CHAPTER 4

THE EMERGENCE OF 'GLOBAL JIHAD' AND THE PAKISTANI DIPLOMACY
The Global Islamic Resurgence

In the previous two-three decades the ideology of religio-civilization has emerged as an important socio-political force and by now, it has taken a global dimension. "Apter, Sigmund and also Shils assert that the situation in the developing countries is ripe for the emergence of ideologies. Modernization is destabilizing the old order of society and forcing the different indigenous social forces to address themselves ideologically to this process of change. This observation is certainly valid in the case of Pakistan where the clash of traditional and modern values has led to endless ideological controversy".¹

The revolt against the West is legitimized by asserting the superiority of indigenous values as against the Western and other outside values. "'Indigenization has been the order of the day throughout the non-Western world in the 1980s and 1990s. The resurgence of Islam and 're-Islamization are the central themes in Muslim societies".² For example secularism which was strongly supported by many ruling elites (usually-Western educated) to avoid religious conflicts is now consciously rejected

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by many politically oriented religious movements.\textsuperscript{3} The Islamic revivalists "base their view of history on a syllogism: Muslims were once strong, but are now weak; when Muslims were strong, they lived fully by the precepts of their faith; therefore Muslims are weak because they do not live up to these precepts."\textsuperscript{4} In their view the problem is compounded by the fact that the West (including the former Soviet Union, and, now Russia) "benefits from Muslims being weak, for this allows it to plunder Muslim lands and hire Muslims for cheap labour".\textsuperscript{5}

Modern Islamic organizations have been the driving force behind the dynamic spread of the Islamic resurgence and they have also been the embodiment of the Islamic threat in the eyes of the various governments.\textsuperscript{6} Many old organizations have reactivated themselves, and are engaged in, propagating some or the other aspect of the Islamic ideology across nations and continents. For example, the Tablighi Jamat, founded by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, which had its "humble origins in the hovels and hamlets of Mewat (in Haryana, India)... in the early decades of the present century (but)... today it is an Islamic reformist movement worldwide in its scope


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p.124.

and active in all the five continents".\(^7\) Even the Pakistani President Rafique Tarar is its member. The professed goal of the Tablighi Jamat "is the re-establishment of the perfect Islamic society of the days of the Prophet and his companions".\(^8\)

Deendar Anjuman, some of whose members carried out several bomb blasts that rocked Churches in Andhra Pradesh, Goa and Karnataka between May and July, 2000, was founded is 1936.\(^9\) Its present leader Zia-ul-Hassan, is a Pakistani national who has also set up the Jamaat Hizbollah Mujahideen with offices in M\&rdash;ordan, Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi and Sargodha.\(^10\) "Hassan has reportedly been inciting members of (Deendar Anjuman)... into triggering trouble. Last November, he visited Hyderabad... and professed a militant version of orthodox Islam. He also spoke of the burgeoning power of the Taliban... and asked his supporters to start a \textit{jihad}".\(^11\)

It should be noted that most of the modern Islamic fundamentalist groups are not against the modern technological and scientific achievement


\(^8\) Ibid., p.187.

\(^9\) Special Correspondent, "Pak Outfit behind Church blasts: Govt." \textit{The Hindu}, New Delhi, July 15, 2000, p.11.

\(^10\) Ibid.

and they do not see any opposition between reason and religion. "Their goal is to 'Islamize' the modern world, not to reject it. This can be achieved by practising Ijtihad, that is, an independent interpretation or analysis of the Quran and Sunna. In this they differ from more traditionally oriented Muslims who believe that 'the gates of Ijtihad' were closed more than 1,000 years ago."

The Salman Rushdie affair and the reaction to it of a section of European Muslims (mostly of Indian, Pakistani and North African origin) nicely brought home this point. In Britain the fundamentalist Muslims took advantage of the Rushdie controversy to threaten pubs and discotheques. They had earlier accepted public drinking and dancing as part of European life, but now it became clear that they could exert pressure out of proportion to their numbers. Kalim Siddiqui, Director of London's pro-Iranian Muslim Institute warned that "Muslims are rapidly coming to the conclusion that they will have to fight to defend Islam in Britain". The director of the Institute of Islamic Culture, Paris, said, "we can now say that France is a part of Umma... and in a few years Paris will be the capital of Islam, just as Baghdad and Cairo were in other eras". That Ayatollah

13 Ibid.
14 Daniel Pipes, no.4, p.217.
15 Quoted by Pipes, Ibid., p.218.
16 Quoted by Pipes, Ibid.
Khomeini, Supreme leader of Iran, thought it fit to issue a death fatwa in February 1989, against Rushdie, a British citizen, boosted the morale of the Islamic zealots. The Fatwa by Khomeini read, "I inform all zealous Muslims of the world that the author of the book entitled *The Satanic Verses*... and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its content, are sentenced to death".\(^1\) Thus the appeal of the Fatwa was universal in nature and any Muslim could carry it out anywhere in the world. A similar Fatwa was issued by one Mufti Nazrul Islam, in 1994, against the Bangladeshi physician and writer Taslima Nasreen for writing the 'blasphemous' books *Lajja*.\(^2\) She had to flee to Sweden. Presently both Rushdie and Nasreen are leading protected and secret lives for fear of being assassinated by fundamentalist Muslims. Many militant groups have vowed to carry out the two Fatwas.

The global dimensions of the militant Islamic resurgence has prompted some observers to theorise in terms of a global jihad. "Mr. Huntington is wrong. It is not the clash of civilizations. It is the dash of the dedicated and determined militant minority of one civilization against all other civilizations... The Mujahideen do not hide their intentions. They do not use diplomatic or apologetic language."\(^3\)

Though, the creation of Israel in 1948 may have let loose some passion for *jihad*, according to John L. Esposito "in many ways the Iranian Revolution, 1978-79, was the defining moment that signalled and symbolized for many the contemporary resurgence of Islam".\(^{20}\) The Afghan war which was seen by the West as a fight against communism further strengthened the forces of *jihad*. The role of Pakistan in the strengthening and spread of the concept and practice of global *jihad* has been seminal. The *jihad* in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Chechnya, Sinkiang and in other places are directly linked to Pakistan in terms of manpower, training, indoctrination, motivation and political goals. We shall begin with an analysis of the far-reaching developments in Afghanistan that started with the Soviet intervention there.

