September Narayan Shenvi arrived back with Bhimaji. They brought Aungier a friendly letter and present from Shivaji, who was desirous of concluding an agreement about Rajapore. To negotiate this Child and Ustick, and Secretary, Francis Day were appointed to meet and discuss with Bhimaji. After much deliberation Aungier got him to raise the amount offered as compensation for the Rajapore losses from 4,000 to 10,000 pagodas, to be paid from the customs at Rajapore and by the supply of goods with in a limited time. This was endorsed by the Council as an honourable settlement and Narayan Shenvi was sent back to Shivaji with a letter accordingly from Aungier and some presents.

In 1674, Henry Oxinden sent an envoy to Shivaji at the time of his coronation at Raigad with presents from the Company and with the promise of their mutual trade and friendship. Shivaji agreed to most of the clauses of the treaty drafted by the English. Shivaji and all his ministers signed the treaty on 12th June 1674. Shivaji agreed to pay with in three years 10000 pagodas in kind and the remission of customs at Rajapore. The English in return agreed to establish factories at Rajapore, Dabhol, Chaul and Kalyan. The English were to have freedom of all the Maratha country and

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111 The former envoy had not come to Bombay though invited by Aungier after the departure of the Dutch ships. E.F.I., 1670-77, Fn., 68.
112 E.F.I., 1670-77, 68.
113 Ibid., 69.
114 He was the brother of Ramchandra Shenvi, Ustick's assistant in the negotiation of 1671-2. E.F.I., 1670-77, 69.
115 Nicolls was not sent again, as it was considered advisable to save extra expense that the sending of an Englishman would entail at this intermediate stage. The Surat Council was consulted and approved of an effort being made to settle terms with Shivaji. E.F.I., 1670-77, Fn., 69.
116 Ibid ., 70.
were not to be subjected to any arbitrary rules and nor charged more than 2 ½ % ad-valorem on all their imports. The current coins of the Company and of Shivaji were to be exchanged at their intrinsic values.\textsuperscript{117}

TREATY OF 1674

The important articles of treaty are\textsuperscript{118}:

- That all acts of hostility, enmity and discord, shall cease and be abolished, and that both parties shall abstain and forbear from all plundering, depredations and injuries, whatsoever, public and private, at all places both by sea and land.

- Shivaji and his subjects and all inhabitants in his dominion shall use and treat the English kindly and friendly, so that they may freely pass by land and water in to the country, cities and towns belonging to Shivaji and they continue so long as they please and buy provisions and likewise trade and traffic in goods and commodities of all sorts, paying the usual duties and be obedient to the civil government of the respective places, the same kindness to be reciprocally interchanged to the subjects of Shivaji on the island of Bombay.

- In any case English or subjects belonging to the island of Bombay shall be wronged and abused in the Shivaji’s dominion. Shivaji or Governors of the respective towns and ports, shall take care that speedy justice be done, according to right and equity, and that due punishment be inflicted upon the persons, who have committed the offence and the injury, the same justice also to be exercised by the Governors of the island of Bombay to all subjects of Shivaji in the like cases.

- If Shivaji had wars at present or here after with the Mughal, Deccan Kings or other prince whatsoever, shall not make inroads and plunder any town where the English have any factory settled, it shall nor be lawful for the General or officers or soldiers of Shivaji to plunder, molest or disturb any house, warehouses or factory, belonging to the English, or to seize upon any of the person of their servants or brokers upon any pretence or design whatsoever, but rather the said General or principle officer shall be obliged

\textsuperscript{117} Letter no.473, E.R.S.,348.
\textsuperscript{118} Letter no. 476, Ibid., 350-354.
to secure the said English factors from the violence of the soldiers, and in case any of the goods or estates belonging or their brokers, shall be embezzled or plundered, the said Shivaji shall be obliged to make full satisfaction for the same.

- The goods confiscated from the captured ships of war if carry goods belonging to English or Shivaji will be restored to one another after considerable proof for the said goods is shown.

- That the English during their pleasure, shall reside at the port of Rajapore or any other ports in his dominions, with all freedom and liberty; the Rajah at his own charges, giving them a convenient house to live in, and not suffering any to molest them and that they may at their pleasure, journey up and down in the country and voyage from place to place in pursuance of their trade, without any let or hindrance, paying custom for, their goods once, and that in port only, when imported or exported.

