CHAPTER IV

INDIA AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NPT,
CTBT AND FMCT
Disarmament & Arms Control

Human kind has for centuries dwelled on the question of war, peace, and order. Arms control and disarmament, are phenomena which have long manifested themselves in international negotiating fora. The definitions of the above terms overlap each other to some extent and are controversial. Yet, disarmament is a measure that significantly lowers the levels of armaments or leads to the abolition of such military assets. The concept of arms control, however, connotes an approach to armament policy which encompasses quantitative amounts and qualitative kinds of weapons in being, as well as development, deployment, and utilization of such forces.

In the light of historical experience as well as logical possibilities, it is useful to classify the types of disarmament along two particular dimensions. One such dimension is the degree of arms reduction, and the other may be called the reciprocity dimension. The first refers to the quantitative and qualitative extent of a nation's military reductions, as the second to the extent to which its reductions are matched, or in some fashion reciprocated, by other nations. The "degree of disarmament continuum" is not, in fact, limited to disarmament measures in the literal sense. In accord with diplomatic custom and scholarly usage, arms control as well as a number of intermediate restraints fall well short of reduction.

At the upper end of the continuum is total or complete disarmament, involving the elimination of all military capability beyond that defined as necessary for the maintenance of domestic order. At the opposite
and lowest end of the degree continuum are arms control measures. These are provisions that may not call for reduction or prohibition of any weapons, yet have the effect of inhibiting a nation's full development of a given weapon category. Arms control measures do not directly prohibit the production or possession of that weapon type but rather seek to work indirectly by limitations or prohibitions on the testing, deployment or use of it. In the middle of the continuum are those measures known as partial disarmament. They may cover (a) incomplete reductions in all weapons categories or (b) complete reductions in some categories. In the first case, the tendency has been to seek across-the-board cuts or limits based on a budgetary or a manpower ceiling, the idea being that adherence to such a ceiling will compel nations to keep their armaments down.

When the second type of partial reduction - complete prohibitions in a few categories - is attempted, the prospective signatories are left free to arm fully in the nonproscribed categories: such partial provisions are also referred to as qualitative disarmament. This type may be negotiated, imposed, or unilaterally undertaken in order to (1) avoid the expenditure for more elaborate or costly weapons, (2) eliminate the more inhuman ones if war occurs, (3) make the soldier's burden lighter in weight, (4) strengthen the defense vis-à-vis the offense in order to make aggression less attractive, or (5) compensate for the asymmetries arising out of the different geographical or technological security needs of particular nations.

Turning to the second dimensions - reciprocity - the major question is whether a given nation disarms unilaterally and unconditionally or
receives (or expects) reciprocal behavior from one or more other nations as a condition of its own limitations or reductions. There are many possible positions on this continuum. At one end is a nation's elimination of its armaments and demobilization of its military personnel without any quid pro quo at all. At the opposite end of the reciprocity continuum would be the disarmament agreement embodied in a bilateral or multilateral treaty, following formal negotiations. In such a situation, every reduction undertaken by one nation is conditional upon the reductions accepted by others. Somewhere between the pure unilateral and the pure reciprocal type of disarmament is imposed disarmament. Although usually the consequence of formal negotiation, it is negotiation between nations of extremely disparate power. However, impermanent that disparity may be. At an intermediate point between the unilateral and the imposed forms is a semivoluntary process, undertaken on the premise that failure to do so voluntarily might require the nation to disarm later under duress.

The twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of disarmament and arms control as a permanent theme in the foreign policies of major governments. The advent of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as intercontinental delivery systems which can rain destruction on cities all over the globe in a matter of minutes, has made, and, general disarmament appear to many a more desirable goal than ever before in history. Even proponents of a nuclear deterrence policy often say that theirs is a policy of temporary insurance until disarmament can be negotiated. Yet the same advanced military technology which makes disarmament so imperative
also makes it the more difficult to achieve in a world of profound cultural differences, ideological divisions, and fundamental political disagreements over the way in which the international system is to be organized. As technology develops, the anxiety of nation-states over their own security increases rather than decreases. Most of the nation-states which are really free to pursue policies of their own choosing still prefer to base their security on some form of deterrence or power balance than on the expectation of disarmament and effective international peace-keeping.

Today disarmament has implied a general international condition of reduced arms levels to be arrived at through a process of formal diplomatic negotiation, culminating in international agreement. It would be possible for the major powers, acting out of mutual interest, to bring about a moderate reduction in armaments levels without agreeing to the creation of supranational machinery to ensure disarmament, to guarantee the security of all nations, and to enforce the peaceful settlement of international disputes. But it doesn't seem possible that general disarmament could ever be attained without drastic political surgery on the international system. It is of the very essence of the nation-state that it seeks its own security with some kind of military power structure-either by maintaining its own military forces, or by allying with a superior power for protection, or by accepting a satellite status, or the status of a neutral buffer, or by looking toward a regional balance, or collective security guarantees, or some such arrangement. It is highly unrealistic to expect that the nations of the world are about to renounce their military capabilities and the concept of a military power structure in the world, and then to
let the problem of security "take care of itself." As Hans J. Morgenthau has pointed out, even partial disarmament presupposes an ability on the part of nations to agree concerning the distribution of power between and among themselves. General disarmament goes much further: it presupposes a willingness of the part of nations to relinquish their primary prerogative of providing for their own defense. Thus general disarmament itself, if carried out, would mark such a profound alteration in the nature of the international system as to warrant the conclusion that the nation-state, as known historically for more than three centuries, would have ceased to exist. The executives and foreign offices of every major power in the world realize this simple fact quite fully. Whether general disarmament could be more easily attained with or without the construction of a new worldwide political organization to which all the powers are willing to entrust their security can be debated. But the political question of world order is very germane to the military-technical question of disarmament. That they can be neatly separated in analysis, planning, or negotiation is a dubious proposition, for if nations are unprepared to incorporate themselves into a new international political system for the nonviolent resolution of their differences, then they are not at all likely to subscribe to general disarmament.

The term "arms control," in contrast to "disarmament" (which entails the elimination or reduction of armaments), refers to a broad range of policies which presuppose the continued existence of national military establishments and other political-military organizations (such as revolutionary guerrilla movements). Arms control policies usually aim at some kind of restraint or regulation in the qualitative design,
quantitative production, deployment, protection, control, transfer, and planned, threatened, or actual use of arms for political-strategic purposes. However, it does not put any kind of restraint or regulation in the field of Research and Development of arms. Advocates of arms control assume that general and complete disarmament (GCD), lies beyond the world's reach, at least under present conditions. Some would contend that GCD is not only unattainable; it is not even desirable within the proximate future. The objectives for which governments, groups, and individuals seek arms control may be manifold: (1) to improve the safety of the international environment against the occurrence of dangerous wars by reducing certain risks inherent in the present military situation; (2) to reduce the likelihood and incidence of violent conflict at all levels; (3) to increase the chances that if military conflicts do occur, as they are likely to from time to time, governments will pursue policies of intelligent restraint rather than engage in operations which lead to uncontrolled escalation, uninhibited violence, and unlimited damage to civilian populations: (4) to effect economic savings by avoiding costly and mutually cancelling competition in advanced weapons technology; (5) to foster international political settlements by providing a climate of détente and cooperation; (6) to shift resources into other areas, such as international development or the reduction of environmental pollution; and so forth. Many advocates of arms control would insist upon another important purpose—support policies that will be conducive eventually to disarmament agreements and the growth of peacekeeping institutions in a world where all nation-states have been persuaded to set aside the rules of force, in favour of the rule of law.
Naturally there is some overlapping in what the disarmers and the arms controllers advocate. Most of those in both groups, for example, supported the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the quest for ways to inhibit the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Most disarmers are in favor of arms control restraints, freezes, regional limitations, and other arrangement insofar as these lead to a diminution of international tensions and pave the way for more substantial disarmament either concurrently or at a later date. In other words, they see many arms control measures as a necessary prelude to, or as apart of, the first stage of GCD. Nevertheless, many disarmers are suspicious of the philosophy underlying the arms control movement, because they think that its adherents, by and large, are not committed seriously to the eventual goal of total disarmament, but are merely engaged in a self-deluding search for conditions that will permit the continued existence of national military establishments. In this connection, needless to say that an attempt has been made to cover the history of Disarmament and Arms Control negotiations to underline its continuity of position. However, the more one is inclined, on the basis of the historical evidence available, to accept the realistic interpretation of international relations and to shun the utopian approach to politics, the more likely he is to doubt that modern military technology can be banished by legal flat, or that nation-states can, should, or will relinquish all of their own military power in favour of the United Nations, an international disarmament organization, or any other instrumentality of world government.
Nuclear Disarmament

