CHAPTER 2

PAKISTAN AS AN ISLAMIC STATE AND A PART OF UMMAH: ACCORDING AN ACTIVE ROLE TO 'ISLAMIC' CONCEPTS
After its emergence as a nation-state, Pakistan required to forge a set of principles which would give it identity, and act as guidelines in the formulation and implementation of various policies. The principles and policies had to be based on determinants like historical experiences, traditions and existing realities. But in practice the different rulers of Pakistan, for their own reason and compulsions, kept varying in their policies the content and emphasis of such an important factors as Islam. The Pakistani policy has remained dynamic with regard to Islam, both in its domestic and international aspects.

Islam and Political Authority

Islam has its own history and traditions and it would be useful to go into them. “Foundations of political authority in Islam can be traced back to the early community established by the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca. As elaborated at that time, the purpose of the state was to enforce the divine law, as revealed in the Quran (the Word of God as revealed to Muhammad) and Sunnah (the practice of the Prophet Muhammad). Two sciences, *Tafsir* (Quranic commentary) and *fiqh* (Jurisprudence), were stressed in the early period of the religion’s development”.¹ According to *fiqh* all laws are pre-existing and eternal.²

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² Ibid.
"The Islamic conception of life being a co-ordination between the body and the soul, it was natural that a very close relationship should have been established between religion and politics, between the mosque and the citadel". The word ‘Islam” means total and abject surrender to the will of Allah and Islam does not divide a man’s life into water-tight compartments of spiritual and temporal.

The integration of political and religious values was obvious in the life and thought of the Prophet himself. In his life-time, Muhammad performed the functions of Prophet, law-giver, arbiter, commander of the army and the head of the state. Another “principal of Islamic politics is that none has a right to make laws for the guidance of a community, a race, or a state. This right rests with Allah alone”. Allah is the sovereign and not the earthly rulers. “They said: What affair is this of ours? Say thou: indeed, this affair is wholly Allah’s”.

The Quran does not lay down any specific form of state. However, leaving the government activity to the Ijihad (interpretation) of the time concerned, the Quran lays down the following general principles:

7 Hai, no.4, p.119.
• Decide your affairs by consultation,\(^9\)

• That when you are called upon to rule over people, rule with justice,\(^10\)

• Obey God, obey the Prophet and obey those with authority amongst you.\(^11\)

The Islamic state is defined primarily in terms of its capacity to maintain justice and to defend the Muslim religion.\(^12\) If the state fails to enforce the divine law, the believer will remain under no obligation to observe the law. The ruler should rule in consultation (*Mushwarat*) with others but no decisions should be taken which conflict with the divine law or the traditions of the prophet.\(^13\)

In this context, it may be noted that the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan begins “In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful”\(^14\) and the preamble begins by stating “Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by him is a sacred trust”.\(^15\) The Oath of Office of the President and the PM of Pakistan, as prescribed in the Third Schedule opens like this:

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9 Ibid., p.169.  
10 Ibid., p.203.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Weiss, no.1, p.2.  
13 Ibid, p.3.  
15 Ibid.
"I ... do solemnly swear that I am a Muslim and believe in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, the Books of Allah, the Holy Quran being the last of them, the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the last of the Prophets and that there can be no Prophet after him, the day of judgement, and all the requirements and teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah... that I will strive to preserve the Islamic Ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan". 16

Article 1 (1) of the 1973 constitution says, “Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”. 17 Article 2 reads, “Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan”. 18 Part IX of the Constitution is titled ‘Islamic Provisions’ and five Articles (227-231) are listed under it. Article 227 (1) lays down that all the existing and future laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam. 19 Article 228 provides for the constitution of a Council of Islamic Ideology also called Islamic Council of 8-15 members. 20 According to Article 230 the Islamic council can make recommendations and give advice to the president, the Provincial Governors and Assemblies, and the National Assembly “as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the masses of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam...” 21

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16 Ibid., p.153.
17 Ibid., p.104.
18 Ibid., p.105.
19 Ibid., pp.106-7.
20 Ibid., p.3.
21 Ibid.
Theories of punishment are an integral aspect of theories of political authority. All penalties in Islamic law conform to two categories: punishment of crimes against religion and military discipline, and penalties relating to private vengeance. Penalties are of three types, (a) hadd (pl. hudood), (b) tazir (pl. ta'zir), and (c) qisa (pl qisas). Hudood crimes are those which violate God's commands and punishment for them is extremely severe as was witnessed in the Zia period. Taazir punishments are for lesser crimes and are left to the discretion of the community leaders. Qisas concern laws of retaliation.

**Ummah and Pan-Islamism**

The Ummah is an Arabic term for group or people and is used in the Quran in the sense of 'religious community'. "The ideal of an *Ummah Muslimah*, a unified, just, and pious community submissive to God, is central to the Islamic religious vision...Although perhaps connected with either the Arabic root for *Umm*, 'mother', or 'Imam', leader, *Ummah* is generally considered a foreign term from either Hebrew or Aramaic... (the early Islamic) community was not tied to a specific geographical area and was potentially all inclusive".

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22 Weiss, no.1 p.3.
23 Ibid.
The idea of Pan-Islamism emerged from the concept of Ummah. "The term pan-Islamism gained currency in the last decades of the nineteenth century and was applied to the effort to forge worldwide Muslim solidarity against European colonial incursions into the West Asian regions". In the Indian sub-continent the idea was strengthened during the Khilafat Movement. Later, "a number of frustrated (Khilafat) leaders joined the Muslim League, and once Pakistan came into being the same group attempted again to work toward some form of Pan-Islamism". A fuller discussion on Pakistan's relation with the wider Muslim world will take place separately. Here one may note that the underlying ideas of modern pan-Islamism are three (a) that the Islamic world is threatened by the new forces of Jahiliyah or pagan ignorance (b) that the Ummah should have social dynamism which will come if it is guided by leaders who known as to what God expects and (c) the sign of victory is the establishment of an Islamic state whose government will be fully under the sovereignty of god.

Broadly, there are three categories of Pan-Islamic organizations. The first category is of groups of nation-states such as the OIC, ECO, etc. These groups try to promote cooperation among member nations and to

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27 Darrow, no.24, p.125.
present an united front on global issues concerning them. The second category is of trans-national Islamic organizations and movements like the *Jamat-i-Islami, Tablighi Jamat, Wahabism, Deobandism* etc. These are revivalist and ideological in nature and may resort to violence only as a last resort. The third category is of organizations like the Islamic Brotherhood, *Hizbullah, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Al Qaida* etc. which openly resort to violence to achieve their Islamic goals. They are the major perpetrators of international terrorism in the name of *jihad*.

**Jihad and International Terrorism**

*Jihad* is the verbal noun of the Arabic verb *Jahada*, meaning, to endeavour, to strive, to struggle. It is usually used to denote an effort towards a commendable aim and is akin to the Christian concept of 'just war'. There are four major components of the Sunni view of peace. First, there is a conception of human responsibility, second, sometimes people forget or ignore the guidance they have received from God; third, the territory of Islam is at least, theoretically the territory of peace and justice, and finally there is an action programme, a struggle (*jihad*) to extend the boundaries of the territory of Islam. *Jihad* is not synonymous with war

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30 Ibid.
and according to classical Muslim scholars there are three forms of *jihad*. The first also called greater *jihad*, is that of the heart and goes on within the individual for self purification. The second *jihad* is that of the tongue or the word and the third *jihad* is struggle by the hand.\(^{31}\) The latter two, also called outer *jihad* are meant to eliminate evil from within the *Ummah* and to advance the ideas of Islam. The cause must be just, which includes the extension of boundaries of Islamic territory. “However the use of lethal force can only be justified against non Muslims if they refuse to acknowledge the sovereignty of Islam by converting to Islam or fail to pay tribute”.\(^{32}\)

In regard to outer *jihad*, *Shias* have a different view. They believe that until the al-Mahdi (the hidden Imam, the rightly guided one) makes himself known, the use of military force to extend the territory of Islam cannot be sanctioned by *Shii* Islam for absence of ‘right authority’.\(^{33}\) Thus the *Shii* Islam is limited to ‘defensive’ wars.

