CHAPTER II

U.S. DOMESTIC STRUCTURE: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The present chapter focuses on the theoretical debate in the international relations literature challenging the intellectual precepts of structural realism as the core approach to the study of international politics. This is imperative, as critical theories attacking the edifice of realism, for example, the neoliberal institutionalists and domestic and cultural theories have arisen in response to the flaws of realism.¹

This chapter discusses the theoretical concepts of the domestic structure approach and describes the framework of inquiry we will use to understand US non-proliferation strategies. It focuses on a description of US domestic structure with respect to its political institutions, the structure of its society and policy networks.² It is organised in the following sections. First, it defines structural realism and deals with its


² A definition of domestic structure can be found in Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
limitations in explaining the domestic determinants of U.S. grand strategy and U.S. non-proliferation policy, in particular. Second, it focuses on the theories that have emerged in response to the inadequacies of structural realism, with the main spotlight on the theory of domestic structure. Thirdly, it justifies the application of the domestic structure approach to give a description of U.S. non-proliferation objectives and instruments, with respect to South Asia, in the period 1990-1995 and beyond. It reinstates the importance of "second-image" analyses in the articulation of U.S. security policy. Using the insights of the domestic structure approach, as developed by Peter Katzenstein, I describe U.S. non-proliferation objectives and instruments for South Asia. Fourth, the thesis gives a description of U.S. domestic structure in terms of its political institutions and the structure of its society.

The theory of domestic structure in international relations, in the broadest sense of the term, falls into the Realist paradigm, since both are rooted in the concepts of power, interests and coalitions among conflicting groups. However, they part ways over the Realist propositions that the

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anarchic structure of the international system, characterized by the self-help system, overrides variations in domestic structure. Since the role of domestic structure is presented as a deviation from Realist theory, it is essential to begin with a discussion of the Realist paradigm.

STRUCTURAL REALISM: DEFINITION AND LIMITATIONS

Realism has been the dominant stream in the study of international relations and grand strategy. Its genealogy is as old as recorded history and its origins can be traced to Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Considering its long descent, there are bound to be differences among its practitioners, but, generally, there is unanimity on international conflict as the salient characteristic of the field. In an international system

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where anarchy is the governing principle and there is no supranational institution or governing authority to protect them, nations are faced with a security dilemma. Embedded in an anarchic environment, states must engage in ‘self help’ to survive. International conflict may be disciplined through alliances and the balance of power.

The key prediction of structural realism is that alliances will form, States are always attempting to improve their position in relation to others, but others will respond by re-establishing the balance of power. The system constrains individual states, shaping their foreign and security strategy, thereby restoring the system’s stability by re-establishing its balance of power. Realism, therefore, is predominantly an equilibrium theory and depends on the responses of specific states to changes in the international distribution of power. The state is viewed as the irreducible atom whose power and interests are to be assessed. Realism is not a theory of foreign policy choice. In other words, it does not explain policy for each and every nation.

According to Waltz, a system denotes a set of interacting units. Structure involves an ordering principal, specifying the functions of the different parts, and finally, the distribution of capabilities. The ordering principle, from the point of view of Waltz, is the absence of higher government or anarchy. In an International system, the parts - nation-state - all perform the same functions. The distribution of capabilities - polarity, bipolarity, multipolarity - therefore predicts the differences in states behaviour.

Power and capability differential are the key constructs of international relations. The amount of power and the distribution of capabilities become the defining factors of the international system. For example, in a bipolar system, one great power responds to restore the balance of power when the other great power has taken steps to increase its own power. The balance of power mechanism operates in a small system of a few great powers. Realism is also a theory, generally, for key players in the international system. The ‘balancing principle’ would be operational between countries with relatively comparable capabilities. Where the power differential is marked, aggressive actions are pursued by

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9 ibid., 38-102.
states. Equally matched rival states will breed competition, leading to a balancing process thereby sustaining survivability. The logical question flowing from this discussion would be whether the Realist conspectus would then be an appropriate tool of inquiry for an analysis of US security policy vis a vis South Asia.

Neorealism provides a parsimonious explanation of a state’s foreign policy behaviour by focusing on its relative power position in an ‘anarchic’ international system. The theory has explained the logic of “bipolarity”, which lasted for more than fifty years. It shows how the U.S. and U.S.S.R. balanced against each other and in the process maintained the ‘equilibrium’ of the international system. The arms escalation between the two superpowers was explicable in terms of the “balancing” principle of structural realism. Systemic explanations however have their own limitations as they offer an explanation of the external behaviour of states only in terms of relative capabilities. Further, to the extent that systemic explanations are preoccupied with the ‘equilibrium’ of the international system, they are limited in their ability to explain change.

