CHAPTER – I

LEADERSHIP AND STATE
1.1. Introduction

State, though a very commonly used word in the political vocabulary, is surprisingly opaque. In fact, like the Brahman of the vedantic literature, it is easier to define it negatively. The State is not mere government. The State means essentially the whole fixed political system, the set up of authoritative and legitimately powerful roles by which citizens are finally controlled, ordered and organized.¹ The state has not remained static in nature. It has changed corresponding to the material conditions of society. According to MacIver, "the state is an agency of human purpose, and its character changes as it is directed more to the interests of this or that class within the community as it serves more this or that aims, as its area or purpose widens."²

Affecting this historical process of the changing character of state is the social-psychological concept of leadership- a subject of much ambiguity and debate. Leadership in the broad matrix of social processes has been largely neglected by dominant political scholarship, studying state. And this has happened despite Churchill's impact on war and political geography, despite Martin Luther King Junior's efforts to end race in equalities in multi-racial democratic set-up, despite Lenin's creation of workers state, despite the Mahatma's unique experiment of satyagraha against the exploitative imperial state.

Leadership has largely been seen as an offshoots of existing social conditionalities, at best an accidental collision between an appropriate person and a precipitating environment. But this is not so; otherwise why do we talk of visionaries and individuals changing the cause of history.

Inability to quantify an operational variable does not make it irrelevant or any less important. Above all, the most important reason for undertaking the study of leadership and locating its importance in state formation, reformation and re-definition is the belief that somewhere, some place great thoughts are being energized, somewhere brilliant people must be managing the resources of the world for the betterment of us all.

Leadership like happiness, success or failure means different things to different people. It is one of the most studied and observed concepts but is also one of the least understood off all social processes. If there is a common thread running through the various approaches to the study of leadership, it is the aspect of social influence through which the leader seeks voluntary participation of subordinates in an effort to reach organizational objectives. Leadership is as Charles Perrow said behaviour that makes a difference in the purposive behaviour of others.3

Thinking concerning leadership has moved through three distinct phase/periods. Early approaches, from the pre-Christian era to late 1940s emphasized the examination of leader characteristics (such as age and the degree of gregariousness) in an attempt to identify a set of universal characteristics.4 At first a few traits seems to be universally important, but subsequent research yielded inconsistent results. Particularly significant was the study conducted by R.M Stogdill.5 In the late 1940's thus leadership researchers began to move away from trait research.

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4 There have been many noteworthy researches dwelling on this aspect. Stogdill, R.M. "Hand Book of Leadership" (NY: The Free Press, 1974); Davis, R.C. "Industrial Organization and Management (NY: Harper, 1957); Hall, R.H. "Organizations: Structure and Process" (Englewood cliffs. N.J: Prentice Hall, 1972) are few such notable works, which had been consulted vigorously.
Researches began considering alternative concepts eventually settling on the examination of relationship between leader behaviour and subordinate satisfaction and performance. During the height of behavioural phase, dating roughly from 1940s to early 1960s. Several large research programmes were conducted. Of particular importance was the study conducted by Ohio State University. The Ohio State University studies on leadership began shortly after World War II and initially concentrated on leadership in military organization. This study found two dimensions: consideration and structure, as highly increasing performance and satisfaction.\(^6\)

It was found that consideration involving friendship, mutual trust, respect and warmth, enhanced the efficiency with which the leader developed structure i.e. organization and definition of relationship between self and subordinates. A high consideration-high structure leadership style was thus found to lead to high performance and satisfaction.

However, in a number of studies, dysfunctional consequences accompanied positive outcomes. In other situations different combinations of consideration and structure (low consideration – high structure) were found to be effective.\(^7\)

The research therefore clearly indicated that no single leadership style was universally effective and it changed from situation to situation. By the early 1960s the orientation of the researchers changed once again. This time towards a situational treatment.


Current leadership research is almost entirely situational. This approach examines the inter-relationships among leader and subordinate behaviours/characteristics and the situations in which the parties find themselves. One of the first such models was constructed by F.E. Fiedler.  

Fiedler claims that leaders are motivated primarily by satisfaction derived from interpersonal relationships and task-goal accomplishment. Relationship motivated leaders display task-oriented behaviours (such as initiating structure) in situations which are favourable for them to exert influence over their work group and they display relationship-oriented behaviours (such as consideration) in situations which are either moderately favourable/unfavourable.

Task-motivated leaders display relationship oriented behaviours in favourable situation and task oriented behaviours in moderately favourable and unfavourable situations.

Fiedler's model specifies that relationship motivated leaders will be more effective in situations which are moderately favourable for the leader to exert influence and that they will be less effective in favourable/unfavourable situations; the exact opposite is the case for task-motivated leaders.

According to Fiedler, the favourableness of the situation for the leader to exert influence over the work group is determined by:

1. The quality of leader-group relationships (the warmer relationship, the more favourable situation)

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Fiedler, F. E. "Engineer the job to fit the Manager., Harvard Business Review. Vol. 43, Sep-Oct 1965) pp.115-122
(2) the structure of the task performed by leader’s subordinates (the more structured, the more favourable)

(3) the power of the leader (the more power, the more favourable the situation).

Apart from extensive work on the approaches to leaderships, there has also been voluminous work on leadership as a personal quality, on personality types.

William James In this book the "Varieties of Religious Experience" describes two basic personality types: 'once born' and 'twice born'. People of the former personality type are those for whom adjustment to life have been straightforward and whose lives have been more or less a peaceful flow from the moment of their births.

The twice-born, on the other hand, have not had an easy time of it. Their lives are marked by a continual struggle to attain some sense of order. Unlike the once-borns they cannot take things for granted. According to James, these personalities have equally different world views.

