Chapter IV

Emerging Conflicts and Policy Imperatives for India

Introduction

The cross-border migrations are fostering regional tensions and threatening stable relation among neighbours. The trans-border population movements in South Asia are regarded as issues that affects internal security, political stability and international relations, not only simply the structure and composition of labour market, or the provision of services to new comers. There is a growing significance of the trans-border refugees' flows as an area of concern in the South Asian affairs. And in recent years, the dimension of refugees, problem becomes so enlarged and complex. Here, we are concerned with the emerging conflicts in a limited context of the South Asian region, that also, the Tibetan and the Chakma refugees who come to India; one from outside the region and one from within the region, after India independence especially for Tibetan after 1959 and for Chakma after 1971, Bangladesh independence.

Tibet as a Factor in Sino-Indian Relation

This work does not embody an interpretation of Sino-Indian conflict as factor in such, but it is mainly confined, as reflected through the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousand of Tibetans refugees to India. We will situate the Tibetan refugee problems within the context of Sino-Indian relations.

The period of hostility between China and India relation began with the flight of Dalai Lama in March 1959. Till the period of this flight, India and China were still sharing the vision of 'great friendship for tens and thousands of years' to come. Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai in his letter to Indian
Prime Minister Nehru on January 23, 1959 expressed his abiding confidence in the Sino-Indian friendship and his country's firm resolve not to allow any differences to affect their friendship.¹

The flight of Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees to India has changed the whole tenor of the Sino-Indian relation. The decade of happy relations marked by warmth and exuberance come to a sad end, relation of the two has never been the same since then.

The grant of asylum and warm ovation that the Dalai Lama received in India evoked sharp reactions from the Chinese. The Peoples' Daily News charged that Sino-Indian friendship was being destroyed from the Indian side because of India's sympathy for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan uprising.² Thus, the Lhasa revolt, 1959 and the flight of Dalai Lama introduced a new and disruptive elements into Sino-India relations. And the huge mass of Tibetan refugees becomes the catalyst for the rapid deterioration of relationship.

The present study has been an attempt to analyze the effect of the flight of Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees on the Sino-Indian relations, the reason for fanfare attached to the flight, both by India and China, why India could not refuse asylum even though friendship with China would have been more in India's interest; the pressures and constraints of the Indian foreign policy. An attempt has also been made to analyze the Chinese reactions to the flight and granting of asylum to Dalai Lama by India.


² The Times of India, N. Delhi, 24 April 1959.
Geo-Political Importance of Tibet

The importance of the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees can be understood only against the broader triangular setting of Sino-Indian-Tibet relation. Tibet played a pivotal role in Sino-Indian relations, while it was Tibet which had provided the maximum scope for understanding between India and China, it was again Tibet which became a point of serious misunderstanding between the two primarily, the Chinese built their case against India on the premise that India interfered in a domestic issue. Later, in the context of the conflicting border claims of the two countries, India's policy towards Tibet caused serious misgivings in the Chinese mind.

The sensitive geo-political position of Tibet between India and China played an important role in both countries foreign policy. Any strong military power based on this natural fortress in the heart of Asia can any day imperil India's security along the 1800 miles long Himalayan frontier. The geographical importance of Tibet has given a new dimension to the Sino-Indian relations, ‘China, that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour has been friend during the ages’, was what Jawaharlal Nehru thought of China and in general reflected the feelings of most of the Indians. Dr. S. Radha Krishan, spoke eloquently on the common cultural and spiritual background and similar ideas of human life and fellowship in the civilizations of India and China, while on a lecture tour of China in 1944. The Indian leader even talked in terms of 'Asiatic Federation'. But that neighbour remained a friend so long as there was

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3 Amuery de Riencourt, 1950, Lost World: Tibet Key to Asia, London: Victor Gallancz Ltd., p. 225. ‘Looking at this Map, I was stuck by the strategic potentialities of the roof of the World. Of this colossal natural fortress standing in the heart of Asia and almost inaccessible by land. Behind the cyclopean Himalayas and Kuenlun mountain ranges Tibet tower on all sides above the three most populated countries of the World, China's five hundred million, India's four hundred million and USS two hundred million. Any power based on Changtang would control the heart of Asia – not only would such bases be an hour’s flight from India’s Delhi and two or three from China’s Chungking, but they would be only 800 miles from Taskent, and 600 miles from Alma Ata, thus controlling the booming industrial centres of Soviet Central Asia’.


5 Ibid.

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very little of interaction between the two, "our two countries have always lived together as friends and never committed aggression on each other". What Chou Enlai told the Indian audience while accepting the D-Lit. Degree Visva Bharati University, was precisely because of Tibet acting as a buffer between the two countries, once the buffer was removed and the area of interaction widened the "intimate cultural" ties of the past 2,000 years took no time in being transformed into distrustful and even hostile relationships. We can say that, one would find the key to Sino-Indian relations hidden in the soil of Tibet, and it is on the rocks of this natural fortress that India's friendship with China flourished and floundered.

Towards the end of 19th and, at the beginning of 20th centuries, Tibet appeared as a political junction of Asia in the three largest land powers - China, Soviet Union and India. Himalayas frontiers, together with Tibetan wilderness could provide the necessary security to the British interests in India. To China a hold over Tibet meant a hold over Mongolia for the two had great religious affinity. And for Soviet Russia which already moving into Central Asia, Tibet naturally held an interest.

Thus, the necessity of maintaining a buffer between India and China, India and Russia, became imperative and the convergence and collision of interest of the three great powers in Tibet inevitable. Sir S. Scott when asked by his government to inform the Russian Foreign Minister, wrote, "His Majesty's Government could not regard with in difference and proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status of Tibet". Lord Curzon advocated a forward policy to prevent the vacuum to be filled by Russia caused

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by the dwindling Manchu influence. However, London critically viewed the Young Husbands' Expedition 1904 and Lhasa Agreement. The exclusion of China from the Lhasa Treaty meant independent status for Tibet and British assumption of the position of suzerain in place of China, which would not only increase Russia's uneasiness but would outrage Peking as well.

Neither of the situations was palatable to the Balfour Government that was at that time wholly obsessed with containment of the growing might of Germany. While London was planning an 'Entente Cordiale' with Russia, with China it was not willing to have a common frontier which it would find difficult to defend for practical reasons as Bogle Mission had already pointed out, in the Report.¹⁰ Notwithstanding, Gurzon and Young husband considered British primacy essential in an area vital to the security of India, London had a strange rationale. Lord Morley placed Indian policy and felt "His Majesty's Government have to survey the whole theatre of Chinese operations which are manifold just now and if the effect of showing teeth too precociously about Mekong-Salween watershed is to provide a Chinese boycott of goods, it would be most awkward and public opinion here in such a case would be apt to ask whether the game was warmth the candle. The British interests in Tibet were only incidental and their major interest lay in controls with China".¹¹

Thus the formula which most filled with their line of thinking and planning 'autonomous Tibet' subject to a week suzerain and guaranteed by a

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¹⁰ Roland, No. 8, p.38.
¹¹ Shashi Bhushan, 1976, China: The Myth of a Super Power, N. Delhi: Progressive Peoples Sector (P) Publication, p.15; Charles Bell, 1946, Portrait of Dalai Lama, London Collins, p.359. ... and most European nations would regard Tibet as being under Chinese rule. No doubt this is convenient arrangement for them as they have one authority to deal with. Besides, we are also told about the vast potentialities of trade with China. The Foreign nations wish to gain a good share of trade and to that extent try to please China.
British-Russian Treaty of 1907. If the Lhasa Convention, 7 September 1904, planned by Curzon and young husband had become effective, perhaps Tibet might have gained its independence. As Roland points out, 'If Curzon could defended, he would doubtless argue that London's diplomacy by undoing what he had accomplished was to blame'. With the 1906 and 1907 treaties, China regained its position of power in Tibet, though it was constitutional fiction and political affectation.

Dawa Norbu said that, the Chinese takeover of Tibet couldn't be explained in terms of either historical claims or ideological motives. Giving a more plausible explanation it may be found in the strategic importance that the Chinese experts have attached. Since the early 20th century to Tibet, just as British strategist in India calculated. To the late Ching empire strategists, Tibet was the "lips" of the Chinese "mouth" and the fulcrum of Central Asian politics. The KMT strategists described Tibet as the "backdoor to China". Maoist strategists have described China's northwest "fortress" against social imperialism and revisionism (former Soviet Union).

Whenever communist China feels strategically vulnerable in Tibet, it makes moves towards New Delhi. Its strategic vulnerability in Tibet increase in

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12 In 1903, Lord Curzon requested London to permit him to send a mission with an armed escort to Lhasa to talk with the Dalai Lama about the trade problem between the British and the Tibetans. However, London did not approve Curzon’s plan lest this should provoke Russia’s intervention. Nevertheless, Lord Curzon continued to press London to dispatch a mission to Lhasa. Finally, the British government allowed him to send a mission. An expedition led by Col. Young Husband reach Lhasa on 2 August 1904. By 7 September, 1904, the British and the Tibetans produced a treaty known as the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet. Detail and discussion are found in, Sanjay Sahita, 1989, India's Tibet Policy, 1947-59, Unpublished M.Phil Dissertation, J.N.U., N.Delhi. pp.8-11.

13 Rowland, No. 8, p.38.


direct proportion to its perception of India allying formally or informally, with a great power hostile to China at a given period of time. China does not usually perceive threats to its occupation of Tibet from India acting on its own. Chinese threat perceptions increase whenever its suspects India of acting in concert with other powers. It is a strategic concerns and defense that dominates the current Chinese thinking on Tibet.16

The Crux of the rivalry between the PRC and India is that both consider Tibet to be strategically important to their national security. If India dominates Tibet (as the British ruler did upto 1947), the Chinese feel insecure and threatened. Conversely, if China dominate Tibet (as the PRC has been doing since 1950), the Indians feel their whole northern security system is open to external danger. Thus, it is the geo-politics interests of China and India on Tibet, which dictates their relationship.