Limitations of Structural Realism

Robert Keohane attacks Waltz’s structural delineation and points out that Waltz’s parsimonious definition ignores international economic
processes and institutions that can also have strong influences on state behaviour. John G. Ruggie criticises Waltz’s theory as being “static” and “unable to explain change.” Realism has been weak in terms of presenting a theory of state interests. How nations define their interests or how the development of international norms interact with domestic politics to define state interests has not been dealt by Realism. Realism is useful at explaining interactions rather than interests. Liberal theory is a good supplement here because it directs attention to the way in which both domestic and international actors interact to change a state’s definition of its interests.11

The limits of a neorealist approach can also be seen in respect of nuclear proliferation and U.S. responses to it. From a neorealist perspective, two competing policy responses appear rational. On the one hand, using the insights of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz is optimistic about proliferation.12 On the other hand, a variety of scholars, also using a

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11 ibid.

neorealist approach, are pessimistic about proliferation.\textsuperscript{13} The two offer quite different policy prescriptions.

Waltz is tolerant of proliferation whereas others seek to constrain proliferation. According to the logic of the Waltzian argument, if nuclear weapons produced ‘systemic stability’, they can do so in regional settings as well. From this perspective, the growing U.S. worry over the acquisition of a South Asian nuclear capability is inexplicable. U.S. policy makers should look at proliferation with favour; but they obviously do not. Waltz’s perspective cannot explain why.

At the same time, neorealism is consistent with a more pessimistic logic. In this view, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is destabilizing to the established power structure. Premised on the theory of relative gains, U.S. policy towards the South Asian situation would be to limit the diffusion of capabilities to preserve its lead. While this accounts for U.S. opposition to proliferation, it does not explain the exact nature of U.S. policy towards South Asia.

Theoretically, a broad range of non-proliferation options are available to U.S. policy makers. These include:

1. The use of counter force (including the building of defensive systems)

2. Supply side constraints institutionalised in a nuclear non-proliferation denial regime.

3. Demand side strategies which try to reduce the desire for weapons development. These include regional accords and nuclear free zones.

4. Security assurances to regional states
   a) Incentives by way of transferring conventional weapons and high technology.
   b) Assist in the quest for status in the international system (e.g. by offering a UN permanent seat on the Security Council).
   c) Help resolve regional conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy.

Which of these has the U.S. chosen? A systemic perspective does not explain why the U.S. made some choices and not others.

In short, systemic theories do not help explain the particular choices made in U.S. non-proliferation policies. To that extent systemic theories are limited. Domestic theories complement systemic theories by providing an insight into how a nation's domestic structure, belief systems, ideas,
economic system, social as well as political institutions affect policy choices.

THE THEORY OF DOMESTIC STRUCTURE

The theory of domestic structure is, in my view, a more appropriate way to explicate the determinants of US non-proliferation strategies. It is more a supplementary theory to the explanatory ability of neo-realism. It does not attempt to replace Realism primarily because it does not provide a more generalizable and parsimonious alternative beyond its case studies. Realism continues to define the discipline even today. The state is seen as the primary actor, anarchy as the ordering principle, and state behaviour is regarded as rational. The study of grand strategy which entails the influences and determinants of a nation’s policy choices for war and peace is the most appropriate sphere for examining Realist approaches. Are countries following Realist imperatives in this realm? Domestic structure theorists state that domestic pressures often outweigh the external ones, in the calculations of national leaders. They also contend that the response to security stimuli may not always occur or may run counter to systemic incentives. They point to the flaw in the inability of Realism to explicate
the end of the Cold War and the failure of countries to form balances, e.g. to counter US hegemony in the aftermath of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{14}

While the international relations literature of the last decade was dominated by debates about the international system, exceptions exist.\textsuperscript{15} Yet, the focal point of the acrimony in international relations literature remains unresolved, that is, whether the pressures generated by the anarchic international system outweigh pressures generated by the domestic structure, or vice-versa.

Perhaps the merits of the theory of neorealism lies in its heuristic value. Logical flaws in a theory may lead to inconclusive debates and precipitate new debates and questions, leading to the development of new theories. Several unanswered puzzles raised by Realism have led to the development of auxiliary theories. Amongst them is the rich literature and a broad range of epistemologies developed around the concept of domestic structure.

In this thesis, domestic structure theory is used as the explanatory schema, while not discounting international structural constraints, to give

\textsuperscript{14} Keneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", \textit{International Security}, vol.18, no.2, Fall 1993, pp. 44-79.

an account of US non-proliferation strategy towards South Asia from 1990 to 1995.