It must be borne in mind, however, that the failure to disarm will be a serious threat to international peace and at the same time a general and comprehensive disarmament seems difficult because of the non-availability of a substitute for armaments. Realistically, therefore, there is a growing realization that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and hence there could be at least disarmament of nuclear weapons. This realization is based upon an appreciation of the fact that intentional conflicts cannot be eliminated and that the substitute for armaments cannot be found without the evolution of world community which seems to be difficult in the foreseeable future. Thus, there has been a strong advocacy of partial disarmament, that is nuclear disarmament. The main focus of disarmament negotiations therefore, since the test-ban treaty of 1963 has been on arms control and not on disarmament. However, the question of nuclear disarmament has many facets. It includes the reduction of nuclear weapon, the non-proliferation or non-dispersion of nuclear weapons, a check on the development of the new types of nuclear weapons and also the abolition of nuclear weapons. The abolition of existing nuclear weapons is a measure of disarmament and a check on the production of new nuclear weapons is a measure of arms control. Non-proliferation is akin to disarmament in one respect and to arms control in another. For the term Non-proliferation refers today to not only putting a stop to the nuclear arms race but also to the abolition of existing nuclear weapons. Thus the problem of disarmament today is identified as the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
There is yet another distinction between non-proliferation and non-dissemination. The former means stopping the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers to non-nuclear powers, whereas the latter refers to a check on the sharing of nuclear secrets by the nuclear power with non-nuclear powers. The ultimate idea in both the cases is to prevent the expansion of the nuclear club. But the expansion of the nuclear club is a problem of only the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, whether by proliferation or by dissemination what is also important in a check against the vertical spread of nuclear weapons, that is the further spread of such weapons in those countries which already possess nuclear weapons. Non-dispersion is a better expression to cover all aspects of the spread of nuclear weapons—horizontal spread and vertical spread, as well as spread by both proliferation and dissemination.

Thus, there has been an attempt towards a shift from the adherence to the goal of general and comprehensive disarmament to a sort of commitment to the limited goal of nuclear disarmament. In response to the demand for nuclear disarmament, the shift of emphasis has been to put in a sharp focus mainly by the super powers in particular and by the nuclear powers in general whose main concern has been to ensure the perpetuation of their own nuclear monopoly for which it is necessary to prevent the non-nuclear, but potentially nuclear powers from becoming actual nuclear powers. These nuclear weapon states and their allies have after more than half a century of determined effort, succeeded in establishing a world nuclear order designed to perpetuate their domination. They have accomplished it, on the one hand, by the development of new nuclear weapon systems,
building up massive arsenals of such weapons and propounding doctrines to justify their retention and use. On the other hand, they have tried to convince the rest of the world that these weapons are safe in their hands but highly dangerous in the hands of other countries. They have coined and given wide currency to such phrases as 'rouge' countries and "delinquent" nations to characterize those which aspire or attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. To preserve this order, they are systematically using the instruments and institutions they fashioned during the cold war period - its double speak, its highly rhetoric couched in terms of lofty principles, its collective action and its institutions such as the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). They have enacted national laws to give effect to obligations under international regimes they have created for the purpose. They have created what they call an international non-proliferation regime consisting of the NPT, the CTBT and the yet-to-be negotiated FMCT. Even though the CTBT is yet to enter into force, they regard it as having established norms against testing of nuclear weapon excepting in the laboratory. They have a high stake in the present nuclear order as it ensures their ability to take unilateral action, their access to the supply of strategic materials, their command over market and resources, their growth and prosperity - in short, their way of life. They have invested a colossal amount of effort and the resources in building and preserving this order.

**Historical Perspective**

A comprehensive plan for disarmament was initiated in the year 1954 by Britain and France who submitted a memorandum outlining three
phases of disarmament. During the 1\textsuperscript{st} phase a control organ was to be set up and military expenditure and manpower of the member states was to be frozen at specific levels. During the 2\textsuperscript{nd} phase, after the establishment of control organ, first half of the agreed reduction of armed forces, conventional weapons and military expenditure was to be carried out. Further manufacture of nuclear weapons was also to be stopped at this stage. The third and final stage envisaged the 2\textsuperscript{nd} half of the agreed reduction and total prohibition and delimitation of nuclear weapons. Though initially Soviet Union rejected the proposal but subsequently in September 1954 she communicated her willingness to the General Assembly to accept the memorandum as a basis for the step by step approach to the nuclear problem. Thus, it looked that the plan would be able to make much headway. But, in March - April 1955, Soviet Union reverted to its earlier position and submitted a new proposal which was identical to the Anglo-French plan. This plan was however distasteful for U.S.A. because it insisted on dismantling of all U.S. overseas bases and a ban on nuclear tests.

The next major arms control measure was Nuclear Test Ban of 1958 where the three powers - U.S.A., USSR and Britain agreed to suspend forthwith all the tests in the earth’s atmosphere, in outer space, in ocean and underground. This was to be ensured through a worldwide detective system to be operated by a single neutral administrator and an international staff. However, Soviet Union, in violation of this agreement went ahead with the explosion of Megaton Bomb. This provoked U.S.A. to declare that she would also go ahead with similar explosions. As a result, the progress made in this direction of securing nuclear test ban at Geneva Conference was watered down. Besides the
Antarctic Treaty of 1959 which was signed unanimously to provide for demilitarization of Antarctica, the negotiation from 1958 till 1963 when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed, continued with difficulties and controversies marked mainly in two disarmament conferences such as Ten National Disarmament Conference of 1960 and Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference of 1962. However, both these conferences come to an end without any accomplishment.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, when mankind faced a holocaust of nuclear war, marked a turning point in superpower relations and also in the test ban issue. It has been regarded by many as the progenitor of the Partial Test Ban because it created an urgent need for a demonstrative act of reconciliation and détente. This Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was concluded at Moscow on 5th August 1963. It prohibited the states from carrying out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control, viz.; a) "in the atmosphere beyond its limits, including outer space or under water including territorial waters or high seas b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted". Though initially the treaty was concluded by the three nuclear powers - U.S.A., U.S.S.R and U.K, it was made open to all the states. However, the treaty made no provision for control through posts, sport inspection or international bodies. It merely prohibited those tests which could be detected and made no effort to reduce the nuclear stockpiles. In fact, both France and China refused to sign the treaty because it did not insist on the destruction of nuclear stockpiles of
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. This decision of China and France greatly jeopardized the attempt at disarmament. Subsequently, China went ahead with her 1st atom bomb explosion which greatly stirred the General Assembly and it decided to convene a conference of the five nuclear powers. In November 1965, it adopted a resolution urging all the nations to suspend all tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. It even sought to extend the ban to the underground tests which were permitted under the Moscow Treaty of 1963. However, U.S.A. and U.K refused to comply with the General Assembly resolution unless a guarantee was provided against similar explosion by other states. thus, presently 119 states are parties to the Treaty and so far abided by the provisions. France and China are not parties to the treaty but ceased atmospheric testing in 1975 and 1985.

**NPT**

The next major international arms control measure negotiated was the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But prior to this important treaty, there were also a number of treaties of arms control negotiated in different years. To mention a few: Seven Point Plan of 1966, Outer Space Treaty of 1967, Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States of 1968 etc. However, the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT) was signed simultaneously at London, Moscow and Washington in July 1968 and actually came to force on 5th March 1970 and was originally to be valid for 25 years. The treaty consists of a preamble and eleven Articles. The preamble deals with the dangers of nuclear war-fare and recognizes the necessity of full cooperation in the application and
improvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. It also reaffirms the principle that the benefit of peaceful application of nuclear technology should be available for peaceful purposes to all parties in the treaty and recalls the importance of exchange of scientific information about peaceful application of atomic energy.

The 1970s

In the beginning of Seventies, the focus shifted to strategic nuclear weapons, although the test ban issue had remained on the disarmament agenda. As a result, the Sea-Bed Treaty of 1971 on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, was concluded by U.K, U.S.A. and Soviet Union. This Treaty came into force on 18th May 1972. An effort to check the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons was also made in 1972 by signing the "Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their destruction". The convention signed on 10th April, 1972 at London, Moscow, and Washington and actually came into force on 26th March, 1975. The convention impressed the need of achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. It held that the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of the
objective of complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Simultaneous attention was also paid to the limitation of the strategic arms with a view to achieve disarmament. The two superpowers: U.S.A & U.S.S.R held prolonged talks and negotiations at Geneva and agreed in principle to restrain and put a stop to the fierce competition for the acquisition of sophisticated weapons which indicated their willingness to reduce armaments and other hazards without jeopardizing their securities and dignity. As a result, The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) was formally signed on 26th May, 1972 with a view to curb the race in the nuclear arms between the two superpowers\textsuperscript{16}. In fact, the agreement broadly consisted of two separate treaties, viz., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System and the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of the strategic offensive arms. While the former was concluded for an unlimited period, the latter was of five-years duration.

