CHAPTER – 2

KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

INTRODUCTION

"The purpose of Allah in creating Khilafat on earth is to set up a responsible community and government for the guidance and welfare of mankind, to establish justice, to remove oppression and tyranny, to prevent people from going astray, and to bring about peace and happiness in the world."¹

With the passage of time, Khilafat became an essential institution, which held the Muslim world together as one family under one leader – Khalifa. Mohammed Ali once explaining the importance of Khilafat said “… Islam is super national and not national…the base of Islamic sympathy is not a common domicile or common parentage but a common outlook on life and common culture in Khilafat…The Khalifa is the commander of the faithful. His commands are the commands of God and that is why our main claim is that Khilafat should be preserved. We cannot tolerate affront to our Khalifa."²

KHILAFAT IN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Indian Muslims were always attached to the Khilafat. To begin with, the Sultans of Delhi developed a new practice of offering symbolic allegiance to the Universal Khalifa in return for letters of investiture.³ This may have been done because of a strong feeling for religious unity and to grasp legitimacy under the Islamic law by the ‘slave’ sultans so as to empower themselves against the “squeamish ulema and factitious nobles.”⁴

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¹ Quran, IV: 62.
Later on, the Mughals, according to the inscription on their coins, assumed the title of Khalifa within India. Even after the decline of the Mughal Empire, the office of Khilafat was upheld by some Sunni Imams; who began to read the Sultan’s name in the Khutba on Fridays. The Turkish Cap, fez, became popular, especially in Aligarh, in the half of 19th century.

It is interesting to note that the office of Khilafat issued legitimate seals to the Indian Sultans when they asked for it. In 1785-90, Tipu Sultan of Mysore is said to have sent an embassy to the Khalifa. It was only after securing the letter of investiture that he assumed the title of an independent king. Thus, the Indian Muslim, unequivocally, was attached to the Khilafat and abhorred its affront.

RELATION OF INDIAN MUSLIMS WITH BRITAIN

Cunningly enough, the British tried to usurp this situation for its own interest. In the ‘dark’ days of the 1857 Mutiny, the British ambassador to Turkey managed to obtain a command from the Khalifa, restraining Indian Muslims from thwarting attacks upon Britain. Britain, in order to safeguard its own interest and to win over the Muslims to its side revitalised pro-Turkish feelings among the Indian Muslims and portrayed to be the custodian of the Islamic interests.

Partly owing to their imperialistic designs and partly out of fear of the Russian advance in Central Asia which threatened the safety of the subcontinent, the British pursued a policy of bolstering up Turkey against Russia.

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5 Khilafat in general term also means Sultan or ruler of a territory. But particularly it meant the Ruler of the Islamic world with his suzerainty over the whole Muslim population and his dictates could be considered as the dictates of God himself. Regarded as the ‘Sword of Islam’, he was actually a servant of God.

6 Gail Minault, op.cit.

7 Ibid.

8 Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India, Brief Survey, 1838-1947, OUP, Lahore, 1967, p.101. But they discarded using it and became more cautious, so as not to offend the British authorities of the College, who disliked student’s involvement in raising fund for the vanquished Turks. (Mohammed Amin Zuberi, Zia-i-Hayat, Din Mohammadi Press, Karachi, 1953, p.53-56.)


10 Mohammed Amin Zuberi, Syed Mahmud, Khilafat and England, Muhammad Intiaz, Patna, 1921, p.80.
The British sent Indian troops in 1878, when there was an imminent danger of Russian attack on Constantinople. This policy of protection was followed during the Crimean War and even after the Russo-Turkish War. All these friendly gestures and British propaganda in favour of Turkey went a long way in creating an impression among the Indian Muslims that England was the true ally and a faithful friend of the Ottoman Empire.

The British by constantly referring its Empire as 'the greatest Muslim Empire' since it contained far greater number of Muslims than any other Muslim country in the world surely conquered the Muslim support. British underwent a role reversal after the Treaty of Berlin, which ended the Russo-Turkish war. Berlin was also increasingly encroaching into Constantinople. But even under a changed circumstance, the enthusiasm of the Muslims did not withered. In 1897, when Turks proffered a crushing defeat to the Greek forces in Thessaly, the Muslim world "thrilled and boosted up the prestige of the Ottoman Empire and looked down upon the pro-Greece Britain."11

The pro-Turkish policy of the British contributed a lot in reconciling the Indian Muslims to the British rule and its change in British policy was destined to shake the foundations of their loyalty. The independence of Turkey and in its territorial integrity perturbed the Indian Muslims.

They were afraid that if Turkey too lost her independence, then the Muslims, like the Jews would be reduced to a mere religious sect without any government of their own. Muslim opposition to the British grew in the years 1911-13, when the series of Balkan wars added to the anxiety to the Muslims. The Muslim press in India viewed the wars as evidence of "the conspiracy of the Christian powers to crush the Ottoman Empire and its Khalifa."12

11 Syed Razi Wasti, Muslim Struggle for Freedom in British India, Delhi, 1983, p.290.
The Sick man of Europe, as Turkey was fondly known in Europe, began its tribulations with Tripoli – a desert with oases. Its European population was composed of a large proportion of Italians. Austria and France made territorial acquisitions at the expense of Turkey. Italy covetously made careful military and diplomatic preparations for years. Under the pretext of ill-treatment of Italian nationals living in Tripoli, the Italian government sent an ultimatum to the Sultan of Turkey and in September 1911, threw 50,000 men without waiting for a reply. Turkey was unprepared and the raid was, therefore, successful. Italy was not prepared for any peace overtures till coveted territory was fully occupied. It also began an orgy of indiscriminate slaughter. The Italian adventure soured the Indian Muslim mind.

Ameer Ali, the head of the London branch of Muslim League strongly condemned the Italian deeds stating that “if the Turks had committed a fraction of what was attributed to the Italians, there would have been a burst of indignation throughout Europe.” The Indian Muslims were infuriated when Italy threatened to bomb the cities of Mecca and Madina, blockade the port of Jeddah, and ban the pilgrimage if the Turks refused to surrender.

It may have been a rumour to bewilder the already excited Muslim intelligentsia. The one-time ally, Britain, following its appeasement policy simply sided with Italy. Turkey was even denied the right to use her own territory to repel the onslaught. The request of the Sultan to be allowed to send troops to Tripoli via Egypt was refused. Ultimately, Turkey had to make peace with the aggressor on the aggressor’s own terms, ceding the province of Tripoli to Italy.

13 The Times, 10 November 1911.
15 The Times, 13 November 1911.
16 Home (Poll.) B, 199-202, June 1912, NAI. Also in Comrade, 4 May 1912.
17 The Times, 1 December 1911.
18 Egypt was a part of Turkish Empire under British Occupation.
In spite of all this, when the World War broke out in Balkans, the Muslims in the whole of India desired that Turkey should not join it. Telegrams expressing the Muslim concern over the question were sent to the Turkish Grand Wazir. Prayers were offered throughout the country to the same effect. Meanwhile, the Sultan appealed to the big European power for help when the Balkan allies threatened to invade. King Ferdinand outrightly denied support and called it a crusade, while King George V avowed neutrality.

But the utterances of Prime Minister Asquith and his ministers were bluntly unfriendly. The British Prime Minister rather accorded the victors an upper hand. He even supported the Bulgarian aggression in Thrace and lectured the Porte for reoccupying Adrianople by force of arms.

**REACTION OF THE INDIAN MUSLIMS**

The part played by the British government at this juncture shook the Muslim loyalty in India. The Muslims, however, did not react with violence but with entreaties, pleading England to be moderate. When supplications failed, prominent leaders took to travelling and addressing the mass-meetings so as to organize opinion in favour of Turkey.

The tone of the press increasingly became bold, vigorous, outspoken and uncontrolled. Some of its more fiery writings were reprinted and distributed wholesale. *al-Hilal*'s weekly circulation in November 1914, was 4,300 copies. Comrade, in May 1912, at Calcutta had an increasing demand of 2,570 copies a week. It rose to 3000 copies when circulation moved to Delhi; while the Zamindar had a weekly circulation of 1225 copies in 1910, which increased to 3,900 in 1911. It then became a daily with a circulation of 5,950, which by end of 1913 had increased almost to 15,000.

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20 Home (Poll.) A, 178-204 and KW, February 1915. History Sheet on Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Home (Poll.) 42, 1912, NAI. The Light of 24 May 1968, claims that "... he (Azad) had captured imagination by his resplendent writing on Islamic issues..."
21 Home (Poll.) A, 34-36, July 1915, NAI.
22 Home (Poll.) B, 199-202, June 1912, NAI.
The growing popularity of these newspapers unleashed the wrath of the Muslim opinion, which forced the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge to declare that the British Government meant no harm to Turkey and showed his sympathy to Turkey. But at the same time, the Viceroy tried to curb the Muslim newspapers. Early in 1913, Comrade had to deposit a stiff security payment for reproducing a Turkish propaganda pamphlet entitled “Come Over to Macedonia and Help Us.” Within a year, following the publication of a lengthy article in Comrade entitled “The Choice of the Turks”, the British Government forfeited the security deposit and shut down the paper.

The career of al-Hilal ended in November 1914 for reporting a pro-Turkish article. A year later, Maulana Azad gathered another security but it too had to be closed in March 1916, as he was externed from Calcutta and was interned in Ranchi, where he remained until 1st January 1920. During his internment, he worked on Tarjuman-al-Quran and wrote his first biography Tazkirah.

Similarly, Zafar Ali Khan was interned in late 1914 for publishing anti-British articles in Zamindar and again in October 1920, for inciting to violence in a speech before a Khilafat meeting in Punjab. Maulana Fazl Hasan Hasrat Mohani, whose journal Urdu-e-Mualla was popular among Aligarh students and wrote a number of anti-British articles, was interned in early 1916. For his anti-British tendencies, he was expelled thrice from the MAO College, but was readmitted on Mohsin-ul-Mulk’s recommendation and he graduated in 1903. He preached swadeshi and boycott of British goods.

23 Mohammed Ali Papers: Order by H.C. Beadon, District Magistrate of Delhi, 8 June 1913, JMI. Also in Afzal Iqbal, op.cit., p.51.
24 Home (Poll.) A, 178-204 and KW, February 1915; History Sheet on Maulana Azad, Home (Poll) 42, 1912, NAI.
25 Ibid.
28 Shan Muhammad, Freedom Movement in India, p.27.
29 Home (Poll.) D, 23, July 1916, NAI.
SPREAD OF DISAFFECTION

While, the Muslim press was spreading the seeds of disaffection towards the British Government, the compatriots organized a Red Crescent Medical Mission under Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari in 1911.31 Dr Ansari, a trustee of Aligarh, had his medical training and residency in England before returning to India in 1910 to practice in Delhi. His brothers Abdul Wahhab and Abdul Razzak were renowned Hakims.32

The Medical Mission was equipped to serve the Turkish army in a field hospital. It consisted of 8 doctors, half a dozen dressers, about a dozen ambulance bearers. Six of its members were students of MAO College namely Khaliquzzaman, Shuaib Qureshi, Abdur Rahman Siddiqi, Abdur Rahman Peshawari and Aziz Ansari. The Mission left in early 1913 and returned after six months. The idea of a Medical Mission, however, was a brainchild of “the volatile editor of the Comrade”, Mohammed Ali.33

Dr. Ansari gained adulation through his work in the Medical Mission. Later on, he was introduced to Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal and became a member of Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Kaaba (Society of the Servants of Kaaba.)34 In an open letter to Gandhi, Abdul Bari called for a rapprochement between the major communities of India to uproot the evil government.35 Fund-raising was also promoted among the people.36

Notices were issued asking people to be generous towards Turkish cause in the Urdu press. Leaders also took to extensive tours, meeting the masses and collected funds. Anjuman-e-Kaaba, which sprang up in all big cities, collected a vast sum of money to help Turkey.37 The students of Aligarh College emptied their pockets, sold personal belongings and dispensed with rich and expensive items. They went to their morning

31 Shan Muhammad, Freedom Movement in India, p.28.
32 Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Muslims and the Congress, Manohar, New Delhi, 1979, p.xviii.
33 Ibid., p.xix.
35 Home (Poll.) D, 9 July 1918, NAI.
36 Shan Muhammad, Freedom Movement in India, p.29.
37 Ibid. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.20. Also in Gail Minault, op.cit.
classes without breakfast and assembled in the College Mosque every evening to offer prayer for the welfare of the Turks and the Khalifa.  

Khaliquzzaman who was then a student at the MAO College commemorates that “the idea of sending the Mission (Medical) appealed to the students and some of us started sending petty sums of money to Delhi for the Mission Fund.” Azad was in contact with the other politicized Ulema and gave full support to the Red Crescent Fund drive. He gave whole-hearted support to the Khuddam-e-Kaaba for that purpose and appealed for funds through his newspaper.

In the face of irrepressible enthusiasm, Zafar Ali Khan, went to Constantinople in 1912 to present to the Grand Wazir a part of this money. Early in 1914, the Turkish Consul-General in India, Khalil Khalid Bey, visited Lahore and presented a carpet to the Badshahi Mosque sent by the Sultan as a mark of gratitude for pecuniary assistance. This mutual transfiguration tended to strengthen the bonds of friendship between Turkey and Indian Muslims.

In November 1914, owing to the persistent aggression, Turkey decided to join the war against England and her allies. Indian Muslims who had joined the war; subsequently to an assurance from Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, to the effect that the Holy places of Islam would be preserved; disliked the Turkish decision. The daily Paisa Akhbar after deeply regretting the Turkish decision appealed to the Indian Muslims to remain unperturbed and advocated loyalty to the British government. While the other Urdu press and opinion poured in with lengthy anti-British, pro-Turkish articles. Maulana

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38 M.A.Zuberi, Zia-i-Hayat, Din Mohammadi Press, Karachi, 1953, p.52.
39 Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p.21.
40 al-Hilal, 15 April-6 May, 1914.
43 Tribune, 27 August 1914.
44 1,160,000 men enlisted during the war, and taking those who enlisted during and before it numbered nearly a million and a half. (Sukhbir Choudhary, Indian People Fight for National Liberation: 1920-22, Srijanee Prakashan, New Delhi, 1972, fn-2, p.216.)
45 Paisa Akhbar, 5 November 1914.
Azad wrote: "We must always remember that the Ottoman Khalifa is the guardian of the holy places of Islam, and that support for Turkey is same as support for Islam."46

This provoked the government and the government reacted sharply by gradually forfeiting, shutting down of the newspapers and finally internment of its editors/proprietors. The Government imprisoned the Ali Brothers under the Defence of India Act and ultimately confined them to Chhindwara in a remote area of Central India.47 The people resented the government action.

