CHAPTER III

U.S. DOMESTIC STRUCTURE AND POLICY OBJECTIVES

This chapter is about U.S. non-proliferation objectives towards South Asia in the period 1990-1995. I begin this chapter by an inquiry into the reasons for the transition of South Asia in the U.S. security debate from a “basket case” or an irrelevancy to “the greatest flashpoint” on earth.¹ Not only has there been an increase in the political salience and visibility of South Asia in American internal analysis and comment, but South Asia is the most commonly quoted example of proliferation concern. Secondly, I draw up a balance sheet of U.S. perceptions of threat vis a vis South Asia. This understanding is vital because a nation’s security policy has to be predicated on its threat perceptions, whether perceived or real. Thirdly, I categorize U.S. non-proliferation objectives towards South Asia in three ways, as they emerge from its domestic structure. These are, first, prevention or renunciation of nuclearization. This is the NPT centered approach, aiming for the prevention of a nuclear

¹ The Carnegie Report makes a reference to South Asia being a ‘basket case’ and recommends that South Asia’s military potential should be taken into account, together with its emerging economic potential. See Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp, India and America after the Cold War (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), pp. 1-77.
breakout by India and Pakistan and is chiefly advocated within the Congress, the orthodox non-proliferation community and some think tanks. Second, there is the objective of cap, roll back and eliminate nuclear weapons advocated primarily by the U.S. administration. Third, there are some who advocate a limited overt capability for South Asia, among the defence and politico-military organizations.

Elimination is total renunciation or dismantlement. It can be voluntary or enforced. One of the best examples in recent years is South Africa, which opted for voluntary dismantlement. Iraq is a good case of enforced dismantlement. The NPT centric approach advocates elimination as an immediate goal, given that the P5 states have registered major progress in arms control agenda. The progress towards disarmament was one of the central conditions of the NPT “bargain”. “Capping” is a more comprehensive and all encompassing term and would imply complete cessation of production of nuclear fissile materials of any grade as well as other related materials which are used in the production of nuclear weapons. A “cap” is not about dismantling, although it may be a first step towards elimination. Here, elimination would be a long term goal. A cap, roll back and eliminate objective advocates a step by step and phased reduction within the framework of conducive security environment built through arms control. This means taking one step at a time towards
progressive disarmament. "Managing" proliferation is even more limited in terms of non-proliferation objectives. It recognizes that security interests may impel India and Pakistan to seek nuclear weapons; therefore proliferation is more or less inevitable. If proliferation is likely to occur, then the managing school argues, these countries should be assisted to build safe, survivable and stably configured small arsenals with centralized and efficient command and control systems.

Broadly, two schools of thought define the proliferation debate in the United States towards South Asia: the proliferation optimists and the proliferation pessimists. The proliferation optimists are sanguine about the effects of the dispersal of nuclear weapons on regional stability.² The spread of nuclear weapons, they believe, has a stabilizing influence on the international system generally. Thus, nuclear weapons will bring about stability in regions such as South Asia.

Proliferation optimism, which has been predominantly identified with the writings of Kenneth Waltz, seeks to replicate the Cold War's

US/Soviet model in the South Asian context.\(^3\) The basic assumptions of the proliferation optimists are premised on the conviction that states are rational actors and behave with pragmatism and caution when confronted with nuclear risks.\(^4\) The optimists’ thinking is grounded in the efficacy of deterrence. Since war between nuclear armed adversaries involves mutual assured destruction, even annihilation, therefore a stable deterrent relationship will come about.\(^5\) The optimists believe in the near-absolute character of nuclear weapons. Their presence is the key variable in any deterrent situation and their devastating consequences simply overwhelms the operation of all other factors.\(^6\) Shai Feldman submits that it is no longer disputed that the undeclared nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have helped stabilize their relations in recent years.\(^7\) It is difficult to see how the escalation of conflict over Kashmir could have been avoided were it not for the two countries’ fear of nuclear escalation. In sum, the optimists admit to the universal application of nuclear deterrence,

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\(^4\) ibid., pp. 1-9.

\(^5\) ibid., pp. 10-17.

\(^6\) ibid., pp. 10-17.

\(^7\) Shai Feldman, "Is there A Proliferation Debate?", *Security Studies*, vol. 4, no. 4, Summer 1995, p. 791.
regardless of context. Proponents advocate the building up of overt nuclear capabilities with the accompanying paraphernalia of retaliatory capacity and survivability. Those who advocate nuclearization belong, predominantly, to academia and few if any are to be found in the policy making community.

The opposing school, proliferation pessimism, is profoundly skeptical of the positive lessons of nuclear deterrence from the Cold War, at least as they might apply to South Asia. Rather, they are convinced of the destabilizing influence of the spread of nuclear weapons and WMDs. Pessimists reject the universal character of nuclear weapons and emphasize the incompatibility of Western rational deterrence concepts with Third World conditions and behaviour patterns. They disagree with the optimists in extending the US/Soviet Cold War model of stability to the South Asian case. Pessimists stress the importance of contextual variables that differentiate the US/Soviet model of nuclear deterrence from any other. The typical political and geostrategic character of the Cold

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War, that is, the physical distance between the superpowers, the absence of a historical and adversarial relationships and the simple bipolar rivalry made for a relatively manageable security environment. This is quite in contrast to the South Asian political context, which is far more complex. The impact of proliferation, pessimists note, would be detrimental in an environment of existing, deep conflict, between adversarial neighbours. They argue that Western rational deterrence concepts are incompatible with Third World politics and decision-making. Generally, official US articulation of non-proliferation policy towards South Asia is predominantly based on pessimistic assumptions.\(^\text{10}\)

THE GROWING SALIENCE OF SOUTH ASIA

Up until recently, South Asian nuclear capabilities and the political recognition of it was hardly the subject of internal U.S. analysis or military comment.\(^\text{11}\) The House of Representatives Committee on Foreign

\(^{10}\) David J. Karl argues that pessimism informs the conventional wisdom on proliferation issues and is the cornerstone for U.S. non-proliferation policies. See David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers”, *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 87-119.