- That whatever goods or merchandise the English shall import and export they are to pay custom, at the rate of 2½ %, and if any goods are landed not sold, but reshipped for other place, no customs to be paid for the same, nor for any sort of provisions or timber whatever.

- That whereas the English factory house at Rajapore is fallen much to decay, they may have liberty to repair the same and build such convenience thereto as shall be necessary and what charge they are at to be defrayed out of the customs.

- That in case any war should happen between the English, Dutch, French, Portuguese and others, it shall not be lawful for Shivaji to assist any of them or any pretence whatever to seize or deliver up or suffer to be seized or delivered up any part of the estate, belonging to the English, or any of their persons or servants, but he shall be bound to protect the Company's or particular men's estate be seized, he shall be bound to make it good.

- That the English, and other inhabitants upon the island of Bombay, shall have free liberty to fetch firewood from the adjacent islands opposite to the main, with out any obstruction from Shivaji people, or any custom to be demanded or paid for the same, to whom strict prohibition [sic] is to be given to prevent any misunderstandings.
That for the better management of the intended trade and commerce, between these islands and Shivaji’s dominions and for the mutual encouragement of the respective inhabitants to supply themselves there unto the more vigorously, all manner of coins made and used on the island Bombay, go current in Shivaji dominions to which effect Shivaji order is to be given to his subhedar, havildar and accordingly, and so also all sorts of coins made in Shivaji dominions shall pass freely on the island Bombay.

The war between Shivaji and Mughal’s however, continued to hamper the trade between Bombay and mainland. The ill effects of this war were enhanced by an incursion into Khandesh made by Shivaji towards the end of 1674, when among other places that suffered the factory at Dharangoan was burnt and pillaged by one of his generals on 1st January 1675. Aungier wrote to Shivaji demanding full satisfaction for the loss suffered, and followed this up by sending Samuel Austen to interview him at Raigad in August. But Shivaji repudiated responsibility for acts which he said were committed by ‘vagabonds and scouts’ without the orders or knowledge of his generals. The only concession obtained was the issue of kauls (written orders) for the protection of the English factories from similar disturbances by his soldiers in future. Their efficacy was doubtful, for Aungier recognized that ‘it is ill trusting a plundering army who hath no regard for friend or foe’.119

Apart from the grievances and the delay in compliance with the agreement to give compensation for the old losses at Rajapore,120 Aungier had no serious complaints to make against Shivaji, whom he regarded as the only one among his ‘odd neighbours’ that he could call a friend, though a self interested one.121

In 1676 Bombay was troubled by Shivaji. In January the Council granted his request that four of his vessels, lying at Pen, might be brought to Bombay and hauled ashore, so as to avoid the danger of their being burnt by Sidi’s fleet. It was held that the Sidi could not rightly object to this, in view of his having similar protection in the past,

119 E.F.I., 1670-77, 125.
120 Ibid., 125, 256.
121 One of the things Shivaji desired was armaments, and Austen brought him brass gun as a present, in addition to five great guns that Shivaji was allowed to purchase. E.F.I., 1670-77, Fn., 125.
and the permission was subject to the express condition that the Shivaji should take
the whole responsibility in the event of an attack on the boats, without the English
being concerned on either side.\textsuperscript{122}

In May Shivaji’s prime minister, Moro Trimbak, demanded the return of several
nautch girls, subject of his, who had run away to Bombay, and orders were given for
their arrest and delivery, as this was reciprocal action to that provided for by article 17
of the treaty in the case of runaway servants of the Company.\textsuperscript{123}

Other trouble during this year related to the bill of exchange which Shivaji has drawn
on his correspondence with Golconda for the payment of money due to some
merchants at Bombay for corn supplied to his subhedars under his own orders. The
bill was sent through the President of Golconda before his arrival. Aungier held that
the Company should aid the merchants in obtaining payment and ordered Giffard to
send mission to Shivaji to recover the debt in the Company’s name. Narayan Shenvi
and Cowas Modi were accordingly sent up, but they got only ‘fair promises’ of
payment, for which Narayan stayed behind.\textsuperscript{124}

