Chapter Two

REPRESENTATIONAL SEMANTICS 
AND LINGUISTIC UNDERSTANDING
Representational conception of understanding language, to be developed as a theory, largely presupposes the availability of a factual world which is sensitive to the semantic demands of the former. It assumes a more or less realistic conception of reality with all the metaphysical presuppositions peculiar to such a conception, and to a certain extent propagates some version of semantic realism, so that the basic scientific conception of knowledge is safeguarded. The very first proposition of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* testifies to this assumption as it asserts the existence of the external physical world as an ultimate presupposition for any further legitimate contemplation regarding language and thought. Wittgenstein's methodology substitutes the question of knowledge with a question of linguistic understanding and takes language as a coherent functional entity, which, as a matter of logical necessity, enables us to know the world in a direct way.

This presupposes an ultimate affinity between language and reality. The whole issue of the nature of understanding is reduced to the problem of language analysis, which is made possible on the basis of and by means of a semantic analysis. Such an analysis is inevitable since the nature of the representational relation is not clear from the syntactic arrangement of linguistic signs. In other words, how language represents the world has to be clarified. World and language are independent of each other and are therefore, in need of a mediating entity to which both of them are necessarily related for their being interconnected in an intimate manner. This mediating entity by its very nature constitutes the representational content of language, without being represented in it, and also reveals a world which has a peculiar structure. This
representational content is what is termed as the semantic content or meaning in the representational framework.

The idea of the representational character of language, from its outset, is not merely a theoretical assumption arrived at on the basis of semantic analysis. It is on the other hand, tantamount to the commonsensical view regarding the nature of language and knowledge. It also justifies the scientific conception of reality which is nothing but a confirmed extension of the commonsensical standpoint. The major attraction in relating language isomorphically to the world lies in the motive of overcoming "anthropomorphism", where knowledge is confused due to the unproportional mixing of our own intuition of meaning, relevance and importance with objective reality. Natural science assumes the availability of an objective factual reality, and its method envisages to gain objective knowledge about such a reality. To achieve this goal, the factual world is approached in a detached way. The scientist is expected to keep away his interests and prejudices, so that he could arrive at accurate objective descriptions of the factual reality. Similarly, as per the method of language analysis, parallel to the analysis of the world into objects and facts, language can be analysed into words and sentences which stand for the former group. The words out of which sentences are constructed are thus shown to be attached to the things they represent. Words achieve meaning only by means of such an attachment with things. Linguistic understanding, then, consists in grasping the meanings of the words, which again, as a presupposition, assumes the word-object isomorphism.

This theory reduces the function of language into representation. Charles Taylor, while analysing theories of meaning, observes that a naturalistic conception of language emerges quite
easily from such a highly designative view of meaning. This is due to the bare identification of meaning with representation. Such a conception of language is much in harmony with the basic parameters of the modern conception of science. Taylor continues

Then we can conceive the idea of understanding a phenomenon like language as we would any other in extra-human nature, that is without invoking any underlying ideas or thoughts. For this extreme naturalism the basic phenomena of language are the sounds we emit, the marks we make, understanding then is seeing how they are evoked by what surrounds us, and in turn trigger off behaviour.²

Initially it is this possibility of explaining language without falling back on internal ideas and images that made representationalism attractive. In this framework, understanding language is the grasping of the meanings of linguistic signs, which again is a matter of knowing to what the words stand for in the world. The order in which the words are arranged informs us about the order of the objects expressed through language. Thus the thought expressed in language becomes directly cognisable without the intervention of mental images and ideas.

But such a designativism remains silent regarding how words in language are related to things in the world. Designativism merely assumes a direct and unconditional correlation between words and things. It also takes the activity of naming as primitive, both epistemologically and logically. But a mere combination of words does not explain linguistic activity satisfactorily. A logical arrangement of linguistic signs is more important here. In other words, what are central are the peculiar roles different words play in the sentence. Even the word-object correlation is determined by the way words are arranged and the subsequent role each word has in the arrangement. Hence, something more than correlation and arbitrary
labeling is necessary to explain the adequacy of linguistic activity. For this the availability of a
representational line between language, thought and the world has to be indubitably established.

Again, representationalism requires to explain the notion of truth in language. Any
theory of understanding has to explain how truth is transmitted through the use of language. In
the framework of representationalism a correspondence theory of truth appears to be most
natural. Moreover, a correspondence theory is taken for granted by the concept of language
which suits scientific purposes. Here the concept of truth itself has to be explained in terms of
language-reality correspondence. This also suggests the necessity of finding out the
representational line that binds language with thought and reality.

Mere representationalism does not endeavour to find out this representational line.
Assuming the activity of naming as primitive and unquestionable on the basis of the testimony of
experience, it gets entangled in the visibly direct ways the words in our language are connected
with the objects. It makes our cognitive relations with things central and finally gets involved in
psychologism. The testimony of experience is necessarily private and remains unshared. It thus
fails to explain the legitimate use of language, as the implied psychologism amounts to confusion
and uncertainty, which again may undermine the very purpose behind propagating
designativism. Neither the function nor the structure of language can be consistently accounted
for merely by emphasising the word - object correlation.

The syntactical arrangement of words does not necessarily point to a representational line
that makes language - reality connection necessary and certain. This prompts us to analyse
language with an emphasis on the semantic aspects. For, as it is noted earlier, it is the notion of representational content of language or meaning that explains how the representational line can be drawn. What justifies the direct word-object correlation is thus, not our experience but the fact that meaning here functions as a mediating entity between the two realms connecting them. Meaning mediates language and world and projects the former as the representation of the latter. This peculiar conception of meaning is extremely crucial for a model of understanding based on empirical representations.

Frege's senses are such mediating entities. They not only guide the uses of language but also determine the basic word-object correlation by presenting the reference with absolute certainty. And by presenting reference, they mediate language and reality. As far as the representational conception is concerned, the notion of sense plays a vital role. Senses ensure that the language-reality correspondence is not just a contingent fact. The required logical necessity was supplied by the senses which are logical entities. It was therefore, to Frege the representationalists owe the possibility of semantic realism which proclaims the availability of a representational line between language, thought and the world, without falling back on psychologism. Being logical entities, the senses enable us to achieve a syntactic-semantic unity in the framework of representationalism. Here language is granted with a more wider role in determining the nature of linguistic understanding. The notion of meaning which justifies the idea of representational line itself is a derivative idea from the notion that language represents an arrangement of more simple linguistic expressions.
An analysis of the representational model of understanding thus makes the notion of meaning its focal point of concern. And meaning, in turn, is understood as the semantic content of linguistic expressions. It is also necessary that meaning should contain faithful information about the world of objects which language is said to be representing. To evaluate the nature of linguistic understanding, therefore, presupposes an explanation of how meaning is evolved out of language. In other words, the location of meaning has to be identified.