For a once-born personality the sense of self derives from a feeling of being at home and in harmony with one’s environment. For the twice born the sense of self derives from a feeling of profound separateness.

Leaders tend to be twice-born personalities; people who feel separate from their environment. Their sense of who they are does not depend on membership, work roles/social indicators/ideology. Their separateness offers a theoretical basis for explaining why certain individuals search out opportunities for change. The methods to bring about

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9. "Theory of Leadership Effectiveness"
change may be technical, political, ideological but the objects is the same: to profoundly alter human, economic and political relationship.

The personality traits of a leader of what Weber calls ‘charisma’ has dominated substantially the analyses of leaders which history of nations has produced.\textsuperscript{11}

Originally a theological nation with the literal meaning of ‘gift of grace’ it was attributed in the catholic theology of saints. Weber used it to describe one of his three types of political authority. Charisma was to Weber a personal quality of attraction and psychological power capable of inspiring deep loyalty in large number of people. “it is the charismatically qualified leaders as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism/his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief in his charisma”.\textsuperscript{12}

John F. Kennedy had such qualities as was evidenced by his ability to attract crowds during his presidential debate and his performance in his famous debates with Nixon. The legend grew into the imagery of Camelot with the brave and fearless band of brothers kept together by the youthful leader, ready to take on all challenges and overcome all obstacles in “getting America moving again.”\textsuperscript{13}

Franklin D Roosevelt presented still another type of charismatic leader. With a voice which evoked symbols to which individuals from diverse groups and backgrounds could

relate Roosevelt forged a new coalition in American politics drawing together liberal intellectual, the blue collar worker and the ethnic minority. Studies of his presidency have yet to reveal how he elicited loyalty from such diverse groups and what kind of personality did he possess which fed his capacity for communication.\textsuperscript{14}

Gandhi, combined in his person the earlier conception of charisma as a spiritual quality and the modern preoccupation with the revolutionary personality.

The study of developing nations suggest, as in the case of India suggests that the transition from the tribal feelings and the orientation to village and clan on one hand to the attitudes of nationhood on the other on the other frequently turns on the presence of a charismatic individual.\textsuperscript{15} The list of such personalities in long and includes Sukarno in Indonesia, Nkumah in Ghana, Nasser in Egypt and Maozedong in China.

Charismatic leaders are almost always great simplifiers, who cut through argument, debate to offer a solution everybody can understand and remember. Churchill warned the British to expect “blood, toil and sweat”, Franklin Roosevelt told Americans that “the only thing to fear is fear itself”, Lenin promised the war-weary Russians “peace land and bread”. Gandhi told nationalist India ‘Do or Die’, straightforward but potent messages.

A charismatic leader does not appeal to our reason, he stirs people spirit and emotions. When times get tough people do not want to be told what went wrong or be lectured, or be given a lot of complicated statistics and plans they don’t understand. They want to be moved, excited, inspired, in short led.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p.257
Studies of a different nature, deriving from Freud, delving into the roots of charisma have also been undertaken.\textsuperscript{16} The psychoanalytic study of charismatic leadership began with Freud’s early work on hysteria, the nature of influence one person can have or another, especially when deep emotional attachments are unilateral.

At the root of hysterical symptoms is the unconscious love an individual feels for another- a love that can progress from fantasy to idealization of the object.

According to Freud, all children pass through such phases in their love of parents in which fantasy compels the child to center his emotional ties on the loved parent. These ties are the basis for influence on thoughts and feelings, intimately affecting character through the mechanisms of incorporation, identification and imitation. If one cannot have the loved object, one will try to be like him to gain his approval, and in all aspects meet his standards and expectations.

Maturation modifies and transforms an individual’s attachments. Therefore the leader and the led experience many different types of relationship ranging from deep and sometimes pathological to purely objective and rational.

Psychological interest in leaders led to an interface between psychology and history leading to the new field of psycho-history. Erik Erickson has made valuable contributions in this field.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid
Particularly interesting is his inquiry of Martin Luther’s and his more recent study of Gandhi. One generalisation which can be made from these studies is that the personality of the leaders seems to fuse personal conflict with historical one.

For Martin, the personal issue was loyalty to his father and obedience to authority. His father wanted him to study law, yet because of his deep “oedipal conflicts” young Luther could neither accede to his father’s wishes nor rebel in an outright way. Rebellion against his father became possible when he entered a monastery to follow the priesthood, for he could then submit to the overriding code of obedience of another authority figure.

However, such a compromise could not stabilize the conflict for long and the issue of rebellion / submission escalated from the authorities in the monastery to the Pope and ultimately to God.

According to Riesman, a charismatic leader has a highly developed and well populated inner life as a result of introjecting early objects and latter identifying with objects, symbols and ideas which have connection to the introjects.

The images, or internal audience exert a powerful influence on the leader and or the basis for the ties he establishes with the masses.

The study of Stanley and Image Hoffman of Charles De Gaulle show how introjects work in the development of a charismatic leadership style. De Gaulle’s introjects established

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18 ____, “Young man Luther: A study in psychoanalysis and History”, New York: Norton, 1969:


his sense of independence which he manifested in school and later in his career; but this independence did not involve rebellion against his parents. De Gaulle transformed his attachment to his parents into an idealized relation with France.

To De Gaulle authority transcended new and ordinary human relationship so that when an individual submitted, it was to ideas. Therefore he avoided conventional compliance as demonstrated in his dealings with Churchill and Roosevelt. De Gaulle was able to bide his time in England during the war, personifying France in waiting. He was also able to withdraw, accept defeat and sustain himself through his images awaiting the call to power in 1958.

