CHAPTER -III

CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN THE
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Introduction: Cold War Era to Post Cold War Era

Defining security at a conceptual level is a very difficult task. Years of efforts have failed to produce a generally accepted definition of the concept of security, because of its close bearing on the national-security problem. After the second World War, the term 'national security' had purely military and defence connotations. It was intimately linked to the 'realist' tradition of thinking about international relation, and the military flavour of the concept neatly complemented ideas of power and interest and the rather tough minded approach to foreign policy which seemed appropriate for the Cold War years. Walter Lippman argued that a 'state is secure to the extent that it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war'¹. Arnold Wolfers reached a similar conclusion. "Security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked². So, most of these Cold War security theorists saw the world in terms of the realist paradigm. Realists argue that the international system is anarchic in nature and the states act to maximise their power or security. They have argued that the state-centric, bipolar nature of Cold War was the best guarantee of preserving international stability³.

In the aftermath of Second World War, the United Nations became ineffective with the emergence of two preponderant superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their mutually exclusive claim for world dominance gave rise to Cold War. The west perceived the
communist claim for dominance as a challenge to the ideals and principles upon which Western societies were built as well as a threat to the territorial integrity of its political system. As a result, the Hobbesian paradigm of national security regained prominence in international affairs. National survival, not international security or world government, was the nation's prime goal. Hence, the requirements of national security dictated that states maintain military forces and a large array of weapon systems adequate to the perceived threat. For the superpowers, the ultimate weapon was nuclear weapons deployed in accordance with the strategy of massive retaliation. For the smaller non-nuclear weapon nations, integration into military alliances under the leadership of the nuclear powers became mandatory. The West met the political challenge with a policy of containment and an array of alliance systems. While for the ideological competition with the Soviet Union, it devised a counter ideology of "anti-communism" and "free-worldism". NATO, the regional security regime spinning the Atlantic, incorporates the military, political and ideological requirements of the West. The crusade for freedom was short-lived but it gave rise to a significant reliance on the nuclear weapons by both superpowers. In the absence of effective global institutions, the structure of the international system consisted of a combination of alliance network and a system of nuclear deterrence, one regulating more cooperative and the other more confrontational relationships. Deterrence was based on mutual assured destruction coupled with a policy of mutual political restraint. However, with the credibility of (extended) nuclear deterrence diminishing and the elaborate system of US-led military alliances
eroding, the study of war started continuing along the line of diplomacy, international understanding, arbitration, national self determination, disarmament and collective security as the guarantors of peace and stability. This also gave rise to four broad themes.

First, security was not the primary concern of all states at all times, but merely one concern that varied in importance from one historical context to the next. Theorists in this area looked at calculations of the trade-off between military security and other values such as economic welfare and individual freedom. Second, both military and non-military tools of statecraft would be important to national security. Third, the recognition of security dilemma (that is, the action that one state takes to increase its security in turn, decreases the security felt by others) led to cautious use of military power. Fourth, linkages between national security and domestic affairs such as the economy, civil liberties and democratic processes were made.

With this type of analysis continued throughout the Cold War along with overemphasis on the military aspects of national security, the strategic studies found itself increasingly challenged by other fields such as peace studies, international political economy, ecology, history, culture etc. It was found that environmental damage, drugs, economic deprivation, population growth and migration, global warming and resource depletion all threaten the security of states in ways the traditional aspect used to do. Therefore, the recent trend towards expanding the notion of security began in 1960s when Robert McNamara suggested that security implied the freedom of a state to develop and improve its position in the future. 'Security is
development and without development there can be no security . . . . .
development means economic, social and political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living and reasonable in this context requires continual redefinition; what is reasonable in an earlier stage of development will become unreasonable at a later stage”7.

More recently, the security agenda has been further widened to cover the whole gamut of economic, social, ecological and demographic issues which now face us. It is persuasively argued that particularly since the end of the Cold War, it is very misleading to confine security analysis to traditional military threats to the territorial integrity of states. It is not that these traditional threats have disappeared - though the threat of planned major nuclear war has surely receded - but that other threats now seem more pressing. Alongside this explanation of the security agenda, has developed a feeling that 'Security' can no longer be conceived of simply as 'the absence of insecurity', any more than 'peace' can be regarded as 'the absence of war'. Security should be considered more positively, as requiring the building of more just and humane world in which human beings are better able to realize their aspirations and potential8. Therefore, with the demise of the Cold War bipolar structure, new concepts of security need to be developed that address both the military realities of the post Cold War world and the political, economic and social realities.

Conceptualisation

In the most fundamental sense, to be secure is to feel free from threats, anxiety, or danger. Security is therefore, a state of mind in
which an individual whether the highest political leader of the land or the average citizen, feels free from harm by others. Used in this way, a state (or its leaders and citizens) believes itself secure when it feels that nothing adverse can be done to it by other states or by other foreign non-state actors. To define security in this fashion is to see that it is a subjective state of mind, not an objective condition of being. It describes how people feel, not whether are justified in feeling the way they do. However, apart from this subjective sentiment, where perception plays a significant role, the concept of security could also be structural in terms of lack of food, money, clothing, education, certainty of future etc. This subjectivity explains why security can encompass so many things. What makes one individual feel secure may not be sufficient to make another feel so. Individuals differ in their tolerance for uncertainty, their ability to live with anxiety and their capacity to cope with pressure. One person's security can well be another's insecurity. On the other hand, the structural sense of security, does not depend on the perception of the individual, rather remains constant for one and all, through it varies in degree. Furthermore, although individuals differ in what makes them feel secure or insecure, most experience neither perfect security nor absolute insecurity. Rather, the subjective sense of security or insecurity as well as the structural sense of security varies along a continuum. Security, therefore, is not a matter of either or - either one has it or one does not; rather, it is a matter of degree, of feeling more or less secure, more or less insecure. What is true of individuals is also true of states. States are not perfectly secure or completely insecure, but rather experience either condition in degrees. For both
individuals and states then, security is a condition that comes in shades of gray not contrasts of black and white. Therefore, security is a feeling of confidence that the disasters of war and the vagaries of international life can be avoided or absorbed, either by ultimate victory of good management, so that the state, its institutions and its ways of life can continue to exist in a fundamentally unimpaired fashion. Clearly, national security is a complex notion, the consequence of both subjective and structural evaluation that a number of vital interests - the physical survival of the state and its people together with their independence and economic well being - are not likely to be thwarted in the foreseeable future. Security is obviously connected with peace, but the two concepts should not be confused. It is possible for states to feel secure even when they are at war, and highly insecure when they are at peace. Because the feeling of safety which we associate with security is subjective, there are many instances of states feeling secure, when objectively that ought not to. Non-the-less, no state has ever been able to feel confident of security. The fact that each exists in an anarchical society alongside other states means that every state must learn to live with an element of insecurity. If insecurity is inherent in international society, then it may be that the problem facing modern states is not how to improve their security but how to live with the increasing degree of insecurity which they face.

