CHAPTER - I

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: BALANCE OF POWER AND CONSTRAINMENT
**Introduction**

The post-Cold War world is characterised by a definite shift towards multipolar setting. The conditions for long post-war peace-bipolarity, would be absent and the power inequities would occur causing instability to a greater extent which would raise the risk of war among nation-states. There would be a constant threat to cooperation and peace. To deal with such kind of changing contemporary international system, sovereign nation states would perforce restructure their foreign policies in order to create more autonomy in the fields as diverse as - economic, ecological, cultural and political. Since, the policy options used within the logic of Cold War seem outmoded, now, the policy makers are increasingly operating under 'constraintment' as the policy option, particularly when the temporary unipolarity assertion is in ascendance. Therefore, in this chapter, an attempt has been made at the outset to trace turbulence in the three different parameters - Micro, Macro and Relational with special emphasis on the last one. Then, an attempt has been made to delineate the interdependence theory which is based on these parametric relationships and how this theory is inadequate to guarantee cooperation and peace. Therefore, national security is under maximum strain and foreign policy reorientations are often taking place in the external direction resulting in various types of constraints which has been dealt with in the next section. Further, an attempt has also been made to define 'Constrainment' at a conceptual level with its differences with 'Containment', 'detente' and 'entente'. Lastly, on the basis of this framework of analysis, it has been said that the unipolar moment is temporary owing to unequal
power structure, absence of balance of power and other structural constraints in terms of differential growth rates, balancing and sameness logic which would render the theory of interdependence inadequate and strengthen the neo-realist argument of conflictual scenario in world politics.

**International relations are in turbulence.** The system based on state sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 is under strain owing to sub-state and supra-state organisations challenging the security agenda of the 1980s and 90s in the fields as diverse as nuclear deterrence, ecological balance and economic self-reliance. Since international system is anarchic, international institutions are unable to cope with the problems of turbulence. Turbulence is marked by elements of conflict and hopes of cooperation. Even if in the short term, under the sameness logic, cooperation may be witnessed, in the longer run, conflict may continue to be the main trend. Old and reforming international institutions such as UN, NATO, EU seem to be inadequate for managing the conflicts but at the same time suggest elements of cooperation under the current moment of unipolarity. In this changed and changing international relations, the turbulence is furiously evident as thunderclouds of war gather or the lightening of a crisis streaks across the global sky: anarchy, as described by Thomas Hobbes. Often the turbulence is of a clear-air kind, the havoc it wreaks unrecognized until after its challenges have been met or its damage done. This turbulence in world politics and the changes that it both reflects and promotes, focus on the underlying and enduring dynamics out of which daily events and current issues flow. Some of the dynamics are located at micro levels,
where individuals learn and groups cohere; others originate at macro levels, where new technologies are operative and collectivities conflict; and still others derive from clashes between opposing forces at the two levels - between continuity and change, between the pulls of the past and the lures of the future, between the requirements of interdependence and the demands for independence, between centralizing and decentralising tendencies within and among nation-states. It is between this change and continuity and in the context of the tensions that the conception of turbulence in world politics as high complexity and high dynamism needs to be considered. The presence of change is not constant across a turbulent environment. Being variable in purpose and structure, actors do not respond to conditions in the same way. Some have a greater capacity for adaptation than others; some may even manage to prosper under conditions of high complexity and dynamism, while others founder & undergo transformation. In other words, there can be big changes and little changes, changes that alter the course of history and changes that are merely momentary deviations from central tendencies. Much depends on the vantage point from which they are assessed. Not all the changes at work in the world, are indicative of global turbulence. It is not difficult to conceive of slow evolutions that never erupt into turbulence. It is also possible to conceive of turbulence that does not accompany or foster change, in the sense of a subsystematic turbulence that spreads neither to other subsystems nor to the more encompassing whole system.

In order to differentiate the familiar & commonplace changes from the profound kind of transformations that seem to be occurring today,
one other attribute of political turbulence needs to be noted namely it involves parametric change. Only when the basic parameters of world politics, those boundary constraints that shape and confine the fluctuations of its variables, are engulfed by high dynamism and high complexity is turbulence considered to have set in. Being boundaries, parameters are normally stable. They make possible the continuities of political life, the ability of individual and collective actors to get from one day to the next and from one era to the next. Hence, when the orientations, skills, relationships and structures that have sustained the parameters of world politics begin to crumble, i.e. when the complexity and dynamism of the parameters reach a point where the existing rules of conduct no longer serve to constrain behavior and outcomes - the course of events is bound to turn turbulent.

**Parameters**

Three dimensions of world politics are conceptualized as its main parameters. One of these operates at the micro level of individuals, one functions at the macro level of collectivities, and the third involves a mix of the two levels. The micro parameter consists of the orientations and skills by which citizens of states and members of non-state organizations link themselves to the macro level world of global politics. This set of boundary constraints can be regarded as the orientational or skill parameter. It basically consists of those predispositions & practices by which people relate to higher authority, a cluster that includes their loyalties, legitimacy sentiments, compliance habits, analytic skills, and cathectic capacities. This cluster is a micro parameter because it refers to the orientations and behaviour of individuals, and it is a global parameter in as much as
people everywhere, not withstanding their cultural differences, tend to allow their leaders to speak and act on their belief in world politics. Historically, the orientations and behaviour of citizens and subjects have accorded their leaders great leeway. Most people were socialised into the norms of their own systems, unexposed to the world beyond their local and national communities and thus responsive to the demands of the other two parameters inherent in a state-centric world of industrialised communities and empires; hence they tended to be minimally and simplistically oriented towards world affairs. Leaving aside elites and attentive public, citizens in every part of the world related to political and organisational authorities with rudimentary analytic skills, with a disinclination to become emotionally involved in foreign situations or outcomes, with a readiness to accept as authoritative whatever the duly constituted leaders asserted as their policies, and thus with a predisposition to comply automatically with the initiatives or directives to which such policies gave rise.