**China and Tibet**

It will be pertinent to examine here the claim of China to suzerainty, which really becomes the takeoff point in the Sino-Indian relations. Nehru, who was so fond of history, could not overlook the historical past of Sino-Tibetan relations in favour of its own security interests. It should be worthwhile to recall, Nehru while signing the Sino-Indian Agreement on trade and intercourse in Tibet region of China, said, 'he was simply recognizing the existing fact.17 It is really the suzerainty aspect of the relationship, which China had been harping upon their subsequent dealing with Tibet, and the rest of the world.

Chinese claim to suzerainty date back to 1717, "when a horde of Moslem tatars swept into Tibet and took Lhasa by storm and the Tibetans

16 Ibid., P. 94.
17 Quoted in Chanakaya Sen, No. 14, Nehru’s Statement in Parliament regarding the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, 18 May 1954, p.120.
sought Peking help.”18 The Chinese, thus came as deliverers and continued as over-lords. Till that time as the Tibetan records stated Tibet had been independent and the fifth Dalai Lama was received in Peking as an independent sovereign. 19 But from 1720, the vassal status comes to be signified by the two Chinese Ambans and Chinese garrison stationed at Lhasa.

This relationship of over-lordism and vassalism- has been changing with the change in the strength of the Central Government in China. However, with the weak, decadent and disintegrating Manchu empire, control over Tibet was, as Lord Curzon described, 'reduced to constitutional friction'. To quote Hugh Richardson, who was the officer-in-charge of Indian Mission in Lhasa from 1947-50 and Anthony Eden also shares the view that, "there was not a trace of Chinese authority after 1912".20 With the fall of Mandhu dynasty in 1911, Dalai Lama XIII assumed full and complete rights over his country. 21

But the British again brought into the concept of suzerainty when it called the tripartite conference at Simla, 1913-14, to settle Tibet's status and boundaries once for all. The urgency was caused, however, by the reported secrete pact between Tibet and outer Mongolia, declaring independence followed by Russo-Mongolian agreement of 12 October 1912, which disturbed both the British and the Chinese. London found Peking's 'suzerain' role useful since it provides China with some legal primary yet deprived it of effective control. It legal present a vacuum which still feared might be field by Russia.

The tripartite conference though a masterstroke of British diplomacy reconciling the three parties (though China never ratified it) was precisely the harbinger of the present crisis. China weak or strong never gave up pretensions

18 Chakravarti, No. 4. Chapter—Tibet and Its Historical Status.
21 Bell, No.11, pp. 135, 356,400.
over Tibet. The drawing of McMohan Line really represents a vital phase in Sino-Indian relations. China's communist 50 years later was to reap the benefit of its predecessor's stubbornness and sense of greater Chinese destiny in refusing to accept Britain's formula. However, no serious attempt was made to exercise her suzerainty over Tibet until the communist came to power.

After assuming power in China 1949, the communist party was determined to bring back to its folds the irredentists areas. The most important and the most vulnerable was Tibet because of its disputed historical state, Tibet became their first target. In their commitment to a strategy of hostile co-existence and a foreign policy, which was an amalgam of Marxist feudal fundamentalism and pan-nationalism, the relevance of Tibet for them increased considerably.

The Communist Chinese foreign policy was geared towards securing three folds objectives i.e. i) To become one of the major world powers or at least the undisputed leader of Asia where views carried weight in any settlement of any major international issue; ii) To build up its national security against the closing rising of the western imperial powers; and iii) To find national natural resources for the reconstruction of its stagnant economy.

And the Dalai Lama listed another goal, i.e. to secure new lands or an extra-living space. Sparsely populated Tibetan highlands, which could relieve the ever-expanding population pressures from the mainland more so when the Marxist had a little faith in birth contract theory till 1954. Edgar Snow analyzed the average density of population was more than 1,000 per sq. mile, while in Szechuan and Yangtse delta, it had reached above 3,000 persons

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22 Rowland, No. 8, p.8.
per sq. mile.\textsuperscript{24}

As Dalai Lama himself has pointed out, the unexplored natural resource of Tibet were great attractions to China.\textsuperscript{25} "The fertility of land, the abundance of hydraulic power, huge deposits of coal, iron, graphite, gypsum, granite, realgar, lead, zinc, oil, copper, borax could provide unlimited power for reconstruction of China. Tibet with its unexplored resources could well might become the treasure house of the fatherland".\textsuperscript{26}

Equally vital was Tibet to the security and expansionists needs of China. Control over this impregnable citadel could be utilized for launching attacks on India, Burma, Pakistan and South East Asian states in order to dominate those states.\textsuperscript{27} Tibetan highlands in nuclear ages had dangerous potential as strategic base for bomber squadrons and missile launching pads aimed at China. As a containment policy in the fifties, the desire for ideological leadership of the communism and control over the un-communicated nations of the regions brought to fore afresh the geo-political realism of Tibet.

Thus control of Tibet would not only alleviate the population pressure form the main land, if, any provide the valuable natural resources for reconstruction of its economy, but would contribute towards a more reliable, more realistic and strategic barrier against the imperialist world. And on the other hand, a weak Tibet could be easily exposed to influence and control detrimental to China. So it become imperative to bring to an end the influence and control erected on Tibet particularly by India which they viewed as a 'front for western imperialism'. Non-alignment policy of India was a force in Lui-

\textsuperscript{24} Edgar Snow, 1963, \textit{The Other side of the River: Red China Today}, London: Victor Gollanez, p.416. "Mao and other leaders have repeatedly declared China’s numbers to be assets".
\textsuperscript{25} Dalai Lama, 1962, No. 23, p.201.
\textsuperscript{27} Dalai Lama, 1962, No. 23, p.201.
Shao-Chi's and Mao Tse-Tung's estimates. India's economic dependence on US in the early years was convincing proof of India's leaning towards the west. Consequently 'liberation of Tibet was announced by the Chinese People's Government as one of the main task of the people liberation Army January 1, 1950.

With India's support the 17-point agreement, May 23, 1951, was entered into by Tibet and China whereby the Tibetan recognized Chinese control over Tibet's army and its external affairs, trade and communication. On the other hand, it guaranteed to them their political, social and religious system. However, what it seemed the tangle had been resolved, China got what it wanted, the aid and support of Dalai Lama, the head of Church in promoting Chinese in Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria, Tibetans could continue with their way of life, and India also achieved to some extend its objective of saving Tibet from turning completely communistic and maintaining the buffer.

The 17-points agreement did to some extent lessen the distrust in the Chinese mind and the exchange of cultural mission in 1951 and 1952 further created an atmosphere conductive to adjustments and compromises. Nehru was even optimistic about India retaining certain rights in Tibet within the context of Chinese suzerainty.

Sino-India Relation: Pre-1959

The agreement on Tibet was signed on the initiative of New Delhi on 31 December 1953. Negotiations began in Peking on the relations between India and Tibet, and an agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India was signed in Peking on April 29, 1954 and ratified on June

1954 broke fresh ground in laying down Panchsheel guiding principle of Sino-Indian relations.

This was an important document, for it enunciated for the first time the five principles of peaceful co-existence for Panchsheel. They are: i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; ii) Mutual non-aggression; iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; iv) Equality and mutual benefit; v) Peaceful co-existence.

In a joint statement issued by the Prime Ministers of India and China at Delhi in June 1954, the five principles of or Panchsheel, as they are popular known, were reaffirmed. Nehru and Chou En-Lai declared that differences of social and political systems "should not come in the way of peace or create conflict". Chou En-Lai was given a warm reception in India, the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indian and Chinese were brother was heard in New Delhi and else).

And also the statement of their talks issued declared: "If these principles are applied not only between various countries, but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence... the Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as the other countries of Asia".

The inclusion of the words 'Tibet Region of China' was very significant, whereby while British India recognized only the suzerainty, independent India recognized 'sovereignty' of China over Tibet. In Nehru deemed it as a great

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diplomatic victory. "In my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we become independence".  

The signing of the agreement marked a qualitative change in the Sino-Indian relationship. For the next few years, their relationship was one of the most sweat reasonableness and smooth operativeness. On the occasion of Nehru's visit to China in October 1954, Chou Enlai emphasized the future role of India and China in the context of international peace. He said: "the friendly cooperation of the 960,000,000 people of India and China constitutes an important factor in safeguarding peace in Asia and the world. We hope that the established friendship between India and China will be further strengthened and developed so that Sino-Indian relations will be a model of coexistence between countries with different social customs and ideologies".  

In April 1955, at the Bandung Conference, where India and China met as co-participants to discuss issues of peace and cooperation among Afro-Asians, the Chinese Prime Ministers said that nations could hold different viewpoints and yet seek common ground. A year later, Mr. Chou acknowledged before a domestic audience that "an actively advocating the five principles of peaceful co-existence and expanding the influence of the peace area, India as a great world power is playing a particularly outstanding role".  

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33 On April 21, 1912, China had declared that Tibet was a province of China but the British Government of India refused to recognize the claim. In 1913 Tibet revolted against China and declared its independence. India then called a tripartite Conference on 13 October 1913, at Shimla where on 3 July 1914, Tibet and India signed the Convention with China refusing to sign. The Convention specially declared that "so long as China withheld signature on the Convention, She would be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom"; Sen, No. 14, Nehru Reply to the Debate on 18, May 1954, p., 123.  
34 Foreign Policy of India. Texts of Documents 1947-58(Lok Sabha Secretariat), N.Delhi, 1958, pp.97-8.  
35 For detail on Chinese participation, see, China and the Asian Conference, Peking 1955.  
Soon afterwards, China's relations with India's began to lose warmth. Though China understandably had reservations about India on the ideological front between 1954-59, it had refrained from making any public criticism of the country's politics.

Tibetan Refugees and its Impact on Sino-Indian Relations

The outbreak of anti-Chinese in Tibet in March 10, 1959 became the catalyst for a rapid deterioration in the relations of the two countries. The uprising in Tibet added to the complexity of the border dispute between China and India. Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai in January 1959, in his letter to Nehru, the Prime Minister of India already had disputed the boundary claimed by India. The reaction to the uprising and its alleged role in providing a base to the Tibetan "reactionaries" led to the accusations of "expansionism" against India and warning the danger of second front, the first being India's conflict with Pakistan.37

A large section of Indian opinion reacted unfavourably to Chinese military measure against the rebels who were ranged against the Chinese central government for Tibetan independence. With the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousand of refugees to India, the situations further deteriorated. China resented and deemed it as interfering in the domestic affairs of China. Differences sharpened between India and China, harbouring among other things, on the nature of the revolt, China viewed it as having engineered by upper-strata reactionaries in Tibet under instigation and support of the imperialist and foreign reactionary elements.38 Nehru refuted this allegation.

