CHAPTER 5

AN ASSESSMENT
Pakistan's use of religion as an instrument of diplomacy has had a long history. It would be unrealistic to expect that Pakistan would make a clean-break from the past on this matter. Co-operation among co-religionist nations to achieve legitimate shared goals cannot be faulted. However it should not degenerate into a gang-up for the achievement of unscrupulous foreign policy goals by employing devious and violent methods. The nurturing of the jihadi infrastructure also cannot be justified on any ground. Pakistan should realise that crypto-diplomacy may not pay in the long-run. It may have harmful domestic consequencies, and worse, other nations may also take recourse to it. In fact Pakistan should be concentrating on resolving some of the more basic questions about its own existence and identity.

Islam and Democracy in Pakistan

Two elements, Islam and democracy are intrinsic to the ideological controversy in Pakistan. Both at the levels of pure thought and real politics these manifest themselves in vastly different forms and shapes, at times as mutually exclusive but most often in combination and permutations.¹ However, both Islam and democracy are often compromised in Pakistan for pragmatic considerations. Thus Maulana Maududi found arguments for supporting a woman as a candidate for the highest political office in the

state and the Islamic socialist Zuflikar Ali Bhutto declared a minor sect as non-Muslim. "The regime in power have found it expedient to include both Islamic political notions and democratic values in their pragmatic compromise over constitution and ideology. As society moves further in the direction of urbanization and industrialization the inadequacy of doctrinal Islam and of a state bound by dogma as a basis for societal interaction will become increasingly manifest. That this will require Muslim intellectuals, thinkers and ideologues to address themselves afresh to the relationship between Islam and the state is obvious".  \(^2\)

It is the human intellect which under all circumstances interprets the law. As witnessed in Pakistan, a dictator, proclaiming loyalty to divine injunctions, can manipulate the authoritarian nature of a doctrinal Islamic state to crush popular aspirations. According to Kalim Bahadur and Charles J. Adams, Maulana Maududi's ideas of an all embracing Islamic polity (in which individuals have to submit to the commands of pious deputies who are not divinely-ordained but divinely guided) could lead to the creation of a totalitarian state.  \(^3\)  Ishtiaq Ahmed believes that in so far as the position of the doctrinal purists is concerned, Islam is opposed to modern democracy in a fundamental, irreconcilable sense.  \(^4\)  He also notes

\(^2\) Ibid., p.224.
\(^3\) Quoted, Ibid., p.197.
\(^4\) Ibid., p.212.
that the concept of an Islamic state has figured in the Pakistani politics in the following ways:

(i) As a symbol of distinctiveness vis-a-vis India.
(ii) As a principle of political legitimacy.
(iii) As a framework for constitution and law-making.
(iv) As a symbol of Muslim solidarity, and
(v) As a framework for the economic system.\(^5\)

Dr. Raunaq Jahan, a Bangladeshi scholar, interprets the in-built tensions of Pakistan as failure of national integration.\(^6\) "At one stage it scared away Bangladesh and in its contemporary era it is alienating Sindh and Baluchistan. But the ruling pays elite scant attention to it. The Punjabi caucus has benefited so much from power centralization that any idea of devolution of authority or making the polity federal is abhorrent to it. Even within the limited provincial autonomy it is the big feudal lords and the Piras who reign, but it is the Punjabi dominated military-cum-bureaucracy caucus that really rules".\(^7\) According to I.A. Rahman, a journalist, Pakistan is not able to complete the transition from authoritarian system of Gen. Zia to normal democratic dispensation.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) Ibid., 222.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Quoted, Ibid., p.209.
Kalim Bahadur suggests: "(The recurring) constitutional conflicts and anarchy (are) the culmination of fifty years of military-bureaucratic rule and subversion of all democratic norms and procedures by the successive autocratic regimes... Democratic institutions have to be firmly entrenched and strengthened to protect the country from recurring systemic crisis".\(^9\) Writing in a similar vein, Maleeha Lodhi comments: "Pakistan is again at a turning point. The external danger from a BJP-run nuclear India cannot be minimized. But the greater threat is from within - a debt ridden economy in tatters, a society that is fracturing, a federation under unprecedented strain, and pervasive lawlessness that is symptomatic of a virtual institutional break down".\(^10\) About the internal dimension of Pakistan's national security, Kalim Bahadur opines: "Pakistan's search for security should start from home. Pakistan's alliance with the US had benefited it in its confrontation with India but had damaged its internal political system and its democratic institutions, in brief its negative impact on the country far outweighed whatever advantage it might have on its military strength".\(^11\)