INDIAN POLITICAL SCENARIO

The Indian political scenario further provided the common platform to both the communities. Hindus and Muslims in particular and the others in general, to come together and fight against the British imperialism. Already the national leaders like Annie Besant, M.A.Jinnah, Mazharul Haq, Raja of Mahamudabad, Wazir Hasan, Sarojini Naidu, Tilak, etc. were attempting for a rapprochement between the Hindus and the Muslims and to erase the differences between the National Congress and the League.48

The environment suited them best and the leaders of Muslim League and National Congress signed an agreement at the Lucknow session of the Congress in December 1916.49 Separate electorates was accepted by Congress and an agreement was reached as to the distribution of seats for the communities by which the Muslims got a weightage in the provinces where they constituted a minority, but abandoned their majority in Bengal and Punjab. Moreover, they also gave up their right to vote in the general electorates. Thus, concessions were made by both, but the Muslims got the best of it.

Coupland argued that it was mainly the Muslims who were shy of adopting a responsible government on the British parliamentary pattern, because in such a case they could be

46 al-Hilal, 19 February, 1913.
48 See p.75-77 for details.
49 Tribune, 13 February 1915.
crushed by the Hindu majority.\textsuperscript{50} Even Tilak and Gokhale reconciled and supported the plan.\textsuperscript{51} Raja of Mahmudabad who presided over the Calcutta session of the Muslim League spoke thus: “The interests of the country are paramount. We need not try to argue whether we are Muslims first or Indians. The fact is we are both; to us the question of precedence has no meaning. The League has inculcated among the Muslims a spirit of sacrifice for their country as their own religion.”

Mohammed Ali Jinnah explained that the understanding between the two would give them a chance to come together and take a decision on the future policies of India.\textsuperscript{52} Appreciating the role played by Jinnah in the Lucknow pact, Mohammed Ali wrote to Moulvi Abdullah Ahmed “We will not lose by conferring with the Hindus…”\textsuperscript{53}

This pact was like dream come true for Maulana Azad who had been insisting on “the cooperation between the two communities.”\textsuperscript{54} He believed “For the Hindus patriotism might be a secular obligation, but for the Muslims it was a religious duty.”\textsuperscript{55} Emphasizing on the ‘Hizbullah Party’ (Party of the God), Rajmohan Gandhi believes that Maulana Azad planned “to enlist and organise a body of dedicated Muslims, make an agreement with the Hindus, and launch a joint struggle against the British.”\textsuperscript{56} But this attempt was not successful because the ulemas opposed him believing that political involvement might make Muslims neglectful of their prayers and bring them into “contact with unveiled non-Muslim women, which might create some fitnah (temptation).”\textsuperscript{57}

Many important Muslim leaders esteemed Lucknow agreement. In September 1917, M.A. Ansari addressed a Provincial Congress meeting at Lucknow and spoke on self-government and passive resistance and called for its immediate adoption. In December 1918, he was invited to chair the reception committee of the Muslim League session held in Delhi. In this, he admitted that the Holy places were going out of the hands of the Muslims sovereign and blamed the English. He called for a bold and emphatic action of passive resistance which impressed everybody including Gandhi. Abdul Majid Khwaja, Syed Hasan Imam, Mr. Asaf Ali and many others echoed the same sentiments.

**Home Rule Movement**

In the same year, 1917, Dr. Ansari was elected President of the Home Rule League. The Home Rule League had a large Muslim following. Raja of Mahmudabad supported the Home Rule agitation “with a clique of noisy and aggressive Muslims” of the Ahrar Party who made the Raja’s house their headquarter and lived and agitated at his expense. Abdul Majid Khwaja, a legal practitioner, organised the Home-Rule League at Aligarh. Syed Hasan Imam was once the President of All India Home Rule League. Asaf Ali, Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardi, Syed Abdul Majid, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, Moinuddin Ahmed etc. were members of Home Rule League before they actively became Congress members.

**Anti-British Muslim Grievances**

Apart from the Turkish question there were many other grievances which made the Muslims anti-British. It is believed that the estrangement between the Muslims and the Government began with the rescindment of the Bengal partition.

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58 Home (Poll) D, 5, September 1917, NAI.
59 Home (Poll.) B, 160-163, January 1919, NAI.
60 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol.15, Delhi, p.895.
61 Home Rule League were the simultaneous movements led by Mrs. Annie Besant with her headquarters at Madras and Lokmanya Tilak with his base in Maharashtra to secure Home Rule or self-govt in India. It was inspired by the Irish Home Rule Movement.
62 Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Muslims and the Congress, fn.6, p.7.
63 Foreign Department (Internal) B, 308, May 1909, NAI.
Annulment of the Partition of Bengal

It is believed that there were two groups among the Muslims in question of partition of Bengal. In general, it was a measure to appease the Muslims whom the Government looked to as its “favourite wife.”

The group which was in favour of partition, expecting the most beneficiary designations in the offices of the newly constituted province. Muslims of this group also organised riots, ostracised co-religionists who dared to oppose the Government scheme and influenced the Muslims into accepting the partition. Due to their influence, the movement was gradually languishing. Even the agitators were slowly beginning to accept the fact as fait accompli. A seemingly reconciled Surendra Nath Banerjee wrote in the Bengalee, “We indeed recognize the fact that this partition has come to stay, and we are not anxious to upset it…”

Earlier in 1910, at a meeting of the Imperial Council, Bhupendra Nath Basu had moved a resolution on revising the partition which was strongly opposed by Shams-ul-Huda and Mazharul Haq. Mr. Haq warned that if the Government meddled in this, it would be an act of “supreme folly and would create unrest and discontent where none existed now.” Surendra Nath Banerjee persuaded Bhupendra Nath Basu to withdraw the scheme of revising the partition.

Even when Lord Hardinge suggested the rectification of the partition almost all officials in responsible position opposed it and “declared the scheme to be impracticable.” So, Hardinge dropped the issue. Even Sumit Sarkar admitted that it was not worth arguing about the annulment of partition because “by then Curzon’s original folly had become a minor issue for most patriots.”

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65 Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After, London, 1911, p.391.
66 Ibid.
67 Hardinge of Penhurst, My Indian Years, Murray, London, 1948, p.36.
It therefore, seems abject when King George V, who came to announce his coronation, revoked Curzon’s partition of Bengal. The announcement was sudden and startling and vexed the Muslims. Saint Nihal Singh writing on the “Kings Tour in India” observed “...It did not need much of a prophet to foretell that His Majesty was sure to commemorate his visit to India by granting some favour big enough to be associated with the epoch-making character of his tour.” Even the Bengali press proclaimed the annulment of partition as a concession and a catastrophe at the same time.

A sullen and disillusioned Nawab of Dacca Khwaja Salimullah, who presided over the Muslim League at Calcutta Session in March 1912, observed “No responsible person could discover a valid reason for reopening the issue, since the agitation against partition had almost died out. Adversaries felt sore at the prospect of Muslims...Actually, we got nothing substantial out of it. But whatever little we secured was lost to our compatriots...But all thus meant nothing to the Government. The Muslims did not participate in this carnival of crime...They remained loyal as a community...Suddenly the Government revoked the partition for administrative reasons...We were not consulted about it. But we bore it with patience...”

An equally vexed Viqar-ul-Mulk Mushtaq Husain wrote: “Muslims detest this measure...[But] we shall not agitate for the reversal of the fateful verdict...This... merely heightens our frustration and deepens our despair.”

The only dissentient voice among the angry chorus was that of Aga Khan, who declared that in the rearranged province of Bengal Muslims would have larger opportunities of exerting their influence on a bigger scale. This repeal of the partition of Bengal seriously worsened the relationship between the Muslims and the Government even those who were pro-British.

69 Quoted by Abdul Hamid, op.cit., p.87.
71 Quoted by Abdul Hamid, op.cit., p.91.
72 The Times, 22 December 1912.
Transfer of Capital

To console the inhabitants of Eastern Bengal and to compensate their loss, Government decided upon two things - firstly, the capital was transferred to Delhi and secondly a university was established at Dacca.

With due regard to the dignity of the Government of India as well as for the public opinion of the rest of India most especially for Muslim sentiment, the government decided to transfer its capital from Calcutta to Delhi. Calcutta had been the seat of Government since the foundation of British rule. Its transfer was a serious matter and needed justification.

The members of the Governor-General’s Council were consulted and after obtaining their assent Lord Hardinge sent a telegram to Lord Crewe the Secretary of State for India. Lord Crewe got the approval of the Cabinet. Thus, with both the Indian Council and Cabinet agreeing, the proposal was passed in November 1911 along with other proposals like:

i) The creation of United Bengal into a Presidency with a Governor-in-Council appointed from England.

ii) The creation of Bihar and Orissa into a Lieutenant Governorship with a Legislative Council and capital at Patna.

iii) The restoration of the Chief Commissionership of Assam.

Factors Responsible for the Transfer of Capital

There were many factors that induced Lord Hardinge to remove the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. Firstly, Delhi was a renowned city with its historic connection of the Imperial dynasties of India in the past. It had a close proximity to Simla – the summer capital – and was easily accessible from Delhi. It was felt that the measure would evoke the Muslim enthusiasm and the Muslims would be filled with gratification “to see the ancient capital of the Moghuls restored to its proud position as the seat of Empire. It was actually

73 The Times, 13 December 1911.
74 Lord Hardinge of Penhurst, op. cit., p.38.
a concession to the Muslims who were bound to be shocked by the revocation of the Bengal partition. It would also appease the Hindus, as Delhi is “associated in the minds of the Hindus with sacred legends.”

Secondly, the presence of the Legislative Assembly in Calcutta created an undue and inevitable Bengali influence upon its members, which was detrimental to their legislative impartiality and presented a field for intrigue in which the Bengalis excelled.”

Thirdly, the reversal of the partition scheme was to be accompanied with other changes. Sir John Jenkins, the Home Member of the Governor-General Council acknowledged that such a measure as transfer of capital “would be a bold stroke of statesmanship which would give universal satisfaction and mark a new era in the history of India.”

Geographically, Calcutta was ill-adapted to be the capital of Indian empire. Capital should be located to a more central and easily accessible land. Politically, this measure would “facilitate the growth of local self-government” as proclaimed by the Indian Council’s Act of 1909, on “sound and safe lines.”

Finally, Calcutta had a unique press, which was loud and forceful in the assertion of its views, and the Government of India was almost exclusive under its influence. Moreover, the increase in the revolutionary organizations, which had been in function since the later part of the eighteenth century, perplexed the government. The revolutionaries were increasing in number and their activities were uncontrollable since almost all of them worked secretly.

The administrative changes were made partly by three proclamations issued on 22 March 1912, an Act passed by the Government of India on 25 March 1912, and finally by

75 Despatch of the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, 25 August 1911, NAI.
76 Lord Hardinge of Penhurst, op.cit., p.36.
77 Ibid, p.37.
78 Despatch of the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, 25 August 1911, NAI.
79 Despatch of the Government of India to the Secretary of State, 25 August 1911, NAI.
Government of India Act, 1912, and received the Royal assent on 25 June 1912. A small Province of Delhi, comprising the new imperial city and its immediate neighborhood, was thus created and placed under Chief Commissioner.

**Criticism of the Transfer**

The transfer of the capital was strongly criticized by the European Commercial Community – British mercantile as well as Anglo-Indians in Bengal. They made virulent attacks upon the Viceroy. They were not prepared to leave Calcutta, its palaces and offices, docks and railways, merchants and lawyers but at the same time they apprehend that otherwise they would lose touch with the Government of India.

The industrialists were disturbed, for it would affect their property. The officials and the die-hard section of the Englishmen regarded it as a severe blow to the British prestige. Property-owners tried to use their influence against the decision. Newspapers like *The Englishman* and *The Statesman* launched an offensive. Through press, the Europeans tried to focus the Government’s attention that Delhi was inaccessible by sea, a fact, which a maritime power like Britain could ill-afford to ignore. They also pointed out the expediency involved in building a new capital.

The Bengalis also detested the scheme as it involved loss of both prestige and material interest. But they could not protest loudly as they were themselves filled with gratification upon the revocation of the Bengal’s partition. But, on the whole the Indians welcomed it. However, very soon the Parliament became aware of the momentous proposal, involving heavy expenditure and far-reaching consequences only after His Majesty’s announcement.80

Lord Hardinge took great personal interest in planing the new capital and paid periodical visits to watch the progress of the new project. During one of these state visits, on 23 December 1912, a bomb was thrown on the Viceroy as he, mounted on an elephant, reached the busiest thoroughfare, through Chandni Chowk. The Viceroy was seriously

80 *Fortnightly Review*, February 1912.
wounded and became unconscious due to loss of blood. But all investigations failed to yield any clue of the miscreant.\textsuperscript{81}

**EFFORT OF APPEASEMENT TO THE MUSLIMS**

Another measure of appeasement to the Muslims, especially of the Eastern Bengal, was the establishment of a University of Dacca in order to bring higher education to its backward people. Surendra Nath Banerjee led a deputation to Lord Hardinge, which tried to wean the Viceroy, as they believed, the inception of another University in the province would accentuate the already existing differences between the two communities.