Aungier however, doubted the fitness of such mission, as being too dilatory and
uninfluential, and suggested that an able Englishman should be substituted and
perhaps stay on as a permanent envoy at Shivaji’s court. Francis Mauleverer was then
sent in August, but he returned from Rairi at the end of September without having got
money or even hopes of ready coin. Shivaji offered only permanent in batty or in
\textit{varaits} or \textit{brauts}\textsuperscript{125} (bills on his subhedars, which Giffard described as ‘uncertain
money’ taking at least two or three years to recover), or in wrought plates obtained by
plunder, to be accepted at an over valuation that would involve Company in
considerable loss. After some discussions Aungier agreed with Petit that it would be
gerger to recover something rather than prolong the uncertainty and accordingly in
November Narayan was authorized to take plates or any other goods he could get.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{122} E.F.I., 1670-77, 148.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Varat}, an assignment on the revenues. \textit{Barat}, an order for payment of money corresponding to
modern cheque. It is also clear from Giffard’s remark about them that they were not gold pagodas, as
stated by Forrest. E.F.I., 1670-77, Fn., 149.
\textsuperscript{126} E.F.I., 1670-77, 149.
Attempts to recover the debt due from Shivaji continued even in the next year. In February Petit reported that Narayan Shenvi had at last succeeded in getting 100 candies of betel nuts and some 300 candies of batty towards its repayment, together with the promise of a good quantity of coconuts. However, this year Shivaji did not trouble much as he was busy in his Carnatic expeditions.

In 1679, Bombay under the Governor Thomas Rolt continued its friendly relation with Sidi’s and Shivaji thus prevented Bombay from getting embroiled in the struggle between the two. This struggle involved the capture of Undheri and Khanderi islands (the capture of these two islands had two fold purposes: political and economic. The latter was corollary to the former. These two islands were situated in such a strategic position near the mouth and harbour and it supplied in to the hands of enemies, spelled danger to the egress and repress of boats in Bombay waters, as a result it became the battle ground for the Marathas and Mughal fleets.

In August 1679 Shivaji captured the small and uninhabited island of Kenery, lying at the mouth of harbour some 12 miles from Bombay. This was not detected in time to prevent the occupation being made good, as Shivaji acted with speed and secrecy. It gave incessant trouble to the island for nearly year and half. Blockade operations on a small scale were started early in September. A rash attempt to land on Kenery was also made by Lieutenant Thorpe and at least two of his men were killed, others were wounded, and his boat, its guns, and several soldiers, were captured.

In addition to this repulse, information came towards the end of September that Shivaji admiral, Daulat Khan, was intending to relieve the blockade. To meet this treat, the Revenge and seven other vessels were fitted out and manned with force of some two hundred men (including most of the garrison) by 6th October. Captain Keigwin the commander of the small troop of horse that had been raised in 1676

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127 Ibid., 171.
128 Sidi’s of Janjira were using the island as a base of their activity since the death of Aungier against the Marathas and indulged in all kinds of atrocities against its inhabitants. But the Company felt powerless to oppose his control for fear that the Mughal Emperor might hinder their trade at Surat. In one sense however it was a boon for the English, as Sidi and Marathas acted as a check and balance as both counted upon the English friendship.
129 E.F.I., 1678-84, viii.
130 E.F.I., 1670-77, 155.
and just been disbanded by order of the Company, was given the command of this squadron. 131

Sidi was expected to arrive from Surat in November and Keigwin was given order to bring back his vessel to Kenery to join him. However Council was suspicious of Sidi as they thought that he wanted to keep the island for himself. The Sidi on his side was distrustful of English and was annoyed with them for their opening of negotiations with Shivaji. 132

Shivaji on the other hand was also willing to negotiate, but showed a clear determination to keep possession of Kenery, which held out in spite of the blockade by the two fleets. Nor was any attack made on the island with the view to a landing on it, though the Sidi at first proposed this. Meanwhile in December the command of the squadron was altered. Adderton replaced Keigwin, who had fallen out with John Child and resigned. 133 However peace was arranged with Shivaji in January 1680, on an undertaking by Shivaji not to interfere with Bombay vessels and to return the boats and the prisoners he had captured. 134

The English at Bombay had to remain helpless spectators and for several years the island lay at the mercy of both. It was due to his efforts that an agreement was signed between them and Shivaji in January 1680. 135 When the Bombay government was making peace with Shivaji, Sidi captured another island Henery, lying half a mile from Kenery. The Councils of Surat and Bombay reluctantly agreed to this under the adopted policy of keeping friends with both Shivaji and Sidi. 136

The result of these affairs were highly detrimental to Bombay as each of the adversaries obtained a base at the southern entrance to the harbour from which he