\(^{11}\) The response of the regional writers has been typically post colonial. Focusing on the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime, Brahma Chellaney’s article, “South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power” focuses on the West’s attempt at managing a nuclear arms race because traditional technology control measures have failed to prevent other countries from attaining nuclear capabilities. The rest of the article, however, focuses on non-recognition of those capabilities. Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power”, *International Security*, vol.16, no.1, Summer 1991, p. 52.
Affairs and the Pacific Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, in a Roundtable on South Asia, on September 21, 1994, concluded that South Asia was the “step child” of American foreign policy and that there prevailed a general tendency of apathy towards South Asia as a region. It argued, by contrast, that South Asia is a critical region that does not get the attention it deserves. It also noted that, as yet, there has not been a politically active South Asia lobby to play a significant role in the U.S. policy process, in business, and in other professional areas.12

The political visibility of South Asia grew only after 1990. Several factors account for this change. First, there was a growing convergence of economic interests between the US and South Asian countries in the aftermath of the Cold War.13 Recently, India and Pakistan have come to be described as “pivotal states”.14 A pivotal state has been defined as a “hot-spot that could not only determine the fate of its region, but also affect international stability.” A pivotal state is also one which is


economically and politically sound and benefits American trade and investment.

Secondly, there has been an increase in the political salience and visibility of South Asian because most domestic constituents agree that the region is the most dangerous "flashpoint". This is evident in the much greater references to non-proliferation. Congressional hearings and reports, documents, and speeches, and the Administration's officials testimonies, all point to South Asia as the most dangerous 'flashpoint'. Former C.I.A. Director R. James Woolsey's testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee points out that the arms race between India and Pakistan is the most likely to lead to the use of WMDs. In addition, the Administration's annual report to Congress on non-proliferation in South Asia noted with concern the problem of proliferation in India and Pakistan. A nuclear conflagration between India and Pakistan was so routinely predicted by senior U.S. public officials that it became a commonly quoted example of the dangers of a proliferated world. The media also echoes this general concern.


The focus in South Asia also developed after a new series of publications brought out by Leonard S. Spector of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as well as by SIPRI on the nuclear weapons programmes of developing nations like Argentina, Brazil,
India, Iraq, and North Korea. These new studies attracted attention on Capitol Hill, but had little impact on military policy. This concern, later, spread to Pentagon-affiliated think tanks and the U.S. intelligence community who then also began to talk in terms of the military dangers inherent in the emergence of well-equipped Third World powers.²¹

Another important report titled *Future Security Environment* also focused attention on the increasing "military capital stocks of these developing countries" and their growing capability to produce and export a wide range of weapons featuring all but the most advanced technologies. This study in particular focused on China, Egypt, India, and South Korea.²² A similar outlook was articulated at the time by a conservative, Washington-based think tank. It published its findings in a 1988 CSIS Report, *Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challenges for the Next President* which highlighted the potential threat to U.S. power projection by the increasingly potent arsenals in the Third World.²³ It was these

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studies and reports that caught the attention of Congressmen who then focused the Congressional spotlight on proliferation issues in the post Cold War period.

U.S. PERCEPTION OF THREATS FROM SOUTH ASIA

In this section I will examine U.S. perceptions of proliferation threats from South Asia. Systemic pressures in terms of the Realist paradigm point to Russia as the United States' primary threat. However, the Clinton administration singled out South Asia and North Korea as areas of major proliferation concern. Viewed from the point of view of the relative distribution of capabilities, Russia's forces remain the most potent threat as its strategic nuclear weapons are easily retargetable on the U.S. and its allies. This has been pointed out by key governmental officials in the U.S. administration.  

However, the Soviet disintegration brought into focus new proliferation problems. First, there was both the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the proliferation of states. Two things were worrisome from the U.S. point of view. There was the


25 John Hawes, *Nuclear Proliferation: Down to the Hard Cases*, Program on Rethinking Arm Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, PRAC., Paper no. 6, pp. 3-4.
problem of nuclear materials integration and co-operation between the
civilian and military establishments and the dangers of nuclear pilferage.26
In addition, there was concern about what could be called “the brain
drain” problem. There was concern that the scientists who had made
nuclear weapons would migrate in search of jobs and would export
knowledge.27

Second, there has been a shift in focus from the U.S./Soviet rivalry
to the threat posed by the so called “opaque” nuclear states as well as
“rogue” states.28 The dispersal of WMDs across the world displaced the
fear of superpower nuclear conflict. As the world became a safer place on
the Moscow - Washington highway, it became an increasingly dangerous
place on the side roads, supposedly policed by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.

Third, it was widely believed that it is now small powers who pose
the bigger threat, including countries like, Algeria, China, India, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, India, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. The
Bush and Clinton administrations identified the proliferation of nuclear
weapons as the main security problem of the 1990s. The Assistant

26 ibid., pp. 3-4.
27 Klare, n. 21, p.13.
Deputy Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs echoed this concern, “In my view, if a nuclear weapon is to be detonated in anger in the next five years or so, it is my personal view that the most likely place would be South Asia.”

Similar pessimistic statements have been made by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency in a hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on nuclear proliferation. South Asia has been identified as the most likely area for the use of nuclear weapons due to the arms race between India and Pakistan.

Fourth, successive U.S. administration came to the view that the main geo-political factor which was worrisome in South Asia was the crisis proneness of the two nuclear adversarial states and their history of previous rivalry. U.S. officials believed that shared borders and the deep-rooted rivalry of India and Pakistan put these states in a more precarious position than, for example, Brazil and South Africa. With three wars between them since independence, each continued to arm against the other and quarrel fiercely over Kashmir, relative capabilities, prestige, and a host of other issues.

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The various reports submitted to the Congress listed Kashmir as the most contentious outstanding issue in South Asia.\textsuperscript{31} Kashmir was worrisome to U.S. analysts because a full-scale war over it in their view could not only become a nuclear "flashpoint" but would have wider implications up to and including Afghanistan and perhaps even further. It is for these reasons and because of the nuclear stakes that the United States developed a vital interest in stabilizing South Asia, internally and externally. Frequent transgression of the line of control and continued skirmishes across the border, in this perspective, was leading to brinkmanship between the two states, which Americans predicted could lead to nuclear conflagration.

