CHAPTER 3

THE PAKISTANI DIPLOMACY OF RELIGION VIS-À-VIS INDIA
Due to a host of factors, conflict has been the dominant theme in Indo-Pak relations since 1947. “Pakistan has been India’s closest and most difficult neighbour. Their relations have been very complex. The major foreign policy concern of Islamabad has been its perception of India as the main and the only threat to its territorial integrity”.¹ In this scenario it is no surprise that the international community identifies India and Pakistan as ‘arch-enemies’ of each-other and rivals in every field ranging from sports to politics. Large sections of the Indians and Pakistanis themselves believe is the stereo-typed image of arch-enemy churned out daily by their media.

In the absence of any credible conflict resolution mechanism, mutual faith, or good-will, most of the Indo-Pak disputes have festered over the years and become intractable. An inverse power equation has developed, and the relationship between the two neighbours often resembles a zero-sum game in which the loss of one player automatically becomes the gain of the rival players, and vice-versa². Most political situations are probably not in fact zero sum, but most are ‘played’ by their actors as through they were.² As if to prove it, we often find that the


² Game theory is an application of mathematical reasoning to problems of conflict and collaboration between rational self-interested actors. It was developed in the 1940s by Austrian mathematicians Von Neumann and Morgenstern. It has been applied to many problems in political science, strategic theory, and even moral philosophy.

Pakistani diplomacy builds upon the conflict in Kashmir: whereas the Indian diplomacy seeks to exploit the ethnic and sectarian entanglements in Pakistan.

If Indo-Pak relations have moved towards negativity and hostility it is because the roots of the disputes go back into history, religions and politics of the sub-continent,\(^3\) and also because of certain post-1947 developments. To get a full picture of Pakistan's usage of religion as a diplomatic tool against India we shall have to traverse large sections of the overall Indo-Pak relation.

The Partition and Related Problems

A bird's eye-view of India's partition has already been provided in chapter 1. The Radcliffe Award, decided in five weeks, was unpopular in both countries.\(^4\) The Pakistanis believed that the 3rd June plan was drawn up by Menon, a Congress-minded Hindu,\(^5\) and that "a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan was more or less flung into the face of the Muslims in the hope that they would either reject it or after accepting it, would find it impossible to keep it alive".\(^6\)

\(^3\) Bhaudur, in Bahadur (ed.), no. 1, p. 203.
\(^6\) Ibid., p. 311.
The utterances of some of the Indian leaders only fuelled this opinion. Nehru said, “It may be that in this way we shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise.”\(^7\) Patel was credited with the view that Pakistan was not viable and could not last. “This deep seated reluctance on the part of the Hindu leaders to accept the separate existence of Pakistan has been a principle factor in hindering reconciliation between India and Pakistan”\(^8\).

Two central concepts born in the turmoil of 1946-48, colour and often determine the Indo-Pak relations.\(^9\) The first is about partition and the Pak belief that the Hindus never accepted it. The Hindus in turn fear that a strong Pakistan intends eventually to establish Muslim rule over all India by force. The evidence for these beliefs is unconvincing.\(^10\) The second concept is religious Pakistanis believe that their Islamic idealism would remain incomplete as long as Muslim Kashmir remained unabsorbed. The Indians believe that the cession of Kashmir would further weaken Indian secularism. “There is ample evidence to dispute the logic of these standpoints but not their emotional appeal”\(^11\).


\(^8\) Quoted, S.M. Burke, “Pakistan and Indo-Pakistani Disputes” in S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi, 1990, p.9.

\(^9\) Brines, no.4, p.51.

\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) Ibid.
After independence the movement of refugees as also communal strife continued for quite sometime. "The hasty and bloody amputation of British India was accomplished before there were adequate arrangements to care for the two patients... what Jinnah had done by releasing violence, moreover, was to turn more sharply towards the past. He hobbled young India and young Pakistan to the ugliest of the passions which the massacre in Calcutta had set off." This deepened the psychological divide between the two countries and their leaderships. The Liaqat-Nehru pact signed in New Delhi in April, 1950 somewhat eased the tension. It promised to the minorities in both countries complete equality of citizenship, full sense of security and equal opportunity.

Since the partition had divided two economically complementary parts, they "became mutually exclusive and competitive in world market with consequent economic loss to both". In general, India received 82.5 percent of the assets and Pakistan 17.5 percent but a dispute arose about the sharing of the cash balances of undivided India which stood at 4,000 million rupees. Similarly the question of evacuee property also strained

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12 Ibid., p.44.  
13 Burke, "Indo-Pakistani Crises and Efforts at Reconciliation", in Burke, Ziring (ed.), no.8, p.58.  
15 Brines, no.4, p.43.  
16 Burke, in Burke, Ziring (ed.), no.8, p.13.
relations between the two countries.\textsuperscript{17} In September 1949, trade between India and Pakistan came to a stand-still when India devalued its currency but not Pakistan.\textsuperscript{18} The sudden disappearance of the Indian market depressed the Pakistani economy and the Indian decision was seen there as nothing short of an economic war by India.\textsuperscript{19} After 1951-52 the volume of trade between the two countries continued to decline due to deterioration of political relations.\textsuperscript{20}

Soon after independence, Pakistan accused India of withholding its share of military supplies. Field-Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck who had been entrusted with the responsibility for the movement of military hardware accused the Indian leaders of trying to obstruct the work of partition of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{21} India closed down his command in November 1947, four months before schedule, following hostilities in Kashmir.