On April 3, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru announced in the Lok Sabha that the Dalai Lama had arrived safely in India. And in a statement in Lok

Sabha, 27 April, 1959, he pointed out that, laying the responsibility on a handful of upper-strata "reactionaries" for the uprising in Tibet was an oversimplification of a complicated issue, since the "basis of the revolt must have been a strong feeling of nationalism".\(^{39}\)

Nehru's statement caused a furor in China. The Chinese press reacted strongly and described the statement as interference in China's internal matters and a misrepresentation of the situation in Tibet. In Chinese political circles, India was criticized as following the British policy of intervention and was accused of making attempts to separate Tibet from China in disregard of the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the Bundung spirit. This is best illustrated by the commentary on Nehru's statement, published by the editorial board of the People's Daily in the form of an article entitled "Revolution in Tibet and Nehru Philosophy". The article discussed the contradictions in the Indian policy by saying that on the one hand the Nehru government followed a policy of peace and friendship with the Socialist countries and opposed colonialism, and on the other, the Indian big bourgeoisie which played in very influential role in the nation's life, maintained manifold links with imperialism and was attempting to continue certain legacies of imperial British.\(^{40}\) In sum the Chinese believed that "no matter what the subjective intentions of the Indian government may be their statements and actions had played an objective role in encouraging Tibetan".\(^{41}\)

A debate, spread over several months and punctuating normal business, went on in the Indian Parliament, on the question of Tibet, bringing March 1959.

In his very first statement - in the Lok Sabha, Nehru explained India's position. He said in reply to points raised by members.

\(^{39}\) Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.30, 1959,Col. 13501.
\(^{40}\) Concerning the Question of Tibet, Peking, 1959, pp.270-71.
\(^{41}\) Statement of the Chinese Ambassador to the Indian Foreign Secretary, 16 May 1959. White Paper 1, p.74.
“We had always, not only our government but the previous governments in the world, you might say, recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet. That had varied; when the Chinese Government was strong, it exercised it, and when weak it did not exercise it. That was for the last seven hundred years. But so far as I know, no country had ever recognized the independence of Tibet. We certainly did not; and it was inevitable therefore for us to recognize the suzerainty; call it suzerainty, call it sovereignty - these are fine distinctions and they are determined on the power of the state and how far it goes. 42

As for the alleged political activities in which the Dalai Lama was supported to engaged in India, Nehru told the communist member, Hiren Mukherjee, that the assurance, which India has asked of the Dalai Lama, was that India should not be made the base for activities outside.

Nehru did not openly side with the Tibetans. But he went to the extent of saying that, “our sympathies go out very much to the Tibetans”. India received thousands upon thousand refugees from Tibet, and the problem of rehabilitation them in a country was an additional burden on the Government of India. Expression of sympathy for the Tibetan people and concern for their well being by Indian leaders were answered by China through a propaganda campaign.

The People's Daily of Peking, mouth-piece of the Chinese Communist Party, launched the attack on April 24, with a banner headline across its front page: "Serious warning to the Indian Expansionists". A double-deck sub-heading said: "The shameless expansionist intrigues of taking advantage of the Tibet rebellion will never succeed. Any action of the imperialist and reactionaries to disrupt China's national unity will be firmly rebuffed. 43

43 NCNA, Hong Kong, 25 April 1959.
This theme was repeated practically by every newspaper and periodical in China; by Radio Peking and the New China News Agency, and hundreds of thousands of words were devoted to the condemnation of "Indian expansionists, imperialist agents, reactionaries" and so forth to bring with in general, and later by name. Those specifically named by Peking, included Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi, the Indian Home Minister, Govind Vallabhai Pant, and the Sarvodaya leaders, Jayaprakash Narayan and Acharya Kripalani.

The entire editorial department of The People’s Daily in its issue of May 6, 1959 was a personal attack on Nehru. It epitomized China's objection to the role played by India vis-à-vis the revolt in Tibet. The 11,500-word article said, among other things:

"Prime Minster Nehru says that the Indian reaction on the question of Tibet is essentially not political but instinctive, largely one of sympathy based sentiment and humanitarian reason, also a feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts with the Indian people."

"We understand that the Indian people have a feeling of kinship for the people of China's Tibet. Not only that the Indian people have a feeling of kinship for the whole of the Chinese people, when Premier Chou-En-lai visited India, the ardent slogan, Indians and Chinese are brothers' (Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai) was heard everywhere, and these scenes and sentiments seems like a matter of only yesterday."

"But how can feelings towards the people in Tibet be used by certain political figures as a pretext for impairing feelings towards the Chinese people and for interference in China is internal affairs. This kind of logic is fraught with obvious dangers, because of such logic can stand, then, when Tibet has taken the road of democracy and socialism, the road of strength and prosperity, could not a 'people's committee to support Assam and a 'committee for Uttar Pradesh affairs' be set up to interfere in the affairs of India's state of Assam or Uttar Pradesh under the pretext of ancient religious and cultural links."

"If the Indian Government can demand certain assurances from the Chinese government, on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the people of Tibet, could it not on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with all the people of China make the outright demand for certain assurances from the Chinese Government, as regards all its internal affairs. Similarity, could not the Chinese Government, also, on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the Indian people, demand certain assurances
from the Indian Government as regards its internal affairs? Where would peaceful co-existence and the five principles be? Would not the world sink into Chaos of mutual interference?"

“Although the Indian Government has no desire to occupy Tibet or make Tibet formally, it ready strives to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its own territory of Tibet. In this respect certain political figures in India have followed the tradition of the British Government of the past - the only recognize China's 'Suzerainty' over Tibet, like India's 'Suzerainty' over Sikkim and Bhutan. What they call 'autonomy' for Tibet is different from regional autonomy as laid down in clear terms in the constitution of China.... rather it is a kind of Semi-independent status”.

“True, Tibet is not a province but an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China, with greater power and functions than a province as laid down in the constitution and by law; but it is definitely no protectorate-neither a protectorate of India, nor a so-called a buffer state between China and India”.44

The first session of the Second National People's Congress of China, held in Peking, discussed the Tibetan question and great the peoples liberation Army units stationed in Tibet. In decided, among other things, “resolutely to implement national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the central government”. The resolution declared Tibet to be an alienable part of China and as belonging to the big family of the Chinese people, and the suppression of the revolt as wholly the internal affairs of China, permitting no interference by foreigners.

The National People's Congress noted “with regret that certain people in Indian political circles have recently made extremely unfriendly statements and commented extremely unfriendly acts which interfere in China's internal affairs”.45

The Tibetan refugee's problem is still today an issue alive, sensitive and important in Sino-Indian relation even after four decades of Chinese takeover.

44 NCNA, Peking, 7 May 1959.
45 NCNA, Lhasa, December 28, 1958, (Survey of China Mainland Press- SCM-US Consulate-General, Hong Kong)
According to reliable sources, Beijing had conveyed the message to New Delhi that China would recognize the MacMohan line of India "stops supporting the separatists" viz., the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees in India.\(^{46}\)

**Border Problem**

The dispute over the border, which in a minor fashion that had stated in 1954 suddenly, took a serious turn in the fall of 1959. The Sino-Indian border actually being the border between India and the Tibetan region, the repercussion of the Tibetan situation were directly felt on the borders. Prior to the Communist China's invasion of Tibet in 1950 there was no reference to any border problem between India and Tibet. But the Chinese occupation of Tibet painfully altered the whole situation.\(^{47}\)

The Sino-Indian border dispute began with the Indian's discovery that the Sin Kiang Tibet highway, completed in late 1957, passed through territory, the Aksai Chin, that India claimed.\(^{48}\) On 18 October 1958, India sent a note to China drawing attention to the fact that a motorable road linking Sin Kiang with Tibet had been constructed through Indian territory which formed part of the Ladakh region. The Indian government also mentioned that the road had been reported as having been completed in September 1957. India considered it a matter of surprise and regret that China should have built the road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining its permission, or informing it. The note also asked the whereabouts of the Indian patrol, which had been lost in the area. The Indian government further expressed it an anxiety to settle

\(^{46}\) Norbu, No.15, p.96.
\(^{48}\) B. N. Mullick, 1971, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, N. Delhi: Allied Publishers, p.198. B.N.Mullick, then Director Indian intelligence, alignment until a patrol party confirmed that the road transgressed Indian territory in the Aksai Chin.
it "the petty frontiers disputes so that friendly relation between the two countries may not suffer". 49

The Chinese replied briefly that the Indian patrol had been apprehended on the Sin Kiang Tibet highway and released later "in the spirit of Sino-Indian friendship". 50 There was no direct explanation of India' charge that the highway had cut, into India territory, the subsequent Indian notes on the subject failed to elicit any reply from the Chinese.