They warned that the new University would make a poor start for want of sufficient academic talent and doubted the value of an institution of higher learning for a primarily agricultural people like the Muslims.\textsuperscript{82} They were afraid that the establishment of a rival seat of learning would lower the prestige of the Calcutta University. But, this protest did not make an impression on the Viceroy and he ignored them. A Committee was set up to frame a scheme for a residential university at Dacca. This was apparently "the first Indian University which included Islamic studies in its courses of instruction."\textsuperscript{83}

**Movement for Aligarh Muslim University**

While the Government was favouring for the establishment of a Muslim University at Dacca, the denial for the same at Aligarh was deeply resented. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the founder of the Mohammedan Anglo Oriental College\textsuperscript{84} had visioned a University on the pattern of Cambridge and Oxford and hoped that with the passage of time it would develop into a University.

\textsuperscript{81} Hardinge of Penhurst, op.cit., p.81.
\textsuperscript{83} Abdul Hamid, op.cit., p.93.
\textsuperscript{84} Founded in 1876
He had himself chalked out such a scheme in his own lifetime\textsuperscript{85}, but it remained an ideal and a distant dream. In his own lifetime, he had seen the college prosper. At the closing of the academic session of 1865-86, the number of students to the college was 260 cf whom 187 were Muslims, 71 Hindus, 1 Christian and 1 Parsi. It strengthened slightly in 1886 with the students numbering 279. Financially also, the College improved its position. In 1883, its expenditure amounted to Rs.44,635-12-6 while the expenditure on 31 March 1885 was Rs.57,889-6-8. The expenditure for the year 1886 was estimated at Rs.49,070-11-4 and the income at Rs.49,700-2-8. Thereby staff also increased.\textsuperscript{86}

The idea of a Muslim University was revived in 1898, soon after Sir Syed’s death. Sir Syed Memorial Fund was established with the aim of raising sufficient fund to expand the college into a Muslim University.\textsuperscript{87} But the involvement of its exponents into politics delayed the University scheme. Since the days of Sir Syed, an Urdu-Hindi controversy had taken place and an Urdu Defense Association was founded in 1900 and his followers redeemed to uphold the Urdu language.

The foremost among them was Mohsin-ul-Mulk who was the Secretary of the College. Theodore Morrison, the Principal of the College and the Lieutenant Governor of U.P pressurized Mohsin-ul-Mulk to stop his political embezzlement which was spoiling his image as the honorary Secretary.\textsuperscript{88} The Lieutenant -Governor even threatened to stop the financial aid to the College if he desisted his advice.\textsuperscript{89}

Though Mohsin-ul-Mulk withdrew, made sure to make known that he “needed no lesson in self-help and self-reliance” and gave a piece of his mind in December 1901 while thanking the Governor of Madras, Lord Ampthill who attended the Annual Session of the Mohammedan Educational Conference held at Madras.\textsuperscript{90} Morrison prohibited the

\textsuperscript{85} Syed Mahmud had proposed the idea in 1873. He had envisaged an institution “perfectly free from any control by the Government beyond mere supervision.” (Quoted by Gail Minault, \textit{The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism}, p.15.)
\textsuperscript{86} Shan Mohammed, \textit{Successors of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan}, p.74.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, p.144, 177-78.
\textsuperscript{89} Shan Muhammad, \textit{The Successors of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan}, p,69.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, p.70.
students from joining the Urdu-Nagri controversy and reprimanded a student for writing a letter to *The Pioneer*.\(^1\) To divert the attention of the Muslim youths from politics, Morrison suggested to start education among the Muslim girls.\(^2\) All this was creating an anti-British feeling among the Muslims at Aligarh.

Apart from this, the Muslim youths also criticized the antipathy of the British officials in the College. The students were constantly, reminded that by manifesting loyalty to the Government, they would benefit. Maulana Shibli abused MAO College to be “an institution for the training in slavery.”\(^3\) Strict vigilance was kept on the students. Students were shadowed and all their correspondences were scrutinized.

Rebellious students were severely punished sometimes even expelled. Hasrat Mohani was expelled thrice due to his rebellious nature. Mohammed Ali was denied appointment in the College by Principal Morrison and later by Principal Archbold.\(^4\) Mohammed Ali exposed the weakness of the College Trustees, which was strengthening the British staff to treat a student discourteously.\(^5\) Mohammed Ali’s fiery writings filled the students with anger. The continuous emphasis of the Muslim staffs including Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Vigar-ul-Mulk to remain staunch pro-British added to their injury.

By now most of the students began to admire the National Congress and a group of students consisting of Dr. Abdul Sherwani, Fida Husain Sherwani, Ghulam Husain Badruddin, Mohsin Ali, Azizur Rahman and Dr. Syed Mahmud attended the Benaras session of the Congress in 1905. This group took utmost care to infuse the nationalist spirit among fellow-students.\(^6\)

Earlier in 1903, a secret society was founded by this group with the objective of ousting

\(^{91}\) Ibid, p.78.
\(^{92}\) *The Tribune*, 21 April 1903.
\(^{96}\) *Madina*, 18 November 1960.
the imperialists from India. The rising restlessness among the students and with it a rise in the discourteous behaviour of the English Principal and the staff was bound to result in a clash.

In February 1907, a small incident sparked the students to strike. At the exhibition ground, some students tried to enter a prohibited place on 9 February 1907. One of the students, Ghulam Husain assaulted a constable. He was fined Rs. 20/- and was asked to report daily to the Principal. But on 15 February 1907, he did not report to the Principal and as a result he was expelled from the college and hostel. This enraged the students to strike. This was an open defiance of the traditional policy of Sir Syed.97

An Enquiry Committee was appointed to enquire the genesis of the strike and came to the conclusion that the students were affected not only by the discourteous behaviour of the college staff but also by the nationalist influence especially the Congress. One of the European staff openly pronounced "Beck loved the College, Morison pretended to love it and I hate it."98

In addition to the above factors, Sir J.P.Hewett, the Lieutenant-Governor of UP felt that Mohammed Ali’s articles published in *The Times of India* and his frequent visits to the College and the visit of Gokhale, a national leader to the College were no less a factor for creating mischief.99 The disturbed Lieutenant Governor immediately visited the College and urged the Trustees to maintain discipline among the students.100

In 1903, Aga Khan revived the idea of a Muslim University, which had been in abeyance for a number of years, in his presidential address to the Mohammedan Educational Conference. Subsequently, the issue was discussed on every educational platform and in newspapers. The government promised consideration if the sponsors of the scheme could

97 Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.17-19.
99 Minto Papers: January-June 1907, Denzil Ibbetson to Minto 23 March 1907; Sir J.P.Hewett to Minto 24 February 1907, NAI.
provide sufficient funds.\textsuperscript{101} King George V was due to visit the country at the end of 1911 and it was desired to receive the charters of incorporation at the Royal hands. Moreover, the drive for a Hindu University at Benaras had accelerated their demand.\textsuperscript{102} The strength of the students in the college had considerably increased. There were 616 students in 1905-06. The number rose to 951 in 1908-09. This certainly needed the expansion of the college staff, buildings, furniture, grants and other necessity.\textsuperscript{103}

Sir Syed Memorial Fund was replaced by Muslim University Foundation Committee in 1911, with Sir Aga Khan as its President. Aga Khan himself came out as the first donor and contributed a sum of one lakh rupees.\textsuperscript{104} Every Old Boy of the College offered a month's income while Mohammed Ali dedicated the columns of his \textit{Comrade} to support the fund-raising mission.\textsuperscript{105}

Shaukat Ali, a government employee in the Opium Department took two years' leave to help in the collection of funds and threw himself into the task with his characteristic energy, acting as Secretary to Aga Khan. They travelled in a special railway car, with much fanfare and enthusiastic coverage by the Urdu press. For days and weeks they lived on railway trains. The appeal revoked a prodigious response and a sum of rupees thirty lakhs was raised.\textsuperscript{106}

After the amount was collected, they played upon the idea of a Muslim University with affiliated Colleges on the Aligarh model all over India.\textsuperscript{107} The University was to be placed under government supervision yet was compulsorily to be controlled democratically by the entire Muslim community through the formation of electoral colleges representing all regions, donors, Muslim graduates and the Muslim masses. It

\textsuperscript{103} Shan Mohammad, \textit{The Successors of Syed Ahmed Khan}, p.93.
\textsuperscript{104} Shan Muhammad, \textit{Freedom Movement in India}, p.55..
\textsuperscript{105} Abdul Hamid, op.cit., p.94.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Comrade}, 27 January 1912.
was desired to be an institution for promoting the unity of the Muslim community in general.\textsuperscript{108}

The issues of government versus community control of the university and whether or not Aligarh University would be an affiliating institution were the points of discussion between the government and Aligarh representatives. Sir Harcourt Butler, a close personal friend of the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Education Member of the Viceroy’s Council felt that it would be wise to grant the Muslims a university “to carry them enthusiastically with us.”\textsuperscript{109}

Likewise, the Government of India advised London to accept a Muslim University provided it was under effective government control.\textsuperscript{110} The Secretary of State agreed to negotiate on that basis.\textsuperscript{111} Accordingly, the Government though agreed upon the university, it maintained a hard line on government control and vetoed affiliation.\textsuperscript{112}

Earlier, the Government tried to ascertain the views of the important officials for the purpose and got a mixed response.

While Sir Charles Bayley, Officiating Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam\textsuperscript{113} and Sir Louis Dane, the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab appreciated the move\textsuperscript{114}; Sir A.H.L. Fraser, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal\textsuperscript{115} and Sir J.P.Hewett, the Lieutenant-Governor of UB\textsuperscript{116} were strongly opposed to the idea. Although reasonably sympathetic to the cause Sir Fraser was afraid of the dangers that were involved in the unlimited expansion of the college. This would bring a large section of the community together at Aligarh for higher education, resulting into the possible development of pan-

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\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, 15 April and 17 June 1911.
\textsuperscript{109} Home (Education) A, 1-2, August 1911, Butler to Hewett, 26 May 1911, NAI.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, The Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 10, 1911, NAI.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 18 June 1911, NAI.
\textsuperscript{112} Home Education A, 4-12 July 1913, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 12 July 1912, NAI.
\textsuperscript{113} Minto Papers: July to December 1908, Sir Charles Bayley to Dunlop Smith, 17 October 1908, NAI.
\textsuperscript{114} Minto Papers: Sir Louis Dane to Smith 4 October 1908, NAI.
\textsuperscript{115} Minto Papers: Fraser to Smith, 5 October 1908, NAI. To him more than 600 students would mean the creation of a separate college. He wrote, “It is not a mere question of staff, it is a question of organic life.”
\textsuperscript{116} Minto Papers: Sir Hewett to Smith, 3 October 1908, NAI
Islamism in direct hostility to Christendom and a change of feeling on the part of the Mohammedan community towards Government.

Rejecting the scheme, the Central Government too was afraid of the adverse effect that the students will face in the wake of Arabic renaissance making them reactionary and retrograde and bring them in hostility towards the West. Furthermore, the government was apprehensive of political intrigues that the students from the Middle East like Egypt, Persia or Constantinople would incur.

The government accepting the deficiencies of the prevailing system of education, argued that the remedy did not lie in creating yet another affiliating university but in encouraging and developing teaching and residential universities. An affiliating university would stifle under the weight of external examination, difficulties of supervision and inspection from one end of the country to another would be insuperable. Linking of inferior institutions would, in course of time, debase the hallmark of Aligarh and there would be no reverence for a remote and impersonal central institution and no loyalty to its ideals.

Moreover, the government also refused to permit the appellation 'Muslim' so that the university would be called Aligarh University and not Muslim University. That was not the end of it. The powers vested in the Viceroy under the provisional constitution were to be exercised by the Government of India, which would obviously place the university under state control and reduced it to a status of a government department. The Aligarh Committee, therefore, could not accept the university under those conditions and voted against it. However, there were many Englishmen like Herbert Butler who regarded the British stand as loathsome.

118 Home (Examination) D, 31-35, July 1904, NAI.
119 The Times, 27 August 1912. Also in Shan Mohammad, Freedom Movement in India, p.92.
120 Home (Education) A, 4-12 July 1913, Mahmudabad to Butler, 12-13 August 1912, NAI.
121 Ibid, Herbert Butler to Raja of Mahmudabad, 9 August 1912, NAI.
Muslim indignation against the government decision found expression in protest meetings throughout the country. The pages of *Comrade* were replete with provocative anti-British articles. But the government was firm and refused to review its decision. The Aligarh Committee now, decided to leave the affiliation statute as originally proposed.

A rumour spread that some members of the Committee were inclined to agree to the incorporation of a unitary university under government pressure. Mr. Mohammed Shafi of Lahore telegraphically threatened the Central Committee with legal proceedings if the demand for an affiliating university were abandoned under coercion. Viqar-ul-Mulk Mushtaq Husain wrote: “Generations unborn will not forgive us for acquiescing in the Government injunction of a non-affiliating university. It is up to the Government to take whatever action it likes on our representation. But we shall not look at a scheme so injurious to our collective well-being.”

At the same time, he accused the government of want of sympathy and of demanding from Muslims standards which it did not maintain in the universities under its own control. The movement finally reached a deadlock because the government was unyielding and the Muslims were upholding the causes. Mohammed Ali declared that “if the University is to be deprived of the power of guiding Moslem education throughout India by a well-planned system of affiliation, the main object including the Muslim University Movement falls to the ground.”

The Muslims were filled with bitterness when the Government blessed, in 1916, a Hindu University at Benaras. Now, with this new development, it was felt futile to hold any longer the acceptance of Government conditions. A meeting of Aligarh trustees and patrons decided to accept the inevitable inspite of protests from Ali Brothers, Hakim

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122 *Comrade*, 12 February 1912.
123 *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, 25 September 1912.
124 Ibid, 15 October 1912.
126 *Comrade*, 20 July 1912. Also in Shan Muhammad, *Freedom Movement in India*, p.62.
128 *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, 20 August 1913.
Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, that such a move should be postponed until after the war.\textsuperscript{129}

In an acrimonious tone, Mohammed Ali said: “For the present, at least, we are incapable of controlling even a college, let alone the university which we once dreamt of controlling.”\textsuperscript{130}

The Muslim University Bill was finally passed in September 1920, providing for a residential and teaching university seen affiliation, with a large measure of Central Government control.\textsuperscript{131} Mohammed Ali wrote: “The long-cherished dream of the Muslims has at last been realized...(but) this was not the university of your dreams any more than mine, nor can we call this the achievement of a grand and glorious undertaking to which you and I had both set our hearts. For had that been so, could we not have our heart’s desire in 1912 instead of 1920?”\textsuperscript{132}

The Muslim University Movement had aimed at the development of a distinguished educational institution, which would be the outward and visible sign of Indian Muslim cultural and political regeneration, as well as the centre for an autonomous network of Muslim educational institutions throughout India. Both of these aims failed as the trustees and secretary once again became bounded to the silken thread of loyalty. Nevertheless, it served as an important vehicle for Muslim political mobilization.