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131 E.F.I., 1678-84, viii.
132 Ibid., ix.
133 Ibid.
134 The prisoners were returned but in a wretched condition. Ibid.
53. As the boats and their contents a quantity of betel nuts was sent instead as compensation. E.F.I., 1678-84, Fn., ix.
135 On 8th January 1680's Shivaji's minister demanded from Deputy Governor of Bombay John Child, a reasonable terms and full texts of proposals of peace, which the Marathas would take in to consideration and send their own terms to English with in short period. Ram Shenvi was sent as a Deputy by the English to discuss with the Subhedar of Chaul and Annaji Pandit. The proposal made by John Child, to be confirmed for peace between English and Shivaji. See ERS II, letter no. 475 for the terms of the treaty also see letter no. 479, 481.
136 E.F.I., 1678-84, ix.
could harass trading vessels at will. Kenery afterwards became the strongholds of Kanhoji Angre, to whom it was ceded in 1713. 137

Agreement of 1680:

- The restoration of the three captured vessels with their arms and other contents and prisoners taken from them.
- An undertaking by Shivaji not to stop, nor otherwise interfere with, vessels comings to or going from Bombay, if they gave notice that they belonged to Bombay.
- Refund of the cost of keeping the fleet at Henery and Kenery.
- Satisfying debts due to Company or inhabitants of Bombay by Shivaji subjects.
- Non interference with the Company’s factor or factory houses in his country.
- Due observation of the treaty of 1674.

Shivaji died in 1680 and was succeeded by Sambhaji, he too showed the same resentment against Sidi’s fleet being allowed to winter at Bombay harbour and make a port a base of operation against his territory. In November 1680 he sent an ambassador Awaji Pandit, to negotiate with Bombay and threatened war if the Sidi plundered the neighbouring island. 138 In 1682 in order to punish Bombay for allowing the Sidi to winter there Sambhaji prohibited the exportation of grain from his territory to Bombay. As a result of this, prices in Bombay tripled. 139

In 1686 Sidi succeeded in capturing several Maratha forts on the coast, which became the cause for uneasiness to Bombay. The Sidi even asked for guns from Bombay, and placed the traders in a precarious position 140 The Sidi also made an attack on Kenery. Bombay therefore proposed to Sambhaji that the island be handed to English and that would be returned to him after he became the master of his country. 141

137 See details under the section Angre.
138 E.F.I., 1670-77, 76.
139 E.F.I., 1678-84, 108.
140 Campbell, I, 98-99.
141 Bombay to Surat 18th October 1686, F.H.S., I, 147.
with Sambhaji proved fruitless, while Sidi in spite of all his attempts fail to capture the island.\textsuperscript{142}

In March 1687 the Bombay Council wrote to Surat about Sambhaji’s letter of sending a boat to bring the new ambassador as the old ambassador had died. However Bombay Council sought Surat advice and for time being deferred the decision to send any boat to Sambhaji to fetch the new ambassador.\textsuperscript{143}

During, this period the part played by the Marathas in the affairs of Bombay and Company, was to disturb their settlements on land, and interrupt their trade on land and sea. The Company however decided to pursue peaceful policy and revive trade. The Emperor and his officers were to be kept pleased, and so also the Maratha generals.

During, the last decade of the seventeenth century the war between Marathas and Mughal reached new heights. Sambhaji was captured and executed by Mughal general Muqarab Khan, Raja Ram escaped to Gingee after the fall of Raigad. However, the war on the mainland unsettled the country, the Company’s factories were in constant danger of being plundered, and trade suffered. Surat wrote in February 1695 “the roads are much infested by Raja Ram’s troops, who have plundered again Dungaon and other adjacent towns in the province of Khandesh, and great robberies have been committed by them near Aurangabad, and the way to Agra, Khandar, etc….are very hazardous to the travellers by the Rajputs thereabout...”\textsuperscript{144}

Bombay,s salt trade with the Maratha kingdom however was maintained throughout the war. In January 1699, while some Bombay merchants were returning home with their ships, Maratha grabs set upon them near Padamgarh castle, and carried them away to that stronghold. They demanded the ransom of Rs. 20,000 which on refusing to pay, they were imprisoned and ‘very badly treated’. On their signing of bond for Rs. 2,000 all were released except two were kept as hostages. Six Marathas accompanied the merchants to Bombay to receive the money promised. On hearing of

\textsuperscript{142} Campbell, I, 102-3.
\textsuperscript{143} Bombay to Surat, 1\textsuperscript{st} March, 1687, Sec. Out. Letter book 4 of 1677-87, Cf., Campbell, I, 103.
\textsuperscript{144} Desai, op.cit., 49.
the outrage, the Bombay government had the six Marathas arrested, and kept them in confinement till the two hostages were released. The salt trade with the Maratha country was at the same time stopped, till a full assurance was received 'from several subhedars that the like abuses should not be done to our people for the future'.