**Holistic Perspective**

The concept of security binds together individuals, states and also international system, so closely that it demands to be treated in a holistic perspective. Although some sense can be made of an
individual security, national security and international security as ideas in their own right, a full understanding of each can only be gained if it is related to the other two. Attempts to treat security on any single level invite serious distortions of perspective. The security of an individual is locked into an unbreakable paradox in which it is partly dependent on, and partly can threatened by the state when regime security equates with national security or when there is a security dilemma as in case of many Third World states or when militarisation of the Third World states leads to internal repression. Individuals can be threatened by their own state in a variety of ways, and they can also be threatened through their states as a result of dilemma developments in international system. The connections not only run from the higher level to the lower but also vice versa. Pressures from individual bear upwards strongly into national security and through their impact on the state also influence the international system. individuals can pose threats to the state and if these are serious and numerous enough, they can corrode the existence of the state as a meaningful entity. Individuals constitute an important part of the amorphous referent object of national security at state level and as such play their role in general process of security policy making. The question of national security cannot be reduced to the individual level because each of the other levels has characteristics which make it more than the sum of its parts. For this reason the tension between individual level and other levels is a permanent feature.
National Security

National security makes only limited sense as are ideas confined to state level. The self-help image of the state as an actor trying to use its own resources to reduce its vulnerability in the face of threats provides only a narrow view of the national security problems. While such a view can accommodate much, though not all, of the interaction between individual and state, it heavily discounts the vital elements of the problem which lie between state and international system. To consider states as the prime focus of the national security problems is mainly useful because it concentrates attention on the principal sources of policy. But the problem which the policy seems to address can only be defined in terms of the state-system nexus as a whole. Patterns in the structure and dynamics at the system level defined many essentials of the national security problems and hence patterns are largely conditioned by the character and behavior of states in the economic front however, both liberal and mercantilist economic structures generate conflict and insecurity and so substantial changes in the actors at state level is imperative to create alternative economic orders. In all these analysis it seems that the security problem of states cannot be properly assessed without reference to the system and the character and dynamics of the systems cannot be understood without reference to states.\textsuperscript{10}

However, we cannot expect the concept of national security to exhibit much unity of meaning in any general sense. In a normative sense, security is as vague a concept as justice is. It is difficult to determine whether justice is related to equality or inequality as has been clearly
brought out by John Rawls in his classic "A Theory of Justice". He says that:

First: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

Second: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.

As the formulation of the two principles of Justice of John Rawls suggest, that the principles presuppose that the social structure can be divided into two more or less distinct parts. They distinguish between those aspects of the social system that define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship and those that specify and establish social and economic inequalities. All the basic liberties are required to be equal by the first principle since the citizens of a just society are to have the same basic rights. The second principle applies in the first approximation, to the distribution of income and wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of differences in authority and responsibility, or chains of command. While the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal it must be to everyone's advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all. One applies the second principle by holding positions open, and then, subject to this constraint, arranges social and economic inequalities so that everyone benefits. The meaning of security will be nearly as diverse as the condition of the different states to which it applies which not only adds to our difficulties in analysing the concept but also adds a hazard to its use in any general sense at
all. Because of this diversity, the nature of security as a problem, necessarily differs substantially from state to state. All states are to some degree vulnerable to military and economic threats and many also suffer from a fundamental political insecurity. The different components of the state appear vulnerable to different kinds of threat which makes national security a problem in many dimensions rather than just a matter of military defence. The idea of the state, its institutions and even its territory can all be threatened as much by the manipulation of ideas as by the widening of military power. Since the ideas underpinning the state are themselves subject to evolution, the problems is not only difficult to solve but may even be hard to identify. The multi-layered nature of the state opens it to threats on many levels, particularly vulnerabilities abilities depending on the unique structure and circumstances of the state concerned. This diversity of states as referent objects for security makes clear the diversity of national security problems. It is also clear that state vary not only in respect of their status as powers but also in respect of their weakness or strength as members of the category of states. When the idea and institutions of a state are both weak, that state is, in a very real sense, less of a state than one in which the idea and institutions are strong.

The argument here is that the external perspective distorts the view in relation to national security by covering over the domestic security dimension. National security cannot be considered apart from the internal structure of state and the view from within not infrequently explodes the superficial image of the state as a coherent object of security. A strong state defines itself from within and fills the gap between its neighbors with a solid political presence. A weak state may
be defined more as the gap between its neighbours with little of political substance underlying the façade of internationally recognised statehood. Since the object itself is so tenuous, the concept of national security lacks among referents other than basic territoriality. So, behaviour within the state can be understood better in terms of individual and sub-group security than in terms of national security. National security properly refers to the relationship of the state to its environments and becomes profoundly confused to the extent that the state is insecure within itself. In other words, the concept of national security can only be applied sensibly to the external side of the state's Hobbesian security functions. Unless the internal dimension is relatively stable as a prior condition, the image of the state as a referent object for security fades into a meaningless blur.  

Security Threats

These internal and external dimensions of the state however, generates different kinds of threats to national security. Invasion and blockades clearly fall within the category, but there is a broad gray area between these obvious threats and the normal difficulties of international relations. The different character of the components which go to make up the state suggest that threats to the state can come in a variety of types. These types can be classified by sector as military, political, economic and ecological.