The next major treaties in the direction of arms control were The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and The Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) of 1976. The TTBT was signed by U.S. and U.S.SR. on 3\textsuperscript{rd} July, 1974 and proposed a ban on carrying out of underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield of more than 150 kilotons\textsuperscript{17}. The two parties also pledged to limit the number of their underground weapon test to a minimum. However, the treaty could not come into force due to non-ratification by the U.S. senate. On the other hand, PNET was signed by U.S and Soviet Union on 28\textsuperscript{th} May,
1976\textsuperscript{18} but could not come into force due to non-ratification of U.S. Senate again. Despite, both the parties pledged to observe the main provisions of the treaty. But till the end of December, the PNET had not formally come into force. Ever since then till 1978, efforts were made to strengthen peace and security of the world in terms of agreements and negotiations to avoid military confrontation and bring about complete disarmament through different provisions like prohibition of military or other hostile uses of environmental modifications techniques.

SALT - II \textsuperscript{19} was signed at Vienna on 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1979 to limit the Strategic Offensive Weapons for period upto 31\textsuperscript{st} December, 1985. While concluding this treaty, both the powers reaffirmed their desire to take further measures for further limitation and reduction of strategic arms with a view to achieve general and comprehensive disarmament. SALT I (1972) set ceilings on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) launchers and of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) sites. The Agreement allowed the US its 1054 existing operational ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union 1618 of which twenty-two were under construction. It also permitted the US to reach, from its existing 656 SLBM launchers on forty-one ballistic missile submarines, a ceiling of 710 SLBM launchers on forty-four submarines; and the Soviet Union, from its base level of 740 SLBM to reach a ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers on sixty-two submarines. These quantitative ceilings were so high and so exceeded their strategic needs that there was no sacrifice of either operational or constructional capabilities. The Soviet Union was allowed more missile
launchers than it had, because no limits were set on intercontinental bombers, in which the US had a very large lead. The Soviet Union had one ABM system located near Moscow deploying sixty-four launchers; the US had none. They agreed to one site for each side deploying no more than 100 ABM launchers at each site. This was no hardship because neither side intended to build a second site. But more importantly, SALT I was neither intended to and nor did it have any impact on multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) deployment with the result that ICBM and SLBM deliverable nuclear warheads had been increasingly by 1000 to 1500 every year. Thus the number of deliverable strategic nuclear warheads of the superpowers increased from US 5700, USSR 2500 (8200 in 1972) to US 11000 and USSR 5000 (16000 IN 1979). This represents a combined explosive power of over a million and a half Hiroshima-size bombs. There are in addition 'tactical' nuclear warheads, and equivalent to about 700 million tons of TNT or to over 50000 Hiroshima-type bombs. Thus at the end of the ten-year SALT I each side will be capable of destroying the other not fifty, but one hundred times over.

There then followed the much awaited SALT II, signed in 1979. It sets initial equal ceilings of 2400 strategic nuclear weapons declining to 2250 by the end of 1981; with various sub-limits on MIRVs; until 1981 there would be no deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles; the production of Soviet (backfire) medium range bombers would not be increased beyond the present estimated thirty a year and both powers to refrain from giving it intercontinental capability; both sides undertook not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers
and neither side was to introduce more than one new type of ICBM until 1985. In SALT I the bargaining counters such as MIRVs, were never bargained away and finally became part of the strategic inventory of both parties; the same has happened with cruise missiles or mobile ballistic land missiles in SALT II.

The SALT talks ignored the other three nuclear weapon powers and had the objective to limit the further growth of the arsenals of the already over-armed superpowers in the interest of preserving the strategic balance between them, and avoiding what they both believe to be unnecessary financial burden. These agreements have made no difference to their overkill capacity and seem to be designed not to halt or reverse the arms race but rather to institutionalise it and regulate it so that it may continue within each country under conditions of relatively less instability and insecurity - that is a continuation of the arms race under agreed terms and conditions.

From 1979 till 1982, the beginning of START negotiation, only limited contact took place between USA and Soviet Union on question of arms control. This interim period witnessed measures like prohibition of Inhumane weapons. New Small Arms Ammunitions of 1981, Agreement concerning Activities of States on Moon and other Celestial Bodies of 1979, Reagan Plan of 1981, Beginning of INF talks at Geneva in 1981 and of course, Brezhnev announcement of March, 1982. In May, 1982, U.S. President suggested that formal START negotiation be held between the two countries and then he proposed two stages of it which were rejected by Soviet Union and thus Soviet Union come up with another proposal having 3 stages only to be opposed vehemently.
by U.S. Then finally START Talks opened in Geneva on 29th June, 1982 and U.S.S.R. offered to make substantial cuts in the long-range missiles and bomber forces in return for U.S. agreement to forgo the deployment of new medium range missile in Europe and to accept stringent restrictions on all further cruise missile deployments. From 1982 till 1984-85, the measures in the direction of disarmament include: New U.S. proposal on SALT in 1983, Talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries in 1984, Improvement of Hotline in 1984, Four Continent Peace Initiative. Of 1984 etc.

The 1980s

Disarmament suffered a serious set back in 1984-85 and two superpowers embarked on a massive programme of rearmament. This trend was reversed towards the close of 1985 when both the President Reagan and Gorbachev met at Geneva and declared that a nuclear war cannot be fought and won. Though the contents of the discussion were not made public, it was quite apparent that Soviet hostility to Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative22 (Popularly known as Star Wars) project at Reykyavik Summit proved to be main stumbling block and no agreement could be arrived at. However, at the end of the talks, the two leaders issued a joint statement in which they emphasized the desirability of intensified dialogue between the two powers through regular meetings at the highest level. After Geneva Summit, the process of arriving at settlement on disarmament continued both at bilateral and multilateral forums. In January 1986, Gorbachev proposed a time table for fifteen years step by step process for ridding the earth of nuclear weapons23. He presented this programme at the
formal talks between USA and Soviet Union on 16th Jan 1986 but it was not accepted by USA.

In Feb 1987, Soviet Union Gorbachev took yet another initiative and called for the elimination of INF missiles in Europe with a limit for each side of 100 warheads elsewhere. He also agreed to proceed without first resolving differences over SDI. As a result, Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Washington Summit in December, 1987 and ratified by the Senate and Presidium of the two countries on the eve of the Moscow Summit in May-June 1988. The treaty provides that during the next three years land-based missiles having a range of 500 kms to 5000 kms and the launchers on which these missiles are to be mounted, will be eliminated. It also provides for the elimination of the short-range missiles within next 18 months. In accordance with this treaty, USA would destroy the 859 missiles based in Western Europe and Soviet would eliminate 1752 missiles based in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. It also specifies the manner, type and place of the missiles to be destroyed. It also makes provision for detailed on-site inspection to ensure that neither side was violating the terms of the treaty. Besides steps were also taken in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) towards an agreement to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals by 50%.

A closer scrutiny of these arms control agreements, however, shows that while the Cold War may have ended, the arms race continues, although at a slightly slower pace. The 15% to 25% reduction in the Soviet and American strategic weapons over a period of seven
years has been counterbalanced by the exemption of more modern weapon systems from future limitations. These new systems will carry more powerful, more reliable and more accurate warheads.

The fissionable material contained in the warheads to be removed under the aforesaid agreements can be recycled into new packages. It is estimated that the fissionable material contained in the Soviet and American stockpiles consists of 200 tons of plutonium and 1000 tons of highly enriched uranium. Under the INF Treaty, the United States recovers between 2.5 to 6 metric tons of plutonium and the total from START cold range between 6 and 24 metric tons. According to David Albright, the START Agreement and cuts in tactical nuclear weapons will add about 15000 to 20000 kilograms of plutonium and about 75000 to 11000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to the American surplus. The Soviet Union will also recover a substantial amount of fissionable material from the two agreements. There is thus the prospect of swords being beaten into swords once again. A commentator however, said about the START Agreement: "The Treaty does not outflow modernisation within the above limits; so both sides are free to replace existing missiles with new versions. The enormous number of weapons that each country is still allowed means that droplets of money saved by cuts in war-heads and missiles with vanish without a trace in Ocean-sized spending on new systems as modernisation programmes go ahead"26. Therefore the arms race continued to exist even during the 80's.
The 1990s

In the year 1990, significant arms control agreement relating to nuclear, chemical and conventional arms were made such as: Washington Summit of May - June 1990, Treaty on Arms cut of September 1990, Treaty between NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries of November 1990 etc. However, on 31st July 1991, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed under which the two superpowers agreed to effect reduction to equal levels in defined strategic offensive arms over a period of seven years from the date the treaty come into force. The treaty was to be valid for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. Thereafter the treaty could be extended for successive five year period if both the sides agreed.

