THE ANATOMY OF WEAK STATES

The previous chapter was an attempt to present the thematic of global culture. The various schools of thought and their respective views on the possible emergence and the nature and composition of the global culture were discussed in detail. In this chapter the focus will shift from global culture to weak states, as it is the latter on which the influence of the former is sought to be demonstrated. The security predicaments of weak states and several theoretical responses would also be briefly reviewed for the sake of completeness. Since global culture undermines the cultural confidence of developing countries, intrinsic relation between cultural power and soft capital acquires new significance. Moreover, whole notion of soft power has to be meshed with the overall strength of the state.

K. Roberts defines state as "... the presence of a supreme authority, ruling over a defined territory, who is recognized as having power to make decisions in matters of governments [and] is able to enforce such decisions and generally maintain order within the state. Thus the capacity to exercise coercive authority is an essential ingredient: the ultimate test of a ruler's authority is whether he possesses the power of life and death over his subject" (Hall, 1993:1).

In the words of R. M. Maciver, "The state is an association which, acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power, maintain within a community territorially demarcated the universal external condition of social order" (Maciver, 1926:22).

According to Garner, "State as a concept of political science and public law is a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent or nearly so of external control and possessing an organized government to which the great body of its inhabitants render habitual obedience" (Garner, 1951:49).

Much more elaborate definition of the state has been provided by Dyson. According to him,

"Besides referring to an entity or actor in the area of international politics, state is a highly generalizing, integrating and legitimating concept that identifies the leading values of the political community with reference to which authority is to be exercised; emphasizes the distinctive character
and unity of the "public power" compared with civil society; focuses on
the need for depersonalization of that power; finds its embodiment in one
or more institutions and one or more public purposes which thereby
acquire a special ethos and prestige and an association with the public
interest or general welfare: and produces a socio-cultural awareness of
(and sometimes dissociation from) the unique and superior nature of the
state itself ... The idea of the state is dedicated to the value of reason,
placed at the service of a set of public norms that are to be guaranteed
against violation by individuals who are attempting to satisfy egoistic
wants. Its grandeur as an institution lies in its authority, but equally power
(though not a good in itself) is a necessary basis of its action" (Dyson cited
in Young, 1994:25-26).

In the words of Max Weber, "the modern state is a compulsory association which
organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use
of physical force as a means of domination within a given territory. To this end the state
has combined the material means of organization in the hands of its leaders, and it has
expropriated all autonomous functionaries of estates who formerly controlled these
means in their own right. The state has taken its position and now stands in the top place”
(Gerth and Mills, 1970:81-82).

On the relationship between violence and the modern state, Weber aptly remarks
that “force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state – nobody says that-
but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and
violence is especially an intimate one” (Ibid:78). He gives equal importance to the
territoriality as the critical factor of the modern state. According to him, “a state is a
human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of
the state. Specially, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other
institutions or individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is
considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” (Ibid: 78). Weber is aware of the
fact that resort to physical force is not confined to the modern state. He is, therefore,
careful enough to add the term ‘legitimate’ before the violence. The term “legitimacy”,
which received at best an adjectival treatment in Weberian political sociology was to gain
critical importance in the latter half of the twentieth century, particularly after the
emergence of the bulk of newly independent states. It suffices to comment here that
Weber cannot be blamed for putting brute force at the heart of the state apparatus as he
takes cognizance of legitimacy as an equally important factor of the modern state. It is
noteworthy that human sources and rule making authority that are recognized as
fundamental characteristics of state by international law and political science receive latent and implicit treatment in the Weberian notion of state. Put together, Weberian notion of state can be summed up as

1. “a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying
2. centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outward from a center to cover a
3. territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises
4. a monopoly of authoritative binding rule making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence” (Mann, 1986:112).

As a heuristic devise these definitions do throw some light on the principal ingredients of the modern state. However, much more still needs to be elaborated. The modern state contains following characteristics.