The rivers water dispute was a direct result of the political division of a single geographic unit. Most of the rivers that traversed through the plains of west Pakistan originated in India. A fear that India may shut off

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{17} Ibid., p.11.
\footnote{18} Naema Sultan Begum, “Indo-Pakistan Trade Relations” in Verinder Grover, Ranjana Arora (ed.), \textit{World Community and Indo-Pak Relations}, New Delhi, 1999, p.160.
\footnote{19} Ibid., p.161.
\footnote{20} Rashid Ahmad Khan, “Indo-Pakistan Trade: Prospects and Constraints” in Grover, Arora (ed.), no.18, p.194.
\footnote{21} Burke, no.8, p.10.
\end{footnotes}
the sources of water as a diplomatic-military posture haunted the Pakistani leaders. They opposed the construction of ‘high’ dams and barrages on the Indian side of the rivers. Subsequently the good offices of Mr. Eugene Black, the then IBRD President became available to resolve the dispute. Mr. Black came up with a plan which was dubbed by the Times of India as “dangerously close to the Pakistani plan”. But finally, Nehru and Ayub Khan signed the Indus waters treaty and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement at Karachi. To ensure implementation of the terms an Indo-Pakistani Permanent Indus-commission was set up.

The upshot of this brief analysis is that India and Pakistan inherited several complex disputes. Kashmir, the most complex of them has been dealt with separately.

**The Cold War Dynamics and the China Factor**

The Kashmir factor brought the cold War to the Indian subcontinent and it was not long before both India and Pakistan found themselves in the vortex of the East-West confrontation. Pakistan and India “adopted two different approaches to nation building at home and chose two different paths in foreign policies”. While India charted a more or less non-aligned

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23 Burke, in Burke Ziring (ed.), no.8, p.12.
24 Bahadur, in Bahadur (ed.), no.1, p.203.
course, Pakistan first signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the US and later joined the U.S. sponsored military alliances like the CENTO and SEATO. The US-Pakistan alliance sharpened Indo-Pakistani tensions. The main aim of the U.S. was to 'defend' south Asia and the middle-east from the threat of Soviet Communism. According to one view, Washington turned to Pakistan only after Nehru refused to discuss a defensive alliance. In any case, while the USA wanted to contain the Soviets, Pakistan through these alliances wanted to neutralise India. As a result Nehru vehemently opposed the alliances.

India's stand during the Korean crisis and Nehru's moralistic attitude were not appreciated by the US. Even in his broadcast of September 7, 1946 Nehru had placed the USSR on par with the USA. On the other hand, Pakistan emerged as "America's most allied ally in Asia". So much so that India began to put forward the argument that it was no longer possible to fulfill the offer of referendum in Kashmir as the US arms aid to Pakistan had changed the situation.

26 Brines, no.4, p.120.
27 Annpurna Nautiyal, "India, Pakistan and the United States in the Post Cold War Era", in Grover Arora, (ed.), no.18, p.18.
28 Text of Speech, Surjit Man Singh (ed), Nehru's Foreign Policy: Fify years on, New Delhi, 1998, p.22.
30 S.S. Bindra, Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1988, p.240.
Meanwhile, China also turned favourable to Pakistan. China had serious border disputes with India and the USSR. With India it was competing for the slot of supreme power in Asia, whereas for the leadership of the communist world it was competing with the USSR. The USSR had refused to part with the nuclear technology know-how and this had further incensed China.

"The Chinese... wanted Gilgit and its surrounding areas (for it) provides an outflanking position south of the Russian Pamirs... there is considerable evidence (that) active Sino-Soviet border hostilities occurred in 1960". The Sino-Indian border war in 1962 brought Pakistan and China even closer. In March 1963 they signed an agreement by which Pakistan ceded 2,500 miles of Hunza to China in return for 750 sq miles of grazing land and salt mines in terrain previously occupied and developed by the Chinese. During the India-Pakistan war, 1965 (in which Pakistan freely used the weapons sold by the US and China), the Chinese troops took up positions behind the passes through which they had poured into India in 1962.

In these circumstances, and under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi India had no option but to tilt towards the USSR. "By 1970, the

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31 Brine,s no.4, p.184.
32 Ibid., p.203.
33 Ibid., p.255.
Soviet Union had become the second largest buyer of the Indian goods, the main source of external assistance in setting up and expanding her heavy industry, and also the main supplier of her sophisticated military equipment." 34 With the East-Pakistan crisis at hand and a sort of US-China-Pakistan axis looming large, the realist in Mrs. Gandhi moved fast and the Treaty of Peace and Cooperation was signed with the Soviet Union in August 1971. The Treaty was initially for a duration of twenty years and it *interalia* provided: "in the event of either party being subjected to an attack.. (the two countries) shall immediately enter into mutual consultations .. and to take appropriate effective measures.." 35

The Indo-Pak conflict of December 1971 led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. The opposite roles of the USA and the USSR during and after the conflict further heightened the cold war tensions between India and Pakistan. India did not condemn the Russian adventure in Afghanistan in 1979 whereas Pakistan pressed the panic-button. "The response from India was muted. The Indian delegation to the UN saw no reason to doubt the Soviet claim that its troops had moved into Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan government". 36 In the US worldview, Pakistan replaced Shah’s

35 Quoted, Ibid, p.393-94.
Iran in strategic terms with the result that Pakistan was given $3.2 billion economic and military aid package in 1981. This emboldened Pakistan to cause subversive activities in the Indian Punjab by training and arming the Sikh militants. Later the same game was played in Kashmir.

The USA kept overlooking, the Pakistani nuclear programme which was aided and abetted by the Chinese. This further antagonised India. Even today, when the US has taken a tough position after the Chagai nuclear tests of May 1998, the Sino-Pakistani nuclear nexus continues.

In fact, it is no surprise that though the cold war buttressed the Indo-Pak hostility, the latter has outlined the former. And, China continues to play a deleterious role in the Indo-Pak relations.