The Maratha relation with English from the last decade of seventeenth century has to be read along with Angre, the Maratha admirals.

Kanhoji at Kolaba was the dangerous neighbour to Bombay. For sometime the Maratha fleet let the English ships alone north of Bombay, but before long the road from Bassein to Mahim had to be protected against his depredations. On the 13th of March 1701, the Deputy Governor of Bombay wrote to Sir John Gayer in Surat: "The Maratha's are become our enemies as appears by their taking several vessels belonging to the island. At the same time they came in here pretending to make satisfaction for what they formerly robbed and to restore what was lately taken."

In 1702, a small trading vessel from Calicut with six Englishmen was captured by him. In December 1702 a betel-nut ship under Captain Doughty was captured by Marathas and when the English demanded its restoration, Kanhoji demanded the ransom of Rs. 5,000. In 1707, the Bombay frigate was blown up in an encounter with Angre ship.

Kanhoji’s activity kept on increasing on the coast and they proved detrimental to the Company’s interest on the Western Coast in general and to Bombay in particular. Thus, it became pertinent for the Bombay governors to deal with him with primacy. Charles Boone, in December 1715 became the Governor of Bombay. One task of importance for him was to deal with Angria's who had taken the place of Abyssinian’s in harassing Bombay and trade of Company. Boone therefore ordered

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146 See details about Angre’s in the chapter 11.
147 Desai, op.cit., 54.
149 Maharashtra State Gazetteer, X, Kolaba, 96.
150 Desai, op.cit., 56.
151 Maharashtra State Gazetteer, X, Kolaba, 96.
152 See details in the chapter Piracy, Bombay Marine, Angre’s
ships to be built at Surat and Bombay and to strengthen the marine. The order of 13th June 1718 proclaimed that all subjects of King George were to desist directly or indirectly from having anything to do with Angria, both the Portuguese and English decided to sink their differences and jointly humiliate their common adversary, but Angria proved to be an elusive foe.

A series of raids on his strong holds at Kenery, Kolaba (Alibagh) and Gheria also known as Vijaydurg or fort of victory, 250 miles down the coast, proved ineffectual, even though Boone himself superintended the naval excursions. The renegade Manuel de-Castro who had been in Angria’s service and had professed to know the layout of his forts was an unsatisfactory guide. Ram Kamati, the wealthy trader who later in 1719 was convicted of treachery and high treason, was unhelpful. At Vijaydurg the scaling ladders were of insufficient length and could not reach the top of the walls much to the jubilation and jeers of the enemy.

The attack on Alibagh the following year was equally unsuccessful despite Portuguese support extended from Chaul. Not even the added strength of a Squadron of four ships of the Royal Navy was of any avail. These humiliating failures led Boone in to giving up the futile chase.

In July 1720, a debate arose whether the additional duties (collected with the customs) towards carrying on the war against Kanhoji Angria and for finishing and repairing the church should be continued or not. It was decided that the duty towards carrying on the war should be taken off and only half percent for repairing the church be continued. At the close of the year, however an additional duty of 20 percent for the term of six months was levied at Bombay, Persia, Surat, and Mokha in order to defray

153 See details under the section Bombay Marine.
154 He (Angria) once took, whilst I was there, several Indians belonging to the island whom he caused to be burnt with hot irons in the forehead to the bone and then ordered them to go tell the General that was his chop (i.e. Mark) which he designed to fix upon all the English in Bombay very shortly, which made us prepare to meet the storm of his arm. Burnell op. cit., 89.
155 Cadell., A History of Bombay Army, 42. The force consisted of 2409 British and 3860 Portuguese but the attack was a failure.
156 Commodore Thomas Mathews arrived in 1721 with a Squadron of four Ships of the Royal Navy Sent by state on the representation of the Company to clear the Eastern Seas of European pirates.
157 P.D.D., No. 1 A/1720, consultation 30th July 1720, 206-207.
the great expense incurred by the Company in fitting out fleets to go in search of the pirates.\textsuperscript{158}