U.S. officials and commentators pointed out that this brinkmanship was manifested in the 1990 Indo-Pakistani crisis. Seymour Hersh gave a chilling and sensational account of the crisis.\textsuperscript{32} This brinkmanship, according to Hersh, was as close as the South Asian nations came to a nuclear exchange, as both nations continued their struggle over the intractable Kashmir issue. The status of Kashmir has been disputed since 1947. However, in January of 1990 there was heightened military activity

\textsuperscript{31} USIS Official Text, \textit{Progress Toward Regional Non Proliferation in South Asia} (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{32} Seymour H. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge", \textit{New Yorker}, March 29, 1993.
across the LOC. Pakistani infiltrators slipped across the border and
established training camps for Kashmir terrorists. The Indian government
responded with a military crackdown. India placed its strike corps into
forward deployed positions in Rajasthan, closer to the border. In
response, Pakistan moved its 1st and 2nd Armoured Corps also close to
the border, thereby escalating tensions. It was at this critical juncture
that Pakistan issued a nuclear threat and General Mirza Aslam Beg
authorized technicians at Kahuta to put together nuclear weapons. "This
seemingly indicated that Pakistan would be prepared to use the nuclear
bomb against India, if required. According to Hersh’s report, the
Pakistan government had developed a modified version of the F-16 for
nuclear delivery. In a verbal battle that was exchanged between the two
leaderships, Benazir Bhutto pledged five million dollars in support of
the “freedom fighters” while visiting training camps inside Pakistan
controlled Kashmir. As reported by Hersh, in a jingoistic speech to the
Indian Parliament, V. P. Singh retorted that Pakistan “cannot get away
with taking Kashmir without war.” The BJP went to the extent of
declaring the “extinction” of Pakistan. Added to this verbal exchange

33 ibid.
34 ibid.
was a photograph sent by American satellites of the evacuation of several thousands of workers from Kahuta. The White House, as reported by Hersh, interpreted this evacuation as the Pakistani expectation of a retaliatory attack by India in response to its first strike. Tensions heightened to such an extent that it was only the intervention of President Bush's personal White House envoy, Robert Gates, that diffused the crises, according to Hersh. Both armies then moved their troops away from the borders, and the two foreign ministries opened up discussions on CBMs.\(^\text{35}\)

The concern over brinkmanship is linked to the U.S. fear of an escalating missile race in South Asia. The First and Third Report to the Congress cautions that an arms race is imminent because of the growing missile capability on both sides. Thus, the Third Report sent to the U.S. Congress by the Clinton Administration noted that the two countries' missile capabilities meant that both had the ability to quickly deploy and possibly employ nuclear weapons.\(^\text{36}\) The First Report warned of the continuing tensions between the two countries, coupled with their advanced programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction and

\(^{35}\) ibid.

ballistic missile delivery systems. Sections of influential American policy makers went further to argue that the successful development of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle by India would give it a rocket powerful enough for an ICBM capability. Pessimists argue that the induction of nuclear-capable missiles and nuclear capable aircraft are destabilizing for three reasons. First, the mere presence of these capabilities does not resolve outstanding political and territorial conflicts. On the contrary, their presence may raise the possibility of escalating conventional conflicts to nuclear levels through misperception of each other’s motives or through the dangers involved in inadvertent or accidental use. Second, missiles are difficult to detect when mobile and almost impossible to intercept given their speeds and short flight times and low radar cross-sections. Thirds, missiles tempt leaderships into thinking about pre-emptive strikes (as, for example, in the Persian Gulf, and the U.S. missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan) because they are capable of delivering advanced and precision-guided conventional munitions. Not much is known about how India and Pakistan view their

37 USIS Official Text, Progress towards Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi: USIS), May 7, 1993, p. 2.


39 Hersh, n. 32, p. 5.
missiles because they have not been used and not a great deal has appeared in print about them, but the U.S. view is that their deployment could well lead to serious crisis/conflict situations as in 1997 when India was reported to have moved its Prithvi missiles up to Jullunder in Punjab.\footnote{A series of stories published in \textit{Washington Post} claimed that the Indian \textit{Prithvi} missiles had been moved to forward deployment positions escalating tensions. India denied having deployed the missiles. See R. Jeffrey Smith, "India Denies It has Deployed Missiles; Gujral Condemns U.S. Report of Arms Shift to Pakistani Border", \textit{Washington Post}, June 12, 1997.}

Finally, as reported to the Congress, President Clinton expressed concern regarding the export from the region to other countries of goods and technologies that could contribute to WMD and delivery systems proliferation. In particular, the President expressed concern regarding third countries exporting WMD-related equipment and technology to India and Pakistan. These U.S. concerns followed from a determination that China had transferred items controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Pakistan in late 1992. The President, in his report, also mentioned Glavkosmos, a Russian entity, that had contracted with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) for the transfer of cryogenic rocket engine technology.\footnote{USIS Official Text, \textit{Progress Towards Regional Non-Proliferation in South Asia} (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, p. 4.}
PREVENTION: THE NPT OR A REGIONAL SOLUTION

In this section, I discuss the most preferred U.S. non-proliferation objectives, namely, preventing India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. I deal with the definition of prevention and then follow it up with a discussion of the two key principles surrounding the concept. The first is the equity principle. The second is disarmament. This is followed by a discussion of the grand bargain as the central concept of the NPT and the key tenets of the bargain and why they must be kept intact, from the U.S. point of view. Then I proceed to a discussion of some key concepts of the NPT, for example, the universality principle, extended deterrence and security guarantees and their possible application on South Asia. I conclude with a discussion of the key civil society groups that demand complete and total elimination of Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities as a U.S. non-proliferation objective.

Those who advocate prevention find support within the traditional non-proliferation community, predominantly within the Congress, selected think tanks and some policy analysts. These groups believe that the most important U.S. non-proliferation objective is for India and Pakistan to renounce their nuclear capabilities and sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. Non-proliferation, as defined by Lewis Dunn, is the “prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to a
region”, in its first stage. The second stage is containment of those weapons in a region and preventing their spread to other areas. Third, there is management of the strategic consequences of proliferation.\textsuperscript{42} The NPT-centric approach falls into the first stage of Lewis Dunn’s non-proliferation approach. The NPT provides a check against the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. It aims at a “freeze” in the number of NWSs. The NPT recognizes only five Nuclear Weapons States. Advocates of this approach are ardent supporters of the prevailing nuclear order—status quo and they advocate policy objectives that would prevent the breakdown of the prevailing nuclear order, best epitomized by the structural edifice of the NPT regime. Such U.S. policy objectives are reflected in a policy sub-section to the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for FY 1993, which suggests that a regional accord should be such that U.S. policy in South Asia should have as its ultimate goal concurrent accession by Pakistan and India to the NPT. A DOD defence planning document as recently as 1994 included prevention of a nuclear arms race in South Asia and ensuring that India and Pakistan sign the NPT or accept full scope safeguards as a key U.S. objective. Evidently, a non-proliferation objective of prevention would call for South Asians to

renounce their nuclear capabilities and sign the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWSs). An NNWS is considered to be one that fulfills obligations under the NPT or a comparably binding commitment not to acquire or possess a nuclear weapon and does not have weapons based on its territory.\textsuperscript{43}

Renunciation of nuclear weapons revolves around two questions. The first is the question of equity. U.S. policy analysts and administration officials recognize that the Indian response to the NPT has been post colonial. India has argued that the NPT is a discriminatory treaty because it divides the world into nuclear haves and have nots. South Asians have decried what they call “nuclear apartheid”. U.S. Congressional sources as well as the Administration have recorded these vital Indian positions on the NPT. Strobe Talbot, the chief U.S. interlocutor in the U.S.-India dialogue on non-proliferation and security issues, has aired Indian grievances in an article he wrote for \textit{Foreign Affairs}.\textsuperscript{44} Other prominent U.S. analysts have also recorded South Asian dissent. Civil society groups have also recorded these views in their

\textsuperscript{43} For text of NPT see Appendix A in Harald Muller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kotter, "\textit{Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order}, Sipri (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994).