**Domestic Structure and Proliferation Politics**

Although the value of the neorealist approach cannot be dismissed, competing theories have questioned this ‘narrowing’ of intellectual inquiry. In particular, theories or approaches which take into account domestic factors offer to complement neorealist explanations by focusing on a nation’s dominant belief systems, ideas, political structures, as well as economic and social factors. Domestic factors help explain what kind of state response is chosen from among a variety of responses to systemic constraints. For example, why did Nazi Germany go to war and Weimar Germany not do so when systemic pressures were the same? Why did the Soviet Union in the pre 1989 period respond to U.S. nuclear arms escalation by reciprocating the arms race, and why did Russia after 1989 respond to U.S. nuclear policy by negotiating? Domestic theory explanations offer a more complete explanation of Soviet policies in the pre and post 1989 period. Non-proliferation or denuclearization can also
be explained from the perspective of domestic politics or major internal political changes as in the case of South Africa.\textsuperscript{16}

The explanation for nuclear restraint can be found in the domestic politics of Brazil and Argentina where the change in regime type leading to 'roll back' was the emergence of liberalizing domestic regimes in both states. The nuclear competition between Argentina and Brazil was transformed to co-operative restraint with the democratization of their governments in the 1980's.\textsuperscript{17} The two countries have set up a mutual inspection regime in co-operation with the IAEA and have ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, which pledges signatories to keep Latin America free of nuclear weapons.

What does this say for proliferation politics? It follows then that structurally both India or Pakistan have little influence or leverage to shape the international agenda. Rather, the international global agenda is being shaped and influenced by the key global players like the Britain, China, France, Russia and U.S.\textsuperscript{18} For example, the nuclear non-


\textsuperscript{18} Harald Muller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kotter, \textit{Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order}, Sipri (Oxford : Oxford University Press).
proliferation regime is led and supported by them. The U.S. led global regime has near universal consensus and is presented as a universal norm. Not only was the NPT successfully extended permanently but the strengthened Review process and the rigorous safeguards system, as spelt out in the 92+3 programme, were setbacks for countries like India.\textsuperscript{19} It showed India’s diplomatic isolation from the international community and the lack of influence, in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) which New Delhi has so assiduously cultivated over the years. There were two viewpoints with respect to the NPT extension.\textsuperscript{20} Most states came to the conclusion that their security interests required either indefinite extension at the 1995 NPT conference or something such as a 25 year rolling extension, which was viewed as tantamount to indefinite extension.

The interests of the powerful Western-led states were the main driving force of the NPT extension conference.\textsuperscript{21} The extension decision had significance for the holdout states, in particular India and Pakistan.


\textsuperscript{21} ibid., pp. 32-35.
It called for a reaffirmed commitment by the nuclear weapon states to Article VI of the treaty which included a "programme of action" for the "full realization and effective implementation" of NPT Article VI, the completion of a CTBT no later than 1996, and the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. The extension also deals with the universality principle, that is, bringing all the remaining states into the Treaty.

The neorealist approach does not explain the details of policy choices or the coalitions and interests involved in decision making, for example, what groups or coalitions were involved in the US NPT extension agenda. What were U.S. interests in South Asia? Neorealism cannot spell the details of foreign policy choices and interests.

Domestic structure theorists point out the failure of the realists to explain particular policy outcomes. Realists, in turn, do not own responsibility for accounting for unit-level decision making. Changes in technologies, development of new weapons, an industrial or communication revolution, migration and population growth may disturb an existing balance of power.22 The influence of these unit-level changes

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have to be factored into any meaningful analysis of foreign and security policy. Structural explanations may provide a good starting point of analysis. However, political structures, bureaucracies and ideas and beliefs can also play a role in shaping policy. Proponents claim that even on its home ground of national security, where states are supposed to follow the Realist imperative, the response to a security stimuli may not occur. In particular, the proponents point to the failure of states to balance against threatening powers. They argue that the domestic focus in explaining foreign policy gives a richer and empirically more reliable representation of foreign affairs. In his book, *Myths of Empire*, Jack Snyder points out that “Recent exponents of Realism in international relations have been wrong in looking exclusively to states as the irreducible atoms whose power and interests are to be assessed ... domestic pressures often outweigh international ones in the calculations of national leaders.” Collectively, the proponents of this approach believe that domestic factors have been neglected as determinants of grand strategy. Domestic factors are important they argue, not only from the point of view of domestic


political institutions and economic orientations but also ruling domestic ideas.²⁶

There is enough evidence to conclude that structural realism has flaws and an academic inquiry into the US non-proliferation towards South Asia in the period 1990-1995 will have to be viewed through the domestic structure approach because of the indeterminacy of the neo-realist approach in explaining U.S. policy.

The domestic structure approach emphasises the importance of the internal dynamics of the political system in explaining external behaviour, that is, foreign policy. At the minimum, it represents the total social effort that goes into policy making. Thus, why is it that a common challenge like the oil crisis the 1970s elicited different responses in the international political economy? Japan’s stunning rise to its position as the world’s leading commercial power cannot but be understood in the light of its domestic structure. The question however is not one of primacy of one over another, but rather of the relation between the external as well as internal variables of foreign policy.