**Territory:** The modern state is by definition a territorial entity. Neatly demarcated portion of earth's surface provides the physical and material foundations to the modern state. As pointed out by Crawford Young,

“the territorial dimension of stateness has been defined with particular sharpness in the modern era following the emergence of a global system of state with precise boundary demarcations. Iconographically, the territorial personality of the modern state finds expression in the ubiquitous national maps with frontiers etched in bold lines. Physical artifacts-boundary markers, even fences —represent territorial limits; at all points of passage, the frontier is personified by the array of uniformed state agents policing the entry and exit of living and inanimate objects; with the flags emblematic of the state assertively placed at the limits of its zone of authority” (Young, 1994:26).

All natural resources lying within its borders are property of the state. Within its borders it is internally unified and fairly organized primarily on the basis of domination. To enter into its territory is to subject oneself under the territorial jurisdiction of the state. Its laws are applicable to all who fall within its borders unless exempted from law by the state itself. Everyone born within its borders is usually granted its full membership and citizenship and the state is obliged to offer indiscriminate protection to all its citizens. As noted by Crawford Young, “the territoriality of states became a bedrock postulate of international jurisprudence; ... the mission and purpose of traditional international law has been the delimitation of the exercise of sovereign power on a territorial basis. No rule is clearer than the precept that no state may lawfully attempt to exercise its sovereignty within the territory of another” (Ibid: 27).
Besides serving as the material foundation of the state, territory provides identity to its citizens clearly distinguishable from primordial loyalties. India, for example, is not where Indians live; rather Indians are those who reside in India. Unlike its predecessors the modern state permits and, in certain cases, even encourages the accommodation of strangers who either do not have their own state or want to change it for any number of reasons. Territory also serves as the basis of political representation of state's citizens. Legislature and parliament of any democratic state consists of men and women representing territorially delineated constituencies (Parekh, 1996:31-32).

Multiple identities of pre-modern political organizations gave way to territorial identity in the modern state. All other identities and affiliations of its members have been subordinated to the territorial identity of the state. In the time of crisis and war all other identities are suspended and in peace time too other identities can flourish to the extent permitted by the state. Unlike other associative bonds of individuals, the modern state is a compulsory association in the sense that all individuals belong to one of many existing states in the world, which no one can leave or enter without prior permission (explicit or tacit) of the state. In contrast to previous political formations the modern state territorializes and totalizes every possible human relation and activity (Ibid: 32).

**Population:** No state can exist without population. Some segment of people is necessary in order to have the state. “Rule is exercised over an ensemble of human subjects resident within the state’s sphere of territorial jurisdiction” (Young, 1994:27). Since the time of Plato quality and quantity of population has been a persistent theme in the Western and Eastern political thinking. None, however, expressed the opinion that state can be conceived without population. Population of the state needs to be viewed from double point of view. Firstly, citizens are members of the state that are endowed with certain rights and privileges. Secondly, they are the subject to whom laws and commands of the state are directed. Crawford Young observes, “the population of a state is not only subordinated to its rule but also organized into a formal set of statuses stipulated by the polity. Male and female, husband and wife, adult and minor, citizen and alien, free and slave, sane and insane, at large and incarcerated: these categorizations may exist independently as ideological representations in society, but they are also formal legal classifications carrying rights and encumberments. A state that loses its population (or its territory) ceases to exist” (Ibid: 27).
Sovereignty: Sovereignty is the source of all authority exercised by the state. In earlier polities authority was plural and multiple with different sources, character and modus operandi. In contrast, it is rational, homogenous, central and hierarchically arranged in the modern state. The notion of one supreme power, although, was very much prevalent in pre-modern polities, it acquired its distinct and qualitatively different character after the emergence of the modern state. If liberal political theory is the justification of individual rights and obligations, entire liberal jurisprudence as developed by Boddin, Grotius and Austin is candid exoneration of the impersonal, indivisible, absolute, exclusive and inalienable sovereignty of the state. It is the source of all political authority and legally free from all moral and conventional constraints, though in practice, it is exercised in a more moderate manner.