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\(^11\) Kalim Bahadur, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy and the New World Order", in Bahadur (ed.), no.9, p.238.
The Shifting Sands of Diplomacy

American policies towards Pakistan have been one of the inputs in the evolution of the Pakistani political system. "It was the role of the US in financing and strengthening the military establishment in Pakistan, which led to the emergence of armed forces in its political structure. Within the military-bureaucratic structure the US administration supported some individuals, whom it perceived as supportive of the US cause... The intimate relationship as has existed between the US and Pakistan, was bound to degenerate into a situation, where the bigger and more powerful partner tries to take charge of all spheres of political and economic life, in the interest of the 'common cause', without thought of its long-term effect on the smaller partner". 12

There are clear sings of a shift in the US policy away from Pakistan. During his brief stop-over in Pakistan recently, President Clinton warned: "A stark truth must also be faced. There is no military solution to Kashmir... (International) support and sympathy will be lost... it is wrong to support attacks against civilians across the Line of Control". 13 On Mr. Clinton's visit to the sub-continent and the US policy, a Pakistani analyst writes: "Despite soft and sweet references to Holy Quran, Quaid-i-Azam


13 Text of President Clinton's Broadcast to the People of Pakistan on March 25, 2000, Strategic Digest, New Delhi, April 2000, p.421.
and Allama Iqbal... the unbecoming tone and tenor of (Clinton's) address, punctuated with repeated warnings and cautions, shed ample light on the nature of the developing Washington- New Delhi romance and its ramifications for the region, especially Pakistan. President Clinton's warning to Pakistan about the 'danger of isolation' on the issues of nuclear restraint, violence and extremism, smacks of a calculated move to render Islamabad subservient to Indian hegemony... The US does not want to mediate on Kashmir."

Some shared perspectives have brought India and the US closer much to the chagrin of Pakistan. For example India and the US have institutionalized on intelligence-sharing arrangement. "Brought together by a common enemy. India and the US have decided to pool intelligence on terrorism. In a far cry from the cold war days, two Indian agents would be stationed in Washington where they will work in tandem with the FBI to beat the threat from Islamic terrorism. Two FBI officials will in turn be posted in New Delhi. This will be an open relationship. (The agents) will be 'declared agents' and will not have to function under diplomatic cover". 


Both India and the US are worried by the continuing Sino-Pakistan missile cooperation. In a series of classified testimonials American intelligence agents have told the Clinton administration and the Congress that China is continuing to help Pakistan build long range missiles and that Chinese experts have been sighted around Pakistan's newest missile factory. In 1991 and 1993 the US had imposed sanctions on China over the issue and, in 1994. China had agreed to comply with the main provisions of the MTCR. But apparently, the Sino-Pakistan missile cooperation is still continuing.

The China-Taliban diplomatic interaction over the last year has caused alarm in India and is being seen as a Sino-Pakistani attempt to strategically encircle India. "There is also a perception that China sees Afghanistan as another area to keep India engaged and thereby ensure India remains 'grounded in South Asia and is unable to check Chinese diplomatic and political manoeuvres elsewhere outside the region."  