\textsuperscript{44} Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 78, no. 1, March/April 1999, pp. 116-120.
reports. How are these arguments relevant to the U.S. non-proliferation debate? They are relevant because they can help explain the shift in the U.S. non-proliferation stand after the 1998 tests and recognition of, if not acceptance, of India’s position on the NPT. As K. Subrahmanyam has noted, “Nuclear weapons are not military weapons. Their logic is that of international politics and it is a logic of global nuclear order. India wants to be a player in and not an object of this global nuclear order.”

Nuclear power, American officials and analysts are aware, is seen by Indians as a symbol of power and sovereignty. India’s newly-acquired nuclear power status increases the stakes in New Delhi’s claim for a permanent Security Council membership. It is not without coincidence that the five permanent members of the Security Council are also the five NWSs. India claimed that it would not be part to a treaty that creates a two-tiered world of nuclear-weapon haves and have-nots. It has repeatedly argued for a universal and non-discriminatory and democratically-framed regime. If nuclear weapons are deemed essential


for the security of some states how, Indians argue, can this right be denied to the rest of the world? If nuclear weapons pose the single greatest threat to world security, they need to be completely eliminated, not legalized in perpetuity for a few countries.\textsuperscript{47}

The second issue relates to nuclear disarmament. The NPT had called for a genuine commitment to disarmament by the NWSs. From the perspective of the U.S. Administration, as evidenced by various reports, presidential speeches and ACDA records, the international community has registered remarkable progress in arms control even if disarmament has not been achieved.\textsuperscript{48} The Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in June 1988, had called for a 50% cut in Soviet and U.S. strategic arsenals. The nuclear weapons powers, proponents of the prevention approach argue, are gradually fulfilling their commitment towards Article VI of the treaty. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the conclusion of a CTBT, and deep cuts in U.S./Russian nuclear arsenals via the START I and START II treaties are all important parts of eventual nuclear disarmament. In


\textsuperscript{48} ibid., p. 1.
addition, negotiations are on for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which will oblige all the declared NWSs to never again produce fissile materials for weapons. This FMCT would also cover the non-nuclear weapons states. The U.S. and Russia have also decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands of tactical nuclear arms. The NPT centered approach holds the view that now that the nuclear weapons states have begun to meet disarmament benchmarks, non-proliferation can be tightened further.

The Grand Bargain of the NPT

The Oxford Dictionary defines renunciation as self-denial or giving up. From the perspective of the CRS Report to the Congress of March 10, 1997, renunciation was the grand bargain struck in Chapter VI of the NPT. In signing the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states (NNWSs) pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge by the NWSs not to assist the development of nuclear weapons by any NNWSs. Advanced nuclear countries promise to promote the fullest possible exchange of

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equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, according to the NPT, NWSs in return agree “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. 51

The NPT instituted a mechanism to check and prevent the military diversion of civilian nuclear technology. For this purpose, each non-nuclear weapon NPT member must negotiate an agreement with the IAEA to submit all nuclear materials in its possession for regular inspections. In the wake of the discovery of Iraq’s and North Korea’s clandestine nuclear programme, the IAEA embarked on an effort to strengthen its safeguards system. In 1992, when the IAEA safeguards and verification mechanism found violations of the non-proliferation regime in Iraq, North Korea, South Africa and the former Soviet Union, it led to interest in strengthening the IAEA’s inspection/safeguards system. The IAEA’s 93+2 programme prompted a more intrusive and strengthened safeguards system. The enhanced safeguards system calls for:

• providing IAEA with intelligence information about suspect nuclear activities;

51 ibid., p.3.
• ensuring access for inspectors to any location on a timely basis (special inspections);
• developing and using new safeguards technology;
• promoting complete transparency and reporting all nuclear commerce;
• providing the IAEA with sufficient financial resources to carry out its expanding responsibilities.\textsuperscript{52}

India is not directly affected by the strengthened measures proposed since it is not a signatory to the NPT. However, in the 93+2 programme, the involvement of states which have voluntary safeguards (such as those of the NWSs) and those with facility related safeguards (such as those of South Asia) has been raised under the so-called banner of universality. This has no legal status since, on principle, undeclared nuclear facilities have no meaning for states which are not treaty-bound to declare the nature and range of their nuclear activities. However, the increased access to information could enable suppliers to make judgements which could inhibit the supply of material, equipment, and technology.

The NPT centric approach gained importance in the post Cold War period because its renewal and extension was due in 1995. In fact, this was one of the prime agenda items of the US in the post Cold War period.

\textsuperscript{52} ibid., p. 4.
The U.S. had led the global non-proliferation regime. Over the years, it had near universal adherence. Its membership has increased to 185 state members. Contrary to the predictions of President John F. Kennedy in 1962 that by the 1970s the United States could “face a world in which twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons,” the NPT and other measures had succeeded in limiting proliferation. With the addition of France and China in 1992, all of the declared weapons states had also become party to the NPT. In view of this successful record a demand for renunciation or a reversal of Indo-Pakistani nuclear capabilities was thought to be a logical move. In recent history, several countries have reversed their course in one way or another. Russia embraced capitalism and democracy. China opened up its economy to foreign investors and South Africa gave up apartheid. There were also examples of reversals along the nuclear path. On November 30, 1985, Raul Alfonsin and Jose Sarney, the civilian presidents of Argentina and Brazil respectively, two countries locked in an adversarial relationship, signed an historic agreement to share nuclear technologies and expertise and to open up nuclear facilities to one another. South Africa was another country that “rolled back” its nuclear programme.\(^\text{53}\)

At the same time as the NPT came up for extension, the NPT structure appeared to be under strain. That structure therefore required strengthening in order to make it more effective. The NPT in the post Cold War could hardly guarantee that countries would not evade its rules and inspections. North Korea dodged the IAEA scrutiny while pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme.\textsuperscript{54} Iraq was also able to do so while being an NPT signatory.\textsuperscript{55} Iran and Libya shopped for their own small nuclear arsenals after the political uncertainty that ensued after the Soviet Union’s disintegration. India and Pakistan also emerged as threshold states, constantly threatening to cross the nuclear rubicon, which they finally did in May 1998.\textsuperscript{56}

This breakdown of the NPT structure was ominous as it could have significant repercussions on the validity not only of the NPT but also of the entire gamut of non-proliferation agreements symbolized by it.