The Clash of Values

India and Pakistan represent not only conflicting diplomatic and military interests, but often they stand for diametrically opposite values also. Pakistan is a self proclaimed Islamic state whereas India is secular, somewhat in the modern Western sense of the term. Even Jinnah usually considered as relatively secular and a modernist declared in December 1947, “let it be clear that Pakistan is going to be a Muslim state based on Islamic ideas. The whole world even the UNO has characterised Pakistan

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38 Ibid., p.134.
as a Muslim state”. In 1949 the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed an Objective Resolution proclaiming the identification of Pakistan with Islamic ideals. These aspects have already been discussed in chapter II. Here we might add that the concept of the Islamic state could not be clarified in Pakistan and various rulers and Islamic organisations presented their own versions of it. This situation still obtains in Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the “Pakistanis retain an interest in the fate of the millions of Muslims in India. (that Muslims) seem perfectly content to live in India, raises the basic questions of identity of Pakistan itself as a homeland for persecuted Indian Muslims. Here as in very few areas of the world, perceptions of the international system are directly related to national identity, and may lead one to question the very existence of the state”.

The feeling of self-doubt was accentuated with the creation of Bangla Desh on the ruins of East Pakistan. It became clear that mere religious solidarity could not be the basis for forging a nation state and that many other ingredients were also required for nation-building.

39 Quoted, V.V. Nagarkar, Genesis of Pakistan, Bombay, 1975, p.483.
Secondly, whereas India acts and behaves primarily as a South Asian power, Pakistan looks towards West Asia in search of its roots and identity. The Islamic countries of West Asia as members of the OIC and otherwise do share some common ground with Pakistan. Particularly "after the 1971 war, Pakistan's status in South Asia was considerably diminished. In this context it became very necessary for a small power like Pakistan to seek an accession of strength from contacts in the middle-east, especially the Gulf countries". In chapter II we have seen now Pakistan's economic relations with this region have become significant since 1971. Also, whereas Pakistan had to invent a history for itself as we have seen in chapter I, India had no such task to accomplish.

Thirdly, while India has remained a functioning parliamentary democracy for much of its existence, Pakistan has had no such luck. It has already undergone three constitutional experiments and four military coups. Thus instability and discontinuity have been inherent in the Pakistani body-politic. And, partially as a result of this, the development of the media in Pakistan has not been as healthy as in India. This has its own implications. Even the democratic Nawaz Sharif Govt. arrested and tortured Mr. Najam Sethi, the editor of *The Friday Times* for articulating

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his views about Pakistan in Delhi.\textsuperscript{44} A Federal Government spokesman expressed the suspicion that the journalist has some nexus with RAW, an Indian counter-intelligence agency.\textsuperscript{45}

It is not surprising that some of the policies of the Pakistani rulers have adversely affected the Pakistani society and its value system. "The internal conflicts in India and Pakistan have common historical roots, but each follows a distinct pattern. In Pakistan the fundamentalist groups trace inspiration from rigid Taliban traditions. The internal conflicts in India on the other hand, are due to glaring economic disparities and unchecked growth of population".\textsuperscript{46} The Taliban are a typical by-product of some of the policies that the state of Pakistan has pursued. The central role of the Pakistani authorities in the creation of the Taliban has been traced elsewhere. Now they are being used by Pakistan to attain political and strategic objectives. Various youth and student organisations of Pakistan consider the Taliban as worthy of emulation.\textsuperscript{47}

Another clash of value was inherent in the fact that India and Pakistan were perceived to be on the either side of the cold war divide. It is only after the collapse of the USSR that India’s search for indepednent

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p.5.
moorings and relative flexibility in foreign policy has begun. Pakistan is also struggling to come to grips with the fact that it is no more a 'frontline state' in the US worldview.

Even relatively small disputes such as those relating to the Sir Creek Island, the Siachen Glacier and the Tulbul Navigation Project have become intractable in the prevailing circumstances and the role of diplomacy has been severely constrained. The effect of a zero-sum game is very much visible in the Indo-Pak relations and Michael Brecher sums it up nicely in observing, "India and Pakistan have been in a state of undeclared war, with varying degree of intensity, throughout their brief history as independent status." 48

Now some of the salient manifestations of Pakistan's diplomacy of religion against India shall be discussed --

Pakistan, the Indian Punjab and 'Khalistan'

The seeds of discord among different religious communities were sown by the British for their own purposes. This was true of the Punjab province also. "A separate religious identity and consciousness was reinforced by the principles of British colonialism: to create and intensify the wedge between different caste, class and community groups spread all

48 Quoted, K. Raman Pillai, India's Foreign Policy, Meerut, 1969, p.73.
over the country.. including Punjab. They did their best to keep Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs divided by administrative and legal means".49

When India was divided on the basis of the two-nation theory, some Sikh leaders too raised the demand for an independent homeland. The demand was formally put forward by the Akali Dal in a resolution passed on 22 March, 1946 citing “Sikhs attachment to Punjab by intimate bonds of holy shrines.. and (the threats) to the Sikhs from the Muslims.. and the Hindus”50 as reasons. However the demand had little popular support and after independence, the Akalis joined hands with the Congress to form a government headed by Sardar Baldev Singh. In November 1966, Punjab was reorganised and a Punjabi speaking state in which the Sikhs were in a majority was created. This satisfied the aspirations of the majority of the Sikhs.

"Religion and politics are inextricably intertwined in Punjab and its nexus in Sikh politics is more pronounced."51 As such Pakistan was always on a lookout to meddle in Punjab and create disturbances. Just before the 1965 Indo-Pak war there were several incidents of desecration of


placs of worship. That these were carried out by Pakistan is evidenced by the fact that once the war ended such activities also stopped.\textsuperscript{52}

After its break-up in 1971, Pakistan not only increased its interference in Punjab but also helped bring together the Kashmiri Mujahideen and the overseas Khalistani, elements. General Zia took advantage of the socio-economic and political discontent among the Sikh youth of Punjab. The Akali Dal played into his hands by launching an agitational programme for the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of October 1971 which \textit{interalia} had demanded "restriction of centre's interference to defence, foreign relations, currency and general communications and... recasting of the Indian Constitution along real federal principles."\textsuperscript{53} The other demands of the Akali Dal related to canal water, Chandigarh, Gurumukhi and so on.