Sovereignty of the state is exercised in two realms: external and internal. Externally, the state is the single unitary legal person on the international plane. There is no other entity on international plane that can issue an order to state governments. There is no central authority, to put it in Waltzian terms, on international plane. "None is entitled to command and none is required to obey" (Waltz, 1979:88). Other actors such as international organizations exercise authority to the extent delegated by states. They may function as an actor but their actorhood is seriously limited by the sovereignty of states. As noted by Crawford Young, "the state by metamorphosis becomes a single international legal person and thus equal to every other similar entity... the Western doctrine of sovereignty has won universal and enthusiastic acceptance by investing a newly independent nation with formal equality of international standing and empowering it normatively with authority, supreme by virtue of its power, uncluttered by any mythological explanations of its mandate and beyond which there could be no appeal" (Young, 1994:29).

Sociology of international system, however, does pose some constraints on the execution of sovereignty on the international plane. Firstly, power differential is the most important limit on the sovereignty of state. "Power remains the most important currency of international affairs, and most states are usually, in no position to enforce their will against the opposition of others" (Ibid: 29). Growing economic interdependence among the nations of the world also poses serious constraints on the state’s ability to act unilaterally. Small and weak states face pressures from bigger and stronger states.
Moreover, there is a world public opinion, albeit a weak one, that acts as a moral check, on the exercise of state sovereignty. Finally, international law, too, is a major limit on state’s sovereignty. As Crawford Young argues “the growing web of international law provides some curbs as well even through there is no ultimate sanction-wielding mechanism of enforcing its general jurisdiction” (Ibid:29).

The state reigns supreme within its domestic jurisdiction. “Sovereignty internally viewed, refers to the amplitude of state authority over subjects” (Ibid:29). In principle, there is nothing that can “establish a natural limit to the competence of the state in relation to its subjects. Nothing in the nature of the state or the individuals prevents the national legal order from regulating any subject matter in any field of social life, from restricting the freedom of the individual to any degree” (Ibid: 29). Legal authority of the state cannot be subordinated to any other principle or individual will within its territorial border. It is absolute to extent that “land without an owner belongs to the state; property without an heir escheats to the state. A helpless individual is a ward of the state. The state may conscript labor for its projects or personnel for its armies. The possessions of the individual are subjects to taxation; behaviour is open to regulation through law” (Ibid: 30).

Like its external counterpart, internal sovereignty of the state functions in a more modest manner. First and the foremost are the limits posed by the constitution of state which clearly demarcates the sphere of state action and rights and obligations of its subjects vis-à-vis state. As pointed out by Crawford Young, “state is rendered subordinate to its own public law; a degree of autonomy is guaranteed to civil society through the interdiction of state action that intrudes on defined individual and group rights-although states regularly test these curbs on their behavior” (Ibid: 30). Secondly, the state is accountable to its society through representative institutions. Thirdly, there is a system of check and balance among state institutions. The power of state is distributed among its institutions in a way that no institution can misuse it. Then there is public opinion, which, if vigilant and wise, works as an effective check or state’s sovereignty. “The state and civil society thus become full partners in the exercise of sovereignty; in such circumstances, the limitless, total, indivisible power embedded in the doctrine is domesticated” (Ibid: 30).
The Idea of the State: One of the most important and perhaps under researched attribute of the state is that it is an idea. This seemingly naïve, ambiguous and bizarre characteristic of state is that which commands loyalty and obedience of its citizens. Indians may dislike, hate or even revolt against the Indian government or its leaders and institutions such as police, bureaucracy, cabinet and judiciary and so forth, but they are prepared to sacrifice their lives for the country’s cause. The idea of state manifests itself in “affective orientations, images, and expectations imprinted in the mind of its subjects. In the tangled perceptions of civil society, the state is benefactor and oppressor, hero and villain” (Young, 1994:33). It is difficult to ignore “the seductive force of the idea of nation; elements of patriotism resonate, even if interlaid with more negative sentiments ...” (Ibid:33). The idea of state gives state a meaning and leaves an image in the minds of its people for the protection of which it originally came into being. It is the idea of state that provides identity to the state, and it is definitely the idea of the state coupled with passionate force of nationalism in the name of which masses are mobilized during the crisis. “There is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self severed if possible, well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed” (Huntington, 1968:2). If state is the fulfillment of the endless human quest to be ruled, it is definitely the idea of the state that exonerates and legitimizes the rule of the state.