Military Threats

Military threats occupy the traditional heart of national security concerns. Military action can and does threaten all the components of
the state. It subjects the physical base to strain, damage and
dismemberment. It can result in the distortion or distraction of
institutions, and it can repress, subvert or obliterate the idea of the
state. Military actions not only strike at the very essence of the states'
basic protective functions but also threaten damage deep down
through the layers of social and individual interest which underlie and
are more permanent than the states superstructures. Since, the state
is more a social entity, an idea, than it is a physical being, the use of
force threatens to overthrow a self-created rule by consent and replace
it with an imposed rule by coercion. For all these reasons, and also
because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very
swiftly, military threats have normally been accorded the highest
priority in national security concerns. In this context, Indian security
policy ever since it achieved its independence, rested on a long term
strategy of self reliance through development in the military
framework. In conventional terms, military threats to Indian national
security came from a variety of sources. Hostile neighbourhood in
terms of both Pakistan and China, America' decision to arm Pakistan
and Pakistan's decision to join the American alliance decades before
the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship have acted as major factors. As a
result, Indian security policy was tightened up to tackle the military
threats across the border. With China going nuclear in 1964, the
pressure on India to tackle the military threat to national security
doubled up. As a response, India started practicing recessed
deterrence since the nuclear explosion of 1974. Now, that she has
crossed the nuclear rubicon by conducting five successful nuclear
tests, the military threat in terms of nuclear capabilities has taken a
different turn. They would warn off potential adversaries and help in avoiding nuclear war. So, the military threat to our national security has to be seen with reference to the nuclear question as well as conventional spares in the context of Sino-Pak-US relationships and Sino-Russian relationship under the older concept of global, regional and bilateral linkages. However, military action can wreak the work of centuries in the political, economic and social sectors and as such stimulates not only a powerful concern to protect achievements in these sectors but also a sense of outrage at unfair play. Difficult accomplishments in politics, art and all human activities can be undone by the use of force. Human achievements, in other words, are threatened in terms of other than those in which they were created and the need to prevent such threats from being realised is a major underpinning of the state's military protection function. Military threats come in many types, not all quite as drastic as the picture sketched above. At the most extreme end are threats of invasion and occupation aimed at obliterating the state. Invasion and occupation may have less drastic objectives, merely loss of some territory or a change in idea and institutions, or both. In all such ones the state is not destroyed and although its institutions, organising ideology and territory may be altered, its national identity, in the strict sense, may not be severely attacked. Military threats may also be in the form of punishment; the objective here usually being to force a change in government policy rather than to seize territory or to overturn institutions. Nuclear deterrence is built on this principle. The doctrine of deterrence is characterized by an emphasis on rational decision making by top national leaders, those entrusted with the management
of national security in a very dangerous world. According to this rational, unitary-actor conceptualization of strategic decision making, nuclear capabilities have vital deterring, dissuasive and diplomatic-political utilities; their actual military employment is considered irrational and highly undesirable under the assumption that each side would suffer certain and devastating destruction in the event of either a first or even a retaliatory nuclear strike by its roughly equal adversary. Victory in terms of the defeat of the adversary is not longer thought to be a rational objective. Nuclear weapons serve a single purpose: to deter an attack by one power against the other. Mutual deterrence based on mutual vulnerability has thus become the foundation of modern nuclear strategy. As noted by Robert McNamara "Having spent seven years as Secretary of Defence . . . . I do not believe we can avoid serious and unacceptable risk of nuclear war until we recognize . . . that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless - except only to deter one's opponent from using them". Subsequently, however, threat of use of nuclear weapons in crisis situations was made by U.S.

Military threats can also be indirect in the sense of not being applied to the state itself but rather being directed at external interests. Military threats occupy a special category precisely because they involve the use of force. The use or threat of force implies a breach of normal peaceful relations. In that sense, it involves the crossing of an important threshold which represents the normal interplay of political, economic and social sectors from the much less restrained competition of war. The existence of this threshold goes a long way towards explaining the disproportionate emphasis given to military security at
a time when threats in other sectors appear to offer greater and more immediate danger\textsuperscript{17}.

In the international system, as Robert Osgood points out, "the primary instrument of order-armed forces is also the primary threat to security"\textsuperscript{18}. This paradox underpins the widely held view that military power lies at the heart of the national security problem. States in an anarchy\textsuperscript{19} require it both for their own security and for purposes of system arrangement. But once acquired, it generates a counter-security dynamic of its own which threatens both individual states and the system as a whole. It is pertinent here to mention that wars not only continue to be inter-state in the form of Kargil or Siachen but also intra-state in the form of insurgencies, terrorism, peaceful threats etc. Keeping this in view, one can conclude that even if western democracies are not fighting wars amongst themselves, the danger for Third World Countries from the system exists. The Kosovo crisis, the Bosnia strife, the Gulf Crisis and Haiti problem, all exemplify and strengthen this danger factor for the Third World countries. So, the threat of war exists and also exists with that contingent threat of use of nuclear weapons from the system precisely because the US very ardently say that the threat is from the Third World, Pakistan and China and are nuclear in nature. Osgood argues that, "force must be as essential to international politics in a anarchy as elections are to domestic politics in an organized democracy"\textsuperscript{20}. Hedley Bull supports this view from a different angle by arguing that "the international order is notoriously lacking in mechanisms of peaceful change, notoriously dependent on war as the agent of just change"\textsuperscript{21}. Michael Howard draws the bottom-line on the matter arguing that, "force is an
inevitable element in international relations not because of any inherent tendency on the part of man to use it but because the possibility of its use exists. It has thus to be deterred, controlled, and if all else fails, used with discrimination and restraint.22"

Now, the deployment of military instruments by states give rise to the problem of war which is intimately related to the problem of national security. When one talks of the national security problem, one has to take into consideration the two important struggles which are central to its understanding. These two struggles are; one is the power struggle which is reflected in the realist view of international system and the other is the security struggle, reflected in a more moderate view of international system. Their dynamics and the power-security dilemma which their interaction creates, express the essence of the military dimension of the national security problem. Besides, another related dilemma which possesses a distinct logic of its own, is known as the defence dilemma23.