On 14 December 1958, Nehru wrote a friend by letter to Chou En-lai reminding him of their previous conversation that China, although not approving of the 1914 Mc Mohan alignment in practice for the sake of good relations with India Nehru was therefore "puzzled" he said about a recent China pictorial article in which China continued to claim both NEFA and Aksai Chin. The article in question was the one announcing the opening of the Sikiang Tibet highway, though Nehru did not mention the road or the fact that it traversed the Aksai Chin. 51

Mr. Chou replied on 23 January 1959 that the border had "never been formally delineated. He reminded Nehru that no treaty regarding the border had been concluded between the "Chinese Central Government and the Indian Government" in other words, that India could not base its claim on the Mc Mohan Line. Furthermore, he indicated that there were some outstanding differences in regard to the border alignment. Chou specifically claimed that the Aksai Chin area has "always been under Chinese jurisdiction" Chou

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49 Chinese note, 23 June 1959. Statement of the Chinese Ambassador to the India Foreign Secretary, 16 May 1959, White Paper I, p.34.
50 Chinese Memorandum, 3 November 1958, Ibid., p.28.
51 Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 14 December 1958, in Sen, No.14, p.441.
nevertheless felt that a friendly and "realistic" settlement could be reached. 52

Again on 22 March 1959 Nehru wrote to Chinese Prime Minister, expressing his surprise that China did not accept the McMohan Line. Nehru claimed that the border was "traditional" followed the "geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range" and had the sanction of international agreements between the Indian Government and the Central Government of China. 53

Chou En-Lai did not reply until of September 1959 by which time relations had significantly deteriorated. Chou expressed surprise that India, which like China had suffered under imperialism, could base her claim upon imperialist treaties. He described the McMohan Line as illegal, and to demand eventual negotiations on the border alignment. 54

By August 1959, the Chinese leaders had concluded that India faced economic difficulties and was under pressure from the progressive forces in Tibet to mount anti-Chinese campaign in order to please the "imperialist" powers. About the thrust of Indian policies found public expression in Chou Enlai's interview to Edgar Snow published in Look Magazine in January 1961; "The real idea they have in mind is turn China's Tibet region into a buffer zone... (they are) using the Sino-Indian boundary question as a card against progressive forces at home and as capital for obtaining foreign aid". 55

52 Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India, 23 January 1959, Sen, Ibid., p.445. China could not accept the legality of the McMohan alignment since the agreement had been negotiated between the British and the Tibetans at Shimla (in an additional agreement not involving the Chinese Representative). For the Chinese to recognize the legality of the line would be the same as recognizing the Tibetan's right to independently negotiate international agreements.

53 Letter from Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 22 March 1959, in Sen, Ibid., p.448. Nehru of course did not mention the fact that the McMohan line had been secretly negotiated at Shimla between Memohan and Lonchen Shatra.

54 Letter from Premier Chou En-Lai to Premier Nehru, 8 September, 1959, Ibid., p.45

55 Bhutani, No.37.
The Sino-Indian border spans along three sectors, the Western Sector, the Middle Sector and the Eastern Sector. There are a number of passes here and some problems about their exact location but by and large the Middle Sector is trouble free.

In the Eastern Sector there are two problems one the McMohan Line; which the Chinese are sticky and emphatic. The Chinese position has always been that this line is an imperialist legacy; that McMohan was the representative of an imperialist power that was trying to exploit China weakness. The Indian Government had, in the meantime, decided that the McMohan Line was India's northern border, an issue not subject to negotiation, a position to which India would adhere as a point of national honour.

The western sector, the dispute over Aksai Chin was obviously the crux of the matter. The Chinese would not deviate on the issue of Aksai Chin (33,000 sq. km) an uninhabited salt plain, which is essential to Chinese communication between Sinkiang and Tibet.

A related consequences of the Tibetan uprising was the intensification of Chinese patrolling in close proximity of the border and occasional clashes with the Indian forces trying to secure their positions. Chou Enlai arrived in Delhi in April 1960, at Nehru's invitation, in an attempt to resolve the border dispute. In January 1960, he had signed an agreement on demarcation of the boundary with Burma (Myanmar) and Nepal in March, recognizing the actual McMohan alignment in both countries. In Sino-Indonesian treaty on the issue of stateless Chinese, was ratified in January. This only served to increase Indian suspicions that Chou was trying to isolate India.

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by appearing to be flexible in uncompromising with Burma and Nepal, portraying India as the unreasonable party in the Sino-India dispute.

The two Prime Ministers had extensive discussion on the border, but their talks could not resolve their differences. They however agreed that the officials of the two governments should examine all the historical evidence, on which each side relied in support of its stand. As stipulated in the Nehru-Chou Joint Communiqué, the officials of the two sides met in three separate sessions between 15 June 1960 to 12 December 1960 to explore and examine the factual maternal in their possession.

The agenda included i) location and terrain features of boundary; ii) treaties and agreements; iii) tradition and custom; iv) administration and jurisdiction; v) miscellaneous.

The officials of both countries were unable to arrive at a consensus on any of the basic issue on the agenda. The relations between the two countries deteriorated further. The Chinese proposed to negotiate a new agreement on December 1961 on trade and intercourse to replace the original one was refused by India. 58 In justification of its stand, India stressed the fact that it had reality sacrificed its inherent rights and privileges in Tibet with a view to laying a new and firm foundation of friendship with China. It would not be possible for India to negotiate a new agreement when China continued to violate the territorial integrity India. 59

By mid-Summer 1962, the border dispute mainly centered on the Western Sector. The subsequent developments widened the rift between the two. Towards the end of summer 1962, the border situation had definitely worsened. The final clash occurred on 20 October 1962. Prior to that, armed conflict had taken place in the Chip Chap area, in the Western Sector on 21

58 Chinese Note, 3 December 1961, White Paper, VI, p.188
July 1962. New incidents of border incursions were also reported in the Eastern Sector, (NEFA Area). The frequently of armed conflict increased from mid-September. The two governments claimed and counter claimed that the McMohan line had been crossed, leading to arm encounters and a highly inflammable situation on the eastern sector. In fact, it was the later which had become the crucial area.

The Chinese troops were scoring successive victories against the Indian. And meanwhile, the Chinese government offered India a three-point proposal for settlement of the border dispute. Firstly, the two sides respected the line of actual control along the entire boundary and withdrew their armed forces 20 kilometers from the line and disengage. Secondly if India agreed to the above proposal China was prepared to withdrew to the North of the line of actual control. All the same time China and India would undertake not to cross the line of actual control in the middle and western sector. Finally the two Prime Minister should meet to resolve the dispute. Chou Enlai also personally sent the proposal to Nehru. ⁶⁰

India opposed to the 3-points proposal, as in its view. The objective of areas in the western and central while retaining the right to negotiate territorial adjustments in the eastern sector. India could not submit to this proposition, as that would near "mere existence at the mercy of an aggressive arrogant and expansionist neighbourer". ⁶¹

The Chinese government however, on 2 November 1962 announced a unilateral cease-fire along the entire Sino-Indian border and withdraw its troops behind the 1959 line of actual control. The Chinese declared it would set up a number of civilian check-posts on its side of the line. These measures were

⁶¹ Letter from the Prime Minister of India to Prime Minister Chou En-Lai, 14 November 1962, and Annex to letter from the Prime Minister of India to Premier Chou En-Lai, 27 October, White Paper viii, pp.10-17.
taken to promote the realization of its 24 October proposal. The Chinese
government would carry out the out-measured and scheduled, even if India
failed to respond in good time.

Though the Indian government was not satisfied with several aspects of
Chinese announcement it accepted the cease-fire in so far as it did not impede
its implementation. Thus an unofficial cease-fire had come into effect on 22
November 1952; differences between India and China remained as insoluble as
ever.

The hostility did not end with the Chinese achievement of their aims on
the frontiers. Major and minor clashes continued, until 1967 when China itself
was overwhelmed by the upheaval called Cultural Revolution. Till date Sino-
India borders are unresolved disputes.

Tibet at United Nations

The Dalai Lama in his speech to the Indian Council on World Affairs
on 7 September 1959, announced his intention to appeal Tibet's case to the
September 1959, referred to Tibet's 1950 appeal, which had been shelved
contingent upon the possibility of a peaceful resolution of Sino-Tibetan
deferece's. The Dalai Lama informed the UN that no peaceful resolution had
been achieved; instead, Chinese aggression had continued. The appeal
reiterated Tibet's status as a sovereign state, based upon the Thirteenth Dalai
Lama's declaration of independence in 1912, the 1914 Simla Convention,
Tibet's World War neutrality, and the recognition of Tibetan passports used by
Shakabpa's, 1946 Tibetan Trade Delegation.  

The inclusion of Tibet on the agenda of the United Nations in September 1959 was secured through Malaya and Ireland. The USA, El Salvador and Cuba supported the proposal, it met with stiff opposition from Russian delegate, Kuznetsov.

China protested the Dalai Lama's appeal to the UN as a violation of India's responsibilities to China under the principles of mutual non-interference and Nehru's assurance, that India would neither recognized a Tibetan exile government nor allow any Tibetan political activities in India. China complained that "the Dalai Lama has all along been engaged in political activities against China and has submitted the so-called Tibet question to the United Nations in the name of the so-called government of Tibet, thus exceeding by far what is permissible under the international practice of asylum".  

One of the positive outcomes of the Dalai Lama's appeal to the United Nations was a report on Tibet. On 25 July 1959 the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published a preliminary report entitled The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, which influenced several countries decision to support Tibet's appeal to the UN the report found prima facie evidence of China's attempts to destroy the Tibetan nation. It also conclude, after an examination of the international position of Tibet, the Secretary General of ICJ concluded, on the basis of Pushottam Trikamdas's, Indian international lawyer analysis, that a

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62 "Dalai Lama Plead for Support", The Hindustan Times, N. Delhi, 7 September; The Dalai Lama acknowledged US advice the at his appeal should be confined to Human Rights Issues but stated that he intended to present his appeal as a continuation of the 1950 Tibetan appeal to the UN: "The Dalai Lama replied that the 1950 case had been a case of invasion of an independent country and that by basing his appeal to the UN on the Continuation of the previous case he was thereby reasserting the independence of invalid Tibet". Embassy, N. Delhi to Department of state 10 September 11959, National Archives, 793B.11' 9-1059.