The macro parameter is designated as structural parameter and it refers to the constraints embedded in the distribution of power among and within the collectivities of the global system. The mixed parameter is called the relational parameter and it focuses on the nature of authority relations that prevail between individuals at the micro level and their macro collectivities. These two global parameters have some common elements, but they are differentiated enough not to treat them as a single cluster. The structural parameter consists of those rules of governance, informal regimes, formal alliances, legal conventions and other arrangements through which the issues contested on the global stage are processed and managed by macro
collectivities (States, sub-national groups, or supranational organizations). These collectivities, in turn, are sustained by one or another form of hierarchical authority relations (e.g. pluralistic and class structure in national systems and balance-of-power and dependency patterns in international systems), which are here designed as relational parameter.

All three of these parameters are judged to be undergoing thoroughgoing transformation today as to bring about turbulence in world politics. In the case of the structural parameter, the transformation is marked by a bifurcation in which the state-centric system now coexists with an equally powerful, though more decentralized, multi-centric system. Although these two worlds of world politics have overlapping elements and concerns, their norms, structures and processes tend to be mutually exclusive, thus giving rise to a set of global arrangements that are new and possibly enduring, as well as, extremely complex and dynamic. In the case of the relational parameter, the long standing pattern whereby compliance with authority tends to be questioning and automatic is conceived to have been replaced by a more elaborate set of norms that make the successful exercise of authority much more problematic, thus, fostering leadership and followership conflicts within and among state and non-state collectivities that can fairly be judged as amounting to a series of authority crisis which, in both their pervasiveness and their scale, are new and global in scope. Lastly, at the micro level, the analytic skills of individuals have increased to a point where they now play a different and significant role in world
politics, a role which has intensified both the processes of structural bifurcation and the breakdown of authority relations.

However, there are certain forces at work towards the end of the twentieth century that drive these parametric transformations. First, the shift from an industrial to post-industrial order which has brought about a technological revolution and made life faster and distances shorter and thus the interdependence of people and events have been made greater. Second, the emergence of transnational issues which are products of this technological development like environmental pollution, terrorism, drug-trade, etc. Third, the reduced capability of states and governments to provide satisfactory solutions to the major issues on their global agendas. Fourth, with the weakening of whole systems, sub-systems have acquired a correspondingly greater coherence and effectiveness, thereby hosting tendencies towards decentralization at all organisational levels. Finally, there is the feedback of the consequences all the foregoing for the skills and orientations of the people vis-à-vis the authority in today's world. Thus, today's politics on a global scale have been transformed by the diverse dynamics that have taken modern life beyond the roles and arrangements that prevailed throughout the industrial era. With these forces driving the parametric transformation changes are marked and subsequently turbulence results from the interactive changes among all these three parameters and in that sense, each is necessary and none is sufficient source of post-international politics. But by being as it were, a transmission belt through which a preponderance of the interactions between individuals and their collectivities across, the relational parameter
serves as a logical point of departure. Secondly, relational phenomenon are especially compelling. Pertaining as they do to what happens when one actor seeks to modify the behavior of another, such phenomena tend to provoke our curiosity much more than do orientational or structural phenomena. Orientations and structures tend to be highly patterned, while interpersonal relationships never seem quite so predictable. They are composed of many dimensions that can undergo wide and sudden fluctuations. The possibility of such swings renders relational phenomena especially problematic and as puzzles in which outcomes can be difficult to anticipate, they are irresistible objects of attention.

**Authority and Crisis**

These dynamics of the relational parameter ensures an analysis around the process of control. The concept of control has much in common with that of influence, but nevertheless, differences are also there. Control is a less encompassing concept, in as much as it tends to refer to conscious efforts to modify the behavior of others, where as influence can occur as a result of factors that lie either within or outside interactive relationships. The concept of control is inherently relational in the sense that it requires that there be one party doing the controlling and another being controlled. The exercise of control, in other words, implies attempts on part of one actor to modify, preserve, or otherwise affect the orientations or actions of another. Thus it is a concept rooted in interactions and its existence can be determined empirically only by observing the degree of correspondence between what the controller does and how the object of control responds. These interactions might be called the relations
of control and the means or techniques through which control is sought and established ranges from the most violent at one end to the least violent at the other. Brute force and other forms of physical coercion are found at the former extreme, scientific proof and reason at the latter. In between these two extremes lie a number of techniques involving interactions that are more complex than both the control achieved through the use of coercion and the compliance that results from the presentation of irrefutable evidence. Appeals to shared values, trade-offs, bargaining, arm-twisting, and economic sanctions are among the non-extreme techniques.

Just as control is exercised through a range of techniques, so also the responses of those toward whom the techniques are directed can be usefully placed along a continuum. At one end is full agreement and compliance, at the other, disagreement and defiance. Between these too extremes lie such reactions as avoidance, disputation, conditional agreement, alternative interpretations, bargaining, delay and counter force. Somewhere in the middle of the continuum are the responses of disinterest and apathy. However, the long run patterns of compliance and defiance serve as the foundations of the relational parameter. The patterns form partly because the relative capabilities of the parties to relationships tend to be enduring and hence to produce recurring outcomes, and partly because compliance and defiance tend to be habitual and thus to become institutionalized. The most notable outcome of these enduring control relationships is hierarchy, the structure of control whereby actors in a system acquire superior, inferior, or control perspective, hierarchical structure refer to the norms, habits, and formal arrangements through which
individuals, groups and collectivities dominate, submit, or otherwise relate to others at the macro level.

Another enduring outcome of control relations is authority, that set of premises and habits on which macro leaders are entitled to rely to obtain automatic compliance from their followers. The processes whereby authority is created in a collectivity are the subject of a vast literature and it is sufficient to recognize that no collectivity could persist for long without having authority as a legal basis for the conduct of its leaders and the maintenance of its hierarchical structures. It is through the exercise of authority that decisions are made and implemented and the coherence of collectivities thereby preserved. If a collectivity lacked authority relations, if its members felt entitled to do as they pleased, goals could not be framed and energies could not be concerted; there could be no collective action, and the collectivity would soon lose its identity as a social system distinct from its environment. Authority relationships, in other words, are those patterns of a collectivity wherein some of its members are accorded the right to make decisions, set rules, allocate resources, and formulate policies for the rest of the members who in turn comply with the decisions, rules and policies made by the authorities.