On April 12, 1980, Jagjit Singh Chauhan announced in London the formation of a National Council of Khalistan with himself as its president.\textsuperscript{54} He boasted that Pakistani military personnel disguised as Sikhs were present at Guru Ramdass Sarai.\textsuperscript{55} In 1981, Chauhan claimed the -

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p.382.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Text of the Resolution}, Chopra, Mishra, Singh, no.50, p.218.
support of the Jamat-i-Islami of the Pak-occupied Kashmir.\(^{56}\) The Babbar Khalsa announced that Pakistan was the natural and cultural neighbour of the Sikhs and was ready to assist them.\(^{57}\) This was not repudiated by Pakistan.

Meanwhile, in Punjab the militant Sikh leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale began to target the moderate Akali leaders, 'heretical' sects of Sikhism, as well as the Hindus. The reaction of the Badal government was that of meek surrender.\(^{58}\) Some religious books of the Nirankaris were banned by the extremists\(^{59}\) and there were several clashes and massacres. The Sahejdhari and Namdhari Sikhs were also attacked.\(^{60}\)

Hindu-Sikh clashes erupted in Amritsar in April 1982 following the recovery of two cow-heads at two Shiva temples in the city.\(^{61}\) Though the Dal Khalsa claimed responsibility for the incident the brain-work for it was obviously done by Pakistan.\(^{62}\) The Home Minister Mr. Zail Singh blamed

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p.211.
\(^{57}\) Ibid., p.213.
\(^{58}\) The Tribune, Chandigarh, Sept. 23, 1978.
\(^{59}\) The Times of India, New Delhi, Sept. 20, 1978.
\(^{60}\) The Tribune, Chandigarh, Sept 16, 1978.
\(^{61}\) The Tribune, Chandigarh, April 27, 1982.
\(^{62}\) National Herald, New Delhi, April 29, 1982.
the 'foreign powers'. A Bangladeshi, supposedly working for the ISI was arrested in the process of planting cigarette-bits in the Golden Temple.

A statement delivered by Mrs. Jean Kirkpatrick, the US Ambassador to the UN, on February 27, 1982 caused widespread resentment in India. She said, "India is a paper-tiger. There is a noticeable growth of separatist movements, to the extent that there is a real possibility of the Balkanisation of India" Since Pakistan had become important for the US due to strategic reasons, instead of asking it to keep away from Punjab, the US reached the conclusion that India was about to break-up!

An Indian Airlines Boeing was hijacked and taken to Lahore by Sikh militants in Sept. 1981. The hijackers were treated well and not handed over to India. Again, in July 1984, the hijackers of another Indian plane were provided with a pistol by the Pakistani security officials.

Left with no option, in June 1984 an army operation code-named Operation Bluestar had to be launched to clear the Golden Temple of heavily armed and Pakistan backed Sikh militants. In her broadcast to the nation on June 2, PM Mrs. Indira Gandhi castigated those "few who have

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63 Organiser, New Delhi, May 9, 1982.
64 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 12, 1982.
scant regard for the unity and integrity of our country..." The operation succeeded and Bhindranwale along with hundreds of militants was killed. The Pak TV showed highly exaggerated accounts of the happenings in Punjab. It distorted video-tapes by super-imposing photographs of Bhindranwale making fiery speeches even after he was dead! Most Pakistani newspapers came out with special supplements on 'Khalistan'. Subsequent desertions by a few hundred soldiers of the Indian army were dubbed as "Mutiny" and "revolt" by the Pakistan TV and Radio. The PTV gave extensive coverage to 'worldwide Sikh anger and resentment' and even showed demonstrators burning the Indian flag.

Lt. Gen. A.K. Niazi, who led the surrender of the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh was put in charge of training the Sikh militants near Attock. Pakistan admitted that there were about 2000 Sikh "refugees" in Pakistan. It was clear that Gen. Zia wanted to avenge the defeat of 1971 from India. Khalistan would also have provided a strategic buffer between India and Pakistan besides leaving Kashmir perilously connected from the rest of

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68 Text of the Speech, Chopra, Mishra, Singh, no.50, p.189.
69 Surendra Chopra, no.51, p.382.
70 Ibid., p.383.
72 Ibid.
India. If the Operation Bluestar had not been conducted at that time, militancy in Punjab may have taken the form of an insurgency which would have crippled the Indian armed forces in any future conflict with Pakistan.

Keeping in mind the Pakistani dimension, on June 4 1984 India prohibited the entry of all Pakistanis to the Indian state of Punjab from Pakistani soil. On June 14, a spokesman of the Home Ministry formally accused Pakistan of conspiring against India to establish a separate Sikh state called 'Khalistan'. On June 22, Mrs. Gandhi alleged that arms recovered from the Golden Temple complex had come from across the border. On June 28, Gen Zia in a telephonic interview with India Today and broadcast by the Voice of America strongly denied the Pak Government’s involvement in the events of Punjab. Nonetheless, the Voice of Pakistan, an ethnic radio programme funded by the Government of Pakistan, broadcast in March 1986 from Toronto, a highly inflammatory interview with Jagjit singh Chauhan. India gave to the Pakistani Govt. proof, including videotapes showing the role of Pakistani agencies in

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75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Chopra, no.51, p.383.
80 Ibid.
arming and training the Sikh militants but no action was taken to prevent the same. On the contrary “immediately after Bluestar, a new generation of weapons the Kalashnikov rifles... were injected into the conflict by a helpful Pakistan”. 81