**The Afghan Cauldron and the Pakistani Chestnuts**

When Pakistan began its innings as an independent country the world was not particularly friendly to it. "A number of prominent Indian leaders considered Partition to be temporary... Attlee (the British PM) had reluctantly acquiesced to the creation of Pakistan... The US. knew little about Pakistan and the reasons for which it had been created..... The religious foundations of the state of Pakistan could not have brought it into a close association with the Soviet Union, given the fact that the Soviet

Union's own Muslim republics in Central Asia were at times openly resentful of Moscow's rule over them... (the global) Islamic resurgence was still three decades into the future."\(^{21}\)

Afghanistan refused to accept Pakistan as the successor to the British Raj in Northwest India and it became the only nation to vote against the admission of Pakistan to the UN. Afghanistan refused to accept the Durand Line, drawn in 1893 as the border between the two countries. Between 1947 and 1979 various Afghan governments consistently argued that the line had been imposed on Afghanistan by the more powerful British.\(^{22}\)

The break-up of Pakistan in 1971 had far-reaching implications for its foreign relations. All the four Pakistani provinces as well as the POK (of the truncated Pakistan) are borderlands. "Pakistan is thus a South Asian state when looked at from India, a Middle-Eastern one when viewed from the Persian Gulf and a Central Asian one as seen from Ghazni, Kandahar or Kabul in Afghanistan."\(^{23}\) The pre-British invasions into what is now Pakistan were mainly from Central Asia across Afghanistan. The invaders wanted to bring the present Baluchistan and NWFP into their realms.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p.198.
Moreover Pakistan possesses the multiple features of South Asian, Middle-Eastern and Central Asian state not only because of its geographical position but also because of its ethnic and cultural composition. "Its different rulers have utilized its geo-strategic location in different ways at different times. Sometimes they stress the South-Asian elements, sometimes the Middle-Eastern and sometimes the Central Asian".24

A question naturally arises as to where does the post-1971 Pakistan really belong if it can claim three different regional characteristics? Barry Buzan, a British specialist in the military aspect of international relations, has provided the concept of 'security complex' which he defines as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns are so sufficiently close that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another'.25 On this basis, Buzan argues that since the bulk of the Pakistani army is deployed against India, Pakistan becomes a member of the South-Asian security complex. Also Selig Harrison, an American commentator with a long association with South-Asian security matters, argues that since Pakistan perceives the threat as coming mainly from India, it should address itself as a South Asian state.26

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24 Ibid., p.12:
26 Ibid.
But few threats were emanating from India in the late 70s when the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan and Islamic fundamentalists captured power in Iran soon after. These two events propelled Pakistan into the slot of the frontline state in the US-led western scheme of things. Islamic regimes of the Middle-East like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt etc. feared Soviet communism as well as the 'export' of Islamic fundamentalism from Iran. They joined with Pakistan and the West in fighting the 'twin menaces'.

As the jihad in Afghanistan picked up, millions of Afghan refugees swarmed into Pakistan. According to UN estimates the number of refugees in Pakistan reached 1700,000 by March (1981). A further 400,000 were in Iran. The guerrilla parties entered an unscrupulous competition for recruits among this flood of people... From 1979 there was a dramatic increase in the production of heroin in NWFP... according to narcotics enforcement officials, the money from heroin production forms one of the principal sources of finance for the purchase of arms". 27

Most of the refugees were Pathan's the core themes of whose folklore are revenge and honour. 28 "The problem really stems from the type of refugees the Afghans are. They are a swaggering, armed, aggressive lot.

27 Mark Urban War in Afghanistan, Hampshire, 1988, pp.77-78.
Their bearing adds to their historical image of themselves as conquering warriors... Afghans have muscled into various enterprises such as trucking, selling cloths etc. from Peshawar down to Karachi... Their tribal networks, crossing international boundaries, allow them to traffic in banned weapons and drugs.\textsuperscript{29}

At the height of the Afghan-jihad, there were three million refugees in Pakistan of whom three lakh were in Peshawar. They became a burden on the Pakistani Pakhtuns so much so that the demand for Pakhtunistan got abruptly killed. "Those Pakistanis who toyed with the Pakhtunistan idea are showing signs of impatience with their guests".\textsuperscript{30}

With a Soviet satellite regime in Kabul and troops close to its borders, the geo-political and strategic framework within which Pakistani policy-makers had operated since the state's existence changed beyond recognition.\textsuperscript{31} In occupying Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was probably over reacting to the instability in that country precipitated by the rising tide of fundamentalism in neighbouring Iran. It was also anticipating the 'harmful' impact of the Islamic Revolution on its own central Asian Muslim

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., pp. 65-66.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p.169.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Dieter Braun "Some Aspects of Pakistan's Foreign Policy After the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan" in Wolfgang Peter Zingel, Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemant (ed.), \textit{Pakistan in the 80s}, Lahore, 1985, p.566.
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population. Gen. Zia, the master tactician, wanted to take full advantage of his country's geo-strategic importance in the backdrop of the developments in Afghanistan and Iran. He was proud to tell a correspondent of the US broadcasting station, ABC, that since the fall of the Shah of Iran he (Zia) had been serving US interests in the Gulf region by acting as its policeman.

In return for providing the US forces with refuelling facilities, Pakistan received $3200m aid from the U.S. It clandestinely sold small weapons and Stinger missiles (received from the US for Afghan war) to Iran and even allowed the transport of Chinese weapons over its territory to Iran. Thus Pakistan made huge profits and at the same time dissuaded Iran from using the Shia card against Pakistan.

During the Iran-Iraq war, Pakistan supplied military instructors to the GCC countries and 30,000 Pakistani soldiers were deployed in Saudi Arabia for internal and external security.

As the war in Afghanistan picked up momentum, the ISI began to help the Mujahideen with training and strategy. The ISI under Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman offered a great deal of assistance to one of the

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32 Shah, no.23, p.34.  
33 Ibid, p.29.  
34 Ibid., p.30.  
35 Ibid., p.29.
Mujahideen groups, the Hizb-i-Islami led by Guluddin Hekmatyar.\textsuperscript{36} He also had the support of Saudi Arabia. The next, director general of the ISI, Gen. Hamid Gul was himself a strong exponent of bringing Islamization not only to Afghanistan but to all of Central Asia.\textsuperscript{37} But while all the resistance parties and groups agreed about fighting the Kabul regime in the name of Islam, they seriously diverged as the nature of the future of a free Afghanistan\textsuperscript{38} as also the role and type of Islam in that. The Peshawar based Sunni Mujahideen parties were divided into the moderate-traditionalists and the revolutionary Islamists. \textit{Mohaj-i-Milli}, \textit{Jebha-i-Nijat-i-Milli} and \textit{Harkat-i-Inquilab-Islami} were the moderate traditionalist parties arguing that Islam prescribed neither monarchy nor republic but that it was up to the Muslims to decide who rules, and to make sure that the ruler rules in accordance with Islamic Law.\textsuperscript{39} They were not against the come-back of the ex-king Zaheer Shah. The \textit{Jamiat-i-Islami Hezb-i-Islami (Khalis)}, \textit{Hezb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar)} and \textit{Ittihad-i-Islami} represented the revolutionary - Islamist parties and were dead against the return of Zaheer Shah. They favoured a new order deriving inspiration from the original sources of Islam. Hekmatyar pronounced, "the believing and courageous people of Afghanistan will not agree to anything but an Islamic

\textsuperscript{36} Burki, no.21, p.199.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp.403-4.
government. (They) will fight (against a Zaheer Shah government) as they fought against Taraki and Amin governments". There was also an Iranian-supported alliance of Shia Mujahideen parties in which the Harkat-i-Islami, Sazman-i-Nasr and Pasdaran-i-Islami were the major parties.