The iconography of state is the mechanism through which the idea of the state is manifested. State devotes considerable resources and energy to crystallize the idea of state and its physical manifestation. Any failure of state to prevent the assault on the idea may seriously undermine the legitimacy of the state. “Iconography of the state is ubiquitous, visually expressed in its flag, postage stamps, coins, and currency; in textual form in its anthems, pledges of allegiance, oath of office. In theatrical projection, the state represents itself in resplendent ceremonal: inaugurations and coronations, parades displaying its military might, rituals of national commemoration... in the monumental architecture of their capital cities, states affix the signature of power” (Young 1994:34).

Vibrant nation lubricates the wheels of the state. Much disagreement exists on the variety of nations and nationalism, but it converges on the point that “the warm, vibrant, profoundly emotive notion of nation invests the more arid, abstract, jurisprudential concept of state with a capacity for eliciting passionate attachment to it by civil society. Nation evokes an image of civil society as natural community, with a vocation of unity
and an embodiment in a state-the nation politically organized …” (Young, 1994:32). While nation’s predecessors can be found in ancient and medieval times, the idea of nation, however, in the modern sense of the term emerged with French Revolution. Among innumerable definitions of nations an old definition presented by Sir Ernest Barker captures its essence in a more convincing manner. According to Barker,

“A nation is a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races, but possess a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history, who on the whole and in the main, though more in the past than in the present, include in that common stock a common religious belief; who generally and as a rule use a common language as the vehicle of their thoughts and feelings; and who, besides common thoughts and feelings, also cherish a common will, and accordingly form, a separate state for the expression and realization of that will” (Barker quoted in Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001:19-20).

It is clear from this definition that culture, language, religion, some notion of right and wrong and collective destiny stemming from the past, pervading the present and leading to future and the state as an instrument to shape and direct the nation, are all necessary components of the nation. Other associated ideas such as the notion of popular sovereignty and the principle of self-determination are the inevitable aspects of the nation. As noted by Crawford Young, “after roaming around various language families and racial categories in search of vast regrouping missions… the idea of nation combined with the right of self-determination to supply an ideology for anticolonial revolt in the Third World. This highly efficacious combat weapon eventually won its battle for liberation from imperial subjugation; the idea of nation was then appropriated by the postcolonial state as a key component in its ideology of legitimation” (Young, 1994:32).

Law: The modern state organizes itself on the basis of law. As remarked eloquently by Crawford Young, “the power of the state is the power organized by positive law-in the power of law… Speaking of the power of the state, one usually thinks of prisons and electric chairs, machine guns and cannons. But one should not forget that these are all dead things which become instrument of power only when used by human beings, and that human beings are generally moved to use them for a given purpose only by commands they regard as norms… That law is to the state as gold to king Midas; everything touched by the state is transformed into law” (Ibid: 31). State takes away from its members their individual characteristics like their social status, ethnic, regional and
religious identities. Members of the modern state are individuals defined in terms of self-determining agents endowed with definite choice and will. Given the fact that every individual is endowed with certain potentials state treats these agents as equal. All of them are subjected to one and the same law and no member or citizen of the state is above, outside or beyond law. Crawford Young holds that "law is crucial to the bonding of the state and civil society. Public law defines the relationships between the two and sets rules to which the state itself is subject. The criminal code establishes boundaries of acceptable behavior. Civil law brings a wide array of private transactions under state regulation, creating in the process rights in property. A host of subsidiary administrative rules complete the finely spun web of law in which civil society is enmeshed" (Ibid: 32). This explains why the modern state is reluctant to recognize any other source of member's allegiance other than itself. Even if citizens adhere to plural loyalties, as is the case in multinational states, it rarely grants them separate legal and political status.