This capability to wait and accept passivity, then to act and move assertively depends upon the sustaining effects of benevolent introjects for such self-assurance comes from being one with inner images. From this integration, the charismatic leader secures his sense of being special, and here the relationship to mother seems significant. According to Freud "A man who has been the indisputable favorite of his mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success that often induces real succes."\(^{21}\)

However, introjects do not lead only to creativity they can become important linkages for regression, megalomania, paranoia and other psychic upheavals. Studies of Adolph Hitler by Erikson show how introjects linked with primitive fantasies of a leader can mobilize the forces of regression.\(^{22}\)


Erikson says Hitler was possessed by an internalized audience which mirrored unsettled yet intense attachments to his parents. According to Erikson, Hitler had doubts about his own origin and legitimacy, and there is also some question about whether his father was born of an illegitimate relationship—both of which found expression in his obsession with a pure race. Hitler’s father who died when he was 13 years old, was 23 years older than his mother. Hitler had either witnessed or was obsessed by fantasies that his father beat his mother. 23 In any case, Hitler’s relationship to his father was distant, which left him not only with a hatred for his father but with an insecure feeling of what it meant to be a man. This hatred became the basis for his hatred of the Jews.

Hitler’s obsessive love for his mother, on the other hand, provided the emotional reservoir, which fed his desire for a “pure” reconstructed German nation. This love of mother and nation remained deeply erotic, combining untransformed sexuality and aggression and became the motive power for his sadism.

Hitler retained two-sided view of his mother—one, the earthly, “iron virgin”. The first introject led to an intense, hysterical attachment to German people and the second introject became his, and later Germany’s ideal for the nation.

Psycho-historical studies show that charismatic leader derive strong group cohesion on the basis of paternalism configuration with masses. Consequently, such studies also focus on the psychology of nations and theorize on national character.

The studies of George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley show that a distrust for charismatic leadership among Americans and preference for consensus style stems from

the conception that the American ego belongs to the society. As such the leader is the first among equals. Calculated, self and group interest rather than emotional bonds are ties that bind men to the structure. The ethos of society is clearly material and not spiritual. According to Mead and Cooley, American politics has constructed a "routinasation of charisma" where by idealized images are occupied by values of democracy and equality and thus the personality configuration which is favored is that of a brother or a peer rather than father.

Mead and Cooley also point out that American nation began with the overthrow of authority and established a legacy in which authority of all kinds, beginning with paternal was suspect.

While scholarship on Western democracies and developing societies (both democratic and non-democratic) for understanding sociological and psychological processes which effect political structure have been abundant studies of the communist system in Russia remained essentially structuralist. The subject of analysis was the communist party, the state, the military industrial complex.

For Marx himself, leadership was nothing more than the creation of material conditions. "Every epoch creates its own leaders", he said and quoting Helevitus and added "or it invents one". Marxist scholarship considered leadership as elitist and contradictory to the leaderless proletariat, which would bring revolutionary transformations.

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However, such was not the case. A group of middle class socialist in superior hierarchy than the masses of proletariat crafted the first communist state. The former legitimized their leadership by saying that they held the superior knowledge of Marxism to organize society and claimed obedience akin to church fathers.

This was not surprising. In Russia reform has been constructed from above and by the leader, whether it was Peter I's efforts to industrialise Russia, Lenins communist apparatus. Gorbachev's Glasnost or Yeltsin's democracy. This study seeks to look at state formation in Russia, in the light of civilization values.

Marxian social-democratic party was first organised in Russia early in the 1880s and it followed a native socialism with a generally agrarian and humanitarian philosophy. The main principle of this philosophy was the idea that a socialist society could be developed from the primitive communism of the Russian village, and peasants were to be target of socialist propaganda. However when this was tried it failed and in consequence the Russian Marxists became committed to the Marxian line of social development from feudalism to capitalism and socialism. The bias of this theory predisposed Russian Marxists to minimize the importance of peasantry.

However, Lenin never lost right of the fact that no revolution in Russia could succeed without at least the acquiescence of the peasantry. Thus though it was the backward industrial working class which made the revolution happen in the background of the war time scarcities of 1914, Lenin purchased the adhesion of the peasantry by tactically postponing the socialist solution in agricultural sector.26

Russian society is essentially patriarchal, centuries of influence of Greek-orthodox church reinforced this tradition. Corresponding political authority has tended to be centralised, earlier in the hands of the czars and later with erstwhile communist leaders.

The organization and systems which the leaders built were the prototypes of extended patriarchal families. The state thus crafted down the generations remained a patrimonial bureaucratic state. The leaders secured legitimacy by claiming faith in their knowledge and actions on the basis of doctrines having scriptural sanctity.

Thus Lenin developed Marxism into a creed or a religious symbol, the object of unquestioning belief and a dogma, supplying the adhesive power of a faith or a commonly held ideal. Lenin often supported a policy by quoting a phrase or a sentence from Marx which would serve as a slogan and which he could attach to the policy by a king of scholastic authentication. Contrarily, he often condemned an opponent's policy by arguing that it was contrary to something in Marx, much in the same manner as some religious fundamentalists use texts from the Scriptures.

Lenin was both a theorist and an organizer but he was an organizer first and his writings on theory were always slanted towards tactics. Nowhere is this clear than his postulations on party. Thus, while Marx's famous statement "The emancipation of the working class was to be achieved by the working class itself" was frequently involved, the concept of party as the vanguard of working class was enunciated. Lenin wrote in the 'Iskara': "A small, compact core consisting of reliable, experienced and hardened workers, with responsible agents in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy
with the organizations of revolutionists can, wide support of the masses and without an elaborate set of rules, perform all the functions of a trade union organization and perform them, moreover in the manner the social democrats desire."²⁷

It was typically a Russian intellectual way of thinking that revolution is something to be brought to the masses from without and that people except under the leadership of intellectuals were incapable of thinking for themselves.