The whole issue is being discussed from the background of an important presupposition which became one of the cardinal notions of the entire representational framework: The idea of the prepositional character of linguistic understanding. This conception not only explains the nature of knowledge and cognitive enterprise but also makes clear the way meaning is evolved deterministically from the structure of linguistic expressions.

2. THE PROPOSITIONAL CHARACTER OF LINGUISTIC UNDERSTANDING

Representational model, from its very outset, universally equated the notion of linguistic understanding with the knowledge of truth conditions. Frege, for example, related the notion of sense, the very core of his semantic theory, with the concept of truth and Wittgenstein proclaimed that, to understand a proposition, i.e., an expression in language, means to know what is the case if it is true. This notion of truth is again connected with the notion of sentence or proposition and further with the notion of sense. Frege writes:

So what is improperly called the truth of pictures and ideas is reduced to the truth of sentences. What is it that we call a sentence? A series of sounds, but only if it has a
sense (this is not meant to convey that *any* series of sounds that has a sense is a sentence). And when we call a sentence true we really mean that its sense is true. And hence the only thing that raises the question of truth at all is the sense of sentences.\(^4\)

The questions of truth and meaning are, therefore, intimately associated with this idea of sentence, or, more clearly, proposition. This insight provides a clear way out from the riddles faced by designativism. What is accounted is a more consistent and detailed view regarding the nature of linguistic understanding. To be precise, the prepositional character of knowledge has to be recognised in connection with the various functions of language. To understand language is, therefore, not a mechanical process in which the referents of each word is picked up and grasped independently. Making proposition the locus of meaning and relating it with the notion of truth envisages an altogether different vision regarding knowledge and understanding and also about the nature of language.

The notion of structure is derived from this conception. A proposition, says Frege, is constituted by a series of sounds or words which have senses. This suggests that a proposition is formed out of sounds or words arranged in determinate ways. This arrangement reveals a structure and when it comes to the question of representation, the latter is explained in terms of this conception. Representational model takes the sole function of language to be consisting in its representing the world based on a structural isomorphism. This concept of structural isomorphism helps in avoiding the riddles the representational model encountered when it asserted language - reality correspondence by means of designativism.
Frege's context principle is a clear and consistent step towards this development. This principle, apart from granting a semantic and logical priority to sentences over words also provides basic insights regarding the nature of knowledge. Unlike designativism which takes for granted the word-object contact, Frege tries to analyse the nature of this relationship. The use of language does not exhaust with, or merely consists in the ability of making words related to objects. In other words, he tries to prove that the words in language are not arbitrarily connected to things on the basis of convention or consensus. Each word acquires its peculiar role in the system of signs as a result of the ways it is related to other words. The context principle thus represents the whole of Frege's conception of linguistic understanding and meaning in a nutshell. By focusing on sentences, rather than on words, Frege reasserts his anti-psychological position, as far as the question of knowledge is concerned. Since the meaning of words are not explored in isolation, the epistemological issue of directly cognising the world of objects has been avoided. In other words, the question of direct knowledge of objects is not raised. With the introduction of context principle, the thought conveyed by the sentence becomes more important and therefore, knowledge about an object in the world is always knowledge of some thought conveying that thing. The sentential senses or thoughts are said to be mediating all our cognitive interactions with the factual reality.

This conception of the "thought that mediates our uses of language", thus occupies a central role in the whole representational contemplations regarding the nature of linguistic understanding. On the one hand it provided an insight which enabled them to avoid the old epistemological perplexities connected with the question of knowledge. With the notion of proposition attention was shifted to language in a more radical way. For example, the question
'how do I know that the leaf is green?', is a question about the meaning of the linguistic expression 'the leaf is green' and has nothing to do with the psychological problem of knowing the properties of a material object. In other words, the whole problem of understanding is condensed to this point of understanding meaning. This insight has been further developed to accommodate a series of other theories accounting for the nature of language and linguistic understanding.

The most significant aspect of this conception is that it brings together the notions of meaning and truth to develop a doctrine of linguistic understanding. By explicating the way expressions describe the state of affairs, this conception provides an explanation of the evolution of meaning out of language. This further explains how expressibility of language is related to representationality. Meaning, in other words, is conceived in this framework as a property of linguistic expressions, which possesses an inbuilt and innate structure.

On the other hand, this conception concurrently develops a notion of truth and makes it fit into the semantic framework of representationalism. Ultimately, it is with this notion of truth that the representationalists intend to establish the legitimate and meaningful uses of language. The question of truth forcefully brings in the question of reference into the framework of language theory. The concept of structure has to accommodate this factor, as the idea of representationality has to take into account the references of words. In other words, the representational feature and function of language are related to the notion of reference of words in important ways. This conception is definitely different from mere designativism, where the original empiricist-representationalist outlook is maintained to a certain extent with an emphasis
on the *a priori* nature of word-object contact. Here meaning and truth are made intimately related with linguistic expressions which have a structure. In other words, the questions of meaning and truth can be raised only if there is such a thing as a proposition. A proposition is differentiated from a sentence and other linguistic expressions, as it is said to be an abstract entity which is not subjected to change. A sentence in language, on the other hand, is a perceptible entity and always occurs in some language or other. The sentences uttered by different people in different occasions remain true or false across all variety of sentence case and occasions of utterance.

What is of immediate concern is the nature of proposition and how the notion of meaning has originated in it. A proposition by its very nature is a complex entity, as it is constituted out of simple linguistic expressions or words in proper arrangement. It is from the structure of this arrangement that meaning of a proposition evolves. The idea of a representational line that connects world and language together itself is bound to these concepts of meaning and structure.

Again, shifting focal attention from words and granting them their semantic legitimacy only in the context of a sentence is to provide a satisfactory account of the workings and meaningful uses of language. It justifiably articulates how language mediates all our cognitive enterprises by explicating how words are related to things. In other words, it re-articulates the representationality of language with additional rigour and consistency with an emphasis on the notion of structure. Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, says Frege. No word is an isolated entity as words make legitimate appearance in language always in connection with other words. Language in no way is a series of words connected improperly or arbitrarily.
Understanding the roles of words in meaningful linguistic expressions is thus a primary concern for the representationalists. And this, in turn, is nothing but an understanding of the structure of language.

3. THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE

Words are conceived as the essential structural elements of language. It is with them that language is immediately connected with reality. They are the feelers by means of which language touches reality. And it is through them in proper arrangement linguistic communication is carried out in the framework of representationalists. As Wittgenstein pointed out, what constitutes a picture, i.e., a proposition in language is that, its elements, i.e., words, are related to one another in a determinate way.⁸

The notion of structure evolves out of this picture. As Wittgenstein argues, the connection between words constitutes the structure of the proposition and also that this structure is the representation of a similar structure which the world bears. The context principle of Frege is thus extended to assert a concept of structural isomorphism. Words as the basic representing data are used for the purpose of expressing something in linguistic representation and the peculiar role of each word is determined by the syntactic and semantic structures of sentences in which they figure as constituents. What is suggested by this argument is the insight that, the semantic content of language is not directly grasped by means of words. It is rather revealed in the propositions which syntactically and semantically arrange words, so as to disclose their
logical contents. In other words, the references depend on the semantic contents of sentences in order to get introduced and thereby cognised through language.

