CHAPTER - II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE:
UNIPOLARITY AND INDIAN PERCEPTION
SECTION I

Introduction: The Conflict-Cooperation Continuum

One of the most pertinent questions that has drawn the attention of scholars, at least since the framing of international relations on the basis of states as units by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 till the present era through different phases and centuries of history, is to predict and forecast futures in international relations. In the post-World War II phase, realists, neo-realists, behaviouralists and structurists predicted the future of international relations in terms of conflict scenarios. Morton Kaplan said, "My universal system is a non-cooperatively interdependent system. My balance of power and bipolar models depend heavily on conflict-elements, but also include interdependence elements". 1 Karl Deutsch, engaged in developing political world models in the 1970s said, "The model could not predict single events, such as fall of government or the outbreak of a war. At best it could show long term trends. But, it could show in principles at least, about when and where situations are likely to arise in which - on the basis of past experience - such domestic or international disruptions seemed possible".2 The realists from Carr through Morgenthau and Waltz, who do not engage in unit level analysis, but with the analysis of international structure, focus on the elements of conflict rather than on elements of cooperation, as predominant facts in the logic of history of international relations. Neo-realist, Kenneth N. Waltz's theory has the rigor to incorporate the realism of Morgenthau in his structuralist theory that helps us to focus on international system and not on units. It helps us to account for recurrence of the balance of power in world politics. It also tells us
how changing power configurations will give rise to patterns of alignments and conflict.\textsuperscript{3}

Given the biopolarity of the post-World War II system, the development of a West European Strategic Community has led some liberal optimists to increasingly focus on values of cooperation at least among the liberal societies and more emphatically among the democratic countries. They have offered the perspective of interdependence and liberal institution-building as the guarantors of cooperation and peace. The proponents of this perspective argue that since the survival of human civilization is threatened by environmental and non-military dangers, conflicts of interests among states and people no longer need to lead to war. They, very emphatically argue that in the politics of interdependence, domestic and transnational as well as governmental interests are sharply at odds with one another in several respects. The realist-liberal dispute focuses especially on the goals of actors in world politics and on the nature of their environment. Realism emphasizes state's demand for power and security and the dangers to state's survival. Military force is therefore, for realism, the most important power resource in world politics. States must rely ultimately on their own resources and must strive to maintain their relative positions in the system, even at high economic cost. Liberalism also examines state action but directs attention to other groups as well. For liberal thinkers, economic incentives are important as well as concerns for security. Among republics, at any rate, military threats may be insignificant, expanding the potential area for cooperation and reducing both role of force and the emphasis, states place on their relative power positions in the international system.\textsuperscript{4} Neo-realists go to the philosophy of Hobbes and the institutionalists to that of Locke.
Realist Vs. Liberalists

In such a world marked by both continuity and change, models of explanations have thus perforce to be varied. The secret of understanding lies in knowing which approach or combination of approaches is to be used in analyzing a situation. Traditionally, classical theories of world politics, have portrayed a potential state of war in which states behaviour was dominated by constant danger of military conflict. During Cold War, especially the first decade after the World War II, the conception leveled 'political realism' by its proponents became widely accepted by students and practitioners of international relations in Europe and United States. From J.S. Mill to Eyre Crowe, world politics falsified the hope of peace in capitalist features and the philosophy of liberalism. This made the scholars on international relations view it as an area of conflict more than cooperation and underlined the value of balance of power and role of strategy. During the Cold War, 'security' was a slogan, American political leaders used to generate support for their policies. The rhetoric of national security justified strategies designed at considerable cost to bolster the economic, military and political structure of the 'free world'. It also provided a rationale for international cooperation and support for the United Nations, as well as justification for alliances, foreign aid, and extensive military involvement. 'National Security' became the favourite symbol of the internationalists who favoured increased American involvement in world affairs. This symbolism thus, was largely a product of the Cold War and the severe threat Americans then felt. Its persuasiveness was increased by realist analysis, which insisted that national security is the primary national goal and that in international politics security threats are permanent. National security symbolism and the realist
mode of analysis that supported it, not only epitomized a certain way of reacting to events, but helped to codify a perspective in which some changes, particularly those towards radical regimes in Third World Countries, seemed inimical to national security, while fundamental changes in economic relations among advanced countries seemed insignificant. As a result, the Cold War sense of security threat slackened and the descriptive accuracy of a view of national security dominated by military concerns declined; so did the term’s symbolic power, as argued by the liberals. This decline reflected not only the increased ambiguity of the concept, but also American reaction to the Vietnam imbroglio, to the less hostile relationship with Russia and China summed up by the word ‘détente’ and national security had to share its position as the prime symbol in the internationalists lexicon with interdependence. Thus, the liberal thinkers tried to pose a challenge to the conception of international relations in terms of conflict scenarios and propounded the theory of interdependence which would assure peace and cooperation.

The realist assumptions, however define world politics in terms of, first, states as coherent units being the dominant actors in world politics. This is a double assumption: states are predominant; and they act as coherent units. Second, realists assume that force is an usable and effective instrument of policy and other instruments may also be employed, but using or threatening force is the most effective means of wielding powers. Third, partly because of their second assumption, realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by questions of military security, the ‘high politics’ of military security dominating the ‘low politics’ of economic and social affairs. These realist assumptions allow us to imagine a world in which politics is continually characterized by active or potential conflict.
among states with the use of force, possible at any time. Each state attempts to defend its territory and interests from real or perceived threats. Political integration among states is slight and lasts only as long as it serves the external interests of the most powerful states.\textsuperscript{7}

The liberal thinkers, however, have imagined very different conditions to construct another ideal type, opposite to realism. They call it complex interdependence. This complex interdependence refers to a situation among a member of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies i.e. state do not monopolise these contacts; there is no hierarchy of issues and military force is not used by governments towards one another. It is of course an ideal type of international system deliberately constructed to contrast with a 'realist' ideal type that has been outlined on the basis of realist assumptions about the nature of international policies. It, however, doesn't faithfully reflect the world political reality. Rather, most situations of international politics will fall somewhere between two extremes. This complex interdependence in world politics gives rise to distinctive political processes which translate power resources into power control of outcomes. These political processes could be linkage strategies; Agenda setting; Transnational and trans-governmental relations; Role of international organizations etc. Thus, complex interdependence yields different political patterns that does the realist conception of the world as well.

**Inadequacy of the Liberal Perspective of Interdependence**

It seems now that the liberal perspective tries to create a new world order replacing the old one of international conflict. But, one can never become sure and confident about that because the perspective never suggests that international conflict disappears when
interdependence prevails. On the contrary, international conflicts or tensions will take new forms or may be concealed in a large number in this perspective of interdependence. Ironically, the trend towards interdependence has highlighted the virtues of historic values associated with independence, thereby giving rise to two different and powerful processes on global scene; an integrative process, where societies are becoming increasingly dependent on and a disintegrative process, where groups within societies are increasingly demanding autonomy for themselves. Though international conflicts are still there by the name of interdependence, the rhetoric of the concept seems to have come into being whatever the reason may be. So, basically, the politics of interdependence is proposed by some liberal optimists and is an idea which gained ground after the World War II particularly in the bipolar model of international relations. It has been defined as a structure and as a process to suggest the initial subordination in the NATO alliance which has given way to increasing equality and this holds the future of peace and cooperation. Their argument has been that process in the structures depend upon the interactions of units who gain from trade and economic incentives & so modify their behaviour. The liberals, they believe, suggest the significance of transnational experience, the impact of communication and the role of liberal institutions in modifying international anarchical behaviour. They therefore, suggest a synthesis of neorealist and liberal approach to understand the possibilities of cooperation and peace. Their propositions of the future have been speculative and optimistic by breaking forth from their neo-realist initial perspectives.8

Interdependence does not necessarily lead to cooperation. For example, says K.J. Holsti that interdependence and globalization have not created a political community. He says, “I have taken the position
that the argument of a fundamental transformation of both structures and processes is not yet sufficiently persuasive to justify jettisoning large bodies of knowledge in our discipline. There is too much evidence that issues of security, war, peace and order are still part of world's agenda. There is a definite trend towards globalization of commerce, but its consequences remain problematic – certainly economic interdependence has not yet created a coincidental community. Michael S. de Vries maintained, on the basis of data from the western community, that interdependence intensifies not only processes of cooperation, but also conflictual processes.