Additionally, as U.S. analysts saw it, it could forestall the progress

\textsuperscript{54} The North Korean problem has been listed as one of the major challenges of the non-proliferation regime. Robert D. Shuey, Coordinator, Steven R. Bowman, Zachary S. Davis, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, CRS Report, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1997, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{55} John M. Deutch, “The New Nuclear Threat”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 71, no. 4 Fall 1992, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{56} Hillary Synnott, \textit{The Causes and Consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests}, Adelphi Paper 332 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 11-23.
registered in the arms control agenda. First, it could lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by allies like Germany and Japan who forswore nuclear weapons during the Cold War. In the bargain, they received security guarantees from the United States. The declining credibility of nuclear guarantees, a central concept of the NPT structure, could disrupt the structure of the NPT regime. The vital US interest in preserving the regime was to protect it from the threat likely to be posed by allies like Germany and Japan.\(^{57}\) These countries have the capability to go nuclear overnight. Any decline in the credibility of nuclear guarantees could lead Japan and Germany to reconsider their nuclear option. This would pose the greatest threat to American interests in the post Cold War world because it would lead to the reconfiguration of the entire security structure. The principle of universal adherence to the NPT, the objective of roping in nuclear capable states like India and Pakistan, and preserving the NPT structure gained significance in this context.

**The Challenge of the South Asian Hold-out States: India and Pakistan.**

From the point of view of Congressional sources and American analysts, South Asian nuclear capabilities have no strategic antecedent.

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The U.S. tendency is to treat these capabilities as local problems. As noted earlier, South Asian proliferation issues were brought under Congressional scrutiny in the 1990s. U.S. dualism in pursuing its non-proliferation objectives towards South Asia has led to a loss of credibility and commitment towards its non-proliferation objectives. For instance, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when Pakistan served as a conduit of arms to the mujahideen, the U.S. subordinated its non-proliferation interests in South Asia to its global objective of containing Soviet expansionism, thus practically turning a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear proliferation.\(^{58}\) When faced with competing foreign policy interests, the U.S. subordinated its non-proliferation interests to its other global foreign policy interests. A policy analyst views the South Asian problem from a regional context. U.S. government and policy analysts tend to take a structural view of the international system. Consequently, they tend to view South Asian nuclear capabilities as those without any strategic rationale. Between 1990-1995, the U.S. government therefore advocated regional solutions for South Asia.\(^{59}\)

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\(^{58}\) For discussion of this point, see Gerard C. Smith and Helen Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68 no.4, Summer 1989, pp. 53-70.

\(^{59}\) See USIS Official Text, *Progress Toward Regional Non-Proliferation in South Asia* (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, pp. 7-9.
The U.S. administration and Congressional legislation groped for a regional solution to proliferation in South Asia. Such a policy objective is reflected in a sub-section to the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for FY 1993, which suggests that U.S. policy in South Asia should have as its ultimate goal concurrent accession by Pakistan and India to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or aim for a regional settlement or accord.\(^60\)

The U.S. administration's five party regional arms control proposal (China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the U.S., originally put forward by the United States and supported by Pakistan is viewed in India as an attempt to mobilize great power backing for bilateral solutions to the South Asian nuclear issue, which India predominantly views as global.\(^61\) India refuses to be party to a five-party conference where it would discuss Indian and Pakistani, but not Chinese, nuclear forces. It therefore questioned the framework and objectives of the proposed talks. While Pakistan has generally indicated a willingness to accept a regional proposal, India continued to resist U.S. initiatives to promote a nuclear free zone in


\(^61\) Kanwal Sibal and Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "Nuclear Politics on the Subcontinent: Two Views", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 9-10
South Asia, contending that the nuclear issue could not be resolved on the basis of a narrow regional basis.\textsuperscript{62}

In 1990, the Bush administration had put forward a proposal also for a nuclear limitation regime, globally and regionally. Limitation was seen as preferable because it would prevent a further build up of nuclear arsenals.\textsuperscript{63} In the middle of 1991, the U.S. with Pakistan proposed a five-power initiative keeping in view the developments in nuclear policy in Washington and Islamabad. The initiative failed because the Indian government refused to participate. In 1992, the Bush Administration tried to rescue the prospect of dialogue. Washington attempted to set up a separate bilateral dialogue with India and Pakistan within a time frame. While the talks did so ahead, nothing concrete was achieved. At the moment, the dialogue process between Indian and Pakistan has been stalled in the aftermath of the Kargil dispute. The U.S. objective is to help restore the bilateral process. In 1993, the Clinton administration revised the proposal to include France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, in a conference of nine states, on the presumption that

\textsuperscript{62} ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{63} USIS Official Text, "Progress Toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi : USIS), February 17, 1994, pp. 7,9.
expanded participation would accommodate India's concern for balance. India turned down this proposal too.

Apart from a strong constituency within the government agencies supporting non-proliferation, civil society groups also called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in this period.

The Henry L. Stimson Center, an influential Washington think tank, called for the U.S. to embrace total elimination of WMDs as a U.S. non-proliferation goal. The Stimson Center's Steering Committee Report on *An Evolving U.S. Nuclear Posture* and later, *An American Legacy: Building a Nuclear Weapons Free World* called for elimination.64 A final report noted that "a world in which all weapons of mass destruction had been eliminated from all countries would be a safer world for America. Achievement of that goal if it could be achieved would require extraordinary efforts over many years. In the near-term, much more can and should be done to ensure that future generations are safe from the threats posed by nuclear chemical and biological weapons. But, the United States, and President Clinton, must be willing to lead."65

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64 See website <http://www.stimson.org>

65 ibid.
The statements of former generals, George Lee Butler, US Air Force, Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army, and General Charles A Horner, U.S. Air Force, called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Nobel Prize awarded to Joseph Rotblat and Pugwash were important indicators of an international movement supporting elimination. The judgement of the International Court of Justice has also held that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law. This comity of interests reflected the near-universal consensus on non-proliferation as a universal norm.