During the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movement Gandhi gave the call to boycott government supported educational institution. To this, Mohammed Ali urged the trustees of MAO College to forego the Raj’s grant.\textsuperscript{133} When the trustees refused, he spoke directly to the students. They left MAO in bevy to join a National Muslim University\textsuperscript{134} those who enthusiastically responded to this were Shaikhul Hind Maulana Mahmud Hasan,
Maulana Mohammed Ali Jauhar, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Abdul Majid Khwaja and Zakir Husain.

These eminent personalities along with others started in tents and houses outside the MAO campus a university named Jamia Millia Islamia. They nurtured it through the changing vicissitudes of history at great personal risk and inconvenience. Jamia moved from Aligarh to Delhi in 1925. Poet Iqbal was called upon to head the institution, but when he declined, Mohammed Ali became its first rector. Thus, a Muslim National University did come into existence but it was not Aligarh Muslim University.

KANPUR MOSQUE AFFAIR

While the University agitation was still simmering, the Kanpur Mosque Affair looped into prominence in July 1913. Some three years before this date, the City Municipal Board had decided to run a metalled road through Machchli Bazaar, and the work required, among other clearances, the demolition of a small outhouse of a mosque standing in the area. The trustees of the mosque agreed to its removal. Fortified with the consent of the guardians, the Municipal authorities notified their intention of pulling it down.

In Muslim eyes a mosque is a consecrated structure and immune from profane. So, the Kanpur Muslims demurred and laid down their views before Lieutenant Governor, Sir James Meston in a mildly worded protest. Several Muslim leaders including Mohammed Ali (who kept the issue out of his journal for some time) and Maulana Azad tried to influence the Governor and took a leading part. While these parleys were going on, the demolition was carried out in the presence of a police posse on 1st July 1913.

135 Home (poll.) D, 66, December 1920, NAI. Bombay Chronicle, 5 November 1920, Aligarh Institute Gazette, ibid.
136 Afzal Iqbal, op.cit., p.236.
137 Gail Minault believes that the washing place had been demolished, while some others hold it to be only the boundary-wall, the real demolished site is not clear.
139 Home (poll.) A, 455-456, May 1916, NAI.

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The act aroused strong feelings. The ulema and the westernized leaders were unified in their righteous indignation and immediately called for redress. The ulemas issued fatwas. But the UP Governor, Meston ignored the issue as a tempest in a teapot and thought that the local emotions would soon calm down. But the Muslims refused to calm down and continuously protested for whole month craving for official attention.

Official attention being denied, Maulana Azad Subhani of Kanpur organized a protest mass-meeting at the idgah on 3rd August 1913. Some ten to fifteen thousand people turned out for the meeting, many carrying black banners, symbols of mourning. Several trustees of the Mosque addressed the crowd, while the spectators wept, and then Maulana Azad Subhani himself closed the meeting with a fiery speech. He said that Meston did not believe their genuine emotions to be hurt.

After the meeting was over, an angry and agitated procession appeared before the mosque, and began to place the bricks in place of the dismantled structure as a symbol of re-construction. A contingent of police which was sent down to guard and were authorized to open fire by Magistrate Taylor, were attacked by the irate mob. To this, the police fired which continued for fifteen minutes and used six hundred rounds of cartridges. Numerous persons were killed and many more wounded.

Mounted police allegedly charged the demonstrators with boycotts. More than one hundred agitators were arrested. A campaign of terror was unleashed on the rest. Muslim India felt deeply hurt. This event was depicted in prose and verse in the Muslim press throughout India.

Meanwhile, indignation at the Government’s rigid stand began to spread among a remarkable cross-section of the Muslim opinion. When another request was made to

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140 Mussalman, 22 August 1913. Lucknow Muslim Gazette, 9 and 16 July and 6 August 1913.
141 Lucknow Muslim Gazette, 6 August 1913.
142 Government sources reported 16 dead and 30 wounded.
143 Comrade, 9 August 1913. Lucknow Muslim Gazette, 13 August 1913. Home (Poll.) A, 100-118, October 1913, NAI.
144 Home (Poll.) A, 142-49, October 1913, NAI.
Meston protesting against indifference and the persecution of the Muslims, he coldly declined to interfere. Overwhelming sympathy of not only emotional *ulemas* like Abdul Bari and eloquent politicians like the Ali Brothers was shown, the staunchly loyal Muslims such as Honorable Mr. Mohammed Shafi of Lahore, Sir Ali Imam of Patna, Raja of Mahmudabad, Viqar-ul-Mulk Mushtaq Husain were touched by religious passion.

Mr. Shafi advised the government to suspend proceedings against those arrested in Kanpur and Ali Imam denounced the UP Government’s policy as “high handed.” The members of the Muslim League too were engulfed into the matter and asked the Viceroy to intervene.\(^{145}\)

Large sums of money were collected to help the bereaved. An army of Muslim lawyers poured in from different parts of the country to organize legal defense on behalf of the accused. It was also proposed to send a deputation to England to get in touch with ministers and members of Parliament to acquaint them with the facts of the case, demanded the renovation of the mosque and prevent the recurrence of similar episodes.\(^{146}\)

For once, Muslim opinion was virtually unanimous. But Governor Meston remained unmoved. The gravity of the situation was lost to him and he allowed the situation to worsen waiting for Muslim wrath to die away. Lord Hardinge regarded the incident as a “stupid blunder.” He went down to Kanpur along with Sir Ali Imam. The gesture was welcomed and his mere presence restrained passions.

The Viceroy discussed the situation with government officials and worked out a compromise, ruling out complete restoration of the premises, and maintaining the extension of the right of way ordered by the Municipal Board.\(^{147}\) In the evening, he met the Muslims of Kanpur, pleaded for the burial of sad memories, and personally contributed to the fund raised for the relief of sufferers. The prisoners were liberated.\(^{148}\)

\(^{145}\) *Home (Poll.) A*, 100-118, October 1913, NAI.


\(^{147}\) *Home (Poll.) A*, 100-118, October 1913, NAI. Also in *Leader*, 15 and 22 Oct 1913.

\(^{148}\) *The Times*, 15 October 1913.
The Muslim leaders extolled Hardinge’s statesmanship.\textsuperscript{149} He wrote to Butler, “I find that the feeling was so strong against the local government and even against Meston, that nothing on earth would have induced. The Mohammedan community to accept any compromise...and that I was the only person through whom any compromise had any likelihood of being accepted...”\textsuperscript{150}

But the bitterness of the intelligentsia was not altogether assuaged. Quite a number of Britons viewed this as submission in a colonial territory, and openly stated that it was unwise of Hardinge to have adopted a policy of appeasement. They were most sullen over the Viceroy’s contribution to the relief fund. They openly declared that if the rioters had been tried and punished, the agitators would have learnt an unforgettable lesson. They deplored that concessions to the tumult had only stimulated the demand for more excitement.\textsuperscript{151} Such expressions were obvious to blaze the trial of bitterness. All these factors added to the Khilafat question and made the Muslims of India restless.

**KARACHI REBELLION**

About the same time, another trifling incident inflamed the Muslim minds against the government. A bioscope film was shown in Karachi in 1914, which was denounced as an insult to the Prophet; and Comrade pretended to believe that it was a manifestation of a deep laid plot engineered by Christian.

**MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS**

In the summer of 1917, Mr. Edwin Montagu succeeded Sir Austen Chamberlain as Secretary of State for India. He, on 20 August announced in the House of Common that “the policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of India is in complete accord, is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the

\textsuperscript{149} Mohammad Ali Papers: Shaukat Ali to Mohammed Ali, October 1913, JMI. Comrade, 28 March 1914.
\textsuperscript{150} Shan Muhammad, Freedom Movement in India, p.51, quoting Hardinge Papers.
\textsuperscript{151} The Times, 10 November 1911.
British Empire. This announcement was followed by his subsequent visit to India between November 1917 and April 1918, to ascertain the views of various political groups on the form of the future reforms. Groups of all kinds, organized deputation to meet him, the most impressive of which was a joint Congress-League grouping which urged the government to adopt the Lucknow Pact. Maulana Abdul Bari also organized a deputation of *ulema* to meet Mr. Montagu.

Many British people considered it just and necessary to reward India for its war efforts and Montagu advocated for it continuously through his budget speeches of 1910, 1911 and 1912. At the same time, Montagu looked upon the Hindu-Muslim problem as the most serious of these objections and came to the conclusion that the Muslims, "have not yet learned to find themselves wholeheartedly Indian."

**ROWLATT ACT**

The time-gap between the announcement for reform and its realization was quite long and kept the Indians in a state of suspense. But the publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report coincided with that of the Rowlatt Report and, where as it took over a year for the reform proposals to be translated into the Government of India Act, the Rowlatt Report was followed by the Rowlatt Act within a few months.

Its aim was to give the Government of India a free hand in dealing with revolutionary activities when the Defence of India Act expired, six months after the concluding of the peace. Perhaps the Government's desire to have at its disposal the legal means for dealing
efficiently with conspiracy\textsuperscript{159}, in view of the troubles caused by the Ghadar Movement\textsuperscript{160} ringing the War and the relations between India revolutionaries and Afghanistan and many other countries, on the other hand. In the year 1919 “anarchical crime” was reported to be declining. Yet, one might ponder as to the necessity of this legislation and to its enactment at such an inopportune moment, especially when the special powers it was endowed with were never made use of.\textsuperscript{161} That too, when the Montagu-Chelmsford Report put its expressing faith in Indian possibilities for a democratic form of self-government, the distrust shown by the Rowlatt Report\textsuperscript{162} hard pricked the Indians.

When the Bill (Rowlatt) was introduced at the Legislative Council, all the non-official Indian members voted against it. Among others V.J.Patel, Malaviya, S.N.Banerjee and M.A.Jinnah took the floor\textsuperscript{163} and argued that the Bill was fundamentally wrong in giving the powers to the executive that only the judiciary should hold, and it was highly inopportune after the expectations that had been raised.\textsuperscript{164}

The Rowlatt Bills were passed on March 18.\textsuperscript{165} The Government insisted that law-abiding citizens had nothing to fear from the Rowlatt Act, but the people were not convinced. Since the legislative opposition could not stop the Government from passing the Bills, Gandhi decided to inaugurate a \textit{Satyagraha} campaign for the first time on an all-India scale and requesting his followers to refrain from all violence.\textsuperscript{166} He also persuaded the Maulanas of Firangi Mahal to follow his principle of \textit{Satyagraha} and Maulana Abdul Bari committed himself to Gandhi. Ali Brothers also adopted \textit{Satyagraha} in their own way.

\textsuperscript{159}Woodruff, op.cit., p.288.
\textsuperscript{160}This was a revolutionary movement mainly operating among the Sikhs. The Rowlatt Report expatiates on its, being dangerous, but in \textit{The Oxford History of India}, it is called not a movement, but a conspiracy, “troublesome rather than dangerous.” (P.Spear (ed.), \textit{Oxford History of India}, London, 1967, p.780.)
\textsuperscript{162}Woodruff, op.cit., p.288. Also see M.Edwardes, \textit{British India 1772-1947}, p.200.
\textsuperscript{163}Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council of 6 February 1919.
\textsuperscript{164}Independent, 2 April 1919.
\textsuperscript{165}Independent, 7 April 1919.
\textsuperscript{166}Bombay Chronicle, 3 March 1919.
March 30 was fixed as the day for a general hartal. But the date was later postponed until 6 April. As the news of postponement did not reach Delhi on time, violence occurred, killing a number of Hindus and Muslims. It resulted in an unprecedented rise of instances of Hindu-Muslims unity. When Swami Shraddhanand, an Arya Samaj leader not known for his friendliness to Muslims, arrived at Jama Masjid; which was giving memorial services to the victims; he was quickly propelled to the pulpit and asked to speak.167

Nevertheless, the hartal of 6 April was relatively peaceful in Delhi, but violence occurred in Amritsar.168 The Jallianwala Bagh massacre and the imposition of martial law in Punjab and the alleged demonstration of force and humiliating measuring such as flogging and the notorious crawling order raged the Indians.169

The Punjab Lt. Governor Sir Michael O'Dwyer looked upon the troubles in Punjab towns as the signs of a “widespread and well organized movement”170. He does not write about the Punjab “troubles” but about the Punjab “rebellion”171 and about “the treacherous Afghan aggression of May 1919; which intended to synchronize with the Indian rebellion of April 1919.”172 It must be borne in mind that having confronted with the Ghadar conspiracy in Punjab, he must have been over-anxious about conspiracies in general. But his suspicions were not wholly unfounded and even Hunter Committee admitted connections of Afghan invaders in Punjab173 and Sir David Petrie of the

167 Bombay Chronicle, 1 and 2 April, 1919. Independent, 6 April 1919. Also in Home (Poll.) B. 494-97, June 1919, NAI.
172 Ibid, p.118.
173 In May 1919, Afghans attempted to invade the country, while the British were busy fighting World War, and were allegedly actively supported the Pathans of NWFP. Issue arose when Amir Habibullah, who was maintaining a neutral position against jihad (Lord Hardinge of Penhurst, My Indian Years 1910-1916, London, 1948, p.131.), was killed and succeeded by Amanullah, his orthodox and pan-Islamist son. Amanullah embarked upon a war with the British. (R.C.Majumdar, An advanced History of India, B.V.B, Bombay, 1967, p.899.) Although, he was defeated, he kept on propagating the idea of jihad. (P.C.Bamford, Histories of the Non-Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements, Delhi, 1925, p.142.) Although, the Viceroy ignored the matter, expecting that the Indians would not support Afghanistan in 1919 soon became anxious because the Khilafat leaders began to support Afghans Jihad. (Mohammed Ali Papers: P.Parasram to Ali Brothers, 8 July 1921, JMI.)