This also gives an outline of the notion of meaning that is conceived by the representational model. It is in this notion that they discover the representational line that connects language with the world. The possibility of understanding language objectively also finds justification in it. What is important to be noted in this context is the fact that this semantic content is necessarily a property of language, or, more precisely, that of propositions. The concept of meaning which constitutes the heart of the theory of language is thus directly derived out of the notion of proposition, which again, in turn, is derived out of the idea that language has a definite structure.

The idea of structure is very much built into the notion of proposition. It is said to be made out of names which are connected with each other in determinate ways. This arrangement of words subsequently exhibits an order. This order is a logical order and hence suggests the availability of structure which is also logical. This is to argue for representationalism on the basis of structural identity between propositions and facts, rather than on the basis of mere word-object relationship. This goes beyond mere designativism - the theory of reference.

Some representationalists, like Russell, even construct metaphysical theories to substantiate the language - reality correspondence, and have developed semantic doctrines in the light of such theories. But the idea of structure gets fully developed only in Wittgenstein's picture theory. Following Frege, Wittgenstein asserts that it is sentences and not words that
constitute the key to understand language, and, consequently, attention is shifted to propositions which are formed out of an arrangement of words

An examination of this arrangement, or, more precisely, the structure of propositions is carried out by means of a logical analysis of language. It is eventually an analysis of the grammar of language, and here Wittgenstein borrows insights from both Frege and Russell.

Russell's method of analysis, as demonstrated in the theory of descriptions, shows how the surface grammar of sentences makes linguistic expressions ambiguous and deceptive. Russell proceeds with the analysis of the nature of the denoting phrases like "the author of Waverley", and "The present King of France". His basic assumption consists in a representational outlook, which takes the meaning of a name as identical with the object denoted by the name. By analysing the expression "The present King of France", Russell categorically states that, this expression does not function as a subject of a proposition. Russell argues that, a denoting phrase is essentially part of a sentence. The sentence "the author of Waverley was a man" is not a statement of the form "x was a man", and does not have 'the author of Waverley' for its subject, though the peripheral grammar suggests so. Russell explains the denotation as:

Every proposition in which 'the author of Waverley' occurs being explained as above, the proposition 'Scott was the author of Waverley' (i.e. 'Scott was identical with the author of Waverley') becomes 'one and only one entity wrote Waverley', and Scott was identical with that one'; or, reverting to the wholly explicit form: 'It is not always false of x that x wrote Waverley, that it is always true of y that if y wrote Waverley y is identical with x, and that Scott is identical with x'.

Such an analysis will prove whether a denoting phrase is meaningful or not. The denoting phrase does not really contain the thing it introduces as a constituent but contains instead the constituents expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase. We can, therefore, apprehend that all the constituents in a proposition are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. This fact will be revealed by analysis.\(^\text{13}\)

But what is more important about the theory of description is that, apart from asserting representationality, it instructs us about the nature of the structure of language. The sentence; "The Present King of France is bald", of course, possesses a structure. Words are arranged properly following the rules prescribed by grammar. This shows, however, that the syntactic structure can be deceptive and misinformative about the functions of language. The sentence appears to be a subject-predicate sentence, while logically it is not. Russell thus emphasises the logical form of language which takes care of both the grammatical and semantic aspects.

From this, Wittgenstein concludes that the real structure of language is and must be essentially logical in nature. Syntax, he contends, does not take us beyond the linguistic order which is itself contingent, being the accidental feature of language. What an analysis of language is expected to reveal is the logic of language which eventually carries with it the knowledge of the necessary ways in which language is related to the world. The latter relates to the semantic structure of language.

Language is taken to be a complex system with a structure. For Wittgenstein, it is a totality of propositions of natural sciences and thus presents itself as a faithful picture of the
factual world. Each proposition, again in turn, is a complex entity, as it can be analysed into more simple propositions, to a point where further analysis becomes impossible. This end-point of analysis leads to the discovery of elementary propositions.

The easiest way to understand the structure of language and examine the way meaning evolves out of it is to analyse the structure of elementary propositions. They represent the atomic stuff of linguistic expressions, as they are the simplest forms of expressions which are capable of conveying and communicating sense. Logically they stand as prototypes for linguistic representations and thereby set standards for legitimate linguistic activity. These unanalysable atomic stuff of linguistic activity is thus focussed more in order to derive information about the nature of language use, meaning and understanding.

The most apparent feature of an elementary proposition is expressed in its definition itself. It is said to be constituted out of words which are names in immediate combination. And these names, it is argued, are immediately connected to objects which are also in immediate combination with each other. An examination of such elementary propositions will ultimately reveal the way sense is evolved out of the propositions. It also instructs us how representationality is retained in the framework of semantic realism.

The concept of object occupies a central position in the attempts to develop the notion of logical structure. The ultimacy of logic and the syntax-semantic unity are established on the basis of this important concept. One can even say that the whole representational ontology is grounded on such a concept. Wittgenstein conceived the objects as making up the substance of
the world and also as occurring always in a combination with each other.\textsuperscript{15} It is the internal property of the objects to exist in combination with each other.\textsuperscript{16} This internal property guarantees the availability of a similar connection among words in language. These objects are not only related to each other, but are related in determinate ways. It is said that an object's all occurrences in connection with other objects are already written into the object itself in determinate ways. As Wittgenstein puts it: "If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in a state of affair"\textsuperscript{17} and again, "If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given".\textsuperscript{18} The different possible configurations of objects result in the different states of affairs out of which the actual and possible worlds are constructed. These states of affairs will have definite structure, as they are generated out of combinations of objects, which, as a logical necessity, are connected with each other in determinate ways. Since the possibilities of connection among words are representing the various possible combinations between objects, the isomorphic connections between language and the world are established on the basis of structural identity. The structure that evolves out of the possibilities of connection between words is identical with the structure that is revealed by the world which is made up of facts.

The concept of structure which is actually an outcome of the context principle thus concludes with an argument that establishes the representational character of language. Since the world is a totality of actual and possible facts, and since language is a totality of elementary propositions depicting these facts, concludes Wittgenstein, language, in a peculiar sense, is the picture of the world.\textsuperscript{19} It represents the world, as the structure of the world is mirrored in the
structure of language. It is this emphasis on structure that makes this standpoint different from mere designativism.

This position probably is the most radical assertion of the representational outlook. It conceives the representational character of language as a matter of logical necessity, as the structure which both language and reality share commonly is the logical structure. This makes representation a matter of logic and hence, certain and absolute. In other words, language is a picture of reality and pictorial relation is necessarily a logical relation. Wittgenstein says:

The fact that the elements of picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.

Let us call this connection of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.\(^{20}\)

The pictorial form is a representative of the form of reality which is the possibility of a structure.