With the ceremonial closure of Cold War in a changing international scenario characterised by the development in Eastern Europe and in Soviet Union with its domestic compulsions, favorable response of the two powers to put an end to disarmament race was observed. As a result certain agreements were made in the year 1992 such as: US-Russia offer to cut Nuclear Arms of January 1992, Five Power Accord to Prevent Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction of May 1992, Pact on Nuclear Arms Cut of June 1992 etc.

The most significant step in the direction fo nuclear arms control was taken on 3rd January 1993 when Bush and Yeltsin signed the Nuclear Arms Control Treaty (START - II) which seeks to bring about 2/3 rejection in world's most terrifying weapons. Under the treaty, U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile has been limited to the position of 1960s
while that of Russia has been reduced to the level of mid 1970's size. In terms of this treaty U.S will wind up 1728 strategic warheads at sea and the Russian with 1600 to 1650. The land-based missiles with multiple war-heads will be however, dismantled by 2003 or as early as 2000 A.D. if U.S. helps Russia get rid of its SS-18s and SS-19s. The treaty limited the nuclear warheads with which heavy bombers of the two sides can be equipped. This limit varies from 750 to 1250 units of nuclear warheads of any type. The two countries, however, reserve the right to reorient upto 100 heavy bombers for the fulfillment of non-nuclear tasks. However, the treaty is subject to ratification by U.S. senate and Russian Parliament.

On 15\textsuperscript{th} February 1993, representatives of 130 countries signed Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC)\textsuperscript{29} at Paris which placed a ban on the use, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Under this convention, th signatory states were required to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons within 2 years of ratification of the treaty. The convention also contained provision regarding international inspections of suspected violations. The convention did not prescribe any procedure for the destruction of the chemical weapons except that it stipulated that chemical weapons should not be destroyed by sea-dumping, land-burial or open-pit burning. This implied that the procedure for the destruction of chemical weapons had to be environment-friendly and should render such weapons unusable.

In the background of all these developments, the current - phase of comprehensive test ban negotiation began in full swing ever since the ball was set rolling on 10\textsuperscript{th} August 1993, when the Conference on
Disarmament gave its Ad Hoc Committee the "mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban". The negotiations began in January 1994. The 1994 Nuclear Test Ban Committee Report\textsuperscript{30}, published in September, took the form of an 18-page Summary of proceedings, followed by a 95-page appendix of text with alternative proposals and techniques in square brackets.

In the meanwhile in May 1995, a global conference on the extension of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)\textsuperscript{31} was held at New York which decided by voice vote to extend NPT indefinitely without any conditions. This permanent extension of NPT implies that only five countries - the U.S, U.K, Russia, China and France could legally possess nuclear weapons capability. However, to placate the non-nuclear weapons states, a list of disarmament goals was attached to the extension decision. One of these goals envisaged completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by next year as well as a plan for annual meetings to review the progress towards that goal.

**CTBT**

The next important step in the direction of disarmament was the signing of CTBT in September 1996\textsuperscript{32}. The treaty was approved by 158-3 votes, while five countries abstained. India voted against the treaty on the ground that it was both flawed and discriminatory. The treaty places a ban on all kinds of nuclear weapons test explosions. It envisages an international monitoring system to check treaty violations. The treaty would come into force 180 days after its ratified by 44 nuclear capable countries, including India.
After this major Treaty in the direction of disarmament, on 29th April, 1997, the chemical weapons convention came into force 150 days after the 65th country (Hungary) ratified it. Subsequently, more countries ratified it. By 1998, over 100 countries have ratified it. Under this treaty, each state party undertakes never under any circumstances, to develop, produce, stockpile or retain chemical weapons or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons, engage in any military preparation to use chemical weapons and assist, encourage or induce, in any way anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the convention. The signatories to the convention are also expected to destroy the chemical weapons which they own or possess, or which are located in any place under their jurisdiction or control. They are also expected to destroy the chemical weapons abandoned on a foreign territory. This treaty is different from other treaties on arms control in so far as it requires total elimination of the chemical weapons, while the other treaties have generally been limited arms control treaties.

**FMCT**

After all these negotiation and agreements on arms control and disarmament, on August 11, 1998, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva took a step closer to a treaty banning production of fissile materials, the essential ingredient for nuclear weapons. A stalemate lasting 18 months following the signing of the CTBT come and end with the 61 members of CD agreeing to convene an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons of mass destruction, such as plutonium and
highly enriched uranium. The negotiations which is expected to begin after the formalities have been dealt with along with the election of a chairman, are expected to last for several years since there is great divergence on the contents and the scope of what should go into the treaty which is to be called the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The Shannon Mandate of 199535 based on a 1993 UN General Assembly Resolution calls for the negotiation of a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". The developing countries known as G-21 nations in a statement emphasized that "the proposed treaty dealing with fissile material must constitute a nuclear disarmament measure and not only a nuclear non proliferation measure and be an integral step lending to the total elimination of nuclear weapons". The statement thus makes a total allusion to the NPT considered by many to be a discriminatory instrument. The G-21 members continue to insist upon the final objective of the disarmament conference - the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the state...
Thus, despite various attempts made at disarmament, the world is not a safer place to live in, because though statesmen have gathered for disarmament conferences, they failed to make more than limited advances quickly reversed by the march of events. The causes of these failures are a lack of confidence between national sovereign states, the question whether confidence shall lead to disarmament, or disarmament shall lead to restoration of confidence. This has been the perennial problem in the history of disarmament negotiation throughout this century. Thus, though the world desires peace is unable to advance towards it.

**Third World Perspective**

Nuclear disarmament is accepted as a step towards a more peaceful international society by the third-world and non-aligned countries also. But their attitude has been shaped by the consideration whether the kind of nuclear disarmament for which the nuclear powers are working so steadfastly would help in the realization of the ultimate objective of a really disarmed world. For, their contention is that the real purpose of nuclear disarmament would be achieved only if it helps the total abolition of nuclear weapons in the world as a whole and not their limitation on the basis of their retention in the hands of the actual nuclear power of the present. The developing countries resent the very basis on which the superpowers are working to devise a scheme of nuclear disarmament. So, whatever be the nature of discussion between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers on the question of nuclear disarmament, the fact remains that the NAM countries have made a notable contribution to the cause of
disarmament both in a theoretical and in a practical way. Theoretically NAM has strengthened the argument that there is a close relationship between non-alignment and disarmament and one instance of the practical way is the significant role played by the NAM countries in creating propitious conditions for the signing of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Besides, the NAM countries have been pointing out the real dimensions of the problem of disarmament through various international forums, particularly through the various summit conferences of NAM countries. One of the points made by the NAM countries has been that the settlement of the problem of disarmament should not be a monopoly of the superpowers and that all the countries of the world should be allowed to participate in disarmament negotiations and to this point our country fully subscribe. Our country remains committed to participating fully and actively in any negotiation on a treaty banning nuclear weapons and all types of tests just as it did in regard to the chemical weapons convention. Our country urges all those countries who have still not done so to ratify the CWC and demonstrate their readiness to move towards banning all weapons of mass destruction.

**Indian Perspective**

India had opted for peace, freedom and economic cooperation as her goals with anti-imperialism, non-alignment and aid sustain as its major planks of foreign policy. India achieved tremendous success in her foreign policy till 1957. Many newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa took up this policy India earned great prestige in international conferences on political and economic, social and
cultural issues. She played a great role in Korea, she spearheaded the introduction of anti-racialist resolution against South Africa in United Nations. She did not take sides with either any block or any military pacts. She got help from major number of countries in the world. India developed extremely friendly relation with China. By 1956, 'honeymoon' period was on. Principles of 'Panchsheel' had been announced and Nehru and Chou-En-lahiad exchanged visits. They had declared their opposition to colonialism and military pacts. India supported China's claim to Taiwan and China supported India's case on Goa. She enjoyed tremendous prestige in the 'third world'. However, the "Hind-Chin: Bhai- Bhai" days were on the way out in the late fifties. Differences arose between the two giants of Asia on Tibet and border issue. And these differences led to a bellicose and hostile anti-Indian propaganda by the Chinese. Then come the border conflict of 1962. China encircled India by colluding with Pakistan in the west, by allying Burma in the East. In the Arab world, there was neutrality over the dispute of the two countries. In 1965, India faced Pakistan aggression. Internally, this was period of famines, draughts and food shortage, leading to poor economic conditions. At the time when India needed a strong leadership and farseeing statesman, Nehru's death created a Vacuum that remained till 1969-71. This vacuum could not produce a leadership of Nehru's caliber and the new leadership leaned heavily on American aid. The net-result of all this was that India's role in international affairs become less effective and constrained one. The change to Indira Gandhi and pursuit of power that led to Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in the wake of perceived threats militarily from neighbouring countries was a landmark policy decision.
Similarly, active support was rendered to Non-Aligned Movement on issues of Namibia, South Africa and New International Economic Order (NIEO). These developments had constraints of Cold War that forced India to sign Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty as an effective response to the Sino-American design to alter the balance of power in South Asia.