Most Islamic terrorists are guided by the notion of just war and see themselves as freedom fighters and heroic figures engaged in a just war against the wrong doers and infidels. International or transnational terrorism generally involves acts in which the nationality of the victims is

\(^{31}\) Ibid., pp.9-10.
\(^{32}\) Ibid., p.10.
\(^{33}\) Ibid.
different from that of the perpetrators. It has a world wide reach".\(^{34}\) It is difficult to define the word 'terrorism' but according to one view, only those incidents of violence could be called terrorism which have political implications.\(^{35}\)

Today, no single definition of terrorism or international terrorism has gained universal acceptance.\(^{36}\) Existing definitions tend to fall into two broad categories, academic and political. The former are primarily designed to fit incidents into various statistical models, the latter tend to be ambiguous to allow the most politically convenient interpretation of events.\(^{37}\) But "what most definitions have in common is an attempt to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence... and all have their roots embedded firmly in just war concepts".\(^{38}\)

Due to certain factors the focus of the Islamic just war has begun to shift from West Asia to South Asia. This has been accepted by a recent US State Dept. report which also accuses Pakistan of providing safe haven and


\(^{35}\) Dr. Kshitij Prabha “Defining Terrorism” \textit{Strategic Analysis} , New Delhi, April 2000, vol.XXIV, no.1, p.130.

\(^{36}\) Robert Kennedy, no.29, p.4.


\(^{38}\) Robert Kennedy, no.29, p.4.
support to international terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{39} “Terrorism is becoming increasingly religiously and ideologically motivated as opposed to the politically motivated terrorism of the past”.\textsuperscript{40} The harmful role of the Pakistani state and some of its institutions in this unfortunate development will be made clear in the course of the thesis.

The Mosques, Madrasas and Islamic Fundamentalism

A regular feature of Pakistani politics since 1947 has been the running confrontation between the ulema and the ruling elite. The Mullah kept up constant pressure for Pakistan to be made into an Islamic state and used the Friday sermon to compare the Prophet’s social and economic system with the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’.\textsuperscript{41} Entrenched as he was in about 80,000 mosques all over the country the Mullah commanded enormous mass following as well as economic resources that came from religious dues and charities. “During 1967-68 the mosque – not the non-existent Marxist cells – became the centres of anti-Ayub agitation.”\textsuperscript{42}

After Field Martial Ayub Khan died and Pakistan broke-up (in 1971) the “Pakistani leaders resolve to keep religion out of politics began

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{39} Quoted, \textit{The Pakistan Times}, Islamabad, May 1, 2000.
\bibitem{40} Ibid.
\bibitem{42} Ibid., p.110.
\end{thebibliography}
to weaken...Bhutto succumbed to the pressure of Islamic activists".\(^{43}\) In 1974 the National Assembly declared *Ahmadiyas* as non-Muslims, Friday as the weekly holiday and prohibited alcohol.

The most far reaching change during the Zia period was the flow of public sector funds to Madrasas – religious schools run mostly by conservative *Sunni* groups who drew their inspiration from the brand of Islam followed by the ruling family in Saudi-Arabia.\(^{44}\) The curricula and reading/teaching styles of these madrasas have remained unchanged since they were formulated at the height of decadence of the Muslim culture.\(^{45}\) Children of the lower strata of the Pakistani society attend these madrasas and it is they who rise in the name of Islam and swell the rank of the Jehadis.\(^{46}\) “If they succeed, as they did in Afghanistan, (the Pakistanis will) have an Islam in which the defining factor will be the length of one’s beard”.\(^{47}\)

The seminaries that produced the Taliban were set up by the *Deobandi* JUI in the 80’s with massive financial assistance from the predominantly *Wahabi* Arab world.\(^{48}\) The confluence of interests gave rise

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\(^{43}\) Burki, no.26, p.220.

\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) Dr. Muzaffar Iqbal "Glimpses of Madarissa Culture" *The Pakistan Times*, Islamabad, May 1, 2000.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Mohammad Ilyas Khan "The Road To Holy Terror" *The Herald*, Karachi, Jan 2000, p.123.
to a perverse compromise between the Deobandi and Wahabi schools of thought to which the Taliban and their semi-literate teachers added a strong overtone of the Pushtun tribal custom.⁴⁹ Presently Pakistan houses about 6000 seminaries imparting religious training to 500,000 students among them Pakistani, Afghan, Central Asian, African and some Far-East Asian citizens.⁵⁰ According to the Pakistani agencies, over 1500 seminaries are preaching jihad, and more than 50,000 Pakistanis have fought in Afghanistan since 1994.⁵¹ Islamabad is silent on the issue because it does not want to antagonize the armed Deobandis who have acted as the linchpin of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.⁵²

Some Pakistani commentators have come out as champions of the fundamentalist terrorist culture as being espoused by the network of madrasas in Pakistan. One of them writes, “Turning to terrorism, here the onus rests more with the West than Pakistan government. Washington should clearly be told that Islamic militancy is not a mono-causal phenomenon due to madarissas… (it has origins in) socio-economic problems, lack of political freedom, oppression, human rights abuses (in

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⁵¹ Ibid.
⁵² Ibid.
Kashmir, Chechnya etc.). It is only when those are addressed that militancy will abate”.53

Indeed Pakistan may itself be in the danger of falling to the forces it has helped create. According to Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan is ripe for a Taliban-style Islamic revolution.54 Islamic fundamentalism stresses on the establishment of an Islamic state in which God’s absolute sovereignty will prevail. The Islamic groups differ on how such a state or society is to be achieved but most of them agree on the necessity of capturing the levers of power.55

The ISI, Organised Crime and Low Intensity Conflict

In Pakistan’s use of religion as a diplomatic instrument the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), a counter-intelligence agency responsible for external intelligence, has played a central role. The ISI also assumes significance in the national security scheme due to Pakistani military planners’ predilection for unconventional or commando warfare strategies.56 As may be expected the ISI’s main focus has been towards India though in the last 20 years it has been closely associated with the

conflict in Afghanistan. The size of the ISI is estimated to be 25,000 strong (of which most) are from the armed forces. Apparently the ISI is controlled either by the military or the political leadership depending on whichever is in power. Following the recent coup in Pakistan (Oct 1999), the ISI Chief Lt. Gen. Khwaja Ziauddin, a Nawaz Sharif loyalist, was sacked and arrested by the army.

The ISI has established close linkages with various Islamic fundamentalist organizations like the Taliban, HUM, LeT etc. who in their turn provide the agency with “street manpower”. The ISI has close relations with intelligence agencies of many other countries particularly the CIA.

To achieve some of its objectives the ISI promotes organized crime and low intensity conflict (LIC) in the targeted areas. Organized crimes are those crimes committed by groups having a corporate structure and with the motive of obtaining profit or power or both. They may have the tacit support of state institutions (like the ISI) also. Illegal trade in narcotics and weapons and narco-terrorism are examples of organized crime. The Bombay blasts and the hijack of an Indian plane IC-814 were the result of

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57 Ibid.
58 Jason Burke “Marching to the Brink” India Today New Delhi, Oct 25, 1999, p.48.
59 Dr. Chengappa, no. 56, p.43.
61 Ibid.
organized crime backed by the Pakistani agencies. These have been discussed in the next chapter.