Before the collapse of Cold War Holsti said, "the appropriate metaphor for the study of international relations is many rooms with many views. A single view – an authoritative model, theory or paradigm at world politics – would probably represent a stifling of intellectual inquiry, not breakthrough! It was, therefore, too early even in the 1980s to talk of either a world system based on cooperation, or of the normative value of liberalism as the basis of global political community or even the liberal international institutions as providing the way for participation of the world community in achievement of peace and prosperity. The metaphor of common home for both Asia and Europe in New Thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev was more metaphysical since the realpolitik after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post Cold War witnessed processes of local bush fires (Europe) and of animated suspension of conflict zones ready to erupt into the open in the near future as in Asia. This happens to be accompanying the processes of fragmentation in Europe. Besides, the affirmation of a growing multitude of 'Sovereignties' is accompanied by the phenomena of macro-regionalism and micro-regionalism. Three macro-regions are defining themselves respectively
in a Europe centered on the EC, an on East-Asian sphere centered on Japan, and a North American sphere centered on the United States & looking to embrace Latin America. It is unlikely that these macro-region will become autarkic economic blocs reminiscent of the world of the Great Depression. Firms based in each of the regions have too much involvement in the economies of the other regions for such exclusiveness to become the rule. Rather the macro-regions are political-economic frameworks for capital accumulation and for organizing inter-regional competition for investment & shares of the world market. They also allow for the development through internal struggles of different forms of capitalism. Macro-regionalism is one facet of globalization, one aspect of how globalising world is being restructured. These macro-regions are definable primarily in economic terms but they also have important political and cultural implications. The EC, for instance, poses a quandary for Switzerland whose business elites see their future economic welfare as linked to the integration in the EC, but many of whose people, including many in the business elites, regret the loss of local control upon which the Swiss democracy has been based. On the other hand, Scotland look to the EC as an assurance of greater future autonomy or independence in relation to the sovereign states of which they now form a part. And there have been no more fervent advocates of North American free trade than the Quebec independentistes. Globalization encourages macro-regionalism, which, in turn, encourages micro-regionalism.13

So, the ending of the Cold War poses the issues of the future of anarchic situation of international relations in contrast to the hierarchical structure of domestic equilibrium, the future of peace, the future détente, the future of the communist world, the future of the liberal idea and the future of Third World conflicts. The exercise of
prediction by almost every school in international relations has been quite off the mark as far as the collapse of the Cold War and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union is concerned.\textsuperscript{14} The basic feature of the post Cold War forecasting of world futures is plurality of perspectives determined by geographical location in the system, mixture of optimism and pessimism reflecting location in the theoretical debate and ideological struggle generated by the optimist assertion of the victory of the liberal idea. The optimistic assertion of the victory of liberal idea, however, have been thoroughly challenged by Immanuel Wallerstein who opined that the year 1989 represented the agonizing end of an era and the so-called defeat of antisystemtic forces was in fact a great liberation which removed the liberal socialist justification of the capitalist world economy and thus represented the collapse of dominant liberal ideology.\textsuperscript{15} The invariable preoccupation of most of the exercises is with the future of peace and the regional peace dividends, that the end of the Cold War may offer to the various regions. In this intellectual pursuit of peace, the realists, the cultural heterogeneity, neo-realist paradigm, the regional tensions and the liberal institution building gone in for examination as also the theme of the continuity or the discontinuity of the unipolar moment with the United States calling the shots in which has been erroneously perceived as the liberal agenda of world integration.

The liberal integration or interdependence since the days of J.S. Mill has been, as brought out by the one world system theorists, only at the level of trade and commerce and out at the level of mode of production. As it has been true of the American social science, it is also true of the post Cold War scholarship that it pays hardly any attention to the complexity of the Marxist argument in terms of class theory of foreign relations or affairs where conflict is inevitable and
interdependence in hardly present. Most of the predictions end up with policy prescriptions for the USA. In other words, there is plurality of voices with the purpose of helping the United States to manage current international relations.16 Talking about the close connection between neorealism and the US management of international relations, Robert W. Cox observes “Neorealism, both in its Waltzian structuralist form and in its game theory interactionist form, appear ideologically to be a science at the service of big power arrangement of international system”.17

However, since most of the countries have not got out of the Cold War logic in an irreversible search for a renewed balance of power, the strategic thinking in terms of deterrence is still on, along with developments in military technology, dangers at the regional level around its borders, the gap between its force and the US potential to take the burden of action in any part of the world. It has meant an accelerated pace of the military modernization, development of nuclear power, expansion of the naval clout, arms transfers and induction of new units formation for political warfare to have defensive offence. In addition to the persistence of old tensions, new tensions have led to a new awareness of increasing possibilities of limited, local, conventional and surgical wars that require small arms. The 73 hot spots of the world only add up to the gravity of new dimension. The failure of super strategic organizations like NATO and the European Community to stoking the ethnic strife in Europe18 and the failure of the Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) troops to help out in Nagarno – Karabhakh region or in Tajik – Afghan border show that old and new security mechanisms are yet inadequate to meet the challenge posed by proliferation of local conflicts and small weapons. John Herz maintained that for peace to
emerge, geography should cool off. But the greatest cause of wars is geography. The surest accompanying factor of international relations is strategy.\textsuperscript{19}

**Unipolarity and the Road to Multipolarity**

The discussion about the future role of strategy, in that deterrence takes off from an analysis of the unipolar moment of US hegemony. An answer to this question divides scholars into optimists and pessimists. Invariability, the discussion on the new world order involve the logic of realism and its combination with the rhetoric about values, particularly the values of liberalism and under Clinton, of multilateralism. The assumption of this view is that there is only one power that is geographical preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it. Russia, Germany and Japan are in no condition to match the global reach of the USA.

However, the preponderance gained in world politics cannot and does not last because it inevitably attracts rival power centres. The global system that is past its prime becomes the arena of oligopolistic rivalry wherein a number of major powers strive to maximise their advantages and long-term considerations of world interests becomes increasingly secondary. This kind of oligopolistic rivalry leads directly to the strengthening of all nation states and to an all round intensification of nationalism. As a result, from initial unipolarity, the global system moves into bipolarity and multipolarity. Rivalries among the major powers grow and assume the characteristics of oligopolistic competition. Gradually, as order dissolves, the system moves towards its original point of departure, that of minimal order and a Babel of conflicting and mutually unintelligible voices.
The Long Cycles

This endogenous model of periodicity in the global system, explicates how cycles in effect are the product of the structure and properties of the system itself rather than of the environment within which it operates. On the basis of this, since 1500 there have been four completed cycles and the fifth is now in progress. In this cycles, the role of nation-states in the global system will tend to diminish in the ascending phase of the cycle and would rise in the descending phase. The ascending phase has its sources in the disorder & disintegration from which global war originates and problem arise that remain unattended to or taken up by rising new leaders and competitors; conflicts are operated that do not seem to yield to solutions. At some point of time the curve turns and begins to descend until such time as the disintegration of authority and the unrestrained assertion of narrow interests lead to a new global conflagration. The destructive aspects of this process mark the lowest point of a long descending phase. By accepting this model of long cycles, the present phase is witnessing the increasing salience for the nation-states and rising nationalism linked to major powers confrontation and animosities. Attempts to meet global problems are relying on national solutions and hence there is a possibility of rising shortfalls in the global order balance.20

Unipolarity Assertion

The logic behind the American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it wishes to involve itself. It is the direct result of the collapse of Soviet Empire. The unipolar world was born in Stavropol in
July 1990 when at the Kohl-Gorbachev Summit, the Soviet Union ceded the jewel of its European Empire, East Germany, to NATO. It is the end of Cold War that change the structure of the world. This unipolar moment means that with the close of the century's three great northern civil wars (World War I, II & Cold War), an ideologically pacified North seeks security and order by aligning its foreign policy behind that of the US.

The United States has pursued the same grand strategy, Preponderance, since the late 1940s. The key elements of this strategy are creation and maintenance of a US-led world order based on preeminent US political, military and economic power, and on American values; maximization of US control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic interdependence as a vital US security interest. The logic of the strategy is that interdependence is the paramount interest the strategy promotes; instability is the threat to interdependence; and extended deterrence is the means by which the strategy deals with this threat.

The question for world order has been integral to US grand strategy since at least 1945. The grand strategic equation of world order with US security reflects a historically rooted belief that to be secure; the United States must extend abroad both its political and economic institutions and values. Thus, even in the mid to late 1940s, the driving force behind US policy was more basic than the mere containment of the soviet Union, which explains why, despite the Cold War's end, the United States remains committed to the strategy of preponderance.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has attempted to prevent the emergence of new geopolitical rivals. In the 1940s, of course, it accepted the reality of Soviet power. Short of preventive war (a thought entertained by some US policymakers), the United States could not prevent the Soviet Union’s ascendance to superpower status. From 1945 on, however, the United States was the sole great power in its own sphere of influence, the non-Soviet world. As the historian Melvyn P. Leffler points out, U.S. policymakers believed that “neither an integrated Europe nor a united Germany nor an independent Japan must be permitted to emerge as third or a neutral bloc”.

Leffler’s argument is not idiosyncratic. Observing that the United States “expected to lead the new world order” after 1945, the diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis states: “Few historians would deny, today, that the United States did expect to dominate the international scene after World War II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear and present antagonist”. It could be argued, of course, that far from suppressing the reemergence of competing power centres within its sphere, the United States encouraged their emergence by facilitating the postwar economic recoveries of Western Europe and Japan. While helping its allies rebuild economically, however, the United States maintained tight political control over them. Washington wanted Western Europe and Japan to be strong enough to help contain the Soviet Union; it did not want them to become strong enough to challenge its leadership. The United States was especially concerned with circumscribing the resurgent power of (West) Germany and Japan. Thus, as the political scientist Wolfram Haweider observed, America’s Post-World War II strategy was double containment (containment of the Soviet Union
and of Germany and Japan). Although the postwar American empire was an "empire by invitation", it was an empire nonetheless and the U.S. sought to maintain its geopolitically privileged position vis-à-vis Western Europe and Japan.