**Defense Dilemma**

The defence dilemma arises not from the dynamics of relations among states although these do contribute to it, but from the nature and dynamics of military means as they are developed and deployed by states. It arises from inconsistencies and contradictions that exist between military defence and national security. Armed forces are justified principally by their necessity for national security and it is often assumed, particularly for reasons of political expediency, that military might is positively correlated with national security. The defence dilemma can come in several forms but the most serious
forms of defence dilemmas occur when military measures actually contradict security. These threats can take the forms of economic damage, or social and political dislocation, caused by military mobilization beyond the states' needs or capabilities. The whole system of nuclear deterrence is the clearest example of a defence dilemma arising from the risk assumed in an overall defence policy. The defence dilemma arises because technological developments have inflated military means to such an extent that a general threat of destruction is the only military logical means of providing national defence. The defence dilemma, in other words, has paralysed military relations among the nuclear powers, thereby forcing them to find ways other than war to manage their rivalries.

**Power-Security Dilemma**

On the other hand, power-security dilemma is a combination of two extremes, via., power and security and they represent completely different conceptualizations of how and why the international system functions as it does. The fundamental distinction requires us to treat the two struggles separately in relation to our central problem of national security. These two struggles can be distinguished by the different explanations of conflict on which they are based. The distinction is an important one and despite the fact that the security struggle originates from realist writers, it correlates closely with the difference in view between realists and idealist which has long divided the field of international relations. But idealists have mostly chosen not to orient their thinking around the idea of security, preparing instead the broader and more popular idea of peace. Just as realists
have subsumed security under their preferred idea of power, idealists have subsumed it under peace. Despite the fact that idealist struggle fits closely with the idealists pre-disposition to see conflict more as a structural, perceptual and resolvable problem than as the intentional and permanent feature which it is in the realist view. At its most extremes the choice is between two view of international relations: on the one hand, as a ceaseless struggle for survival and dominance among states motivated by the pursuit of power and on the other hand, as a tragic struggle for security by states trapped in a system which distorts their legitimate efforts at self-protection into a seamless web of security and conflicts.

These two resultant struggles are however, inseparably connected in a variety of ways and for this reason they must be considered as a single dilemma. At least, three considerations link the power and security struggles together. First is the fact that both represent essentially political problems which underlies the defence dilemma. Second is the link created by the role which defence plays in both the struggles. A desire for defence can be imputed as a prime motive underlying the two, the problem being that defence can be interpreted to cover a wide range of activities. Third, and related to the previous point, is the link created between the two in the real world by the fact that the international system as a whole can seldom be characterised purely in terms of one or the other. While some relations within it will fit the power model, others will fit the security model. Neither model can be safely used to generate assumptions which are sound enough to serve as a basis for policy. These two models are frequently difficult to distinguish from one another in practice. Two useful approaches to
this confusion are first, to look at the nature of the actors in the system and second, to examine the nature of weapons and the military balance. Both of these approaches offer insights into the power and security struggles which help to explain why, what appear to be so clear in theory becomes so murky in practice. These approaches illuminate why the power security dilemma is such a central component of the national security problem. The dilemma is between two choices or perspective each of which implies a deeply rooted and persistent source of threat. 

**Political Threats**

Thus, military threats as we have seen above occupy the traditional heart of national security concerns. However, military threats usually have political objectives (seizure of territory, change of government or institutions, manipulation of policy or behaviour), but some political objectives can be pursued by political means. The idea of the state, particularly its organizing ideology and the institutions which express it, are the normal targets of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, it may fear political threats as much as military ones. This is particularly so, where the ideas and institutions are internally contested, for in such cases the state is likely to be highly vulnerable to political penetration. Even when the state is both strong and powerful, political threats might still be a source of concern. Political threats stem from the great battle of ideas, information and traditions which is the underlying justification for the international anarchy. In the 20th century, liberal, democratic, fascist
and communist political ideas contradicted each other in practice just as much as monarchic and republican ideas did in the 19th century. Because of this difficulty, political threats almost always involve the confusion between domestic and national security. Political threats can be international. It can also be structural, which is to say that they result more from the nature of the situations than from the particular intentions of one actor toward another. The structural political threats arise when the organising principles of two states contradict each other in a context, where the states cannot simply ignore each other's resistance. Their political systems thus play a zero-sum game with each other whether they will it or not. The achievements and successes of one, automatically erode the political structure of the other and this often leads naturally enough to more intentional forms of political threat. For example, India and Pakistan offer a particularly tragic case of structural political threat. Their historical, geographic and cultural ties do not allow them to ignore each other, but their organising principles pose a permanent threat to each other; a threat amplified by the fact that both states are politically vulnerable. Thus, the political threats posed to each other by India and Pakistan clearly define a central element in the national security problems of each of them, and illustrate the extensive ground for confusion between internal politics and national security. In case of India and Pakistan, the difference at societal level is between a segmented society and a segmentary society which is also a pluralist society. In case of China, however, political threats stem from the ideology and the organising principles.
Economic Threats

Economic threats are more difficult to relate to national security than military and political ones, because the normal condition of actors in the economic domain is one of risk, competition and uncertainty. If insecurity in the economic domain is the normal condition, then it is difficult to locate the boundary at which issues acquire special status as threats to national security. Furthermore, the state is often only one among many levels of economic actor and its responsibilities and interest are not as clear in the economic sector as they are in the political and military ones. Economic threats are more narrowly bound than military ones, in that they operate only against the economy of the target state. However, a huge number and variety of economic threats exist which cannot reasonably be construed as threats to national security, rather they all fall within the merciless norms of competitive economic activity. Specific economic threats to national security are hard to distinguish from the pitfalls of normal economic competition, but two cases do stand out. The first involves the traditional links between economic factors and military capability. In a general sense, military capability rests on economic performance, but this level is too broad to deal with interest of economic threats. More specifically, military capability rests on the supply of key strategic materials and where these must be obtained outside the state, threats to security of supply can be classified as a national security concern. The second case is of more recent concern and involves what might loosely be called economic strategies based on maximisation of welfare through extensive trade. However, economic threats do resemble an attack on the state in the sense that conscious
external actions by others result in materials loss and in strain on various institutions of the state. The parallel with a military attack cannot be sustained, however, because while a military attack crosses a clear boundary between peaceful and aggressive behavior, an economic "attack" does not.