Due to many factors southern Asia has become the hub of organized crime. These include the presence of three opium producers in the world Pakistan, Afghanistan and Myammar, weakening of the state-authority in all three, ‘difficult to police’ borders, several trans-national conflicts, emergence of radical religious ideologies and covert wars by proxy.\footnote{Ibid., pp.406-8.} During the Afghan \textit{jihad}, the Pakistani army itself was noted for having salted away more than three million AK-47 rifles for covert operations.\footnote{Ibid.,p.413.}

In recent decades terrorism and LIC have emerged as instruments of foreign policy. “Given the changing political scenario of the world... nations have taken to new instruments to implement their foreign policies... when one instrument tends to lose its effectiveness another one takes shape and undergoes a period of trial”.\footnote{Dr., Kshitij Prabha “Terrorism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy” \textit{Indian Defence Review.} no.54, p.69.} Since the 1970s the nation –states have chosen terrorism which amounts to a via-media between the soft diplomatic option and the hard choice of war.\footnote{Ibid.} Proxy-wars and LICs are terroristic in nature and drawn out over long periods. They are meticulously planned and executed. LIC “is a low cost, less risk and high-
gain venture. It is aimed at inciting the populace to rise against the state. more often it is aided by an outside force with vested interests".66

Pakistan embarked on the strategy of LIC in Afghanistan and Kashmir after realizing that direct military means were not likely to succeed against stronger countries like the USSR and India. It also learnt some lessons from operations Gibralter and Grand Slam (1965), which failed became (i) there was no upspring of people in Kashmir and (ii) open war began between India and Pakistan.67 The present Pakistani proxy-war in Kashmir has been extremely well-planned and executed.

The End products: The Taliban Militia and other Fundamentalist-Terrorist Groups

Due to some of the policies of the Pakistani rulers and certain other factors which have been discussed later in the chapter, a large number of jihadi organizations came into existence with Trans-national goals and activities. “The Taliban militia is the foremost of them. . The Taliban’s links to Pakistan are all-encompassing, forged through nearly two decades of war, development and life as refugees... Most of the Taliban are children of the jihad (in Afghanistn). Many were born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistani madrasas and learnt their fighting skills from the Mujahideen parties based in Pakistan. Their social history also allowed

67 Ibid., p.88.
them to be extremely well connected to many Pakistani state institutions, political parties and business groups in what was already an extremely fragmented Pakistani power structure".68 It may be noted that Pakistan is greatly responsible for the military training and the ideological and political training of the Taliban.69 “Pakistan’s objective could be to bring Afghanistan under the control of a friendly Pushtun dominated regime so that it could acquire strategic depth vis-à-vis India and, have a safe transit route for Central-Asian oil and gas pipelines, and get direct access to Central Asian Muslim Republics for its long term political, economic and cultural goals”.70 In fact, Pakistan wants to jointly achieve with the Taliban the objectives of first capturing the whole of Afghanistan, then Kashmir and then carry forward the jihad into the rest of India and Central Asia.71

Pakistan and Afghanistan have become home to dozens of pan-Islamic organizations professing jihad. They have been fighting among other places, in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Xinxiang, Central Asia, Chechnya, Bosnia etc. They have been linked to a number of international terrorist attacks against targets in India, Russia, the US, Europe etc. The following major jihadi organizations are based in Pakistan:

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p.28.
1. The Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Righteous) - LeT is the military wing of Markaz-e-Dawa-wal Irshad, an Ahle-Hadith Wahabi organization based in Muridke, near Lahore. It is relatively a new outfit, with high success rate and is mostly active is Kashmir. About 80% of its recruits are Pakistanis and it runs 30 schools in Pakistan, with 5000 students enrolled in them. It is funded by Arab donors interested in ‘purifying’ Islam in the subcontinent as well as by rich Pakistani businessmen.  

2. The Harkat-Ul Mujahideen (HUM) – Previously known as the Harkat –Ul Ansar, it is considered close to the JUI and the SSP. One of its splinters Al-Faran kidnapped six foreign tourists in Kashmir after which HUM was declared a terrorist organization by the US.  

3. Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) – It is the militant wing of the politico-religious party, the Jamat-i-Islami (Pakistan). It favours Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan.  

4. Al Badar-It is close to the JI and was associated in the Kargil conflict.

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72 Ibid., p.33.
74 Lt. Gen. Saklani, n.66, p.94.
5. JKLF – Consists mostly of Kashmiris and demands independence for Kashmir. It is considered a political party but some of its members and leaders like Maqbool Butt have indulged in terrorist activities. It declared a ceasefire in Kashmir in 1994.

6. Al Quaida – It is led by Osama-bin Laden who has been sheltered by the Taliban. Recently it warned India of more Kargils.  

7. Jaish-I Mohammad – It has been launched by the released cleric Maulana Masood Azhar. The HUM, to which Azhar previously belonged now suspects him to be acting as an Indian agent.

8. Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) – It is a sectarian outfit espousing Wahabi –Sunni variety of Islam. It is responsible for killing hundreds of Shias in Pakistan. Recently, the SSP and the Shia militant group, Tahrik-I-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) accepted the GoP’s offer of mediation.” It has a presence in Kabul under the patronage of the Taliban.

Besides the above, the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (another Sunni sectarian outfit), Hizb-i-Wahadat, Lashkar-i-Jihad, Sipah-i-Mohammad Pakistan etc. are other notable religious terrorist groups in Pakistan.

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A large number of Mujahideen training camps where military training is imparted, have been functioning near Kabul, South-Eastern Afghanistan, North-Western Pakistan and the Pak-occupied Kashmir. In POK there were at least 37 known training camps including those in Aliabad, Bagh, Bhimber, Domel, Lipa, Mirpur, Muzaffarbad and Rawal Kot. Staging posts were in Khojabandi, Lipa valley, Dudhnial, Kel, Tejian and Nekrun. Recently a training camp of HUM near Batrasi and of Al-Badar near Manshera have come to light.

Several training camps are located in Attock, Pershawar and Abbotabad (Pakistan) and Khost (Afghanistan). The Khost camps belong to Osama bin Laden and they were attacked in August 1998 by the US. The camp in Akora Khattak in Pakistan house 3000 students and have hi-tech facilities like a web-site, e-mail and computers. The Pakistan police has provide them with armed guards. Militant organizations such as Al-Badar, HM, LeT, HUM, JUM and HJI “run over a dozen training camps in Hazara, Azad Kashmir, the Northern Areas and Afghanistan. Militant Islamists from other countries look to Taliban for training facilities. A camp south of Oxus has been set up by the Islamic Movement of

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79 Ibid., p.310.
80 Khan, *The Herald*, no.48, p.121.
81 Burki, no.26, p.212.
82 Brig Anand, no.73, p.541.
Uzbekistan to train militants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Western Chinese province of Xinxiang. Osama bin Laden’s *Al-Quaida* provides sanctuary, funds and training is guerilla warfare as well as the manufacturing of explosive devices to Arab dissidents from Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Algeria, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan and Iraq”.  

In fact, Kabul itself resembles a Pakistani suburb as between 3000 to 5000 Pakistanis belonging to a dozen Islamic fundamentalist parties have set up office and reception centres there with the blessings of the Taliban. In all these activities the Pakistani military and the ISI are major participants.

**Islam and the State in Pakistan**

The fusion of Islam and political nationalism in the modern state of Pakistan is a highly significant development, not only in the political history of modern times but also in the history of Islam itself, which emerged as a socio-religious ideology of a modern political state. But the biggest irony of Pakistan’s history is that Islam, its raison d’etre not only failed to hold the country together but also became the biggest source of its

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84 FEER Report, quoted by Kumar, no.69, p.28.
identity crisis. A unique feature of the Pakistan Movement was that very little thought had gone into the question as to what political system it would have. The early years of Pakistan were therefore, spent in debating the Islamic basis of Pakistan. But unfortunately, history provides no uniform pattern on which a religion-based state is structured nor is there any uniformity even among the so called Islamic states. "Islam can be interpreted either as a sum total of the fundamental Islamic social and revolutionary principles and doctrines aimed at ameliorating the social conditions of the masses... or as a complex of Muslim institutions belonging to certain historical epochs and modes of production. Islamic ideology therefore is amenable to very different interpretations depending on the class characteristics of those who invoke it".