Lenin’s thought reflected his personal philosophy, his preference for discipline and his distrust of spontaneity. He often contrasted between "consciousness" and "spontaneity". Consciousness for Lenin meant the ability to organize, make plans, calculate chances, to take advantages of opportunities, to anticipate on opponents more and to forestall them. Lenin’s Bolshevik party was an embodiment of consciousness, a personification of perfect foresight and an idealization of being forearmed for every contingency.

Spontaneity on the contrary meant for Lenin, impulse, drive and will, essential for making a social movement but inherently aimless and primitive. Lenin’s attitude towards spontaneity was tinged with distrust and fear and therefore had to be maneuvered by a leader. The masses embodied spontaneity as the party embodied consciousness. This was perhaps a natural reaction of the Russian intellectual class frustrated in its isolated superiority and deep aspirations of countering the European intellectuals. As a personal philosophy it was a curious compound intellectual arrogance coupled with a good deal of doubt and skepticism.

Lenin's party, was thus in the danger of becoming elitist a minority chosen for intellectual and moral superiority, representing the most advanced part of he working class and so its vanguard. During Lenin's lifetime the party was held together by his personal ascendancy and after him by bureaucratic intrigue and force.

However, Lenin had no conception or intention of creating an aristocracy. The party's work was distinguishable but not separate from the people it led. According to Lenin there were two ways in which the party leader could lose contact with the people. One was to "runahead" that is to go faster or farther than people who are yet to be persuaded to follow or to advocate a course for which the public has not been prepared by propaganda. The other is to lag behind that is to fail to go as far as the people might be incited to go.28

Democracy for Lenin meant little more than an accurate articulation of the middle position between these two errors. The 1917 policy of turning the land over to the peasantry was part of this articulation.

After the revolutionary years, when Bolsheviks came to power, Lenin tried to unite the middle class character of the party by recruiting peasants and brokers on a mass scale to the party, a process that continued after him.

Lenin's theory of the party had three main characteristics. First, the party was assumed to possess in Marxism a unique type of knowledge and insight with a uniquely powerful

28 Ibid, p-360-367
method—the dialectics. This was considered to be a science but the power it purported to have went far beyond scientific. For it went on to forecast social progress.

Consequently it could make decisions that are in effect moral or even religions. Marxism thus becomes for a communist party a doctrine whose purity must be preserved and if necessary enforced. The party therefore acquired something of a quality of a priesthood, and it demanded of its members corresponding submission of individual and a total subjection of private ends to the ends of the collective organization. Second, Lenin’s party being in principle a carefully selected and a rigidly disciplined cadres was never designed to become a mass organization exerting its influence mainly by convincing and attracting voters. It claimed superiority both moral and intellectual, because it included adepts in theories of the party’s unique science, and moral because its members were selflessly devoted to realizing the destiny of the social class it represented. Its ideal was one of total dedication first to the revolution and then to completing the construction of the new society for which the revolution had opened the way.

Lenin’s party was designed to be a tightly centralized organization, excluding any form of federalism or autonomy for any local or other constituent bodies. It was to have a quasi-military organization subjecting its rank and file to strict discipline and rules of obedience and its leaders to a hierarchical chain of authority from, the top down. Freedom of discussions was permissible on matters of policy but only till such times as the party patriarchs had not decided it. Once a decision was reached, it was to be accepted
and followed without a question. This form of organization was described as "democratic centralism." 29

This is not surprising. Indeed, it would be a deep surprise to learn that Lenin had any deep moral feeling for liberal democracy. He was helped by the fact that Marxism never acknowledge so called the ethical overtones of bourgeois democracy, and the entire corpus of literature was ammunition enough to heap scorn on democratic institutions like suffrage, parliamentary representation and civil liberties, without equality and social justice.

The party’s role as the vanguard of the Proletariat helped it secure monopoly of power over all other organization such as labour unions or even government itself and the principle of democratic centralism helped the top leadership to secure a monopoly to power within the party. The death of Lenin aggravated the process. It set off a long struggle for succession, and Stalin was a different personality from Lenin. While the latter had controlled the party’s decision mainly by superior acumen and force of personality, Stalin operated rather by secrecy, intrigue and by pitting his competitors against one on other, and inciting them to eliminate each other. 30

Nevertheless, it can well be doubted whether in the long run the result would have been very different if Lenin had lived. The tasks that the party had to perform in making a government were enormously more complex, first with the civil war, then with the

reconstruction that followed and finally with the decision to embark on rapid industrialization in 1928, and the collectivization campaign in agriculture. Under this sort of pressure, the making of party decisions by deliberation evaporated. The party developed the organization characteristic of a bureaucracy with a fixed chain of command which was the principle contained in Lenin’s centralism. Its structure became hierarchical, with the supreme leader or more inner clique controlling the central committee and the central committee the party, which in turn as vanguard controlled government and all organizations outside the party.\(^{31}\)

With passage of time, the party greatly changed. It built up a tremendous bureaucracy in which the chief secretaries held key positions. Its membership had almost completely change. Supplemented by Stalin’s purges, the old Bolshevik intelligentsia became extinct and industrialization created a new intelligentsia composed largely of officials, managers and professional people.

Changes were brought in the Soviet establishment but all within the legitimate framework of Leninism. Even Gorbachev when he initiated his reform package (Glasnost and Perestroika) sought legitimacy by claiming that he was rebuilding Leninism.

Moreover, changes were also brought into accommodate dominant party-state bureaucratic interest- agrarian, industry military industrial complex to adjust to situational pressures and constraints.


Khrushchev's programme of de-Stalinisation was in part an effort to give more freedom and influence to agricultural interest in the party since he rose within the ranks of the party as an agrarian specialist. However, he was ousted in only about six years time, because he failed to secure the balancing act between investment demands of military as well as agricultural and failed to increase consumer production side of industry to win public support.32

Leonid Brezhnev, responsible for engineering Khruschev's fall took over reins in 1964. Brezhnev operated with complete autocratic power based on manipulation of the CPSU.