At the same time both India and the US have been expanding their areas of cooperation with China thus somewhat reducing Pakistan's diplomatic leverage with Beijing. Besides, China has its own compulsions

17 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
in having working ties with New Delhi and Washington. This became clear
during the recent visit to China by a delegation of the Islamabad Council of
World Affairs (ICWA), led by its president former Foreign Minister Agha
Shahi.\textsuperscript{20} A senior Chinese researcher underlined to the delegation that
China's top priority over the coming decades was economic development
and this necessitated a path of engagement with the US and that
notwithstanding differences with India China had opted for a positive
approach since confrontation would have the effect of driving New Delhi
into the arms of US.\textsuperscript{21} "With regard to Kashmir, China saw it as a problem
left over by history which had to be solved through peaceful negotiations.
Pakistan needed to concentrate on improving its economy and building up
national strength like China".\textsuperscript{22} As mentioned elsewhere, the Chinese role
during the Kargil conflict was not unfavourable to India.

\textbf{The Indo-Pakistani Equations}

Despite absence of international support on Kashmir, Pakistan's
compulsive hostility against India has continued. "One suspects... what
Pakistan's dread more than Indian hostility is Indian indifference towards
their country. Indifference would remove the only point of reference they
have to justify their often anguished search to seek parity with India,

\textsuperscript{21} Quoted, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
always." An element of duplicity has also been the hall-mark of the Pakistani policy towards India. About this K. Subramaniam writes: "It is forgotten that this (the Kargil conflict) is not the first time an Indian Prime Minister has taken Pakistani declaration at face value and was taken for a ride. It happened to Lal Bahadur Shastri. As the Indian and Pakistani envoys (who happened to be brothers-in-law) were signing the agreement on submitting the Rann of Kutch dispute for arbitration in June 1965, (Field Martial) Ayub Khan was preparing to unleash the 'Operation Gibraltar' infiltration forces on Kashmir". A captured Pakistani soldier Inayat Ali revealed that he had entered the Kargil area as early as November 1998. The contents of the personal diary of Muhammad Maaz Ullah Khan, 8 NLI, Pakistani Army, recovered from point 4812 reveal that he entered the Indian side of the LoC in January 1999. And despite the Lahore spirit Gen. Musharraf himself visited the Mushkoh Valley in February 1999, as noted in the personal diary of Capt. Hussain Ahmad. India had neglected the peaks believing that they were unsurmountable and that Pakistan would not infiltrate its soldiers in a predominantly Shi'a

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26 Ibid., p.174.
27 Ibid., p.139.
area. "In the Kargil sector, the Pakistani Army, according to some reports, has yet not fully withdrawn from our side of the LoC. Pakistani troops have maintained a highly threatening posture all along the LoC in the post-Kargil period".  

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) has submitted its first report, called the National Security Review (NSR) to the GoI. It has recommended: "If the level of Pakistan-sponsored violence in Kashmir does not decline, we must adopt a strategy to raise Pakistan's costs (e.g. by an occasional, thoroughly prepared raid on carefully chosen targets in PoK. (This) would be a useful prelude to the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan... (the) new military regime in Pakistan is inherently unstable and may act in irrational ways". Considering its advisory role, the NSAB failed to foresee a Kargil-type situation and it has admitted as much: "Right upto Pakistan's Kargil adventure, our enemies have caught us unprepared".

In the wake of the Pokhran and Chagai nuclear tests in May, 1998 and the Kargil conflict in Summer, 1999 a debate stoked by statements

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28 Ibid., p.140.
30 Quoted by V. Sudarshan, "A Sand-castle Blueprint" Outlook, New Delhi July 17, 2000, p.16.
31 Ibid., p.17.
from L.K. Advani and George Fernandes, on 'Limited War', has been raging in India. "The Kargil conflict had obtained India the necessary credibility and aura to initiate a formal national debate on the Limited War doctrine... given the evolution patterns of the post-nuclear military doctrines of all other nuclear weapon powers - which have all slowly moved towards Limited War paradigms - this Indian debate shows all the signs of evolving Limited War as India's military doctrine for the coming years."32 Theoretically, a Limited War implies the following: (i) that the capability to fight a total and/or nuclear war forms the essential backdrop to fighting a Limited War, (ii) that it is this fear of expansion into a total war that makes limitation no longer a 'desired' but an 'in-built' element of Limited war, (iii) that limitation becomes for more important than even the outcome itself, (iv) that it is peace and not victory that become the supreme objective of Limited War, (v) that 'limited setbacks' rather than victory may bring this desired lasting peace and (vi) that observing limitation becomes a strategic objective and is expressed in terms of tactical compromises in one's diplomatic military engagements with the adversary.33 "The most important thing to notice is that adoption of the Limited War doctrine, therefore, does not mean limiting one's mind-set to any specific category of war-fighting despite the fact that it implies that days of decisive victories