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Intelligence Bureau attaches communists contacts.\textsuperscript{174}

**IMMEDIATE CAUSE – DISMEMBERMENT OF KHILAFAT**

Last but not the least, the Muslims of India in this whole scenario were perturbed because of the British apathy towards Turkey. Turkey had been completely vanquished and lay prostrate before the victor allied powers, which began encroaching into Turkey. British armies - which consisted largely of Indian Muslims regiments - were occupying Palestine, the larger part of Syria and Mesopotamia. Allied war-time aims with regard to Turkey were not as to reassure the Muslim mind.

The British Prime Minister Asquith on 9 November 1914 predicted the ruin of the Ottoman government not only in Europe but also in Asia.\textsuperscript{175} Nor were some statements of a later date likely to set the Muslim mind at ease. Balfour had issued that one of the objects of Britain was “The setting free of the populations subject to the tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to western civilization...” This object was confirmed by the Allied powers in an official communication to the American President.

But as the War broke out, the Viceroy, authorized by His Majesty’s Government proclaimed that the Holy places of Arabia, the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the Port of Jeddah would be “immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy places and shrines in question.

At the request of His Majesty’s Government, the Government of France and Russia have given them similar assurances.\textsuperscript{176} Indian Muslims regarded this as a pledge, which would affect post-war conditions. As a result declaration of fidelity to the Raj at Muslim public meetings and *fatwas* of loyalty from a variety of *ulema* came pouring in.\textsuperscript{177} To ally

\textsuperscript{174} David Petrie, *Communism in India*, 1924-1927, Simla, 1927, p.20.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, p.63.
\textsuperscript{176} Balfour's Declaration of 2 November 1914. *The Times*, 25 November 1914.
\textsuperscript{177} Gail Minault, op.cit., p.52.
the feelings of the agitated Muslims, the Viceroy also sent to Ali Imam, a donation of Rs. 500/- for the Turkish Relief Fund.\textsuperscript{178} Lloyd George substantially altered the Balfour’s Statement on 5 January 1918, in which he said: “Nor we are fighting...to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race... while we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople...Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia and Palestine are in our judgement entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.”\textsuperscript{179} The Indian Muslims again kept their word and pinned high hopes on the British Prime Ministers promise. Muslims voluntarily enlisted for the military services.\textsuperscript{180}

This feeling of compatibility was strengthened by the USA’s President Woodroe Wilson’s Fourteen Points which also stated that the Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire should remain Turkish, but the subjected peoples should get “autonomy”. However, when victory came, the British government broke its words on a strange excuse. India office functionaries tended to deny even of taking any pledge and contended it to be “an explanation of war aims to the Labour Party” and the Government of India took a similar lines when in a circular letter to all Local Governments; it stated that it had been an offer of peace terms which, having be rejected by Turks, was no longer operative.

Even Lloyd George disavowed the pledge. This gave rise to the frequent use in the next years of the terms “suzerainty” by the Indian Muslims; which would fully issue the integrity of Turkey maintaining the suzerainty of the Sultan over the federated autonomous Muslim state of Arabia including Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. If the British government accepted this claims, the prestige of Indian Muslims would be bolstered both at home and abroad.

\textsuperscript{178} Shan Muhammad, \textit{Freedom Movement in India}, p.24.
\textsuperscript{179} \textit{The Times}, 6 January, 1918.
\textsuperscript{180} Quoting 26 February 1920 Speech of Lloyd George from Indian Review, 1920; Sukhbir Choudhary, op.cit., p.216-217.
**EMERGENCE OF GANDHI**

All the above episodes worsened the relationship between the British Government and the Muslims in particular and the Indians in general though the British tried to appease them from time to time. However, the emergence of Gandhi gave a new dimension to the Indian national movement. He had comprehended the ongoing rift between the Muslims and the British Government by drafting a joint scheme Non-Cooperation with Khilafat movement to give the common blow to the British government.

His whole life was devoted to the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity. He was among the first leaders to speak in his mother tongue.\(^{181}\) Handloom, the spinning wheel and *khaddar* became the symbols of his action.\(^{182}\) The motives behind his unity call were both political necessity and his conviction that every true religion held eternal values not irreconcilable to each other.\(^{183}\) But at any rate admittedly Indian unity and the fight against communalism were the foremost concerns of his life, to which he dedicated the very last years of his life leading up to his violent death in 1948. But this does not imply that he was prepared to give up anything of Hinduism. He never wanted Hindu-Muslim unity to include inter-dining or intermarriage\(^{184}\) and in his language and actions he always remained a true Hindu.\(^{185}\)

No doubt, Gandhi was an extraordinary man and as such he provoked opposition as well as admiration. It is remarkable that those who ever praised Gandhi never did it unconditionally. He is called a saint, a hero, an astute as well as a courageous politician, a sincere and incorruptible leader but he is also criticized. Jawaharlal Nehru, who was his staunch follower, recorded that he was perturbed by “his (Gandhi) distress at the religious overtones…and the strange admixture of politics and religion.”\(^{186}\)

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Ram Manohar Lohia, who certainly admired Gandhi greatly wrote, “On the other hand, I am now somewhat suspicious of certain aspect of Gandhiji's philosophy or at least of some modes of action and organization. These appear to have turned other men into heroes or extraordinary men of the flashy moment, but to have brought out the worst in them in the normal routines of life... Was there an evil core of unbalance in Gandhiji's modes of action?”

Nevertheless Gandhi himself tries to justify the saintliness and politician in him. He wrote, “what I want to achieve – what I have been striving and pinning to achieve...is self-realization...I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, all my ventures in the political field are directed to this same end.”

No wonder, therefore, his political action sometimes annoyed his more exclusively politically-minded friends and he, even while influenced enormously the Indian politics after the war, aroused opposition among his own followers. However, he inaugurated an era of mass-movements, in which social and economic issues got another meaning and transformed the national movement into an “umbrella” under which the various classes could be kept together.

**COURSE OF REVOLT**

The rulers of the princely states expressed their solidarity with the Muslims. Lord Sinha, Maharaja Ganga Singh of Bikaner, Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan and Yusuf Ali went in a deputation for representing the Muslim case before Loyd George, President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, and the Italian Prime Minister, a body commonly known as the Council of Four. But they sadly failed. The Begum of Bhopal put her faith in the British

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188 M.K.Gandhi, op.cit., p.x.
191 Sukhbir Choudhary, op.cit., p.218.
192 *The Times of India*, 17 July 1919.
believed that “the Ottoman Empire was in no danger of dismemberment...” Similar hopes were manifested by the Nizam of Hyderabad.\textsuperscript{193}

Mohammed Ali appealed on 17 March and again on 21 March 1920 to “spare us the one thing which is to us more than all territory – more than all financial resources, and that is the liberty of our conscience. We have come to you...to help us in presenting the sanctity of our soul. This question...is not nearly a Turkish question. It is...an Indian question.”\textsuperscript{194}

The acceptance of the Muslim demand was, however, detrimental to the imperial interests of the victorious powers, which had fought the war not to save democracy and nationalism but to protect their empires and to add more territories, if possible.\textsuperscript{195} The allied powers published the peace terms with Turkey on 14 May 1920 by which all the territorial possessions and principalities, which were the marks of stately Turkey were stripped off and were distributed among the Allied Powers.

The Treaty was an outrage on the Muslim conscience and \textit{fatwas} were issued by the Moulvies and Maulanas ordering the reverence of relations with the government.\textsuperscript{196} In order to soothe the Muslim disappointment, the Viceroy expressed his sympathy for their loss.\textsuperscript{197} But in the process, he irritated them more and filled them with resentment; who were already enraged with the fact that Muslims were expelled from Greece.\textsuperscript{198}

Maulana Shibli, Maulana Azad, Maulana Abdul Bari and the other eminent religious minded Muslims were opposed to the too much loyalism displayed by some Muslims. Even the most loyalist element of the British government, Sir Aga Khan now, openly became hostile. The Nizam of Hyderabad declared that he had no desire to apply methods

\textsuperscript{193} Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.32-33.
\textsuperscript{194} Afzal Iqbal (ed.), \textit{Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohammed Ali}, p.158.
\textsuperscript{195} Sukbir Choudhary, op.cit., p.219-220.
\textsuperscript{196} M.H. Abbas, \textit{All About Khilafat}, p.329-31.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
of repression to prevent the public expression of the sentiments associated with religion. But at the same time, he urged the Khilafatists not to start any agitation in his state.\textsuperscript{199} Gandhi also had shown sympathy for the Turkish cause and called upon the Hindus and Muslims to unite and support the just cause of the Muslims and said, “for the Hindu not to support them (Muslims) to the utmost would be a cowardly breach of brotherhood.”\textsuperscript{200}

Even the Muslims like Dr. Ansari, Maulana Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, Shaukat Ali, Maulvi Mahmud Husain etc. stressed on the Hindu-Muslim unity through the Muslim League and the Congress platforms. In December 1918, when some speaker tried to mention the Hindu acts of violence, he was hooted down.\textsuperscript{201}

Elsewhere in India, there were frequent examples of Hindu-Muslim fraternization. In Calcutta, Hindus were admitted for the first time to the Nakhuda Mosque, Maulana Azad’s home base prior to his internment.\textsuperscript{202} In Allahabad, Hindus and Muslims jointly attended a mass meeting in the chief Mosque of the city.\textsuperscript{203} In Bombay, there was an

\textsuperscript{199} Sukhbir Choudhary, op. cit., p. 219.
\textsuperscript{201} In September 1917, serious rioting broke out in Shahabad District in Bihar on the occasion of Bakr-ID, when Hindus objected to the Muslims’ sacrifice of cows. Mobs pillaged and burned Muslim villages over an extensive area, with much loss of life on both sides. The Muslim press expressed indignation over the riots, which were pictured as an organized Hindu attack against a helpless Muslim minority. They held meetings in mosques and collected funds to aid riot victims. (Hamdard, 16 December 1917.) Relations between the two communities continued to be tense for sometime thereafter. The situation worsened in October 1917, when the occasion of Dussehra – a Hindu festival, coincided with Muharram – a Shia Muslims procession of weeping mourners. Many places were affected and Allahabad recorded the most serious conflagration. Similarly, series of riots occurred on the eve of Bakr-ID in September 1918.

Another communal incident developed in Calcutta in 1918 over a supposed insult to the Prophet published in an English daily newspaper. The Ulema of Calcutta called a protest meeting and carried out a protest-procession. Hindu-Muslim skirmishing broke out when the protest-march passed through a Hindu commercial area. Shooting erupted resulting in several deaths and hundreds of Muslims were arrested. (John H. Broomsfield, “The Forgotten Majority: The Bengal Muslims and September 1918” in D.A. Low (ed.), Soundings in Modern South Asian History, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1968, p. 196-224.) It is still ambiguous whether the attacks were part of a coordinated plan or not but it quickened the tension between the two communities. And the press played a pivotal role in it.

\textsuperscript{202} Independent, 15 April 1919.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
active campaign by leaders of both communities to sell proscribed literature, including Gandhi's pamphlet.  

**EMERGENCE OF ALL INDIA KHILAFAT CONFERENCE**

The demonstrations of communal amity had made a great impression. The cry of ‘Hindu-Musulman ki jai’ could be heard throughout India. In about September 1919 Indian Muslims began to feel the necessity to make themselves heard by means of an organization created especially for the purpose of supporting the Khalifa. Simultaneously two conferences - one met at Lucknow on 21 September and the other on 23 September 1919 at Delhi - were organized which culminated into the All India Khilafat Conference. Another such organisation was made in Bombay by a group of notably loyal and pious men.

On 20 March 1919, at a public meeting of 15000 Bombay Muslims, a Khilafat Committee was formed. The president was Seth Mian Muhammad Haji Jan Muhammad Chotani, a wealthy local merchant, who had made a fortune by trading with the British in lumber and other strategic raw material. Chotani was a sincerely religious man, concerned about the future of the Khilafat and the security of the pilgrimage places.

This Conference merged with the All India Khilafat Conference and Chotani became the chief financier of the Khilafat Movement both in India and in England. Gandhi and Swami Shraddhanand attended the Conferences on 23rd September. Gandhi presided over the 24 September Conference. 17 October 1919 was to be celebrated as Khilafat Day. On 10th March 1920, Gandhi issued a Manifesto. This manifesto is historically important as it contains the first definite elaboration of Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violent,

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204 *Independent*, 10 April, 1919.
206 Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.47-48; claims that he organized the Lucknow Conference while Bamford, op.cit., p.140. names it as a “Muslim Conference” while H.N.Mitra dates the formation of the Conference on 22nd September, *Indian Annual Register*, 1520, p.250-51.
207 Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Muslims and the Congress* i.n.1, p.12.
208 Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 49.
non-cooperation, which was shortly to play a dominant role in Indian politics.\footnote{R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. III, Firma KLM Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1977, p.48.} Gandhi suggested withdrawal of support to the Government by means of returning Government titles, boycott of law courts, educational institutions, European goods and legislature, resignation from the Government services etc. This was very similar to what Maulana Azad had preached in 1913 through al-Hilal and Masla-i-Khilafat.\footnote{A.K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.10. A.K. Azad, Masla-i-Khilafat, p.29-30.} Twenty-six ulemas issued a \textit{fatwa} in Bengal forbidding Muslim participation in the peace celebrations.\footnote{Mohammadi, 12 December 1919.} But Gandhi was particularly opposed to this resolution.\footnote{Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, op. cit.} For Maulana Azad, the Khilafat was not a mere system of state organization, but a much more fundamental thing, the application in society of the principle on which Allah has organized the whole of existence. It was “the Unity of God...(and) one ruler, the Khalifa.”\footnote{AX Azad, Masla-i-Khilafat, p.183.} He regarded the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire and independence of the Ottoman Sultan indispensable for the preservation and security of Islam as well as for the unity of the Muslim world.\footnote{Ibid, p.28.}

Therefore, Maulana Azad asked his co-religionists to help as much as possible with their hearts, tongues, money and deeds.\footnote{A.K.Azad, Khutba-i-Sadarat-ul-Ulema-i-Bihar, p.44. Also in Prabha Dixit, "Political Objectives of the Khilafat Movement in India", in Mushirul Hasan's (ed.), Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, Minohar, 1981, p.58.} He also provided a religious justification for limited cooperation with the Hindus, by dividing the countries into \textit{Dar-ul-Islam, Dar-ul-Aman} and \textit{Dar-ul-Harb}. Through this division Maulana Azad divided non-Muslims into the categories of those who had committed aggression against the Muslims and those who had not. Cooperation with the latter against the former was permissible.\footnote{Ali Ashraf, "Khilafat Movement: A Factor in Muslim Separatism", Mushirul Hasan (ed.), ibid, p.77.}

\textbf{CONTRIBUTION OF THEOLOGICIANS FOR THE SANCTITY OF KHILAFAT}

Maulana Azad also issued \textit{fatwas} asking his co-religionists to perform \textit{hijrat} or migrate...
from India which was now Dar-ul-Harb to Dar-ul-Islam. He was followed by hordes of ulema – both well-known and lesser known who - declared similar fatwas. Inspired by the Istifta of Abdul Bari’s January 1919 fatwa, the lesser known moulvis of Sukkur issued a similar fatwa declaring that Jazirul-al-Arab was a sacred place where non-Muslims could not rule or remain in possession. Not content with only sheaf’s of fatwa, the ulemas wandered throughout the country so as to mobilize their followers. They quickened the tempo of their agitation establishing Shariat tribunals in a few places and opening national schools in some parts of the North West Frontier Provinces.