Incidentally, Brezhnev rose on the coat-tails of Khruschev his patron for whom he first worked in 1938, proving himself by taking part in Stalin's destruction of traditional Russian land holding peasantry.

Brezhnev's rule over USSR was characterized by complete inertia in industrial and economic matters, a return to cultural and human rights repression after Khuschev's mild liberalization and an aggressive and an adventurist foreign policy.33

He was a militarist increasing defense expenditure by 50 per cent, engaging in military excursion through his "Brezhnev doctrine" of suppressing anti-socialist movements in Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan and a futile arms race with U.S His refusal to modernize the Soviet economy led to the economic and social collapse inherited by Gorbachev.

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32 Crankshaw, Edward. "Krushchev's Russia" (Baltimore, 1959)
33 Theodore Denno, "The Communist Millenium: The Soviet view" (Hague, 1965)
After his death, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko were both too weak, physically and politically and too aware of the impending crisis in Soviet economy and polities to bring about any change.

Then came Mikhail Sergeivich Gorbachev, the last leader of the USSR and more than anyone else, responsible for the abolition of that post and the geographical entity that was USSR. Driven by acceptance of the appalling state of Soviet economy Gorbachev was convinced of the need for widespread reform in the USSR. In particular he realized that the USSR’s combative foreign and defense policy was far beyond the economy’s capacity. USSR’s allied governments in Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and Angola required huge subsidies. Nearer home, the dangerous forces of dissent were building up in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev’s only option was to reform at home and retreat abroad. He accepted too that existing work habits and industrial socialisation had to be changed, incentives for work introduced and the paralyzing weight of party bureaucracy lifted. These matters he tried to change with his policies of glasnost, perestroika and the fresh approach symbolized by the new thinking in foreign affairs. But he was only a reformer. In the early stages he did not seriously doubt Communism, the role of the party, or the need for powerful and direct state control. Each of his reform, for example the introduction of very limited democracy inside the single party system, simply increased the demand for more, without materially affecting the social and economic conditions of the ordinary system.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{34}\) Robert V. Daniels, "Is Russia Reformable? Changes and resistance from Stalin to Gorbachev" (London, Westview Press, Boulder, 1988). Other books which helped on the subject were:

Gorbachev's rule from 1985, until his resignation on 26 December, 1991 after the creation of a Commonwealth of Independent state (CIS) which embraced 11 of the 15 former Soviet republics; was a classic demonstration of the argument that a system cannot be changed or transformed by half hearted measures and it is difficult to combine socialism with free market institutions. It will never be clear how much of the change in the last years of the USSR was really to his credit, because many argue that any leader faced with economic and foreign policy situation of 1985 would have had to act in much the same way.

What is clear is that he was never in control either of political forces or of strategy during those last years. Meanwhile in the political landscape, where power was leaching out of Kremlin and independent power centres like republican on leaders, legitimately elected mayors, legislators and journalist were becoming important. One man was growing large on Russia's political canvas – Boris Yeltsin, the Russian Federation President.

Known for his dramatic rhetoric bold and impulsive political gestures. Boris Yeltsin, captured the imagination of democratic Russian citizenry when he stood atop a tank to defy the coup leader in Red Squane of Moscow in August 1991 while Gorbachev was held captive in his Crimean retreat.

The end of the old order was not preordained. The leaders of the soviet system brought it about by making a concerted and ultimately counterproductive attempt to rectify what they felt at the outset to be budding crisis symptoms in the system.

The announced aim of perestroika in politics was to graft onto the trunk of the communist regimes, liberal principle. First, the politburo eased restrictions on artistic expression,
intellectual inquiry and private association. Then in 1988, Gorbachev outlined a daring plan to introduce multi-candidate elections and authentic legislatures.

However, the amalgamation could not be sustained and the result was an all-consuming and uncontainable crisis of the regime. Like so many authors of liberalizing but not fully democratizing reforms, he found himself occupying a dwindling center not pleasing either conservatives or radicals.

Elections in the fifteen republics in 1990 thrust a new cast of players onto the stage. This study is an attempt to map out Yelstin's career, to analyse the condition which helped create him and the conditions which he in turn created the institutions he crafted, and above all to assess him as a leader. The following chapters would dwell on the introjects which has influenced and his psychology and analyse of his style of functioning and decision making based on primary and secondary sources.

The failed conservative coup triggered by the scheduled signing of a new union treaty produced declarations of independence from nearly all of republics and a new round of republic to republic diplomacy.

In concert with republican leaders, Yeltsin embarked upon a process of De-Sovietization and projected it as a victory over authoritarianism and establishment of a democratic polity.

The hammer and sickle flag was lowered replacing the USSR with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
True to its historical and intellectual tradition changes was crafted not by popular movement or by representatives of state in concert with political opposition but by a powerful elite of politics.

1.2 THE STUDY:

The study is designed to be mainly analytical. It is based on primary data on the political developments in Russia chiefly for the period from 1985 onwards. The primary data survey is based on documents of party congresses and conferences, resolutions, reports of financial institutions, speech texts and bibliographical writings and memoirs. Period literature written by specialists have also been consulted and have helped in building the thesis.

The general purpose of the study is to map out Yeltsin's career, to analyse the condition which helped to create him and the conditions which he in turn created, the institution he crafted and above all the assess him as a leader. In that effort a wide ambit of issues have been covered: the roots of 1917 revolution, the development of an authoritarian regime under the communist party, the historical need for perestroika, US-Soviet relations, economic policy making and of course the personal history of Boris Yeltsin.