The Mujahideen had no dearth of sophisticated weapons which came from many sources including China. "Egypt became a crucial part of these arms shipments. What the US was prepared to do was to make the Soviet behaviour costly by providing military aid to the resistance". Ironically, a lot of these arms were of the Soviet origin. Pakistan cornered a good deal of these weapons for own use. As already noted, some of these were sold to Iran. Recently during the Kargil conflict Indian helicopters and air force planes were attacked and shot down by using Stinger missiles received by Pakistan from the US during the Afghan war. The Afghan president Dr. Najibullah told Journalist Mushahid Husain in an interview, "social process and internal tensions which presently continue in Pakistan are all due to inner factors and motives of the Pakistani society... you know better that the city of Peshawar and its vicinity have been

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40 Ibid., p.403.
41 Ibid., p.405.
43 Ibid., p.76-77.
44 Harinder Baweja, A Soldier's Diary - The Inside Story, New Delhi, 2000, p.69.
transformed into a black market for arms in the undeclared war against Afghanistan."\(^{45}\)

Significantly, both the Soviet and the Pakistani militaries sought to minimize occasions when their forces came into direct confrontation. The Soviets also drew limits to the degree to which they were willing to try to destabilize Pakistan and Moscow never gave up the idea of keeping the diplomatic channels open for a settlement.\(^{46}\) Diplomacy came into full play when "the amount of material damage and casualties inflicted by the Mujahideen became an unacceptable burden for the Soviet Union".\(^{47}\) Proximity Talks began under the aegis of the UN and finally the Geneva Accord was signed in April 1988 which paved the way for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops by Feb. 1989.\(^{48}\) Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a bilateral argument by which both undertook to respect the sovereignty of each other while the USSR and the USA undertook to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan. "In Zia's decision to sign the accord, he no doubt concluded that this was probably the best Pakistan was going to get and, indeed, most of its requirements


\(^{47}\) Burki, no.21, p.199.

\(^{48}\) Weinbaum, no.46, p.108.
had been met. the Soviet departure was an enormous victory for Pakistan in many ways".49

But there were other implications too. For one, the internecine conflict among the Mujahideen groups sharpened. For another, the US halved its financial and material support in 1990 and totally withdrew them in 1991.50 In March 1992 Dr. Najib resigned to pave the way for a negotiated settlement which, however, could not be achieved because of serious clashes of interests among the Afghan ethnic groups, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia etc.

During the Afghan jihad "some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined (the) fight between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to study in Pakistani Madrasas. Eventually more than 100,000 foreign radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad. The camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan where they were trained became virtual universities for promoting pan-Islamic radicalism (all over the world). Americans woke up to the danger only in 1993, when Afghan trained Arab militants blew up the World Trade Center in New York, killing 6 people and injuring 1,000. The bombers believed that, just as Afghanistan had defeated one superpower - the Soviet Union - they would defeat a

49 Ibid.
50 Burki, no.21, p.200.
second." In this manner, the development of the concept and practice of 'global jihad' was by far, the most important outcome of the Afghan jihad. And the Taliban militia emerged as the most potent and visible symbol of the global jihad.

The Taliban Militia

Pakistan has always wanted a friendly regime in Kabul which would give up Afghanistan's claim of territory over Pakistan, provide an easy access to the Central Asian Muslim Republics and give strategic depth to Pakistan vis-a-vis India and particularly Kashmir. The Taliban Militia was created and sustained by Pakistan to achieve mainly these goals. The origin of the Taliban in the Pakistani Madrasas and among the children of the Afghan refugees has already been discussed in chapter II. "The official Taliban version of history traces the genesis of the movement to a humble Madrasa is Singesar village of Kandahar province's Maiwand district where Mohammad Omar, a former Mujahid was studying... the probability is that Pakistan was aware of the new movement.. and that various channels were at work in liaising with them. ISI had long-established networks in and around Kandahar, where Pakistan had a consulate and where ISI had its own close links with the so-called 'Airport-Shura' of

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commanders". In summer 1994, the Taliban, a small band of 30, took up arms against the excesses of predatory Mujahideen bands in Kandahar. The Taliban had their own long-established links with the Madrasa network of the JUI in Pakistan where thousands of Afghan refugee youths were engaged in Koranic studies. These Madrasas provided the bulk of the fresh Taliban recruits. While all Taliban speak their mother tongue Pushtu, for many their second language is not Persian, the lingua franca of Afghanistan, but Urdu, the language of Pakistan.

In the 1980s Pakistan had conducted its Afghan war with the help mainly of the JI and the Hezb-i-Islami. But by 1994, it was self-evident that Hekmatyar had failed not only to conquer Kabul but also to unite the Pushtun, who loathed him, against the Tajik dominated regime of Burhanuddin Rebbani. Thus Pakistan's Afghan policy got stranded and it had to look up to the JUI which had meanwhile built up a support base amongst the Durrani Pushtuns living in Baluchistan and the NWFP. The Pushtuns both of the JUI and the Taliban belong to the Durrani tribe and are Deobandis, followers of a fundamentalist reformist sect which interprets Islam, particularly its injunctions against women, extremely

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53 Ibid., p.44.
54 Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban", in Ibid., p.73.
55 Ibid., p.74.
strictly. The Deobandi tradition also opposes the tribal and feudal structures of the Pakistani society and has a strong belief in egalitarianism. It has great antipathy against Shiism and as a result, against Iran. When the Taliban took Majar-i-Sharif, a Shia town, they killed many Iranian diplomats and went from house to house cutting the throats of civilian.

In 1993, the JUI allied itself with the winning PPP led by Benazir Bhutto and thus became part of the ruling coalition in Pakistan. The JUI used the opportunity to establish close links with the army, the ISI and the Interior Ministry under retired General Naseerullah Babar. Maulana Fazlur Rahman, leader of the JUI, was made Chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, a position which enabled him to influence foreign policy. To lobby support for the Taliban he visited the US, European capitals and Saudi Arabia. Soon the Saudis emerged as the major financial backers of the Taliban, hoping, *interalia*, to get a foothold in Central Asia.