India's Policy Posture, pressure of its goals of freedom, peace and economic cooperation find expression in its efforts to create a climate of peace, and help achieve disarmament for internal development. Soon after India became free, this major concern was to narrow differences between two blocs. It adopted a working formula to do nothing that will contribute to the further enlargement or entrenchment of the climate of war, but do everything possible towards its shrinkage and dis-establishment. India's role in disarmament has been, broadly, a conscious and painstaking effort to reconcile Great Power differences by refraining from either side in any move if it involved anything that would annoy the other side. The concept of psychology of peace was a diplomatic effort on India's part to pursue its aim of narrowing the differences without offending any side with a touch of idealism of a new nation. If India had opposed the west on the principles of communism it would not be helpful. If it opposed the East on the principles of liberal doctrines, it would also not have brought the blocs closer. So, India attempted to narrow the differences by searching for points of consensus and by encouraging adjustment towards compromise.
In this way, for five decades, India has been at the forefront of efforts and demands for total elimination of nuclear weapons. This position had been supported, at the UN and outside it, by the majority of the international Community and some nuclear weapon states during the Cold War. Peace movement had been extremely active especially in the 1980s in seeking nuclear disarmament. But with the end of Cold War, the risk of nuclear war having reduced, the international community become more Banguine about the dangers of nuclear weapons. But nevertheless, India has been consistently pleading for a universal nuclear disarmament ever since the Cold War days though she have been grossly misunderstood. However there are certain obvious reasons why nuclear disarmament is a strategic goal for India.

**India's Why For Nuclear Disarmament**

Firstly, there is the issue of moral and ethical basis for this demand. Nuclear weapons are the worst form of weapons of mass destruction. India does not believe that morality and fundamental human values must be necessity scarificed at the altar of national interests linked to the moral principle is the issue of legality and legitimacy. The indefinite extension and the NPT, which is the only international treaty legitimizing the nuclear weapons and especially the efforts of some nuclear weapon states to ensure that no linkage with disarmament is established in spite of the commitments in the treaty itself, and of others like China which set about testing nuclear weapons within hours of giving a commitment to exercise "the utmost restraint" in this regard has influenced Indian thinking deeply. India
has been seeking a convention to outflow the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons - a resolution at the UN supported by an overwhelming majority of states year after year since 1978, especially during the cold war. Presently, the International Court of Justice has ruled that the use of nuclear weapons is not consistent with the laws of armed conflict that a civilized world has otherwise adopted.

Secondly, nuclear disarmament will be a major factor enhancing international peace and security. The argument that nuclear weapons had kept the peace during the Cold War is fatally flawed since the concept, taken to its logical application, would sanction nuclear weapons for most if not all sovereign states in the world. And so is the view that the weapons need to be retained in future even if only by the nuclear five. Nuclear weapons use would affect not only the combatant countries but large parts of the world.

Thirdly, nuclear weapons need to be eliminated if we are to move toward a more equitable international order. Democracy at the national level cannot be sustained as a core principle without movement towards greater democratization of the international order. Unfortunately, sustained an inequitable order by creating a powerful distinction between the haves and the have-nots. Nuclear weapons have been legitimized with the five countries who also are the permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto powers. This has created a nexus between iniquitous power banned substantive on nuclear weapons as the ultimate arbiter of hegemony and influence on one side, and geopolitical framework of an international order.
reflecting the now outdated power equations of an earlier colonial era on the other.

Fourthly, the issue of national security remain central to Indian Policy. There is a need to recognize that India's strategic and security interests are served better if there are no nuclear weapons that can impinge on Indian's security calculus. Pakistan, in a non-nuclear environment, would pose a lesser security challenge in view of India's size and potential. The divergence in relative capabilities, in reality, has been growing in our favour during the past three decades. It is for this very reason that Pakistan in an effort to neutralize India's intrinsic conventional superiority has acquired nuclear weapons. Contrary to popular belief in a conventional military scenario, India would be in a better position to defend herself if a situation like that in 1962 develops in relation to China also. There is finite limit to the quality and quantity of force that China can deploy on the Himalayan borders and sustain it for operations. We have shorter logistic lines. Geography and the very nature of terrain dictates that Indian air power will remain superior and able to influence the ground battle, unless we allow the balance to alter. It is the nuclear factor that places us at a gross disadvantage on the two key frontiers.

Nuclear disarmament, therefore, is fundamental to our strategic and security interests. The fact that this also coincides with our principles and the moral/ethical approach to nuclear weapons only enhances the need for nuclear disarmament for international peace and security as well as our own. So, the only viable solution to our security concerns related to nuclear weapons lies in pursuing total elimination of nuclear
weapons from national arsenals. In view of the effort towards total elimination of nuclear weapons or the need to approach the disarmament problem, India has been trying diligently ever since 1954 in different agreements and negotiation on disarmament. So, to understand the Indian position and why it's a constraintive one, we need to look at the Indian position in different disarmament measures since 1954 with special reference to NPT, CTBT & FMCT which this chapter tries to focus upon.

**Indian Position in Disarmament and Arms Control Measures : Constraints**

India categorically proposed suspension of nuclear weapon tests for the last time on 2nd April, 1954. It all started from the parliamentary debates in India, in which the attention of the Indian government was drown to matters of urgent public importance created by the explosion of Hydrogen Bomb by the U.S.A. on 1st March, 1953. In a statement made on 2nd April, 1954. Prime Minister Nehru urged for "some sort of, what may be called 'standstill agreement' in respect, at least, of these actual explosions, even if arrangements about the discontinuance of production and stockpiling, must await more substantial agreements amongst those principally concerned". The other aspects of this proposal included.

(a) full publicity by those principally concerned in the production of these weapons, and by the U.N of the extent of the destructive power and the known effects of these weapons and also adequate indication of the extent of the unknown but probable effects. (b) Immediate (and continuing) private meetings of the sub-committee
of the disarmament commission to consider the "Standstill" proposal pending decisions of prohibitions and controls, etc., to which the disarmament commission is asked by the General Assembly to address itself (c) Active steps by states and peoples of the world, who though not directly concerned with the production of these weapons, are very much concerned by possible use of them, and also at present with these experiments and their effects.

This proposed letter\textsuperscript{43}, envisaging suspension of nuclear weapon tests was referred to the disarmament commission for its consideration. But it did not receive enthusiastic treatment. Nevertheless, as a gesture of good will, on the request fo the Indian representative to the chairman of the Disarmament Commission\textsuperscript{44}, Indian letter was annexed to the fourth report of the Commission, and the proposal was referred to the sub-committee of the commission.

In the period between 1954 to 1963, India developed the required infrastructure, trained manpower resources and external inputs, particularly from the U.S., to create programmes for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. India, however, remained firmly opposed to the acquisition of nuclear arms and to nuclear weapon tests. Indian ideas articulated during debates of U.N. resulted in the toms for Peace Programme initiated by the US and adoption of the partial test ban treaty in 1963. India's successful establishment and operation of the nuclear research reactor of Trombay and later commissioning of Tarapore atomic power plant resulted in our country being acknowledged as one of the front ranking countries in the international community in the sphere of nuclear technology and its
uses. India voluntarily agreed to submit nuclear reactors which it had constructed with foreign assistance to safeguards and inspections, first bilaterally and then through the International Atomic Energy Agency. During this period, India continued to make substantial efforts for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests particularly by the super powers as a step towards disarmament.

When negotiations on nuclear test ban treaty were resumed after a long gap, the Indian Defence Minister said at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) that the issue was of high priority and asked the great powers not to conduct nuclear tests while the Geneva Conference was sitting. However, India became a member of the drafting committee of what eventually constituted the eight-power 'compromise' referendum of 16 April 1962, seeking ban on nuclear tests, which did not go very far, despite repeated pleas. At home Nehru continued to describe them (nuclear tests) as "Crime against humanity".

On Partial Test Ban, India held that it would be valuable "but it is not the solution". The Indian representative to ENDC, Arthur Lall, asked the nuclear powers to come to a conclusion (on nuclear test ban) "taking into account constructive recommendation of their own high level scientists in the field".