The study attempts an analysis of the Yeltsin regime. It is about the construction of a democratic regime, struggling amidst deep economic crisis and rising ethnic tensions, and marginalisation in international affairs.

The study in not in any fashion an attempt to explain how all of this came to
pass-why Gorbachev’s perestroika ended as it did. Why trying to reform the Soviet system killed it and why the USSR collapsed. At best, the study looks at vast profound questions of this order fleetingly since it deflects from the main agenda of research.

1.3 HYPOTHESIS

The theoretical approach to the analysis of political system based on structural functionalism has been a dominant trend in political theory. Essentially, the theory consists of identifying a set of necessary functions or tasks that any social system must fulfil for survival and then researching what institutions or structures seem capable of satisfying those needs. For instance, degree of democracy and representative institutions.

However, this study is a leadership study, it does not follow the structuralist pattern. Instead it draws heavily from the elitist theory paradigm that every political system whatever its official ideology is, in fact ruled by a political elite or elites.

Democracy itself becomes a contest for competing elites who submit themselves for selection or rejection by electors.

The specific objectives of this study are:

(i) Boris Yeltsin leadership in Russia is a historical event. He came to power on a mandate of democracy and the study would analyse his role in developing liberal democratic institutions.

(ii) Denial of the communist system meant the dismantling of the ‘public’ economy and the development of the private enterprise. The study entails an expose on the growth of market institutions.

(iii) The study conducts review of the elite composition of Russia.
(iv) Assesses Yeltsin's role in the marginalisation of Russia in international relations.

1.4 METHODOLOGY AND GENERAL PLAN OF THE STUDY.

Most of the scholarship on political leaders is a mix of personal and political history. This means that segmentation follows the pattern of growth, maturity, decline and assessment of the sources of leadership. I have followed the aforementioned methodology in the study undertaken for an understanding of Yeltsin’s leadership.

The thesis consists of five chapters inclusive of an introductory chapter and a review of literature.

Chapter I discusses the various leadership studies and dwells on the linkages between leadership, state formation and political systems. It also outlines the hypothesis, the methodology followed and contains a brief review of literature.

Chapter II focuses on Boris Yeltsin’s political career. It traces his development to eminents and assesses the factors which contributed to the creation and strengthening of his leadership.

Chapter III deals with his headship of the Russian Federation, the institutions he established for the creation of liberal democratic system and free market economy. It also dwells on his foreign policy towards the former republics of the erstwhile USSR and the West.

Chapter IV analyses the factors which contributed to his down slide and makes an assessment of his governance.
Chapter V concludes the Thesis. The study is not merely about Yeltsin. It is about Russia and his role in Russia’s dramatic transition to democracy. It seeks to answer the historical necessity and role of Boris Yeltsin.

1.5 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Building the thesis required an extensive survey of primary sources from 1986 to 1997. The sources consisted of official Documents of Communists party (reports, resolutions, communiques of plenaries); government documents, speech texts and addresses of the important leaders of the period, notably M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin. Additionally, it also involved a careful reading of the memoirs and biographical writings of the notable personalities of the period, (Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Raisa Gorbacheva, Andrei Sakharov, Ruslan, Khasbulatov, Alexandr Solzhenitsyn) to name a few.

Post-Soviet scholarship has mostly tried to grapple with democratic transformations and creation of market institutions. Writing by scholars on the subject have usually hinged the continuance of the reform processes on the survival of Boris Yeltsin. Further, there has also been notable work explaining the collapse of the Soviet State, often in the form of narrative history.

Russia may no longer be Churchill’s riddle wrapped in an enigma, but it remains a puzzle one whose pieces are being given shape.

Jonathan Steel’s Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev and the Mirrage of Democracy, (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1995), focuses on the last years of Gorbachev’s reign and the launching of post-soviet democracy. The book is a thoughtful portrait that answer many questions about the new Russia.

Stephen Handleman’s Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafiya (Yale University, 1995), offers a series of vivid portraits of the criminal nomenklatura who appear at the interstices of the economy.
Though there is considerable work on economic and political change in Russia, studies examining Russia's public attitudes about the country's transformation is rare. Nikolai Popov, the head of the political surveys department at the Russian Centre for Public Opinion research has done just that. In his book, *The Russian People Speak: Democracy at Crossroads*, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995). Popov has constructed a fairly comprehensive portrait of Russia's social journey toward democracy.

Popov argues, convincingly that political culture in Russia has not been restructured around the democratic ideals of choice and representation. Not only do the Russian people lack expectations of democracy, they have also lost whatever social adhesions they shared under socialism. Popor sees this ideological no man's land as the primary cause of Russian society's moral breakdown; his insight into the kind of spiritual void that is there in Russia is noteworthy.

Russian philosophers in the late 1800s were the first to use the phrase "the Russian idea" to refer to what they believed to be uniquely Russian cultural and societal ideals that rejected the individualism arising in Europe and to extol the community as the building block of a great Russian society.

Tim McDaniel, in his work *The Agony of the Russian Idea*, (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996) points out that the agony of the Russian idea stems from the tension between the superficial use it was put to by both Tsarist and Soviet leaders attempting to inspire nationalism and loyalty to the state and the great meaning the hope it gave to many Russians struggling to come to terms with a history of serfdom and oppression.

McDaniel argues, the Russian idea handicaps leaders in their effort to rid the country of communal ideals and adapt it to the individualism of the free market and democracy. To create a political environment in which Russians could be thrust into democracy, President Boris Yeltsin should have likened "modified ideals" from the Russian idea, such as equality, to democratic and capitalist ideals. Instead, his government called for a total break with the Russian idea, a move that devalued the Russian idea, increased people's fear of change, and led to political apathy.
Unfortunately for the reader, McDaniel does not outline how the government could build policies based on the Russian ideas that would foster political participation and create a Russian democracy. But McDaniel's insights do give the reader a deep understanding of the mentality born of the Russian idea and its overlooked role in Russians' struggle to trust democracy and adapt to the market. His authoritative analysis is an essential resource for understanding the old and new Russia in all its agony, ideological and political.