The Abolition 2000 network of grassroots NGOs has called for a timetable for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Report of the Canberra Commission of 14 August 1996, formally submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 30, 1996 by the Foreign Minister of Australia, identified a series of steps and practical measures to bring about the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commission report even suggested its adoption at the NPT Review process, perhaps with an agreed time frame, arrived at through a consensus.

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66 ibid.
67 ibid.
68 ibid.
These trends were significant and cannot be overlooked. It reflected, on the one hand, the growing international consensus on non-proliferation as a universal norm. On the other, it portended ominously for the diplomatic isolation of India and Pakistan from the international mainstream.

Those that favour the complete and immediate elimination if nuclear weapons in the hands of India and Pakistan are not in the key policy making position, although they have a strong influence on opinion making. Frank Von Hippel, another strong advocate of elimination, argued that it would very difficult to recreate the status quo with two or more nuclear weapons states. He recommended that in order to move towards total abolition, the US and Russia should convince South Asian that they intended to put the nuclear club completely out of business because otherwise South Asia would continue to seek membership, for reasons of equity, national prestige, and international status. This reduction in the value of nuclear weapons could be accomplished by ending the practice of keeping nuclear missiles on hair trigger alert, a posture which India and Pakistan seemed intent on imitating. The U.S. objective should be to evolve a posture that would provide a sufficient incentive or an inducement to forego nuclear weapons. Hippel, therefore, recommended that the central U.S. objective to reach a negotiating threshold for total
abolition should be to shift its own nuclear goalposts to nuclear disarmament by acting on the commitment made at the April 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit to place excess fissile materials under international safeguards. Then U.S. and Russia could start by immediately committing to reduce their stockpiles of unsafeguarded fissile materials to 2000 strategic warheads that had been agreed to for START III. After a more than 90% reduction from peak Cold War levels, a further reduction to 1000 warheads could pave the way for a multilateral negotiation to further deepen cuts to reach the goalpost of total abolition or elimination.

The U.S. domestic structure presents a broad range of non-proliferation objectives. The goals of the administration and Congress converge, that is, both ultimately strive for total elimination of nuclear weapons South Asia. However, the means to that end are different as we will see in the next chapter. The broad range of non-proliferation objectives, as they emerge from this review of the U.S. domestic structure, and summarized in U.S. Congressional records as well as think tank recommendations, can be listed as follows:

- Cap, roll back and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery;
• Reduce tensions and avoid conflicts which could possibly escalate to the use of WMD or ballistic missiles;

• Create a climate in which each country’s sense of security is enhanced through tension reduction and confidence-building measures;

• Inhibit the export, from the region to other countries, of goods and technology that can contribute to WMD and missile delivery systems;

• Discourage third countries from exporting WMD-related equipment and technology to India and Pakistan.69

The two South Asian countries should undertake:

• To make a formal commitment to refrain from further nuclear weapons testing by signing the CTBT;

• to participate in good faith in negotiations that aim to end the production of fissile material and sign any fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) that results;

• to announce a willingness to participate in a broad-based moratorium on producing fissile material;

• Not to deploy missiles with nuclear warhead or aircraft with nuclear bombs;
• To initiate political, economic, and military steps designed to calm the situation in Kashmir while avoiding unilateral acts that could exacerbate tensions there; and
• to enter into sustained, negotiations with each other on the entire range of issues that divide them.\(^70\)

**CAP, ROLL BACK AND ELIMINATE**

Although declaratory policy between 1990-1995 remained non-proliferation, by the end of 1994 the U.S. administration recognized that it really had to address the post-proliferation phase in South Asia. U.S. official policy had to shift beyond prevention if it wanted to succeed and there was need to frame a non-proliferation policy that was more in tune with the ground realities in South Asia. First, proliferation in South Asia had moved to Lewis Dunn’s second stage of proliferation. This stage is one of “ambiguity”, a key concept from the South Asian perspective. Here, there is uncertainty both as to the will and the capacity of a country

to acquire nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{71} The non-proliferation goal of renunciation cannot be applied at this stage because proliferation as a process has moved beyond prevention, a stage when states do not have a capacity to build nuclear weapons and can foreclose their option by subscribing to the NPT and IAEA verification system.\textsuperscript{72}

In this period U.S. policy analysts and the U.S. administration acknowledged that South Asia had to be dealt within a post proliferation phase. In a proliferation debate in the prestigious journal, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Seth Cropsey, Director of the Asian Studies Center at a leading, Washington-based think tank, the Heritage Foundation, advocated counterforce as the only credible deterrent to stem the tide of new proliferation suggested. However, Cropsey also argued for a shift in the focus of U.S. non-proliferation policy from containing the spread of nuclear weapons to preventing their use, in dealing with the emerging nuclear powers.\textsuperscript{73} In a rebuttal, Ted Galen Carpenter, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, advocated a non-proliferation policy of arms control and a moratorium on testing while acknowledging that the South


\textsuperscript{72} ibid., pp. 338-40.

\textsuperscript{73} Seth Cropsey, “The Only Credible Deterrent” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 73, no. 2 March/April 1994, pp. 14-20.
Asian nuclear neighbours required to be dealt with innovatively. The real task was to learn to live with proliferation. Carpenter suggested that in the case of the two regional nuclear rivals, the U.S. could help them develop reliable command and control systems to prevent accidental launches or the theft of weapons by terrorist organizations. An active U.S. diplomacy could help in the articulation of defensive nuclear doctrines to reduce the chances of miscalculation.

Such views were also reflected in the official articulation of U.S. non-proliferation policy by administration officials. In early 1995, former U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry declared, “the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan flow from a dynamic that we are unlikely to be able to influence in the near term. Rather than seeking a “roll back” which we have concluded is unattainable we have decided, instead to cap their nuclear capabilities.”

Adopting a more accommodative approach, the U.S. administration advocated the much quoted, “Cap, roll back and eliminate” approach for South Asia. This has also been the official articulation of the U.S. administration’s non-proliferation objectives towards South Asia.

75 ibid., p. 13.
This approach is more accommodative because it makes elimination a long term U.S. objective. The approach is not NPT centric. It is a co-operative security approach focusing predominantly on arms control. It combines global approaches like the test ban as well as the fissile material freeze with regional and bilateral accords to ease regional security tensions. Its objective is also to work towards resolving the core dispute between the two South Asian countries and to build a more conducive regional security environment to preclude the need for nuclear weapons acquisition. The objective of this non-proliferation approach is to remove “demand side” incentives. This would then pave the way for movement towards the ultimate goal of total elimination.