Another major Pakistani influence on the Taliban was the truck-transport smuggling mafia based in Quetta and Chaman in Baluchistan. "Made up largely of Pakistani but some Afghan Pushtuns, drawn from the

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56 Ibid., p.75.
57 Burki, no.21, p.201.
58 Rashid, no.54, pp.75-76.
same tribes as the Taliban leadership and closely knitted to them through business interests and intermarriage, this mafia had become frustrated by the warring warlords around Kandahar, who prevented the expansion of their traditional smuggling between Pakistan and Afghanistan further afield into Iran and Central Asia... By contrast, the transport mafia based in Peshawar had been relatively successful..."^59 The Quetta-Chaman mafia funded the Taliban handsomely and the smuggling activity increased. As a result, the Central Board of Revenue estimated that Pakistan lost 3.5 billion rupees (US $87.5 million) in customs revenue in the financial year 1992-93, 11 billion rupees (US $275 million) during 1993-94 and 20 billion rupees (US $500 million) during 1994-95. In a 1995 study the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics estimated that the smuggling trade had an annual turnover of 100 billion rupees (US$2.5 billion) or almost one third of Pakistan's estimated black economy of 350 billion rupees (US $8.75 billion).^60

The Taliban, backed as they were by Pakistan and other powerful interests, took Kandahar, Jalalabad and Kabul one by one. The ISI played a leading role in Taliban's capture of Jalalabad and Kabul, by first helping subvert the Jalalabad Shura and offering its members sanctuary in Pakistan and then allowing the Taliban to reinforce their assault on Kabul by fresh

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^59 Ibid., p.77.
^60 Ibid., pp.77-78.
troops drawn from Afghan refugee camps on the border.\textsuperscript{61} When Kabul fell in September 1996, Pakistan diplomats and the ISI officials arrived there promising all out support to the Taliban and the JUI sent a delegation to help the Taliban write a new Afghan constitution. Till date only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recognised the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government.

Pakistan has hoped and wished that the Taliban would succeed in unifying entire Afghanistan but this has not happened. The Taliban were pushed back from Majar-i-Sharif in 1997 and the Northern Alliance continues to hold a portion of the country with active help from Russia, some of the Central Asia states and probably India. "For many experts in and out of government, especially for Pakistan's frustrated diplomatic corps, it was another classic example of Pakistan's overreaching foreign policy aims and ambitions, which were set in the Zia era when the country could at least claim lavish support from the USA, China and Saudi Arabia. But in the post cold war era, Pakistan had neither the resources, nor the domestic economic and political stability, to sustain such an ambitious foreign policy."\textsuperscript{62} But Pakistan continues to play the \textit{Great Game} keeping in mind its interests in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Kashmir. According to Ahmed Rashid's new book \textit{Taliban: Islam Oil and the New Great Game}

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p.87.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p.88.
in Central Asia, in 1997-98, Pakistan provided an aid of $30 millions to the Taliban.\textsuperscript{63} This included 600,000 tonnes of wheat, diesel, petroleum and kerosene fuel which was partly paid by Saudi Arabia, arms and ammunition, aerial bombs, maintenance and spare parts for its Soviet-era military equipment, repair and maintenance of the Taliban's airforce and airport operations, road building, electricity supply in Kandahar and salaries.\textsuperscript{64} "Increasingly, the Kashmir issue became the prime mover behind Pakistan's Afghan policy and its support to the Taliban. The Taliban exploited this adroitly, refusing to accept other Pakistani demands knowing that Islamabad could deny them nothing as long as they provided bases for Kashmiri and Pakistani militants".\textsuperscript{65}

The heroin-trade constitutes a major source of the Taliban's income. They actively encourage its production and processing. The UN has estimated that Afghanistan accounted for an astounding three-quarters of the global opium output in 1999.\textsuperscript{66} "Afghan heroin is feeding an already swollen population of Junkies in neighbouring Pakistan, which has nearly two million addicts and also in Iran, Central Asia and Russia... 90 percent of heroin used in Europe originates in Afghanistan and officials in the

\textsuperscript{63} Quoted by Amit Baruah "Pak Ripe for Revolution" \textit{The Hindu}, New Delhi, February 24, 2000.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.

United States worry that increased quantities will soon find their way there... The Taliban militia is funding itself by taxing the opium trade'. 67 India, Pakistan, Central Asia and Iran are used as transit routes. "Around Kandahar, poppy fields stretch as far as the horizon. In Herat, the Taliban have set up model farms where farmers learn the best method of heroin cultivation... The Taliban collect a 20 percent tax from opium dealers and transporters - money that goes straight to the Taliban war chest." 68

Osama bin Laden, one of the main recruiters of Arab militants for the Afghan jihad, was heavily patronized by the ISI and the Saudi intelligence. He befriended Omar, the Taliban chief, and united Arab militants in Afghanistan to create the '055 brigade'. 69 "The Taliban had no contact with Arab Afghans or pan-Islamic ideology until then. But Umar was quickly influenced by his new friend and became increasingly vociferous in his attacks on Americans, the United Nations, and the Saudis and other pro-Western Muslim regimes. Recent Taliban statements reflect a bin Laden style outrage, defiance, and pan-Islamism that the Taliban had never used before his arrival". 70 The Taliban have ignored or rejected repeated US pleas and threats for the extradition of Laden. Presently Laden

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67 Ibid., pp.21-22.
68 Rashid, no.51, pp.33.
69 Ibid., p.32.
70 Ibid.
is leading the *Al Quaida* organization which has been linked with attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. "Recent reports that members of the militant Islamic organization *Al-Quaida*, which is closely linked to Osama bin Laden, had in 1993 attempted to purchase enriched uranium lend further credence to fears that terrorists might attempt to obtain nuclear material from the illicit black market. Moreover allegations have subsequently come to light that bin Laden in fact may already have acquired tactical nuclear weapons from this market -- presumably through sympathizers in the Central Asian Republics who in turn acquired the weapons in the Ukraine."\(^{71}\)

Laden has created diplomatic problems for Pakistan. If Islamabad were to support the US in capturing him the JUI would protest and Pakistan's Kashmir cause would also suffer. Already the JUI has issued death threats to all Americans in Pakistan, to be carried out if Osama is extradited to the US.\(^{72}\)

As mentioned in Chapter 2, a large number of training camps belonging to various Mujahideen groups are operating in Afghanistan under the Taliban patronage. According to a former *jihadi* commander now living in Peshawar, the short term objective of these camps is to provide

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72 Rashid, no. 51, p.33.
trained manpower for the separatist movements in Kashmir and the fight against the Northern Alliance. In the long term the aims is to export the Taliban model of Islamic statehood as far afield as Central Asia, the Middle East, North and East Africa, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{73} It may be noted that the entire region between the Caucasus and Xinxiang is made up of weak governments characterised by elitism, corruption and lack of representative governments. The HUM trainees, all of whom are Pakistani men aged between 18 and 25, make a mandatory stay at the Harkat's Kabul headquarters for initial briefings before they are assigned to various training camps in Afghanistan. The most notorious of these camps is the one at Rishkhor, near Kabul, supervised by dreaded Pakistani terrorists Riaz Basra and Saiful Islam Akhtar.\textsuperscript{74}

The \textit{jihadi} agenda may run up against the agenda of the Western powers led by the US who are keen to control the economic resources of Central Asia, already being described in some US quarters as the 'Greater Middle-East.'\textsuperscript{75} Long before the fall of Kabul US officials had high aspirations from the Taliban. Along with the wish that the Taliban would clean up drugs, Americans then also thought they would (1) serve as a bulwark against Russian and Iranian interest in Afghanistan (2) restore order