Richard E. Staar, *The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996) is a telling commentary on the capacities of the armed forces.

Drawing on his extensive knowledge of the post-Soviet military, Richard Staar sets forth in his work, fears about the future intentions and capabilities of the Russian Federation's armed forces. Staar, who once served as President Ronald Reagan's ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, remains wary of a renewed and dangerous Russian military. He structures his work about 10 "myths" Western experts believe about the Russian armed forces.

Despite his meticulous research, Staar does not present a central thesis for his work. Without a clear focus, the reader is left to decipher confusing and often contradictory tables and flowcharts, as well as the brief resumes of 100 "key military figures." Though Staar's research would seem more than sufficient to support a lucid presentation of trends in Russian foreign policy, he believes that the cold war is only "supposedly over" and therefore emphasizes issues such as the strength of Russian anti-ballistic missile systems and a purported Russian nuclear advantage. He criticizes Russia for selling offensive weapons abroad to maintain its military-industrial complex.

This anxious and vague book leaves the reader without direction in a forest of detail and thus unprepared for the author's startling conclusions. He predicts a remilitarized Russia either torn by continual internal conflict or dominated by a military dictator. Though Russia's future is far from certain, the reader will not be convinced by Staar's pessimistic forecast that the West must prepare for a new Russian military threat.

Eight years after the demise of the Soviet Union, Polish-born and Oxford-educated scholar Wisla Suraska performs yet another post-mortem of the regime. In the study Suraska details a slow, inevitable deterioration, focuses primarily on the personalities of Soviet leaders from revolution to dissolution, particularly on the shortcomings of the well-meaning but ill-prepared Mikhail Gorbachev.

Dubbing the Gorbachev elite “the children of Stalinist society,” Suraska sets the tone for what becomes an apoligia for that generation’s lack of an intelligent intelligentsia. Although university education was widespread, “the political elite born in the 1930s belonged to the first Soviet generation that had learned history from Stalinist textbooks.” Historical facts had been replaced with nationalist propaganda, and the terror inspired by Stalin’s purges continued to repress candid conversation well into the 1980s. Suraska argues that this lapse in intergenerational education and communication fatally handicapped Gorbachev and his radical advisers, rendering them incapable of anticipating all the possible consequences of their idealistic reforms.

In a sequence Suraska calls the Soviet cycle, Stalin and Gorbachev both contributed to the irreparable weakening of the Soviet infrastructure by instigating “revolutions from above” when the party apparatus became too entrenched in the provinces. Although Gorbachev lacked Stalin’s stomach for coercion, both viewed government as their personal affair, giving themselves carte blanche to destroy any institutions – including, in Gorbachev’s case, his own vehicle of power, the Communist Party—that threatened the maintenance of centralized authority. Suraska contends that Gorbachev could not have hoped to sustain his domestic leadership in such deinstitutionalized conditions without resorting to terror, but any chance of his being “admitted to the club of Western leaders as an equal” –and of receiving needed Western funds- would have been destroyed by such action. Hence Gorbachev perceived postmodern globalism as more lucrative than old fashioned despotism, and “persecuted, sneered at, and spat on” the Soviet army during the five years of his perestroika. In so doing, he extinguished any inclination or
ability the military once may have had to support him either domestically or in the empire’s increasingly restless fringes in East Central Europe.

Suraska’s writing is strong and engaging when she explores the dynamics of the Soviet leaders themselves, occasional pop-psychology musings aside (“The outward appearances of Gorbachev’s marriage also identified him as an externally rather than internally guided person”). The final 20 pages, however, have a decidedly tacked-on feel, disappointingly retreating into murky didacticism and seemingly endless discourse on totalitarianism and Weberian theory. After presenting an assortment of other terminal Soviet Flaws, including the military-KGB rivalry and the overriding ambition of post-Stalin Communists, Suraska hastily concludes with the anticlimactic thesis that “the Soviet Union fragmented and collapsed... because it was despotic.”

Rose Brady Kapitalizm: Russia’s Struggle to Free Its Economy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999) says that more than 70 years of Communist economic thinking and the rigidly structured economy that had been its brainchild has been set aside. Under the guidance of Western academics and policymakers, Russia’s best and brightest would create a new economic space in which would arise a nation of shopkeepers and worker-shareholders. Allowed to pursue their self-interests, they would position Russia to ride the wave of globalization that was thrusting humanity toward the promised End of History.

Unfortunately, reality intruded. Seven years after the great transformation’s beginnings, Russia has been transformed, but not in the manner anyone expected, or wished. The country’s GNP has plunged nearly 50 per cent in the last decade. Workers go on “vacation” at privatized factories idled by massive debts brought on by the reform’s tight money policies. A dictatorship of the oligarchs has seized control of vast sections of the economy—an economy that has been 70 percent privatized, hopeful Russia watchers tell us, even though 50 percent of those privatized businesses operate at a loss.

In Kapitalizm, Rose Brady, who has covered the transition in Russia for Business Week, tries to capture at the individual level the transformation that was to have been. The work showcases people like Josef Bakaleynik, the prototypical “new” Russian businessman (
albeit armed with a Harvard MBA), who tries to steer the privatized Vladimir Tractor Factory through an economic environment for which his case studies at Harvard had not—and could not have—prepared him. Bakaleynik’s trials illustrate some of the larger problems that have plagued the transition. They begin as he tries to unseat the old-guard factory director the workers know and trust during the privatization process. He receives the post, however, when the director resigns and the factory’s workers turn to him in the hopes of receiving paychecks consistently and seeing the assembly lines kept open for more than a few weeks at a time. It is a hope that is never realized.