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Tibet legal status "was not easy to appraise", and that it "cannot be fitted into a logical category". Nevertheless, "Tibet has been to all intents and purposes an independent country and has enjoyed a large degree of sovereignty", therefore it would be difficult for the Peoples' Republic of China to claim domestic jurisdiction in regard to Tibet. 64

Despite the fact that the Dalai Lama's appeal had been based upon a violation of Tibet's sovereignty, and the ICJ report had also addressed the political issue, international support Tibet's case at the UN was confined to human rights violation to the exclusion of political issues of Tibetan independence or China's violation thereof. After abstaining on the question of inclusion of Tibet question for United Nations debate, India entered the debate in the general Assembly in 1964. The Indian delegate pointed out that the Dalai Lama's letter to the Secretary General "seeks to established the Tibetan's status and seeks recognition of their sovereignty as a result of our discussion", whereas the draft resolution of Malaya and Ireland dealt only with the human rights issue: "in what the assembly is seized of now there are no political issues, therefore it is unnecessary for my Government to agree this question at all". 65 Acknowledging that many countries looked to India for leadership on the issue India nevertheless emphasized that its abstention was due not to any fear of displeasing China, but "in the interest of reconciliation in the future, because it (the resolution) does not promote any constructive step at all". 66 India maintained that discussion of Tibet in the United Nations would serve not purpose, since "nobody is going to send an army to Tibet", except to further

64 Question of Tibet and Rule of Law IV. The I.C.J. described itself in the preface to the preliminary Report as a "non-government and non-political organization". The I.C.J. has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council.
65 Fourteenth Session General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eight Hundred and Thirty-Fourth Plenary Meeting, 21 October 1959, UN Doc. A (pv. 834, in Tibet in the United Nations, p.201. India (represented by Krishna Menon) further argued that "India inherited the British position in Tibet in 1947, that is to say, that Tibet was under Chinese suzerainty. In 1954 we entered into an agreement which was not a political agreement in regard to the political status of Tibet as such, but was an agreement relating to trade matters. Ibid., p.201.
66 Ibid., p.208
annoy China and possibly produce "reactions on the Chinese government which are more adverse to Tibet and the Tibetan people than even now." 67

The Tibet Resolution was finally adopted on 21 October by a vote of 46 in favour, 9 against and 26 abstaining. 68

Rather than focusing on Tibet's political status, the legitimacy of the Chinese inclusion and occupation of Tibet, or Tibetans right to national self-determination, the subsequent debate over Tibet became mired in contradictory claims about the nature of Tibet's former social system compared to the supposed improvements made by the Chinese. Despite attempts by Dalai Lama to return debate to Tibet's right to independence, the issue thereafter was primarily confined to whether or not the Tibetans were better off under Chinese rule than they had been under their own supposedly misrule. Refugees continued to flee Tibet, but their accounts of atrocities were discussed as exaggerated by a world reluctant to believe that the Chinese could behave so brutally when the Chinese portrayed them only with social reform and modernization.

We can concluded that when we made an assessment of the Sino-Indian relations after the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousand of refugees to India, after 1959, Tibet may be considered as the most critical issue in their

67 ibid., p.206.
68 Those States voting for the Resolution were: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Equador, El Salvador, Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Those against were: Albania, Bulgaria, Belarussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, and Soviet Union.
Those Abstaining were: Afghanistan, Belgium, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, South Africa, U.A.E., United Kingdom, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Ibid., p.724.
relationship. Indeed, the one constant around which links were forged as well as disintegrate.

**Chakma Refugees as Factor in Indo-Bangladesh Relations**

The flight of Chakmas and other tribes from their homeland, CHT to the neighbouring states of India; the refugees settlement in Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram was a continuing reality. In Tripura State along about 60,000 refugees were in the camps once in 1987. In the early 1987, the refugees made it clear that they would resist force repatriation. International campaigns were mounted in urging India to protect them. Numbers of refugees in the camps fluctuated. Some had gone back to Chittagong Hill Tracts and some returned to the refugees' camps, in India.

The political situation in the CHT after 1986, deteriorated. The problem of Chakmas in CHT and refugees in Tripura State had gained considerable national, international attention. The volume and composition of refugees influx into Tripura early how qualitative change from the trickling of refugees crossing in the initial period to flood of people fleeing atrocities in the CHT. Fresh influx of refugees were a common phenomenon which was as result of torture of the tribal people by plain settlers and backed by Bangladesh armies and paramilitary forces in the CHT. Some were said to be reprisal actions after the attacks by Shanti Bahini against military and Bengali settlers. Fearing large-scale influx of refugees the Indian Border Security Force has been put on alert on the South Tripura - CHT border. 69 Discussion to find an amicable solution to the problem had failed, due to the inflexible stands adopted by the Bangladesh Government and the Chakma leaders.

The continuous reports of the two country media during this period also echoed the visible tensions that had developed in the bilateral relation of

Bangladesh and India. The Chakmas' problems in the form of refugees become a major issue for India to air its grievance against Bangladesh.

**Indo-Bangladesh Relation Due to Refugees the Chakma**

The relation between India and Bangladesh deteriorated after the exodus of Chakmas from Bangladesh into India, leading to the misunderstanding on both sides. As the states of Tripura and Mizoram shares an international boundary with CHT, the refugees problems are felt in these borders states. Since the time - these refugees began to enter into the states in April-May 1986, - they are posing a serious national problem and are also straining the scarce resources of the border states. It also threatens to jeopardize its political, economic and social structures of these border states.

To compound the problem, the Bangladesh has alleged that India has been assisting and providing bases to the Shanti Bahani, who have killed many innocent Bangladeshis and destroyed national property. A Bangladesh newspaper carried a report that a captured Shanti Bahini guerrilla named Narendra Tyara had revealed Indian Government's complicity in the organization. He was said to have disclosed that many of the Shanti Bahini cadres were trained in insurgency and guerrilla warfare at Indian security force camps for six months in 1985.

On the other hand, the Indian authorities have blamed the Bangladesh authorities for giving shelter to the outlawed, the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) and other insurgent groups of North Eastern Indian tribal in the CHT region. The Indian newspaper report that on the Tripura Eastern boundary with

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70 "India Urged not to Aid Shanti Bahini", *The Bangladesh Observer*, Dhaka, 2 June 1986.
Bangladesh, some Bangladesh's counter insurgency commandos entered Indian territory and raided the Chandra Haspara village and kidnapped 4 Chakmas of Indian nationality.\textsuperscript{72}

A reorganized Shanti Bahini force carried out its biggest coordinated attack on 29 April 1986, raided rural Bangladesh army camps, outposts of paramilitary forces and new Bengali settlers of the Muslim settlers and government forces. A government force intensified a reprisal attach forcing the tribal people to flee to India.

On May 9 1986, a flag meeting took place at Jaleya (South Tripura) between the Deputy Inspector General of Border Security Forces, (Tripura) and his counterpart Bangladesh Rifle (BDR). The Bangladesh side agreed to take back the tribal refugees who had entered south Tripura since April 30, 1986, and they would inform the Indian side of the tentative date for the return of refugees.\textsuperscript{73}

There were reports of fresh influx of 100 refugees the following day into South Tripura and 800 others pushed back. And other 5,000 tribal were reportedly scattered all along the border trying to cross over. On May 12, 1986, Shanti Bahini killed at Maring Camp 12 persons (soldiers and resettlers). There was alleged reprisal attack. There are reports of torture and pushing back of the refugees in the border area by the B.S.F. (Border Security Force). According to the report B.S.F. had pushed back 4,000 refugees upto May 10, 1986. Around 15,000 Chakmas and Moghs were waiting along the international boundary. The same report gave the figure of 6,570 refugees in Karbook and Silachari Camps, with the information that they were starving.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} "Tension Continues on Indo-Bangladesh border", \textit{The Statesmen}, New Delhi, 5 March 1986.
\textsuperscript{73} "Bangladesh Agree to Take Back Refugees in South Tripura", \textit{The Hindu}, Madras, 10 May 1986.
\textsuperscript{74} "Refugees Alleges Torture on Both Sides", \textit{The Patriot}, New Delhi, 10 May 1986.
On May 19, 1986 the resettlers allegedly backed by Bangladesh army were said to have completely burnt down the village of Tarbanmukh and Ladiapara, and killed 16 Hindu Tripura tribals in Kamilatila and Taidong villages (Khagracherri district). The Shanti Bahani were reported to have attacked army camps on the Khagracherri and Abaydnagar, Hasim Nagar and Ali Kadam killing 8 Bangladeshis, 60 plain resettlers and seriously injured 15 Jawans. And two day latter in the other attack of Shanti Bahini two soldiers died and two injured. The Bangladesh soldiers and resettlers reportedly retaliated and burned down the tribal villages, the refugees in India state of Tripura reached about 11,000.\footnote{“Bahani Men Gun Down 68 in Bangladesh”, \textit{The Patriot}, New Delhi, 24 May 1986; “Shanti Bahani Renew Operations in Bangladesh”, \textit{The Patriot}, New Delhi, 28 May 1986.}

A second flag meeting on May 10, 1986 has followed by a third flag meeting held on June 2, 1986 at Ramgarh, between the commanders of the Bangladesh Rifle (BRD) and the Indian Border Security Force (BSF). The commanding officer of BRD was reported to have requested his counterpart, that India should not give shelter and assistance to the outlawed Shanti Bahini members.\footnote{“India Urged not to Aid Shanti Bahani”, \textit{The Bangladesh Observer}, Dhaka, 2 June 1986.}

The Indo-Bangladesh relations took a new turn in the mid-1987, when the Bangladesh Government alleged that 50 armed personnel of the BSF raided the NALUARLHAR border village near Ramgarh in CHT and killed persons including 6 children. This development once again highlighted the sensitive situation developing in this part of the region.

**Disagreement on the Refugees Numbers**

The most contentious part of the Chakmas problem is how many of them have actually taken shelter in India. Despite the assertions and arrangement made by the Bangladesh government on the Chakma for their
return, the influx of Chakma was continuing unabated till April 28, 1987. The then Foreign Secretary of India, Shri K.P.S. Menon has said that the two countries differed in the figures of the refugees. Indian says the figures was 48,000 and Bangladesh say that so far identify of 27,000.77

Openly disputing the Indian figure of 50,000 Bangladesh says the figure cannot more than 30,000. This is the first time that Bangladesh have disputed refugees figures given by India.78 On July 1988, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister Shri, Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury told the Bangladesh Parliament that, 29,920 Bangladeshi tribal refugees were in the camps in India. So far 8,00 such refugees have returned to Bangladesh and are leading a normal life.79 The Indian Home Minister on 24, April 1990 informed the Lok Sabha, (Lower House) that there are 64,000 Chakma refugees in India.80 There was contradiction and disagreement on the number of the refugees.