Maulana Abdul Mohsin and Maulana Mohammad Sajjad Nazim of Jamiat-i-Ulema, Bihar presented a debate in acceptance of the Non-Cooperation programmes to be legal according to Shariat, which were supported by about 120 ulemas. Similarly, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema issued a fatwa, which was signed by 925 eminent Muslim divines and sanctioned the programmes of non-violent, non-cooperation.

The activities of the ulemas had increased so much that the government officials were alarmed and began to consider them to be the “most dangerous class.” Even the newspapers broadcasted warnings. The Independent admonished its readers, “Take great care that the control of the Khilafat Movement does not fall entirely within the hands of theologians and divines.”

In legitimizing the local leaders and exhorting the hesitant to take up arms (methods of non-cooperation) for jihad against the government Maulana Azad and Maulana Abdul Bari bestowed unity and fragile alliances temporarily. Abdul Bari wrote to Gandhi “Thanks are due to your kind special attention for the success of the Day of Prayer and Hindu-Muslim unity. Your personality and behaviour are deeply affecting in general and religious sections in particular. A group of ulema have written to me specially to pay their

217 Tribune, 21 March 1919.
218 P.C.Bamford, op.cit., p.151.
220 Independent, 3 June 1920.
homage to you."  

Again in November 1920 regarding the non-cooperation manifesto, he declared: "I have accepted his support in getting our aims fulfilled and for that purpose, I think it is necessary to follow his advice."  

But it is wrong to assume that all groups of ulemas gave active support to Gandhi’s non-violent, non-cooperation, rather it met with strong opposition from some quarters. The Istifa of Abdul Bari was opposed by ulemas of even Deoband. The Muttaffiga fatwa, which made non-co-operation mandatory on all Muslims, was rejected by Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi, Ahmed Raza Khan and the Bohr-al Uloom Party of Firangi Mahal. There were others like Maulvi Mohammed Ikramullah of Nadwa who thought supporting the non-cooperation was opposed to the boycott of educational institutions.  

The Piris of Sind were equally divided. The Piris of Kingri, for instance not only opposed non-cooperation but also advised his followers to rally round the government. While another Pir, Rashidullah held aloof from non-cooperation camp as it was initiated and controlled by Hindus.

However, such opposition failed to stem the pan-Islamic tide. "The stand taken by the supporters of Non-Cooperation found overwhelming support. Hardly any one examined the reasoning behind the pro-Non-Cooperation fatwa. The general feeling was that the British and allies were out to destroy Islam as a force in international affairs, hence they were the enemies of Islam, therefore, the non-cooperation against it must be right ... The Muslims supported the movement with rare abandon."  

However, in Bengal, the ulemas who had formerly held aloof from politics were drawn into the boycott movement.  

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221 Quoted by Mushirul Hasan (ed.), "Religion and Politics in India: Ulema and the Khilafat Movement", op. cit., p.11.
222 Home (poll.) D, 4, 1921, NAI. Home (poll.) B, 148-152, 1919, NAI.
223 Maulvi Mohammed Ikramullah, Masla-i-Taalim aur Turk-i-Mavalaat, Aligarh, 1920, p.34, 36.
225 Home (Poll.) D, 18, December 1921, NAI.
ACCELERATION OF KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

But it is generally believed that the ulemas – even those who participated actively – were against Gandhi’s domination and as such their sub-servient position. They demonstrated their impatience with the Mahatma’s policy of caution and moderation and expressed dissatisfaction with the limited vigour with which he prosecuted the Khilafat agitation.

Moreover, they disliked the presence of scantily dressed Hindus in the Khilafat committee. Nevertheless, these ulemas abide by the non-violence principles on the All-India Khilafat Day. It was the first test for those who wanted to organise a mass demonstration of Indian Muslim unity on the Khilafat question. Dr. Ansari and Gandhi called for fasting and prayers by Muslims all over India and Hindu-Muslim unity. Their tone was of moderation when calling for hartals, which were to be undertaken only when proper arrangements were made to ensure its peaceful and voluntary character.226

But Hasrat Mohani called for complete hartal and for “monster meetings of protest.” Outspoken appeals were made by Abdul Bari in Urdu calling upon Muslims for prayers, fasting and meetings to save Islam, which was “facing ruin.” Seth Chotani and the Bombay Khilafat Committee appealed for Hindu-Muslim unity.227

The Khilafat Day was a huge success. The bazaars of India did little business on that day. The mass-meetings were also very much successful in drawing the Muslims and Hindus.228 In Calcutta, Fazlul Haq captured the emotions of the masses at Town Hall. Elsewhere in Bengal, peaceful meetings were observed.229 Monster-meetings were held in Delhi where 50,000 people assembled to hear the speeches of Dr. Ansari, Mufti Kafayatullah, Swami Shraddhanand and Asaf Ali.230

226 Home (Poll.) D, 14, November 1919, NAI.
228 Bombay Chronicle, 18 October 1919. Also in Home (poll.) D, 16, November 1919, NAI.
229 Tribune, 19 October 1919. Also in Home (poll.) D, 16, November 1919, NAI.
The *Pirs* organized protest meeting in villages in Sind.\(^{231}\) Writing about the success, Gandhi wrote: "The 17\(^{th}\) October will long be remembered as a great day in India History...People have come to realize that not by violence but by peaceful combination and sustained effort are great causes to be won. As soon as the people ceased to fear force, so soon will Government find it to be useless. Oppression ceases when people cease to be afraid of the bayonet."\(^{232}\)

A Khilafat delegation was to go to England to acquaint the Home Government of the Muslim grievances.\(^{233}\) Originally it was to include Raja of Mahmudabad, Fazlul Haq, Raza Ali, Syed Husain, Dr. Ansari, Seth Chotani and Maulana Abūl Bari was supplanted by Mohammad Ali’s delegation.

The delegation waited upon the Viceroy on 19 January 1920\(^{234}\) and thereby went to Europe. On 23 March 1920, the delegation met at Essex Hall in London. The Chair was occupied by Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall, President of the Anglo-Ottoman Society, and in addition to the members of the delegation; Messrs, Mohammed Ali, Syed Husain, former editor of the *Independent*, Maulana Syed Sulaiman Nadwi, Rector of the Shibli Academy. On the platform, there were Dr. Abdul Majid of Islamic Society; J.M. Parikh representing the British Committee of the Indian National Congress and the Indian Christian Community; M.T. Kaderbhoy, a Shia gentleman representing the *Anjuman-i-Zia-ul-Islam* of Bombay; B.G. Horniman editor of *Bombay Chronicle*; Sarojini Naidu, the Indian poet, representing the Hindus of India; Leland Buxton, Arnold Lupton and Douglas Fox Pitt. This delegation represented a firm stance of 70 million Indian Muslim’s concern regarding to the future of Khilafat and Turkey’s settlement. From there, it toured other European countries.\(^{235}\)

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231 *Bombay Chronicle*, 23 October 1919.

232 *Young India*, 22 October 1919. Also in *Young India, 1919-1922, A Selected Collection of Writings by Gandhiji and others*, Ganesan & Co., Madras, 1923 , p.134-35.


234 *Home (Poll.) D, 78, January 1920*, NAI.

235 M. H. Abbas, op.cit., p.88-104.
The failure of this delegation strengthened the Khilafat movement. But the more patient elements prompted another letter to Viceroy and got it signed by about 90 Sunni Muslims. This letter dated 22 June 1920, expressed the desire to restore the power and prestige of Khalifa in Turkey and warned that if the government refused to comply, they would refuse to cooperate with the government. Meanwhile, the second Khilafat Delegation consisting of Seth Chotani, Hasan Imam, Dr. Ansari and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar returned from Europe unsatisfied. The Secretary of State and the Prime Minister gave them only the verbal assurances.

Meanwhile, Maulana Azad had been released from internment and arrived in Calcutta from Ranchi on 13 January 1920. He spoke on the Khilafat problem and what to do about it. Unlike Ali Brother's enthusiastic speeches, he opted moderation in tone and temperament. He looked forward to the adoption of non-cooperation and other programmes of the movement and enthused the people through Quranic interpretations, which he deemed necessary. He left Calcutta soon, thereafter for Delhi, where the Khilafat deputation was gathering and met Gandhi for the first time.

Gandhi, fearful of violence, sought to slow the pace and moderate the statements of his Muslim allies. He constantly reassured them of his faith in the peaceful methods. Now, he decided to use the "opportunistic" moment for launching his Non-Cooperation movement embracing the Turkish and Punjab grievances as national issues. Nationalism and Khilafat now seemed organically related as the twin objects of the entire country.

Both Hindus and Muslims marched together in processions led by Congress and Khilafat flags containing the symbol of charkha and the Crescent. Sometimes to the repugnant surprise of the orthodox Muslims and Hindus alike, the fraternization spread. So far as to

236 Independent, 22 June 1920.
238 Home (Poll.) D, 13, July 1920, NAI.
239 When Maulana Azad was an internee at Ranchi, Gandhi, who came to the city during Champaran Satyagraha; wished to meet Maulana. But the Bihar Government did not give him necessary permission. (A.K Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.9.)
permit the Hindu “brothers” to address Muslim congregations in the Mosques and the Muslim “brothers” to speak at the innermost shrines of Hinduism. People of different cultures, antecedents, religious beliefs and historic traditions became united. History performed a miracle by bringing together what civilizations and religions had divided in the past. The major communities of India had turned “into so near brothers as two sons cf one mother.”

All the different sections of the people of India were welded together in what Sarojini Naidu called the “flame of a common national name and national patriotism.” At the Cambridge dinner, responding to the Khilafat toast she emphatically reiterated “The Hindus of India would stand by Islam to the death – they have no separate destiny.” Similarly, Jawaharlal exhorted the Hindu brethren to join the Khilafat and Non Cooperation Movement as “the Khilafat does not concern the Muslim religion only...This struggle is for the Khalifa. This struggle is for the independence of your country.”

Equally enthusiastic was the response from the Muslim side. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad a “pronounced non-cooperator” expounded the Muslims to join “in freeing their country from its slavery...(and to) take fullest share along with their Hindu, Sikh, Parsi and Christian brethren. If they (Muslim) lag behind it will be for them an act of utter shame and disgrace in the eyes of the forty crores of Mussalmans of the World.”

Likewise, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, which had come into existence in 1919 with the sole intention of expelling the British from India; lend unconditional cooperation to Congress and through religious injunctions asked the Muslims to enjoin them. They said quoting Quran: “God does not forbid you to do good and justice towards such infidels.

241 Home (Poll.) 11, 1921, NAI.
242 M.H.Abbas, op.cit., p.304, n.25.
243 Ibid, p.316.
244 Home (Poll.) 112, 1-8, 1922, NAI.
245 Home (Poll.) 253, 1924, NAI. Also in Home (Poll.) KW, 1-74, 1924, NAI.
who did not fight a religious war against you and did not drive you out of your homes. God certainly loves those who are just." Mohammed Ali eloquently exhorted the Hindus to compare their Aryan glories of antiquity with their present servitude under British rule. He also exposed the drain of Indian wealth to England. While Shaukat Ali recalled the glories of the Mughal era, when both the Hindus and Muslims jointly ruled over India.

On 20 November at a meeting at Kohlapur, he compared Gandhi with Shivaji and emphasized the need of a Shivaji to liberate the country from the foreign yoke. At Jhansi, he lamented: “Brethren, the work of Gandhiji is now the work of the whole country...Brethren, if I die and the blood of Mahatma is shed, great Mahatmas will spring forth from each drop of blood.”

At certain places when the leaders of both the communities gathered together the zealous Muslim children first raised the slogan “Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai” and then “Ali Brothers may fare well.” In fact no stones were left unturned to win over the Hindu support. Shaukat Ali promised on behalf of the Muslims that when they got swaraj one of the first regulations of the Swaraj Parliament would be the prohibition of cow-slaughter. The same promise was also made by Mohammed Ali and Maulana Azad. Mahadev Desai writes, “...Maulana (Azad) boldly told the Mussalmans that their insistence on the right of cow-slaughter was far from conducive to communal peace.”

Hindu-Muslim unity was in the air. Now the next logical step was the adoption of the non-cooperation movement. Gandhi, who was afraid of violence tried to persuade the

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248 Home (Poll.) 194, 1921-22, NAI.
249 Ibid.
250 Home (Poll.) 112, 1-8, 1922, NAI.
251 Home (Poll.) 11, 1921, NAI.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 Mahadev Desai, op.cit., p.29.