33 Ibid., p.22.
are over once and for all. Secondly, while the limitation will operate in the perceptions of all adversaries they must be expressed in terms of policy objectives to ensure reciprocity without which escalation will become too rapid to observe the sanity of commanders and decision-makers. And finally, the eternal truth must remain supreme that War in order to remain war must serve declared political objectives and that the costs of a war must not exceed from its expected benefits".34

The international action to secure East-Timor's independence from Indonesia prompted Nawaz Sharief (a month before his ouster) to compare the situation in Kashmir with East-Timor and seek international, particularly, US support.35 But Khalid Mahmud, a Pakistani specialist on Indian affairs saw a pronounced pro-India tilt in the US stand after Kargil and he had no hope for world pressure to mount on India.36 Some other Pakistani analysts felt that world pressure for East-Timor came because its population was mainly Christian. About the differences between the two situations, Kashmir analyst Dr. Ajmitabh Mattoo said: "The East Timorese movement had tremendous leadership... it did not get criminalized, instead, it threw up Nobel Peace Prize winners".37

34 Ibid.
35 Mariana Babbar, "Precedent for Kashmir?", Outlook, New Delhi, September 27, 1999, p.49.
36 Quoted, Ibid.
37 Quoted by Janaki Bahadur Kremmer, "Tremors After Timor", Ibid.
It would be simplistic to suggest that Indo-Pakistani hostility is based on the single issue of the Kashmir dispute yet the resolution of the Kashmir tangle may be "followed by a long-awaited era of mutual cooperation." The first task before India and Pakistan should be to bring peace to Kashmir. Militancy in Kashmir has strong roots in domestic factors (like corruption and insensitivity and high-handedness of bureaucrats and politicians) which must be openly acknowledged and addressed. A great deal of blame in this regard lies with successive governments in Srinagar and New Delhi. An example about Aassiyeh Andrabi, the DeM leader, may be cited. In 1987, she led a delegation of 150 women to meet CM Farooq Abdullah to demand reservation of seats for women in state-run buses. The behaviour of Farooq Abdullah was ill-tempered and he taunted the delegation for talking about reservation when man had landed on moon! When full-fledged insurgency erupted in Kashmir, Andrabi emerged as one of its ideologues. She is also leading the DeM which has lent a great deal of overt and covert support to militancy. It is clear that the existing state-structures and representative institutions in India are not fully respecting even the legitimate societal and individual

39 Vijaya Pushkarna, "Burqa Brigade", *The Week*, Cochin, December 5, 1999, p.34.
40 Quoted Ibid., p.36.
aspirations. This often leads to emotional break-up in people and the urge in them to 'punish' the 'unjust' system.