The Chakma issue has become the most ticklish between India and Bangladesh. Admitting that the Chakma refugees had sown a seed of discord between the two countries the Bangladesh Foreign Minister Shri Humayun Rasheed Choudhury said his government had done everything for the safe return of the refugees.81

The tribal refugees in Tripura camps are apprehensive of their future if they go back to CHT, from where they had migrated. The refugees themselves were emphatic that there is no question of their going back until conditions were created for their safe packages and full security of life and property was assumed. The refugees’ leader raised the demand for involvement of a third country. They insisted on India involvement to find out a solution to

80 The Telegraph, Calcutta, 25 April 1990.
81 “India Ask Dhaka to Take Back All Refugees,” The India Express, N.Delhi, 2 June 1987.
the Chakma problem. The other demands are withdrawal of army camps, and guarantee of their safe return.

The Bangladesh government had agreed to take back the Chakma refugees, but rejected all the demands of refugees saying no foreign country can be involved in solving it domestic problem. It also agreed that no self-respecting country could agree to the withdrawal of its armed forces from a part of its own territory.82

India view the Chakma problem as an internal problem of Bangladesh. On April 28, 1987, the Indian media reported that Shri. K.P.S. Menon, the then Indian Foreign Secretary said on Chakma refugees, "it is the responsibility of the Bangladesh side to begin the process (repatriation) by convincing their citizens to returns to home from Indian territory".83 Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, visited Dhaka on 25 August 1987, as a special envoy of the Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi to discuss the refugee issue. Both Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao and President General H.M. Ershad described the refugee issue as essentially Bangladesh's problem and said Dhaka had to take the initiative for solution.84

The Indian authorities made it clear that India was not going to be a party to any agreement between the Bangladesh Government and the Chakmas, as it was an internal matter of that country. India only got involved on humanitarian grounds because the Chakmas had crossed the border in search of sanctuary.

Accords on Trans-Border Insurgency

One of the important developments on Indo-Bangladesh relation was the

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82 "Involvement of India Ruled Out", The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka, 18 September 1987.
83 Zaglul A. Choudhury, No. 77.
84 The Times of India, New Delhi, 25 August 1987.
signing of an accord on trans-border insurgency. Many years were spent in mutual accusations. One side felt that insurgents were being given sanctuary on the other side to promote local secessionist movement. On December 7, 1986 the Bangladesh Observer, reported that a meeting at Demagiri, (Mizoram), between the "military team" of India and Bangladesh, an accord had been signed to prevent cross-border insurgency. Both sides had reportedly discussed problems of cross-border insurgency. And also agreed to promote mutual understanding and cooperation in preventing cross border insurgency. They also agreed not to harbour or provide sanctuary to any of these 'misguided groups' in each other's territory and help each other in combating the problem.85

The common interest of both sides to stamp out insurgency was finally seen as an agreement, which apparently has culminated in adopting a common plea for military operations. On May 1992, a joint task force was formed for dealing trans-border insurgency at the Home Secretaries level.86

Internationalisation of Chakma Issues and Human Rights

The influx of Chakma refugees and the presence of thousands of refugees in six camps in Tripura have not only strained the Indo-Bangladeshi relations, but also receives international attention. Large scale atrocities are committed by Bangladesh resettlers on the Chakma villages in CHT, when the Chakma began to fight for retaining the autonomy and protected status, which they enjoyed right from the British period. Both Shanti Bahini and Bangladesh government accused each other of human rights violations. The Shanti Bahinis attacks on Bengali settlers have led to reprisal attacks Bengalis backed by security forces on tribal settlements.

85 The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka, 7 December 1987; "Dhaka-Delhi Pact to Curb Insurgency", The Times of India, New Delhi, 12 December 1986.
At the international level, the Jana Samiti of the CHT had issued a fervent appeal to human rights organizations as well as the United Nations after the atrocities in CHT in 1986, to intervene and save the tribals of the region. Norway has also complained to the United Nations about human rights violation by Dhaka in the CHT. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights in its report to the 44 Session of the United Nations General Assembly in March 1988 and in its other reports has expressed deep concern and sought an early solution to the problems being faced by the refugees.\textsuperscript{87}

The issue was annually raised in the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous populations. Allegations of gross and reliably attested patterns of violations human rights went to the United Nation Sub-Commission on prevention by Discrimination and protection of Minorities, and Bangladesh was questioned both at that level and at the level of UN Human Rights Commission. From 1985 the ILO (International Labour Organization) had annually and publicly criticized Bangladesh of inadequate reporting on conditions of the CHT subsequently the ILO official visit Chittagong Hill Tracts in 1989.

The various reports on CHT have clearly documented massive human rights violations in the CHT. In October 1986, Amnesty International issued their major report on the situation in CHT entitled "Bangladesh: Unlawful

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Killing and Torture in the CHT", which is believed to have continued eyewitness accounts of the torture and extra-judicial killing tribal people. The report stated that government forces had killed or tortured hundreds of unarmed villagers in the CHT during the previous 10 years. There had been marked increase in such acts between February and May 1986. Some were said to be reprisal actions, occurring after the attacks by Shanti Bahini against military and settlers. Unarmed hill people had also been killed during army counter-insurgency operations. Hill people were tortured and compelled them to move to "protected village".\(^{88}\) Besides, the Amnesty International reports on CHT were published regularly by the Anti-Slavery society, the International Working Groups for Indigenous Affairs, and Organizing Committee on CHT campaign.

In 1990 and 1991, a group of European, Canadian and Australian Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) under the name; "Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission" sent a mission to Bangladesh and India to investigate allegation of human rights violations in the CHT. The commission's report, issued in May 1991, was the first attempt at a concise report on human rights situation in CHT. The reports were critical to some aspects to the Bangladesh Government’s past and present policies.

The report concluded that the Bangladesh Government has militarized all facet of life in the CHT and is destroying its tribal society and culture as well as its indigenous economy, by concentrating the population, tribal and settler into cluster villages as part of the government counter-insurgency strategy. The commission also concludes that government development and agricultural programmes are causing grave ecological damage to the area, destroying the habitat of the tribal peoples. While the commission

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notes that all parties to the conflict suffer violence and human rights abuse, it is most critical of the effects of continued settlement and government policies on the indigenous tribes of the Hill Tracts.\textsuperscript{89}

The CHT Jumma Refugees Welfare Association from the Takumbari refugees camps in South Tripura has brought out a booklet (1993), where it was alleged that the Bangladesh Government has adopted a policy of eliminating the Chakmas and setting the Bengali Muslim in CHT. The booklet says a series of as many as eleven "ethnocides" were perpetrated between 1972 and 1982, "leaving thousands of Chakmas dead, tortured, and raped. Villages and religious temples were plundered and burnt to ashes and thousands of acres of Jummaland was grabbed by the Muslims".\textsuperscript{90}

The booklet was prepared against the backdrop of the UN observing 1993 as the year of the indigenous people also contain their desire to go back, "we are eager to go back home as early as possible. But we do not dare to do so in the abnormal situation in the CHT".\textsuperscript{91}

The refugees were a major embarrassment for Bangladesh. Something was drastically wrong if 10 percent of the hill people were in refugee camps across the border. Bangladesh is extremely dependent upon foreign aid. Aid giving countries, and international organizations like World Banks have increasingly paid attention to the human rights records of recipient countries. The problems in the CHT were, among other things, a foreign aid problem. The issues of the CHT began to be discussed by the aid granting countries, both individually, and in the meetings of the Committee of Donors. The Jana Samhati Samitis (JSS) and certain human rights groups were calling

\textsuperscript{89} For detail please see ‘Life is Not Ours’, Land and Human Rights in the CHT of Bangladesh. No.20, pp.65-75.
\textsuperscript{90} Samudra Gupta Kashyap, “Dhaka Sceptre keep Chakma in India”, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 12 June 1993.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
for conditional aid or a halt to aid, until the problem in the CHT was adequately resolve.

Repatriation and Problems

Amidst officially stated contradictory positions the Chakma refugees' figures claimed by both sides there was vast differences. It was announced in the media of both countries that the refugees would be repatriated in phases.

The Bangladesh Government had made attempts to repatriate the Chakma refugees from Tripura State. For this many bilateral meeting were held between India and Bangladesh. On 6 January 1987, it was reported that, besides discussion on important matters relating to the two countries, the repatriation of Chakmas to CHT was agreed between India and Bangladesh, after Indian Foreign Minister Shri N.D. Tiwari's 3 day visit to Dhaka. It was decided that the repatriation would be carried out from January 15, 1987. However, prior to that "a Chakma refugee delegations" would visit the CHT area before January 15, and see for themselves the situation prevailing there. 92

The news report stated that on the Bangladesh side, the district administration of Khagracherri had taken necessary steps, to receive and rehabilitate the tribal who had fled because of the Shanti Bahini activities. Two reception centres were set up at Ramgarh and Pancherri. Initially 6,400 tribals were to be taken back, a process that was to stretch till February 1987. The process involves determination of identity of the tribal and Indian insistence that there are more than 24,000 tribal who had taken shelter in Tripura. 93

Eight-member delegation consisting of six representatives of the Chakma's refugees and one each from B.S.F. and the district administration

was formed. The same paper reported that on January 7, 1987, the visiting delegation had returned from CHT. The representative of the Chakma refugees, in an urgent telegram to the Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi and the External Minister of India, Shri N.D. Tiwari, requested them to "stop repatriation of the Chakma refugees". The representative said, "torture, killing, arson, rape, large-scale eviction of Chakmas by Bangladesh forces and illegal occupation of land by the Muslim continued unabated". Despite the agreement to take back 24,000 Chakma refugees, further thousands of uprooted Chakma families were leaving Pancherri area and entering Tripura. It was reported that January 7, 1987, had been the third successive day of influx of yet more refugees, fleeing another offensive of fresh action against them by BDR, Bangladesh army and Muslim resettlers. The refugees were apprehensive that the repatriation under these circumstances means sure death of the refugees according to the report refugee rises to 30,000. They have been sheltered in five refugee camps. Silachari, Karbook, Kathalchari, Pancharampara, and Takumbari. 94

The expected repatriation did not take place as scheduled on January 15, 1987. The Chakma tribal, fearing further persecution had put forward a series of demands as conditions to their return. On February 2 1987, the Bangladesh newspaper reported that the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Shri Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury having said that, "Bangladesh was willing to take back the Chakmas refugees from India and all arrangements had made in this respect We stand by our decisions", he said and wondered why repatriation did not come off. 95

Following the failure of the repatriation plan some strains appears in Indo-Bangladesh relation. Not a single refugees turned up, forcing the plan to be postponed to cover up the embarrassment to Bangladesh, to Dhaka press had

95 "Dhaka Committed to Take Back Chakmas", The Bangladesh Times, 2 February 1987.
launched a sustained campaign accusing India complicity in frustrating the plan.