Economic interdependence has played a central role in U.S. grand strategy since 1945. Indeed, the strategy of preponderance's hallmark is the interplay of security and economic factors. Even before the Cold War's onset, the United States "deliberately fostered the economic interdependence of the major powers in order to ensure US security and prosperity". The centrality of interdependence in post 1945 foreign policy is explained in part by economic considerations. As a structure, interdependence meant U.S. hegemonic relationship with war ravaged European states that were helped through the Marshal Plan. US policymakers have come to believe that America's prosperity depends on its access to overseas markets and raw materials. Even more important, however, are the perceived political and security externalities that flow from interdependence.

As World War II drew to a close, U.S. decision makers subscribed to three beliefs about interdependence's positive externalities. First, they embraced the traditional perspective of commercial liberalism that by increasing prosperity, an open international trading system decreases the risk of war by raising its costs. Second, they believed a key "lesson" of the 1930s was that economic nationalism (autarky, rival trade blocs) led to totalitarianism and militarism in Germany and Japan, and thus was an important cause of geopolitical instability. An open postwar international trading system would prevent a replay of the 1930s by strengthening the domestic political position of elites who would be predisposed by economic interest and ideology to
pursue pacific foreign policies. Third, they believed that World War II’s origins were rooted in economic causes (i.e. competition for territorial control of markets and raw materials). An open international trading system would eliminate the need to capture resources and markets by providing nondiscriminatory access to all states. The Cold War added a fourth reason to regard economic interdependence as a vital American interest: an open international trading system would contribute to peace and international stability in the non-Soviet world, and hence reduce its vulnerability to communism.

Although the Cold War has ended, the United States remains wedded to the strategy of Preponderance. The Bush administration’s “new world order” and the Clinton administration’s strategy of “engagement and enlargement” reflect Washington’s continuing aspiration to maintain an international system shaped by America’s power and values. The US foreign policy community understands that little can be done to prevent the emergence of a new great power challenger (China) outside the U.S. sphere of influence. Within its own sphere, however, the United States remains determined to suppress the rise of rival powers: Germany and Japan are to be contained by embedding them firmly in U.S. – dominated security & economic frameworks.32

Now, as during the Cold War, the U.S. military protectorate’s purpose in Europe and East Asia is to facilitate interdependence by removing the security dilemma and relative gains issue from relations among the states in Washington’s orbit. U.S. security commitments continue to be extended beyond the European and East Asian core into the periphery. Preponderance’s strategic imperatives are the same as they were during the post-World War II era: pacification and reassurance in Europe and East Asia, and protection of these regions from the contagion of instability in the periphery.
The strategy of preponderance assumes that the international system will be relatively orderly and stable if the United States defends others’ vital interests, but would become disorderly and unstable if others acquired the means to defend their own vital interests. Thus, to ensure a post-Cold War geopolitical setting conducive to interdependence, the United States “will remain the preeminent responsibility for selectivity addressing those wrongs which threaten not only our interests but those of our allies or friends, which could seriously unsettle international relations”.

**Challenges and the Way to Multipolarity**

Christopher Layne challenges the unipolar optimism from the structural realist point of view based on a discussion of unipolar moments in earlier history. Layne draws the following lessons from the two unipolar moments in history. Great power emergence is a structurally driven phenomena. Specifically it emerges from the interaction of two facts: (1) differential growth rates and (2) anarchy as mentioned in the first chapter and therefore, incase of the current unipolar moment, the geopolitical backlash will produce multipolarity. Germany will reemerge once US withdraws from Europe. If Japan begins to rearm, it will pose a challenge in the Pacific. Further, China – despite all the collaborations that US has worked out in the field of economy, technology and military areas, does not, at least at the rhetoric level, look very kindly to the proclamations of the 'New World Order'. There is bound to be great power rivalry in the multipolar setting. Layne’s forecast underlines the conflictual probabilities thus, “the impending structural shift from unipolarity to multipolarity means that the security dilemma and the relative gains problem again dominate policy maker’s concerns. As Japan and Germany become significantly more competitive, great power security
rivalries and even war will be likely, and cooperation will correspondingly become more difficult.\textsuperscript{35}

Layne has offered an alternative to the strategy of preponderance and that is off-shore balancing. Off-shore balancing is a strategy for the multipolar world that already is emerging. Its underlying premise is that it will become increasingly more difficult, dangerous and costly for the United States to maintain order in, and control over, the international political system as called for by the strategy of preponderance. Offshore balancing would define U.S. interests narrowly in terms of defending the United States territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemony. As an offshore balance, the United States would disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan and South Korea. The overriding objectives of an offshore balancing strategy would be to insulate the United States from future great power wars and maximise its relative power position in the international system. Offshore balancing would reject the strategy of preponderance's commitment to economic interdependence because interdependence has negative strategic consequences. Offshore balancing also would eschew any ambition of perpetuating U.S. hegemony and would abandon the ideological pretensions embedded in the strategy of preponderance. As an offshore balance, the United States would not assertively export democracy, engage directly in peace enforcement operations, attempt to save “failed states” (like Somalia and Haiti), or use military power for the purpose of ‘humanitarian’ intervention.

Offshore balancing is a balance-of-power strategy, not a hegemonic one. It assumes that the United States would be more secure in a multipolar system than it would be by attempting to perpetuate its current preeminence. However, this strategy would be predicted on
the assumption that attempting to maintain U.S. hegemony is self-defeating because it will provoke other states to balance against the United States, and result in the depletion of America's relative power—thereby leaving it worse off than it would have been by accommodating multipolarity. An offshore balancing strategy also would reject the balance-of-threat argument advanced by preponderance's defensive realist proponents: it is the very fact of the hegemon's unbalanced power that threatens others (and spurs the emergence of new great powers). An offshore balancing strategy would accept that the United States cannot prevent the rise of new great powers either within or outside its sphere of influence.36

In a tightly argued though abstractly treated subject, Mearsheimer carries forward the new-realist argument to say that bipolarity rather than multi-polarity is a safer structural condition to live in. The post Cold War world will be more dangerous to live in since there will be multipolarity. He takes a position both against the argument of a non-nuclear world and an interdependent world. He says that the departure of superpowers from the European continent would be followed by the rise of Germany, France, Britain, Italy and erstwhile USSR as great powers. Power inequalities will occur causing instability to a greater context. The withdrawal of the nuclear arsenals from Central Europe would also lead to at least four scenarios. First, Europe would became nuclear free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Second, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers weapons. Third, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen dangers inherent in the proliferation process. There would raise the risk of war. The fourth alternative would be different. It will be the least dangerous since proliferation
would be managed by the current nuclear powers. Yet it should "still be dangerous than the world of 1945-90". He goes on to challenge the optimistic predictions of multipolar peace on grounds that their logic is flawed. Secondly, the conditions for long post war peace viz.; bipolarity, rough equality of military power between these two polarities, and the appearance of nuclear weapons would be absent in the new world. The reason for multipolar world being more warlike are that in that situation local powers will go to war oftener, that these will escalate into something bigger and so many cause general conflict. Secondly, in a multipolar situation it is difficult to structure deterrence. Power balances are hard to maintain and so this may lead to wars in two ways: (a) aggression by two states; and (b) bullying of small state by a big power. The new order that is recommended is the one in which there is limited, and managed nuclear proliferation and the worst order would be a non-nuclear Europe. He suggests in the realist vein, "each state must always be concerned to ensure its own survival". He concluded that the "demise of the Cold War order would occur in Europe" As a remedy he suggests that the United States should encourage limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. In his argument, put bluntly, it means that Germany needs to be allowed to go nuclear; US and Britain should retain forces that can be deployed in Europe to deter states that threaten to start a war. And finally concerted efforts should be made to keep hyper-nationalism at bay especially in Eastern Europe.

In this regard Waltz explains that the proposition of theory specify relationships between certain aspects of the system and actor behaviour. His formulation of structural realism as a systematic theory seeks to explain two elements of international structure as
constant: (1) the international system is anarchic rather than
hierarchic, and (2) it is characterized by interaction among units with
smaller functions. His third image realism or element of structure
tries to draw corrections between the distribution of power in a
system and the actions of states: small countries will behave
differently from large ones, and in a balance of power system, alliance
can be expected to shift in response to change in power relationships.
So, the distribution of capabilities across the states in a system
varies from system to system and over time. since it is a variable, this
element – the distribution of ‘power’ – takes on particular importance
in the theory. The most significant capabilities are those of the most
powerful actors. He also says that structure is the principal
determinant of outcomes at the system level: structure encourages
certain actions and discourages others. It may also lead to unintended
consequences, as the ability of states to obtain their objections is
constrained by the power of others. Basing on these analysis, Waltz
quite logically deduces the expected outcome namely the formation of
balance of power.