**Ecological Threats**

Threats to national security might also come in ecological forms in the sense that environmental events, like military and economic ones, can damage the physical base of the state, perhaps to a sufficient extent to threaten its ideas and institutions. Traditionally, ecological threats have been seen as natural and therefore, not part of national security concerns. But with increases in the scale, diversity and pace of human activity, however, ecological threats to one state might well steam identifiably from activities within another. In this regard, it has a very close connection with the traditional connotation of security. Scarcity of resources and struggle over them leads to war and that relates ecological security to that of the military security. Ecological threats may appear to deserve a relatively low priority compared with the other forms of threat, but some of the more extreme scenarios (greenhouse effects and melting polar caps, diminution of oxygen supply through ocean poisoning and deforestation) have enough plausibility to command attention. They raise interesting and important question about how national security should be viewed, both in temporal terms and in terms of priorities.

Threats to national security can also be differentiated along a number of other dimensions that the sector in which they come. It can vary as
to source. They may come from an internal source as in case of secessionist movements, or more likely, they may come from one of a variety of external sources of these may have a symbiotic relationship. But these threats are all regarding set of conditions faced by any particular state. While this perspective is useful for illuminating one side of the national security policy problems, it largely ignores the deeper cause and dynamics of threat which lie beyond the state in the international system as a whole. Any sound security policy must address threats in both these ways: dealing with them as they come, like reducing vulnerability by preparing defence against invasion, on the one hand, and dealing with their causes, like seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute, on the other. For this reason, we must know about the security at international system level.

**International Security**

International security can only be understood in a narrow sense by reference to the system structure as an object of security. It is this sense which is meant when the balance of power is said to serve the security of the international anarchy. The balance of power can work to preserve the anarchic structure over all, without serving the security interests of any particular state. Those meanings of national and international security which are restricted tightly to states and system level respectively do have their uses. But it is in the nexus between them that we find the real substance of national security problem. Taken by themselves, they produce an image of the security problem that is so distorted as to be more misleading than helpful. In relation to the concept of security, strict observance of the levels of
analysis, conventions weaken analysis because the space between the levels is as important as the levels themselves. To argue that the levels should not be treated in isolation, but instead be approached as different ends of a single phenomenon is not to suggest that each level is merely the sum of its parts. The wholly laudable attempt to clarify the basis of theory by specifying the level of analysis should not be allowed to obscure the connections which range across the levels and bind them into a single phenomenon. The levels are worth identifying because they represent an analytical synthesis which expresses something more than the form of its parts. The focus on the 'something more' and to discount or ignore the fact that it rests in 'the sum of its parts', is to risk a division of analysis which is at odds with the fundamental wholeness and continuity of events.

Thus, the concept of security can be understood by reintegrating the levels. The individuals, states and the international system do not provide three distinct, separable categories of referent object for concept of national security. The full richness and meaning of there concept is to be faced in the interplay among them. Major security phenomena like terrorism, deterrence simply cannot be understood properly without a full appreciation of their sources, effects and dynamics at and among all three levels. The national security problems turn to be systematic security problem in which individuals, states and the system, all play a part. From this reintegrated holistic perspective, the three levels appear more useful as viewing platforms from which they appear as self contained areas for policy on analysis.\textsuperscript{32}
However, it is fundamental that each nation has its own security policy and its own interests. But the world as a whole has interests and as in any larger political entity constructed from lesser but self conscious units, the general interest supports some elements of each particular interest and opposes or confines others. It may be widely accepted that there is an international security interest, but there is little agreement about how it is to be divorced and implemented. However, the concern that states have for their security stems from the nature of the international political environment in which states exist. International politics is characterized by the absence of an effective government above states that has the authority and the power to make laws, to enforce them, and to resolve disputes among states. International politics is anarchic because there is no world government. In such an anarchic realm, states must be concerned first and foremost with their security - the extent to which they feel threatened by the actions of others. With no government to look to, for protection they must rely on their own efforts. A concern for survival thus breeds a preoccupation with security. This scenario in international field has given rise to the balance of power system. However, the hypothesis of the effort behind an international security system should be that states do not want a war, and if they get into one, they would soon enough want to be extricated from it and that the business of international society is to give permanent, effective and practical life to the common interest. Though international security assumes that there should be no war, still this has not happened in history. Alliance systems have floundered on war, for e.g., in ancient times during Peloponnesian wars. More recently, the inter-war period
is full of examples of declarations against war as policy option to be flouted. The Cold Peace after the Second World War witnessed wars in Third World region. After Cold War, Eastern Europe has seen it in the Balkans, in the Gulf, threat of use of force in China Sea, attacks on Haiti and increasing number of intra-state wars, which is the newest face of war.

Security can be used as an organising principle in international relations that combines the concern for national interests of the realists with the concern for global human interests of the idealists. Structural violence, the unintentional loss of life due to unjust social conditions has caused many more available deaths than wars and must be an important aspect of security studies. Greater security cannot be achieved by military defence alone, but must also address the underlying causes of conflicts and ways to reduce non-military dangers to security. International law, economics, sociology, and many other disciplines offer important insights in addition to the more traditional fields concerned with security studies such as strategic studies and international relations. True security cannot be achieved at the expense of security of others. Security is invisible in a triple sense. First, if a state wishes to achieve lasting security, it must satisfy the human rights of its citizens, otherwise they may sooner or later revolt. Second, it must seek to reassure other states that it poses no threat to their security, otherwise they may wish to eliminate that threat. Third, it must live in peace with nature, otherwise pollution and resource shortages will take their toll. 