As citizens of the state its member are bestowed with certain specifiable endowments and obligations. These endowments and obligations are the direct result of the new identity created by the state within its borders. Entire modern liberal political theory most notably as propounded by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel is manifestation and to the extent justification of this process. These thinkers, with some differences among themselves, rightly asserted that state brings qualitative change in relations of its member. It either creates new avenues to relate to its member or transforms social, ethnic or primordial ties into new impersonal political bonds with historical constancy.

Effective execution of the political authority requires clearly defined and fairly organized institutions. It is through these institutions state expresses itself and rules over its members. Since state institutions function on the basis of law, law becomes the *sine qua non* of the modern state. Different in nature and above social customs and traditions laws of the state command privileged status in the modern state. It is so important for the functioning of state that state is firstly and mostly judged by its ability to establish and maintain order, which in fact is an order based on law.

The modern state is devoid of human face in the sense that no one can lay any claim over it and treat it as his or her personal property. Personal loyalties of pre-modern era no longer hold state officials together. Law is the only thing recognized and obeyed by members of the state. All authority is acquired and exercised in the capacity of some
office established and governed by the law. The modern state, theoretically, is totally impersonal in nature in the sense that it functions as a system of interrelated and well coordinated institutions and officers exercise their powers and discharge their functions according to rules clearly defined by the law. Trained personnel selected on the basis of merit rather than that of personal gift hold these institutions and offices. These professionals are required to overcome their human emotions while discharging their official duty. They treat individuals as case to be dealt with according to impersonal rules and regulations promulgated by the state (Parekh, 1996:34-35).

**Hegemony:** State is supposed to hegemonize all power within its jurisdiction in order to exercise sovereignty. “All states are continuously engaged in a struggle to ensure the supremacy of their authority” (Young, 1994:35). All other sources of authority within the state (though they might have different origins and character) are subordinated to the state. They function, or more accurately, they are required to function in consonance with the commands of the state. “Profoundly imbued with the notion of their own sovereignty, even if constitutionally circumscribed, states will not brook direct affronts from segments of society to their right to rule. No one, the adage goes, is above (or beyond the reach of) the law” (Ibid: 35). The state allows dissenting voices within itself. However, they can flourish to the extent permitted (tacitly or explicitly) by the state. There are conditions under which even civil disobedience might be possible, it too recognizes the existence of law. But if any group or individual declares its refusal to acknowledge the command of the state forceful action is likely to follow to ensure its adherence to the state.

The hegemony of the state on the means of violence is sustained, institutionalized and manifested through the “policing apparatuses whose professionalization is one of the hallmarks of the modern state. Domination requires that the unruly be disciplined, the refractory punished” (Ibid: 35-36). Besides coercive measures, domination of the state is sought by ideology as well. Ideology justifies coercion and rule of the state. “An ideology of domination adds to the instrumentation of state ascendancy hegemony… is articulated as a normative doctrine” (Ibid: 36).

**Legitimacy:** Legitimation of domination is the crucial component of the operational code of conduct of the state. There are several good reasons for that. If it is human to be governed, it is equal or perhaps more human to be governed legitimately. Citizens expect
good laws, welfare, law and order, safety of men and material and so on from the state and give allegiance to the state in return. If state fails to provide these basic goods or frequently resorts to coercive measures, it loses its legitimacy.