The question as to how the Islamic state of Pakistan should be structured and what should be the role of Islam in this state are yet to be answered and clarified. "The Islamic parties have invariably demanded implementation of sharia and transformation of Pakistan into a true Islamic state, but without evolving any consensus among themselves on these

86 Kumar, no.69, p.17.
88 Kumar, no.69, p.17.
89 Ziaul Haque, in Gardezi, Jamil, no.85, p.368.
much debated and controversial issues". The rulers had no better idea and usually they enacted and implemented ‘Islamic’ provisions either under pressure from the Ulema or to get their support for specific reasons.

The Ulema are divided into several schools of thought and organizations based on those schools. One of them, the Deobandi school was founded by Md. Quasim Nanawtawi in the mid 1800s. Noted for its orthodox theological scholarship it specialized in Islamic traditional sciences. It was an ideological opponent of the Aligarh Movement and opposed the idea of partition. In 1919 some of the Deobandi Ulema founded a religio-political movement called the Jamiat-i-ulema-i-Hind (JUH). In the 1940s before Partition the JUH broke up and the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) came into existence. It supported the Muslim League and the idea of Partition. With partition the JUH split up again and the Jamiat-i-ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) came into existence in Pakistan. Presently in Pakistan the JUI and JUP broadly comprise the Deobandi and Barelvi ulama respectively. They have split many times and there are fierce sectarian differences between them. The JUI is being led by Fazlur Rahman and the JUP by Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani.

90 Rasul Bakhsh Rais “Assessing the Threat of Islamic Revivalism in Pakistan” in no.55, p.293.
91 Weiss, no.1, p.6.
92 Kalim Bahadur, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan” in no. 87, p.67.
93 Ibid., pp.67-68.
The most important Islamic fundamentalist party in Pakistan is the Jamaat -i-Islami (JI) presently led by Qazi Husain Ahmed. The JI was founded in 1941 by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) and represents an important Islamic movement. Maulana Maududi’s writings have also influenced a variety of revivalist and fundamentalist movements in the Arab world and his ideological influence on the Muslim Brothers of Egypt is well recognized.94

"Religious Fundamentalism, as a religio-political movement, essentially means doing back to the original sources and roots of religion".95 Similarly Islamic fundamentalism also, as a religio-political movement, essentially means going back to the original sources and roots of Islam. “It advocates adherence to the original beliefs of Islam in their literal interpretations as fundamental and basic principles thus transcending all social, economic political and cultural transformations which span a period of fourteen centuries”.96 Islamic fundamentalism opposes pluralism (in political and religious life), secularism, nationalism and women’s freedom and equality.97

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95 ibid., p.279.
97 Kalim Bahadur, ibid., pp.283-84.
Maulana Maududi believed that Islam was not a jumble of unrelated ideas and incoherent mode of conduct, rather a well ordered system, a consistent whole, resting on a definite set of clear-cut postulates. He “pointed out that the present civilization was quickly moving towards its doom. By this he meant Capitalism, Socialism and Fascism… he claimed that the future of humanity depended upon Islam even though he strongly felt that ideology was not enough. A right ideology needed a righteous party”.  

Before independence the JI had shown strong reservation if not direct opposition towards the AIML regarding it as a party of westernized Muslims paying lip service to Islam. Moreover “the JI considered nationalism to be a conspiracy to divide the Muslim Ummah. According to Maulana Maududi… Islam is cognitive of cultural variations among the Muslims but is entirely opposed to modern territorial nationalism since it negates the existence of an all-encompassing transterritorial community”.  

Following Partition, Maulana Maududi migrated to Pakistan where he launched an agitation for an Islamic constitution. It was mainly JI’s

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"Campaign for an Islamic consistency that kept the issue of Islam alive in Pakistan’s political life. However the constituency of the Jamat has been more apparent than real. In the course of various turns and twists which the Pakistani politics underwent, the Jamat also changed its stand, made compromises and shifted its ground".  

The Jamat has around 5,500 members and claims to have about a million associates. "Organizing protests is its strength... the Jamat seems to have a lot of money... its special strength is its closeness to the Afghan refugees and guerilla parties... Its main problem is that people do not vote for it much". The student wing of the JI, the Islami Jamiat Tulaba Pakistan is militant in nature and often resorts to violence in campuses and cities across Pakistan.

The electoral performance of the above mentioned three religio-political parties has been worsening over the last three decades. They fought the 1993 elections as parts of three distinct alliances. Th JI was part of the Pakistani Islamic Front which won only three out of 103 seats it contested. The JUI (FR) and JUP fought within the Islami Jamhoori

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101 Kalim Bahadur, no.98, p.ix.
103 Ibid., pp.228-29.
104 Kalim Bahdur, no.98, p.54.
105 Kumar, no. 69, p.29.
106 Kalim Bahadur, no.92, p.68.
Ittihad which won only 4 National Assembly seats while the Muttahida Democratic Mahaj of which the SSP and one faction of the JUI were members could win only 2 seats. The ordinary citizen of Pakistan feels that the Ulama should not involve themselves in politics and that this art should be left to politicians alone... An important reason for the lack of public support to the religious political parties is a fear among the people that the doctrinal divisions among them may ignite sectarian civil war in the country. Another reason could be that these party often aligned themselves with military establishments unlike in Algeria and Egypt.

To begin with, problems of Pakistan’s national survival to some extent overshadowed the questions of national identity and ideology. The first major occasion where a serious conflict over the role of Islam in the state emerged was the anti-Ahmadia riots of 1953. The 1956 Constitution was a compromise. The modernists got a doctrine which had few Islamic provisions whereas the religious leaders settled for a system in which no law could be repugnant to Islam. The Ayub Khan regime (1958-69) set up an Auqaf (religious trust) Dept. in an attempt to weaken

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107 Ibid., pp.68-69.
108 Rasul Bahksh Rais, no. 90, pp.300-302.
109 Kumar, no.69, p.30.
110 Weiss, no.1, p.7.
111 Kumar, no.69, p.19.
the power of the *Ulema* but the scheme failed due to strong resistance.¹¹² Field Marshal Ayub Khan focused on Pakistan's relationship with the international capitalist system and through his Basic Democracies programme on gaining some degree of political legitimacy from the West.¹¹³ The Constitution of 1962 initially omitted 'Islamic' from the official name of the republic, as also the divine sovereignty phrase which limited the power of the state 'within the limits prescribed by Him'.¹¹⁴ But under pressure from the orthodox sections these Islamic provisions had to be restored by the First Amendment Bill of 1963. We have already discussed the role of the *Ulema* in the ouster of FM Ayub Khan.

The break-up of Pakistan in 1971 and India's nuclear test in 1974 resulted in an increase in the role of Islam in Pakistan's body-politics. Z.A. Bhutto noted, "the severance of our eastern wing by force has significantly altered our geographic focus. At the moment we are within the ambit of South and Western Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie".¹¹⁵ As long as Pakistan remained divided into two wings, the question of Islam's role in the affairs of the state remained unanswered, but now Bhutto succumbed to the pressure of the Islamists.¹¹⁶ We have

¹¹² Siddiquei, no.41, pp.110-11.
¹¹³ Weiss, no.1, p.8.
¹¹⁴ Kumar, no.69, p.19.
¹¹⁵ Quoted, Burki, no.26, p.207.
¹¹⁶ Ibid.
already noted some of the Islamic measures taken by the National Assembly in 1974.

Bhutto and his PPP gave the slogan of ‘Islamic socialism’ in appealing to the masses.\textsuperscript{117} Bhutto impressed upon his audiences that his love for Islam was second to none and that his demands for economic justice, social equality and love for the poor were strictly according to the dictates of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet.\textsuperscript{118} As we have already seen the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan has wide-ranging Islamic provisions. In addition, article 31 (1) says, “The policy of the state is to try to help Muslims live in accordance with the fundamental principles of Islam”.\textsuperscript{119} Article 31(2) makes Quranic instruction compulsory for all the Muslim students.\textsuperscript{120}

Unfortunately, Bhutto could not control the forces of fundamentalism that he had helped release. The opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) included Islamist Parties like the JI and demanded stricter implementation of Islamic laws.\textsuperscript{121} The PNA forged links with the army which effected a coup in July 1977 to remove

\textsuperscript{117} Weiss, no.1, p.8.
\textsuperscript{119} Quoted, Weiss, no.1, p.8.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} R.G. Sawhney, Zia’s Pakistan: Implications For India’s Security, New Delhi, 1985, p.6.
Bhutto.\textsuperscript{122} Gen. Zia ul Haq became the new ruler with the designation of CMLA.