The nature of pictorial relationship is further analysed by Wittgenstein. The picture, he says, reaches right out to reality,\(^{21}\) and it is laid against reality like a measure.\(^{22}\) The elements of the picture are immediately and directly related to the things in the world.

The availability of such a pictorial relationship is justified further by introducing the notion of logical form. Logical form is the common element which language and reality share. Language may depict reality correctly or incorrectly, but the very possibility of such a depiction
necessarily presupposes the availability of such a common property as the logical form. Wittgenstein adds:

> What a picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality.\textsuperscript{23}

It is on the basis of this logical form that the structural isomorphism between language and reality and subsequently the fundamental representational status of language is established.

This will become more clear if we examine the way Wittgenstein develops the notion of semantic content or sense and propagates the representational doctrine of linguistic understanding. This semantic content or meaning, according to Wittgenstein, evolves out of the structure of language. Or more precisely, he identifies sense as the exclusive property of propositions. This outlook is characteristically different from the standpoint adopted by Frege in developing a semantic realism. Frege conceives every appropriate linguistic unit as possessing both sense and reference. He takes sense as the mode of presentation of the object referred by the expression. Any sensible linguistic expression will, on the one hand, refer to or stand for an object and on the other hand will present that object in a particular way. For example, the expression 'morning star', refers both to the object 'Venus' which is a star and presents it as a celestial body which appears in the morning. The expression 'Evening star' also refers to the same object 'Venus' but presents that object in a totally different way, i.e., as a celestial body which appears in the sky in the evening.
The difference between the two expressions 'morning star' and 'evening star', owes to the different ways they present the same object. In other words, this constitutes a difference in sense. The semantic content, therefore, is the way the references in the factual world is introduced into the conversation situation through language.

Sense, which is the essence of language for Frege, therefore, is the essential property of all linguistic expressions. Sentences as well as words have both senses and references. In the case of sentences the sense is said to be constituted out of the senses of simple expressions and reference is understood to be the truth-value of sentences.

This approach seems to be contradicting another significant insight of Frege, viz., the context principle. The latter rules out any possibility of fixing the meaning of a simple expression or name in isolation. But Frege's compositionality principle, employed in order to explain the generation of sense contends that the sense of a complex expression or sentence (proposition) is the sum total of the senses of the simple expressions out of which it is constituted. He conceives even a sentence as a complex name.

What leads Frege to such an assumption is his conception of sense as the mode of presentation of the object. Conceived in this way words also should have sense as they also present the objects they refer to in peculiar ways. This is shown with the example of 'morning star' and 'evening star'. Frege thus ignores the important ways in which simple expressions in language are different from complex expressions, i.e., the difference between names and sentences. The difference, to be precise, consists in the fact that, while the latter possesses a
definite structure, the former by its very nature inherits only the possibility of constantly being in
combination with other simple expressions to form such structures. Since there are infinite
number of objects in the world, their possibility to be combined with each other also is infinite.
Similarly, every name in language, being representative of object in the world, is capable of
entering into infinite number of combinations with other names to form complex propositions
which have definite structures, and every such proposition will have different senses owing to
the difference in the structural arrangement of words.

Ascribing sense to names thus may lead to semantic indeterminism, since every name
was capable of generating infinite number of different senses by entering into infinite number of
combinations with other names Wittgenstein tackles this riddle by identifying sense with the
pictorial content of propositions, which by means of a definite arrangement of words stand as
faithful pictures of reality. Instead of the mode of presentation, what Wittgenstein stresses is the
articulate nature of propositions A proposition articulates a fact by showing a possible
arrangement of words. The sense is said to be generated out of the structure evolved from the
determinate internal relationships that hold between words By emphasising on structure he
could propagate a doctrine of sense determinism which is suitable for establishing a
representational conception of meaning and understanding.

To assert the determination of sense, Wittgenstein mainly relies on two assumptions:

a) The representationality of language.

b) The simplicity doctrine.
The representationality of language, as we have seen, has been established by means of a picture theory, which ultimately asserts a structural identity between world and language with an appeal to the logical form inherited commonly by both the realms. Regarding the second assumption, the logical simplicity of objects and words has been a perennial insight in the whole framework of representationalism.

The logically simple words or names have, as their meaning, the objects in the factual world, and they stand for these objects. In other words, their references are fixed in advance. To know the reference is a prerequisite for linguistic understanding. And since the meanings of words are fixed, the possible combination between them is bound to generate a determinate and definite sense, irrespective of the time and place where it finds articulation. What Wittgenstein says about objects is relevant here. As it is stated above, the internal property of an object is conceived as its ability to be in combination with other objects, and to know an object is to know its possible combinations. It is, in other words, to know the logical space occupied by the object in relation with other objects. Similarly, what is necessarily needed to know the meaning of a word is to know the logical space it occupies in the multitude of language uses. And to know this logical space is to know the structure of language.

The logical space further points to the fundamental logical framework inherited by both language and reality. The structure of language represents this logical framework as it reveals the possible combination and interrelationships between objects in the factual world. The sense that is generated out of this interrelations between words is also fixed.
The notion of sense determinism becomes further explicit when the notion of the general form of proposition is propagated. This conception explains how the semantic content of a proposition is read off from its form. The general form of proposition informs us about the logical nature of interrelations that are possible between names in language for the articulation of sense. It says how things stand in relation to one another and therefore refers to the factual world structurally.

A further insight - the idea of logical grammar - asserts the relation between the logical space and sense determinism conclusively. The idea of logical grammar points to a normative rule system that dictates the manifold of language uses. The structure of language, thus, on the one hand prescribes a spatio-temporal arrangement of individual expressions. It goes without saying that the syntactic rules govern the uses of linguistic signs even for ordinary conversations. Language, in other words, is essentially rule bounded - be it the language of a scientist or of a lay man. Expressions are systematically arranged, so that the structure of this complex expression mirrors the possibilities of combination among words.

On the other hand, this system also appeals to a system of logical rules, the rules of meaning fixation. This is because the syntactical rules are not adequate to articulate the representational features of language. For this it must be shown how the grammatical rules function in union with the semantic rules - the rules of meaning fixation - to form a legitimate system for expressibility and communicability. In other words, the system of normative rules has to be adapted which contains in them the explanation of how the arrangement of words in the
linguistic system reflects a similar arrangement that exists in the world. Language has to be connected to the world and syntax with semantics.

This further reasserts the fact that the structure of language is a logical structure. Logic for Wittgenstein, as we have seen, is the fundamental framework of language and it also forms the basic scaffolding of the world. He affirms the ultimacy of logic as:

It is used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic - The truth is that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like.  