\textsuperscript{73} Quoted, Mohammad Ilyas Khan "The Road to Holy Terror" \textit{The Herald}, Karachi, Jan.2000, p.122.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p.121.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p.122
to all of Afghanistan (3) get rid of terrorist training camps (4) pave the way for the return of Zahir Shah, and (5) provide a US ally, Pakistan, an overland link to the immense profits to be made from trade with the new Central Asian republics. The Taliban promised to open doors for the construction of giant gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia via Afghanistan to probably Karachi in Pakistan. The main contender for that pipeline was an American-Saudi coalition of UNOCAL and Delta oil companies. UNOCAL and its partner Delta hired as consultant every available member of the inner circle of those Americans involved in Afghan operations during the *jihad* years. Iran and the Northern Alliance were opposed to the project for their own reasons. But the US policy of engaging the Taliban broke down due to four main factors - (1) The Taliban could not bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and failed to unify it (2) instead of checking the cultivation of opium poppy they encouraged it, (3) they proved less sensitive to the US political interests than desired as shown by the Osama-standoff and (4) their ill-treatment of women and medieval legal system antagonised the US public opinion. UNOCAL, however, continues attempts to revive the pipeline project. Pakistan, also, is very much interested in the project which, if very much

76 Richard Mackenzie "The United States and the Taliban" in Maley (ed.), no.52, p.96.
77 Ibid., pp.97-87
interested is the project which, when completed, would bring royalty as well as cheap oil and gas for domestic consumption.

What is clear from all these developments is that the situation in Afghanistan developed in ways that nobody could have foreseen in Dec. 1979. The big question is, would Pakistan succeed in limiting the influence of the Taliban to Afghanistan especially when their emergence was the consequence of developments inside its own borders? The answer seems to be a resounding 'no', particularly as Pakistan has been trying to use the Taliban to achieve its own goals in various parts of the world. Moreover Pakistan has a problem at its own hands. "With Pakistan's civil state machinery eaten away by corruption and ineffectiveness and growing public disillusionment with the political system, the law and order agencies would be unable to cope with an Islamic movement which would be violent and self sacrificing. The middle and lower echelons of the army's officer corps are themselves now full of fervent fundamentalist officers, many of them having graduated from a madrassa-style education rather than the public schools of the ruling elite. The threat of an islamic revolution in Pakistan has never been greater".

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79 Burki, no.21, p.201.
80 Rashid, no.54, pp.88-89.
The Pakistani Army and the 'Zia Generation'

During a recent visit to Pakistan Stephen Cohen, an expert on the Pakistani army, noted the emergence of a possible 'Zia generation' of officers: individuals who were socially more conservative, perhaps more Islamic in orientation, and not overly worried about the army's role in the Pakistani politics. Zia's stress on Islam, in an already conservative society, encouraged the Islamic enthusiasts in the army. For some officers the war in Afghanistan became the proto-type of a new Pakistani strategy of war by proxy against domestic and foreign enemies. Maj-Gen. Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi, one of the leaders of the aborted coup attempt in, Sept. 1995, spoke publicly about the need to 'Islamize' both Pakistan and its army.

The Pakistani army officer sees the politicians, especially Benazir Bhutto, as being responsible for most of the problems facing Pakistan. "A summary list would include the continuing inability to develop a coherent national strategy, let alone a national ideology that would serve as a unifying force for all Pakistanis, the no-win stalemate in Kashmir, the worsening of relations with Iran, the loss of American support, an uncertain situation in Afghanistan (and little progress towards achieving}

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82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
the grandiose goal of projecting Pakistani power into Central Asia), an economic disaster at home, the specter of widespread political corruption undermining Pakistani democracy, tainting the military (possibly weakening national security). Only the nuclear programme, under army control, seems to have produced positive results and the Pakistani generals believe it deterred an Indian attack in 1990.

After 1988 the Pakistani Army emerged as an important component of the 'troika' system that came to characterize decision-making in Pakistan. However, the term, 'troika', never quite captured the shifting balance of influence between the army, the Prime Minister and the President. The balance has totally shifted in favour of the army following the coup in October 1999. Gen. Musharraf would surely try to redress some of the grievances, as listed above, which an average Pakistani army officer has in his mind. He would also try to overcome Pakistan's recurrent nightmare - that its 'three-legged stool' of outside support from China, the US and the Islamic world has collapsed. Beijing, Washington and Teheran have openly advocated a dialogue on Kashmir and Pakistan has not been able to formulate a coherent response to this. They have also opposed terrorism and religious extremism.

84 Ibid., p.168
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p.163
87 Ibid., p.174
Recently the Pakistani Army has circulated to its soldiers a booklet, prepared by the Psychological Operations Branch, which exhorts the soldiers to fight against India as this was the will of Allah.\(^88\) It adds, "Holy person said that Muslims will fight *jihad* in India. Had he been alive, then he too would have spent his life and property on *jihad.*"\(^89\)

It would be useful to try and understand the psychological make-up of Gen. Musharraf who is presently leading the Pakistani state as well as its army. The human factor becomes more important by the fact that Pakistan is a praetorian or garrison state and a country where the militarization of civil society as well as the civilization of military community have been going on simultaneously.\(^90\) Musharraf's grooming took place in an artillery regiment. As a general rule, the informal adjunct for all gunners in the Pakistani army is LMK, i.e. Lean, Mean and Keen.\(^91\) He spent six years of his prime youth in Turkey and was influenced by Kemalism. This he articulated while talking to the press on Oct. 20, 1999. A jittery Qazi Husain Ahmed, Leader of JI, responded that his party would not let anyone enforce Kemalism or secularism. "The brave armed forces and self

\(^{88}\) Dr. Nagpal, no.19, p.13.
\(^{89}\) Quoted, Ibid.
\(^{91}\) Ibid.
respecting people of Pakistan will not tolerate any system other than Islam". 

Musharraf specialises in issuing statements with more than one mind as target, for example:

- India is a bloody coward nation and they will never cross the border (Addressing a garrison on 25-26 Oct. 1999).
- Pakistan is Kashmir and Kashmir is Pakistan (speaking in POK on 29 Dec. 1999).
- We would like President Clinton and USA to play a role, the role they played in Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo... by addressing and resolving the core issue of Kashmir (speaking at the dinner hosted in honour of US Senator Tim Johnson on 22 Jan. 2000).
- Indo-Pakistan tension would escalate if the US President skipped Islamabad from his coming tour to South Asia (speaking to the Pakistani Media on 2 Feb. 2000). 

From the above, it is clear that the general is not very diplomatic and speaks his mind. His commitment to the 'Kashmir cause' is very strong

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92 Ibid., p.92.
93 Ibid., p.90.
but he is also aware of the constraints facing Pakistan in this regard. He is adventurous and rebellious by nature.

He is ruthless in the pursuit of security goals as is evident from the way in which he suppressed the Shia revolt in Gilgit. He is known to be a devout Muslim officer and has linkages with a number of Islam-pasand politicians of Pakistan. He has had strong links with the JI. Overall, Gen. Musharraf seems to be a typical 'Zia generation' officer as described by Stephen Cohen. His Kargil expedition may also be explained by using the same model.