Gen Zia did not have legitimacy to power or any popular constituency among the masses so he decided to cultivate the \textit{Ulema}.\textsuperscript{123} By then the Pakistani society had become susceptible to Islamic appeals due to many factors like (i) the trauma of Pakistan’s break-up, (ii) the increased prominence of the Middle-East as a factor for Pakistan, (iii) peoples’ disillusionment with foreign ideologies as they manifested themselves in Pakistan, first capitalism under FM Ayub Khan then socialism under Z.A. Bhutto, (iv) the slogan of Nizam –I-Mustafa given by the PNA during the 1977 elections and the increasing role of the religio-political parties in the political process, etc.\textsuperscript{124} It came as no surprise that in the 1984 referendum 97\% of the valid votes were cast in favour of the Zia regime and its Islamization programme.\textsuperscript{125}

Few leaders of the contemporary world have relied so heavily on religion to legitimize their rule as Gen. Zia of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{126} In Pakistan

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{122} Ibid., p.8.
\bibitem{123} Hassan N. Gardezi "The Resurgence of Islam: Islamic Ideology and Encounters with Imperialism" in Gardezi, Jamil (ed), no.85, p.364.
\bibitem{125} Ibid., p.132.
\end{thebibliography}
religion has played a more important role in the legitimization process than in most countries because Pakistan came into existence without the traditional characteristics of a state—a common ethnic, linguistic or territorial identification.\(^{127}\) To top it the roots of democracy in Pakistan remained weak. Pakistani state soon lost the roots it developed during struggle for freedom particularly after the state institutions like the military and the civil bureaucracy eclipsed the political institutions like Parliament and political parties.\(^{128}\)

During Gen. Zia’s rule (1977-88) Islamization of society became the Pakistani stat’s official programme and he tried to build an alternative (to the western model) political system experimenting with a nominated assembly, a partyless assembly and a spurious referendum.\(^{129}\) He got the full support of the religious parties like the JI for his Islamic measures. He reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology, set up Shariah benches to decide repugnancy of laws to Islam and in Feb 1979 formally announced the \textit{Nizam-i-Islami}.\(^{130}\) He also introduced Islamic taxes \textit{Zakat} (alms-giving) and \textit{Ushr} (agriculture-tax), abolished riba (interest) in banking, brought a blasphemy law and \textit{Hadood} ordinances which reduced the status of

\(^{127}\) Ibid., p.33.
\(^{129}\) Bahadur, no.92, p73.
\(^{130}\) Kumar, no.69, p.221.
women. As already noted, he diverted public sector funds towards madrasas.

Increased stress on religion led to increased sectarian strife with outside forces like Saudi Arabia and Iran also chipping in. The shias protest against Zakat became violent in 1980 and finally they had to be exempted from it. Hundreds of people have died in Shia-Sunni clashes. Ahmadias and minorities were persecuted. Sindhi – Mohajir and Punjabi-Pashtun tensions were further exacerbated. With Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan jihad drugs and weapons proliferated with their own harmful consequences.

In her first tenure as PM, Benazir Bhutto (1988-90) neglected the social sector particularly education leaving a very large number of people in the care of madrasas. She also failed to repeal the blasphemy laws and the hadood ordinances. The Shariat Act was enacted is summer 1991 in the IJI rule headed by Nawaz Sharif. Even during his second tenure from February, 1997 Sharif showed great weakness against the pressure of the Islamists. In Jan 1998, Rafique Tarar, a member of the Tablighi Jamat became president of Pakistan. Recently, chief Executive Pervez

131 Burki, no.26, p.220.
132 Bahadur, no.92, p.73.
134 Ibid., p.221.
Musharraf had to back-track on the promise of disarming the armed militant groups in Pakistan. He had to do the same on the proposal of amending the blasphemy laws when eleven religious fronts observed a protest day on 28 April, 2000 declaring the proposal as a conspiracy against Islam.\textsuperscript{135}

Steering clear of controversies Musharraf has recently unveiled a comprehensive district and local government outline programme according to which the non-party elections to the three tiers of local bodies institutions will be held from December, 2000 to July, 2001.\textsuperscript{136} The performance of the unofficial candidates of the religious parties in these elections needs to be closely watched. One of the ‘guiding principles’ of the new plan is to be the subordination of government functionaries to elected representatives.\textsuperscript{137} Given the past experience achieving this would be a tall order but certainly not impossible.

A short look at Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes would not be out of place. According to Shahid Javed Burki there were four possible reasons for Pakistan’s nuclear endeavour, (i) weakening in its position vis-à-vis India due to break-up of the country in 1971 and India’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[135] The Pakistan Times, Islamabad, April 29, 2000.
\item[136] Shamim Ahmed Rizvi “Pervez Musharraf’s new plan for democracy” Pakistan and Gulf Economist, Karachi, May 8-21, 2000, p.33.
\item[137] Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
successful nuclear test at Pokhran in 1974, (ii) wish to develop an ‘Islamic bomb’ in cooperation with other Islamic countries like Libya so as to successfully counter both Israel and India, Bhutto is said to have hinted at it a few days before he was hanged, (iii) it was a Sino-Pak joint effort to improve the crude Chinese methods, of enriching uranium and obtaining weapons grade plutonium, and (iv) to overcome Pakistan’s energy shortage which became acute in the 80s, Zia-ul Haq even articulated this view.\textsuperscript{138}

Following the Indian nuclear test in May, 1974, Pakistan submitted a resolution in the 29\textsuperscript{th} session of the UN General Assembly in October 1974, seeking to endorse in principle the concept of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia.\textsuperscript{139} India also tabled a resolution supporting a regional initiative and approaching the issue on the basis of peculiarities of the region. Both these resolutions were passed with China voting in favour of the Pakistani resolution.

During Z.A. Bhutto’s visit to China in May, 1976, a secret Sino-Pakistan nuclear agreement was signed.\textsuperscript{140} During Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Pakistan in June, 1981 New Scientist reported that an agreement had been reached between the two countries for exploding a

\textsuperscript{138} Burki, no. 26, pp.209-10.
\textsuperscript{139} Savita Pande, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, New Delhi, 1991, p.135.
\textsuperscript{140} P.L. Bhola, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, New Delhi, 1993, p.85.
nuclear device at a site on Chinese soil.\textsuperscript{141} In 1982 reports appeared in the American press that China had given Pakistan its nuclear weapon design.\textsuperscript{142}

Through these methods Pakistan was able to acquire the nuclear capability as demonstrated by the Chagai nuclear tests in May, 1998. It has been argued that the Pakistani bomb is in fact an ‘Islamic bomb’. The idea was first articulated by 

We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization is without it, but the position was about to change.\textsuperscript{143}

Why did Bhutto talk in these terms? “First nuclear weapons can give Pakistan the leadership of the Islamic bloc... Secondly, by associating Islam with its nuclear efforts, Pakistan can or at least hopes to get financial resources from the oil rich Muslim countries. Thirdly, it might have been contrived by the Pakistani leadership as a mechanism to insulate its a nuclear weapons programme from the ire of the proponents of anti-proliferation region... Forthly by calling it the ‘Islamic bomb’, the Pakistani leadership has sought to whip up the anti-zionist aspect of the bomb.”\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p.133.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p.134.
\textsuperscript{143} Quoted, Brij Mohan Kaushik, O.N. Mehrotra, \textit{Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb}, New Delhi, 1980, p.89.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
Whatever the reasons, motivations and sources of support, the Pakistani nuclear status is now a reality and must be factored in for the purpose of analysis. For example "the fighting in Kashmir combined with uncertain capabilities, doctrines and safety measures on both sides... create the possibility of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange". 145

Similarly Pakistan has come to acquire nuclear-capable short and medium range ballistic missiles with alleged Chinese and North-Korean nexus. In the course of the Kargil conflict an Indian MI-17 helicopter was shot down by a shoulder fired stringer missile. 146

Pakistan's Political Economy and the Ummah

Pakistan has used Islam as a conjunct of its foreign policy ever since its existence. This has taken the form of cultivating special relations with the Muslim countries, receiving economic aid from them, joining multilateral Islamic organisations and using their platforms to promote its foreign policy goals particularly in relation to India. 147

"The Muslim world stretches over a vast area of the globe from Indonesia in the East to Morocco in the West... the Muslim nations are well aware that Pakistan's location gives it an internationally important position

146 Col. Ravi Nanda, Kargil: A Wake-up Call, New Delhi, 1989, p.16.
147 Kumar, no.69, p.25.
among the Muslim nations..."148 Pakistan had its own motivations and compulsions particularly in ideological and economic terms in forging close relations with Islamic countries.