He, as a systematic theorist deduces logically that multipolarity is
structurally prone to instabilities, and the two major cases of this
century illustrate his theory suitably. In multipolarity, argues Waltz,
states are said to be structurally prone to either of two opposite errors
that destabilize the balancing system. On the one hand, they may
chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is
seemed to be indispensable to the maintenance of the balance. This
was the pattern of behaviour that led to World War-I. On the other
hand, they may pass the buck, countering on third parties to bear the
costs of stopping a rising hegemon. This was the pattern that
preceded World War II. So, in creating a theory of international
politics, Waltz is interested mainly in showing that a system of two is more stable than a system of many\textsuperscript{41}. Thus, the present transitory phase which is viewed either as unipolar moment or multipolar moment is needless to say, pretty unstable logically. Therefore, international realm is variously described as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogenous. This neorealist position of Waltz has implied the continuation of balance of power between two opposed systems as a guarantee of peace. He further believes that if unipolarity is military bipolarity is nuclear and multipolarity is economic.

Charles A. Kupchan is of the opinion that America's preponderance and its will to underwrite international order will not last indefinitely. Even if the U.S economy grows at a healthy rate, America's share of world product and its global influence will decline as other large countries develop and become less enamored of following America's lead. As a result, the United States should prepare for the inevitable decline of its preponderance by encouraging the emergence of regional unipolarity in each of the world's three areas of industrial and military power – North America, Europe and East Asia. Unipolarity at the regional level will offset through structural forces the fragmentation and rivalry that otherwise would likely accompany the decline of American hegemony. Because even global wars start at the regional level, securing peace within regions is an essential first step toward securing of "benign unipolarity" which refers to a hierarchical structure in which a preponderant geographic core establishes a hub-spoke pattern of influence over a weaker periphery. As in an empire, the core exerts a powerful centripetal force over the periphery by virtue of its uncontested preponderance and the size and scope of its economy. In contrast to a classical empire, however, regional order
emerges from a consensual bargain between core and periphery, not from coercion. The core engages in self-restraint and agrees to subject the exercise of its preponderant power to negotiation. In return, the periphery enters willingly into the core’s zone of influence. Regional spheres of influence again become the main ordering formations in the international system, but these spheres are based on voluntary, not forced, participation. Furthermore, order emerges precisely because of the withholding and modernization of power, not its unfettered exercise. Benign unipolarity thus holds promise for dampening competition among regions as well as within them.\textsuperscript{42}

In conclusion, it needs to be asserted that the current behaviour of the great powers is no different from the behavior of the earlier powers in matters of diplomacy, sanctions, advice, dialogue, exercise of diplomatic clout in matters that are not in accordance with the dominating wisdom of the omnipotent civilisational and military centre, the Judeo-Christian world. Geopolitics and strategy will remain strong as it has always persisted since the Treaty of Westphalia. Along with the desire for interdependence cooperation and peace, there shall be the compulsions of a balance of power, a strategy in the changed circumstances of the lack of the Russian capacity to dominate in Eurasian landmass and the predominance of the U.S. sea powers\textsuperscript{43}. Control will be the operating watchworld.

Thus, states will continue to assert themselves in issues of national security even though the new liberal agenda of free market, fiscal austerity, civil libraries, loss of political rights and social rights, transnational & subnational actors may claim its negation or its dilution. The continuation of the ad hoc international state (OECI) to police the advanced and the Third World on old principles of free market will lead to the growth of contradictions that are bound to
create unsettling effects. However, the neo-liberal thinkers who have attempted to conceptualize the current moment as a moment of enlarged possibilities and a world of peace based on capitalism are definitely going to get a setback because their theory of interdependence is theoretically tentative and also is a critique of the realist and the neo-realist understanding of the dominance of international relations which emphasis on the continual chances of war. Their liberal optimism is reflected in looking at the emerging relations among states both as a process and as a structure. The structure is marked by the asymmetrical relationship between the hegemon and the subordinates and the process indicates that the relationship may be equalizing. They underline the need of projecting subnational and transnational actors on the international stage more or less to the disadvantage of the state and state sovereignty. In so far as states regularly follow the rules and standards of institutions, they signal their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation and therefore reinforce patterns of nationality, interdependence, stability rather than national security and conflict. But the collapse of second world is a collapse of the liberal socialist agenda. The future anomalies that will be generated owing to the operation of the new or conservative liberal principles, the temporary character of the unipolar moment, and the neorealist argument about the continuation of conflict as a historically proven phenomenon will render interdependence inadequate. Issues like nuclearisation of other regions, instability of multipolar world, limits of cooperation among nations, and other similar issues will continue to dominate the international system. Interdependence has to be a subterranean trend and the issue of security will dominate the relations of states even though economic integration will continue to be the present preoccupation among certain sections of national bureaucracies. Thus,
the world will not be a very different place to live in even in the present unipolar moment which may last two generation of fifty years if earlier history is any guide. Balance of power, strategy of difference, of nuclear deference, sea-space power consideration will determine the unit level actors even with the developing word's efforts to move for alternative restructuring of international relations.

Keeping all of this at the background, since the entire gamut of post World War II relations among nations got directly or indirectly affected by the nature and intensity of relations between United States and Soviet Union, leaders and scholars of many a nation have begun to deliberate on and discuss the possible course of their relationship, particularly in the security and strategic dimension, with the two superpowers in the coming times. Followers of the theory of long cycles believe that Japan will overtake USA and that too without War, which is the strong beat of long cycles. The situation of flux unipolarity. In that context, Indian perception have to be read both as a reality and as a pious hope.

SECTION II

Indian Perception

Perceptions and images play an important role in shaping the foreign policy/policies of nations as well as the relations among them. Reality is not doubt important, but the perception of reality is, in a dynamic sense, almost as important as what may be called objective reality. This is so because one acts on the basis of what one perceives to be real.

Perceptions and thinking about the international affairs, have started becoming conditioned by the aftermath of Cold War to a great extent.
Earlier it was simply taken for granted that the bipolar structure of the Cold War provided the framework in which foreign policies had to be made and analyses framed.

After the end of Cold War, the debate in international relations sifted from issues related to bipolarism to "unipolarism/multipolarism", from 'containment of communism' to 'constructive cooperation and also to intervention by force or 'constrainment' as in case of China and from polices of Cold War to policies of détente as per the Idealists. Several rethinking studies surfaced, concepts were revisited, calling for a redefinition of relationship between the main actors of international politics. These included discussions on South Asian issues and consequently, as obvious on India-US relations.

Problems of peace and security in South Asia received a fresh look outside the Cold War parameters of the preceding years. Relations between India and United States were also discussed in this new framework. This was pretty obvious because India's national interests are tied to the South Asian regional status quo. This is of course, self evident because India comprises a huge area of South Asia, and her status quo interests in the region is a force for stability in a major political theatre of the world.

In the hard issue of security in South Asian region, Indo-Pak relations remain in a fractured state on problems of state sponsored terrorism, clandestine nuclear programme of Pakistan till May, 1998 and refusal to cooperate in SAARC on issues of trade. SAARC is still not even an economic security arrangement. Arms race continues to accelerate. Indo-Pak dialogue at the level of secretaries has ended. Kashmir, nuclear option, terrorism remains the stick with which the administrators enter into hostility. Regional disputes have a character
of their own. The irony is that at one time it was thought that global rivalry was stoking up regional forces and these were all proxy wars and the regional specificities were forgotten. We know, this resulted in the collapse of regional security system formed as part of global strategy. But now, we have a twist in the situation. Regional wars can attract global intervention. But more fundamentally without a broader security framework, regional tensions are not going to ease and here we have the specific situation of today. The Cold War has ended, but it has not been replaced by a modern global security system, keeping the global imperatives in mind. Gorbachev’s Vladivostok Proposal of Asia-Pacific Security System has not made any progress after the initial stage of germination. West Asia remains in the dangerous state as before. Arms trade progresses by leaps and bounds. We have thus a big void – the old system has collapsed, nothing new has come up. As the Chinese say, from bipolar to multipolar or unipolar. So we have now a unipolar world. It is in this context that one has to pause and ponder if any substantial change would be effected in terms of security in Indo-American relations.

