Since coming into existence on August 14, 1947, Pakistan has charted a multi-dimensional diplomatic course. Complexity being one of the hall-marks of the post second world war international order, no nation-state can hope to further its national interests without adopting a calibrated, flexible and multi-dimensional diplomatic posture. "Contemporary diplomacy operates in an unprecedented environment. Diplomatic actions are similar to navigation in an uncharted sea full of reefs and icebergs. Different methods of diplomacy must be used (and) diplomacy must be flexible".¹

Diplomacy and Crypto-Diplomacy

Diplomacy has historically been both a function and a determinant of the international order.² However, though diplomatic theorists insist that precision is a key element in the conduct of international affairs, it is ironic that the word diplomacy itself has been rather imprecise and given to several meanings.³ Besides, its content has undergone changes overtime. The definition of diplomacy as recommended by Harold Nicolson⁴ and given in the Oxford English Dictionary seems to have become less than comprehensive. It says: "Diplomacy is the management of international

relations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist; skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiations”. This definition is unable to account for the activities of Pakistani diplomats Mohammad Arshad Chima, Zia Ansari and Asam Saboor, all posted in the Pakistani Embassy in Kathmandu. Virtually acting as ISI agents, these diplomats were involved in the recent hijack of the Indian plane IC 814 and circulation of fake currency in India. Saboor was not only arrested but also declared *persona non grata* by the Nepali government after he was caught red-handed with fake Indian currency.

To a great extent the Pakistani diplomacy has been characterized by the use of religion, proxy war, subversion and terrorism as instruments for the achievement of foreign policy goals. The phenomenon, termed variously as Machiavellian, covert and deviant forms of diplomacy or even as crypto-diplomacy, has been discussed in chapter 1. Even Hitler was a keen practitioner of crypto-diplomacy. The diplomatic use of religion has had a chequered history. “Ever since Plato devised the ‘Myth of the Metals’ ruling elites have relied on myths to legitimate their power. As Machiavelli

---

7 Ibid.
8 Hamilton, Langhorne, no. 2 pp.181-82.
notes (‘there never was any remarkable law-giver amongst any people who did not resort to divine authority’), religion has long been recognised as an important legitimizing myth. From the civic religions of Rome, through the theory of the divine rights of kings during the Middle Ages, down to the current resurgence of political Islam religion has been an important tool of ruling elites.”. This tool is used not only to gain legitimacy to power but also to achieve diplomatic objectives.

**Religion and Ideology**

Religion is a complex phenomenon but it may be broadly defined as, “a particular system of faith and worship based upon the recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect upon the individual or the community”. Religion is never an abstract set of ideas, values or experiences developed apart from the total cultural matrix and many religious beliefs, customs, and rituals can only be understood in reference to this matrix. Religion may be seen as a result of the interaction of the essence of the human nature with the objective world.

---


"The immense mystics and uncertainties of the world and man's own enduring and evaluating self-consciousness make inevitable a reaching out for some sort of ultimate values and realities – which is but another name for religious quest". There are certain characteristics and structures common to all religions. These are: traditionalism, myth and symbol, concepts of salvation, sacred places and objects, sacred actions, sacred writings, sacred community and sacred experience.

Religion is a basic factor in human society and a strong emotive force. An interest in the social consequences of religious belief is probably as old as the interest in religion itself. Hence it should come as no surprise that nation-states take recourse to what may be called the 'diplomacy' of religion. Major religions such as Islam and Christianity may also be considered as ideologies. The disposition towards ideological construction is one of the fundamental characteristic of the human race once it reaches a certain stage of intellectual development. According to Synder and Wilson: "An ideology is a cluster of ideas, about life, society or government, which originate in most cases as consciously advocated or

---

12 Ibid., p.292.
13 Ibid., pp.286-92.
domestically assisted social, political or religious slogans or battle cries and which through continuous usage and preachment gradually become the characteristic beliefs of dogmas of a particular group, party, or nationality".\textsuperscript{17} As with other ideologies, Islam becomes a factor in the national power of states like Pakistan, particularly as the country was created on the basis of Islam.