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Muslims to stick to non-violence. Shaukat Ali gave him the promises of assurance. The All-India Khilafat Committee, which met at Bombay in April and May accepted the principle of non-cooperation and a sub-committee was appointed to work out a scheme for its initiation. The sub-committee including Gandhi, Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani, Dr. Kitchlew, Hakim Abu Yusuf Ispahani and Haji Ahmed Siddiq Khatri drew a four-stage non-cooperation programme.

The first stage was to relinquish all titles and honours given to the Indians by the government. The second demanded withdrawal of Mussalmans from the Army and Police services. The third stage was to resign from government services and Legislative Councils and the final stage was to refuse payment of taxes. The sub-committee also resolved in favour of Swadeshi, establishment of a Khilafat Volunteer Corps, with branches all over India for raising funds and preparing the people for non-cooperation. In June, the Committee met at Allahabad and resolved to give effect to non-cooperation “without further delay”. However, the sub-committee took a step backward before attempting the great leap. The Viceroy was given “a month’s warning.”

But, a certain group of higher strata Muslims led by Seth Chotani were hesitant. Their mood was weary, timid and not at all bellicose; it was Gandhi and Shaukat Ali who spurred them on. But they felt the programmes to be dangerous, impossible and impracticable. They either condemned it outright or else accepted various points in the non-cooperation programme which they felt were workable for the moment.

Abdullah Koor, an honorary Secretary to the Central Khilafat Committee resigned from his post arguing that the last stages of non-cooperation were unconstitutional and impracticable. Moreover, he argued resigning from government posts would be suicidal.

256 Tribune, 16 May 1920. Also in Home (Poll.) D, 31, August 1920, NAI.
257 Home (Poll.) B, 109, July 1920, NAI. Also in Ram Gopal, op.cit., p.143.
258 Bombay Chronicle, 5 June 1920. Also in Home (Poll.) B, 109, July 1920, NAI.
259 P.C.Bamford, op.cit., p.15.
260 Home (Poll.) D, 96, July 1920, NAI.
262 Home (Poll.) D, 110, August 1920, NAI.
to Muslim interests, since members of other communities would rush in to fill the vacancies. While the more optimistic among them clung to the non-violence and strictly believed force against Government to be “futile and out of question.” The programmes were to be adopted on 1st August 1920.

Throughout the summer, Gandhi and Shaukat Ali worked tirelessly preparing for the beginning of non-cooperation on 1st August and rallying support in anticipation of the voting at the special Congress in September. They toured the country from north to south, stressing the need for non-cooperation as the only remedy for the Khilafat and Punjab grievances.

The first stage of the non-cooperation programme was extended to include not only resignation of titles and honorary positions, but also the boycott of government schools, of elections to the reformed Councils, and of the law courts; suspension of practice by lawyers, refusal of invitations to all government receptions and the promotion of Swadeshi goods.

LAUNCHING OF THE NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT FROM THE CONGRESS PLATFORM

1st August 1920 marked the beginning of a new era of non-cooperation and popular participation in Indian politics. But, it was marked by a sense of loss for B.G.Tilak, who had passed away in the early hours of that day. His death contributed to the success of the non-cooperation all over India as even those who had little desire to non-cooperate struck work in honour of Tilak’s memory.

The tide in favour of non-cooperation swelled to the Provincial Congress Committees. The Punjab Provincial Committee being the first to adopt non-cooperation made the other

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264 Tribune, 11 June 1920.
266 Bombay Chronicle, 2 August 1920. Home (Poll.) D. 11, August 1920, NAI.
provinces enjoin the programmes. Bengal also endorsed it, but without any instructions of Gandhi. 267

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE KHILAFAT PROGRAMMES

It must be mentioned here that whereas the Khilafatists accepted the non-cooperation programmes without too much opposition to it and in rather a short time, the Congress took longer time to do so. In regards to their programmes which included resignation from the police and the army and refusal to pay taxes evoke a strong sense of opposition to the government and could also bring about a revolutionary situation. Whereas the Congress programme in this respect went no further than advising people not to offer themselves as recruits for the army, and then only for services in Mesopotamia.

There were absolutely no talks of resignation from the police and army, as the Khilafatists were planning. Nor did the Congress talk about non-payment of taxes. These widely differing programmes reflect the differing attitudes of the Khilafatists and the majority of Congress towards the non-cooperation. This, obviously, affected the decision-making of the Congress.

The old-Congress leaders disliked the idea of mass agitation 268 and leaders like C.R. Des, Lala Lajpat Rai and B.C. Pal bitterly opposed it. 269 However, Gandhi overcame their opposition. 270 The opposition was due to two factors. The first that Khaliquzzaman stresses the lack of sympathy for Muslim cause. 271 The second cause was aversion to embark upon a revolutionary course that may slip out of their control. The casting of vote was remarkable and the resolution on non co-operation was passed by 1,826 to 804 votes. 272 Even in this session, the Muslim members outnumbered the Hindus. 273

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268 Koch, op.cit., p.428.
269 Choudhary Khaliquzzam, op.cit., p.55. P.C. Bamford, op.cit., p.18. Also see P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.189.
272 Koch, ibid, p.429.
273 Khaliquzzaman, op.cit. p.57.
MERGING OF KHILAFAT MOVEMENT WITH NON-COOPERATION

The success of the non-cooperation was remarkable. Resignation of titles and honours had already occurred before the programme was launched. Rabindranath Tagore had renounced his knighthood after the Amritsar massacre.274 Hakim Ajmal Khan was the first to renounce his titles.275 Gandhi himself surrendered his title.276 By the end of February 1921, twenty-one titles and honours had been sent back.277

The boycott of Government educational institution was a practical test. Many ulemas set up madrasas in the rural areas of Sind and in some parts of the NWF Provinces.278 Some teachers belonging to both communities from Bombay municipal vernacular schools willingly accepted to work at lower pay in national schools.279 The biggest success was at Aligarh where hundred to two hundred students left the MAO College to found a National Muslim University with Mohammed Ali as its temporary Shaikh.280

From Aligarh, the student non-cooperation movement spread to the Islamia College in Lahore, although the administration under the aegis of Mr. Mohammed Shafi, voted against non-cooperation.281 Similarly, the Calcutta madrasa witnessed a students' walk-out on 29 October as a gesture of sympathy towards the Aligarh colleagues.282 Maulana Azad called upon all students to leave Government institutions and to devote themselves whole-heartedly the national work for the next year. To faint heart he pointed out that there was no need to leave school permanently, for national institutions would be established to replace the iniquitous government ones, nevertheless, all schools would be national when Swaraj was established at the end of the year.283

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274 Nehru, Discovery of India, p.342.
276 Home (Poll.) D, 38, August 1920, NAL.
277 Koch, op.cit., p.432.
278 P.C. Bamford, op.cit., p.151.
279 Bombay Chronicle, 7 April 1921.
280 Afzal Iqbal, op.cit., p.236. Also see Khaliquzzaman, op cit, p.57.
282 Independent, 2 November 1920.
283 Home (Poll.) 45, 1921, NAL.

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On November 5, Azad announced the founding of a national madrasa, the Madrasa-e-Islamia, in the Nakhuda Mosque. About 200 students from Government madrasas joined it.284

Gandhi founded Kashi Vidyapith at Benaras in February 1921.285 He also started the Gujarat Mahavidyalaya at Ahmedabad where several hundred non-cooperating students of local college thronged.286 But similar efforts of Gandhi failed in regard to the Benaras Hindu University owing largely to the opposition of Pt. Malaviya and other Hindu leaders.287

The boycott of law-courts and of elections achieved major success. Some prominent politicians like Motilal Nehru, (C. R. Das and Choudhary Khaliquzzaman gave up their practice as barristers.288 Among others were Abdul Majid Khwaja, Moazzam Ali, Asaf Ali, Hafiz Muhammad Ahmed, Rafi Ahmed Qidwai, his uncles and relatives, who gave up their lucrative legal practice to the call of the nation.289

The boycott of elections was described as “moderately successful”290 with great local differences, in Bombay only 8 percent of the voters went to the polls, but at Lucknow 60 and at Madras about 50 percent291, 32 percent in Punjab and 33 percent in the U.P. However, Sir Valentine Chirol, who happened to be in Allahabad during the polling have registered the success of boycott where not a single voter had appeared.292

284 Ibid.
285 Independent, 12 February, 1921. Home (Poll.) D, 33, January 1921, NAI.
287 Tribune, 27 November 1920. Also in Independent, 5 December 1920.
288 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 59.
289 AICC Papers: File no. 5/1920, NMML.
290 W.R. Smith, Nationalism and Reform in India, New Haven, 1938, p.117-118. He specifies that it was more successful in the towns than in the countryside, more among Muslims than among Hindus.
Although non-cooperators refrained from either standing for election or voting, they were unable to prevent the Councils from being filled. Some exception were made with the object of throwing ridicule on these bodies and non-cooperators succeeded in electing a cobbler to represent a Noakhali constituency in the Bengal Council and a sweet-meat seller to represent Delhi in the Legislative Assembly. Similarly, a Muslim seat in the Legislative Council allotted to South Kanara was occupied “unopposed” by an illiterate coolie. At Mangalore, an illiterate ex-convict was nominated for the Muslim seat. The objective of these acts was to prevent able-minded to occupy their seats. However, the results were satisfactory for the Government.

VOLUNTEER CORPS OF THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

Another significant measure was perhaps the growth of the volunteer movement. The volunteers were by no means a new phenomenon as the Congress and the Servants of India Society had already made use of volunteer corps. But, for the first time the volunteers were composed of striking students. These volunteers, which were organised as per the All-India Khilafat Conference’s Allahabad resolution, was assigned to help patrol the city on each successive Khilafat Day and organize processions which welcomed the speakers and led crowds to mass meetings.

However, these objects differed from the tasks usually assigned to volunteer corps and the Government of India was clearly somewhat alarmed. While the local government felt assured, the Secretary of State, Montagu was “alarmed about these volunteer associations or what they may grow into.” He was afraid that the Khilafat volunteers might develop as the Irish volunteers.

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293 Home (Poll.), 185, 1925, NAI.
294 P. Spear (ed.), op. cit., p. 786, fn.2.
295 The Lucknow Gazette, 9 December 1920.
296 Bombay Chronicle, 18 and 20 March 1920.
297 Home (Poll.) A, 248-282, June 1921, NAI.
298 Ibid.
These volunteers also canvassed for funds. Abdul Bari urged the Muslim generosity to pay the religious tax – *zakat*. Maulana Azad advised people to curtail unnecessary and lavish expenditure in the memory of those who were suffering untold miseries and hardships and to contribute their savings to the Smyrna Fund. The effect on the masses was so profound that the bourgeois class appeared on the Id-day, in simple dress. Some wore hand-made *Swadeshi*. They also donated huge sums of money, which the volunteers collected. Cloth merchants of Gujarat offered money. Women also freely offered their jewellery. Seth Chotani himself had donated over two and a half lakh of rupees during the course of the year.

The *Bombay Chronicle* recommended that salaried employees pay one-tenth of their monthly wages, professionals and business men one-twelfth of their net annual income as of the end of May, the landed people two and half percent of the value of their property and all others not less than four *annas* to the Tilak Fund. Ardeshir Godrej, a wealthy Parsi manufacturer responded earnestly and contributed three lakhs of rupees to the Tilak Fund. The Tilak Fund totalled one crore and five lakhs, with Bombay alone contributing thirty-seven and a half lakhs, Bengal twenty-five lakhs, Gujarat fifteen and Punjab offering five lakhs.

**MERGING OF THE SWADESHI MOVEMENT WITH THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT**

The Swadeshi movement also culminated itself into the Khilafat movement. Mohammed Ali emphasized the point that by ruining the textile industry, the British were...
able to spread their stronghold in India. He declared "A hundred years ago we sold away the spinning wheel and we purchased our slavery"\(^3\)\(^0\) and "We shall expel the thief through the same avenue through which he has come. We shall eject the burglar through the same breech through which he entered to commit theft."\(^3\)\(^1\) Statements to appeal the passions of the people were accordingly circulated.

The British had deliberately wrecked the Indian textile industry by cutting off the hands of thousands of Muslim weavers and that the money acquired from the sale of Manchester cloth was used to produce armaments for the suppression of India. These remarks were so appealing that the people assembled there began to throw caps, handkerchiefs, coats, waistcoats and other foreign garments from all sides. Gandhi, who was also present on the occasion, made a bonfire of them.\(^3\)\(^1\) The Tilak Fund was created in order to buy twenty lakh spinning wheels so as to enable the non-cooperators to start spinning.

The boycott of foreign goods in support of Swadeshi goods was followed by social ostracism of Europeans and their close Indian followers. It was more observed in Bengal which was more experienced since the Swadeshi days. At Mymensingh, coolies refused to carry Europeans' and Government servants' baggages. A sub-registrar was assaulted for wearing a European hat and coat and the superintendent of a landlord's estate office was beaten up with shoes for failing to attend a political meeting. A ticket collector was beaten for not allowing non-cooperating students to travel without tickets. In the interior parts of Mymensingh there was a general refusal to attend police investigations and a belief that the authority of the Government had vanished.\(^3\)\(^1\)

At Dacca, four or five cases of pelting stones at the wife and the infant child of British Superintendent of Police occurred.\(^3\)\(^1\) At Howrah, the manager of a jute

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\(^{309}\) Home (Pol.) 45, 1921, NAI.
\(^{310}\) Home (Pol.) 11, 1921 NAI.
\(^{311}\) Ali Brothers: For India and Islam, A Collection of Speeches by Ali Brothers, Swarajya Series, Calcutta, 1922.
\(^{312}\) Musalman, 12 May 1920.
\(^{313}\) Amrit Bazaar Patrika, 6 June 1920.
gheraoed and beaten for denying bonus to the labourers who had observed hartal. Legal prosecutions were launched against students for preventing the unloading of Liverpool salt at Munshiganj Commercial. The most important event was the revolt in Rajshahi jail, which broke out on 24 March 1921. The prisoners declared hartal on Gandhian principles and disobeyed the rules. At mid-day, when the wardens were being changed, they fled.