The Hizbul Mujahideen's unilateral declaration of a three-month-long cease-fire could go down, in the history of militancy in Kashmir, as the most significant one with a half_chance of bringing about peace in the valley.\textsuperscript{41} Abdul Majid Dar, Commander-in-Chief of the HB in the valley is being both fair and bold in saying: "Although we stand for Kashmir's merger with Pakistan, we will respect the wishes and aspirations of the people".\textsuperscript{42} The GoI has accepted the offer of talks particularly as 95\% of Hizbul's cadres are Kashmiris. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the JI leader, has reacted with anger: "We have been betrayed... They not only ditched me and my party but the whole jehad in Kashmir... But as far as jehad is concerned it will continue."\textsuperscript{43} Foreign mercenary-based groups like LeT and HUM have also condemned the peace move. Some experts see the unilateral truce "in the context of Gen. Pervez Musharraf's planned September visit to the US. Musharraf had earlier said that Pakistan could use its influence with the Mujahideen if India responded positively to discuss and resolve the core issue of Kashmir."\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} Murali Krishnan, "A Quest For Calm", \textit{Outlook}, New Delhi, August 7, 2000, p.20.
\textsuperscript{42} Interview to Fayaz Bukhari, Ibid., p.21.
\textsuperscript{43} Interview to Mazhar Abbas, Ibid., p.28.
\textsuperscript{44} Mazhar Abbas, "Peacemeal Voices", Ibid., p.28.
Danger also arises from the fact that quite a few militant groups operating in India may not be within the command and controls of Islamabad and its agencies like the ISI. They may have their own independent agendas. The ISI has set up a number of organizations in different parts of India with the objective of creating chaos and communal disharmony.\textsuperscript{45} Kafla-i-Sakht Jan, Muslim Tigers and Inquilab Islam Ayatollah are some of the ISI-created organizations active in different parts of India.\textsuperscript{46} "ISI is a highly indoctrinated, motivated force... engaged in the task of destruction of India. Its dragnet spreads from Kashmir to Kerala and Mumbai to Kohima."\textsuperscript{47} That within the Pakistani establishment the ISI acts as a law-unto-itself is well-known.

The Indian response to the Pakistani and the ISI challenge has not been upto the mark: "There is another constant theme. That Pakistan is behind every act of subversion in India... What are we saying? That the enemy is trying to kill us? Of course he is! That is why he is the enemy. It is the ISI's job and mandate to try to destroy India. But what should we do? Gather evidence? Publish White Papers? I think not... We have to understand and come to terms with the large strategy of the enemy, out-think him and then defeat him and his proxies on the ground. Apart from

\textsuperscript{45} Bhure Lal, \textit{The Monstrous Face of ISI}, New Delhi, 2000, p.22.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., pp.22-23.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p.144.
frenetic fire-fighting in the wake of each new outrage, I do not see signs of a coherent effort to do this."48

The proxy war is likely to continue, if not escalate. India has a long border with Pakistan. Only the Punjab border has been fenced. The ISI has also been exploiting India’s soft borders with Nepal and Bangladesh. Thus for India border management has become a major challenge. It has no option but to improve intelligence gathering and go for hi-tech surveillance of the borders by using sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites imagery. These must be done without losing any more time.

The Indian policy against international terrorism has never been clearly spelt out. The USA and Israel have taken a firm stand and sworn to strike back at countries and organizations harbouring terrorists.49 The US has laid down certain guidelines to deal with international terrorism. These include, (i) not to cut deals with hostage-takers, (ii) expose states supporting terrorism, (iii) expand international cooperation, (iv) establish central data-bases on terrorist activities, (v) covert action against terrorist groups, (vi) deny use of high technology to terrorists, etc.50 India can also implement these type of measures to its advantage.

50 Ibid.
International cooperation is essential to combat international terrorism. Recently through a series of high level visits, India has sought Israel's help for counter-terrorism to which Israel has agreed. Dr. Yehoyada Haim, Israel's ambassador to India, has said that Mossad was doing its homework on India.\textsuperscript{51} Other efforts can also be made. "The Paris meeting in June 1996, specifically convened to discuss international terrorism finalized a list of 25 measures for its eradication... A comprehensive review of all conventions relating to terrorism needs to be undertaken to determine their present status, and how many of them have been ratified by all the countries."\textsuperscript{52}

On which Side will the Cookie Crumble?

For many Pakistanis, various developments in the last few years have come as traumatic shocks. The Pakistani Embassy in Kabul had to be closed in 1994 after it came under attacks from factionalist Afghans.\textsuperscript{53} Even in July, 2000, a bomb exploded in the Embassy with the Taliban blaming it on 'terrorists'.\textsuperscript{54} Pakistán's high hopes from the Taliban seem to have soured and with it the dreams of engaging the Central Asian Republics in a big way. The Northern Alliance (now renamed as the United


\textsuperscript{53} Malik, no.38, p.200.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{The Dawn}, Karachi, July 11, 2000.
Front of Afghanistan) has been holding out, whereas the rigid and uncompromising stance of the Taliban has made the peacemaker's job exceedingly difficulty.\textsuperscript{55} Thus Pakistan's Afghanistan policy has in effect got stranded. On Kashmir also, Pakistan is not making any progress whether on the ground or in the international fora.