Due to a host of factors, the tide began to turn against the ‘Khalistanis’ beginning with Operation Black Thunder of 1987. The appointments of Julio Ribeiro and then KPS Gill as Directors General of Police had a salutary effect on the situation. “During my journeys through the villages of Punjab... I found there were two points that really troubled (the villagers). The first was the massacre of hundreds of Sikhs in Delhi following the assassination of Indira Gandhi (and the Govt. inaction on the matter). The second grouse... was about the Jodhpur detainees”. 82 The militants’ supply lines were choked by erecting electrified barbed wire fencing along much of Punjab’s border with Pakistan. Increased patrolling and setting up of observation posts also went to break the nexus between militants, smugglers and arms-runners. The Indian army launched operations Rakshak I and II (1990-92) with the aim of “sealing the border, assisting the police in cordon and search, setting up check-posts and

conducting night patrols". All these measures combined to normalize the situation.

Elections to Punjab Assembly were held in Feb 1992 and the Congress party led by Sardar Beant Singh came to power in Chandigarh. But Pakistan continued its attempts to revive militancy. In Oct. 1992, two Pakistani ISI agents and four Sikh militants were killed in an encounter near Phillaur. It was discovered that the agents had entered India as tourists and on fake passports. Besides "it is a matter of deep concern that during the visit of (Sikh) pilgrims from India, the Pakistani authorities (permit) the occasions to be misutilised for anti-India propaganda..." The Council of Khalistan is still active with the Pakistani support. Recently it blamed the Chittisinghpora massacre of Sikhs on India's policy of divide and rule and claimed, "Only a free Khalistan will end India's corruption, tyranny and genocide against the Sikh Nation".

It is clear that Pakistan has not given up the Khalistan card and in league with certain overseas Sikh organisations it is bent upon creating problems for India at a time when situation in Kashmir is extremely fluid.

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Religion, Kashmir, Kargil and Coup in Pakistan

"The debris of the partition of India in 1947 has clouded India's relations with Pakistan. The debris has yet to be cleared."\(^{88}\) In the context of Kashmir, this statement is eminently true. Pakistan has not reconciled to the accession of Kashmir to India even though it has annexed one-third of the state through military means. Pakistan sees the Kashmir issue purely is religious terms and believes that because of its Muslim majority and in accordance with the two nation theory Kashmir should have gone to Pakistan. Pakistan's stress on plebiscite presupposes that since most of Kashmiris are Muslims, they should and would indeed opt for Pakistan.

Kashmir was a princely state ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh. Before independence politics in Kashmir virtually assumed the same shape as the Indian politics with National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah coming close to the INC and the Muslim Conference supporting the Muslim League.\(^{89}\) After independence, Kashmir came under 'tribal invasion' in October 1947 following which the Majaraha signed the Instrument of Accession for joining India.\(^{90}\) According to a Pakistani view "there were three formidable hurdles in the way of Kashmir's accession to India - (i) Kashmir had a very large Muslim majority (more than 77%) in the

\(^{88}\) Kalim Bahadur, "India and Pakistan" in Grover Arora (Ed), no.18, p.327.

\(^{89}\) S.M. Burke, "The Kashmir Dispute" is Burke, Ziring, (ed.), no.8, p.20.

\(^{90}\) Ibid., p.25.
population, (ii) the state had no practicable land-link with East-Punjab, (iii) ruler.. Hari Singh intensely disliked Nehru".  

Liakat Ali called the accession as "fraudulent (because) it was achieved by deliberately creating certain conditions (and was) based on violence".  

Under Mountbatten’s pressure India reported the matter to the UN and on 1 January 1948, filed a formal complaint against Pakistan in the Security Council. The petition was filed under section 35 of Chapter VI (of the UN Charter) which relates to 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' and not under Chapter VII which deals with acts of aggression". On January 20, the Security Council established a three (later five) member UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) "to investigate the facts.. (and) exercise... any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties."

The UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 came up with schemes to resolve the dispute. These schemes were complementary in nature. The August 13 resolution was in three parts, part II of which proposed certain principles as a basis for a truce agreement.

92 Quoted, S.M. Burke, "The Kashmir Dispute" in Burke, Ziring (ed.), no.8, p.27.
93 S.M. Burke, no.89, p.28.
94 Ibid.
"The resolution of August 13, 1948, required Pakistan to withdraw its army, tribals and its nationals (because)... Pakistan had no legal status in Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, the right of India to maintain forces... was clearly recognized... in the resolution of 5 January 1949 the proposed Plebiscite Administrator was to be appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Government... the right of the Indian army to defend the state was clearly affirmed." 96

On 1 January 1949, both the Governments announced their agreement to order a cease-fire. The UNCIP on the advice of its military advisor set up an UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 97 which was deployed in Kashmir. The UNCIP was terminated in March 1950 but the UNMOGIP continued to function. 98 Presently "its task is to observe to the extent possible, development pertaining to the strict observance of the cease fire of 17 December 1971 and to report thereon to the Secretary General." 99 In 1996, there were 44 observers from 8 countries and the UNMOGIP was financed under the UN regular budget. 100

97 Dept of Public Information, UN, no.95, p.134.
98 Ibid., P.136.
99 Ibid., p.142.
The Pakistani attitude towards the UN is guided by its own experience and needs.\textsuperscript{101} In its disputes with India, initially Pakistan had high hopes from the UN but gradually realized the limitations upon its power. "Pakistan therefore has consistently pleaded that the UN should have greater authority and an international force at its disposal."\textsuperscript{102}