This suggests that, it is in a sense impossible to commit mistakes in logic. Since language inherits the basic logical framework, it is impossible to express in language anything that contradicts logic by means of language, like in geometry it is not possible to represent a figure which contradicts the laws of space. The representational feature of language becomes once more evident here and it is further affirmed that, logic is interested only in reality and in sentences only in so far as they are pictures of reality. This insight, which makes language depend on logic, indubitably establishes representationalism. In other words, it makes language a picture of reality, for otherwise it is to go outside logic in language which is evidently impossible. The logical framework is so fundamental to language, as the laws of logic are the laws of language use extensionally as well as intensionally. Since these logical laws from their very outset prescribe the representational feature of language, representationality is ensured from the very fact that language has a logical form. A picture or a proposition, says Wittgenstein,
cannot place itself outside the representational form. In short, logic is the fundamental framework of language which makes language representational.

The much discussed notion of ideal language is a natural derivative of the notion of structure developed out of this framework. We have seen earlier how different philosophers dealt with this concept. Though different philosophers conceive the notion of structure in different ways, the fact that language and reality share a common logical structure has the status of a fundamental presupposition in the representational theories of meaning and understanding. Though Frege never makes this point explicit, his principal doctrines not only appeal to a similar standpoint but also can be legitimately substantiated by the idea of structure. Frege's notion of sense, as the logical entity which necessarily mediates any legitimate linguistic activity, looks more consistent and acceptable when understood in the light of this presupposition.

Regarding the question, how the problem of understanding is related to the structure of language, different thinkers hold different and sometimes even contradicting views. Yet it is widely accepted that this structure is a logical structure. Moritz Schlick, for example, identifies structure as the essential feature of an expression. He adds:

It is not spatial order that is required, nor temporal order, nor any other particular order, but just Order in general. It is the kind of thing with which Logic is concerned, and we may, therefore, call it Logical Order, or simply Structure.27

But making this structure purely of logical nature avoids the problem of the cognitive relationship with the structure of language. Wittgenstein assigns no role for epistemology in
explaining the problem of linguistic understanding, as the generation of sense does not call for a process of empirical experience for its comprehension. It evolves out of the structure of language as a matter of logical necessity and is grasped by the cognitive intellect from the structure of language itself. Neither its generation nor its cognition calls for a mental entity which is evoked as the result of an actual contact of the subjective psyche with the world of objects.

This conclusion forced certain representationalists to turn away from such a highly logical conception of linguistic understanding. Their contemplation regarding the issue surrounded the question of the knowledge about the empirical world.

4. STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE AND UNDERSTANDING MEANING

As stated already, one of the major aspects which makes the representational model significant is its ability to provide an alternative to anthropomorphism, which de facto prevents the possibility of objective understanding due to the improper mixing of our own ideas and preconceptions with knowledge. By making language a representation of reality, an immediate contact seems to have emerged between the linguistic expressions we encounter in the process of understanding and reality. In other words, it conforms perfectly to the parameters laid and demands posed by the language employed by science. It is imperative to science to develop a system of true and valid statements. It seeks to derive knowledge about the material world by means of contact with objects through experience, which again is expressed in the language of
representation. The whole process of linguistic practice from this viewpoint consists in a 'talk about the world'.

It is this association of the scientific ideal that has situated the representational conception of linguistic understanding at the core of 20th century philosophical enterprise. The spirit of the age is represented in Wittgenstein's assessment that, philosophy is a 'critique of language'. Language in turn, is constituted of the totality of propositions of natural science. Here the whole problem of understanding language is associated with the scientific understanding of reality, and thus the problem of meaning is intimately connected with the factual world.

It is from this conceptual framework that the neo-empiricist conception which identifies meaning with the method of verification has been derived. A concurrently developed notion of truth also makes a clear appeal to the actual or possible states of affair. As Wittgenstein puts it: "To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true". The question of understanding thus is related to the existence of actual or possible facts.

This point has been focussed more extensively by the neo-empiricists who ultimately turned away from certain basic postulates framed both by Frege and Wittgenstein. An extreme concern for the empirical reality and an overemphasis on the relation between understanding and empirical experience make them engage with epistemological concerns. Since the nature of the empirical world crucially determines the understanding of linguistic expressions, the possible ways by which the empirical world is contacted becomes important. And experience is the only
immediate means by which this contact is established. The phenomenon of experience is thus brought to the very core of understanding and meaning theories thereafter.

But this is to come back to deal with the problem of cognitive relationship with the references of words in linguistic expressions. The problem has been marginalised both by Frege and Wittgenstein when they dealt with the discussion of linguistic understanding. Frege envisages to construe a logically consistent and perfect theory of understanding by positing the abstract senses as the semantic counterpart of linguistic understanding. This conception categorically rules out the possibility of reference being an ingredient of meaning. The semantic contents of expressions are identified exclusively with the senses of those expressions. References, Frege contends, are altogether different entities, both logically as well as ontologically. Dummett observes:

If meaning is taken as the mechanism or rule determining the use of an expression then Frege's sense is (the main) part of an expression's meaning whereas his Bedeutung is not part of it at all, but is what is meant by the expression in an altogether different use of the word mean. 30

As far as linguistic understanding is concerned, it is only the sense that is to be focussed. To raise the problem of cognitive relation with objects referred to is to allow the intrusion of psychologism, as to make reference a part of meaning necessarily leads to an ideation theory of meaning. Ideas are mental images which require a host to whom they belong. And since they are epistemically private, they are in essence incommunicable and unsharable.
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, as we have seen, appeals to the structure of language and there is nothing in the structure which forces the reference of words in language to appear as essential counterparts in linguistic understanding. But, as we have seen, the very idea of representation makes it a necessary imperative that the empirical world is properly accounted for in the framework of the theories of language and understanding. Frege also allows its entry, as he envisages an ideal language where the sense and reference of expressions are necessarily united. Yet Frege hesitates to posit reference as a central factor when he addresses the problem of linguistic understanding. An absolute priority has been granted to the sense of expressions, and in his framework it is even possible to imagine a proper name which does not have any reference. The question of reference becomes relevant only when the truth-value of the sentence is under discussion. But sense is poor even to the truth-value of sentences as the latter itself is determined by the senses.

Moreover, as Dummett says, if reference is an ingredient of meaning, then the reference of a word would determine the sense, since nothing more would need to be known about its meaning in order to fix the truth-value of the sentence in which it occurs. Thus Frege's Platonist semantics, though originally favours representationalism, sacrifices it for the sake of logicism. A representational theory cannot heavily rely on such Platonic abstract entities. Because, what is being represented in language is the concrete factual reality, which is given to us in experience. Hence, a process of understanding meaning should also take into account the phenomenon of experience seriously. In other words, such experiences also has to be granted a justifiable role. An observation of Russell runs:
I think that the notion of meaning is always more or less psychological, and that it is not possible to get a pure logical theory of meaning, nor therefore of symbolism.31

Russell consequently conceives physical objects as the actual prepositional constituents and contends that knowledge about them is important in the determination and assimilation of meaning. The structure of language, according to Russell, is thus a structure it derived from the empirical world. The theory of language Russell construes in the framework of representationalism is thus eager to make room for empirical experience. For him, meaning is connected to the way we experience the empirical world and hence the latter is important, not only to decide the truth conditions of sentences but also to make us understand the very sense of sentences. What is presupposed is an empiricism wedded with psychologism. This alone, Russell observes, can accommodate the idea of empirical experience into a theory of understanding meaning.