There are various reasons why people accord legitimacy to the acts of authorities and comply with their directives. One is fear of consequences of non-compliance; another is an understanding that collective coherence and action serves their needs and goals; a third is the expectation that others will also comply. Mostly, however, compliance is a matter of habit; repeated instances of compliance became deeply ingrained as a response when certain procedures are
followed and certain kinds of pronouncements are issued. The longer the authority has been in place, the greater is the legitimacy that attaches to it, and thus the more deep-seated are the habits of compliance it evokes. Under these conditions which is to say, under circumstances where the parameters of a system are stable and its dynamism confined to selective variables, actions and policies authorized at the macro level are simply accepted unquestioningly by those toward whom the actions and policies are directed. The compliance may be preceded by argument, bargaining and delay, and the actions and policies may thus be moderated, but in the end the habit of compliance will normally prevail as the relational outcome. This habit of compliance remains in tact when authority relations are clear-cut and accepted as in the case in stable collectivities. But, authority relations can undergo change, if forces at work within or external to the collectivity erode the habit of compliance. Sometimes the erosion reaches the point where leaders are inclined to resort to coercion to implement their policies. Such a shift in the nature of leadership is likely to erode the habits of compliance still further and bring on a full-blown crisis of authority. And in a state like this, both leaders and members will have to turn more frequently to other techniques of control to return a collectivity's coherence and move toward its goals. Since, coercive techniques are likely to be less and less available in the absence of effective authority relations, and so persuasion, trade-offs, and other forms of bargaining became the main techniques by which control is sought. In bargaining relations, compliance is induced by trading some benefit in exchange for it. In this situation, authority is absent from the relationship; compliance occurs not because those who accept a decision believe that those
who made it were entitled to do so, but because they are willing to comply in order to achieve the benefit that has been offered. But, when uncertainty marks the course of events and the collectivity's members do not fall back on the techniques of habits of compliance, and the systemic complexity and dynamism intensify to the point where the appeals of leaders are questioned or even defied, the relational parameter begins to undergo turbulence. When turbulence sets in, however, the habits start to come undone. The premises of compliance become unclear, unsettled and open to bargaining; leaders have to devote time to assuring their legitimacy sentiments. The more such circumstances impinge on authority relations, the more it can be said that they are in crisis.

**Turbulence in Relational Parameter**

Crisis in an authority relationship is not necessarily the outgrowth of differences within a collectivity over policy issues. Members of collectivity express differences and even make gestures of defiance of authority without of necessity being ready to abandon compliance. To be sure, widespread manifestation of defiance may be precursors of a breakdown in compliance habits, but it is only when the breakdown has occurred that an authority structure begins to lose its utility as a mechanism for resolving the collectivity's disputes and moving toward its goals. Authority, relations in crisis are thus fragile and uncertain. They hint at change, collectivities in flux and the regrouping of lines of authority. Thus, the global authority crisis is a series of authority crisis that appear in every region of the world. However, the notion of a global authority crisis calls attention not only to a spreading and intensification of violent conflicts in world affairs, but also and more
importantly, to changes in the underlying and enduring relationships by which collectivities concert their energies on behalf of shared needs and goals. In this sense, authority crises reflect deeper dynamics than even outright war, because they involve the day to day patterns whereby collectivities cohere and perform their tasks. Violent conflicts terminate, but the habits of compliance and cooperation may not follow the cessation of hostilities. So, the turbulence and cascading interdependence of recent decades transformed the relative symmetry of global authority relations into the asymmetries of a bifurcated world and recurrent breakdowns in the habits of compliance.

In order to know how proliferating subgroups have contributed to global authority crises, it is useful to note how the prime political order in the state-centric world, the national government has declined in terms of its capacity to generate compliance. The assertion of such a decline poses problems of perspective and measurement. It might be argued that governments have never been very effective, that their legitimacy has always been subject to question, and that current trends are thus mere fluctuations in a long-standing pattern. Hence the assertion that a decline in the effectiveness of governments is under way should be verified with systematic longitudinal data. What follows is admittedly not based on data of that kind; the relevant materials have not been compiled. Perhaps, then the postulated trend of declining effectiveness is a distortion of an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the impression of diminished competence is not easily dispelled, and there are also good theoretical reasons to expect that as societies become more complex, governments burden of maintaining its authority by security the consent of the governed becomes
increasingly difficult. Some have called this situation a crisis of governability.

Walter Lippmann, concerned about the erosion of executive power in democratic societies during the first half of the 20th century, expressed the same idea in even more dire terms: “where man opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid derangement of the true functions of power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis of the capacity to govern. This breakdown in the constitutional order is the cause of the perceptible and catastrophic decline of western society. It may, if it cannot be arrested and reversed, bring about the fall of the west.”

However, the declining effectiveness means a progressive inability on the part of governments to provide their clients with the conditions and services that reflects the goals they have set for themselves and that their clients expect of them. Effectiveness, then is more than the maintenance of order. It involves the solving of problems and the resolving of issues, or at least preventing the worsening of problems and the intensity of issues. It pertains to policy outputs, to tangible services, such as highways and unemployment checks and to such intangible conditions as a feeling of physical security and a sense of optimism about what the future holds. Effectiveness, however, is not easily measured in terms of outputs. It should be sought in the compliance attitude and behaviour of those toward whom the outputs are directed, in the orientations and activities of elites and citizenries in the case of domestic policies and in the reactions of allies and adversaries in the case of foreign policies. Systematically observing and aggregating such phenomena obviously presents enormous
difficulties and most analysts have instead employed crude measures—such as the length of time that governments hold a legislative majority—that are hardly more satisfactory than the mere impression of ineffectiveness derived from such developments as the near-total breakdown of governmental authority, the persistence of poverty in all parts of the world, the failure of agricultural policies in many countries, the existence of underground economies and things like that. Apart from effectiveness as the criterion by which governments are evaluated, stability and openness are also equally important criteria and in some instances their record in this respect may be more impressive. From the perspective of governments constrained by subgroupism at home and authority crises abroad, however, the criterion of effectiveness is especially important. For the greater the decline in the capacities of governments to realize their goals, the greater is the likelihood of resistance to their policies and of the erosion of their legitimacy, consequences, which, in turn, detract further from their effectiveness. Whether the decline in governmental effectiveness is a cause or a consequence of the trend towards attaching authority and legitimacy to nongovernmental collectivities—and doubtless it is both a cause and a consequence—the result is the same: the leaders of national governments have limited room for innovation. Internally they are restrained from understanding new policies by the lack of a political consensus and by the demands of more coherent subgroups, while externally their initiatives are limited both by the similar circumstances of the governments with which they must negotiate and by the demands of transnational actors in international fora. There are in short, the conditions of stalemate. Post international politics have deprived governments of room for
maneuver and even well established policies have proved increasingly difficult to maintain as the global crises of authority continue to intensify and cascade tensions along the many focal lines of cleavage. These actions, however, are now played out in the context of authority relations that are most unsettled and tenuous than they were before the onset of global turbulence. As authoritative actors in an era when authority is suspect and delicate, governments must move slowly and allow for stalemated institutions that in effect, preserve the sources of their authority.