The Bush administration in its annual report to the Congress on progress in non-proliferation in South Asia stated the official U.S. non-proliferation objectives of cap, reduce and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration in its annual report to the U.S. Congress reiterated official U.S. non-proliferation objectives towards in similar terms.


Within the U.S., the constituency that advocates rigorous arms control has emerged powerful in the post Cold War period. The various administrations have been outspoken in their embrace of arms control. A test ban and a freeze in fissile material stocks was high on their agenda. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, in a speech to the Association of the City Bar, said, “Arms control is America’s first line of defence. And we have the support of distinguished military and civilian officials, of all the President’s cabinet, of leaders in both parties and of the private sector.”

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) the key government agency dealing with arms control and non-proliferation, was assigned its broadest agenda of arms control measures. ACDA Director, John D. Holum, defined South Asia as a region poised on the brink of a nuclear arms race and a missiles race. In another speech, the ACDA Director pointed out that the test ban, an arms control measure, would be another barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons and a truly comprehensive test ban treaty would end the race to create new nuclear weapons. He added that a ban on explosive testing or a moratorium

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would put an end to a number of new technologies - the so called ‘nuclear shotgun’, enhanced electro-magnetic pulse weapons microwave weapons, and the new “mini-nukes” and “micro-nukes”. Such technologies would be pushed beyond reach by a ban on nuclear explosives tests.\(^8\)

The review and extension conference of the NPT in April-May 1995 extended the Treaty indefinitely. Extension was accompanied by certain non-binding measures, including a “Decision on Principles and Objectives and Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” that set forth goals for the universality of the NPT, nuclear weapons free zones and emphasized the importance of achieving a universal test ban.

From the perspective of the ACDA Director, a test halt or moratorium had significance in terms of capping South Asian nuclear capabilities because it would prevent India and Pakistan from making advanced nuclear warheads which are easier to deliver by ballistic missiles. A cap would also block dangerous nuclear arms competition and prevent new threats from emerging. Holum stated that a ban on explosive testing would halt both vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. A ban on explosive testing had direct implications for capping South Asian

nuclear capabilities. First, Article I of the test ban states that “The heart of the treaty is the obligation not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” This formula bars even very low yield tests, as some nuclear weapons states had wanted and also bars peaceful nuclear explosions, but rejected India’s concern that a CTB should “leave no loophole for activity, either explosive-based or non-explosive based, that aim at the continued development and refinement of nuclear weapons.”

Testing establishes the credibility of the deterrence capability of a state. A ban on explosive testing would generate lower confidence in any new weapons design, for military planners. A test ban would therefore put a virtual halt on both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would also foster an international political environment conducive to further reductions and move the world a step ahead towards the goal of total elimination. The test ban negotiations were important

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82 ibid., p. 3-4.

in another way in respect of constraining nuclear weapons programmes. The International Monitoring System as envisaged by the CTBT as well as the on-site inspections provided by the treaty would help confirm that no other state was assembling a nuclear arsenal through explosive testing.

The CTBT's very demanding entry into force (EIF) requirement stands in the way of its entry into force and could prevent the full implementation of the extensive monitoring and on-site inspection system stipulated by the Treaty. The 44 specified countries that must ratify the Treaty before it can come formally into force include the five NPT nuclear weapons states, plus India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. Not until all 44 countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the UN Secretary General will the CTBT enter into force as a treaty. In the final year of the CTBT negotiations (1996) it was felt that apart from the recognized nuclear weapons states, India, Israel and Pakistan also should ratify for the EIF because each of these countries was believed to have made nuclear weapons. Yet, this move was opposed by many non-nuclear weapons states who did not want to grant any special status to the three nuclear capable states. Therefore, the compromise that was thrashed out was that all 44 states listed by the IAEA as having nuclear reactors must ratify before the CTBT goes formally into affect. What is of significance here is that the three nuclear capable states were obliged to sign the treaty...
to ensure that they did not pursue explosive testing to modernise and make qualitative improvements on their warheads. A test ban would foreclose the weaponization option of the two South Asian neighbours, thereby stopping a nuclear arms race in the Subcontinent. According to the CRS Report for Congress, a fissile material ban would impede India's ability to build thermonuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{84} The ACDA Director stated, in a speech, that President Clinton had "directed that we intensify our efforts this year to negotiate a cut off in the production of fissile material for weapons. The fissile cut off is our best hope of capping the nuclear weapon potential of countries outside the NPT, including India and Pakistan."\textsuperscript{85}

Prominent U.S. policy analysts suggested that a global cut-off of fissile material might encounter more difficulties than even a CTB. The U.S., which gave a call for the global ban, would have to mobilize the support of the other four declared nuclear weapon states. Principally, a U.S./Russian agreement to halt their plutonium production would be essential. Beijing and New Delhi, as well as Pakistan, could be brought


in after France and Britain had been initiated into the talks. From the U.S. perspective, a fissile cut off that would stop an Indo-Pakistani arms race was politically attractive, so much so that the U.S. should go ahead with a cut-off despite Chinese resistance. This might not be acceptable to India which includes China in any calculus of threat perceptions. The FMCT would place all of India’s and Pakistan’s fissile material production facilities under IAEA safeguards and seal its production of weapons grade usable material. Although India and Pakistan could still continue production by claiming that they needed to produce materials for civilian purposes, like fuelling breeder reactors, research reactors, and naval reactors, the pressure of intense and intrusive inspections would rule out any sort of diversion.86

A verification regime for a cut off could also be a complicated affair. Intrusive verification measures like challenge or ‘special’ inspections would not be an acceptable limitation to the five nuclear-weapon states as well as the other three NPT holdout states. The alternative before the U.S. and India and Pakistan would be to discuss a framework for unilateral unverified declarations for a fissile production

freeze. A step by step, incremental, approach to the IAEA inspections could follow later.87

The U.S. also insisted that a cut-off of fissile material, to be meaningful, should be accompanied by a worldwide halt in weapons production. However, verifying limits on weapons inventories would require very intrusive procedures. It was easier to verify a ‘freeze’ on deployed weapons by counting the delivery vehicles. However, the U.S. felt that a verified limit on the inventories of the U.S. and Russia could induce India, Pakistan and Israel to make a similar declaration, with the objective of implementing further phased, step-by-step reductions in nuclear production as well as inventories. These reductions would take time. Britain, China and France would not want to begin negotiations on an FMCT until the arsenals of U.S. and Russia were reduced to their levels. Since these reductions would take time, all countries should keep negotiating and reiterating their commitment to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons and should not stall arms control process and negotiations by getting drawn into a rigid or fixed, time-bound plan as advocated by some including India. A more practical approach would be

87 ibid., p. 18.
to “lay off” on the NPT and insist that either one of the South Asian neighbours should join, without the other.88

MANAGED OVERT CAPABILITY

In this section, I deal with the third view in the U.S. of South Asian non-proliferation objectives: an overt, though non-weaponised, capability. There is a constituency of U.S. non-proliferation experts who advocate the management of overt capability for South Asia.