In July, 1963, India once again requested for inclusion in the agenda of the 18th session of the UN General Assembly the item on the "urgent need for suspension of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests". Subsequently, the proposed item was considered by the First Committee in October 1963.
In a letter dated 10th October 1964 to the Secretary General, the then Indian permanent representative to the UN, B.N. Chakravarty, said that the treaty (PTBT) was an important landmark in the disarmament discussions. It restricted the development of nuclear weapons and implied renunciation of the manufacture of these weapons of mass destruction on part of these non-nuclear states which subscribed to the test ban treaty. But as the treaty did not specifically prohibit manufacturing requisition, receipt or transference of these weapons, the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be the next logical step after the signing of the test-ban treaty.

It was in 1964 that China conducted its first nuclear weapon test that was surely condemned by India that it "constitutes, a threat to world peace, a grave hazard to the health and safety of people living in areas of the world are likely to be affected by the radioactive fall out resulting from this explosion and generally contrary to the interests of the humanity at large". After this test, the NPT debate picked up and India vociferously opposed moves by the nuclear-weapon states to deny peaceful nuclear explosions by non-nuclear weapons powers. It is however, interesting to note that India was one of the co-sponsorers of the resolutions which led to coming into existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1965, it put forward certain criteria for NPT: An undertaking by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon technology to others; An undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against countries, who do not possess them; an understanding through U.N to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by powers having a nuclear weapons
capability; Tangible progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery as well as substantial reduction in the existing stocks; An undertaking by the non-nuclear powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. Besides, these criteria, India also supported the principles of non-proliferation laid down by the UN General Assembly in November 1965: The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form; The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear or non-nuclear powers; the treaty should be towards achievement of general and complete disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament; There should be acceptable a workable provisions to ensure effectiveness of the treaty; Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the rights of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. However, these principles were altered to a great extent when USA and Soviet Union prepared a draft treaty and finally ensured its approval.

Since then, the Indian attitude to non-proliferation issue appreciably hardened and Indian has been consistently criticizing the draft treaty on three grounds: imbalance of obligations between the nuclear weapon powers and the non-nuclear weapon powers; inadequate security guarantees; and discrimination in the development of peaceful nuclear explosives. Narasimha Rao, as the External Affairs Minister, stated in the second special session on disarmament of UN General Assembly, "History has demonstrated, the efforts on restraining the
emergence of the largest number of nuclear weapons will succeed only if the existing nuclear weapons powers themselves accept the same principles as they demand of others. To us this is a matter of principle under Article - VI of the Treaty, there is an obligation on nuclear weapon states to reduce their arsenal but in actual practice, their arsenals have more than doubled. This has been the reason why the NPT has proved to be such a fragile instrument\textsuperscript{54}. However, though the treaty has been extended for an indefinite period without making it compulsory for all now, our country has not acceded to it and our stand remain unchanged.

In 1974, the government of India announced that it had carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment using an implosion device. The explosion was carried out at a depth of more than 100 metres. As part of the programme of study of peaceful nuclear explosion, the Government of India had undertaken a programme to keep itself abreast of developments in this technology particularly with the reference to its in the field of mining and earth-moving operations. The Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India, also stated that India had no intention of producing nuclear weapons and reiterated its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear explosions\textsuperscript{55}. In 1978, the India representative, Samarendra Kundu said, "we have not and we do not intend to carry out any nuclear weapon tests"\textsuperscript{56}. In 1980 again, India appealed to the world community in CD to see the treaty as part of complete disarmament, which should be negotiated multilaterally, and to treat the problem not merely as technical but also political agreement, between nuclear weapon states as a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests\textsuperscript{57}. 
In 1984, India along with five other nations of Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania appealed for a halt to nuclear testing in what was called the 'Six Nation Initiative'. In January 1985, the heads of Six Nations met in New Delhi at the invitation of the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and declared that 'two specific steps today require special attention: The prevention of arms race in outer space and a comprehensive test ban treaty'.

Speaking in February 1986, the Indian representative, Eric Gonsalves, said in the CD that the opponents of CTBT put two arguments. One was security advantage, vis-à-vis the adversary of securing modernization and non-obsolescence of existing weapons. Secondly, reference had been made to the perceived disadvantage of the state parties to a future test ban treaty in the event of evasion by others. As for the first question, he said "we do not see how carrying out more tests is essential, especially when the existing nuclear weapons with the superpowers are, on each side's admission, adequate to defer the adversary". On the second issue, he said, "the efficiency of national and international seismic monitoring arrangements is by objective international standards adequate for effective verification and can very easily be upgraded." Besides, "political commitment of the international community as a whole to a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban will in itself be an effective deterrent against attempts to go in for evasion".

In the same year, at the ministerial meeting of the coordinating bureau of NAM countries at New Delhi, the then Prime Minster Rajiv Gandhi said, "Nuclear escalation must be staunched at the source. This is why
more than 30 years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru was the first statesman to appeal for the suspension of nuclear tests, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The appeal remains unheeded as the world drifts closer to the edge of the abyss. A moratorium on all nuclear weapons test by all nuclear powers is essential"60. Once again in his inaugural speech at the International seminar on "Non-alignment and world peace", New Delhi on 7th August 1987, Rajiv Gandhi stated "The prospects for nuclear disarmament are better now than they have been for many years. After Reykjavik and subsequent proposals, what we need is a moratorium on nuclear tests to facilitate progress in the disarmament negotiations"61".

In 1988, Prime Minster Rajiv Gandhi, while addressing the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament called for a moratorium on testing of all nuclear weapons and initiation of negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the first stage of the 'Action Plan' for achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon free and non-violent world order (Stage I (1988-1994), clause 2.9 VI and 2.1 A VII). The 'Action Plan' thus presented envisaged "entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty" in Stage II (1995-2000) as per Clause 2.2 a (iv)62.

Thus, India's policies on non-proliferation and disarmament issues from the 1950s upto 1989-90 contained the following elements63.

(a) India remained firmly opposed to nuclear weaponisation and the development of weapons of mass destruction.
(b) India desired the international community to accept a time-bound programme for complete and general disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, without any discriminatory provisions.

(c) India was firm in her desire to acquire and develop nuclear technology and higher technologies for peaceful purposes, the ultimate objective being to become self-reliant in this important sphere of productive scientific and technological activity which was of vital interest for India's development and economic well-being.

(d) India was willing to submit itself to controls, safeguards, and inspections if they were made equally applicable to all countries regardless of their influence and power.

Besides, our general philosophical approach to non-proliferation and disarmament has been quite aptly enumerated in what Rajiv Gandhi said in his speech at United Nations General Assembly, New York on 9th June, 1988: "We pay tribute to the sagacity of the American and Soviet leaderships. They have seen the folly of nuclear escalation. They have started tracing the outlines of a pattern of disarmament. At the same time, we must recognize the role of countless enlightened men and women all over the world, citizens of the non-nuclear weapons States as much as of the nuclear weapon states. With courage, dedication and perseverance they kept the candle burning the enveloping darkness. The Six-Nation initiative voiced the hopes and aspirations of these many millions. At a time when relations between the two major nuclear weapons states dipped to their nadir, the Six Nations - Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania - refocussed world attention on the imperative of nuclear disarmament.
The appeal of May 1984, issued by Indira Gandhi, Olof Palme and their colleagues, struck a responsive chord. Negotiations stalled for years began inching forward. The process begun in Geneva has led to Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow.

We have all welcomed the ratification of the INF Treaty concluded between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. It is an important step in the right direction. Its great value lies in its bold departure from nuclear arms limitation to nuclear disarmament. We hope there will be agreement soon to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent. The process should be carried forward to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Only then will we be able to look back and say that the INF Treaty was a truly historic beginning. India believes it is possible for the human race to survive the second millennium. India believes it is also possible to ensure peace, security and survival into the third millennium and beyond. The way lies through concerted action. We urge the international community to immediately undertake negotiations with a view to adopting a time-bound Action Plan to usher in a world order free of nuclear weapons and rooted in nonviolence. We have submitted such an Action Plan to this Special session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. Our plan calls upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament. This commitment must be total. It must be without reservation\textsuperscript{64}.

However, the period from 1990 till present period has generated critical pressure on India, with regard to disarmament and related
technological issues. The break-up of the Soviet-Union and the end of the Cold War have enabled the U.S. and its allies to initiate and push through an agenda on disarmament which would ensure the long term strategic superiority of the industrially advanced countries over the less developed countries. This agenda poses one of the most important challenges to India's foreign and national security policies as already indicated in Ch-II and III. It would be relevant, therefore, to analyze in some detail, non-proliferation and disarmament measures during this period.

During the period 1989-90, India played a leading role in three main multilateral disarmament fora, viz.: the conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the UN Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. In addition, India also made a significant contribution at the Paris Conference on Prohibition of Chemical weapons and the International Government Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons held in Canberra and the Third Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean-floor and in the subsoil, thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty). The Indian approach continued to be based on the principle that in the nuclear age, disarmament is necessary for the survival of mankind. The Action Plan for a nuclear weapons-free and non-violent world order tabled at SSOD-III by India in 1988 was a continuation of India's well-known policy on disarmament.