Studies of domestic structure reveal that it is the critical intervening variable in the shaping of international strategies.²⁷ Empirical evidence

²⁶ ibid., p. 31.
suggests that despite similarities in the pattern of public attitudes in the four developed countries (US, France, West Germany and Japan), the nuclear policies of the four developed countries differed from one another in response to Soviet policies in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{28} It has been suggested that domestic structures and the coalition building process provide that ‘missing link’ between public attitudes and similarity of international challenges and differing policy responses by Western governments. That is, domestic structure is the linkage between public opinion and institutional decisions in foreign and security policy. It explains variations in the foreign policy of countries facing more or less similar international structural constraints.

Further, there is a growing body of work on domestic structure and its relationship to war.\textsuperscript{29} That democratic states are more pacific than nondemocratic states is a fairly well established, though still controversial thesis. One scholar has gone to the extent of concluding that “the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an


\textsuperscript{29} Jack Snyder, \textit{Myths of Empire, Domestic Politics and International Ambition} (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
empirical law in international relations". The explanation of this has been sought in the domestic structure of democracies. Jack Snyder has used domestic structure arguments to show why various great powers overextended themselves internationally even though it was clear enough that they were doing so to ill-effect. A domestic structure model factors in the existing political and ideological cleavages that influence policy making. It also brings into view the various groups and coalitions and their interests in proposing a particular policy: for example, the convergences and divergences between the vastly proliferated government agencies and the varied civil society groups. Therefore, a domestic structure approach offers a deeper and fuller explanation of the determinants of security policy. Further, it helps to explain a particular policy choice.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

If US policies are to be understood in terms of the influence of domestic structure, what intellectual tools are available that might help systematically structure our inquiry? The most prominent books are those

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by Peter Katzenstein and Jack Snyder. Their approaches present the following framework for analysis.

The domestic structure approach as developed by Katzenstein focuses on three factors

(1) Policy objectives and policy instruments
(2) Ruling coalitions
(3) Policy networks

The basic argument is that domestic structure can be described in terms of ruling coalitions and policy networks.\(^\text{31}\) The nature of the coalitions and networks influences policy objectives and policy instruments, that is, ends and means. Thus, with respect to US non-proliferation policy, the domestic structure approach means an investigation into the nature of coalitions and networks within the US which have helped determine the ends and means of non-proliferation policy.

Ruling coalitions and policy networks in domestic politics condition international political strategies. The policy objectives are shaped by the ideological outlook and material interests of the ruling coalition. This

consists of the dominant social classes and the political power brokers, such as, the executive, political parties, government ministries, banks, industry, business associations and corporations.\textsuperscript{32}

Coalition building is the process by which interest groups combine with state power in order to define the broad objectives of national policy with the aim of furthering their interests.\textsuperscript{33} Some of these groups enjoy political advantages owing to their ability to organise for collective action, their monopolies on information and close ties to the state. This process of coalescing has also been referred to as 'logrolling', because the coalescing groups provide unprincipled assistance to further each other’s progress. It is unprincipled because logrolling benefits concentrated group interests and ignores diffuse interests, like those of the tax payers.\textsuperscript{34} Ruling coalitions condition the nature of policy objectives in a particular issue area.

Policy networks are the juncture of state and society which condition the number and range of policy instruments. The key issue here is the extent to which a state and society are differentiated from each

\textsuperscript{32} ibid., pp. 890-2.


\textsuperscript{34} ibid., pp. 19-20.
other and the extent to which state and society are centralised or
decentralised. Thus, where the state penetrates society thoroughly, one
can expect a particular type of instrument to be chosen to achieve policy
objectives and where society penetrates the state, on the other hand, a
different type of instrument is likely to be chosen. Similarly, where the
state displays a high degree of internal decentralisation, it is likely that it
will favour certain types of instruments whereas if it was a highly
centralised state it may well prefer other types of instruments. By
extension this kind of argument holds true for civil society as well. The
preferred instruments of a decentralised and centralised civil society will
vary.

How can this sort of theoretical approach be applied to the case of
US non-proliferation policies towards South Asia? In order to assess US
non-proliferation policies, we must distinguish first of all between US non-
proliferation policy objectives and policy instruments.

Study of official US documents in the period 1990-1995, such as,
the Congressional hearings and reports, Congressional Research Services
(CRS) Reports for Congress, USIS Official Texts, and USIS Wireless
File and Legislation indicate that US non-proliferation objectives include the following:\(^{35}\)

1. Shift in the focus of nuclear concerns from the US/USSR nuclear rivalry to the emergence of new regional threats, the ‘opaque’ undeclared nuclear powers and the so called ‘rogue states’.
2. The overall objective to cap, roll back and eliminate nuclear and ballistic missile programmes amongst would-be proliferators.
3. To address the motivations for weapons acquisition.
4. To promote regional security through confidence-building measures and arms control.
5. To stem the proliferation of WMDs.
6. To inhibit the export of technologies that can contribute to the proliferation of WMDs and missile delivery systems.\(^{36}\)