5. PSYCHOLOGISM AND REPRESENTATIONALISM

This juncture seems to be posing for the representational model a dilemma: on the one hand, a theory of language which is developed to positively respond to the scientific notion of rationality and objectivity calls for a representational conception, and on the other hand, when it is attempted to explain language and linguistic understanding in the light of empirical experience, psychologism becomes inevitable. Russell was well aware of the dilemma and envisages to avert the problem by making reference as the actual prepositional constituent.
Russell's theory of proposition, therefore, on the one hand, construes an ontology which primarily proclaims that propositions have senses. On the other hand, he develops a psychologists epistemology and tries to explain how this senses are cognised. His ontology is a natural offshoot of this line of development. The theory of language developed by Russell widely presupposes this ontology of logical atomism. The sentences in language are said to be representing the facts in the objective world, as the names out of which they are constituted immediately stand for objects in the phenomenal world.32

Any assertion made in language through sentences consists of two aspects. There is the objective side where the facts are indicated. Here the truth conditions of the sentences are under focus. The significance of the sentence, on the other hand, is attached to the subjective side where the mental state of the speaker is expressed. The significance of sentences thus has to be understood in terms of the psychological factors such as images and other psychic states of the person. Russell says "... in the case of a sentence of atomic form the significance is a state of the believer, or rather a set of such states having certain similarities".33 The notion of proposition is derived, in this context, as it is this significance of a sentence that is to be called according to Russell, a "proposition" which is either true or false.

This notion of proposition constitutes the nucleus of Russell's theory of meaning and language. The very idea of meaning itself brings the notion of proposition into the limelight and thus also the notion of significance. The semantic analysis of the proposition is further extended to the examination of how propositions acquire their meaning. Here Russell categorically asserts the representational character of language and linguistic understanding.
In short, it is with this notion of proposition that Russell proclaims his commitment towards empiricism. Originally this concept was conceived by relating it with the notion of truth conditions, a stand which Frege took earlier. Yet his conception differs from that of Frege's in significant ways. Following Frege he also defined a proposition as "what we believe when we believe truly or falsely." He begins with the most obvious fact that a proposition is a form of words and moves away from Frege by emphasising the crucial role of objects to which words refer in determining the semantic features of linguistic expressions. Meaning of a proposition, he argues, depends on the meaning of the separate words out of which the sentence is constituted. Here he echoes Frege's compositionality principle which considers the status of a complex expression as the function of its constituent parts. But Frege deliberately avoids focussing on words when they are in isolation, since he thought, it would amount to psychologism. Moreover, the aim of Frege's compositionality doctrine was to explain how the semantic contents of individual expressions contributed to determine the logical nature of linguistic expressions that had truth value as their reference. Thus, by highlighting the logical aspects, the problem of direct correlation between words and empirical objects are never raised.

But Russell's hard core empiricism could not avoid this problem. Meaning of sentence is taken by him as depending on the meaning of the separate words out of which the sentence asserted are formed. This in turn is rooted in the world. Propositions are thus made up of words both syntactically as well as semantically. This atomistic conception of language with its inherent empiricism necessitates the fundamentality of the word-object correlation
The logical analysis of language also led Russell to this fundamental problem. The representational character of language is revealed through the significant sentences which immediately and necessarily stand for the facts out of which the world is made up. Most of the sentences in our language have the function of expressing these facts, though the former also have other important functions. Such sentences when employed to assert something, i.e., when they are true or false in relation to objective empirical facts, are propositions for Russell. And this determination of truth value forcefully brings the notion of empirical confirmation into the forefront.

Russell thus intends to complete the representational line with a happy mixing of empiricism and psychologism. To further clarify this notion he introduces the notion of acquaintance. Meaning of a proposition, since it is constituted out of the meaning of words is understood only by acquaintance with the objects signified by the words. Thus to understand the proposition 'aRb' what is required is an acquaintance with the three things, a, R and b. In other words, it is the bare contact with the objects or the set of objects that is required. In such a form of relationship, there is immediate contact between the mind and the object. Yet, the contact is not a persisting one and therefore, will not result in any knowledge about the object. Russell himself calls it, "... a dual relation between a subject and an object which need not have any community of nature." In short, what Russell wants to argue is that, all our cognitive relations with objects are cardinal for the explanation of meaning, and all such relations - attention, sensation, memory, imagination, believing, disbelieving etc., presupposes acquaintance. It is this factor that made Russell to argue that physical objects are the actual prepositional constituents.
What Russell does here is precisely to reintroduce the operation of the subject - object category to explain meaning. This again is just in opposition with the Frege-Wittgenstein standpoint which rejects any such operation as irrelevant. To explain meaning in terms of acquaintance makes psychologism inevitable. The relation called meaning, as he puts it, is not a direct relation between the word and the object, but definitely passes through a mental intermediary. Against the behaviouristic conception of language which takes no account of the mental images, Russell categorically affirms that words obtain their meaning through images. "To think of the meaning of a word is to call up an image of what it means."\(^{37}\)

Russell was aware of the possible solipsistic conclusions such a standpoint may lead to and hence argues that the focal concern of our thoughts and sentences are not merely our private ideas, but the objective world of entities. The direct cognitive relation of acquaintance, he thought, would obviously constitute presentation. The object with which one is acquainted need not necessarily be present before one's mind. The object's past presence before the mind and the possible future presence are sufficient. Again, the notion of acquaintance guarantees the relational character of the fact with which we are concerned. This conception takes for granted the existence of the subjective as well as the objective poles and thereby rejects both materialistic as well as idealistic standpoints.

For Russell sense data are the obvious kind of data with which we are acquainted.\(^{31}\) He believes that with all these he can retain psychologism and hence an empiricist theory of knowledge and meaning without being a solipsist. Though words obtain their meanings through mental images the very capacity to form images is connected with perceptibility. Psychology is
thus, related to physics in unique manner. Perceptibility itself is a relative notion, as it presupposes the availability of an empirical world of objects. The importance of this world is paramount as even beliefs and images which are psychological are formed out of it. The conception of objects as the prepositional counterparts also assumes that the focal concern of our thoughts and sentences are not merely our private ideas. All these assert the inevitable and necessary existence of the objective world of entities and proclaims that all sensible talk is directed towards this world.

But this position fails to offer a satisfactory explanation to the problem of understanding in the framework of representationalism. The idea of mental categories mediating language and world, and completing the conceptual line between them is not consistent with the representational idea of scientific objectivity. This is because, the mental categories cannot be objective. The apparent paradox can be stated in the following terms. On the one hand, there is the demand of the intersubjective language of science which is a talk about the world that is expressed, communicated and assimilated completely and perfectly. This language is, in this respect, different from the commonsensical talk and yet distinguishes itself from the logical and mathematical statements which are not related to experience and are therefore not representational. The latter contain no information about the world. They are what Wittgenstein calls tautologies. The statements of science are not constituted out of linguistic structures with an empty content. They have both form and content.