147
At a minimum level, the ability to enjoy a reasonable degree of security requires that a state be certain either that it can dissuade other states from attacking it or that it can successfully defend itself if attacked. A concern for security, immediately gives rise to a focus on the military power, the state has relative to that of others. In the pre-war period, military threats took place of pride in the hierarchy of national security priorities. In the real world, military threats posed the most direct, immediate and visible danger to state security, and military means have frequently proved useful against both military and non-military threats. State military forces provided protection against unfair threats to force and in the process, maintenance of an adequate military establishment itself became a national security interest. History is however, replete with heroic examples of military force being used to save cultural, political and economic values from violent overthrows. Military factors had dominated national security considerations and national defence had, at least until later half of 80s, been almost synonymous with national security. Trade was not crucial to national survival, and to a considerable extent could be protected by military means. External threats were primarily military in nature, and the available military technology meant that they were slow moving. Ideology and economic interdependence scarcely existed as issues of political significance. States principal military need was to defend its domestic universe from disruption by external military attacks or internal disorder. In the national defence orientation, the emphasis was primarily on the state and its military capabilities, taking likely rivals into account, and on the balance of power dynamics of the international system.
But after 1945 / World War II, advances in military technology had undercut the idea of national defence dramatically. The declining viability of national defence as a solution to the problem of national security produced very different experiences all over the world. Because of the marked contrast in their geostrategic attributes, the European countries and the United States faced quite different orders of threat from military action by their enemies. In Europe, the growing contradiction between national defence and national security had been made apparent by the World War I and became increasingly obvious with new weapons development and of course, with the advent of nuclear weapons thereafter. Besides, the industrialization of war had made society inclusive to the war and conflict paradigm. This has had far reaching consequences for human progress and peace. Coupled with the evolution of politico-military doctrines which are essentially offensive in nature, the threat to human society at large, especially with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, has been hanging like the 'Sword of Damocles' during this period. So much so that the human race is virtually existing on the edge of cataclysmic disaster, where even a minor shift in technology, doctrine or human perception could unleash a global holocaust. There was a universally felt need to seek ways to step back from the principle and evolve more durable and constructive paradigms of security. This can only be done by reshaping the politico-military doctrines to seek a positive relationship between the security of all states.
Third World Security

In recent years, however, the concept of national security has attracted the attention of scholars and statesmen from the Third World both as an analytical and as a management formulation. The body of literature on Third World national security is generally produced in the west and as a result they seem to rely on the western experience to understand and apply national policy and security. Though, the literature has focused chiefly on the military dimension, especially threat perception of contending elites, doctrinal responses, security resources and capabilities to meet external threats to the state, it seems to have underestimated the salience and impact of domestic political structure and policy making economic and technological aspect, domestic and social aspects as well as problems in the ever expanding populations and the severe eco-political pressure effecting the Third World. Most of the literature on Third World national security till the end of the Cold War focused on the fact that the superpowers and medium-sized powers establish the agenda of international issues and determine directly or indirectly the parameters and the type and intensity of interactions in the international system. The rest of the world, including the Third World, was simply the backdrop for the competition of the superpowers and medium-sized powers and is relegated to the status of clients who benefit or suffer commensurately with their protectors. Consequently, it was essential to understand the dynamics of the general and local balances of power in order to describe, explain and prescribe the national security policies of developing countries.
In the post Cold War era, the Third World has been the most affected area in terms of Peace and Security. The reduction in tensions of rivalries between the Super Powers and their military blocks does not offer hopes and better prospects for the vast majority of the Third World countries. In the strategic and security field, the Third World Countries have to confront a formidable challenge of living with conflicts and tensions externally and to grapple with turmoil and instability internally. To this is added the possibilities of pressures and interventions (subtle or direct) from the major powers in the fields such as arms flow, regional and internal conflicts, economic development. Therefore, the Third World Countries need to be careful in coping up with the post Cold War transformation.

In the conventional view, military strength often considered almost synonymous with national security. But in Third World, three factors can be cited which limit the application of the conventional approach. They are contextual differences, nation-state maturity and variation in national values. The contextual differences stem from a set of internal and external conditions unique to developing countries. Most Third World nations, trapped in a complex vortex of local, regional and above all superpower rivalry than and unipolar hegemony now are faced with a lot of difficulties as far as external security environment is concerned. This situation is exacerbated by external weakness. Being exploited by developed countries and often small in size, they were unable to accumulate the physical power needed to alter or protect themselves from external conditions. Such a setting marks Third World insecurity more real and pressing. External weakness is aggravated in part by economic backwardness. In short, the security
environments and external weaknesses combined with economic backwardness clearly differentiate the Third World security context from that of the West. It is this difference that shapes the modalities by which national values are perceived and identified and policies determined and implemented.

In most of the Third World countries, barring India, however the link between state and nation is still in the process of formation, very few have completed the process of nation-building in a single political and territorial entity. India as a sharp contrast to these developing Third World countries has demonstrated a matured and completed process of nation building. The adaptation of parliamentarism and constitutionalism in India to the varied practices of Indian society is what makes her unique and enviable among the other developing countries. It is one of the most democratic political regimes in the world by most conventional measures of political participation, electoral and party competition and persistence of parliamentary institutions. There is a free press and ordinary people are free to speak their minds in public and private. It is also among the least repressive regimes in the world. Thus, politically it is the most developed in the Third World and the gap between state and society is the least. Therefore, it is possible to talk of national security without reference to regime security. In this context, though national security concerns are dominated by conventional terms, several other values also play a role in the security concerns of Third World such as economic well being, prosperity, national integrity, communal harmony, domestic order and tranquillity and prestige etc. These multiplicity of national values produce security
dimension more diverse in the Third World than in the West. Though the conventional conception of national security has a face validity across most developing countries, other dimensions of national security also play a role such as the economic dimension, the growing ecological scarcity of resources and the implications of this phenomenon for the organic survival of a national population, organic survival as a national security concern, social and political or domestic integration as a concern etc. These multiple dimension of Third World national security needs to be dealt with carefully because of the threats associated with them such as the military threat or external threat, economic well being threat, ecological threat, organic threat, socially produced threats, domestic threats etc. These threats, however, require varying types of capability and policy response because policy capacity reflects the perception decision and implementation of security policies. It is through the policy capacity of a nation state that national values are defined, threats and vulnerabilities are perceived and assessed, resources are allocated, and options are screened, selected and implemented. So, in trying to elucidate Third World security needs, one has to give special attention to effective policy capacity.