Among the people who matter in Pakistan a feeling that Pakistan has been denied its dues and cheated by the international community has taken root. They are looking to Islam and the global Islamic community as an alternative to the present largely secular and West dominated international order. President Rafique Tarar said recently, "Kashmir is a test case for the viability and credibility of the present international order". Coming from the head of state it is certainly a categorical statement. A Pakistani author also laments, "Although the Muslims constitute one-fifth of the global population and have one-fourth of its resources (but) it is strange that the decisions on the fate of Muslims are

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94 J.N.Dixit "Knowing The General", Seminar, New Delhi, Jan. 2000, p.64.
95 Ibid.
96 Quoted, The Dawn, Karachi, July 7, 2000
taken by others, whether it be Iraq-Kuwait war, or the matter of Bosnian Muslims... or that of Libya and Pakistan becoming nuclear powers - all decisions are beyond the power of the Muslims... From Kashmir to Bosnia everywhere the Muslims have had a raw deal. Muslims are being killed everywhere but the international community is not bothered. The author goes on to recommend that the Muslims should come together and form their own equivalents of the UN and NATO.

Pakistan and Central Asia

Ever since the nineteenth century Central Asia has formed the southern soft belly of first Tzarist Russia and then the Soviet Union. With Russians being Christians of European slav stock and Central Asians being mainly Muslims of Asian stock, in one way or another Russian rule was resented and resisted in Central Asia. When the USSR collapsed the five Central Asian Republics, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as well as Azerbaizan declared their independence. Later they joined the CIS and the ECO.

Pakistan's geo-strategic significance as a gateway of Central Asia has already been mentioned. The reality of six Islamic republics is seen by Pakistan not only for its communal possibilities but psychologically as

98 Shah, no.23, p.33.
well, opening up the possibility of Pakistan overcoming or leaving behind many of its familiar problems in South Asia. Pakistan fancies the chances of the emergence of a strong Islamic bloc which would give it a sense of security as well as pressurize India on the Kashmir issue. Not surprisingly Pakistan became the first country to establish diplomatic ties with the six republics and joined in sponsoring them for membership in ECO.  

These republics have been struggling against economic underdevelopment as well as the problem of Islamic terrorism. "All the Central Asian states are experiencing sharply declining production and consumption, monetary and financial disequilibrium and deteriorating employment situation... the two most urgent tasks before (them) are economic stabilization and transformation of economics in viable market economies through structural and institutional changes".

As far as matters of religion are concerned, the Sufi tradition developed in Central Asia. "In this cross-road of cultures and languages, Central Asia represents Islamic mysticism, ie., the Sufism. The Sufi doctrine and its societal extension, the Sufi Brotherhood, have found in

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99 Weinbaum, no.46, p.167.
100 Ibid.
Central Asia a very fertile land." However the recent years have witnessed important changes. With petro-dollars pouring in from Saudi Arabia, and Iran and Pakistan also taking interest, there has been a rapid growth of militant Islam in the region. "After religious restrictions were removed, there has been a tremendous Islamic upsurge as is manifested in growing performance of rituals, visits to Sufi shrines, opening up of old and construction of new mosques and religious seminaries, and pilgrimage to holy places abroad".

The Afghan war veterans are also active in the region but the competing sectarianism may eventually prove an anti-thesis to the vision of an Islamic front in the region. Pakistan can take full advantage of its links with the region only if the political situation in Afghanistan settles down. The ECO has a potential market of 300 million people. Details about the ECO have been discussed in Chapter II. Here it would be useful to note the relative advantages that Pakistan enjoys in dealing with Central Asia:

• Cooperation has already been envisioned in trade, communications, energy, banking etc.

• The Karachi port is the closest in terms of mileage from the eastern republics.

• Uzbekistan has already expressed a desire to link Tashkent with Karachi.

• Pakistan and Tajikistan have developed a new trade link through the Han corridor of Afghanistan.

• A land route can be developed from Pakistan via Sinkiang to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Presently, a land route runs through the Soviet built Salang Tunnel crossing the Hindu-kush mountains.

• Tajikistan can supply electricity to Pakistan.

• Pakistan can provide technical skills and manpower in sectors like banking, management, military etc.

• Joint ventures in sectors like mineral development, telecom, agriculture and gas pipelines are possible.

• Uzbek raw cotton can be processed in the Pakistani mills.

• Railways can be developed.

• Pakistan holds some political advantage because unlike Iran and Turkey it has no obvious stake and no ethnic ties that could complicate or
compromise its role as a possible mediator should the republics be looking for one.\textsuperscript{106}

Pakistan has the disadvantages of instability in Afghanistan, limited ability to supply credits or hard currency, little cultural acquaintance with the republics and lack of infrastructural development essential for close cooperation.

Turkey which is competing with Pakistan for space in Central Asia has the following advantages:

- Its economic condition is good and it can invest large amounts of money.
- Turkey can provide a port on the Black Sea.
- Turkey is secular and democratic.
- It has ties with Western militaries.
- It has an impressive record of economic growth.
- Linguistically it is closer to Central Asia. Turkey has the disadvantage of greater distance from most of the republics.

Iran, another competitor has these advantages.

\textsuperscript{106} Weinbaum, no.46, pp.167-68.
• It has easy access to Central Asia being close to it. Railheads and roads are already developed.

• It can offer a port on the Persian Gulf

• Iran has experience in oil and gas extraction and carrying it through pipelines.

• It has cash and can provide credits.

• In Tajikistan most people speak Persian and Iran already has a strong presence there.¹⁰⁷

Iran's main disadvantage is the fear among the republics of its brand of theocracy and Islamic fundamentalism.

The Saudis are also interested. Saudi delegations have visited the republics regularly since 1990 and have reportedly spent $1 billion for the revival of Islamic institutions and the rebuilding of mosques.¹⁰⁸ In seeking to export Wahabism the Saudis are poised to counter the Iranian influence much as in Afghanistan.

India is also interested but is hampered by lack of both ground and sea access to the region. India has experience of this market (in the Soviet period), can provide various types of low priced goods and technical

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.169.
expertise and a large number of Indians who have been educated in Tashkent can speak the Uzbek language. But in the ultimate analysis the reliance of these republics on Russia continues to be heavy in the absence of equivalent alternatives.