The fragmentation of whole systems into subsystems occurs: either decentralization of the system is believed to allow it to move more effectively towards its goals; or, because its subsystem's members increasingly sensitive to the differences among them. In the former case, decentralization advances through formal and legal processes that accord it official approval. In the latter case, it develops through informal and ad hoc procedures that may be neither planned nor sanctioned. In either case whether such changes stem from systematic planning or systematic stirrings, they amount to movement in the direction of what has been called "subgroupism", a direction contrary to that of 'nation-statism', whereas nation-statism suggests convergence around the values and institutions of whole systems, subgroupism implies convergence occurs around subgroups. Subgroupism is a generic concept for the splitting away of one or more components of any collectivity, be it a nation, community, political party, opposition movement, or international organisation. Viewed in this way, conventional definitions of a nation – e.g., that it is "a terminal community", by which is meant "the largest community
that, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those that cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society\(^9\) – can be readily recast to fit any subgroup and the basis of its persistence through any historical period. Thus, subgroupism is part of a cyclical or dialectical process wherein tendencies toward global centralization contain the bases for renewing decentralising tendencies.

Apart from this, the sources of subgroupism at work within countries also operate to undermine the organisational relations between them. At the international level, the nation-state is a subsystem, and thus at this level sub-groupism can include an emphasis on the interest of nation-states as well as those of their sub-systems; but the consequences are the same, in the sense that organisations changed with governance undergo a loss of support, a diminution of authority, and a slippage in effectiveness. So, the governing mechanisms of international organizations have not been immune to the global tendencies towards decentralization. As turbulence has mounted in recent years, however, a variety of international organizations – from global ones like the UN & UNESCO to regional and issue-based ones like the OAS, EC, FAO – have undergone the same splintering and decline in effectiveness experienced by their sovereignty - bound counterparts. Consistent with the decentralising tendencies that have disrupted authority relations at all levels marked by increasing conflictual scenarios rather than interdependence and cooperation, is the diminishing role of liberal optimistic ideology of interdependence as the guarantor of cooperation and peace. In common parlance,
simple interdependence refers to mutual dependence which finds a clear cut expression in Herbert-Spencer's doctrine of social organism. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. These effects often result from international transactions - flow of money, goods, people and messages across international boundaries. Such transactions have increased dramatically since World War - II and claim as guarantors of cooperation and peace. The proponents of this perspective argue that since the survival of human civilization is threatened by environmental and non-military dangers, conflicts of interests among states and people no longer need to lead to war. They further argue that in politics of interdependence, domestic and transnational as well as governmental interests are involved and hence, the behavior of states and world politics in general are affected. Therefore, interdependence would lead to cooperation and peace.

Since, states in the system today are primarily motivated by relative gains, where states not only consider its individual gains but also how well it does compared to other states, rather than absolute gains where states focus on their own profits alone, cooperation is more difficult to achieve. This is because states concerned about absolute gains need only make sure that the pie is expanding and that they are getting at least some portion of the increase, while states that worry about relative gains must also care about how the pie is divided which complicates the cooperative efforts.

Therefore, interdependence cannot be defined entirely in terms of situation of evenly balanced mutual dependence. It is asymmetries in
dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence and coercion for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues. Therefore, interdependence involves a sort of interaction where there are reciprocal costly effects of transactions and where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness. Since, interdependence involves costs, it restricts autonomy and thereby never suggests the disappearance of international conflicts.

On the contrary, international conflicts or tensions have taken a new form of 'Constrainment' and are concealed in a large number in the perspective of interdependence. However, a micro perspective, the macro-level trend towards subgroupism constitutes an opportunity, in the sense that it offers individuals a series of alternative collectivities to which they can attach their loyalties and apply their criteria of legitimacy. In so doing, of course, it also intensifies crisis in relations of authority as citizens become both more flexible and more fickle with respect to the attachment of their loyalties. From the perspective of the structural parameter, on the other hand, the decentralising patterns of authority relationships are less an opportunity than a major challenge: they increase the complexity and dynamism of global politics and make it more difficult for collectivities, singly or interactively, to manage their affairs. Besides, from the relational parameter point of view, in a decentralised structure, with public more analytically skillful and more ready to question authority, hegemons have proved it increasingly difficult to exercise political
control even within their own sphere of influence. In short, the rise of multi-centric world has brought major changes to the state-centric world. The prospect that any sovereignty-bound actor will be able to prevail over, or even to coordinate, the decentralising dynamics that are at work among sovereignty-free actors is highly remote for foreseeable future. Thus global life has turned in decentralising directions that may make the notion of hegemony in world politics obsolete.

**National Security, Foreign Policy Reorientation and Constraints**

In such an international situation, the concept of national security, with its emphasis upon military rivalry between states might be replaced by a universal concept of human security based in the understanding that much of the time, for most people, feeling of insecurity derive from the uncertainties of daily life. While the concept of security, is increasingly used to refer to these broad issues, there is a danger that it may be irredeemably contaminated by its historical use in relation to national security. That is why the concept of insecurity has been referred to in addition. The end of the Cold War brought hopes, also, that global solutions could be found, through a reformed and invigorated UNO, to problems of insecurity deriving from a multitude of sources—economies, environmental, the practice of sexual or racial discrimination, the spread of infectious disease, or the outbreak of war. There was wide convergence of opinion that security could not be viewed purely in military terms. The various non-military threats to security were attracting increasing attention because without adequate security, there could be neither disarmament nor development as reflected in various UN documents.
and World Development Reports. The International Conference on Relationship between Disarmament and development from 24th August to 11th September, 1987 in the UN General Assembly, stated as follows:

"Security is an overriding priority for all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military but also political and economic and social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects. Enhanced Security Council, on the other hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and, on the other, provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development. The development process, by overcoming non-military threats to security and contributing to a more stable and sustainable international system, can enhance security & thereby promote arms reduction and disarmament". Various development reports like Patterson Commission, Olof Palme Report on Common Security, Willy Brandt Commission had focussed on universal, human & non-military dimensions of security in the 1980s. To cope up with the non-military threats to security, governments often restructure their foreign policies. These perceived conditions may range from extreme economic vulnerability (trade concentration toward a single market) to concerns about cultural 'pollution' through excessive contact with foreigners. Given the advances of transportation and communication facilities during past decades, it is understandable that the society, or segments of the culture could be absorbed or destroyed by an influx of aliens and their ideas. While a nationalist response to asymmetrical cultural contacts is hardly new in history, the scope of external
penetration today is multiplied greatly by technology\textsuperscript{14}. However, the policies regarding this foreign penetration and changes in externally directed actions thereby, can be explained in terms of the decision maker's perceptions of the external and domestic conditions which give rise to dissatisfaction with one foreign policy orientation and the desire to restructure external contacts. A variety of factors may be involved, including perceptions of military and non-military threats, calculation of costs and advantages of dependence, domestic political factionalism where creation of an external 'enemy' becomes important, prestige, ideological commitments of groups, parties, or factions, cultural values, personality characteristics of key policy makers and so on. Besides, changes in the externally directed actions may also be explained in terms of the reasons for which the policy makers choose a particular type of new orientation, as opposed to some other. These reasons, however, vary from nation to nation. Those may range from conditioning elite and popular attitudes to policy maker's psychological needs and personality characteristics\textsuperscript{15}.

Analysis have shown that Bhutan, Burma and China have restructured their foreign policies due to external threats in terms of both non-military threats and economic vulnerability and military threats. They express deep concern about the extent of foreign penetration, their vulnerability to outside economic decisions, the weakness of their cultures in the face of foreigners and modern communication media and their lack of autonomy in government-decision making, particularly in the economic realm. Whereas in Burma, 'the foreigner', predominantly in his non-military guise was a perceived threat, in both Bhutan and China, it was perceived military
threat/pressure. Bhutan, in the face of a perceived military threat to its independence, looked at the only one possible source of support for the country's miniscule, sword-bearing army-India. Burma's change to isolationism reflects characteristics of Burmese attitude towards foreigners, widely held antipathy against colonialism and all its destructive consequences in Burma. China's three foreign policy restructurings took three to four possible forms open to the country; orientation to the Soviet Union in opposition to the United States; self-reliance within the communist camp leading in the end to total diplomatic and economic isolation; orientation to the United States in opposition to the Soviet Union; and balance between East and West. Each orientation lasted approximately a decade and each was tried in turn; the 1950s was the decade of the military, economic and ideological alliance with Soviet Union; the 1960s was devoted first to self-reliance and then during the Cultural Revolution to isolation; the 1970s saw reorientation to the West, in particular to the United States. the last option that China seems headed is that of true independence through balance.

In the domestic sphere, the foreign policy reorientation and restructuring of actions may stem from internal threats like rebellions and civil wars which may reduce the government control over the country to the small central sector. Domestic economic conditions and political fractionalization are other serious considerations leading to foreign policy reorientation where nation states basically attempt to assert autonomy, control transnational processes, destroy the residues of colonialism and escape from the embrace of hegemonism.
Thus, in an age where independence and equality stand as major international values, the search for autonomy - economic, cultural and political and breaking away from dependent relationships will continue to shape the restructuring of foreign policies and the various processes which bring societies closer together and which bind their economies may breed counter reactions in the form of autonomy-seeking behavior. These kinds of analysis and discussions existed within the logic of Cold War. However, in the logic of unipolarity, the logic of external factors will work but not the specificities of complex emerging multipolarity. Unipolarity and multipolarity are expected to pull in opposite direction at a later stage. As of now, when unipolarity asserts, 'Constrainment' is the policy option used.

**Constrainment**

However, in a world popularly characterised as 'beyond nationalism', where growing interdependence between societies is supposedly on the verge of creating a global community, attempts would be made not to 'contain' nation states in the name of instability, but to 'constrain' nation states, i.e. resisting the interests of nation states in defence of the interests that are in conflict with other relatively powerful nation states or in the face of globalisation of recent years. So, the policy of 'constrainment' is intended in the direction that the outside world has interests that will be defended by means of incentives for good behavior, deterrence for bad behavior, and punishment when deterrence fails. In this sense, it is different from concepts like containment, détente and entente. 'Containment' refers to the US policy of seeking to limit the expansion of the power and ideology of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China by whatever
means have been thought appropriate; the Supporters of 'containment' have hoped that the communist giants, frustrated in their efforts to expand, would weaken, change their ideological commitments, abandon aggressiveness and accept international status quo\textsuperscript{19}. This policy option was increasingly followed in the bipolar model of Cold War period by US. Now, with the end of Cold War with a definite shift towards multipolar setting. 'Constrainment' is the policy option used by powerful nation states in defence of their indigenous interests in various fields.

Détente, the French noun meaning relaxation designates in diplomatic terminology a condition of reduced tensions and lowered levels of threat or conflict between two or more states. Policies of détente refer to those actions and agreements which are designed to reduce conflicts and improve mutual relations. Détente does not necessarily imply shared interests beyond the mutual desire to avoid war, crisis and high levels of tensions and threat\textsuperscript{20}. This was once again a policy primarily used for the conduct of diplomatic negotiations during the Cold War period. But now in this multipolar setting, conflicts and tensions are bound to arise among nation states due to broad range of interests and attempts to defend those interests. Therefore, 'Constrainment' is the changed policy option used instead of 'détente'.