While superpower confrontation has ceased in Europe with the rise of Central Europe as a strategic entity, this has not been repeated elsewhere. In the regional military environment in the Indian ocean/Persian gulf region, the old threat perceptions continue. Force deployment of extra regional powers remain. It is quite obvious that arms control in the Indian ocean is linked to global arms control dialogue. In Afghanistan, Soviet compulsions to urge arms control and stop intervention was great. But the end of Cold War and bipolarity with a whimper and without an effective replacement to it signifies instability in terms of security framework. Indian perception of threat and presumptions about its role in South Asia show hardly any sign
of change. On the American side, China's military modernization, military presence in the Indian Ocean, practical nuclear non-proliferation, arms transfer and security relations with Pakistan, non-intent to solve the civil war in Afghanistan, hard-line Gulf policy and finally controlling technology transfer, aid flow, demanding open market etc. are crucial areas which will be relentlessly followed and will be continuously opposed by Indian rulers. For example, U.S. may not regard China to be a threat to India; the latter does, despite its current up-beat relations with China on LAC (Line of Actual Control). Thus, India will remain a persistent factor in US policy in Asia, and there is hardly any reason to assume that the divergence in the perceptions of the elites of two countries, of the rulers of two powers, one global another regional, will cease in the wake of the closure of the Cold War. Soviet Union's direct presence in Afghanistan is a thing of the past and China does not have a hawkish posture vis-à-vis India, despite the Tibet question, yet one cannot claim that demilitarization has started either in India or Pakistan, or America's offers of arms and technological assistance to the region have stopped. There is no possibility of a viable trilateral or multilateral security framework in this region. If 'Indo-Soviet Axis' is no more the whipping horse for Americans, 'US-China-Pakistan Axis' may be replaced by China-Pakistan partnership, with the U.S. becoming a referee. This will still allow for arms trade and arms race. A new axis will guarantee it. It is here that knowledgeable American commentators of the scene have erred. They have been taken in by the formal appearance of relations when making forecasts on the evolution of relations in the future. However, anticipating changes with the changes in security considerations after the closure of Cold War involves another error. Ascribing an autonomous status to the security factor ignores the compulsions emanating from world military
order and the international arms regime. Developing nations are often subjected to this order and regime. Arms producing, arms shipping and arms shopping are based together. Security doesn't dictate arms, often arms dictate security. In other words, arms find their legitimacy in the notions of security. For testing arms, nations contrive threats to security. The world military order and international arms regime are inextricably linked with industrial military production, diffusion of armament technology and arms trade. Today, apart from the infantry, all other items in the military are part of some system or the other - tanks, missiles, rocketing, rapid force, air reconnaissance, naval supervision etc. The system devours individual necessities. The system involves heavy military spending - thus a deviant industrialization, foreign dependence, inequality. Armaments do not only result from economic linkages. They have a logic and compulsions of their own. Being in the nature of regime, they compel international relations to adopt to certain exigencies. It is in this sense that independent and substantial amount of change in security dimensions of Indo-US relations are not foreseen. Thus, the imperatives of armaments will ride over others, and the Third World citizens will be subjected to the angry outbursts over who gives arms to whom, against whom, for whom, or from whom to have arms, for what and against whom. An observation of an expert on the world military scene goes as follows: "The use of new military technologies in the Third World has already caused untold misery. Their transfer to local elites has provided the sophisticated wherewithal for repression and has served to mould patterns of development in such way as to cause massive economic and social dislocation and to produce the necessity for authoritarian and militaristic forms of rule. The acceleration in the development of new military technologies and the
pace of military transfers from rich to poor countries can only result in more of the same and worse\textsuperscript{49}.

Thus, the ceremonial closure of the Cold War is too weak to effect any substantial change in Indo-US relations which is of the nature of a regime – a regime characterized by the imperatives of world military order, conflicting notions of security, unequal exchange, technological flow patterned according to 'new' international division of labour, a shrinkage in the claims of the Third World on the world aid basket with the entry of East European countries as new claimants and the responses of US foreign policy towards the Third World. In South Asia, US has not declared Pakistan a terrorist state, as for China, despite the noises against it, it has not prevented China-Pakistan missile trade. U.S. – Pakistan arms sales are resumed. In the present context, U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit to South Asia this Spring may well be the springboard for the greater security involvement that it has been seeking, securing and scouting for in the last five decades\textsuperscript{50}.

The question of security, viewed a little more closely reminds us of India's traditional national security concerns despite the virtual withdrawal of Russia's active support for India's security problematic in relation to Pakistan. Yeltsin establishment has not sent encouraging signals to India on Pakistan at the diplomatic level. India in effect, hoping for restructuring her relations with Russian Federation is working to reorienting her thinking towards the US on issues of defence and security, has to develop a long term, an intermediate and an immediate perspective in terms of 15, 10 and 2 to 5 years since both Russia and China are in the throes of change with the latter on an upswing and the former twirling on its own axis without much spiraling movement. The USA's diplomatic reorientation
is welcome and India's need to bandwagon in economic and military times is underlined by many. Maneuverability with the US has evaporated with the Russian foreign policy's westernisation. Its attempt to balance the tilt is not of much use yet, though while in Delhi, Yeltsin did say that Russian support on Kashmir to India's stand exists and is assured. US's reformulation of her foreign policy towards India does not imply smooth relations. India wanted to detonate but Rao was prevented from doing so by USA though Rao and Clinton shook hands in Washington and Rao said there was no arms twisting., the cryogenic deal of ISRO with Glavkosmos episode showed that the US does through her weight around singularly both on India and Russia.

The Chinese threat, thought not imminent, has not disappeared, nor is it likely to do so through the nineties. With the virtual collapse of Sino-Soviet hostility, the incapacity now to obtain any kind of leverage through the successor states of the Soviet Union, with increasing American and western concerns and commitments to China, and the remarkable, rapid growth of Chinese power under its modernization programme, India's potential isolation in relation to China is an ugly diplomatic fact of life for this country. Never mind, if for the moment, China is quiescent, and too engrossed in her internal consideration. Here too India must evolve a diplomacy with or without the US and the west and move in the direction of taking steps towards normalising of relations with China and see if China-Pakistan factors is, really their 'bilateral' concern as the Chinese think. Regional relations continue to be of concern. None of the states of the South Asian region are likely to be disturbed by the diminution of Indian strength on the sub-continent; quite the contrary. They may of course, not as yet have any reason, as Pakistan has, of actively,
abetting such an eventuality. But, should this transpire, none of them is likely either to want to be of any help, or be too displeased by it. Nor has India acquired such economic importance in the global economy to discomfit any power center very much by the loss of a huge or influential economic market. However, these international and regional susceptibility seem to be heightened by the increasing internal security challenges to India’s political leadership to govern the country as well.

Again, with the decline of the Cold War, America’s bottom line is that India should forget about its nuclear option; should stop developing even medium range missiles, whether intended to carry nuclear heads or not, and should not deploy even the short range ‘Prithvi’. For more than forty years, in the name of sustaining Pakistan’s integrity, America sustained Pakistan’s ambition to achieve a hostile military parity with India. In the matter of Kashmir, which unlike Aksai Chin, is much more than only a territory for India, US enemies, not Pakistan, became the first to plant the idea in chosen Kashmiri minds that the valley at least, if not the whole state, should become independent. In the first decade of the UN debates on Kashmir, US made cynical misuse of its hold on the US to thwart India for more legitimate case and to prop up Pakistan’s baseless one in order to pay Pakistan for services rendered.

So powerful has been the drag of these controversies that they still distort the state of the Indo-US relations. In the Indian perception, American diplomacy remains tilted in favour of Kashmir seceding from India and becoming ‘independent’, questions being raised about the validity of the accession being one part of the process; another being the prolonged resistance to the Indian allegation of Pakistani support to terrorism in Kashmir. However, the weight of evidence
proved too heavy to be ignored. And now, ignoring Pakistani misuse of American military support against India, America has offered to revive the security relationship we have had with Pakistan in the past. This is a far more serious matter than the proposed one-line exception to the Pressler Amendment to enable Pakistan to get some 40 odd F-16 warplanes.

The nuclear issue between the two countries not only remains as hot as in 1974, when India exploded a nuclear device at Pokhran, it has lately become a major controversy. General Aslam Beg, who was Chief of Pakistan Army, has publicly confirmed that America looked the other way while Pakistan went ahead with its clandestine nuclear schemes (about which further information surfaced in Germany as recently as 13 June 1994). But America has not hesitated to pounce upon the Indian programme. Between them, the chairman of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton and the new American Ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, have delivered to India the 'cold and blunt warning' which a former US President, Jimmy Carter, threatened to deliver in 1977. At the same time the government of India has now officially stated what it and many others have suspected for long that the issue of human rights and of Kashmir, is also being harnessed to corner India on nuclear issue. More significantly, America has not only opposed India on these specifics but on what has always been the core of Indian defence and development philosophy and continues to be despite changes in India's economic strategy; that India should not only not possess weapons but also the technology to produce them indigenously, and that key industries should be in the public sector. However, the earliest and the most seminal difference between the two countries arose precisely on these too issues. India turned to United Stated for
Combat Aircraft and for a steel plant, she was rebuffed by America, and on the rebound was caught by Soviet Union. America displayed a continuation of the same attitude only a few years ago when it pressurized Russia to renege on an agreement made by the Soviet Union with India to supply cryogenic engine technology. India saw this as an attempt by America to deny it not only militarily, but all advanced technologies, a suspicion which has also arisen only a little while earlier when the United States prevented an American farm from supplying an advance computer to India. So, these problems illustrate a long term problem in India – US Relationships; that American policy toward India has always been a consequence of or a function of American policy toward something else, whether that ‘something’ be the Cold War with the Soviet Union or a desire to use Pakistan in its relation with China or the Islamic World. Or, as now, it is a function or a consequence of America’s global policy on nuclear arms and missiles.