The outlook of the Pakistani economy has never been sound and secure. "Pakistan has been a text-book example of dependence on foreign aid. By 1970 nearly $6.5 billion worth of economic assistance had been committed to Pakistan, mainly by the US and the World Bank. As much as 50% of Pakistan's second Five-Year Plan for economic development was financed by foreign aid. Owing to a worsening balance of trade, the servicing of debts became increasingly burdensome. The inability to pay foreign loans and the dearth of resources for economic development were compounded by the loss of markets for west Pakistani goods in East Pakistan to the tune of $300 million annually."149

In 1950, about two-thirds of the Pakistani populace relied on agriculture for livelihood and the ratio is still about the same.150 The rate of capital formation and investment has remained extremely slow and attempts to change Pakistan's agricultural economy into a semi-industrial

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148 S.S. Bindra Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1988, p.300.
149 Feroz Ahmed "The New Dependence" in Gardezi, Jamil, no.85, pp.192-93.
one had to face many obstacles.\textsuperscript{151} Till 1971, Pakistan's commodity trade with the other Muslim countries was modest compared to that with the West, Japan and Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{152} It was only during the East Pakistan crisis that the critical economic importance of the Middle East was realised and substantial steps taken to improve matters. As a result the share of nine major Muslim trade partners in Pakistan's total exports increased from 6.6% in 1967-70 to 24.8% in 1973-74.\textsuperscript{153}

Secondly, in the late 1960s Pakistan adopted an official policy of encouraging large scale export of manpower to the Middle-East as a means of earning foreign exchange, with the result that the ratio of remittances to Pakistan's exports earnings shot up to 14.8% in 1973-74, up from 9.8% in 1970-71.\textsuperscript{154} A high level of unemployment and low wages in Pakistan forced the Pakistani citizens to emigrate to the Middle-East in numbers.

Thirdly thanks to the boom in oil prices the OPEC countries could begin a massive aid programme to Pakistan. In 1974-75 the Muslim countries pledged $896m or 51.4% of the record aid commitment of $1,744 million made to Pakistan by the various donors.\textsuperscript{155} Since 1974 direct foreign investment in Pakistan by the oil producing countries particularly

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p.125.
\textsuperscript{152} Feroz Ahmed, no.149, p.193.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., pp.193-94.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., pp.194-95.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p.196.
Iran and Abu Dhabi began on a large scale. On its part Pakistan began to export skilled manpower and technical expertise and to train the personnel of the Middle-East countries.\(^{156}\) Besides technical cooperation in the military field the Pakistani military personnel came to occupy important positions in the armed forces of Oman, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.\(^{157}\) In this way Pakistan began to earn a lot of foreign exchange.

Certain complementary factors were responsible for the success of Pakistan's economic relationship with the Middle-East countries particularly those of the Gulf region.\(^{158}\) These were (i) Pakistan badly needed foreign exchange of which the oil-exporting Middle-East (OEM\(^{156}\)) countries had vast reserves, (ii) the OEM\(^{156}\) lacked in technical expertise for their industrialization and modernization and Pakistan could fill this gap in certain sectors (iii) the OEMC had a shortage of skilled labour which Pakistan could provide, and (iv) the OEMC were deficient in food whereas Pakistan was in a position to export wheat, rice etc.

A high level of defence spending (in a bid to balance India) adversely affected the Pakistani economy. According to a Pakistani expert, "the statistics of Pakistan's economy are not in a good shape... Historically in a bid to balance India our political economy became defence

\(^{156}\) Ibid.  
\(^{157}\) Ibid.  
\(^{158}\) Ibid., p.199.
oriented." In the 50's Pakistan spent four percent of its GDP on defence which became 6% in the 60's, 5.75% in the 70's and over 6% both is the 80's and 90's. "India spent much less percentage but still its total spending (on defence) is 6-7 times higher... It is imperative for Pakistan to substantially reduce its defence expenditure and make the most cost effective use of its defence outlay. Our nuclear capacity has given us opportunity to take such a step... The armed forces have to become lean and mean."  

Pakistan argues that despite pressure from western lending agencies like the IMF it can not cut down on its defence budget unless India does so. It is said that the Indian defence budget in the 90's was $10b annual on average as compared to Pakistan's $3.3 b. The 2000-2001 defence outlay of Pakistan saw a marginal increase in real terms over the last budget.

The Pakistani economy also suffers from a large black market of smuggled goods causing revenue loss of rupees 40b annually to the exchequer. According to a World Bank estimate the informal economy is

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160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 *The Pakistan Times*, Islamabad, May 1, 2000.
70% of the GDP, up from 20% in 1973. The *bara market* smuggles in goods worth rupees 140b each year and the Musharraf regime has ordered a crackdown on it. The aim is to document the entire economy so as to be able to widen the tax base. There have been clashes between the *bara market* traders and the authorities and the *Jamat-i-Islami* leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed has emerged as an acceptable mediator.

The trade deficit during the first nine months of the current fiscal year has crossed $1.3b as against the target of $800 m for the full year despite the fact that exports grow by 10 per cent in this period as compared to the last year. Political instability and lack of economic vision on the part of the government have not helped matters.

"Pakistan continues to grapple with difficult political, social, cultural and governance issues that affect the pace and effectiveness of its economic development effort. Ethnic, domestic and regional rivalries have contributed to political instability and have delayed efforts to reach a consensus on development policies and programmes. The real cause... is the failure of governance... Pakistan has not been governed properly by those who were given the opportunity... The frequency of crisis has created

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165 Ibid.
166 Amit Baruah* Jamaat to Play Crucial Role* The Hindu, New Delhi, June 7, 2000.
167 Shamim Ahmed Rizvi "$1.3 billion trade deficit* Pakistan and Gulf Economist, Karachi, April 17-23, 2000, p.29.
reoccurrences of military intervention in Pakistan's political life. Civil military relations are now viewed as a key indicator of the Government stability.\(^{168}\) In this situation Pakistan's economic relations with the other Muslim countries become even more critical.

In 1964, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey came together to form the RCD (Regional Co-operation for Development). Besides Islam and a common Turko-Persian culture, as distinct from the Arab culture, (the three countries) had been members of the CENTO, were committed to the west and all of them had fears from the Soviet Union.\(^{169}\) The idea of economic collaboration between Muslim countries was not a new one but due to various factors the RCD could not achieve quick promotion of trade relations among the members. "First, the trade relations of Pakistan were oriented towards the Commonwealth, Turkey traded with European countries while Iran had its own trade channels which included neither Turkey nor Pakistan. Second, all the three countries (were) more or less at a similar stage of economic development... Third they.... adopted highly protective policy.\(^{170}\)"


\(^{170}\) Ibid., p.177.
In 1985 the RCD was renamed as the Economic Cooperation Organisation and in 1992 it was expanded to include seven more member nations, Azerbaiian, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, (all former USSR republics and located in and around central Asia) and Afghanistan. The principle objectives of the ECO are to promote conditions for sustained economic development and raise the standard of quality of living in Muslim states through mobilization of the region’s economic and social potentials.