\textbf{Some Internal Roots of the Pakistani Diplomacy}

It has been suggested, "In view of the ideological character of the Pakistani nation, it would have been impracticable for the rulers of Pakistan to exclude religion from foreign affairs".\textsuperscript{18} Within Pakistan, however, the conflict between the secular and the sacred has taken many forms and is yet to be resolved. There have been other problems also. "Pakistan's dilemma, from its inception, has been a dialectical polarization between the forces of uniformity and pluralism; authoritarianism and democracy and elitism and constitutionalism. Sustained efforts by the bureaucracy, the military and the co-opted intermediaries over the decades to sustain a non-mandatory authority upon the country have frequently exposed the thin basis of the Pakistani state structure and its extreme elitism, jealously resisting urgent prerogatives like decentralization,

\textsuperscript{17} Quoted, Palmer and Perkins, no.15, p.73.

supremacy of political over administrative, primacy of judicial over executive of even reforms in electoral, banking, taxation and land holding systems”. 19 Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy20 and the impact of the Pakistani civil society over the country’s foreign policy should be seen as mandatory

The formulation of the Objectives Resolution itself became a matter of controversy. It was another matter that neither the ulama nor the politicians had attempted to put their conception of an Islamic state into legal or even literary form.21 The ulama desired to enshrine the principle of Sharia, while the politicians found this principle acceptable so long as it was not clearly defined. The president of JUI, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was the leading figure among the ulama putting pressure on the government over the issue.22 The government made a dramatic statement on the Islamic character of Pakistan in the form of the Objectives Resolution in March 1949. Interalia, it stated: “Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which he has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust... wherein

20 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan and the Changing Regional Scenario, Lahore, 1988, p.5.
22 Ibid., p.137.
the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna..." The Resolution, though a compromise, became the basis for the Islamic provisions of the three constitutions of Pakistan particularly the constitution of 1973.

But the issues of Islam and Islamization in Pakistan are far from resolved as succinctly put forth by John Esposito: "Islamization in Pakistan has travelled a rocky road. The process thus far has led to frustration, disillusionment and opposition. Pakistani have found it easier to rally under the umbrella of Islam in opposition movements, e.g. against the British or Hindu rule or, more recently, against the Bhutto regime, than to agree upon what Islam and Islamic state are".24

Erwin Birnbam also notes: “It is important to realise that many Pakistani Muslims looked at the state as means towards the earliest and fullest attainment of the Islamic ideal of good life.. Islam needed a new form of government that might as yet have been without precedent. For lack of any better nomenclature “Islamic” was applied to it. The true meaning of the word was not and still is not, clear to the Pakistaniis

23 Quoted, Ibid., pp.142-43.
themselves”. As a result the development of religio-political thought in post-independence Pakistan has revolved around a conflict between the idealised model of an Islamic state and the reality of a secular state-system.

Pakistan faces some more internal challenges. It is a multi-ethnic state and the question of ethno-nationalism has moved to the centre-stage of Pakistani polity in recent years. The Punjabis, Sindhis, Pakhtunese and Baluchis constitute the most important elements in Pakistan’s ethnic mosaic. The latter three have always suffered from a feeling of relative deprivation vis-à-vis the Punjabis. The Baluchi-Pakhtun and the Sindhi-Mohajir discords have also led to political violence. In fact a major threat to the regime in Islamabad has been from internal violence along religio-ethnic identities. The sectarian divides such as between Shias and Sunnis create additional discomfort for Pakistan.

An air of uncertainty and suspicion hangs over the political scene at the best of times. Politicians in Pakistan are like sand-dunes. They move in the direction the wind blows. To be weighed down by ethereal concepts

28 Ibid., pp.169-70.
29 Ibid., p.216.
like loyalty, ideology, public values of morality, etc. which form the bedrock of evolved democracies will be nothing short of committing political harakiri in Pakistan”.