Islamism is the perception of Islam more as a political ideology than as a mere religion.\textsuperscript{56} "The future of Islamism in Afghanistan is likely to be determined by two factors: The general crisis of Islamist thought and practice in the Muslim world, and the specificities of the Afghan politics-rurality, ethnicity and tribalism. Both show that there is no future for Islamism in Afghanistan and that the Taliban model may not survive for very long as a 'political' model, but will reinforce the traditional conservatism and puritanism of Afghanistan's tribal South, the Koran belt."\textsuperscript{57} Thus the Afghan Islamism would continue to have an adverse impact on the Pakistani civil society.

An assertive and effective civil society is not merely a political or intellectual construct, it is also related to just and egalitarian policies to be pursued by the state. Moreover the "Pakistani civil society has to co-exist


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p.204.
with an egalitarian and forward-looking version of Islam. The sectarian, intolerant and obscurantist forms of Islam have to give way, through an intellectual reconstruction which is a gigantic project; (Pakistanis) will, however, have to do it."\(^{58}\)

At the same time often a 'selective' presentation and analysis of Islam and events in the Muslim world by scholars and political commentators\(^{59}\) should be considered as a problem. "This selective analysis fails to tell the whole story, provide the full context for the Muslim attitudes, events, and actions, or fails to account for the diversity of Muslim practices. While it sheds some light, it is a partial light that obscures or distorts the full picture. As a result Islam and Islamic revivalism are easily reduced to stereotypes of Islam."\(^{60}\)

To bring Pakistan on the right track, Gen. Musharraf should abandon Pakistan's long-standing but futile quest of wrestling Kashmir from India. According to economist Omar Noman, 80% of Pakistan's total debt was accumulated under military regimes.\(^{61}\) Currently, the military budget alone consumes 40% of government expenditure. "Unless Musharraf improves relations with India - and this means resolving Kashmir - the two

\(^{58}\) Malik, no.38, p.136.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
countries will remain locked in a defence-spending race. India's substantially higher and more diversified industrial base, its higher rates of growth, and its manifestly greater military strength make such a competition suicidal for Pakistan.62

Gen. Musharraf should attempt to curb the heavy influence that religious and sectarian organizations like the JI have been wielding. He should rein-in the ISI, as well as the various Mujahideen groups operating with impunity from Pakistani soil. The present policy which seeks to curb the Islamists' powers at home while supporting their activities in Kashmir is not only untenable but also opens Pakistan to the risk of a Taliban-type uprising. Gen. Musharraf should also concentrate on economic and other reforms. State institutions must be made accountable and freed from religious zealots. Democratic and political institutions must be allowed to play their legitimate role in the civil society. These efforts will require not only great internal endeavour but also international pressure. "A new policy should seek Pakistan's structural transformation, both political and economic. It should focus on reducing the power prerogative and pocket-book of the army, creating and strengthening internal regulatory bodies responsible for revenue collection and enforcement, fundamentally realigning the government's budgetary priorities, improving the quality of basic public services, developing a viable, politically neutral police force

62 Ibid.
and an independent judiciary, upholding the freedom of the press, and guaranteeing minority rights... unless Gen. Musharraf is prodded and persuaded to undertake these measures, Pakistan's ability to function as a viable state will remain in jeopardy - a prospect too dire to risk. 63

Diplomacy is called upon to bridge gulf and to defuse tension in a world with few effective restraints on the policies of individual states and virtually no enforceable international authority. 64

Having received legitimacy and sanction from the Supreme Court, Gen. Musharraf has got time on his hand. The question is: would he break with the past and chart a new course for the sake of Pakistan or remain content in marching on the beaten-path?

63 Ibid., p.7.