This is a distinctly minority view but does find some support in defence organisations, think tanks and amongst nuclear analysts. The approach stems from the view that nuclear weapons are a currency of power, and the end of the Cold War has not seen the reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and national security. This is true for both the NWSs and NNWSs. U.S. government documents like the Nuclear Posture Review and the Bottom Up Review indicate the continued reliance on nuclear weapons for national security. Those who take the non-weaponised view take a non-traditional approach to non-proliferation and advocate an arms control approach as opposed to the NPT-centric approach of prevention. Management of proliferation takes place at the level of nuclear capabilities and not necessarily at the

88 ibid., pp. 21-22.
weaponisation stage. The advantages are that non-weaponized nuclear programmes are easier to manage than nuclear arsenals. The risks involved in managing proliferation at this stage is less. The idea is that countries stop short of actual development of nuclear weapons and full deployment. A non-weaponised state practices nuclear restraint. Despite the fact that such a state has the capacity of developing a full fledged arsenal, it does not do so.

The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) specifies three threshold requirements that a proliferant must complete before having the capability to produce weapons. First, a state should acquire adequate fissile material. There are two routes that can be taken. Taking the uranium route would require mining natural uranium and separating U235 or acquiring low enriched uranium for light water reactors and then enriching the U-235 to very high levels (about 80 percent). The plutonium route requires using uranium to fuel a reactor and reprocessing the spent fuel to separate the plutonium. A second step involves designing and assembling a fissile core and other non-nuclear components into a weapon. The third step is also necessary. States must develop arsenals and integrate the weapons into military and national strategic planning.89 This

requires official and public articulation of their nuclear status. A nuclear
document articulating their intention, capability and postures indicates their
readiness to use nuclear weapons.

This approach advocates a limited nuclear capability for South Asia. This is a revisionist approach and a non-traditional outlook on proliferation, and most analysts in the U.S. argue that it could unravel the non-proliferation regime. However, it is justified by its proponents on the basis of the following factors. First, India and Pakistan have crossed the nuclear rubicon and have entered the post-proliferation phase. Their nuclear weapons programmes have reached a certain level of maturity and technological independence. Both India and Pakistan have acquired weapons-grade materials and have the capabilities and components to assemble deliverable nuclear weapons. They have stopped short of the third step of assembling and deploying weapons or missiles. Finally, they have not incorporated nuclear weapons into their strategic doctrines. Although India did announce its nuclear doctrine, it has not moved anywhere near the sizeable capability indicated by its nuclear doctrine.

Where traditional instruments like non-proliferation regimes and export controls have not served their purpose, this approach suggests that a limited nuclear capability in South Asia can be tolerated if it is “managed”. How is “management” consistent with non-proliferation?
Management is consistent with the logic of non-proliferation because it advocates nuclear restraint. Management of proliferation focuses on, first, assistance to India and Pakistan to enhance the deterrent effectiveness of their nuclear potential. This means, Secondly, that reliable command and control systems exist to give each side confidence that reliability and safety of their weapons and those of their adversary are under the control of the right authorities. It also means the possession of a retaliatory/capability, effective hot lines operating between adversaries, and assisting these countries in the design of safe nuclear bombs. The total cost of the U.S. nuclear weapons programme since 1940 surpassed $5 billion. Those who argue for this approach note that flawed assumptions about the cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons, over reaction to the Soviet threat, and secrecy, all these drove the United States to build a nuclear arsenal larger than what many security analysts thought was necessary for deterrence. South Asians could do with much less and be secure.

The American intelligence community, foreign policy analysts and the U.S. government believe that South Asian nuclear programmes are essentially non-weaponized. Arms Control Today editor, John Schulz, writes that serious observers believe that India’s nuclear weapons
programme is non-weaponised. The scholarly literature implies the same about Pakistan. Both countries would assemble weapons rapidly if they close to do however, CIA Director Robert Gates testified to Congress in 1992 that though the U.S. had "no reason to believe that either India or Pakistan maintains assembled or deployed nuclear bombs ... such weapons could be assembled quickly." 

George Perkovich of the Alton Jones Foundation is the chief proponent of non-weaponized deterrent. He believes that, "Indian and Pakistani elites show little interest in postulating how nuclear war could be managed, how deterrence could be extended across a range of conventional and nuclear scenarios, or whether worst case analysis require an ambitious programme to deploy nuclear weapons. Instead, at least for now, they simply seem to accept the basic and mutual deterrent effects of one's capability to drop a nuclear weapon on another." Perkovich believes that the Indo-Pakistani form of deterrence is much simpler than that which was built between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He writes

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92 See George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy, no. 91, Summer 1993, pp. 88-104.
that an "existential deterrent relationship has been established, probably without construction of actual nuclear weapons, and both countries at the moment feel no compulsion either to renounce this deterrent or to 'bolster' it by weaponizing and arms racing."^93

CONCLUSION

This chapter has looked at U.S. non-proliferation objectives towards South Asia in the period 1990-1995. First, it defined the parameters of the non-proliferation debate. The two broad schools are proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists. Each school discusses the stabilising and destabilising influence of nuclear weapons on the international system and South Asia in particular. Second, the chapter looked at the factors responsible for the growing salience of South Asia in U.S. internal analyses. It also accounted for the increasing political visibility of South Asia in the U.S. and the growing convergence of economic interests between the U.S. and South Asian countries in the aftermath of the post Cold War. Third, it analysed the role of civil society groups in particular the think tanks and discussed their non-proliferation approaches towards South Asia. The chapter then moved

^93 ibid., p. 88.
on to discuss the U.S. perception of threat from South Asia and explained why South Asia was been described as a nuclear “flashpoint”.

Fourth, the chapter dealt with the three broad U.S. non-proliferation objectives towards South Asia. The first section discussed the most favoured of U.S. objectives, prevention or elimination. This approach found support predominantly within the Congress, selected think tanks, and policy analysts. The second approach had as its objective “cap, roll back and eliminate”, which had a constituency mostly within the U.S. Administration. The concluding section looked at those who favoured managing South Asian proliferation. This approach drew support from some civil society groups, think tanks, and some in the Administration and Congress.