According to Mohammad Waseem the nationalist party was unable to organise itself as an agent of political mobilization and critically depended on traditional elite for support at the local level. The party was not much of an intruder in district politics which continued to be patterned after the previously operative patron-client relations with relative impunity. At the federal level the party failed to get control over the purse and policy from bureaucracy while at the local level also it lost credibility. “The bureaucracy made common cause with the military with whom it shared a perspective based on suspicions of all public activity. The party was distrusted as a mere destabilizing factor in the locality and a rival policy-bearing institution at the highest levels. The electoral mode of politics which defined the role of parties and parliament itself became the greatest casualty in this context. Having once struck the military continues to cast it shadow over the way politics is organised in the country”.

In this way the army has ruled either directly or by proxy during much of Pakistan’s existence. The anti-Indian syndrome further strengthens the stranglehold of the military junta. For example the military runs the secret

---

30 Ibid.
31 Quoted by Akbar, Ibid. p.214.
nuclear programme of Pakistan by giving the logic of India's superiority in conventional weapons and the need to deter a possible Indian aggression.

The dynamics and vulnerability of the civil society in Pakistan are contingent upon complex historical and contemporary factors, including the Islamic experience in South Asia, colonialism and class formation, the evolution of Pakistani statehood and its trajectories, the debate on national identity and the realities of political economy. Interplay among these forces has significantly fashioned the course of civil society in Pakistan. "Pakistan's political culture is clearly reflective of administrative highhandedness and narrow interest. (Pakistan's) history has been charred by successive authoritarian regimes which have not only suppressed the debate and the civic forces but also added to fragmentary localism and philistine thinking". At another level, "the definition of Pakistani nationalism in reference to Islam – the Two Nation theory – has led to simplistic and ahistorical reductionism. The emphasis on ideology without a proper definitional consensus so as to maintain Punjabi-Muhajir primacy over the state structures in early years and then that of the Punjabi-Pushtun elite especially during the martial law, has only added to societal chasm by increasing inter-ethnic tensions. The historical and textual narratives have not fully explained the demand for Pakistan, its multi-disciplinary roots

---

33 Malik no. 19, p.129.
34 Ibid., p.133.
and its indigenous feed-back. Pakistan is simplistically presented as the handiwork of a single person or a superordination that had already been historically 'given' yet had to be territorially retrieved.”

In 1996, a comprehensive nationwide survey with a margin of error of less than three percentage points, threw up interesting data about the Pakistani civil society and its thinking. 52% of the 1260 respondents said that the country had been grievously harmed by the martial laws. 96% believed that bureaucrats were absolutely corrupt, 95% felt the same about politicians and 76% about the generals. 55% believed that there was no possibility of any accountability in the country and 56% did not believe in official newsreports on state television. 74% of the respondents supported an immediate ban on sectarian parties engaged in violence and 72% found the overall role of the religions parties since 1947 as harmful and to the detriment of social fabric whereas only 25% perceived their role as positive. 86% were against the changing of the weekly holiday back to Friday and 81% were opposed to the ulama giving political Khutbas during Friday sermons. Yet, 70% of the respondents had a strong belief in the viability of Pakistan and 82% would never dream of leaving the country. “Such a clear consensus speaks for overdue reforms which the state is reluctant to implement. The survey equally highlights the viability of the

---

36 Ibid., pp.135-37.
informal civic sectors within society which can provide a well-needed foundation to a civil society... The Pakistanis desire a closer relationship with the Muslim world and share greater concerns for the Muslims elsewhere but are not definitely prepared to hand over their country to mullahs and their repressive style of Islam".37

The Rise of Militant Islam and Pakistan

Since the 1970s, Islamic fundamentalist movements have swept the society and polity of several Muslim countries. The resurgence of fundamentalism is the Muslim countries in neither consistent nor of the same magnitude everywhere but is spreading to new areas.38 “It was the military regime of Gen Zia-ul-Haq which gave a fillip to the Islamic militant movement in the region... (Events in Iran and Afghanistan) legitimized Gen. Zia’s Islamization and stabilized his shaky regime."39 Zia's Islamization took place at the expense of democratization with the regime declaring the representative system as un-Islamic.40 Zia's regime not only subverted the 1973 Constitution it also proved to be "more disastrous for the country than all earlier military regimes, it left deep scars