State legitimizes its rule in a number of ways. Ideology is a critical instrument of legitimation of political order. Marxism-Leninism, for instance, legitimized communist rule in former Soviet Union and China. Liberal democracy, constitutionalism, fundamental rights and protection of property are some of the sources of legitimacy of state in capitalist societies. Religion too has played an important role in the legitimation of the state in history. It is still a crucial component of legitimation in some countries particularly Islamic ones. Democracy also became major source of state’s legitimacy in twentieth century. As pointed out by Crawford Young, “regular observation of constitutional assurances of the political rights of civil society, and procedures persuading civil society that accountability and responsiveness exist, are time-tested instruments of legitimacy. Performance criteria enters as well; pervasive corruption or conspicuous incompetence in statecraft corrodes legitimacy. Apparent success in economic management, as measured in the master indicators of growth, inflation, and unemployment rates, supply an aura of effectiveness” (Young, 1994:38).

**Autonomy**: Autonomy is the next behavioural imperative of the state. It, like sovereignty, has internal and external dimensions. The quest for independence is the essence of external aspect of state’s autonomy. State survives as a state if it is able to independently function on international plane. Conversely, state ceases to exist or faces a significant loss of prestige if it is governed by the dictates of any other state or transnational collectivity. Crawford Young states that “no intrusion on the national domain can be tolerated, nor can another state be permitted to assert its jurisdiction within state territory. The quest for autonomy within the global system of states is perpetual, governing policy choices for states large and small” (Young; 36).

Internal dimension of state autonomy is more complicated. According to Eric Nordlinger, “the state is autonomous to the extent that it translates its preferences into authoritative actions, the degree to which public policy conforms to the parallelogram of the public officials’ resource-weighted preferences. State autonomy may be operationally defined in terms of overall frequency with which state preferences coincide with authoritative actions and inactions, the proportion of preferences that do so, the average
substantive differences between state preferences and authoritative actions, or some combination of the three” (Ibid: 36). More simply internal autonomy refers to ability of the state to rule the society in which it is embedded. There occurs a constant competition between different social groups to define the national interests and the means through which they can be obtained. State institutions somehow reflect this tussle and try to keep it within acceptable limits. They deliver or they are required to allocate values authoritatively within the society so as to retain their authority intact.

Security and law and Order: No state can eschew from its primary obligation of maintaining law and order and providing security to its subjects. Absence of security makes life nasty, brutish and short. National security defined in terms of absence of threat to the physical survival and core values is the sine-qua-non of the state. It is not an exaggeration to say that the maintenance of law and order and security is the primary test of the success or failure of any state. State failing on this front is doomed to disaster unless the same function is performed by other agencies or state seeks the security umbrella of abler and stronger allies.

The primary concern of the modern state is to maintain and retain itself as a state: to maintain its legal supremacy, territorial integrity and order. All other functions - welfare or otherwise- are of secondary importance to the state. Its success or failure is primarily judged by its efficacy to unite itself and withstand any situation of crisis. It is for this purpose that the state monopolizes authority to use force. As a rule governed and institutionalized mechanism state, however, is expected to use force in a measured way.

Revenue: Accumulation of revenue is an important imperative of state behaviour. The significance of this imperative is self evident for the simple reason that “revenue enhances the ability of rulers to elaborate the institutions of the state, to bring more people within the domain of those institutions and to increase the number and variety of collective goods provided through the state” (Young, 1994:38). State competes with its civil society in the extraction of revenue so necessary for performing its ever-expanding functions. People do not want to give what they have earned through hard work. It is generally exonerated in the name of some crisis either real or imaginary. Crawford Young remarks on this aspect of the state behaviour that “the trade -off between legitimacy and revenue is often direct...direct taxation always evokes resistance and
evasion; it has generally been extended, in modern states, under cover of war needs” (Young, 1994:39).