Furthermore, as a sharp contrast to 'détente', 'entente' as a policy option suggests overlapping and common interests, policy coordination and possible alliance\textsuperscript{21}. But, this policy option also suffers from inadequacy to explain the present international order which is heavily tilted towards multipolarity. Therefore,
'Constrainment' is the buzz policy option that has been increasingly used in the present context. Thus, the onset of liberal interdependence model does not suggest the disappearance of international conflicts, pressures or constraints. On the contrary, international conflicts or tensions have taken new forms in terms of 'constraints' and are being concealed in a large number in this perspective of interdependence. It is in this sense that the trend towards interdependence has highlighted the virtues of historic values associated with independence and autonomy. This 'constrainment strategy' is the result of both external changes and domestic compulsions. Externally, it's a product of the process of globalization and interdependence where states besides loosing their maneuverability find it increasingly difficult to maintain their relative autonomy and independence because of challenges in the fields as diverse as nuclear, economic and ecological. At the domestic level, challenges stem from internal threats, economic conditions and political factionalization. Keeping both these external and internal dimensions in view, nation states are constrained to reorient their foreign policies either as a response to the internal contradictions or as a response to world affairs externally.

**Balance of Power, Temporary Unipolar Moment and Inadequacy of Theory of Interdependence**

International security, in the past, had been constructed essentially on a competitive and autonomous basis. As we move towards the desirable goal of cooperative security for all, it is necessary to enhance mutual political understanding and trust. But the dramatic events witnessed in the post-Cold War years, in terms of dissolutions of one
of the Super Powers into fifteen sovereign states, have made the international security system competitive once again because the unipolar moment is temporary, anarchic and more conflicting, if history is of any guide. The two unipolar moments in history were in 1660-71 and 1860-1910. Each lasted for about 50 years only. In the first-phase was the French hegemony and in the second, it was British hegemony. French hegemony was negated by the rise of Britain and Australia whereas the British hegemony was ended by the rise of Germany, Japan and United States. In both cases international system moved towards multipolarity. So, in the case of the current unipolar moment where there is a definite loss of maneuverability because of decline of USSR which stemmed not from changes internally but from changes externally, the shift is towards multipolar setting. In such a setting there is bound to be great power rivalry which would mark conflicts as the main trend and inadequacy of the theory of interdependence. What, therefore, needs to be done is to look for sources of conflict away from the unit level politics within or among states; to locate conflict at the structural level that assumes anarchy of actions resulting from the pursuit of national interest. This creates its own balance. The neo-realist argument depends heavily in the rationality of micro-economics wherein the national actors of the society are mediated through the forces of the market. The latter determines the outcome that are not stipulated by the national actors. In the international system, the system determines the outcomes. The influence of the system on outcomes is indirectly through socialization of actors and through competition among them. These two pervasive processes occurs at both the societal and international levels. Socialization reduces variety and competition generates order, the
units of which adjust their relations through their autonomous decisions and acts. Since international system are decentralised and anarchic, international institutions are unable to cope with the problems to turbulence. Turbulence may lead to imbalances. The UN and USA have not been able to stop the disruption that was caused in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Capitalism's advent to globalize in the 19th century had ultimately given rise to the creation of nation-states such as Yugoslavia after World War-I, on the principles of the right of nations to self-determination. And yet, it was not applied to Ireland or Finland and other Balkan states. This time the decline of these regimes and states has once again led to the assertion of the rights of nations to self-determination in the new phase of globalisation. This has been made possible by the fact that international law is silent on the issues of state sovereignty and the rights of nations to self-determination. This is where it could be said that the present phase could continue to witness the relations of conflict as the main trend.

Unipolarity in international relations refers to a situation where there is only one power that is militarily preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it. Russia, Germany and Japan are in no condition to match the global reach of the USA in military terms. Russia under Yeltsin has a foreign policy that aims to adjust to the policies and structures of the West. Henz Timmanerman says of the Yeltsin foreign policy "clearly, the main aim of Yeltsin and his government is to link Russia with the West by the way of the four D's : Democratization, Deglobalization, Deideoloization and Demilitarization". Paul Kennedy who recognizes that in the evolution
of the world, the Great Powers future will hold out for countries like Japan says that the USA is currently the most powerful state militarily. In terms of trade, economy and technology, the US has rivals, but its preponderance is not questioned in the period of 90’s. In pursuance with this US grand strategy in the Post-Cold War era, there has been an unbridled use of military force in the protection of strategic US assets abroad and in enforcing certain rules of international behaviour deemed beneficial to America’s continued political and economic paramountcy.

One can see the emergence of this outlook in US strategy before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict. In essence, this outlook holds that the United States is a global power with vital economic interests in many parts of the world - interests that are shared in many cases by the Western industrial powers with which the United States is closely aligned. This outlook further holds that these interests are threatened by social, economic, and political disorder in the Third World, and that, for lack of any suitable alternative, the United States must shoulder responsibility for the protection of such interests and for the maintenance of global law and order.

This outlook is clearly articulated in President Bush’s important address on national security policy of February 7, 1990. America’s post-Cold War strategy, he noted, assumes that ‘new threats are emerging beyond the traditional East-West antagonism of the last 45 years. These threats must now receive the same attention once accorded to the Soviet threat. Clearly, in the future we will need to be able to thwart aggression, repel a missile, or protect a seaplane, or stop a drug lord. To do so, moreover, we will need forces adaptable to
conditions everywhere. And we will need agility, readiness, sustainability. We will need speed and stealth\textsuperscript{24}.

Essential to this mode of thinking is the conviction that the United States must be prepared to use force when necessary to carry out the missions described by President Bush. As suggested by General A.M. Gray, the Command of the Marine Corps.

The international security environment is in the midst of changing from a bipolar balance to a multipolar one with polycentric dimensions. The restructuring of the international environment has the potential to create regional power vacuums that could result in instability and conflict. We cannot permit these voids to develop through disinterest, benign neglect, or lack of capability if we are to maintain our position as a world leader and protect our global interests. This requires that we maintain our capability to respond to likely regions of conflict\textsuperscript{25}.

Thus, this kind of strategy of 'World Policeman' which was espoused by President Roosevelt, continued to exist during Bush period and even in the Clinton phase of today, it continues to be the same in some form or the other. In this conception, Michale Mandelbaum suggests that there are two parts to Clinton doctrine\textsuperscript{26} (a) the use of force on behalf of universal values instead of the war over national interests for which sovereign states have traditionally fought, (b) in defence of those values, military intervention in the in the internal affairs of sovereign states rather than mere opposition to cross-border aggression.
However, the reality points at another name of this strategy: globalisation and localization, where the later may represent medieval religious strife to be put down with a heavy hand in the name of the 21st century vision of tele-informatics. The record of this doctrine is that it went to Haiti to restore democracy, but achieved anarchy. It bombed Bosnia for the sake of national unity but presided over a de facto partition. It bombed Kosovo to protect human rights, but aimed at destabilising Yugoslavia and marginalizing Russia.