37 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p.78.
40 Malik, no.19, p.205.
of ruthless repressive rule..."41 It also undermined the moderate Sufi-Hanafi Islamic tradition of Pakistan. "The Sufi-Hanafi tradition is natural to Pakistan rather than the (militant) Wahabi variant being thrust down the throats of Muslims in that unfortunate country by its military-feudal rulers".42

Militant jihadi organizations have proliferated in Pakistan and fighting for Wahabi and Deobandi forms of pure Islam. For example the Markaz Dawa-al Irshad (Centre for Preaching) based near Lahore propagates an austere, purified version of Islam.43 It has seminaries all over Pakistan which concentrate on education and jihad. Its military wing is the dreaded Lashkar-i-Taiba (Army of the Pure). The militants of the Lashkar as well as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen joined forces with the Pakistani regulars to occupy the Kargil heights and give a tough time to the Indian army.44

It is obvious to any observer of contemporary South Asia that the vexed problem of the appropriate or optional relationship between religion and state has not yet been resolved.45 Moreover, Pakistan does get easily

41 Kalim Bahadur, Quoted by Akbar, no.27, p.209.
43 Bahadur, no.38, p.80.
44 Harinder Baweja, A Soldier's Diary - Kargil: The Inside Story, New Delhi, 2000, p.140.
affected by the global Islamic cross-currents. The global Islamic resurgence could not but have impacted upon Pakistan. "Not that the Muslim masses everywhere turned into religious zealots overnight. The real issue revolved around the political expression of Islam especially because in Muslim societies, religious law even if neglected in practice remains the supreme reference in the eyes of the masses".\textsuperscript{46} We have reached a stage where it is rather irrelevant to discuss whether there could be a complete separation between sacred and secular at least in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{47} The re-emergence of religion as a major political idiom, hand in glove with the nationalist lobbies, invites a serious recapitulation of secularism and religion is definitely proving a crucial factor in global politics.\textsuperscript{48}

Like other manifestations of the global religious revival, the Islamic resurgence is both a product of and an attempt to come to grips with modernization.\textsuperscript{49} Each culture has its own characteristic pace and populations sometimes actively resist a change of pace.\textsuperscript{50} "Violence too offers a 'simple' way out of burgeoning complexity of choice and general over-stimulation. For those who lack an intelligent comprehensive

\textsuperscript{46} A.J. Siddiqi, Quoted by Waseem, no.26, , pp.376-77.
\textsuperscript{47} Malik, no.19, p.100.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, London, 1971, p.46.
programme, who cannot cope with novelties and complexities of blinding change, terrorism substitutes for thought. Terrorism may not topple regimes but it removes doubt".51

Compared to its social and cultural manifestations, the political manifestations of the resurgence have been less pervasive "but they still are the single-most important political development in Muslim societies in the last quarter of the twentieth century".52 And as part of what may be called 'cultural diplomacy', Pakistani "leaders have fairly consistently tried to claim the role as the promoter of cooperation among Islamic states and the speaker for Islam to the rest of the world".53

According to the UNESCO definition: "culture comprises the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society and social group."54 The origin of modern cultural diplomacy lay in its having been a tool of the colonial regimes. After the second world war 'culture' emerged as an instrument of external policy of various states. Culture became a dynamic operational element in international relations and diplomacy. "The newly emerged independent countries utilized their 'cultures' to overcome their respective

51 Ibid., p.329.
52 Huntington, no.49, p.112.
53 Ibid., p.178.
crises of identities and to assert their nationhood". In the case of Pakistan, "a stronger affiliation with the Muslim world retained enormous geopolitical, economic and psychological advantages for Pakistan which its leaders have pursued vigorously over the last four decades. Pakistan has duly benefited from its mutualities with the co-religionists in Western Asia whereas the South Asian bickering... has thwarted the rare efforts to bring sanity and amity." Lately Pakistan has been looking towards Central Asia with high hopes as vividly described by M.K. Akbar, "with a great deal of gloating, and as if to mock me, some leading ministers in Pakistan told me of Pakistan's 'great achievements' in Central Asia. Many ministerial delegations had travelled to the capitals of the new republics and signed some... agreements for trade etc. On some occasions, they had also tried to mobilize them over the Kashmir issue".