**War:** War, industrialization and education are some of the measures used by the state in order to unite its members (Parekh, 1996:36). Among these war has been important to the extent that war making potentials and statehood have been seen as coterminous by many scholars such as K. Roberts and to some extent Charles Tilly. It has been mentioned earlier that cultural and spiritual connotation attached to the land in premodern times were broken down by the emergence of the modern state. Now territory serves as the physical foundation of the state. It enables state to fight a war of territorial expansion. Besides territorial expansion war serves other important political purposes for the state. “War made the state and state made war” is conventional wisdom in this regard (Tilly, 1975:42). It helps state to suppress internal division and resist discontent. It creates plenty of room to formulate policies and develop institutions, commencement of which remains inconceivable during peacetime. It is not an exaggeration to comment that much of what the modern state stands for has been the direct and inevitable result of wars imposed on or undertaken by the state. Had there been no war in history the primary purpose of its emergence would have evaporated or even if its development had been supported or encouraged by some other social forces its nature would be qualitatively different from what it presently is.

**Education:** Practically all modern states use education as an instrument to propagate common values and consolidate the novel sense of identity created or backed by the state. It is used for cultural and political conditioning of citizens. It shapes the mental makeup of citizens in a way that their beliefs and values are similar with that of the state and do not differ beyond the limit permitted by the state. Proper education actually reduces the livelihood of use of force to secure compliance of citizens. It is, therefore, not surprising that everywhere state is generally seen devoting its considerable amount of resources in imparting free and compulsory education to its citizens (Parekh, 1996:37).

**Industrialization:** Industrialization plays a critical role in functioning of the modern state. Most of existing states have been the result of war, which requires advanced technology and strong industrial infrastructure. Routine functions of the state overshadow
lives of millions of people. Presence of strong industrial infrastructure is a prerequisite to control and regulate the behaviour of citizens residing from the capital city to distant corners of the country. Regulation of the isolated and atomized members devoid of any conventional bondage necessitates close surveillance system capable of penetrating into their routine activities and able to act at the shortest possible notice. This too increases the dependence of the state on advanced technology and industrialization. Besides that, industrialization brings material prosperity and can serve as the solid basis of legitimacy so critical for the maintenance of statehood (Parekh, 1996:37).

The State-Society Relationship: The modern state peculiarly relates to the society in which it is embedded. The state constitutes fairly autonomous and self-contained space in which it prefers to operate with its own authority. It may or may not intervene in large number of societal activities but none of them is immune from its legal jurisdiction. Despite the fact that most of societal activities are not state driven, they all operate within the legal framework established by the state. Given the durability and stability of the state, it is generally the only source of rules and norms badly needed by the society to organize itself in a coherent fashion. The state, seen from this perspective, is both coextensive with and narrower than the society. Former is the case because it governs all activities of the society and latter is reflected in the distance that the state maintains from its society. This is, however, not to depict the immunity of the state from societal constraints. Its very existence, in fact, heavily depends upon social acceptance. In reality no state even the strongest one can dare to ignore deeply held beliefs and values of society. Its *modus operandi* is very much subject to the broader social and economic forces that exert tremendous pressure on and provide critically needed support to it. Predominantly driven by their own internal dynamics these forces are capable enough to create, paralyze and even destroy the state. But formally the state is outside the society and it constantly shapes and in turn is shaped by it (Parekh, 1996:38).

Impressive though they might be in capturing the essence of modern statehood these definitions and features of the state are necessary but by no means sufficient. They are necessary because they serve as heuristic devices to understand the modern state. They provide important clues to comprehend what and how the state as an ideal type should look like. The insufficiency of these definitions is manifested by the fact that they fail to portray the exact if not the perfect picture of what and how state actually looks like.
in different times and places. In fact, it is one of the most serious fallacies of post war
Political Science and International Relations scholarship that they have paid scant
attention to the limits of functional utility of heuristic devises in the social sciences and
consequently blurring the distinction between ideal type and actual or normal type. The
post war international system candidly demonstrated the limitations of the post
Westphalia statehood that would be dealt with later in the chapter. It is sufficient here to
point out that states vary hugely from each other in terms of territory, institutional
efficacy, social and political cohesion, soft capital, and most importantly as emphasized
by Maciver, Roberts and Weber, in their ability to commit violence.