The instruments of U.S. non-proliferation include the traditional non-proliferation tools - diplomacy, arms control, treaties, safeguards,

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deterrence, export controls, sanctions, intelligence, and security assurances and guarantees.\textsuperscript{37}

US policy instruments can be classified as follows:

\textbf{(1) Treaties}

- **NPT**: The US and the Soviet Union joined with non-nuclear weapon states that shared their interests in halting the spread of nuclear weapons to negotiate the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1968. The NPT entered into force in 1970. Nuclear weapon states that are parties to the Treaty pledge not to assist non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons between them; non-weapon parties pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons and to open their nuclear programmes to IAEA inspections. The NPT was permanently extended in 1995.

- **CTBT**: The treaty seeks to ban all types of nuclear testing, and the US led the campaign to sign the CTBT. Though the treaty has been opened for signature at the UN General Assembly, India and Pakistan remain non-signatories.

• Fissile material ban: the “fisban” will be a multilateral, verifiable cut-off treaty to cap the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons. It will extend international safeguards to currently un-safeguarded production facilities.

(2) Technology Control Regime

• MTNR: This is a voluntary arrangement among countries which share a common interest in arresting missile proliferation. The regime consists of common export policy guidelines applied to a common list of items.

• Australia Group (AG): The AG is an informal forum of states whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical weapons (CW) proliferation by harmonising national export controls on CW precursor chemicals, sharing information on target countries, and seeking other ways to curb the use of CWs.

• London Supplier’s Group: This is also a supplier’s restraint instrument. It was formed in the mid 1970s to coordinate national export policies.

• COCOM: The end of the East-West confrontation has made it possible to convert COCOM which served as the mechanism for coordinating the denial of strategic technology to the Soviet
Union and its allies into a broader cooperative arrangement. This arrangement unites East and West in an effort to limit the spread of technology for WMDs.

- **WASSENAAR Arrangement:** This is the successor to COCOM and it coordinates controls on conventional arms and dual-use and technologies.

**(3) National Legislation and Controls:**

- **The Glenn and Symington amendments:** In the year 1976-1977 Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require the President to end economic and military assistance to countries that receive or supply un-safeguarded uranium enrichment or re-processing equipment.

- **NNPA:** The NNPA requires the US to re-negotiate all of its bilateral agreements for nuclear cooperation because the law asks all non-nuclear weapons states to allow full-scope safeguards on all their nuclear activities as a condition of nuclear cooperation.

- **Pressler Amendment:** In 1985 Senator Larry Pressler sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require
the President to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.

Given the above-inventory of objectives and instruments, the proposed study asks how domestic structure arguments can account for the range of objectives and instruments. What coalition has combined to produce these objectives? In addition, and more importantly, what is the nature of the policy network which has defined the range of instruments? The US state is often seen as highly-decentralised relative to other democratic states, with different agencies competing to define policy instruments. For instance, what is the relationship between parts of the executive, that is, between the Pentagon, State Department and the National Security Council. How do the executive branch and Congress relate? What, on the other side, has been the roll of think tanks, public interest groups on disarmament, business and arms producers who are affected by export controls? At the same time, US civil society is regarded as highly pluralistic and autonomous of the state. Is this decentralisation and pluralism in fact the case for national security issues and in particular for non-proliferation policy? One could argue that this is one area where state-society relation and pluralism of both state and society are different. This thesis will attempt to see if the choice of instruments in non-
proliferation policy are dominated by state agencies and how much of an influence civil society has, on non-proliferation policy?

**U.S. DOMESTIC STRUCTURE**

In this section I will give a description of the U.S. domestic structure in terms of its (i) political institutions and (2) the structure of its society. In the first section, while describing the political institutions I focus, in particular, on the distribution of power. Is it centralized or decentralized? Is the policy process diffuse or co-ordinated? Is policy making consensual? Secondly, I look at the structure of U.S. society. Is American society heterogeneous or homogeneous? Is it fragmented? How autonomous is the society from state penetration, and vice-versa. And how would all this impact on policy making?

**Political Institutions**

The American state is based on the Madisonion system. Its foreign and security policy making structure is also decentralized. Federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, the committee and seniority system in Congress and the absence of a disciplined two party system, all these fragment political authority in the United States. The multidimensionality of national security policy has led to the spread of decision making in this
sphere too.\textsuperscript{38} With the policy making structure spread across a broad spectrum of departments and agencies within the US government, the federal organization for non-proliferation is also diffuse. The Departments of State, Energy, Defence, and Commerce, ACDA, the intelligence community, and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are all involved in the formulation and implementation of non-proliferation policy.

The Departments of State, Energy, Defence, and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) the intelligence community; and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are all involved in the formulation and implementation of non-proliferation policy.