During the period 1990-91, apart from playing an active role in the three main multilateral disarmament stated above, India continued to
emphasize the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons within a time bound framework and a movement away from the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. India, therefore, highlighted the urgent need for commencing negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests consistent with the Preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Hoping to work towards this goal, India showed adequate flexibility to accept the establishment of the CD of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. India was among the main supporters of the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference held in New York from 7-18 January, 1991\textsuperscript{67}. During the 1991-92, the Indian approach to disarmament continued to be guided by the basic philosophy that in the nuclear age and especially after the end of Cold War, disarmament measures should be taken in a time bound manner for the survival of mankind and for promoting development. India maintains the view that the priorities for disarmament are postulated in the consensus final document of the 1978 first session devoted to disarmament\textsuperscript{68}.

Notwithstanding India's role in the multilateral disarmament for a and her approach to disarmament, bilateral discussions with USA on regional security and non-proliferation issues continued during the period 1992-93. The Foreign Secretary visited Washington 9-11 March 1992, where he held wide ranging discussions with a number of US officials. India's position on signing the NPT was reaffirmed. India also highlighted its position that regional security cannot be confined to an artificially demarcated zone. Global security issues including US-Russia arms reduction agreements, the chemical weapons convention and developments in the West Asia were also discussed. Bilateral discussions with U.K was also held during this period on disarmament.
and non-proliferation issues. Outside the three main multilateral disarmament fora, India continued to provide support to disarmament initiatives taken by non-governmental organisations and actively participated in meetings organized by them.

The period 1993-94 witnessed some remarkable development in the field of disarmament. With the end of Cold War, positive development took place in a number of areas in which initiative had been announced by India decades ago. In 1993, January the chemical weapons convention was opened for signature. India, along with 131 countries, became an original signatory to this convention. India had played a key role in the successful conclusion of the negotiations that have resulted in a unique multilateral disarmament agreement which is comprehensive and non-discrimination. India's approach on the subject on nuclear disarmament continues to be guided by the philosophy that a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound manner is essential. India also tabled a resolution on the subject of a convention on the prohibition of use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. In keeping with her efforts to promote peace and security, India played a constructive role through her participation in regional security initiatives and dialogues such as those conducted by the UN Regional Centre in Kathmandu and the initiative launched by President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan. Bilateral dialogues on disarmament, non-proliferation and security related issues were held with U.S., U.K, Japan, Germany, France and Russia. These dialogues were aimed of developing a better understanding of each others security concerns in the context of the changing international security environment.
During the period 1994-95, positive initiatives in the field of global disarmament, which began in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, were further consolidated. In January 1994, an Ad hoc Committee of the CD on Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) with a full negotiating mandate to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was established. Since 1954, India has been calling for a comprehensive ban but it was only in 1993 that there was a perceptible shift in the stand of the nuclear weapon states on this issue. Thus, a draft "rolling text" of the CTBT was finalized in September 1994. Besides, a special co-ordinator was also set-up at the CD for negotiation on a convention on the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons, the resolution of which was co-sponsored by India. India continued her principled opposition to ad hoc export control regimes such as Australia Group, Nuclear supplier's Group; and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in various international fora and called for their conversion into universal, transparent, non-discriminatory treaties which clearly distinguish between civilian and military applications. India participated actively as one of the vice-presidents of the special conference of the states parties of the Biological weapons convention which resulted in the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts to consider verification measures for the BWC. India also took favorable steps towards bilateral dialogues on disarmament, non-proliferation and security related issues with U.S., France Germany resulting in positive achievements.

During the period 1995-96, the indefinite extension of the NPT by states parties without securing any binding commitment from the nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament and the continued
nuclear testing by some nuclear weapon states such as China and France, in face of international criticism cast a shadow on any serious attempts to move towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. India along with G-21 nations expressed dismay over the nuclear tests and urged all countries to refrain from activities contrary to the objectives of the CTBT, while the later was being negotiated. However, India categorically stated in May 1995 that the decision taken to indefinitely extend the treaty did not in any way change her position in the NPT which enjoyed national consensus. India will not sign the NPT in its present form. She will continue to work for achieving genuine non-proliferation through the elimination of all nuclear weapons. In 1995, negotiation continued at the ad hoc committee of the CD on Nuclear Test Ban resulting in a second draft rolling text of the CTBT which was circulated in July 1995. India however tabled amendments to the text of the treaty at the ad hoc committee on 26th Jan, 1996. Besides, a group of countries including India, Myanmar, Mexico, Egypt, Colombia and Pakistan co-sponsored a resolution in the first committee on the conference on Disarmament calling for global nuclear disarmament in a time bound framework which was strongly endorsed of the NAM summit at Cartagena72.

During the period, 1996-97, India followed its consistent and principled stand on the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament. India had visualized the CTBT as a part of a step by step process of global nuclear disarmament, leading to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time bound framework. India also believed that the objective of CTBT was not merely to end test explosions but to end the qualitative development and refinement of nuclear weapons
whether through explosive or other means. Based on India's position, concrete Indian textural proposals on amendments were tabled to link the CTBT to the objective of elimination of nuclear weapons within an agreed time frame. **As the proposals were not taken on board, India made definitive statement that she could not subscribe to CTBT in its existing form as it was not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament and was not in India's national security interest.** India's nuclear option is part of vital national security and India will not accept any constraints on this option as long as other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons within a time bound framework. The article pertaining to "entry into force", conditional upon ratification of the treaty by 44 countries including India, was an unprecedented step in international law and practice of multilateral treaty negotiation. India made it clear that such a requirement, despite India's clearly stated position would oblige India to oppose the adoption of the CTBT text. Thus, India opposed to the adoption and subsequently the transmission of the special report by the CD to the 50th UNGA as there was no consensus on the draft treaty text. In 1996, India deposited its instruments of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). India maintain that the CWC in a significant milestone in multilateral disarmament negotiations in both its negotiating process and its non-discriminatory character and provides a valid model for future disarmament agreements.

During 1997-98, India continued its efforts aimed at giving highest priority to global nuclear disarmament. However, reluctance on part of the nuclear weapon states to begin early negotiations for elimination of
nuclear weapons had not produced any tangible results. There was growing international awareness on the need to seek elimination of nuclear weapons. India has been supportive of these efforts. In 1997, the CD was unable to start-negotiations on a Fissile Material cut off Treaty (FMCT) due to the opposition from nuclear weapons states to the creation of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The first plenary session of the CD during the year 1998 witnessed the beginning of informal consultations on cut-off treaty. India, while signalling its willingness to participate in consultation on this issue, based on the various proposals that have been put forward, would nevertheless seek to ensure that any cut-off Treaty would form part of the overall objective for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time bound framework. India's apprehensions on the CTBT which was opined for signature were coming true. India has consistently pointed out that the CTBT, without being placed in the context of a phased programme for global nuclear disarmament, serves only a discriminatory non-proliferation intent rather than the urgent goal of global nuclear disarmament. India further reiterated that mere non-proliferation arrangements as are now manifest, do not take into account India's legitimate security concerns. Besides, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1997 and during the First Conference of States Parties, India was unanimously elected the First chairman of the Executive Council of the organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons which oversees the implementation of the CWC. During this period, the attention of the international community had increasingly focussed on the problem wrought by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. India's record in the
responsible use of anti-personnel landmines had been internationally acknowledged. India remain committed to the goal of the eventual elimination of landmines and supports a phased approach towards attaining the objective of non-discriminatory and universal ban on anti-personnel landmines.

India's attitude in the non-proliferation scenario was particularly constrained and isolated given the number of Third World nations which had surrendered their nuclear options in the few years preceding the NPT treaty. In 1994, Argentina and Brazil ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco making Latin America a nuclear weapons free ozone and placing all their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Former ex-Soviet republics like Kazakhstan, Belarus and, somewhat more reluctantly, Ukraine also surrendered their nuclear arsenals between 1993-94. South Africa announced the destruction of its nuclear weapons programme, from bombs down to documents, in 1993. The most obvious evidence of how India was getting isolated with the new nonproliferation thinking was sponsorship of nonproliferation initiatives such as the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTBT) and the Fissile Materials Cutoff (FMCT) which it was then forced to turn against or withdraw from as they came close to fruition. This clearly shows the collapse of Third World Countries and NAM on the issue of non-proliferation. They have tried to perform at a level of double axes, viz; multilateral (radical) and bilateral (accommodating with US) relations. In some of these countries the needs of development, after the USSR was disintegrated, was to deal at the bilateral level and with the West in the context of globalisation. They had no option left. Their multilateral diplomacy of radical nature
collapsed. Their adjustments at bilateral level deepened. Their rhetoric of NAM started cracking up though not the vision.