Outside of UN, Nehru and Md. Ali Bogra met in Karachi and New Delhi in 1953\textsuperscript{103} to sort out the matter but not much progress could be made. US arms sales to Pakistan further vitiated the atmosphere. Diplomatic posturings continued with India asking Pakistan to make a no-war declaration and Pakistan, till 1962, inviting India to enter into an arrangement by which they could jointly defend the sub-continent against all outsiders.\textsuperscript{104}

Following the endorsement by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly of Kashmir's accession to India. India has taken the position that the only issue pending settlement is that of vacation of the occupied territory by Pakistan. India lays emphasis on the Simla Agreement, 1972 and the Lahore Declaration, 1999 as providing methods for a final settlement. Pakistan on the other hand lays stress on UN resolutions, need for

\textsuperscript{101} S.M. Burke, "Pakistan in United Nations" in Burke, Ziring, (ed.), no.8, p.136.  
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{103} S.M. Burke, "The Kashmir Dispute in Burke", Ziring, (ed.), no.8, pp.39-40.  
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p.53.
international mediation, ‘atrocities’ by the Indian army on the Kashmiris and the 'right' of self-determination of the Kashmiri people.

Pakistan has been creating disturbances in Kashmir to underline the need for international intervention there. In December 1963, suspected Pakistani agents caused the disappearance of the Prophet's Holy Relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar. This led to violent disturbances. On January 3, 1964, Pakistan observed a hartal on the matter and Pakistani ministers accused India of carrying out a genocide against Muslims in Kashmir. Radio Pakistan mischievously alleged that a mosques had been burnt in Kishtwar by the ‘Indians’. Some Kashmiris themselves acted as Pakistani agents such as those associated with the Plebiscite Front and the JKLF. In 1971 an Indian plane was hijacked and taken to Lahore and later blown up by two members of the National Liberation Front. Both of them were given asylum in Pakistan.

Certain events and processes which alienated a section of Kashmiris from India have boosted Pakistan's capability for damage. A policy of confrontation adopted by the Pradesh congress against the National Conference government allowed the anti-national elements to gain

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106 Ibid, p.159.
107 Ibid, p.156.
108 Ibid., pp.35-36.
Farooq Abdullah Government was brought down in 1984 through horse trading and rampant rigging took place is the 1987 election. Economic stagnation, growing unemployment and a virtual one-party system not to speak of corruption and bureaucratic and military high-handedness further alienated the people. Despite coercion from the security forces the participation of voters in recent elections has been decreasing. "Misgovernance (and) rampant corruption... spread over decades is accepted as one of the main reasons for... militancy in the nineties... Allegations against army excesses are seldom heard..... The role of surrendered militants is a cause for serious alarm".

The flare-up of insurgency since 1990 has its roots also in the growth of madrasas preaching fundamentalism of the Wahabi variety. "A section of Saudi men of substance and the Wahabi preachers are inspired by this ideology and fired by a zeal to 'save' the world. The Harkat-ul-Ansar terrorists, who had many Arab and Afghan Mujahids in their ranks and belonged to the Wahabi faith, occupied the Charar-e-Sharif dargah of Sufi saint Sheikh Nooruddin Noorani in 1995... They were as intensely

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112 Ibid., p.25.
hostile to the Sufi institution as to the Indian State". They torched the Sufi shrine and put the blame on the Indian army. They could do so this because the Indians had kept away the world media and were content in the belief that the rebels (being Muslims) would not harm the shrine. Like Chechnya and Dagistan the Kashmir conflict is also a two-in-one. It is a conflict between Muslim separatists and the Indian State and also there is a hidden Islamic clash between Wahabis and traditional Sunnis. "The exact number of institutions in India financed by the Saudis and propagating the Wahabi faith.... could well be in thousands".

Over the last few years, the foreign component of militancy in Kashmir has increased dramatically. Kashmir is being sucked into the militant Pan-Islamic vortex. The ISI, the Pakistani army, the jihadi, network of Pak-Afghan region and the drug-weapon mafia have increased their role. "The ISI controls the drug-traffic and the Mujahideen in Pakistan. The army controls big money from narcotics, weapons Mafia and the terrorist activities in Asia". As far back as 1994 the total number of Pakistani Mujahideen fighting in Jammu and Kashmir was over 5000.

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114 Kunal Gosh, "Wahabism and Indian Historians: The Sound of Silence", Mainstream, New Delhi, March 25, 2000, p.25.
115 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
There is the inevitable Taliban connection also. The *Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam* (JUI) led by *Fazlur Rahman* which together with *Harkat-ul-Ansar* (its ally, now renamed Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) is a key Pakistani Islamic militant group sending recruits to Kashmir was given camp Badar near Khost by the Taliban.\(^{120}\)

The streak of Pan-Islamism is very strong in some of the militant organizations and their fronts active in Kashmir. According to Aassiyeh Andrabi, the leader of *Dukhtaran-e Millat*, the goal of her organization is "liberation and merger with Pakistan first, and at the global level, unity of all Islamic *Ummah*. Merging with Pakistan is only a transitional step... We would like to Islamize Pakistan".\(^{121}\) The DeM has tried to impose Burqa on women and hoisted the Pakistani flag in Srinagar every August 14 in for the last 18 years.\(^{122}\)

The *Hizbul Mujahideen* (HM), the militant wing of Jamat-i-Islam, seeks Kashmir's merger with Pakistan and hence enjoys strong Pakistani support.\(^{123}\) It has close links with the Afghan Mujahideen and conducts many of its activities from mosques.\(^{124}\) The JKLF stands for independence


\(^{122}\) Vijaya Pushkarna, "Burqa Brigade", Ibid., p.32.