Bakaleynik’s travails are one of the few threads that connect the tale that Brady tells. The many other insights and illustrations she offers of Russia’s economic deformation are never interpreted or probed; they simply appear and disappear as part of the book’s straightforward narration of the events in Russia’s economic transformation. Nearly seven years of observation should have provided Brady with the knowledge and understanding to look back and apply a critical perspective when relating these events. Instead, she glancingly criticizes—and even indirectly praises—those dashing young men with their new suits and new ideas who engage in corrupt business activities when they first appear on the Russian business scene; only later, while recounting the events of the “loans for shares” deal (which is one the book’s superior sections) and some of the other more blatant corruption of the mid-to late 1990s does she bring judgement to bear. She also fails to step back and enlarge her analysis; a more rigorous critique of what went wrong in Russia would have pinpointed lack of the rule of law and a weak state as two of the major determinants of the country’s slide into economic oligarchy.

This level of analysis is not to be found in Kapitalizm; we are given instead an assemblage of quotations and observations that has been loosely interwined with Brady’s desultory commentary. That the book does not accomplish more analytically is regrettable; what is valuable are the views Brady relates of both the Russians who have suffered and those who have gained from the reform effort.

1997) says that the Russia that emerged from the fall of communism in 1991 has always been a bit suspect. The revolution that ended the Soviet Union was exceptionally bloodless and peaceful for a country whose leadership—for more than a few Western Sovietologists represented evil in the modern world. How could the oppressed so easily overthrow such diabolical oppressors? And isn’t it odd that the land whose gulag archipelago disappeared tens of thousands has never focused the nation’s attention on the crimes of the past as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has? Just what kind of revolution was this?

For Jerry Hough, it was a revolution as thoroughgoing as the Russian Revolution of 1917 and even more sweeping in its political and economic transformations than the French Revolution of 1789. But, he argues in Democratization and Revolution, it was a revolution from within—a top-down revolt that was a battle of elites centered on a titanic struggle between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. More fundamentally, it was a revolution that came about because those in control of the party-state had lost faith in the ruling ideology and found personal enrichment at the state’s expense a greater calling. Communists became capitalists in 1991 not because of a conversion, but because capitalism offered a way to legitimize personal gain.

Of course, in making this argument Hough must deal with the dominant perception that it was pressures from below, especially restive nationalities, a newly energized civil society, and the pervasive influence of the media, that caused the Soviet Union’s inevitable disintegration once Gorbachev loosened the totalitarian controls that had prevented these forces from coming to the fore. He does this less by offering individual counter arguments than by noting that the “objective” conditions of state strength—a strong army, a government that still totally controlled the economy, however enfeebled—were not in jeopardy. “The problem was not the weakness of the state as such, but the weakness of the state of mind of those running the state.” And nowhere was this weakness more apparent than in Gorbachev’s aversion to the use of force to control the “tiger” he had unleashed, an aversion that Hough finds difficult to understand and that remains a major unanswered historical question.
The evidence Hough brings forth to bolster his argument composes the bulk of his book; typical of a political scientist’s reconstruction of the past.

Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: **Tombstone of Russian Power** (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998, makes the argument much more directly and succinctly: “Unlike in Eastern Europe or the Baltic states, the processes within Russia that contributed to the destruction of the Communist system and the Soviet Union were predominatly elite-led and dominated.” Lieven, like Hough, finds an elite that had jettisoned ideological commitments for the pursuit of personal gain through clientelism and rent-seeking behavior years before perestroika and glasnost were unleashed. True, there were protests, but the major events that led to the Soviet dissolution and the rise of the new Russia were not initiated or propelled by mass movements.

For Lieven, however, this was a “passive revolution,” one in which although “many of the personnel have stayed the same, the basic economic relations in society have been utterly transformed.” The old nomenclature may lay claim to much of Russia’s industrial base, but it must share power with a new force of robber barons who have emerged from the “privatization” process.

Lieven offers a penetrating discussion of how this has happened and how Russia functions today-while at the same time providing a riveting account of Moscows’s attempt to crush the Chechen secession. He has succeeded in writing an extremely perceptive, provocative, and original work on postcommunist Russia.

John Keep’s book, **Last of the Empires: A history of Soviet Union 1945-1991** (NY, Oxford University Press, 1995), gives a narrative history of USSR from the last years of Stalin’s despotic rule to the eventual collapse of the empire in 1991. During these years the author, documents, improvement in living standards as various attempts were made to reform communist rule. The official ideology, however grew less and less relevant to people’s everyday concern; and the party began to loss its moral authority. The early 1980s saw a growing black market, incompetent management and agricultural waste. When control passed to pragmatic younger leaders like Gorbachev, their attempts to reinvigorate the economy by appealing to the intelligentsia opened a Pandora’s box of
conflicting opinions. The party surrendered its monopoly of power, central institutions crumbled and the centrifugal forces emanating from national minorities culminated in the empire's downfall.

Stephen White, Graeme Gill, Darrel Slider (ed.) **The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post Soviet Future** (Cambridge University Press, 1993) traces the dramatic transformation of Soviet System: from Marxism to competing values from centralisation to fragmentation and from state ownership to a mixed economy. The authors analyse the full impact of transition on official and popular values, central and political institutions, the Post Soviet republics, the CPSU and the parties which replaced it and political participation. A final chapter considers the problematic nature of this form of democracy from above and stresses that the emergence of democracy hinges on action in two areas, the formal institutional area and the public area.

Only a brief preview of literature consulted has been mentioned. Numerous articles, opinions, comments by specialists in notable journals were also referred to.