However, the CTBT negotiations made rapid progress and India realised that the treaty had a good chance of coming into effect and that would effectively mean India surrendering the nuclear option. India then began to demand the treaty be linked to global nuclear disarmament in a timeframe, that it cover laboratory nuclear tests and the stringency of its verification system. The first two requirements were either politically impossible or technically unenforceable. The late hour at which India raised these objections led most countries to suspect India was acting as a deliberate spoiler.

While India cloaked its rhetoric in moral posturing, complaining the CTBT was dividing the world into nuclear have-nots, it rejected last minute attempts by the conference's group of 21 nonaligned countries to form a joint position to strengthen the draft's wording on the nuclear weapons states' obligation to disarm. In June 1996 India announced it would not sign the treaty, but would not stand in the way of the CTBT being sent to the UN for adoption and signature. What else could it do - splendid isolation like that of a peacock because of arms twisting at the global level.

A perusal view of all these disarmament measures and Indian response to them show that India has been facing enormous challenges and constraints in the path of keeping her nuclear option open which is so very important in the deteriorating security environment. But, nevertheless, India is determined to pursue the path of peace and to buy a position of status and prestige in the
comity of nations. In this direction, as India's policy on international issues in general and specific issues of disarmament in particular, has been based on its enlightened national self-interest, helping in easing tensions, reducing the situation of balance of power to a stage where the tensions are at a minimum and at the same time pursuing its interests not to anybody else's disadvantages. And in this it has been supported by majority of Afro-Asian countries, pursuing their respective self-interests. And as a group it has been exercising political pressure on the major power blocs /major actors in international fora to abandon their rigid portions, find consensus on points of difference & narrow down the gaps. In this endeavour, the support enjoyed by India from NAM countries for the policies on disarmament is a measure of its success, even if the NAM countries surrendered to the CTBT and NPT vision in the end.

However, it sometimes seems ironical that having been an active supporter of the disarmament measures ever since 1950 when Nehru called for an "immediate standstill" of nuclear explosions, India kept her nuclear option open without subscribing to disarmament measure like NPT, CTBT, FMCT etc. Why? To answer such a question, one has to look at the constraints for which India did so.

After the Cirus reactor started up in 1960, Nehru declared, "we are approaching a stage when it is possible for us to make atomic weapons". That stage was reached unquestionably in 1964 when India completed a facility at Trombay to regress the Cirus spent fuel making it the fifth country to be able to produce plutonium. When the Chinese conducted their first test in 1964-four months after Nehru's
death -Dr. Bhaba declared that India, if it decided, could build a nuclear bomb within 18 months. China's first nuclear test, barely 2 years after its invading forces inflicted a crushing defeat on India, sharply heightened this country's insecurity. The following year, Pakistan, taking advantage of India's travails, infiltrated its men into Jammu & Kashmir, triggering a full scale war. At this juncture, India was torn between the security imperative of acquiring nuclear weapons and strong doubts about the morality of such an action. Besides China & Pakistan, both U. S & Soviet Union had forces armed with nuclear weapons deployed in the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific region, from Hawaii to Diego Gracia & thereby adding to the insecurity of the country. Keeping these security imperatives in mind, India eventually conducted a nuclear detonation in 1974 at Pokhran calling it a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion(PNE). This gave India a tangible Nuclear option. The country broke no legal commitment and had the sovereign right to continue the testing programme. Even Henry Kissinger told the U.S Congress after this Indian test: "we objected strongly, but since there was no violation of U.S agreements involved, we had no specific leverage on which to bring our objections to bear". This test shook the 1968 designed-discriminatory and non-comprehensive treaty NPT & the regime to its very foundation. Mrs.Gandhi, who did not complete the political task of declaring India a nuclear weapon power in 1974, considered testing a nuclear device again in 1984 with the backdrop of reports on Pakistan's clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons, since the late 1970's which gave a fresh impetus for the Indian re-look at its Nuclear Weapon option. But the preparation for the test were apparently
discovered and had to be called off. Had India continued to test, the NPT regime probably would have disintegrated or been seriously damaged.

The nuclear option came under increasing siege in the '90s with the five declared NWS joining goods to enforce non-proliferation as a global norm. After legitimising their own nuclear hegemony through the NPT's permanent extension, these powers had begun targeting India through the CTBT and proposed FMCT. It was due to this pressure that the Indian nuclear programme slowed down. The Narasimha Rao government had the task of dodging the pressure. But the nuclear indecision of his regime, of keeping the option open but not testing, severely undermined India international role. While the threat of sanctions was being cleverly employed to rein in India, the country had over the years fallen victim to increasing technology sanction for merely retaining an open nuclear option. Every cost benefit analysis was showing that India was bleeding its interests, incurring the liabilities of maintaining of open option but not making the security gains.

In late 1995, Rao came close to nuclear test, but eventually backed off. H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral, although they did not test retained the option to do so by not signing the CTBT, thus generating an important leverage for India if and when it did complete its testing programme. Vajpayee, then, ran the crucial last lap in the long relay race to make India an overt nuclear weapons power. India's nuclear ambiguity was increasingly becoming untenable. It had to come out of the nuclear closet and test before it was too late. However, it won't be
wrong to say that different governments at the centre have followed the same nuclear policy. There is no doubt that since the days of Nehru, India has been campaigning for a comprehensive test ban treaty as a part of a commitment to universal nuclear disarmament it joined the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty; during Rajiv Gandhi, an alternative to the NPT was formulated (the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan) in 1988 and presented at the UN Special Session on disarmament; in 1993, the then government went so far as to co-sponsor with the U.S., a UN General Assembly Resolution in support of a CTBT and Fissile Freeze Treaty. However, as it became clear that the decades old long nuclear diplomacy for elimination of global atomic stockpiles had failed, India had no choice but to go in for weaponisation, keeping in view the progressively deteriorating security environment around India where the strategic and security cooperation between Pakistan and China and U.S.'s accommodative stances on both Pakistan and China can have a negative impact on India's security environment.

India has to live with a hostile nuclear China on the one hand and equally hostile nuclear Pakistan on the other. These constraints made India keep the nuclear option open till finally it declared its doctrine by crossing the nuclear rubicon. Besides, U.S.A's accommodative attitude for both Pakistan and China, declining role of non-aligned countries and Group of Fifteen in international affairs, North Korean and Iraq nuclear crisis, military interdiction in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, threat of economic sanctions against developing countries, disapproval of bilateral trade negotiations, permanent extension of NPT, U.S. Policy to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty and cap it off with a fissile materials cutoff treaty, U.S. plan to re-engineer the
IAEA into a nuclear policeman and others have acted as constraints as far as India's security is concerned. There constraints flow from the structural level and therefore, India by not adhering to the discriminatory treaties like NPT, CTBT and FMCT has shown its maturedness and sovereign right of self-determination. However, this is not to say that India is not in favour of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and global comprehensive disarmament, which has been its one of the most important policies in the international fora. India's commitment to nuclear disarmament remains undiluted and highest priority as ever but there has to be a truly non-discriminatory, all comprehensive and transparent disarmament measure agreement with a time-bound specification ensuring the security of independent countries.

With this background of constraints, particularly from the international system seemingly dominated by one power - U.S., India's decision to conduct the recent nuclear tests have posed a fresh set of question in the disarmament diplomacy, which would be taken up in the next chapter.
END NOTES


5 Ibid, pp. 33-36.

6 Ibid, pp. 456-87


14 UN Document - A/RES/2660 (XXV).


16 SIPRI, Year Book, op.cit., 1974, p. 103.
17  Ibid, 1975, p. 405 and Appendix 14A.
18  Ibid, 1977, p. 354 and Appendix 8B.
22  Ibid, 1987, p. 324
23  Ibid., p. 236
29  SIPRI; op.cit., 1993, pp. 733-56.


40 Ibid, pp. 51-52.


46 ENDC/PV. 5, March 20, 1962, p. 41.


50 UNGAOR, 18th Session, Document - A/5758.


53 Ibid

54 Ibid, p. 453.


58 Text of Speech of the Six Nation Summit on Nuclear Disarmament, 28\textsuperscript{th} Jan, 1985.


61 Ibid, p. 268.

62 Text of "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear weapon free and non-violent order", presented by the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi at IIIrd Special Session on Disarmament in June, 1988.

63 Dixit, J.N., op.cit., p. 283.


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66 Govt. of India Reports, Ministry of External Affairs, 1989-90, pp. 49-50.


70 Ibid, 1993-94, pp. 82-84.

71 Ibid, 1994-95, pp. 84-87.