So, the bilateral relationship between India and the United States has always remained zig-zag and characterized more in terms of Competition than cooperation, by misperceptions and misunderstanding than accurate and sensitive attention to the needs and concerns of each other. This kind of strained relationship has become all the more apparent in the wake of Pokhran-II episode of India’s nuclear testing during the period 11 to 13 May, 1998. From India’s point of view, Pokhran – II marked the culmination of her response to the changing security environment around the country and to the failure of the international community to work towards a firm commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the process, it has not only triggered off a debate on a whole range of issues ranging from nuclear deterrence, nuclear proliferation to
nuclear disarmament but also resulted in trade sanctions imposed primarily by the U.S.A. and other countries who once again showed their insensitivity towards the immediate security concerns of our country.

Now, after getting a general idea about the Indian perception as regards the current moment of unipolarity, it would be interesting to note the viewpoints of the senior echelons of our strategic community or national security establishment individually, who actually shape Indian thinking on different policy matters not withstanding the moment of unipolarity.

In this contest, Jaswant Singh in his recent monograph/book 'Defending India' has opined that India's answer to global bipolarity was the principle of NAM: an appropriate response which gave India the needed flexibility. It provided the correct policy platform for an assertion to the sovereignty of a newly independent India in international relations: it echoed accurately the sentiments of the emergent, post colonialism Third World; and it adequately subserved India's national interests. But, neglect of relations with the neighborhood resulted in an 'internationalization of the problems of the subcontinent', which could under no circumstances be treated as being beneficial to Indian national interests. After all, superpower policies were then determined by their own strategic and political perceptions, that is their own national interests, which is not, and cannot be a synonym for Indian interests.

Now, while making towards the twenty-first century, one marks that the world has altered behind recognition. Its bipolarity has dissolved. With the great meltdown of 1989 and a deferring of the Cold War the supporting contours of the NAM movement have lost their sharpness.
India seeks a reliable order out of this apparent and existing disorder; of the culmination of one power but polycentrically, without fixity. The strategic situation, both globally and in Asia, is in a state of flux. As traditional alliance systems – of which India too has been a beneficiary – and the U.S. decline in importance and effectiveness, no regional order appears ready to replace them. This reality dictates the primacy of ‘state-centric perceptions’ with the predominance of concerns about ‘sovereign national interests and state influence’. This is the inescapable reality and around this reality India addresses itself to the challenges of the twenty-first century what is it that it seeks? And it is not simply the certainties of foreign relations that have changed. Concepts and nature of warfare too have altered, almost beyond recognition. As new international accords about weapons of mass destruction are arranged, there is a poignant irony in recognizing that it was in the twentieth century that the world experienced the use of them: atomic, biological and chemical. Whilst social and environmental inequalities arising from a free play of market forces place serious question marks on today’s suggested penaceas, order is sought through experiments like the World Trade Organization (WTO). New issues arise, for example, the loss of a monopoly of the state over both knowledge and weapons; and the preponderant importance of factors like environment, drinking water and movement of people; these issues now enter our concerns as areas of new security challenges.

Warfare of the future, with the ‘greater democratization of knowledge and resources’, including weapons, and their concentration in uncontrolled private hands’ has been altered beyond recognition. It is no longer possible for nations (and this despite the apparent example of the Gulf War of 1991) to conquer another country, to subjugate an
entire people or to take into captivity as a booty of war the adversary state as a colony. There is an inescapable conclusion to be drawn about the nuclear reality; of recognising both the deterrent factor of such weapons and, paradoxically, their actual non-usability in conflict. This dilemma confronts India more directly and much more pointedly than perhaps any other country in the world. Even as environmental aggression becomes a factor in today's security considerations, so too does the question of energy dependence. Without doubt the economic is the determining criterion, but no economic progress is possible without energy sufficiency.

In the transformed nature of war what India is experiencing and shall have to contend with is not so much open, direct conflict as covert war, clandestine war. This has, in any event, been waged against India for almost the entire half century of independence. In turn this altered and transformed nature of war will require a total transformation of our concepts and response mechanisms too. On the other hand, in the absence of any social, cultural, political or economic commonality or interdependence, a blend policy of ‘improving relations’ with China could, over time, convert into an opiate, consequentially persuading us to mortgage the future yet again for illusions about the present. The Chinese strategic culture remains what it has always been: wedded to domination; not so much through occupation of the (real or potential) adversary’s territory as through a psychological subjugation of mind, an emasculation of the advisory’s response options. India, therefore, needs to pose to itself some unsettling questions. It is in this broad backdrop that we address ourselves to drawing a contour map of India’s tasks in the coming decades.
J.N. Dixit also talks of the current temporarily unipolar world order\textsuperscript{55}. He says that with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of Soviet Union, the world for the time being has become unipolar and that there is going to be 'Pak Americana' for the next hundred years or so. One does not question the fact that the United States will be the most dominant factor in world politics for quite some time to come, but in terms of technological capacities, access and control of natural resources, population strengths and economic determinants of investment opportunities and markets, the world is bound to be multipolar with other power centres being Western Europe the Russian Federation, China, Japan, India and some strong regional arrangements if they were to emerge in South America and Africa. Issues which dominated international relations during the Cold War period, such as colonialism and imperialism, the ideological struggle between the industrially advanced countries and the poorer developing countries, have been replaced by concerns about human rights, disarmament and arms control, good governance, management of the global environment and the structuring of a globalize economic order ruled by free market economy principles. So, a major task of India, in view of J.N. Dixit, would be to mixture its economic and technological capabilities and to increase its political stability and military strength to levels where it can elevate itself to a position of strength to network an equilibrium with the new power centres of the emerging multipolar world. Indications are there that an atmosphere and an opportunity for such networking now exist\textsuperscript{56}. In an interview with Mr. Dixit, he says that India should be intensely conscious of her own interests & should try to safeguard them without conflicts or confrontation. But in the process of competition in the international fora, if conflicts arise then she should be prepared to undertake them with courage and determination. India is strong enough to defend her
interests despite constraints in terms of economic sanctions, trade sanctions, technological restriction, resistance. For that we need to be determined, united, disciplined and firm. She has resisted these kinds of constraints more often than not during the last 50 years of her independence. He further believes that the kind of influence that India had acquired due to her non-involvement in power-blocks in the bipolar model has slackened a bit but nevertheless, she can resist the moment of unipolarity with her enormous bargaining power in different fields. We have given an example of resisting these constraints on nuclear question and various other fields. There is no gainsaying that India as a major power has the capability of trusting others arms and for that she has to build up her economy as the Chinese have done and be calculative on taking steps.\textsuperscript{57}

Jasjit Singh is of the opinion that the collapse of the bipolar system can be likened to the situation where two powerful wrestlers press hard against each other and one of them suddenly caves in. The vanquished gets unbalanced; but the victor also, even if momentarily, is disorientated. In the present circumstances this has resulted in the strategic vacuum, intensified as it has been by another, almost side-play – the Persian Gulf War. States and systems – whether of the erstwhile East or West, or the New North, and the South – are busy trying to reorient themselves in the altered strategic landscape. The United States in the flush of victory tried to define a “new international order”, by which it might try to fill the strategic vacuum resulting from the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It would also be logical to assume that other powers, in the process of reorientation would also lean into the vacuum to seek some space for maneuver in the altered strategic landscape. However, the relative power of the US which was in evidence over the previous
decade suggests that the international political architecture has been evolving into a polycentric world order. So, if we go by conventional wisdom defining elements of national power, the leading half-a-dozen powers of the world now would be the USA, Japan, Germany (in the EC), India, China and Russia.

K. Subramanyam has very clearly stated that the developments in the present world order and in the international security environment do not give the assurances that the world will become unipolar. He says that China is growing at 10% per year and if it is able to maintain such high level growth rates, it is likely to overtake the U.S. as the largest economy in the next two decades. China is emerging as a major military and economic power and so the present moment cannot be called 'unipolar'.

He further adds that in this situation, India must reconcile itself to the harsh fact that the NAM is no longer of much consequence in international politics. The strategy of balance of power in a bipolar world which was the case of NAM has now to be applied in a world where the hegemony of US is likely to decay and new centres of power are likely to emerge.

V.P. Dutt says that, the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War dramatically signified the collapse of the world order existing since the second World War and heralded a new period characterized by a highly uncertain world order. And thus, the collapse of communism in East Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union left the United states unrivalled. The chief successive state, Russia, was so economically and politically sheltered that even with its nuclear weapons that could destroy the world, it was struggling for survival and stability. However, at the same time Dutt argues that
history has not afforded any instance of a lasting hegemony. If a hegemonic power becomes too overbearing and drives others to the wall, the second-echelon powers tend to coalesce in order to counterbalance the power of the hegemon. Eventually, the hegemonic power gets over committed, its economic resources and production unable to sustain military commitments, the economy progressively slides, and the hegemon gradually loses its hegemony. In this context, he visualizes the challenge to the hegemon from Japan as an economic giant, and also from China to some extent.