- The National Security Council is the hub of non-proliferation policy.
- The State Department, in consultation with the Energy Department and ACDA, negotiates US agreements for nuclear cooperation and represents US non-proliferation interests with other states and international organizations such as the IAEA.

• The Department of Defence (DOD) is responsible for counter-proliferation strategy and policy and also administers the Nunn-Lugar programme.

• The Department of Energy (DOE) provides expertise in nuclear weapons to support non-proliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its national laboratories. DOE also administers some Nunn-Lugar-type programmes to control fissile materials in the former Soviet Union.

• The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports subject to concurrence by the Department of State.

• The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use exports as mandated by Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, which requires controls on "all export items, other than those licensed by the NRC, which could be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes."

• The Department of the Treasury oversees US embargoes through its Office of Foreign Assets Control and enforces export controls through the US Customs Service;
• The CIA has a Non-proliferation Center that coordinates intelligence aspects of non-proliferation policy.

• ACDA is responsible for non-proliferation diplomacy such as extending the NPT and negotiating certain agreements.\(^{39}\)

The Deputy Defence Secretary, John Deutch, tendered a report in May 1994 which identified 80 different groups that the report found to be labouring under co-ordination and communication problems. Such a diffused policy process leads to problems of coherence and policy coordination. It was the absence of co-ordination that led to the need for the development of new structures of national security decision making in the United States. Further, it led to the establishment of the NSC with a view to achieve higher levels of policy co-ordination during the Cold War Years.

The inter-agency process of policy making has its strengths and weaknesses\(^{40}\). The interagency decision making process is usually inconclusive, because a decision on any significant new proposal cannot be made at the working level without a consensus of the key departments. Almost invariably more than one department of the Executive Branch has


jurisdiction over an issue, and agencies, therefore, must co-ordinate their work and policies. For example, in the area of trade, the State Department has to co-ordinate with the Department of Commerce. The State Department chairs the majority of the inter-agencies and the NSC staff pursues, primarily, a co-ordinating function. This decentralized decision making structure, evolved during the Reagan Administration, has been criticised on the grounds of creating deadlocks. The process of decision making can only operate on the basis of consensus because the State Department is merely a primus inter pares and cannot force or overrule agency positions. Therefore, in the absence of consensus, there is a tendency to 'kick' decisions upstairs to the White House and the President. Bureaucratic compromises have their own contradictions. Inter-service and interagency disputes and rivalries have led to the fashioning of security strategy in their own peculiar way. If 'counter force' is the name of the 'counter proliferation' game for the Air Force, a curious and blurred bureaucratic compromise forged by the National Security Council has led to a definition of counter proliferation as 'non-proliferation' as performed by the Department of Defence. Following its logic, a military officer in the U.S. delegation to the 1995 NPT review conference dealt with counterproliferation, while the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency representative in the next chair would be in the business of non-proliferation.41

The other factor impacting on the decision making process is the mode of operation that shreds time into almost useless bits. Meetings on major policy issues are called on a few hours notice making it difficult to prepare properly. Concurrence on cables to be sent to foreign governments setting out the Administration’s position is often requested within an equally tight timeframe. Additionally, option papers on alternative policy approaches to a problem are often demanded within a few days notice, which result in the knowledgeable few writing these papers. This conveys the impression that crucial decisions are being made at a furious pace. The decision making process requires more organization.42

The other part of the time is spent fighting ‘turf’ battles. Within the government the notion of power also depends on the size of its policy domain. There is a constant tug of war at the boundaries of different policy domains. A lot of political energy is expended over the battle for


42 ibid., pp. 211-219.
‘turf’. There exist in-built tensions and limitations in the development of a more efficient working relationships between the Congress and the Executive Branch of government. Although the perceived deficiencies in national security policy proposals originating from the Executive Branch in successive administrations must remain the object of Congressional scrutiny, the inherent inability of Congress to lead or to maintain complete leadership of complex issues and weapons systems needs to be recognized. The prospect of elections for some members is faced by the House members annually. This also affects the legislative process.

Although the President’s national security team is competent and well-versed on national security issues, the ability of the new team to persuade the Congress to go along with the administration’s national security agenda and its credibility with the public play a crucial role in the forwarding of the administration’s arms control agenda. Additionally, second term presidents tend to lose momentum and effectiveness after their fifth or sixth year.43 A lame duck administration may not be able to achieve much that needs Congressional approval. The weakness of the American party system, which is not as rigidly disciplined as the British party system, limits the power of the Executive over Congressional

43 Hippel, n. 40, p. 51.
decisions. Institutional provisions such as the two-thirds majority
requirement for the ratification of international treaties also leads to
friction between the Executive and the Congress. The personal style and
leadership skills of the President become crucial when the President faces
an opposition dominated Congress. However, the flexibility of the party
system leads to political loyalties cutting across party lines. Coalition
building, then, occurs between conservatives or liberals, cutting across
party lines and between hawks and doves, hardliners and moderates. This
is manifested in the missile defence debate in the U.S. which is still in
conclusive.44