Indian Security Perspective

Indian security perspectives have always given importance to values of democracy, independence, secularism, self-reliance, territorial integrity and national integration, welfarism and autonomous foreign policy in formulation of approaches to security policy. These policies continued to remain valid through most of the Nehru years (marked by
idealism) and beyond until the shift towards South Asian regionalism in the 1970s. Even then, the key tenets of the approach continued to dominate neighbours. Today, in an age that professes transnationalism, India continues to reassert the fundamentals of peace and independent understanding of world affairs as key to its world view incorporating real politick in its idealism. The Indian approach, therefore, takes a global/international perspective of security along with a national perspective focusing on the problem of survival of the world community and the nation-state. It revolves around two fundamental principles/dimensions: one, the recognition that in any conflictual situation the roots of conflict need to be tackled (conflict resolution, and not conflict management); and two, the need to resolve conflict without recourse to violence. The first is a long term perspective and includes social, political, and economic aspects of any conflict. It presumes that conflicts are a product of tensions emanating in social, political, and economic areas that ultimately escalate into military and armed conflict. The latter is a more short term view that looks at the means of pacific settlement of disputes which is obviously different from internal governmental policies in terms of dialogues and repression to fight discontent internally. Commenting specifically on national security perspectives that have evolved in India, P.S. Jayaramu brings in Nehru's perspective to say that he was looking at security in terms of independence, development and defence and diplomacy in which terrain Nehru had to deal with the hostility of both Pakistan and China while pursuing a foreign policy of peace accompanies by a sophisticated economic diplomacy of interdependence and industrial
policy of self-reliance. Mrs. Gandhi’s phase was marked by quest for power on the material base that Nehru model had generated. In this context, K. Subramaniam’s analysis needs to be seen. Adopting a political approach to National Security, he says in the context of adversarial international relations ‘...no nation has been able to develop itself (and consequently develop its power) without facing the problem of security from the rest of the international system. In his definition of national security there is a focus on economic development, social cohesion and egalitarian and technological society as core values. Any internal or external threat to it is a national security concern. Subramaniam contextualises the national security concerns in conflictive terms of the external environment, internal growth and destabilisation attempts in the 1960s and early 70s, shift from philosophical approach to internaional relations in India to real politik, he lays down the national security goal for India of becoming a major power39.

In its internal dimensions he makes the point that despite Nehru and owing to the Chinese aggression the elites attempted to have an alliance with the US as in other countries of the Third World, which led to a conflict between the elite and the larger interests of the nation. Subramaniam’s perspective on national security is based on conflict scenarios internally and externally.

In its internal aspects the conflict paradigm has been adopted for conceptualising national security concerns in the 1970s to 1990s. Commenting on the post 1970s, Raju G.C. Thomas looks at the national security concerns in the ability to deal with internal conflicts
thus... 'a second, equally important concept of national security has received greater attention in India. Especially from the standpoint of the newer states in Asia and Africa, security is also perceived to be the ability of a state to avoid, resolve, or ward off internal disorder and violence, secessionist movements, and perhaps even the fragmentation and collapse of the state itself'. He examines security concerns in the broader context of the Indian polity and economy with reference to the political and bureaucratic structures and processes. Indian security is analysed by him at the internal level as a broad concept 'to include the problem of internal violence and political turmoil', to include the challenges of guerrilla war and terrorism, with their external conflictual linkages.

Predominantly, the enquiries on national security have focused more on conflictual aspects of political life and little on cooperative dimensions. This has been done with efficiency through the examination of the external environment, understandably owing to the problems generated by anarchy in the international system, even if one viewed it from an idealist perspective. The literature on the Third World, comparatively speaking, ignored the external conflictual dimensions while focusing on the internal conflicts challenging the State in terms of political legitimacy, political integration and policy formulation capacity, and, ideology as significant dimensions to the internal security concerns. Almost a solitary exception in this regard is the theorisation of regional complexes as that focuses on the external-internal linkages of internal security problems.
In real terms, therefore, India rejects the balance-of-power approach and looks at the world through the conceptual lenses of a cooperative society. Further, the balance of power or deterrence approach is essentially status quoist in nature. The Indian policy framework assumes/demands a possibility of change in the existing order. This can be seen in various fields: in the economic field, it was articulated as a demand for a new international economic order; in the political field, it found its expression in the support for national liberation struggles and democratization of polity; and in the social field it was reflected in the demand for social justice and social responsibility. With regard to conflict resolution, India lays great stress on the use of diplomacy. Emphasis is laid on various techniques of pacific settlement and institutions that enable its implementation. This is not to deny the use of force as means of safeguarding security. India accepts the utility of force; it has also demonstrated its use for its security as also for the security of others.

However, three factors have dominated India's security policy: the first is the regional threat perception that focuses primarily on the neighbours, Pakistan and China, and subsequently the other regional powers. The threat from Pakistan and China is predominantly a threat of conventional border conflicts and internal destabilisation. Over the years, other dimensions such as insurgency, support to militancy, and concerns about nuclear weapons have further complicated this relationship. In case of the other regional powers, the threat is an undirected one; it may manifest itself through intervention in favour of or covert and overt support to anti-India forces. The second factor is the urge for self-reliance. This could mainly be seen in the context of India's relations with the West and the former Soviet Union. The threat perception in this case rested on a wide spectrum of relations including those dealing with trade and commerce (especially in
armaments). Of some significance has been the effort to secure a transfer of technology in the purchase of foreign equipment. It also rested on the approaches these countries took in the context of Cold War conflicts and consequent repercussions on India's national interests. A military connection with the former Soviet Union appeared to satisfy some of these interests. The third dimension of India's security policy is the debate over the validity of the concept of self determination and the limits to its application. Democratic systems draw their legitimacy from the people through a complex system of representation. The concept of self determination is the basis of this legitimacy. However, this concept works in two, mutually opposite directions - as a unifying force and as a divisive one as well. Indian security policy has had to confront itself with these questions, whether in the context of demands for separatism or autonomy.

During the early years of independence, India's security policy followed two main trends: one represented India's urge to retain newly won independence in the practice of security policy even while upholding its peace policy: the second reflected in the application of these principles in the context of building regional solidarity and the spread of regionalism. But regionalism never became a fundamental concern of Asian states. Interstate conflicts caused by unsettled boundaries, existence of large minorities, clash of elites, etc., were some of the serious obstacles. The onset of the Korean war and the resultant Korean system of alliances ended attempts at regional solidarity. Therefore, the fundamental tenets of peace and independence became the foundations of the new Nonaligned policy. The security dimensions of the Nonaligned approach were to draw on these basic tenets. They ensured that the strategic doctrine of a country focused on the fundamentals of national interest, as defined by the approaches of peace and independence, and thereby enabled one to structure a
security policy to ensure the goals. Such a perspective on Nonalignment considered the Cold War a contextual perspective within which the definitions of interest had to be articulated. This ensured its continuing validity as a security policy in the days of the Cold War and the period of détente.