That was why many U.S. analysts were advocating for the US the role of an arbiter, a facilitator, a moderator in international affairs so that it did not lose its power and its overall authority in the world. Addes to these international complexities are regional and subcontinental compulsions and contradictions. The Cold War may have ended in Europe, but not in this subcontinent. Regional animosities continue to haunt South Asia. In such a situation, India's Security dilemmas arise not from any ethnic eruptions but from international pressure/constraints and regional rivalries overlaid by the long shadow of nuclear weapon around its borders. For long years India had to contend with two hostile neighbours. India fought three wars with Pakistan and one with China. The war with Pakistan could have been avoided but for her involvement in the game of international politics. Despite India staying away from power blocs, the Cold War took its toll as far as India's security problem were concerned. Besides, other compelling security factors which intensified the security problem were the presence of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean base in Diego Gracia; Sino-Pakistan Collaboration in the development nuclear weapons, US's accommodative attitude towards both Pakistan and China; indefinite extension of NPT etc.
In such an environment India fairly demonstrated its sovereign right to go in for nuclear weapon testing and then Spelt out the principal elements of her nuclear policy. This step brought about both positive and negative reactions in domestic as well as international circles. Nonetheless, India withstood it with great courage and showed her firm intention for a stable and global disarmament and her maturity to move towards a responsible position in a nuclear field to protect herself in a nuclearised environment around here. So the 'official' nuclear powers, instead of chasing the mirage of de-nuclearisation of South Asia should technically help India in adopting a code of conduct. India, on the other hand, must be sensitive to and energetically utilize all the currents and cross currents, all the twists and turns, all the contradictions, all the opportunities and openings to be able to meet the challenges ahead. India according to Dutt needs to work out in full, in a well-coordinated manner the political and economic measures that can bring about a qualitatively new level of relationship with over neighbours, as well as with East, South East and Central Asia. Also, policy makers need to give new directions to the NAM. India's foreign policy has traditionally been one of 'temperance', of balance, of extending the hand of friendship to all countries. Particularly those in the neighbourhood, while preserving the security and other national interests of the country but trying to harmonize them with the larger interests of the people of the world, of responsible responses to the world's problems, of close interaction with the international community and of according a high place to promotion of the economic welfare and prosperity of the Indian people.

In an interview with Prof. V.P. Dutt, he says that "in this multipolar model of international relations dominated by the West, India faces
constraints from a variety of sources which are not just
domestic. Sino-Pak factor, the West European factor are some of
the external factors which play a major role in shaping up of
Indian foreign policy. They are in constant effort to make us to
take certain decisions which do not cope up well with our
national interests. However, we have a capability to withstand such
kinds of constraints and we need to maintain a balance in this
regard, LOC (line of Control) is a clear cut example in this regard. Our
quarrel with Pakistan and Chinese factor as a constraint is much less
in degree than that of the American factor. America is constantly in
lookout for some issue or the other to keep India under pressure and
uphold her own interests which hint at its policy of dominance in the
international system. Our economic independence has been
constrained by the process of globalisation. There are a lot of
pressures on the nuclear question terms of economic sanction,
trade sanctions etc. on the question of ecology also, there are
pressures which make us believe that there has been no real
agreement as yet on ecological issues not withstanding the
different attempts at it in terms of Stockholm Conference or Rio
Conference. Therefore, we should try and keep our momentum of
development to withstand there pressures as has been successfully
done by the China. We can align with like minded countries and
provide counter weight to maintain a balance in the international
system.

Keeping intact its goal of retaining independence of action in
international affairs, and seeking to find a respectable place for itself
in the community of nations, India must constantly evaluate the
changing nature of international alignments and find the means to
secure its objectives.
Being very optimistic about the revival of a multipolar world, M.S. Rajan opines that since the end of Cold War in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, we have a radical and truly unprecedented situation of the bipolar world being replaced by a unipolar world, dominated by the sole superpower, the United States. This development has greatly distorted traditional international relations, based on a multipolar world- making maneuverability for the rest of the 184 nations, even the other four permanent members of the United Nations, very limited. He further adds that, in last three and half centuries, many great powers have arisen and disappeared that include surprisingly many states of little or no consequence today. The present big five (P5) were so recognized only in 1945. Presently, some moves toward reviving a multipolar world are in the offing. Supporting India’s nuclear tests at Pokhran in May, 1998 for security reasons, he describes India as a "caged tiger" and says that India would continue to behave at the global level as a benign global power in the next millennium, as it has been doing so far, as a major regional power.

D. Banerjee has criticized the two different viewpoints of the emerging world order such as multipolar and polycentric; as imprecise and that analysis based on these versions make finite conclusions more difficult. He has tried to analyze the world order by assessing the elements that constitute national strength and which nations feature in which category and in what order. He delineates three elements of national strength such as political, economic and military. In political sphere, he says that USA’s role will continue to be pre-eminent for some years. In economic sphere, he favors USA and Japan for several decades and finally, in military sphere the role of China seems to him to be very significant. So, he opines that the unipolar moment, even if
it did exist some time between 1990 and 1992, is surely an element /
event of the past. Keeping this in view, he has suggested that Indian
policy should be based on three planks, namely, (i) strengthening its
regional base, (ii) its economy and (iii) security67.

Rakesh Gupta discussing on "Religious Revivalism, Regional
Instability and War in the Unipolar Moment68 opines that "the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the US leadership of the Gulf War and
the effectiveness of missile technology, the transnationalisation of
the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) technology thrust earlier, the
lack of room for the maneuverability of the countries of the Third
World, the new foreign policy of Yeltsin, the dynamism of the Western
bourgeoisie's to come out of the trade and fiscal crises and impose
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank regime on the
OECD as well as countries of the Second and the Third Worlds has
made the USA the hegemonic power in this unipolar moment". Here,
he tries to bring in the theory of long cycles of Modelski which says
that in the world system there exists a nation- state that orders the
existence and the well being of the world system at its own expense
and its organizing principle is specific to its own values and interests.
This system declines after some time. It is replaced by a new world
power that comes into prominence after a war. This process takes
about a 100 or 120 years. The long cycle is also explained further as
consisting of different phases in which there is a challenger in a
situation of entropic decline. The challenger is not usually the new
world power. Instead, it is some ally of the old power. This process of
long powers is irreversible. The global war is the strong beat of the
long cycle. It serves as the decision mechanism generating new
leadership. Modelski has named the Soviet Union to be the challenge
and Japan to be the new hegemon. Gupta further adds that "the
1990s will continue to witness the relations of conflict as the main trend. Anarchy of self-interest, balance of power, the growth of dependencies will still be created. The world is going to move towards multipolarity from this unipolar moment. Great powers are going to come up. New balance will be ordered.\textsuperscript{69}

Bhabani Sen Gupta has said that in the 21st century, India will be one of the six great powers that will straddle the planet. These powers are generally identified as the United States, China the European Union, Japan, Russia and India. There will be several other important centres of power in the coming century in which economic political and even military power will be more widely dispersed than in the century that is rolling out to history. So, the transition from the bipolar or unipolar world to a genuinely multipolar one is in the offing. He further adds the India's strategic position distant from the potentially most likely nuclear flash points (Europe and East Asia) allows it to pursue an ambivalent nuclear policy for as long as one can look through the mists of time. India's self-image on the eve of the 21st century is not that of the next nuclear power, but of the next economic and therefore strategic power in the new century\textsuperscript{70}.

While accepting the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower, P.S. Jayaramu expresses his reservations about the emergence of the unipolar world. He argues, firstly, military power is not any longer the sole criterion of determining the power position of a nation, more so a superpower. As a part of this proposition, collapse of the Soviet Union need not necessarily lead to a position of US military overlordship of the world. He quotes Stanley Hoffman and Jasjit Singh and opines that post-Cold War world would be multipolar from a structural point of view, but the 'poles' will have different currencies of power-economic and financial (Japan and Germany), demographic (China
and India), military (US) - the fate of the world depending on how the
different poles cooperate with one another. Secondly, considerable
importance has to be given to the role of the developing Third World
States who provide the resources as well as the markets to the
industrially and militarily advanced nations leading to a considerable
dependence of the latter as the former then necessitating us to
consider them as important constituents of the international system.
Simply put, the interdependent character of the world is a compelling
factor in recognizing the multipolar character of the international
system. The inevitability of the multipolar system and the need for
the system being responsive to the needs and aspirations of the Third
World nations who are eversince the 1950s fighting for a new
international order based on equity, development and social justice in
an otherwise neo-colonialist world system has been in recent times
brought out emphatically by India and China. So, the historic and
unbelievable changes in the global political scene notwithstanding
the international system has remained essentially multipolar thus
exposing the illusory character of the American belief and advocacy of
the Unipolar world. More than anything else it has emphasized the
need for bringing about a harmony of the Third World and developed
world's goals and value systems in the remaining years of the 20th
century and beyond. In this situation, the biggest challenge to India
lies in how successfully and objectively her leadership reconciles the
real politick oriented management of its national interests with the
value oriented goals of NAM71.

Swaran Singh has said that the end of the Cold War has no doubt
changed many things and not one but many centres of power
around the globe continue to balance each other and that similar
checks and balances also constantly continue to operate within
various regions themselves. It is more like a multipolar world with one particular nation or grouping being ultimately more important as compared to all others. In this connection, he has rightfully termed Japan as economic superpower. He says, with increasing inter bloc interactions and changing power equations around the globe, it has also many new opportunities for India for building new alignments and partnerships.