"While the ECO members are conscious of the need to implement the... Izmir Treaty, Quetta Plan of Action, Istanbul Declaration, Almaty Outline Plan and Asghabad Declaration, bottlenecks remain... the pace of cooperation in key areas of trade, commerce, communication, tourism and science and technology has not been up to the mark". The ECO members conduct a total of $68b trade, of which only $4.5b trade in among themselves. The third ECO Ministerial Meet was held in Islamabad recently and it examined in detail the need for broadening the areas of economic cooperation among the members of ECO by building a modern

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infrastructure of roads and railways. The challenges before the ECO include; political instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, 'harmful' influence of Russia on the Central Asian ECO member-nations, resource constraints, and continuing clashes of ideologies (nationalism, religion, modernism, secularism) within several member nations. The political economy of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia has been discussed in Chapter 4.

Pakistan, the Muslim World and the Kashmir Issue

As a reaction to a fire-incident at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, an Islamic Conference attended by 24 countries was held in Rabat in September 1969. Here the idea of a pan-Islamic organization to be called 'Organization of Islamic Conference" (OIC) took shape, and the first conference of the OIC was held in Jeddah in March 1970. The following are the charter objectives of the OIC which presently has more than 50 members:

(i) to promote Islamic solidarity among member states,

(ii) to consolidate cooperation among members states in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other vital fields, and to arrange consultations among member states belonging to international organisations.

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174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Sheel K. Asopa "Islamic Revivalism and its Implications for Pakistan" in Chopra (ed.), no.25, p.30.
(iii) to endeavour to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination and to eradicate colonialism in all its forms,

(iv) to take necessary measures to support international peace and security founded on justice,

(v) to co-ordinate all efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and support of the struggle of the people of Palestine... and help them to regain their rights and liberate their lands,

(vi) to strengthen the struggle of all Muslim people with a view to safeguarding their people, independence, and national right, and,

(vii) to create a suitable atmosphere for the promotion of cooperation and understanding among member states and other countries. 177

In 1975 the OIC member-nations set up as international financial institution, the Islamic Development Bank, with headquarters in Jeddah. Its aim is to encourage the economic development and social progress of member countries and of Muslim communities in non-member countries in accordance with the principles of the Islamic Sharia (Sacred law). 178 The authorised capital of the Bank is 6000 million Islamic Dinars (ID) with one ID being equivalent to the value of one SDR of the IMF. 179 Its subscribed capital amounts to ID 4000m of which Pakistan (as a member) has subscribed ID 124.26m. The Bank adheres to the Islamic principle forbidding usury, and does not grant loans or credits for interest. provides

178 Ibid., p.208.
179 Ibid., p.209.
interest free loans for infrastructural projects, technical assistance etc. to members.\textsuperscript{180}

Pakistan has been using the OIC and such other Islamic fora to get international Islamic support on the Kashmir issue. Nawabzada Nasrulla Khan, then chairman of the Kashmir Committee of the National Assembly said in a speech in 1994 "our previous governments failed to arouse world public opinion on this (Kashmir) issue and they could also not impress upon the Muslim countries the seriousness of the problem... In a summit of heads of Islamic countries in Lahore the only item on agenda was Palestine. Since the Balfour Declaration all the Muslim leaders of the subcontinent have opposed the claim of the Jews on Palestine. It pains me that our Arab brothers are now vying with each other to seek Israel's honour. Pakistan has not recognised Israel..... Israeli commandos visited Srinagar to destroy Pakistan's nuclear plant at Kahuta... after the formation of the Kashmir committee, the first step taken was to give a call for a general strike in Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and occupied Kashmir".\textsuperscript{181} Mr. Khan then went on to provide the details and achievements of the five delegations that had been sent to different countries by Pakistan to mobilize world opinion on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
In effect Mr. Khan was saying the following:

(i) Pakistan has always championed the Palestine cause as it is an Islamic issue. In return the Muslim world must champion the Kashmir cause which is, another Islamic issue.

(ii) Both India and Israel are anti-Islamic and that is one reason they are coming together.

(iii) Unfortunately some Islamic countries are getting close to Israel. I fear that they may get close to India also and forget the Kashmir cause.

Pakistan has missed no opportunity to label India as anti-Islamic. India's Muslim leaders have been dubbed as 'rented Muslims.' The reaction of the Muslim countries, to these attempts by Pakistan has been mixed. While being sensitive to the 'Islamic' aspect of the issues like the Babri - Mosque demolition and the conflict in Kashmir, the Islamic countries do not wish to antagonise India outrightly. India is too important for them. Islamic organizations do pass resolutions against India but individual Islamic countries continue to maintain cordial relations with India. And this is what Pakistan resents most.

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183 This phrase was used by a Pakistani Official Spokesman to describe Mr. Salman Khursheed. See P.O.T. Pakistan Series New Delhi, February 12, 1994, p.318.
In May, 1979 an international conference of 27 Islamic countries in London asked the UN to support the holding of a plebiscite in 'India held Kashmir' and warned India against any attempt to tamper with the demographic character of the 'disputed' territories.\textsuperscript{184} Following the demolition of the Babri-Mosque, the Rabita Alami Islam, a sister organisation of the OIC warned that if India continued "to deny... the Muslims of Kashmir and kept maltreating the Muslims of India, the Muslim states would be constrained to cut off trade relations with India besides stopping the employment of Hindus in their lands."\textsuperscript{185}

Indeed, in seeking international Islamic intervention against India some Pakistani columnists even of the English press (considered much more objective than their Urdu counterparts) resort to lies and hyperbole. The Ummah must react because "mosques in India and Kashmir are being desecrated and demolished by the Hindu zealots at will...I Muslim girls are being gang-raped inside mosques... and the murder (of Muslims) is the order of day in India."\textsuperscript{186}

The OIC Foreign Ministers' Conference in Karachi (April 1993) adopted several anti - India resolutions. One resolution equated the

\textsuperscript{184} The Times of India, New Delhi, May 29, 1979.
\textsuperscript{185} Quoted by Mir Abdul Aziz, "Indian Affront to the OIC", The Frontier Post, Peshawar, Feb, 18, 1993.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
'atrocities and human rights violations against the Kashmiri people' with
the 'atrocities' committed on Bosnian and Palestinian Muslims.\textsuperscript{187} Another
resolution sought 'safeguards for rights and welfare' of Muslims in India
and urged the GoI to rebuild the Babri Mosque at the 'same spot.'\textsuperscript{188} The
recommendations of the Conference included trade and economic sanctions
against India, mobilization of funds for Kashmir and 'persuasion' of India
to abide by he UN resolutions on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{189}

In April 1994 India sent Mr. Salman Haider to the Jeddah
headquarters of the OIC in an attempt to soften its hardline against India.\textsuperscript{190}
Yet at the ICFM, in Islamabad in September, 1994 an OIC Contact Group
on Kashmir was formed to 'better coordinate the attempts at
internationalizing' the Kashmir issue particularly at the UN.\textsuperscript{191} "During
1996, communications were received transmitting the text of a statement of
the contact group on Jammu and Kashmir of the OIC (A/50/927-
S/1996/262) dated 2 April, and a Declaration on Jammu and Kashmir,
adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of the Contact Group of the OIC on 13
August (S/1996/678)."\textsuperscript{192} The UN has not acted on these petitions.

\textsuperscript{187} The Times of India, New Delhi, April 30, 1993.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} The Hindu, Madras, April 22, 1994.
\textsuperscript{191} Bangkok Post, Bangkok, September 11, 1994.
\textsuperscript{192} Dept. of Public information, UN, Year Book of the United Nations: 1996, Vol.50, New
At the Casabalanca summit of the OIC (December 1994) the moderate Islamic heads of state come out openly against religious extremism and terrorism administering a blow to the Pakistani diplomacy against India. Egypt and Algeria took the lead in this. Some of the APHC leaders were allowed by India to attend the Meet and this further weakened the Pakistani hardline position on Kashmir.