When the Taliban captured Kabul in September, 1996 Central Asia reacted with "consternation and dismay as well as frank alarm at the rise to power of a movement about which little certain was known beyond its puritanical creed and retrograde social ideas. An emergency meeting was called in Almaty attended by Russia and four Central Asian republics. A stern warning was issued to the Taliban not to invade the CIS borders north of Afghanistan. The Meet also decided to extend 'humanitarian assistance', including supplies of flour and electricity, to the inhabitants of Afghanistan's northern regions and to refugees. The implications for Central Asia of continuing instability in Afghanistan as well as the prospects of a renewed Taliban offensive north of the Hindu-kush were the subject of talks held in Tashkent in February, 1997 by the defence Ministers of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan together with Russia's Defence Minister. "According to Interfax, three contingency plans were discussed at the closed meeting in Tashkent, one of them being

109 Ibid., p.170.
110 Anthony Hyman "Russia, Central Asia and The Taliban" in Maley (ed.) no.52, p.106.
111 Ibid., p.107
the creation of two motorized army divisions by the CIS states. Rodionov (the Russian defence Minister) was quoted as expressing concern over what he described as 'plans by military circles in Afghanistan and Pakistan relating to an escalation of tension on the border of the Central Asian states, with which Russia is linked by good close relations'.

When in May, 1997, the Taliban were close to taking Majar-i-Sharif, the Central Asian states and Russia warned that a military response, (possibly air strikes), was not ruled out. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan share boundaries with Afghanistan totalling 2000 km in length. A panic reaction set in among the republics at the prospect of the apparent collapse of anti-Taliban coalition forces which were acting as the buffer between the militant militia and the republics. "From the Taliban side, messages from Mullah Mohammad Rabbani were sent to some of the governments in an attempt to reassure them that the military offensive in Afghanistan did not constitute any threat to the Central Asia States". But claims and counter claims continue. The Taliban claimed that Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, alongwith Iran, India and France, were all implicated in arms transfers and help for the northern alliance. The spokesmen of the alliance parties maintained that Pakistan had airlifted Taliban reinforcements form Pakistan besides supplying more arms and

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112 Ibid., p.110.
113 Ibid., p.113
ammunition.\textsuperscript{114} It may be noted that the statements and warnings made to the Taliban regime, whether coming from Russia, the Central Asian capitals or Iran, are in reality more directed to the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia than to the Taliban regime as such. It was Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, together with US oil interests behind the UNOCAL-Delta pipeline project which were jointly held responsible for coordinating, providing logistics and financing the series of Taliban military successes.\textsuperscript{115}

Tahir Yuldashev, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), fled to Afghanistan after his assassination attempt against President Islam Karimov failed. The Taliban have allowed Yuldashev to set up a military training camp where he is reported to be training several hundred Islamist militants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as well as Uighurs from Xinxiang.\textsuperscript{116} The IMU is influenced by Wahabism. In August 1999, Juma Namangani, another IMU leader, entered southern Kyrgyzstan with some 800 militants (motly Afghan, Pakistani and Arab), seized several villages and threatened to invade Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{117} Russians are particularly upset over these developments in Central Asia where Moscow

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p.114.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pp.115-16.

\textsuperscript{116} Rashid, no.51, p.30

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
is building two oil-gas pipelines.\textsuperscript{118} The Uzbek government has drawn a direct drug-smuggling link between Afghanistan and the Farghana Valley where the IMU is based. The civil war in Tajikistan was partly fueled by the Afghan drugs. "New transport and smuggling mafias have developed in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Iran. They are ignored by their governments, due to a web of corruption that benefits everyone from border guards to cabinet ministers."\textsuperscript{119}

Recently four supporters of the banned extremist religious organisation, \textit{Hezb-i-Tahrir} were arrested in Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{120} The main goal of this organization is to build a single Islamic state in Central Asia. Its member circulate subversive literature printed in the US and Turkey. More than fifty of its members have been arrested this year in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Five members of a separatist group demanding an independent Uighuristan on the territories China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been arrested by the Kyrgyz police.\textsuperscript{121} According to the Kyrgyz sources activities of \textit{Wahabis} and Islamic extremists who do not

\textsuperscript{118} Mohammad Ilyas Khan, "Central Asia: Caught in the Crossfires", \textit{The Herald}, no.73, p.123.
\textsuperscript{119} Rashid, no.51, p.34
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{BBC Monitoring}, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part I, Reading, April 21, 2000, p.SU/3821, G/2/3.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 10 May, 2000, P.SU/3836, G/2.
like the existing secular states are on the increase. The arrested people have
told the officials that they wanted to bring 'true Islam' to the region.\textsuperscript{122}

The 'Shanghai Five' grouping consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was set up originally to resolve border issues but now its focus has shifted towards countering separatism and religious extremism. Recently its Summit Meet was held at Dushanbe where it was agreed to create a joint anti-terrorist centre to fight cross border incursions by guerrillas and drug traffickers and also to put up a united front against US domination in world affairs.\textsuperscript{123} The Afghan civil war was also discussed and a call made for the settlement of the conflict through peaceful means with the help of the UN. Uzbekistan has evinced interest in joining the 'Shanghai Five' grouping.

Also, a conference of the heads of CIS security bodies and special services was held in Moscow.\textsuperscript{124} One of its aims was to arrive at a definitive concept of terrorism. It also discussed the type of forces to be used to combat terrorism in the light of European criticism of Russia's military methods being used in Chechanya.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{123} \textit{The Dawn}, Karachi, July 6, 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{124} \textit{BBC Monitoring}, no.120, April 21, 2000, p.SU/3821, B/4.
\end{itemize}
Recently the US Secretary of state Ms Madeleine Albright visited Uzbekistan where she said, "The US and Uzbekistan share common interest in halting terrorism, drug trafficking and spread of weapons of mass destruction. That is why the US has been expanding its export control and border security programs especially in Central Asia. As part of the expanding threat reduction initiative we have been providing pagers and other radiation detection equipment to Uzbekistan and other newly independent states."125

An Azerbaizani-US inter-state working-group has been established for economic cooperation.126 Azerbaizan has reached a free trade zone agreement with Russia. It has also started selling oil to Israel through the Supsa Terminal.127 Azerbaizan and Turkmenistan have reached an accord on the distribution of their quotas in the planned Trans Caspian pipeline project meant for transportation of Turkmen and Azeri gas to Europe across Azerbaizan and Geogia.128 The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, being backed by the US, is also in the offing.129

125 Ibid., p.SU/3821, G/3.
126 Ibid., p.SU/3840, F/4
127 Ibid., April 21, 2000, p.SUW/0636, WD/3.
129 Ibid.
The Conflicts in Chechnya and Xinxiang

After a prolonged conflict the Muslim majority Chechnya province, in the north Caucasus, practically separated from Russia in 1995. Recently after more heavy fighting Russia was able to recapture Grozny, the Chechen capital. The rebels have dispersed into mountains and jungles from where they have been launching guerrilla attacks. They have been receiving international *jihadi* support. Laden's International Islamic Front trained scores of volunteers in Britain, then took them to Pakistan from where 38 Mujahideen went to fight in Chechnya.\(^{130}\) In Feb. 2000, Zelimkhan Andarbayev, a former President of Chechnya visited Pakistan to raise funds and other types of support.\(^{131}\) He proposed the formation of an international army of Islamic states to prepare themselves against the Russian aggression and the challenge by others to the entire Muslim Ummah. He suggested that Pakistan, Afghanistan and Chechnya form a confederation with common armed forces to counter the onslaught of anti-Islamic forces.\(^{132}\) Andarbayev met Pakistani military leaders and received funds from many sources including Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the

\(^{130}\) Mohammad Ilyas Khan "Osama of Course", *The Herald*, no.73, p.127.