During the governorship of Phillips alliance with Portuguese against Angria was formally broken.\textsuperscript{159} During this period the Sidi power was waning, while Angre's were becoming extremely dangerous. So, to counter Angrias, it became pertinent to the Bombay Council to use Sidi as a foil to Angria until such time they should themselves be ready to stand alone. In 1724 Kanhoji addressed a letter to William Phillips proposing a treaty of peace. Phillips replied in a haughty tone, commenting on the character of Kanhoji's government.\textsuperscript{160} But Kanhoji renewed his proposals of exchanging prisoners.\textsuperscript{161} Eventually, an exchange of prisoners was affected in 1725\textsuperscript{162}, though the main differences between the two combatants still remained unadjusted.

In 1729, January, Robert Cowan became the Governor of Bombay. During this period, desultory warfare with the Angria continued Bombay also helped Sidi against Marathas but the latter ultimately prevailed and deprived the Abyssinian of all effective power. In 1731, Robert Cowan played the role of mediator in bringing peace between Portuguese and Marathas. The interest of the Bombay Council in bringing peace between these two powers was to secure a better inlet for trade from the Marathas\textsuperscript{163} and liberty of passing by Thana custom free from the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{164} But these pious hopes proved chimerical, as the Marathas never intended to keep peace with Portuguese. Soon they resumed the war against Portuguese.

The Maratha conquest of Salsette and Bassein\textsuperscript{165} in 1737 and 1739 respectively is one of the most important landmarks in the history of the relations between Bombay and the Marathas. Having become their close neighbours, the traders found it absolutely

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid, Consultation 16\textsuperscript{th} December 1720, 285.
\textsuperscript{159} Desai, W. S., Bombay and Marathas up to 1774, Manohar, 1970, 70-80; Pissulencarr, S., Portuguese Maratha relation, Bombay, 1983, 110-125.
\textsuperscript{160} P.D.D., No. 1 A/1724, May, 1724, 120.
\textsuperscript{161} Letter Dated, Friday 26\textsuperscript{th} June 1724, P.D.D., No. 1 A/1724, 40-41.
\textsuperscript{162} P.D.D., No. 1 A/1724, 169. The exchanges of prisoners were affected in Portuguese Island of Karanja on 26\textsuperscript{th} July 1725.
\textsuperscript{163} Correspondence between Bombay and Madras. Campbell, III, 160.
\textsuperscript{164} F.H.S. II, 48, letter dated Sunday, 15\textsuperscript{th} April, 1731. Portuguese requested for the loan of 300 Sepoys to garrison to Thana and would be paid by Portuguese only till they remain in their territories, the request was compiled with, as Bombay recognized his prosperity and safety would be endangered by the Marathas getting possessions of Salsette, and thus its necessary to assist Portuguese.
\textsuperscript{165} See details in chapter under the title Bombay in after Aungier and first half of eighteenth century.
necessary to try their level best not only to remain in amity with them, but also to be ever on guard against an invasion. The garrison and the navy had therefore to be strengthened.

The relation between Angre's and peshwa worsened during this period, which made peshwa to look for alliances against them. This was done tactically by them by forging treaty with English in 1755 and thus eliminated them.¹⁶⁶ This was the most important step on the part of Bombay Council as their most formidable enemy has been wiped out with minimum loss to them and that to be with the help of another potent enemy. These diplomatic alliances opened the way for different powers on the coast to cement such alliances and re-alliances in future.

SUMMING UP
In the foregoing essay the relation of Bombay with different neighbouring powers has been analyzed. It was the period when the policy of the Company was to temporize with various native powers in Western India and to utilize the comparative tranquility thus, engendered, in gradually strengthening their political and commercial position. The complete isolation was impossible, but having decided which of their natural enemies was likely to prove the most troublesome, the Bombay Council endeavoured to keep on good terms with that party; whenever, it became necessary they rode with one power or the other, they sought to afford such assistance to weaker entities as would prevent their being too speedily overwhelmed.

With regard to the Angre, Sidi, Marathas, Portuguese, their policy was based on aforementioned considerations. They fully pursued this policy towards the external forces. At the same time they settled domestic administration, rendered possible by the fact that the dual control of affairs by the President at Bombay and Surat and the internal schism, which had marred progress at the close of 17th century, had disappeared and yielded place to unity. Thus, by the end of the period the Company was exchanging the role of a purely mercantile community for that of the great political power.

¹⁶⁶ See details under the section Angre.