But for India to defend itself in the OIC without being its member is difficult. One option is that India ignore the OIC resolutions as they may not constitute a major threat particularly as Pakistan is being more and more perceived as some sort of a 'terrorist' state. The second option supported by Dr. Zafar Imam is that India associate itself with the OIC, not only to be able to counter the Pakistani machinations but also for other benefits. This may mean giving undue importance to everything that Pakistan says and may have the effect of making Indian diplomacy Pakistan-centric. Moreover, becoming member of a religion-based organisation like the OIC would be inconsistent with India's policy of secularism.

The Third option could be to cultivate to a point of steadfastness certain important OIC members like Iran, Egypt and Turkey.

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194 Dr. Zafar Imam, "India Must Reassess Its Ties With OIC" *The Times of India*, September 12, 1994, New Delhi.
Simultaneously India could take a tough stand against those Islamic countries who keep a double face or fully support the Pakistani propaganda and efforts on Kashmir. They could be told to choose between India and Pakistan. If they choose Pakistan their own anti-people policies could be exposed to prove the point that they hardly qualify to champion the cause of the Indian Muslims who in any case have more freedoms than the Muslims living in most of the Islamic countries. To my mind this would be the correct option for India. The Muslim countries must note that a conference of 8000 Muslims in London passed a resolution stating, "All regimes in the Islamic world have no legitimacy in Islamic law." In other words militant pan-Islamism is a danger for the Muslim countries much more than it is to India, and developments in Algeria, Egypt and Turkey have proved it. Further Islamic organisation and the Muslim countries must be careful to the possibility that irresponsible statements and actions on their part may provoke a Hindu backlash against Indian Muslims and that this may indeed be a part of the Pakistani game-plan against India. "As far as Pakistan is concerned its overriding interest in OIC has been to use it in its fight against India." At the same time the fact remains that the OIC

195 The Bangkok Post, Bangkok, August 9, 1994.
196 Kalim Bahadur, "OIC and the Islamic World" in Kalim Bahadur (ed.), no.87, p.93.
has failed to emerge, due to many factors, as a coherent and strong factor is international relations.\textsuperscript{197}

\textbf{Pakistan and some Major Pan-Islamic Issues}

Pakistan has always been an enthusiastic participant in, as well as organiser of, international Islamic conferences dealing with various issues concerning the Ummah. For its own purposes particularly in relation to economic aid and the Kashmir cause, Pakistan has used these platforms to harp on the sentiment of pan-Islamism. At the Islamic Summit at Lahore in February, 1974 Bhutto remarked that distinctions of race were anathema to Islam, and hoped that a Muslim commonwealth would materialise without delay.\textsuperscript{198} Gen. Zia-ul Haque as the Chairman of the OIC said at the UN Assembly in 1980, "Muslims all over the world retain an abiding sense of Islamic affinity. It is this unity in diversity which is the hallmark of the Muslim \textit{Ummah}."\textsuperscript{199}

As part of the \textit{Ummah} Pakistan got itself involved in several sensitive issues such as the issue of Palestine, the Suez crisis, Arab-Israel conflict etc. "Pakistan's support to the Palestine cause at the UN was backed by a clearly defined policy of the Government and massive show of

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p.92.
\textsuperscript{198} Quoted by Ali, no.118, p.134.
\textsuperscript{199} Quoted, ibid, p.279.
public support and sympathy." In December, 1947 complete strikes and protest demonstration marked the Pakistani peoples’ response to the Partition of Palestine resolution passed by the UN General Assembly. The GoP officially condemned the Partition. Pakistan feared that India may increase its influence in West Asia. Jinnah had remarked as early as December 1946, "If India will be ruled by Hindu imperialistic power... I think the whole of the Middle-East will fall from the frying-pan into fire. The Middle East countries want to be free and self governed and not subject to spheres of influence". 

When the Suez Canal company was nationalised by Egypt, then under Nasser, in 1956, the Pakistani Government took an ambivalent position. While the Pakistani religious groups wanted open support for Egypt, Pakistan as part of the Western military alliance system did not want to antagonise the US, Britain and France. As a result the Arab public opinion got antagonized from Pakistan and the Indian influence with the Arab countries increased.

Field Martial Ayub Khan became unhappy with the US for not supporting Pakistan during its war with India in 1965. He also realised that

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201 Ibid., p.98.
202 Ibid., p.107.
203 Ibid., p.167.
it was Arab nationalism and not Islamic nationalism which was the guiding
force for the Muslim countries of the Middle-East.\(^{204}\) To mend Pakistan's
relation with these countries he went to the extent of offering material aid
to the Arabs during their conflict with Israel in 1967. On the issue of fire is
the \textit{Al-Apsa} Mosque Pakistan took a strong anti-Israel line in the UN
Security Council.

When the fourth Arab-Israel war broke-out in 1973, Pakistan
offered 'whole hearted' support to the Arabs. Medical teams were sent,
unspecified military aid given and some Pakistani pilots stationed in Syria
fought against the Israelis.\(^{205}\) Following the war, Z.A. Bhutto undertook a
highly successful diplomatic visit to Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. One
aim was to strengthen Pakistan's bargaining power against India. In a
message to Col. Qaddafi of Libya Bhutto candidly said, "The similarities in
the behaviour of India and Israel represent a conscious attempt to weaken
Islamic countries and to suppress our resurgence as a cohesive force
following the end of colonial era".\(^{206}\) At the Lahore Islamic Summit,
February, 1974 he said, "Pakistan's support to the just cause of the Muslim
world is organically related to its own national vocation. It is time we
translate the sentiments of Islamic unity into concrete measures of

\(^{204}\) Ibid., p.217.
\(^{205}\) Ibid., p.269.
\(^{206}\) Quoted, ibid, p.287.
cooperation and mutual benefit."\textsuperscript{207} It is clear that Pakistan wanted a share in the expanding oil wealth of the Middle-East Islamic countries. We have already seen that Pakistan did receive a healthy share of it.

Among the Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia emerged as Pakistan's closest ally. "Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were both created in the name of Islam and their people are consciously aware of the fact, comparing Saudi-Arabia to the cradle of Islam and Pakistan to its citadel both committed to the unity of the Islamic Ummah on the basis of \textit{Kalima-e-Tayyaba}."\textsuperscript{208} Saudi Arabia emerged as Pakistan's closest ally when '\textit{jihad}' commenced in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The \textit{Wahabi} ideology with its stress on monotheism, \textit{jihad} against unislamic practices, and a strict interpretation of the Quranic precepts influenced a section of the Muslims of the subcontinent. The \textit{Wahabi Tehrik}, a religio-political group at the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century affected the Indian national movement and the revolt of 1857 was greeted as \textit{jihad} by the Muslims of Mecca and Medina.\textsuperscript{209}

In the 90s, Pakistan shifted the focus of \textit{jihad} to Kashmir and this has been discussed in Chapter III. "In the last twenty years... Pakistan fell

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{207} Quoted, Ibid., pp.300-302.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Gulshan Dhanani "Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: An Alliance for Survival" in Chopra (ed.), no.25, p.347.
\item \textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
prey to the temptation of nurturing militancy in the name of Islam, and thought this to be an easy option as a means of promoting its strategic goals in the region, particularly in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan called it *jihad.*" That Pakistan itself has not remained immune from some of the harmful consequences of *jihad* has not prevented successive Pakistani rulers, Gen. Zia, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Gen. Musharraf from espousing it ever move vigorously. *Jihad* has acquired its own independent iron-structure in which the Pakistani army, the ISI and religio-terrorist organisations are important pillars with a relatively modest role for the rulers of Pakistan. *Jihad* has its own political economy. And all this has come about from the thoughtless use of religion as an instrument of diplomacy by Pakistan.

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210 Kumar, no.69, p.25.