On India side the problem faced by the Indian and Tripura state governments were highlighted. In other reports, India had spent Rs. 2.25 crores on the Chakmas in the nine months in 1987.96

In another development India protested to Bangladesh against concentration of hundreds of tribal refugees along the border. Despite the Border Security Forces (BSF) trying to check the refugees attempts to cross the border the influx continued unabated through dense forest. Apart from this, another 6,000 were camping at the Mizoram, Chittagong Hill Tracts border, according to official.97

The Bangladesh Foreign Ministry, Shri, Humayun Rahseed Chowdhury commented that Bangladesh had done everything possible for the repatriation of Chakmas taking refugees in Tripura. And added that armed miscreant were creating panic among the tribal people in CHT. In regard the failure of Chakma repatriation, he told the parliament on Indo-Bangladesh relations that the process could not carried out owing to the 'intransigent' attitude of the Indian authorities to send them back, on the plea of their security and safely. He said that a peaceful atmosphere prevailed in the Hill Tracts and the government was capable of ensuring their full security.98

Contrary to the assertions made by Bangladesh, the Indian newspaper reported that the influx of Chakma refugees, into Tripura continues unabated. The figure increased to nearly 50,000 persons in April 1997, creating a tremendous problem of management for the state government. In the same

newspaper reported that, the then Chief Minister of Tripura Shri Nripen Chakravarty was provoked to say that, "we cannot shoot them down on the border since no one leave his hearth and home unless driven to do so".  

On April 27, 1987, the newspaper reported that the Foreign Secretaries level talks held in Dhaka for the early repatriation of Chakmas refugees from India. However, the two sides could not evolve any modality or fix any tentative date for it.

On August 25, 1987 Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Dhaka as a special envoy of the Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi and discussed the refugees issue with president General H.M. Ershad take a new fresh look at the Chakma refugees issue. The Bangladesh government has set up a government committee in August, 1987 headed by the Planning Minister, retired Air Vice-Marshal, A.K. Khandakar as its Chairman and Senior Official as members to solve the tribal problem in the hill district, and facilitate their return to CHT. In fact, Shri A.K. Khandakar was earlier Bangladesh High Commission to India.

The setting up of the committee indicates Dhaka's seriousness in bringing back the refugees from the camps in India. The Bangladesh newspaper on September 18, 1987 reported that the said committed will soon visit the Hill Tract to make on the spot study of the problem. They will identify the problem in consultation with the tribal leaders standing in the way of a lasting peace in the area.

Talks with the Government of Bangladesh and Jana Samhati Samiti/Shanti Bahini held in December 1987 in order to solve the tribal problems in CHT, but without any success. More refugees were reported in early 1989 on the eve of the controversial election of the District Council in CHT, which was opposed by Shanti Bahini; caused refugees to swell up their

100 "Involvement of India Ruled Out", The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka, 18 September 1987.
number to 70,000 in May 1989. Shri Upendra Lal Chakma Former Member of Parliament and Member of the Liaison Committee, fled to Tripura on the eve of the election in the CHT on May 24, 1989. He said that those who returned to their homes were forced to hard labours in concentration camps. Explaining his defection Shri Chakma asserted that "staying back would mean working against one's own conscience and people".101

Despite the increased bilateral moves to find a solution to the problem, the refugees have consistently refused to repatriated, barring political settlement of the tribal problem in the CHT, guaranteed security of tribal in their homes, including proper rehabilitation and land restoration and international supervision of the repatriation.

The parliamentary democracy was installed in Bangladesh in 1991. The Bangladesh Prime Minister Begum Zia visited in May 1992, made a fresh look at the Chakma problem, Begum Zia initiated the setting up of a Joint Task Force to facilitate the speedy return of the Chakma refugees the CHT.

The Bangladesh government in July 1992 formed a nine-member committee headed by Shri Oli Ahmed, Bangladesh Minister for Communication, to find a political solution of the Chakmas problems. Prime Minister Begum Zia, herself visited the CHT and offered talks the militant to bring about a settlement. The Shanti Bahini in turn responded by declaring a unilateral truce in August 1992. And its political its political wing Parbatthya Chattogram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) came out to participate in the talks.

The joint Indo-Bangladesh ministerial level delegations visit to the refugee camps of Tripura. According to the official sources after the visit the Bangladesh government had announced a package of incentive and takes several measures for rehabilitation of refugees after their return to the CHT.

The repatriation again could not take place as schedule. The Chakma refugees observed fast and remained indoors to avoid repatriation due to start on June 9, 1993. They insist that Dhaka sign a repatriation agreement with the Parbatya Chattogram Jana Samhati Samiti (PJSS), the political Wing of the Chakma insurgents on the basis of the 13 points Charter of Demand.\(^\text{102}\) Their demands includes withdrawal of army and Muslim resettlers from the CHT, doing away with the system of reorganizing the tribals in cluster villages in the Hill Tracts, total regional autonomy, political settlement of the CHT, along with the restoration of democracy in the areas.

The president of the Chakma Refugees Welfare Association, Shri Upendra Lal Chakma after his talks with the Bangladesh Parliamentary team and government officials, in the border town of Ramgarh on January 16, 1994 had "agreed to Dhaka's proposal to start repatriation with an aim to create a situation conductive to the solution of the problem."\(^\text{103}\) The repatriation of about 53,420 refugees settled in six camps in Tripura would be repatriated in batches.

The first batch of repatriation of the refugees began on February 15, 1994. Initially 77 families comprising of 282 refugees departed for their homeland in the CHT. Commenting on the repatriation, the Tripura Governor Shri Romesh Bhandari has said, "the 300 Chakma refugees families repatriated to the CHT, Bangladesh were being properly rehabilitated".\(^\text{104}\)

Shri Upendra Lal Chakma who along with Indian Government officials, visited CHT between April 25 and 29, 1994 to monitor rehabilitation of the first batch of 379 returnee families. He charged the Bangladesh government to implement 16 conditions on the eve of the first round of repatriation. He said the first batch of 279 families had returned responding to an appeal from the


Indian government and at the request of the Tripura governor, Shri Romesh Bhandari, but the Bangladesh Government was not following the terms of the accord. Altogether 1028 tribal refugees families compressing 5199 people, had already been repatriated in two phases in February and July 1994 following the Bangladesh Government announcement of a 16 points economic package for them.

The third phase of repatriation cannot take place, following the refugee's unwillingness to return to their motherland in CHT. They refused to submit to the state government the list of those to be repatriated in the following phase.

On February 1994, a five-member delegation led by Shri Oli Ahmed visited Takumbari, Pancharmapara, Karbook and Kathalchari refugee camps in South Tripura. They appealed to the refugees to return assuring them of implementing their 16 points charter of demands. The refugees staged demonstration and refusing to be swayed away by the repeated appeals of the Bangladesh government delegation.

After June 1996, parliamentary election in Bangladesh Sheik Hasina Wazed assumed office. A new mood of goodwill prevailed in Indo-Bangladesh relation. A landmark agreement was signed for the repatriation of Chakma refugee from India. Her government was also committed itself to giving aid and assistance to Chakmas in resettling themselves.

The director (special affairs) in the Bangladesh Prime Ministers Secretariat Shri A.S.M. Mufaidul Islam and the President of the Chittagong Hill Refugees' Welfare Association, Shri Upendra Lal Chakma signed the 20-point accord. The agreement envisages setting up a task force comprising representative of Bangladesh and Chakmas to monitor its implementation. As per the agreement the refugees are to leaves for CHT in a phased manner from March 28. To reassure the Chakmas of the bonafides of its intention, the
Bangladesh Government has offered to reorganize the existing district councils of Rangamati, Khagracherri and Bandarban to give them more power.

The first batch of 1183 Chakma refugees from the Kathalcherri camp, from a total of 6646 refugees belonging to listed families would leave for their homes in the CHT area of Southern Bangladesh between March 28 to 30. The remaining 5463 refugees from five other camps of Amarpur Sub-Division would be repatriated between April 1 to 7 as per schedule drawn up by officials of the two countries.

The Tripura Deputy Chief Minister, Shri Baidyanath Majumdar would accompany the Chakma refugees to Ramgarh District in Bangladesh on March 28, 1997 and oversee the process of rehabilitation, according to the official sources in Agartala.\(^{105}\)

According to newspaper report the final repatriation of all refugees from Tripura Camps and on 28 February 1998 with crossing over the CHT through Sita Cherri-Tabal Cherri border till afternoon.\(^{106}\) These are some of the important issue and emerging conflict in relation to Chakma refugees of Tripura state. We will discuss about the Chakmas who are living in other states of India.

**Impact of Chakmas Refugees on State Level Politics of India**

The Chakma as noted earlier are living in some of the North-Eastern states of India particularly Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram. The Chakma refugees become political issues especially in


Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. The nature of and gravity of the problems differs from state to state needed to deal state-wise.

**Arunachal Pradesh**

The Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh as discussed in Chapter III came to India following large-scale communal violence in the then East Pakistan with year 1964 and rehabilitated under five settlement schemes in Tirap (now Changlang), Lohit and Subansari (now Papumpare) districts. In recent years they faced local antagonism which has been increasing. Although the problem in Arunachal Pradesh is not as volatile and is different from the refugees problem as that of Tripura. But, they are now caught up in the foreigner issue and threat from deportation by many political groups including the Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union.