\(^{132}\) Ibid.
11. It may be noted that the Taliban have already recognized Chechnya as an independent country.

Saudi Arabia has officially expressed concern over the Russian 'atrocities' in Chechnya. The Mufti of Saudi Arabia has also appealed the Muslims to help their Chechen brothers with donations. The Council of American Islamic Relations and the Muslim World League have also come out in support of the Chechen rebels and condemned Russia.

Prominent Chechen separatist leader Shamil Basayev and Jordanian mercenary warlord Khattab are trying to restore a uniform command system and to put up an organized resistance to the federal troops. The Russians are using MI-24 helicopter gunships and SU-24 and SU-25 bombers to locate and destroy rebel hide-outs. The Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov has vowed that the Chechens would fight on. A military majlis held in Ichkaria has vowed that unless Russian troops withdraw, the Mujahideen will declare the entire North Caucasus region as

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133 Ibid.
135 Ibid., p.27.
136 Ibid., pp.24 & 28.
137 BBC Monitoring, no. 120, April 21, 2000, p.SU/3821, B/2.
138 Ibid.
the fighting zone. The Russians on their part have been trying to get the support of some local religious leaders and officials in order to isolate the rebels. The neighbouring Dagestan area is also affected by violence. The Caucasus region is extremely rich in unexploited oil and gas resources making it important for the combatants as well as the West.

Separatist tendencies in China's north-western Xinxiang Uighur Autonomous Region are part of the area's history and serious violence erupted in 1986 after Uighurs from the southern Kasghar area joined the anti-communist jihad in Afghanistan. Riots took place in Kasghar in 1990 and in Yining in 1997 leading to 'considerable' causalities. According to the Uighur Chairman of the province, the Party of Allah with more than 1600 active members is responsible for the trouble. Many more are being trained in Afghanistan and drugs-money is being used for subversion in the province. In Feb. 1999, a Chinese delegation visited Kabul to seek deportation of a number of Uighur militants but the Taliban authorities denied any knowledge of such militants. Tonnes of explosives have been seized in Xinxiang and China has blamed 'the CIA, reactionary forces in the West, separatists and religious extremists' for creating problems for China. Chinese leaders acknowledge that Xinxiang could become their

140 Ibid., p.SU/3836, B/7.
141 Mohammad Ilyas Khan, "The Chinese Connection", The Herald, no.73, p.124.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
Achilles' heel though publicly they claim that Islamic extremism does not pose a threat to them.\(^{144}\) They argue that China as a civilization has a long experience of dealing with multi-ethnic problems particularly with Muslims.\(^{145}\) But in reality, China has tried to deal with the problem in Xinxiang by using brute force and settling ethnic Han Chinese there.

‘Global Jihad’ and the Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chemical, biological and nuclear (fission and fusion) weapons are generally labelled as weapons of mass destruction. As a fourth category the still untested radiological weapons may be included.\(^{146}\) Recently there has been a growing fear that some of these weapons may fall in the hands of ideologically motivated terrorist groups or individuals with catastrophic results. Such weapons in wrong hands have a blackmail-value also.

The nuclear black market in the former Soviet Union is supply-driven, that is, there are more sellers than buyers. Nobody knows the exact quantity of nuclear materials produced during the Soviet era. In 1991, Islamic jihad approached one of the Russia's closed cities, Arzaman-16, offering to buy a nuclear weapon.\(^{147}\) Libya has reportedly offered to pay


\(^{145}\) Ibid.


\(^{147}\) Ibid., p.117
the entire national debt of India or Pakistan in exchange for a nuclear weapon.\(^{148}\) This could have amounted to $10bn if these two countries had not declined the Libyan offer. "In the future desperate armed movements like the Chechens might come to possess more know-how, money and determination to take recourse to the ultimate weapons".\(^{149}\) Osama bin Laden's organisation has also been trying to acquire nuclear weapons as discussed earlier in the chapter.

**Some Acts of 'Global jihad'**

Meanwhile acts of terrorism, with the main motivation of *jihad*, have been sweeping across the world. Some of the major manifestations of *global jihad* which may be summarized as follows:

- In Feb. 1997, bombs exploded in three buses in Uruqmi, capital of Xinxiang killing 7 people and wounding 67.
- In September, 1999 a Moscow apartment was bombed killing 94 people. In Volgodonsk, 17 people were killed in a similar fashion.
- In March 2000, 36 Sikhs were massacred in Chittisinghpora in Kashmir.

\(^{148}\) Ibid., p.118.
\(^{149}\) Ibid., p.115.
• Between January and August in 1998, the Albanian terrorists carried out a total of 1126 terrorist attacks in Kosovo in which 74 policemen and 81 civilians were killed and over a thousand injured.

• In April, 2000, 20 tourists belonging to Germany, Malaysia, Finland, France, South Africa, Lebanon and Philippines were kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf militants from Sipadan in Malaysia. Some hostages have been killed while others are still being held hostage on a Philippines island. The kidnappers have demanded the release of three Muslim terrorists convicted by the US, among them Ramzi Yousef, prime accused for bombing the World Trade Centre in New York.

• In August, 1998, US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam were bombed killing over 200 and wounding over 4000 people. It is believed the attackers were acting on a fatwa calling for the killing of Americans throughout the world.

• In Algeria Islamic militants belonging to the Islamic Salvation Front have killed thousands of civilians and scores of foreign tourists.

• Foreign tourists have been killed in Egypt also, by Islamic militants.

• In April, 2000, an armed delegation of 1200 men gathered outside the Indonesian Parliament in Jakarta demanding resignation of President Abdurrahman Wahid. 3000 volunteers are being trained in Bogor, in Java by Islamic clerics who have returned from Afghanistan.
• In February, 1999, Christian-Muslim riots broke out in Northern Nigeria when the Muslim mobs demanded imposition of Sharia laws.

• The web-site named 'jihad in Chechnya' calls upon 'all the Muslim brothers and sisters wherever they may be, to join the battle against the enemies of Allah' and by all possible means including dua.

• The International Islamic Front has this year proclaimed a fatwa of jihad against the heretics who have occupied the Muslim lands'.

• In April, 2000, over 5000 Mullahs, Maulavis and Maulana attended a convention organised, among other, by the HUM at Muridke near Lahore. The convention decreed a 'jihad in Kashmir', calling it the religious obligation of all Muslims.¹⁵⁰

The above examples are by no means exhaustive and more such developments are taking place regularly. The spirit of jihad is very much visible in these events as also the role of the jihadi infrastructure located in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. As we have already seen Pakistan's official agencies have been directly linked in nurturing jihad in the supposed national interests of Pakistan. However Pakistan itself has been fast emerging as another victim of jihad.

¹⁵⁰ Dr. Nagpal, no.19, p.13.