The neo-empiricists carry with them this worry and discuss the issue by focussing on the idea of basic statements, since it is the latter which stand as direct representations of reality. To
make certain statements basic on the ground of direct and immediate reference to experience is
to assert epistemological certainty of those statements in our cognitive system. Camap thus
construes the possibility of a set of primitive protocols which find their justification for
primitiveness and primacy in terms of epistemological priority. He claims a peculiar neutrality
for these basic experiences that occasion these statements and echoes the classical empiricist
conception of epistemology which envisages to picture an external world by means of the
immediately given sense impressions or *qualm*. But an inherent solipsism forces this conception
to give way to a physicalist picture which focuses more on the objective physical world of
objects than on the subjective and private references to those objects. The Phenomenalist
position, therefore, fails to give a satisfactory account for the very act of communication through
language. As Quine observes

> It leaves each of us, indeed, nothing but his own sense data, for the assumption of there
> being other persons has no better support than has the assumption of there being any
> other sorts of external objects. It leaves each of us in the position of solipsim, according
to which there is nobody else in the world, nor indeed any world but the pageant of one's
> own sense data.

> Quine adds that the physicalist pictures the observer as projecting his theory of the
> external world, not from an internal domain of *qualm*, but from objects of the world itself. He
> adds:

> For one thing, terms for physical objects belong to a more basic stage in our acquisition
> of language than abstract terms do. . . . For another thing, terms of intersubjectively
> observable physical things are at the focus of the most successful of unprepared
> communication, as between strangers in the market place.
Camap himself moves to this direction and construes a set of basic statements which directly refer to extra-linguistic facts. Statements of this sort are the fundamental presuppositions for any scientific enterprise. But Carnap conferred epistemological certainty to these statements in order to retain verifiability. This again brings back the threat of psychologism.

It is therefore necessary to make an immediate return of reference to the intersubjectively communicable aspects of language, at the same time maintain the primary role of experience which inevitably refers to subjective elements. Montz Schlick thus attempts to establish the possibility of an intersubjective language, which is in essence representational, at the same time retaining the subjective and psychological element that is inevitably present in any process of understanding, once an empiricist framework is professed. He thus recognises the two basic elements that are necessarily present in any empirical statement - the subjective and the objective elements, or in his words, the structure and content. Schlick writes.

It seems impossible to speak of Form and of Structure without implying the existence of something that has the structure or form. It seems natural to ask: What is the material that possesses a certain structure? What is the Content which corresponds to the Form.41

Schlick thus tries to establish a representational conception of understanding which properly specifies the roles of the form and content of expressions used in scientific discourse. Due to its subjective nature the content cannot be a crucial ingredient in the process of understanding. Content is necessarily private and cannot be made public, so as to be employed for communication. The intersubjective aspect of language is intimately related to its communicable nature and hence Schlick concludes that communicability can be regarded as a criterion for
expressibility. Therefore it has a close and direct reference to the structure of language. He writes.

. . . the possibility of expressions seems to depend on the possibility of arranging signs in different ways, in other words, that the essential feature of expression is Order.\textsuperscript{42}

This order for him is not the temporal order nor the spatial order but the logical order or structure. Expressibility and communicability of language can be exhaustively paraphrased with a focus on the structure. Even the qualities of sensation which gives the phenomenalist a good point towards arguing for a mentalist semantics, according to Schlick, can be consistently translated and expressed into a language which conveys the logical structure of facts. This is possible because even qualities of sensation belong to a system of qualities and therefore exhibits a structure which can be properly expressed and objectively communicated.

This standpoint seems to be making the role of empirical experience irrelevant in the process of cognition, as the notion of structure implies the availability of only an empty framework which has hardly anything to do with any particular empirical information. Schlick insists that it is practically and logically impossible to express and communicate content. Or, in other words, the inexpressibility of content is a truism, and to speak of expressing content is a contradiction in itself, like making music without sounds or painting without dyes.\textsuperscript{43} As far as the questions of communication and understanding are concerned one cannot escape the structural framework of language.
Yet Schlick wanted to preserve empiricism and hence argued for the need of filling the structure with content. He says.

What you call the 'understanding of the true meaning' is an act of interpretation which might be described as the filling in of an empty frame: the communicated structure is filled with content by the understanding individual. The material is furnished by the individual himself, derived from his own experience.\(^{44}\)

The fact that any material can make any structure leads to the possibility of having different interpretations. But Schlick categorically asserts that, though these interpretations are carried out on the basis of the content which is obviously private, linguistic understanding is not uncertain, since what is communicated is not the content but the structure. Schlick continues:

Thus we see that there may be complete understanding between individuals even if there is no similarity between the contents of their minds, and we conclude that understanding and meaning are quite independent of content and have nothing whatever to do with it.\(^{45}\)

Schlick thus asserts the absolute inescapability from language. Even when communication is initiated by means of transposition, that is, by taking the fact or thing and presenting it before the hearer, one is not going out of language, rather this very move of presentation of the object is very well a part of language. The object is introduced into the language and it functions as a sample only if it is being used as a symbol. And to be used as a symbol is to form part of the structure of language. Schlick here announces the impossibility of avoiding language and bringing someone into immediate contact with the factual world. He seems to be presupposing the Wittgensteinian insight that the logical structure is a common property shared by both language and the world of facts.
But the separation between form and content persists. Content is there in the epistemic acts of the individual and fulfils its function when the latter interprets the structure he receives on the basis of his content. Uncertainty also persists so far as the content delivers its function. This situation is bound to occur so far as the expressibility, communicability and understanding of language is explained in terms of empirical representations.

6. MEANING, LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATION

While empiricism relates meaning with experience, representational conception in general assumes the possibility of explaining language and linguistic understanding on the basis of language-world relationship. By making the elements of language, eternally fixed on the objects of factual world, they could propagate a doctrine of semantic invariance. The references of words are always to be found in the external world which is commonly available. The doctrine of semantic invariance has been explicated in the framework of representational model mainly in two ways

1. The Frege-Wittgenstein conception which makes the concept of proposition central to their vocabulary and which, with an insistence on the notion of logical structure, propagates a peculiar form of semantic invariance.

2. The empiricist route, which focuses more on the external world of objects and thus projects the concept of reference in their idea of semantic invariance, concurrently with a correspondence theory of truth by univocally asserting the word-object relationship.
Despite differences in certain fundamental points, these two streams and therefore, the representational conception in general, identify a location where the uses of language find certain common reference points which make expressions objectively communicable. These common reference points are related to the factual reality.

Wittgenstein thus makes the idea of proposition and its essential representational structure the principal doctrine of his semantic theory. The sense of the proposition, as we have seen, is taken by him as determined \textit{a priori}, a fact which makes its comprehension non-contingent. Sense is evolved out of the structure of language which is logical. It thus does not presuppose a contingent world of objects and a cognition of that world which itself will be contingent. The determinate sense which is present in the structure of language, is directly given to the cognitive intellect, even prior to the assertion of truth and falsity of propositions. Frege also held a similar view, though he made his semantics populated with Platonic abstract entities.