**Pakistan and Jihad**

Pakistan has taken an extreme conflictual position on Kashmir prompting Josef Korbel to remark: "the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromizable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organization that find themselves locked in deadly conflict in which

---

56 Malik, no.19, p.201.
57 Akbar, no.27, pp.211-12.
Kashmir has become both a symbol and a battleground. Pakistan is not satisfied with the status quo and Gen. Pervez Musharraf has gone to the extent of saying: "Pakistan is Kashmir and Kashmir is Pakistan" and that "jihad that began in Afghanistan has now shifted to Kashmir... jihad is not terrorism". He has defined jihad as a "struggle in the path of God, opposing victimization against the Muslims wherever its exists. Jihad is also what I am doing in this country against illiteracy and corruption. So jihad is a very wide concept."

Active insurgency in Kashmir has adversely affected the Indo-Pakistan relations. Pakistan is not willing to move on other fronts until the 'core' issue of Kashmir is settled to its satisfaction. "Pakistan sees a role for itself in any outcome both because of the Security Council resolution and because of the continued Pakistani belief that Kashmiris still have an emotional tie with Pakistan... India (has) admitted that there are genuine problems but claimed that these were manageable without Pakistani interference." Pakistani attempts at seeking international support over Kashmir have not yielded the desired response. In the UN Human Rights

58 Quoted by D.C. Jha, "Basic Foundations and Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" in Surendra Chopra (ed.), Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Amritsar, 1983, p.11.
Conference in Geneva, in 1994, despite Pakistan's best efforts, its resolution against India did not get the support of important countries like the US, China and Iran. Without the cold war political standards with which to fault the Indian foreign policy, the US has increasingly felt comfortable with India.

The Afghan war has left Pakistan with a troubling legacy. It institutionalized the policy of active involvement of its intelligence service, the ISI, in domestic and foreign policy. "The ISI was able to claim credit and credibility for future actions, with or without sanction from the political leadership, and in areas where it was less than qualified." As another adverse fall-out of the war arms became a part of the political culture of Pakistan and contributed to an upsurge of sectarian and other types of violence. The country became a conduit for the drug trade going from Afghanistan to the West and drug-addiction increased manifold in Pakistan.

Pakistan has already suffered four military coups and the country suffers from endemic social, political and economic ills which its various regimes have proven incapable of handling. Pakistan's problems matter

---

63 Ibid., p.59.
64 Ibid., p.67.
65 Ibid., p.50.
66 Ibid., p.51.
not just to the Indian subcontinent but to the rest of the world as well. "Pakistan is a state with crushing economic problems, a burgeoning population, and few effective civilian institution. It abuts two regions of the world, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, that are flash points in American's battles over oil, terrorism and drugs. Pakistan wields major influence in the growing Islamist movement in Central Asia and the surrounding regions. If Pakistan collapsed, refugees would flood into India and Iran and Africa's stability would be further undermined. Worse yet, any further weakening of the state could leave Pakistan's nuclear arsenal vulnerable to terrorists."68

These may not be alarmist or imaginary fears. Ahmed Rashid* who has covered the Afghan war for twenty years also holds bleak prospects for Pakistan. In his recent book *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* Rashid has argued that Pakistan was ripe for a Taliban-style Islamic Revolution which could jeopardise security in the region.69 With a pro-active and probably impatient general at the helm in Pakistan some dramatic moments may, indeed, be ahead for Pakistan and the global community.

---

68 Ibid.