The late 1960s brought in several changes. At one level, Pakistan sought to reassert itself. Pakistan did this by moving closer to China and also through conflict with India, first in the Rann of Kutch and later on in Kashmir in 1965. The late 1960s also saw several initiatives taken by the United States and the Soviet Union that were of significance to India. Richard Nixon's Guam doctrine and Henry Kissinger's four Power Balance doctrine spelt out the American position vis-à-vis India. As against this, came the Brezhnev Plan for Collective Security in Asia, the Kosygin Plan for Economic Cooperation and the series of treaty initiatives, one of which later culminated in the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 1971. This period also saw the beginning of Soviet arms aid to India. Unlike with the Soviet Union, India's security relationship with the US was of limited nature. Since the Nehru days, India was neither looking for nor was interested in a strategic relationship with the United States. It sought arms and received those in limited numbers. The American decision to arm Pakistan, taken in the face of Indian opposition, and the Pakistani decision to join the American alliances strained the Indo-US security relationship further.

This changing security environment raises two questions. First, how far was Indian security policy a product of "reactive" responses to the international situation? Second, to what extent did the Indian political elite set the agenda for the security policy of the nation? However, two parallel forces operate in this regard. One force seeks to formulate the
agenda for the future. Nehru's perceptions about regionalism, efforts to forge a common identity for Asian and African countries, in order to achieve developmental goals and opposition to extra-regional intervention constitute the first trend. The other is the reactive response to threats from China and Pakistan. Indian response to the Chinese threat appears to be more tactical than the product of a strategic doctrine. Chinese interests were accommodated in the 1954 Tibet agreement. In 1962, Indian response to the Chinese attack was essentially a tactical one. The shift from confrontation to dialogue that came in the mid-1980s might have been a product of a series of debates within the ministry, or a response to the changes that Gorbachev brought about in the Asian balance of power. India responded to the crises created by Pakistan in 1947-48 and in 1971-in the first case the issue was the defence of Kashmir and in the second the independence of East Pakistan - in a similar fashion. Thus in terms of articulating a "security policy", the Indian political elite appears to have exhibited a rather restricted agenda. The post 1962 debates on security policy did focus on the validity of Nonalignment but much of the focus remained on the linkage between Nonalignment and military preparedness. The post 1971 literature on security policy tended to focus on the regional dimensions of India's security policy. The nuclear explosion of 1974 did not alter the South Asian dimension of such a security perspective.

India began its nuclear programme soon after independence. India's Nuclear policy, as it came to be formulated in the early years, revolved around two principles: promotion of research and development for harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and attainment of self-sufficiency in the nuclear programme. The 1962 Sino-Indian war and the Indian debacle in it brought in some early rethinking. Between 1962 and May 1964, when Nehru died, Indian policy
continued to tenuously cling to the peaceful uses adage. Within a few months of Nehru's death, the Chinese detonated a nuclear device. As a befitting response to it, India also conducted the first nuclear test at Pokhran in 1974. Following the 1974 implosion, Mrs. Gandhi stressed that the experiment was part of the research and development work for peaceful purposes. She took note of American, Canadian and Soviet reactions, and also underlined India's willingness to share nuclear technology with other countries.

It was only after the implosion that India finally developed a coherent nuclear doctrine to suit the changed circumstances. The doctrine was based on the same constructs of geopolitical utility and overall commitment to peaceful uses. The former rationalized the PNE experiment because it gave India a different kind of capability; the latter helped India retain the diplomatic advantage of being a non-nuclear power. The deliberately vague posture on nuclear options granted a significant bargaining value to India. By refusing to sign the NPT, India had declined to legally abjure its right to make nuclear weapons, should the strategic situation so change/demand. The PNE gave India a deterrent capability - a PNE bargain was useful because of its unbuilt defence implications. There has been no substantial change in this policy over the years, though there have been indications of some change in recent years in response to Pakistan's nuclear postures. Starting from the strict peace policy of Nehru - despite the apparent build up of nuclear capability - India had proceeded to adapt itself to international requirements in the context of the Chinese explosions. This peace policy with a PNE preparedness had elementary deterrent implications. This was translated into a demonstrable deterrent capability by Mrs. Gandhi by going in for a PNE - again a further adaptation to the then prevailing international situation.
Ever since then, the global order has undergone several changes in terms of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and end of Cold War. These changes invariably have an impact on India's security policy notwithstanding the relevance of both instrumental considerations of power and the dominance of conflictual trends. The global context of conflict has changed from Cold War bipolarity to economic conflicts and unipolarity. This has of course, not resulted in any significant change in the regional situation. Countries in the region are still living with conflicts and tensions both externally and internally, which specifically flow from the moment of unipolarity. China continues to be a threat to our national security and so does Pakistan. In the economic sector, the process of globalisation has meant hegemonic dominance and that has resulted in putting enormous pressures and interventions by the major powers to throttle our economic autonomy. As a response, though the fundamental preoccupations of NAM: peace and development have not been altered, still Indian responses to these changes are visible to be constraintive at the operative dimensions of policy that would include responses to a wide range of security issues such as: nuclear disarmament in terms of NPT, CTBT & FMCT; economic security in terms of GATT & WTO; ecological security in terms of Earth Summit - Rio etc.. However, it is also pertinent to mention here that since India demonstrated her nuclear capabilities in 1999 owing to security compulsions, the constraints have increased manifold and imposition of economic sanction is but one. Therefore, it becomes necessary to analyse constraintive responses of Indian policy towards these security issues at an empirical level.
END NOTES


6 Ibid, p. 122


12 Buzan, Barry, op.cit., p. 43.


14 Ibid, pp. 74-75.

The International Political System is an anarchy, which is to say that its principal defining characteristic is the absence of overarching government. The principal defining feature of states is their sovereignty, or their refusal to accept any political authority higher than themselves. Thus the essential character of states defines the nature of international political system and the essential character of political system reflects the nature of states. If units are sovereign, their system of association must be anarchic, and if the system is anarchic, its members must reject overarching government.


Paranjpe, S. op. cit., p. 149.