The empiricists, on the other hand, made a more direct and radical approach to the factual world and by focusing on the notions of reference, attempted to project linguistic understanding as a process where one succeeds in associating words with objects. The objects, being the constituents of the external world which has a mind-independent reality of its own are subjected to cognition by means of words in language.

In short, the representational conception postulates a direct and immediate relation of correspondence between the realms of language and the world, either in terms of the notion of proposition or by means of direct world-object contact. The semantic invariance doctrine is
postulated on the basis of this. The idea of proposition has been projected as a common essential property of language that is being expressed, communicated and assimilated in the multitude of ways language is being used in the various situations of life. It makes the assertions either true or false and provides a domain to which all creatures who can use language can come into an agreement. As Quine suggests, by means of such a conception the propositionalist bypasses differences between languages and differences of formulation within a language. The notion of direct word-object contact also ensures the permanent fixation of language and meaning to the world, so that meaning will not change.

The notions of truth and reference are crucial in this context, not only to explain the representational relation but also to give an account of meaning and understanding, as the concept of understanding is largely equated with the knowledge of truth-conditions. What is central to the representational conception is that, it develops a theory of meaning and truth on the basis of a peculiar notion of language. We shall conclude our discussion on the representational conception of meaning with a brief analysis of the way meaning is related to language which suggests a unique notion of language where the latter is taken as a medium. Since language is the medium of representation, truth is a property of the latter. This in turn demands the propagating of a conception of truth much in line with the traditional metaphysical notion.

Language is conceived essentially as a medium of representation. This picture is supported either by the notion of proposition, which are fixed as logico-linguistic entities that permanently mediate its uses or with the notion of reference which fundamentally fixes basic linguistic units to the factual world. This view represents language into simple expressions or
sentences which represent the factual reality. Two immediate features of the model of language propagated here are:

1. Language as a medium of representation. This calls for the epistemological picture of subject-object dualism.

2. Language as something which possesses an a priori structure. It is understood here as a representation of the world. In the words of Rorty, the world is out there and language is representing this world.\(^{47}\)

These features together suggest that the language which we analyse to discuss meaning and truth is a representational language. It is a language which depends upon the factual reality for its very factual legitimacy. The whole representational picture rests on such a conception of language, where the latter is conceived as a medium and this eventually is the result of assuming the paradigmatic status of simple sentences (basic propositions or elementary propositions). As Rorty observes, this is possible only when we decide to deal with single sentences, and when we turn to vocabularies as a whole this approach towards language ceases to make any sense.\(^{48}\) We then have to consider alternative language games, which form part of our everyday linguistic practices. As Quine puts it, the notion of meaning is deeply rooted in our everyday linguistic practices and discourse and is not easily dispensed with.\(^{49}\) It is in this context of everyday discourse, the notions of meaning and linguistic understanding are more relevant. Here one is not provided with a set of linguistic expressions where a clear separation can be made between form and content. Nor can we pick out the reference of each word used. The representationalists idealise the language of science. But this evidently gives an account of only one of the ways
language functions and never helps in developing a theory of understanding language. As Quine observes

But a trouble with trying to equate sentences in real life, in respect of the information they convey, is that no matrix of alternatives is given, we do not know what to count. There is no evident rule for separating the information from stylistic or other immaterial features of the sentences. The question when to say that two sentences mean the same proposition is consequently not adequately answered by alluding to sameness of objective information.

The trouble, in other words, is in the representational functions of language with the concept of semantic invariance. This function of language, as Wittgenstein says in his *Philosophical Investigations*, is only one of the innumerable functions language has. Wittgenstein further points out that the activities of meaning and naming - the processes which are central to the representational conception - are possible only when language reaches a point of maturity in the process of leaning.

The whole representational conception of meaning and truth has undergone a sea change with this shifting of focus from single sentences to vocabularies, which again suggests change in the concept of understanding meaning also. We shall have a detailed examination of this later. Now we shall conclude our discussion on the representational concept of meaning by summing up its important features and implications.

1. Meaning is the information content of linguistic expressions which are the representations of facts or states of affair in the factual world.
2. Meaning of linguistic expressions is determined in an *a priori* fashion either by the logical structure of language by means of propositions or by objects in the factual world.

3. Language, which is the representation of the factual world, is a medium of both expression and representation. The representational function is considered as the central insight.

4. The model of language and theory of meaning propagated by the representationalists is an ideal model for scientific practice. It ensures that the traditional metaphysical notion of truth is safeguarded and the classical ideals of objectivity and certainty are secured.

The hermeneutic model, which we briefly examined in the first chapter, presents an altogether different version of meaning, language and truth. The traditional ideals of objectivity and the metaphysical view of truth were discussed by the thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition. Initially they also stuck to the traditional-classical models and ideas. But the recognition of historicity resulted in a fundamental change in approach and perspective. Along with this recognition of historicity, the larger role of language in determining meaning, truth and understanding also has been recognised. In other words, the hermeneutic model examines the fundamental ways language is related to our very being. The historicity of our language, therefore, points to the historicity of all our conceptual parameters and our thinking. In the next chapter, we shall discuss the notion of meaning in the hermeneutic tradition.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. Ibid, p250

3. Cf Wittgenstein, L *TIP*. 4 024


5. The idea of context principle has been introduced by Frege as an important concept to substantiate his logico-linguistic doctrines. Cf Frege, Gottlob: 1959, *The Foundations of Arithmetic, A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number*, tr J.L. Austin, Oxford, Blackwell.


7. Cf Wittgenstein, L" *Op Cit.*. 2.1515

8. Cf. Ibid., 2.15


13. Cf Ibid, pp.55-56


16 Cf Ibid, 2.0123
17 Ibid
18 Ibid, 2.0124
19. Cf Ibid., 401
20 Ibid, 2.15
21 Cf. Ibid, 2.1511
22 Cf. Ibid, 2.1512
23 Ibid, 2.18
24 Ibid., 3031
25 Cf. Ibid., 3.032
26 This is because, both language and world share the common logical form.
28 Cf Wittgenstein, L: Op Cit 4.0031
29 Cf. Ibid, 4.024
31 Russell, Bertrand PLA, inLK p.186.
32 Cf. Ibid.
35. Cf. Ibid.
37 Russell, Bertrand OP., p 300
41 Schlick, Moritz. Op Cit., p. 132.
42 Ibid, p.131
43 Cf Ibid, p 142
44. Ibid, p 137
45. Ibid, p.140.
46 Cf Quine, W.V : 1978, Philosophy ofLogic (hereafter PL), New Delhi, Prentice-Hall of India Private Limited, p 3.
47. Cf Rorty, Richard' CIS, p 5.
48 Cf Ibid., p.5.
50 Quine,W.V.: PL,p4.