The Chakmas and Hajong Tribals in Arunachal Pradesh as par their statement to the Rajya Sabha Committee on petition at Delhi on the 20th September and 29th November 1995, did not face any trouble when Arunachal Pradesh was a Union territory. They were getting every facility that was available for an Indian citizen only after 1979, when Arunachal Pradesh was given state status, Chakmas were harassed and treated as refugees.107

The problem of Chakmas began in the seventies and in the early eighties when the state government officially banned educational facilities such as stipend and employment rights of Chakmas and Hajongs. Since 1980, no Chakma has been given employment Government of Arunachal Pradesh with their curricular CS/PR-154/89/99, had banned the issue of ration cards to Chakmas and Hajongs of Changlang district. The All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union, (AAPSU) also become vocal on the foreigners issue which

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was at its peak in Assam at that point of time. In this sense the Anti-foreigner movement in Arunachal Pradesh was a spill over from Assam, the Chakmas and Hajongs has became a soft target in Arunachal Pradesh. Wall posters and banners decrying Chakmas as 'foreigners' and 'refugees' came up and Chakmas became the target of AAPSU violence.

The All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union (AAPSU), spearhead a statewise movement against the Chakmas and made it clear that the 'foreigners' had overstayed and demanded, *inter alia* eviction/dispersal of Chakma refugees from Arunachal Pradesh. Encroachment of land by Chakmas, alleged involvement in criminal and feeling threatened by the increasing Chakma population and other reasons cited for their agitation. In August 1994 the AAPSU demanded the expulsion of all foreigners including Chakmas/Hajongs refugees from Arunachal Pradesh. They had initially served a "Quit Arunachal" notice with 30 September 1994. Public rallies mostly in Chakma areas were organized. 108

The AAPSU also make a representation to the Prime Minister of India, submitting a memorandum describing problems due to Chakmas and Hajongs and requesting earlier solution by personally intervening himself. 109

According to papers reports terror-struck tribal Chakma families, living in the Papumpare jungles on the night of August 21,1994. This of was followed by continuous threats to oust them by many political groups, including students. The same paper reported that about 2500 Chakmas fled the state after a 'direct action rally' which was held in the districts where Chakmas are settled by the All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union. Graffiti like the,

108 Counter Affidavit of Union of India on the Chakmas and Hajongs of Arunachal Pradesh in the Supreme Court of India, (Civil Jurisdiction), Writ Petition Civil No.720 of 1995. Published by: Committee for Citizenship Rights of Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh.
109 Memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, on May 1994. Ref no: AAPSU/M-1/94, All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union, Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh.
"Chakma dogs quit Arunachal" and "bloody Chakma - get out", came up on the walls of the district headquarters and the areas near Chakma settlements.

There were threats of stopping of all facilities. Like education, health care and access to public distribution system (PDS) to these tribal.110

In 1994 the Government of Arunachal Pradesh expressed its inability to provide coverage of public distribution systems of Chakmas and asked them to surrender all the ration cards already held by Chakmas.111 After the expiry of the 30 September 1994 deadline, the AAPSU and other tribal students' organizations continued to agitate and press for expulsion of all foreigners including the Chakma/Hajong and Tibetan refugees. It was reported that AAPSU started enforcing economic blockade of the refugee camps resulting in adverse effects on supply of rations, medical and other facilities and spread of Malaria and dysentery in the Chakma settlement.

The exoduses of Chakma from Arunachal Pradesh due to "direct action rally" create problem in the neighbour state of Assam. The then Chief Minister of Assam Late Shri Hiteswar Saikia told the Prime Minister that supply because of its Central location in the region, Assam cannot afford to become a sanctuary of all the displaced people from the neighbouring states. Even shoot at sight and orders was issued on refugees entering Assam from Arunachal Pradesh.112

Newspaper report on 9 October 1994 that in move to mitigate the escalating tensions over the issue of deportation of 38,000 Chakma and Hajong refugees from Arunachal Pradesh, Chief Minister Gegong Apang convened an

110 "Terrorized Chakmas Flee Arunachal", The Times of India, New Delhi, 19 September 1994.
informal meeting of North-Eastern states' Chief Minister in New Delhi. The report said the Chief Ministers were unanimous that the refugees should be deported and the Central Government should put pressure on Bangladesh accept in nationals. The same paper reported of Shri Gegong Apang stand that Chakmas would not be allowed to settle in Arunachal Pradesh. He said, "They have overstayed and now its time for them to go. The sooner they leave the better it would be for peace in our state".113

The issue has been agitated by AAPSU once again after February 1995, a joint rally has been held on 20 September 1995 which demanded expulsion of all Chakmas/Hajong refugees from Arunachal Pradesh.

The annual report of the Union Home Ministry for the year 1994-95, said that in Arunachal Pradesh, the AAPSU started on agitation demanding expulsion of all the foreigners including the Chakmas and Hajong refugees from the state. The report, however, silent about the fact that the demand for the deportation of the Chakmas from the state was raised by the Arunachal Government, along with the students.114

The State Government as well as the student bodies in Arunachal Pradesh were up in arms with the Central Government for its failure to deport from the state. Shri Gegong Apang disclosed that the Arunachal Government is united with the student bodies and the opposition parties in this demand. And also said that if the Centre is interested in keeping the Chakmas in country, they should settled elsewhere in the country.115

Facing serious threat to the lives and liberty of Chakmas and Hajong by the All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union and the State Government of

113 "Chakmas Have Overstayed, says Apang", The Times of India, New Delhi, 9 October 1994.
114 "Delhi Silent on Future of Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh", The Assam Tribune, Guwahati, 17 May 1996.
115 Ibid.
Arunachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India intervened on a petition filed by National Human Rights Commission of India after necessary complaints from the Committee for citizenship rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP). In a judgment on 9 January 1996, the Supreme Court of India directed to process the citizenship applications of the Chakmas and Hajong and protect their lives and properties. Despite the Supreme Court judgment, not a single Chakma and Hajong could submit citizenship application in Arunachal Pradesh due to the fear created by the State Government, and the Arunachal Students' Union.

Mizoram

As discussed Chapter III, the Chakmas are living in a contiguous but along, covering the three Districts of Mizoram, namely Aizawel, Lunglei and Chhimituipui. Though the 80,000 Chakma Tribal population have been inhabiting this contiguous area of Mizoram, they have been under four separate administrative units, namely, Aizawl District, Lunglei district, Chakma Autonomous District Council and the Lai Autonomous District Council of the Chhimtuipui district.

After 1947, due to the absence of proper arrangements to prevent the Chakmas enter from across the border, the Chakams kept an infiltrating into Mizoram. In 1972, the Chakma Autonomous District Council was created. According to the comments of State Government of Mizoram to the Parliamentary Committee on petition, 1994, stated that, the illegal infiltration made their settlements at places of their own choice.

The Chakmas in Mizoram prayed to the Parliamentary Committee on Petition that all eligible Chakma voters should be enrolled an on the electoral

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117 Rajya Sabha Committee on Petition, Hundred and Fifth Report, No.111, p.20.
role and no Chakma should be treated as a doubtful foreigner. There was allegation that the MZP (Mizo Student Union) had in connived with the state government in deletion of Chakmas voters from the electoral roles.

The Chakmas have demanded that the western belt of Mizoram inhabiting 80,000 Chakmas should be put in a single administrative unit and be administered separately through a suitable Central agency. They have also demanded voting rights, security and special development programmes for the Chakmas of the state. The state Government of Mizoram has however strongly opposed carving belt a separate administrative unit for the Chakmas and is adamant on deporting the Chakmas who came there after 25.3.1971. The State Government has also contended that adequate developmental schemes have been undertaken in Chakma-inhabited areas.

In October 1997, a 50,000 strong procession took to the streets of Aizawl in protest against the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Petitions. The Mizo people are of the opinion that the recommendation was one sided and against the constitution infringing upon the Fundamental Rights of the Mizos, who are the rightful owners of the land.

The procession, organized by the Joint Action Committee comprising various social organizations and political parties, carried placards and banners condemning the recommendations of the PCP and shouting slogan. They expressed their opposition to, partition of Mizoram to be allotted to foreigners and condemned the PCP of their recommendations submitted the Government of India without even visiting Mizoram, at least once. The people alleged that the Committee, solely relying on the Chakma sources submitted their recommendations without assessing the ground realities on the spot.

118 Ibid., p.3; “Chakma Refugees: Mizo Chief Minister Singing A Different Tune”, The Statesmen, N. Delhi, 30 June 1996.
The procession adopted various resolutions demanding withdrawal of the recommendation of the PCP and abolition of Chakma Autonomous District Council established for Chakma in 1972 established much against the wish of the Mizos.\footnote{"Mizo Protest", The North-East Sin, N. Delhi, 15-31 October 1997, pp. 4-5.}

Conclusion

The presence of thousand of Tibetan and Chakma refugees in India is a continuing irritant, which is likely to get even more. The Tibetan’s Status, the legitimacy of the Chinese inclusion and occupation of Tibet, or Tibetans right to national self-determination, the subsequent debate over Tibet mired in contradictory claims about the supposed improvements made by the Chinese.

Despite attempts by the Dalai Lama to return debate to Tibet’s right to independence, the issue there after was primarily confined to whether or not the Tibetans were better off under the Chinese rule than they had been under their own supposedly misrule.

The Tibetan refugees led by the Dalai Lama had been a model refugee, but as the younger generation of radical and militant Tibetans’ takes over, they would not averse confronting the Chinese more directly. If the Government of India is to crush Tibetan uprising it will most certainly face domestic and international equilibrium. In short we can say that Tibet may be considered as the most critical issue in their relationship.

And in the case of Chakmas, in the early 1987, the refugees made it clear that they would resist force repatriation. International campaigns were mounted in urging India to protect them. Some had gone back to CTH and some returned back to the refugee camps in India.

The Bangladesh government made attempts to repatriate them. For this many bilateral meeting were held between India and Bangladesh. There were
problems of repatriation, but there was openness on both sides who had the desire to solve the Chakmas problems.

There are problems on Chakmas on state level politics in Arunachal Pradesh and in Mizoram. Where the Chakmas tribal are facing serious threat to their lives and liberty. The problems of Chakmas in CHT, Bangladesh had been solved, but not likely in the state of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram.

Thus in our discussion we observe that the refugee movements in the case of Tibetans and Chakmas they generate a lot of problems at various level – Global, national and local. But the comparative analysis shows no similarities in the emerged conflicts, except that the refugee flows creates problem for the host and the origin country.