The Structure of Society

American society, like its decision-making structure, is
heterogeneous. The structure of society is important because the decision-
making process and structures inevitably form the context within which
national security policy is formulated, and they reflect the society whose
interests they serve and represent. American society is fragmented along

44 See Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, "Missile Defence: The Sequel,"
class divisions and ideological cleavages. This has its repercussions on foreign and security policy. ⁴⁵

Across the spectrum of American thought from Left, Right, and Center; from scholars, policy makers, and talk-show hosts, one detects a growing sentiment for America to turn away from international responsibilities. Having said that, public opinion has many conflicting currents. Some neo-isolationists favour free trade and foreign aid, while others would abandon liberal internationalism altogether. Some think that America’s international strategic engagements have always been a mistake, while others would prefer a more internationalist role for America. ⁴⁶

Although most presidential candidates in both parties remain internationalist, neo-isolationist sentiment will be an undercurrent. For instance, the American public is unwilling to tolerate any further loss of civilian lives and human casualties in international policing duties. Generally, the rapid globalization of manufacturing and services has made employment more unstable and earnings more dependent on knowledge

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and skill in all the industrialised democracies. The resulting economic anxiety and inequality are easily mobilised by populists, left, right and centre. There is a growing nexus between business, industry and the state.

Americans also seem to be tightfisted in an era of financial curtailment. Some show concern for risky ventures abroad, a preoccupation with economic and social problems domestically and a new interest in restraining immigration. Though all these attitudes may be labelled as isolationist, the problem in part is lack of confidence within the administration itself. The Clinton administration took over at a time when it was thought that the U.S. would be able to focus on domestic issues. Instead, the country was confronted by hard core security issues which required an immediate military response, for example, in Kosovo.

The Clintonian discomfort with the use of force is but another vestige of the Vietnam era's liberal guilt. However, the main lines of the post Cold War administration's worldview rests on assertive multilateralism, a good amount of faith in the United Nations, and an enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention, based on liberal values. 47

On the other hand, the Republican Party leadership is overwhelmingly internationalist. So is the majority of the American public.

This is the conclusion arrived at by recent public opinion polls, especially the in-depth surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.\textsuperscript{48} The results of the Council poll show that almost 75 per cent of the American public expects the United States to play an increasing role in world affairs and a majority even favours halting the cutbacks in defence spending and continuing U.S. participation in UN peace-keeping missions, if asked.\textsuperscript{49}

Although the Republican Party leadership is overwhelmingly internationalist, its ability to carry the day in the legislative process is uncertain. The Republicans are faced with their own dilemmas. Some such a Patrick Buchanan have reinvented themselves as the champions of isolationism. Buchanan is out of step with much of the post Cold War sentiment and conservative philosophy, which embraced free trade, the solidarity of the democracies and US global leadership. Nevertheless, Buchanan exerts a gravitational pull on Republican freshmen in Congress particularly on issues such as immigration.

Societal mobilisation is high in the American state. Social institutions are strong with the ability to express their grievances. The


\textsuperscript{49} ibid.
nuclear protest and the freeze campaign are graphic examples of societal groups influencing security policy.\textsuperscript{50} American society has undergone a process of technological and demographic transformation.\textsuperscript{51} Immigration and travels abroad have integrated Americans in different ways with each other and with foreigners. The communication revolution has brought the world to America's doorsteps and globalized its society. It has also prompted incentives at the local, regional and national levels to get involved in world affairs. Whereas globalization has had the impact of making the concept of national security more elusive, it has also sensitised local and regional groupings to events and developments abroad. Foreign policy thus has become locally driven.

American society saw a transformation from a small and cohesive group of academicians, diplomats, financiers, lawyers and politicians who staffed the foreign policy establishment to a more diffuse foreign policy making structure embedded in a society whose national security interests were not focused but disparate. The concept of national security has become more elusive and society has become more heterogeneous with the impact of globalization. The classical delineation between


\textsuperscript{51} Michael Clough, “Grass Roots Policy Making”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 73, no. 1., January/February, 1994, pp. 2-8.
domestic and foreign policy has worn thin. Earlier, the separation of policy into foreign and domestic had legitimised a close knit community of experts that directed American policy throughout the Cold War. 52

Although the internationalists were concentrated on the east coast, in the debates on war and neutrality they had faced opposition from the isolationists from the west and midwest. The industrial and Anglophile north was counterbalanced by the agrarian south. The eastern internationalists were able to subdue the isolationist sentiments of the midwest and mobilized around the key organising principles of the existence of the Soviet threat. 53

The economic optimism felt after the Second World War led the Americans to assume the mantle of world leadership. The east coasters were not only successful in mobilizing the domestic consensus on containment but also free trade which emerged as America’s guiding international outlook. The east’s predominance in foreign policy was aided by the support of the mainstream media, both print and visual, that made the major commentary on foreign affairs, such as, the New York Times. All these were based in the east. So were the main national network television centers.