In such kind of a situation, therefore, there would be a constant threat to peace and security of nation-states the current-phase would continue to witness the conflictual trends and a definite challenge to the temporary unipolar moment. However, the history reveals that the unipolar moment does not last for more than 50 years and always leads to multipolar setting which is unstable, war-like and there is a constant threat to peace.

So, in this presumably temporary unipolar moment, there would be a definite threat to peace because of inequality of power, absence of parity or balance of power which are pre-requisites of peace in a nuclear era. There have been two other comparable unipolar moments in modern international history. The evidence from those two eras confirms the expectations derived from structural realism: (1) unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because of hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers; and (2) the entry of new great powers into the international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and ultimately, its preeminence. So, in a unipolar world, systematic constraints - balancing, uneven growth rates, and the
sameness effect - impel eligible states (i.e. those with the capability to do so) to become great powers. As Kenneth Waltz says, "in international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it." So, great power emergence is a structurally driven phenomenon. Specifically, it results from the interaction of two factors: (1) differential growth rates and (2) anarchy.

**Differential Growth Rates**

The process of great power emergence is underpinned by the fact that the economic and (and technological and military) power of states grows at differential, not parallel rates. That is, in relative terms, some states are gaining power while others are losing it. Robert Gilpin notes, "overtime, the differential growth in the power of various states in the system causes a fundamental redistribution of power in the system." The result as Paul Kennedy has shown is that time and again relative "economic shifts heralded the rise of military or territorial order." The link between differential growth rates and great power emergence has important implications for unipolarity. Unipolarity is likely to be short-lived because new great powers will emerge as the uneven growth process narrows the gap between the hegemony and the eligible states that are positioned to emerge as its competitors.

There are also other three respects in which great power emergence is affected by differential growth rates. First, as eligible states gain relative power, they are more likely to attempt to advance their standing in the international system. As Gilpin points out, "the critical
significance of the differential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost of changing the international system. Second, Giplin observes, rising power leads to increasing ambition. Rising power seeks to enhance their security by increasing their capabilities and their control over the external environment. Third, as Paul Kennedy explains, rising power leads also to increased international interests and commitments. Oftentimes, for great powers, geopolitical and military capabilities are the consequence of a process that begins with economic expansion. Economic expansion leads to new overseas obligations (access to markets and raw materials, alliances, bases), which then must be defended.

**Anarchy: Consequences**

Because it is anarchic, the international political system is a self-help system in which state's foremost concern must be with survival. In an anarchic system, states must provide for their own security and they face many real or apparent threats. International politics thus is a competitive realm, a fact that in itself constrains eligible states to attain great power status. Specifically, there are two manifestations of this competitiveness that shape great power emergence: balancing and the sameness effect.

**Balancing**

The competitiveness of international politics is manifested in the tendency of states to balance. Balancing has especially strong explanatory power in accounting for the facts that unipolarity tends to be short lived and that would be hegemons invariably fail to achieve lasting dominance. Structural realism leads to the expectations that
hegemony should generate the rise of countervailing power in the form of new great power.

The reason states balance is to correct a skewed distribution of relative power in the international system. States are highly attentive to changes in their relative power position because relative power shifts have crucial security implications\textsuperscript{37}. Giplin says, "the international system's competitiveness stimulates, and may compel a state to increase its power; at least, it necessitates that the prudent state percent relative increase in the powers of competitor states\textsuperscript{38}. By definition, the distribution of relative power in a unipolar system is extremely unbalanced. Consequently, in a unipolar system, the structural pressures on eligible states to increase their relative capabilities and become great powers should be overwhelming. If they do not acquire great power capabilities, they may be exploited by the hegemons. Joseph Grieco points out, because states worry that today's ally could become tomorrow's rival, "they pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relative capabilities in future"\textsuperscript{39}.

Moreover, if stability is equated with the dominant state's continuing preeminence, the stability of hegemonic systems is questionable once the hegemon's power begins to erode noticeably. As Giplin points out, over time a hegemon declines from its dominant position because (1) the costs of sustaining its preeminence begins to erode the hegemon's economic strength, thereby dominating its military and economic capabilities; and (2) the hegemonic paradox results in the diffusion of economic, technological and organizational skills to other states, thereby causing the hegemon to lose its "comparative advantage" over them\textsuperscript{40}. Frequently, these others are eligible states that will rise to
great power status and challenge the hegemon's predominance. This reflects the fact that in unipolar system, there is no clear-cut distinction between balancing against power. This is because the threat inheres in the hegemon's power. In a unipolar world, others must worry about the hegemon's capabilities, not its intentions. The preeminent powers' intentions may be benign today but may not be tomorrow. Unless they are prepared to run the risk of being vulnerable to a change in the hegemon's intentions, other states must be prepared to counter its capabilities. Moreover, even a hegemon animated by benign motives may pursue policies that run counter to other's interests. As Waltz says, "Balance-of-power theory leads one to expect that states, if they are free to do so, will flock to the weaker side. The stronger, not the weaker side, threatens them if only by pressing its preferred policies on other states." Invariably, the very fact that others believe a state is excessively powerful redounds to its disadvantage by provoking others to balance against it. It is precisely because of this reason that counter-hegemonic balancing has occurred during periods of perceived unipolarity and no wonder that this pattern of balancing against the dominant power in a unipolar system (actual or perceived) will recur in the post-Cold War period.