Sometimes rumours were spread to incite the people’s religious excitement. Abdul Rahman, Secretary of the Comilla Khilafat Conference in Eastern Bengal; exaggerating the existing rumour of the bombardment of holy places at Mecca; declared in April 1921 that the British had not only broken down the Prophet’s tomb but eased themselves on the Quran and converted the Muslim burial ground for throwing the night soil. Adding to the same religious fervour, Mohammed Ali instructed the people of India to break unjust and illegal laws aiming to free thirty-two crores of people.

References of certain historical cases of British injustice, particularly, the case of Maharaja Ranjit Singh was made. A.G.Gardiner and many other English journalists felt that if the Indians thought the continuance of British rule a burden and not a blessing, “We shall go – We must withdraw.”

WEAKNESS OF THE REVOLT
Meanwhile, the ulema’s feathers were considerably ruffled when Shaukat Ali, in a flight of rhetorical fancy, referred to Gandhi as an “imam”. This created ill-feelings and the ulema began to demand separate national arbitration courts for Muslims as well. A subservient posture was distasteful to all ulema especially to Syed Ahmed Raza Khan of

314 Nabajug, 14 July 1920.
315 Amrit Bazaar Patrika, 12 July 1920.
316 Home (Poll.) 185, 1925, NAI.
317 Home (Poll.) 112,1-8, 1922, NAI.
318 Home (Poll.) 185, 1925, NAI.
319 The Times, 21 June 1921. Also in Indian Review, Vol. XXII, 1921, p. 599.
320 Aligarh Institute Gazette, 1 December 1920.
321 Home (Poll.) D. 66, December 1920, NAI.
Bareilly and to the Bohr-al-Uloom of Firangi Mahal which became hostile to Gandhi’s domination of the Khilafat movement and subsequently to non-cooperation movement.

This showdown came in December 1921, when Hasrat Mohani, representing the views of the more militant ulema proposed that the Congress and Muslim League should strive to attain “Complete Independence” and declared that, if martial law is imposed, Muslims would either have to abandon non-cooperation or face the bullets and bayonets. In the later event, violence was the natural course to adopt in self-defense. This was symptomatic of the tensions between Gandhi’s ideal of Satyagraha and the Khilafat leader’s adoption of it as a political technique.

Gandhi himself created this tension, despite his laments about Muslim motives, by making non-violence the precondition of his support for the movement. His hopes of transmuting the sentiments of the Muslims into a nationalist movement failed because, particularly the ulemas among other elements amongst Khilafatists were unwilling to go along with him in the realization of his ideals. They extended grudging support to the non-violent non-cooperation programme as a price for securing Gandhi’s adherence to the Khilafat cause.

Thus, the very fabric of trust was shaken. The Congress support to Khilafat movement in a mistaken belief of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity did not pay off. The Congress had no direct access to wield even little influence over the Muslim masses. Maulana Azad openly acknowledged this. He pointed out that a national organization like the Congress devoted purely to the political cause could never win the sympathies of the Muslim masses. Khilafat being a religious issue of the Muslim community, the propaganda for non-cooperation could be effective only when it was carried out by the Muslim organization themselves.

323 Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Communalism and Pan-Islamic Trends in India*, p. 16-17.
MOPLAH UPRISING

This distrust and imaginary fear between both the groups were reinforced by the Moplah riots along the Malabar coasts of South India and decisively weakened what little enthusiasm Hindus had for the Khilafat cause.325 Gandhi tried to soothe their feeling, but it was of no avail. Hindus were becoming increasingly apathetic to the Khilafat cause and were anxious to extricate themselves from the travail of non-cooperation.326 Defiance of British power by the Moplah agricultural population of interior South Malabar dated since the decade after 1792 when Tipu Sultan ceded Malabar to the East India Company.327

The root cause of the Moplah uprising in Malabar was economic. Descendants of Arab traders and of convents to Islam, the predominant Muslim peasantry had a long-standing grudge against the Namboodri landlords and Nayyar moneylenders. The Moplahs responded with a series of attacks on the landed castes to reduce the tenancy vulnerable to rack-renting and eviction at the hands of landlords who were sustained by British Indian courts.

In the words of Dale, the landlords "represented a continuation of the Mappilla challenge to the economic and social power of the upper castes." These attacks were carried out as ritual acts in which the Moplahs sought Martyrdom.328 Dale emphasizes that they were not just religious expressions of social-economic grievances but on occasions the expression of religious drive alone.

MacGregor, district collector of Malabar in the 1880's placed the emphasis elsewhere. He argued that the outrages had an agrarian basis and that "fanatism is merely the instrument through which the terrorism of the landed classes is aimed at."329 While arriving at

326 Ibid. p. 18.
similar conclusions in 1881, the Logan Commission proposed changes, which were never put into practice to mitigate the long-standing plight of the Moplahs in Malabar’s land tenure. As late as 1900, the region continued to suffer under an oppressive system of sub-infeudation. South Malabar, in particular, earned the “unenviable reputation of being the most rack-rented country on the face of this earth.”

Fresh impetus for the resistance was received when Malabar District Congress Conference held at Manjeri in April 1920 supported the tenants’ cause and demanded legislation to regulate land-lord-tenant relations. The Manjeri Conference was followed by the formation of a tenant association at Kozhikode, and soon tenants’ associations were set up in other parts of the district.

Simultaneously, the impact of Khilafat movement, which merged with the tenants’ meetings – with same leaders and audience – provided the national base to the social movement. The Khilafat leaders like Shaukat Ali, Gandhi, Maulana Azad and Mohammed Ali considerably impressed upon the Moplahs. Other motivating source was the Muslims who had returned from overseas military duty and already trained in the use of arms and accustomed to concerted action. These provided training to the Khilafat volunteers, supported Khilafat demands and championed a form of non-cooperation which condoned violence.

In face of rising emotions, the Government issued prohibitory notices on all Khilafat meetings on 5 February 1921. Yakub Hasan came to Calicut in spite of the Government ban persisted to hold meeting and he also refused to pay a security deposit. He and three of his associates, U.Gopala Menon, P.Moideen Koya and K.Madhavan Nair

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333 Home (Poll.) 23 and KW, 1922, NAI.
334 Bombay Chronicle, 19 September 1921.
335 He resigned his seat in the Legislative Councils and other local bodies in Madras Presidency during the Khilafat agitation. (Sukhbir Choudhary, op.cit., p.245.)
were arrested on 18 February and were sentenced to six months imprisonment.\textsuperscript{336} This resulted in the leadership passing into the hands of the local Moplah leaders. The Government determined to crush the Khilafat movement also arrested the Khilafat leaders like Maulana Azad, Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali by the end of 1921.\textsuperscript{337} Angered by the British repression, the Moplahs organized a burglary of a landlord’s house.\textsuperscript{338}

On 20 August 1921, E. F. Thomas accompanied by a contingent of police and troops raided Mambrath mosque in a village of Tirurangadi on hearsay evidence that war knives had been stored in the mosque. He, under the Malabar Offensive Weapons Act XX of 1854, and to arrest Ali Musaliar besieged the mosque “as if it were an enemy’s fort.”\textsuperscript{339} However, they found only three insignificant Khilafat volunteers and arrested them. A rumour spread that the mosque, of which Ali Musaliar was the priest, had been desecrated, and destroyed.

This led the Moplahs from Tanur, Kottakkal and Parappanagadi numbering about 3000 to converge at Tirurangadi and their leaders met the British officers to secure the release of the arrested volunteers. The people were quiet and peaceful, but the police opened fire on the unarmed crowd and many were killed. A clash ensued and Government offices were destroyed, records burnt and the treasury looted.\textsuperscript{340} The police and the magistracy were driven out. The infuriated mob cut off telegraph wires and removed railway tracks and destroyed every symbol of British rule. This situation remained for two years.

In August, Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, called the Viceroy for the immediate suppression of the uprising.\textsuperscript{341} Before this, Leinster Regiment of a hundred men was deployed. But it was too less numerically to be able to withhold the rebels and

\textsuperscript{336} Home (Poll.) D, 42-43, April 1921, NAI.
\textsuperscript{337} Sukhbir Choudhary, p.325.
\textsuperscript{338} Home (Poll.) 241/1A, 1921, NAI.
\textsuperscript{340} Bombay Chronicle, 25 and 26 August and 3 September 1921.
as a result Lord Reading reluctantly deployed more troops and proclaimed martial law. Yet, the measure taken was insufficient. The strength of the rebels had grown during September from 3000 to 10,000. Guerilla bands cut the communication of the inadequate military force employed, denied them intelligence by terrorizing the Hindus, and remained masters of the country.

The Government of India was so frightened of criticisms like those levelled at the sentences given in the Punjab in 1919 that, contrary to the advice of the Government of Madras, no machinery was provided whereby serious offenders could be adequately punished without long delay.

This travesty of martial law gave the public impression in Malabar of a lack of determination on the part of the government and deterrent Hindus from cooperating. Michael O'Dwyer made a comparison of the Malabar insurgence dealing with his own Punjab. It was not until 10 October that the Government of India decided to use more troops and to empower court martial to pass sentences of death and of substantial terms of imprisonment without appeal.

With the adoption of a systematic strategy to deal with the outbreak, the situation rapidly improved. By the beginning of December the big bands of Moplahs were broken up; by the end of January 1922 organized rebellion was over; and by the end of February martial law could be lifted. Moplahs casualties were estimated at close on 2300 dead and over 1600 wounded, 5700 were captured and 40,000 surrendered. These figures were

343 Sir A.Rumbold, op.cit.
344 Viceroy's Letter to Lord Willingdon, 19 September 1921.
345 Lord Willingdon's Telegram to Viceroy No. 1235 of 2 September 1921; and His Letter to Viceroy dated 6 September 1921, NAI.
346 Lord Willingdon's Letter to the Secretary of State dated 10 October 1921, NAI.
347 O'Dwyer, op. cit., p.318-25.
348 Sir A.Rumbold, op.cit., p.263.
immensely greater than those in the differently handled disturbances in the Punjab in 1919.\(^{350}\) Casualties among troops were 43 dead and 126 wounded.

The Moplah rising deprived Gandhi of some Hindu support and left him more dependent on the Muslims, at a time when these were growing more angry over Turkey and when the extremists amongst them were increasingly becoming restless and were eager to resort to violence. In these circumstances, it was not surprising that Gandhi repeated at the end of September the Karachi Khilafat resolution that it was sinful to serve in the army or police.\(^{351}\) Though, the Khilafat issue bore no significance to the Hindus; for Muslims, the future of Khilafat and the safety of the Holy places remained the dearest issue.

As such, the reports of the Moplah uprising, often distorted and exaggerated widened the breech in the Hindu-Muslim front. Congress leaders in general adopted a partisan attitude, accusing each other of instigating violence. Hasrat Mohani said to the Congress Subjects Committee that the Moplahs suspected Hindu of collusion with government and were, therefore, justified in “presenting the Quran to the Hindus. And if the Hindus became Mussalmans to save themselves from death, it was a voluntary change of faith and not forcible conversion.”\(^{352}\)

Syed Mahmud told Gandhi that there were no forcible proselytizations. While Abdul Bari accused the government of circulating false rumours in order to drive a wedge between Hindus and Muslims. But Malaviya, Moonje, Lajpat Rai and Shraddhanand were not satisfied with these explanations, arguing that fanaticism was used as an instrument by pan-Islamists to excite Muslims against the Hindus.

Moonje, the aggressively anti-Muslim leader from Nagpur, mooted the idea of providing the settlement of “warlike races such as the Marathas, Rajputs, Sikhs etc. in Malabar

\(^{350}\) M. O’Dwyer, op.cit.
\(^{351}\) Sir A. Rumbold, op.cit., p.263.
which alone...can solve the problem of Moplah terrorism over the meek and helpless Hindus." This was the preparation of launching the Sangathan movement, which greatly embittered the Hindu-Muslim relations throughout the country.

WITHDRAWL OF NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT

In the midst of the heated controversy generated by the Moplah riot, Gandhi decided on 5 February 1922 to abandon the civil disobedience. But Gandhi’s decision also took the sting out of the Khilafat agitation for which the Muslims were disappointed and angry, and at the meetings of Jamiat-i-Ulema and the Central Khilafat Committee in March 1922,

Gandhi was condemned for his betrayal. Hasrat Mohani rejected the Bardoli programme on the ground that if religion enjoined violence, a policy of non-violence could not be adopted. At the Jamiat-i-Ulema Conference held in Ajmer, Abdul Bari verbally attacked Gandhi and the Bardoli resolution adopted by the Congress Working Committee. Such attacks continued even after Gandhi’s arrest on 10 March 1922. The Muslims felt betrayed and abandoned and left to stew in their own juice.

The Muslims now to counter the Sangathan started their own Tanzim movements. This led to riots and restlessness everywhere. In the wake of these communal movements, two new movements, Shuddhi and Tabligh came into existence and worsened the existing worst situation. Many leading politicians, who were eager to work the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms extricated themselves from the travail of non-cooperation and strayed into the new councils

353 Moonje Papers: Acc No. 13, NMML.
354 V.D.Savarkar Papers: Roll No.188, (Microfilm) NMML.
355 Mohammed Ali Papers: Abdul Bari to Mohammed Ali, 11 September 1923, (Microfilm), NMML.
356 Home (Poll.) 18, February 1922, NAI.
357 Home (Poll.) 501, February 1922, NAI.
359 Prabha Arun, op.cit., p.12.
360 Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Muslims and the Congress, op.cit, p.xxiv.
ABOLITION OF KHILAFAT

After the suspension of civil disobedience, another surprise awaited the Muslims – the abolition of Khilafat. On 21 November 1922, the Turkish National Assembly at Ankara decided to separate the Khilafat from the Sultanate. And since the maintenance of the temporal power of the Khalifa was one of the main objects of the Khilafat movement; this action by a purely Muslim body completely took the wind out of its sails. In March 1924, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who burst the bubble of the Khilafat, struck the final blow. Its immediate result was the disruption of the Khilafat party in India.361

361 Home (Poll.) 60, 1923, NAI