52 ibid., pp. 3-4.
53 ibid., pp. 4-5.
The globalization of society has led to local, state and regional actors influencing global policy. Not only have new centres of power developed which are regionally based but also led to the erosion of the east’s influence on the foreign policy making process. As globalization leads to a more localised foreign policy, the impact of ethnicity takes on its own momentum to foster and influence foreign policy. While ethnic groups gain political representation, they influence policies in particularistic ways and are propelled to emphasise their ethnic identities. Political activity amongst ethnic groups gets heightened, such as by Mexican-American, Chinese-American, Hispanics and Asian Americans.54

Finally, societal pressures also led to the mushrooming of global issue groups, who aim at changing policies and living condition beyond their national borders, such as, peace movements, environmental groups and human rights activists. The overall impact of these pressures has been to build up disparate voices in the realm of foreign policy. The challenge for the United States is to create a national security apparatus which makes a synthesis of these competing interests.

54 ibid., 6-8.
The differentiation between state and society is not very well developed in the United States. This is because of the unique features of American society. The openness of the society, its decentralised political structures and fragmented society allows for a permissive and penetrative state-society relationship. Leaders, lawyers, and investment bankers were able to move in and out of the biggest levels of government, for instance, such as luminaries Robert McNamara, Donald Regan, Dean Acheson, to mention a few. Additionally, the Congress has control over trade policy, thereby providing opportunities for continuous business lobbying. The net result has seen a neat symbiosis between the private and public sectors. Policies therefore are tailored by corporate America’s foreign policy.

Although, business has driven foreign policy historically, the contextual environment within which it operates has also changed. Jeffrey Garten argues that the globalization of the economy, as also the globalization of American business, has made this synergy between government and business obvious and compelling. Domestically, the US

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56 ibid., pp. 70-5.
economy cannot generate more growth in terms of jobs and employment. More than one-third of the economy now derives from exports.\footnote{ibid., pp. 75-80.}

Emerging and potential markets have assumed great importance in the government's strategy for growth and production. Some of these markets are China, South Korea, India, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. More jobs for Americans will be sustained by overseas sales. Some vital American interests are at stake in the new emerging markets - labour practices, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and environmental protection. Business and government interests are getting increasingly intertwined and they need each other to achieve their goals. For instance, the executive branch is practically entirely dependent on business for technical information regarding trade negotiations.\footnote{ibid., pp. 76-77.} The direct investments made in factories and other hard assets in the new and emerging markets can be done only by business. Business in turn needs the help-and-patronage of government in order to get their contracts abroad. In turn, they can influence and reinforce Washington's human rights practices through private diplomacy. As the relationship between the business and government gets complex, there arises the need to develop a
more co-operative and effective working relationships between the two.

The age of corporate America is yet to dawn. 59

Similar symbiotic relationships between public and private industries can be seen at work in other sectors of American state and civil society. A case in point would be the issue of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The convention reflected the sum totality of preferences of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, which represents more than 90 per cent of America’s chemical manufacturing industry. In fact, the treaty’s verification provisions were derived in co-operation with American industry which begun working with the negotiators in the late 1970s to fashion treaty provisions that would enable verification but protect confidential business information. 60

A similar process can be seen during the Reagan administration. The public protest against the military build up and the first use of nuclear weapons provided the issue publics with a window of opportunity. The nuclear protest movement originated outside of Washington’s arms control elite. The movement quickly gained ground and penetrated the arms control community and also found support among numerous social

59 ibid., pp. 78-80.

organizations such as the Catholic Church. The openness of the US political system facilitated the easy access of interest groups to the political elites.  

CONCLUSION

This chapter has developed a framework for an inquiry into U.S. non-proliferation policy towards South Asia between 1990-1995. It began the debate about Structural Realism and its inadequacies. The domestic structure approach is rationalized on the basis of the inadequacies and limitations of neorealism. It is put forward as a supplementary theory and not as an alternative to Structural Realism. Thus, though Structural Realism may be a good starting point for an inquiry into national security policy, it is not adequate to explain particular U.S. non-proliferation policy towards South Asia. Nor does it represent a theory of interests of states. To account for the range of policy options available to the U.S. and U.S. interests in South Asia, a domestic structure framework of inquiry is more useful. Thus, with respect to U.S. non-proliferation policies, the domestic structure approach means an investigation into the nature of coalitions and networks within the US.

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which have helped determine the ends and means of non-proliferation policy. I use this framework to draw up an inventory of U.S. non-proliferation objectives and instruments or end and means towards South Asia in the period 1990-1995.