Achin Vanaik has said, the idea that great powers decisively shape the world has become increasingly outmoded as the world becomes an increasingly complex arrangement of interesting relationships of all kinds. The Pax Americana of today despite its victory in the Cold War cannot even hope to reach the same level of world influence as the Pax Americana of the Cold War period. And this is not only because of the possible rise of Pax Nippon and Pax Germania. Even if Japan and Germany continue to outpace the USA economically, Pax Nippon and Pax Germania will have a relative global weight even less than that of the Pax American that preceded their rise. So, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the ex-USSR showing how fragile even super powdrom was, matters seem altogether more complicated and the Indian search for acknowledged and unchangeable regional eminence in South Asia seems both more difficult than once assumed and also rather more pointless. India should concentrate on its more fundamental security problems of the kind outlined earlier and eschew more grandiose ambitions.

Salman Haider, former Foreign Secretary told that “India has been playing a responsible and constructive role in international relations. In the present context, India is facing a fresh set of questions. The world has moved towards the direction of unipolarity though projections at a psychological level or aspiration are there by countries like India & China that we are moving towards
multipolarity. So, in this unipolar model, we have to take note of the American influence, its weight and the strong voice it has on different issue defining world politics. However, unipolarity does not mean a kind of ‘headmaster approach’ rather it is to be seen in the context of the voice and weight of America. In this direction, she often practices or attempts to compel other nations to adopt certain internal standards of practice which may be contrary to their own interests and that has been a major shift in her foreign policy from ‘containment’ to what can be called as ‘constrainment’. In this ongoing battle, we have faced challenges or constraints in terms of American attempt to undermine our security strategy by way of sanctions, compel us to confirm to NPT regime, non recognition of our country as a nuclear power etc. However India has withstood these constraints diligently and even the recent visit of Clinton doesn’t make any difference in that regard. Therefore, India in order to play a meaningful role in international relations should mend the neighbourhood relations, maintain stability, and retrain from creating tensions on matters of nuclear policy. In this way she could play a more constructive and responsible role in international relations”.

Talking of the current world order, P.N. Dhar, believes that the post-Cold War world is multipolar, still fluid and very complex. He further adds that in this world, a country can join other countries for different purposes for all time to come. In other words, India will need pragmatic policies and highly flexible diplomacy to search for situations and countries with which its interests coincide. This is a new context in which our policy makers have little experience. But what is favourable for India is that its national aspirations run parallel to emerging concerns of the powerful industrialized countries. For them, there is advantage in supporting Indian aspirations.
Equally, our policy-makers should move out of their old rigidities and show greater schedule in areas where mutual interest converge. Mr. K. Raghunath is of the opinion that 'ever since the end of Cold War, we have a new situation in front of us and in this situation, our roles as well as goals have to be defined in clear terms by looking at the configuration of states. In the Cold War days, the kind of constraints that we used to face have been reduced to a considerable extent in the present context and that has helped us in creating a balancing factor. Formulation of foreign policy has become easier. While doing so, we should not only keep an eye over the external factors like- Pak factor, China factor but also the internal factors in terms of the perception of global interests of major powers like the United States. We have been very consistent in our policies and always try to orient them in our own interest. International pressures by major powers would always be there not only in respect of our country but also others since they have varied interests as well. So, in this competitive world, where every nation state makes frantic attempt to uphold its own interests, I think, we are formidable enough and strong enough to resist those pressures and formulate the policies in our own interest. There have been pressures to sign the NPT after hijacking of non-proliferation agenda in NPT, but we have resisted it. There are constraints or pressures on us for the unstoppable process of globalisation. We have to live with it and therefore, we have to be good managers inside the country to cope up with those pressures of globalisation. We generally learn from our own experiences and in the present international system, we should maintain a cordial relationship with the neighbouring countries, take determined steps towards economic growth, improve the internal contradictory situation and so on which would enable us play a meaningful role in the international fora.'
Kanti Bajpai is of the opinion that, in the Cold War, India's foreign policy autonomy - its ability to stay away from permanent alliances, to condone and commend the actions of others - was under stress from the two superpowers, on at least from the competition between them, and the temptation to join one side or the other. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the military, diplomatic and ideological competition between the two blocs has been removed. India no longer has to deal with the pressures from a bipolar system. Instead, it inhabits a world dominated by one power, the United States, which leads a coalition of industrialized states from North America, Europe and East and South-east Asia. On various issues, this US led coalition could attempt to constrain Indian choices. Nuclear policy, regional security, human rights, trade and intellectual property, environment, population, all these are areas where the US and some combination of its allies may come up against India. In its relations with greater powers, states can choose bandwagoning, balancing non-alignment, even "hiding". In the bipolar world, India chose non-alignment. In the unipolar world which is transiting to a multipolar world, and is in the economic realm nearly multipolar, India's strategy for autonomy has been one of "bandwagoning - with-balance".

Thus, the senior echelons who have actually shaped the Indian perception of the current moment of unipolarity, more or less believe that the current seemingly unipolar moment is temporary in character and it will invariably move towards multipolarity. Emerging powers like Germany, Japan, China, India besides others will definitely pose challenges to the so-called preeminence on preponderance of the United States in the fields as diverse as economy, technology and military. Now, with the rise of these powers, the quality of their relations with United States will be profoundly
altered. Relations will become significantly more competitive and cooperation will correspondingly become more difficult. In a situation like that, great power security rivalries will be present and the world will be more dangerous to live in. Besides, with the inevitable growth of technology and improvements in the methods of warfare, armed conflicts are likely to keep increasing. These nations have come to depend heavily on nuclear weapons and the concomitant doctrines of nuclear deterrence to provide security. The rationalization and perpetuation of the politco-military doctrines based on offensive capabilities inevitably tend to push them towards wider adoption and universalisation of the doctrines and capabilities supporting them. This has been the fundamental reason for proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1945, and increasing number of states seek to find security through the means and methods adopted by these countries in general and Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in particular.

Thus, the present phase of history will continue to witness the relations of conflict as the main trend. Anarchy of self-interest, balance of power, the growth of dependencies will still be created. Spheres of influence may still be carved out. In the temporary phase of unipolar moment with varied constraints in it, cooperation and interdependence would become increasingly difficult and therefore, new balance will be ordered. Great powers are going to come up to challenge the unipolar moment and move the world towards multipolarity. Given the background of such developments, it has become pertinent to understand the concept of security in the changing international relations and that would be taken up in the next chapter.
END NOTES


5 Gupta, Rakesh, op.cit, p. 67.


7 Ibid, pp. 23-4.

8 Gupta, Rakesh, op.cit., p. 3.


11 Ibid;

12 Gupta, Rakesh, op.cit., pp. 4-5.


The link between America’s security, its preponderance, and an American-led world order was articulated in NSC-68, which states that the purpose of American power is “to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish” and the strategy of preponderance is “a policy which (the US) would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet Union”. NSC-68 in Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment : Documents in American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York : Columbia Univ. Press, 1978), p. 401.

See Russell D. Bulite and William. Christopher Hamel, “War for Peace : The Question of American Preventive War Against the


The term “double containment” is from Wolfram Harreider, Germany, Europe, and America (New Haven, Conn. : Yale Univ. Press, 1989).


Diplomatic historians agree that economic factors played an important role in postwar American foreign policy but disagree about whether geopolitical or economic considerations were accorded priority in U.S. strategy. Compare Leffler, A Preponderance of Power with Bruce Canings, “The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History”, in Michael J. Honga, (eds.), America in the World : The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941 (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995). The crucial point, sometimes lost in the debate, is the seamless interconnection of strategy and economics.


Brent Scowcroft argues that American prosperity depends on the global economy, and therefore the “US cannot prosper amid chaos and conflict”. Brent Scowcroft, “Who can Harness History”, New York, Times, July 2, 1993, p. A-15. The Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated : “We are a trading nation and our prosperity is directly linked to peace and stability in the world . . . simply

117
stated, the worldwide market that we are part of cannot thrive where regional violence, instability and aggression put it in peril".


"Exerts from Pentagon's Plan" (emphasis added).


The arguments made in this paragraph are elaborated on in Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion", op.cit.


Ibid, p. 44.

Ibid, p. 52.

Gupta, Rakesh, op.cit., p. 20.


43 Gupta, Rakesh, *op.cit*, p. 20.


51 Rana, A.P. *op.cit.*, pp. 48-49.


Ibid, p. 386.

An Interview with Mr. J.N. Dixit, Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India on 29th May, 2000 at 3 p.m. at his residence.


Dutt, V.P. “Complexities in the Post-Cold War World: the Indian Perspective” in Ibid, pp. 120-128.


Ibid;

An Interview with Prof. V.P. Dutt, on 17th May, 2000 at 3 p.m. at his residence.


70 Sengupta, B. “India : The Next Great Power” in Mansingh, Lahiri et. al. (eds.) op.cit., pp. 129-140.


72 Singh Swaran “Post – Cold War World Order and India’s National Security”, in Strategic Analysis, (New Delhi : IDSA, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1995),


74 An Interview with Mr. Salman Haider, Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India on 29th May, 2000 at 11 a.m. at his residence


76 An Interview with Mr. K. Raghunath, Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, on 19th May, 2000 at 3 p.m. at India International Centre.