\(^{124}\) Ibid.
and it is no surprise that its march into Indian Kashmir in February, 1992 was violently suppressed by Pakistan.\textsuperscript{125} In an attempt to patch up their differences, seven militants groups came together to form the All Party Hurriyat Conference in 1993.\textsuperscript{126} Pakistan's proxy war against India continues... In Kashmir, having failed to thwart and sabotage the election... the ISI is now attempting to forge a common understanding amongst the various militant groups".\textsuperscript{127}

After Kargil, the Indian policy on Kashmir has been to engage Kashmiri leaders including those of the APHC in talks so that a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem is thrashed out. As part of this policy the APHC leaders were released from jail and invited for talks. This has unnerved Pakistan because at the same time India has been rejecting "Gen. Musharraf's offers of talks on the core issue of Kashmir".\textsuperscript{128} India has begun to give the impression that Pakistan has no locus standi on Kashmir and that the problem can be resolved internally. A Pakistani expert has cited international pressure with "failure of Farooq regime and India's military campaign in IHK" as reasons behind the release of the APHC leaders. He reckons that India would have nothing more to offer "than an

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Editorial, "India again turns deaf ear to Musharraf's call" \textit{The Pakistan Times}, Islamabad, May 1, 2000.
autonomy package.. (and) we must have faith in the sagacity of the Kashmir leaders to cope with Indian manoeuvres". Another expert advises "The Kashmiri freedom fighters and the people who support them. .. (should) carefully study the triumph of the Palestinian and Lebanese people and maintain their image as genuine freedom fighters... ultimately the Indian troops would be defeated".

At this moment it would be too early to predict the impacts of the autonomy demand, made by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly and the proposals made by the US-based Kashmir Study Group. The former has the potential of isolating Pakistan from the Kashmir-debate but militant groups may privately see it as a step forward towards their ultimate goals. The KSG proposals are exploratory in nature and not final and they give a role to Pakistan in the discussion on the future of Kashmir. Increase in militancy after Kargil has ensured that India has frittered away some of its diplomatic advantages over Pakistan on the question of Kashmir.

The Pakistani intrusion in Kargil itself "came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian Government, Army and intelligence.

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agencies." The intruders planned to stay on in the hope that the Indians would not be able to dislodge them and after some fighting international pressure would lead to a cease-fire. Pakistan was worried by the Indian security forces' steady ascendancy over militancy. Moreover there was a feeling in Pakistan that "by acquiring nuclear status it had overcome its military and conventional disparity with India which added to its confidence and a hope that India would seriously try to address the security problems with Pakistan". In addition, the political dispensation in New Delhi was suffering from instability. A combination of all these factors encouraged Pakistan to put into action the Kargil Plan, first formulated by General Zia, under the code-name of Operation Badar.

But India reacted strongly and even resorted to aerial bombings. Pakistan failed to get any military and diplomatic support from China and Nawaz Sharif had to cut short his visit to Beijing. Islamabad was diplomatically isolated and its plea that "the Islamic Mujahideen fighting for freedom of Kashmir had taken on the Indian army" had few takers. As the losses mounted, Nawaz Sharif tried back-channel diplomacy with

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133 Executive Summary of Kargil Review Committee Report, Mainstream, New Delhi, March 18, 2000, p.12.
New Delhi and Niaz Naik and R.K. Mishra acted as special emissaries of the two countries. But the Pakistani army scuttled the talks which possibly involved turning the LOC into an international border with minor adjustment by both sides.

In a face saving move, Sharif travelled to Washington, which advised him to get out of Kargil. The Joint Statement announced that the Line of Control would be respected. The fundamentalist sections in Pakistan reacted angrily and Sharif had to delay his return by four days due to fear of backlash. Khalid Qayyum wrote in *The Nation*, "The compromise in Kargil inked in Washington is being seen as Pakistan's worst ever defeat on the political, diplomatic and the media fronts."

Despite tall claims of inflicting heavy casualties on India, Kargil worsened the relations between the COAS Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif to the extent that a bloodless coup took place on October 12, 1999 and Gen. Musharraf assumed power. Musharraf is on record saying, "Jihad that began in Afghanistan has now shifted to Kashmir. Jihad

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140 Mariana Babbar, "LOC as Border: The Secret Deal", *Outlook*, New Delhi, October 4, 1999, p.64.
141 Anthony Spaeth, "Rock and a Hard Place", *Time*, New York, July 19, p.28.
142 Quoted, Ibid.
is not terrorism". Even if Musharraf is not a jihadi personally "he appears unable to take on the jihadi forces for fear of any change in Pakistan's traditional adventurist policy.... Pakistan's Kashmir policy is as 'domestic' as it is foreign'. The Lashkar-e-Taiba Chief Hafiz Md. Saeed recently warned the General not to interfere with Islamic madrasas where as he said, Jihad and not terrorism was taught. Going a step ahead, the pro-Pakistan Al-Fateh recently "warned the APHC not to start negotiations with India unless the talks are aimed at independence -- nothing more or less."

From the above description it is clear that as long as Pakistan does not, somehow, dismantle the terrorist-jihadi infrastructure from its land Kashmir will continue to burn. India should not only strengthen its defences but also put enough international pressure on Pakistan to give up on Jihad and terrorism.

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148 Quoted, the Pakistan Times, Islamabad, May 9, 2000.
Pakistan, the Babri-Mosque Issue and the Bombay Balasts

Ever since the Babri-Mosque controversy acquired prominence in the 1980s, the Pakistani government and the media have taken an active interest in it and tried to make it a pan-Islamic issue.