**Sameness**

As Kenneth Waltz points out, "competition produces a tendency toward sameness of the competitors", that is, toward imitating their rival's successful characteristics. Bismark's startling victories over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1870 quickly led the major continental powers (and Japan) to imitate the Prussian military staff
system, and the failure of Britain and the United States to follow the pattern simply indicated that they were outside the immediate arena of competition. Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies begin to look much the same all over the world. However, the effects of competition resulting in successful characteristics are not confined narrowly to the military realm, viz., military strategies, tactics, weaponry and technology, but also administrative and organizational techniques. If others do well in developing effective instruments of competition, a state must emulate its rivals or face the consequences of falling behind. Fear drives state to duplicate other's successful policies because policy makers know that, as Arthur Stein observes, "failure in the anarchic international system can mean the disappearance of their states". From this standpoint, it is to be expected that in crucial respects, great powers will look and act very much alike. It is also to be expected that sameness effect imperatives will impel eligible states to become great powers and to acquire all the capabilities attendant to that status. As Waltz observes, "in a self-help system, the possession of most but not all of the capabilities of a great power leaves a state vulnerable to others who have the instruments that the lesser state lacks." This sameness effect has also been glorified by the "Second image reversed" perspective, which posits a linkages between the international system's structural constraints and a state's domestic structure. Charles Tilly's famous aphorism, "war made the state, and the state made the war", neatly captures the concept. Tilly shows how the need to protect against external danger compelled states in early modern Europe to develop
administrative and bureaucratic structures to maintain, supply and finance permanent military establishments. Besides, the evidence from the two perceived unipolar moments in the history suggests that great power emergence reflects an eligible state's adjustment to the international system's structural constraints. Otto Hinze observed that the way in which states are organized internally reflects "their position relative to each other and their overall position in the world", and that "throughout the ages pressure from without has been a determining influence on internal structure".

Great powers are similar because they are not, and cannot be, functionally differentiated. This is not to say that great powers are identical. They may adopt different strategies and approaches; however, ultimately they all must be able to perform satisfactorily the same security-related tasks necessary to survive and succeed in the competitive realm of international politics. The sameness effect reflects the enormous pressure that the international system places on great powers to initiate the successful policies of others. Hinze's discussion of Prussia - Germany and England is illustrative. Their respective domestic, political and economic systems developed dissimilarly, in large part because each was affected differently by international pressures. But as is true for all great powers, in other crucial respects Prussia - Germany and England were very much alike. That is, both were organized for war and trade in order to maximise their security in a competitive international environment.

Thus, the close juxtaposition of states promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise from a failure to conform to successful practices. It is this "sameness", an effect of the system,
that is so often attributed to the acceptance of so-called rules of state behavior. Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to power. In power, most of them quickly change their ways. They can refuse to do so, and yet hope to survive, only if they rule countries little affected by the competition of states. The socialization of nonconformist states proceeds at a pace that is set by the extent of their involvement in the system.

Thus, in anarchy, security is the highest end, only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. It is here that one predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another. Balances of power recurrently form. Since the theory depicts international politics as competitive system, one predicts more specifically that states will display characteristics common to competitors: namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialised to their system. Besides, the relational parameter perspective which portrays the international system as a highly decentralised structure with public more analytically skillful and more ready to question authority, hegemonic dominance in terms of exercise of political control has become exceedingly difficult even within their own sphere of influence. This is precisely because under the 'sameness effect', the more analytical and skillful public very quickly imitate the successful policies of others in order to check the hegemonic dominance and also to keep the competition in terms of balance of power in the international system.
in tact. So, in short, the prospect that any sovereignty-bound actor will be able to prevail over or even to coordinate, the decentralising dynamics that are at work among sovereignty-free actors is highly remote. Thus, global life has turned in decentralising directions that may make the notion of hegemony in world politics obsolete.

Here Kenneth Waltz's concept of international system composed of state units holds relevance when he clearly expresses "international political system like economic markets are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city-states, empires or nations. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained". So, in this constrained system of international relations, globalization has meant dominant-subordinate relations. Constraintive response to unipolarity is different from the response that the politics of cold war evinced since the nature of constraints assume hegemonic pressures on the three issues of security. As of now since there is a rolling back of military threat, the hegemon is focusing on economic as well as ecological issues dovetailed with nuclear issues.

**Indian Case**

In this present changed and changing context of international relations, one of the pertinent question that has baffled many a scholar has been – what would be India’s role on issues of security? India’s policy ever since her independence has been formulated in the framework of non-alignment which permitted it to take autonomous
positions on issues of disarmament, decolonisation and development both as multilateral and bilateral levels. But after the end of Cold War and dissolution of one of the super powers, it is becoming difficult on India's part to continue with autonomy/independence in matters relating to foreign policy. This is not to say that India has withdrawn herself from the policy of NAM, rather, it continues to adhere to NAM and leadership of NAM since she is a faithful model for others. But it is a movement constrained by current unipolarity. In this system, India is being seen moving from the policy of relative autonomy to a policy of constraintiveness as far as the response to world affairs is concerned which has clearly been marked at least in three most important issues of security defining world affairs in the present period such as nuclear disarmament in terms of NPT, CTBT, MTCR, FMCT etc., economic security in terms of GATT & WTO and ecological security in terms of Earth Summit at Rio. Besides the constraints in the external dimension such as: presence of nuclear weapons in Indian ocean; perennial security threats both from China and Pakistan in the neighborhood; their collaboration to develop nuclear weapons and missile production, accommodative attitude of U.S. towards Pakistan and China; and a host of other challenges have perforce India to reorient its foreign policy at a theoretical level to cope up with the international environment. The Indian response to these issues of security are constraintive owing to a number of factors linked with the emerging structure of international relations which is unipolar at the apex (US hegemony), nuclear bipolarity at the next rung (US - Russia nuclear deterrence) and economic multipolarity (US, Europe, East Asia). In this structure, India apart from being involved in finding a place in the future based on its domestic growth
rates and focus on missile and space programme, also pursues her own state-determined agenda, particularly on the nuclear issue which has not been hampered by the local skills and awareness of the people in general.

We examine the Indian response to the apex rung of the current structure of international relations, i.e., to the current moment of unipolarity with U.S. hegemony in the next chapter.
END-NOTES


2 Ibid; p. 186.


4 Rosenau, J.N. - op.cit.; p. 191.


16 Ibid, pp. 198-219.
17 Ibid;
27 Ibid.


30 Kennedy, Paul, op. cit., p. xxii.

31 Giplin, op. cit., p. 95.

32 Ibid.

33 Kennedy Paul, op. cit., p. xxiii.

34 Waltz, K.N., op. cit., pp. 107,127.


37 Ibid, p. 126.

38 Giplin, op. cit., pp. 87-88.