On December 6, 1992 the PM Md. Nawaz Sharif expressed a deep sense of shock and horror at the destruction of the Babri Mosque in India. The Pakistani Government supported a nationwide strike against the demolition. On December 8, mobs ransacked and burnt the residence of the Indian Consul General in Karachi. An unprecedented violence against the Hindu minority was unleashed with active state-support. "Worst communal massacre occurred in Baluchistan which has a significant Hindu population (and) property worth .70 crore of rupees was destroyed (there). Some Ministers in the provincial government of Punjab actually led the mob which demolished temples in Lahore". A federal minister, Raja Nadir Parvez was photographed smashing the walls of a Faisalabad temple with a pick-axe. The DIG Karachi was under strict instructions of the

149 Grover, Arora (ed.), no.75, p.447.
150 The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, December 10, 1992.
153 Aitzaz Ashan, "Has India been let off the hook", The News, Lahore, December 17, 1992.

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CM, Sindh "not to challenge those protesting against the demolition of the Babri mosque."

The Pakistani commentator used the 'opportunity' to reiterate their view that India's secularism was a sham and just another name for Hindu rule. An article in Jasarat, an Urdu paper close to JI, asked the Indian Muslims to fend for themselves as Pakistan would not be able to help them.

The Bombay blasts of March 12, 1993 were completely master-minded by the ISI as a sequel to the Babri Mosque demolition. By official count 253 people were killed and 1225 injured in a series of RDX blasts. The targets included the BSE and the Air India building. Interrogation of suspects led to the discovery of lists of telephone numbers of ISI operatives in India and Pakistan. It came to light that in February, 1993 the ISI had conducted a training camp in Dubai for Yakub Memon and his associates. The sophisticated level of conspiracy using car-bombs

154 Ibid.
155 Kalim Bahadur, "Babri Masjid Demolition and Pakistan", in Bahadur, no.1, p.89.
156 Ibid.
159 V.K. Ramachandran, no.157, p.16.
160 Ibid.
immediately, made the ISI the prime suspect. The timing of the attack (Friday: 1.20-2.50 P.M.) was meant to maximize Hindu casualties (the Muslims would be busy in offering prayers) and spark off communal riots. No riots, however, took place.

On 7 April, 1993, Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh accused Pakistan of not extending cooperation in apprehending the blasts suspects. Six members of the Memon family had reached Karachi from Dubai on a PIA flight but the Secy. Gen. Foreign Affairs, Mr. Akram Zaki feigned ignorance about their presence. He accused India of trying to get Pakistan listed as a 'terrorist' country. Indian Home Minister S.B. Chavan formally accused Pakistan in the Lok Sabha of hatching a conspiracy with Dawood Ibrahimim and the Memons. The subsequent arrest and interrogation of Yakub Memon in August 1994 has proved the complicity of the ISI in the blasts. Dawood in still holed up in Karachi and running an underworld syndicate from there. Proof of this was

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166 The Times of India, New Delhi, August 6, 1994.
provided to the interpole when the Home Minister Mr. L.K. Advani visited its headquarters in Lyons, France recently.  

More Acts of Pakistan's Religious Terrorism in India

In Coimbatore a series of bomb-blasts took place on February 14, 1998 killing 46 (final figure 59) and injuring more than 200 people. The blasts carried out by the Al-Ummah, a fundamentalist outfit had many similarities with the Bombay-blasts. In addition it had the human-bomb feature.

In December, 1999, five ISI agents (all Pakistani nationals) hijacked an Indian Airlines flight IC 814, on flight from Kathmandu to Amritsar and took it first to Lahore and then to Kandahar. For six days they bargained for the release of certain top militants languishing in Indian Jails. The GoI had to release Masood Azhar (a Pakistani, belonging to HUM), Umar Saeed Sheikh (a British national, HUM) and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, a Kashmiri militant. The Taliban authorities allowed the five hijackers, Ibrahim Azhar of Bahawalpur, Shakir of Sukkur, Shahid Akhtar Syed,  

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170 Prabhu Chawla, "Relief and Surrender", India Today, New Delhi, June 10, 2000, p.31.
171 Ramesh Vinayak, "Caged Menace" India Today, New Delhi, January 17, 2000, p.31.
Sunny Ahmed Qazi and Mistri Zahoor Ibrahim, all three of Karachi, to cross over to Pakistan. Pakistan has not arrested any of them. After his release, Masood Azhar has launched his own Jehadi outfit, Jaish-i-Mohammad to 'liberate' Kashmir. The arrest in Mumbai of Abdul Latif, ISI 'resident' agent, has unravelled the Pakistani role in the hijack drama.

Due to a host of favourable factors the ISI has entrenched itself in Nepal and has been using it as a launching pad to destabilize India. Even the Pakistani Embassy in Kathmandu in being misused for the purpose. In the North-East too the ISI has been fanning insurgency by using Bangladesh as a base. Five ISI operatives were reported to have entered Manipur and were functioning as the think-tank of the Muivah faction of the NSCN. The ISI has also been instigating the Muslim youth in the communally sensitive districts of Assam. Recently the NSCN (IM) leader Isaac Muivah was in Karachi before flying to Bangkok where he was arrested by the Thai Police in January 2000. "Due to the

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173 Sheela Raval, "IC 814 Hijack: Made in Mumbai" *India Today*, New Delhi, January 24, 2000, pp.22-23.
174 Sayantan Chakravarty, "Guest of Dishonour", *India Today*, no.171, pp.33-34.
175 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
strengthening of border controls in the west the (narco-weapons) trade moved into Nepal... Bangladesh offers a transit point for weapons... The core of organized crime in Southern Asia is clearly built around the criminal economy in the Afghan-Pakistan region. Here the organized crime interests and state interests (come together). the result is a blend of terrorism and violence—which may serve the needs of both".179

From the above account it becomes clear that Pakistan's harmful involvement in India is at once wide and deep rooted. Pakistan has emerged as a major cause of violent disturbances, communal disharmony and social discord in India. However, though Pakistan has succeeded in destabilizing India by using the combined forces of Pan-Islamism, organized crime and international terrorism, it has failed to create 'Khalistan' or to annex Kashmir.