Post war international system has been markedly characterized by the intense
proliferation of states. The membership of the U.N. which was 51 at the time of its
inception has now touched the figure of 190 or so. This phenomenon is the direct
consequence of the Wilsonian idea of self determination which led to the emergence of
several sovereign states during the interwar period. The process gained momentum after
the Second World War and practically entire Asia and Africa were liberated from
colonial rule leading to approximately three times more states on international plane than
at the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The idea of self determination has
gained so much currency and the principle of sovereign statehood has become so
imbedded in international politics that as pointed out by Robert Jackson “to be a
sovereign state today one needs only to have been a former colony yesterday. All other
considerations are irrelevant (Jackson, 1990:17).

All are equal but some are more equal than others. This naïve but widely used
quotation of George Orwell becomes very apt when existing states are compared in terms
of their size, capabilities, efficiency or as modern political scientists put it - stateness.
Like most other concepts of social sciences notion of weak state is exceedingly
problematique. Societal cohesion, institutional efficiency, ideational character, state-
society relationship, various degrees of state building and legitimacy are the bone of
contention. If scholars like Barry Buzan (1991) emphasize societal cohesion, institutional
efficacy and ideational character as the criteria for assessing the strength of state, there
are others like Joel Migdal (1988) who stresses on the state – society relationship as the
lowest common denominator to gauge the power of state. Mohmmad Ayoob (1995) has
drawn the attention to the several stages of state building as a factor in the calculation of
state power. Whereas K.J. Holsti (1996) has shown the role of legitimacy for the functioning of the state.

The weakness of state is not susceptible to an easy calculation. What makes it difficult to comprehend is the constant interplay among the variety of variables that continue to have bearing upon the power of the state at a given point in time. The incongruity of state weakness or failure makes it further more problematic. As pointed out by Robert I. Rotberg, “failed states are not homogenous. The nature of state failure varies from place to place, sometimes dramatically. Failure and weakness can flow from a nation’s geographical, physical, historical and political circumstances... More than structural or institutional weakness, human agency is also culpable, usually in a fatal way. Destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost paved the way to state failure” (Rotberg, 2002:127-128). To put it simply, the weakness of the state can be defined in terms of the inability of the state to produce political goods for its citizens. Revolution in rising expectation has made it imperative for the state to perform more on domestic and international fronts than was the case in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The state is expected to provide not only safety and security but also good governance, prosperity, education, health and other facilities to its citizen. The most important political goods like national security from internal and external threats and law and order are still the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. It includes the safety of property and the respect for mutual contracts. Another important political good is to develop and maintain the basic infrastructure of communication and transportation. In the absence of this bare minimum no state can be expected to provide its people conditions necessary for life. Other services like medicine and health care, social services and water and energy supply, taxation and so forth are also responsibility of the state. States unable to deliver these political goods can be easily identified as weak states. Close to this there is the phenomenon of the failed states. Full of serious implications for international peace and security, however, the phenomenon of state failure has been long underway. What makes them different from weak states is that all characteristic of the latter converge and apply more readily in the case of failed states. Robert I. Rotberg has painted a perfect picture of failed states:

“Failed states are tense, conflicted and dangerous. They generally share the following characteristics: a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural hostilities; civil war, the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a
collapsed health system; rising level of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation (Rotberg, 2002:132).

It is clear from this picture that threats faced by weak and failed states are primarily domestic in nature. A state torn by civil strife and internal disorder can hardly provide any incentive for external powers to intervene except on humanitarian grounds or unless state failure itself has spin–off effects. As suggested by Barry Buzan, “the principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government; in other words, weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and contributing element in the domestic political life of the nation” (Buzan, 1983:67). Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Angola and Burundi are some of the ideal type of failed states.

The colonial history of weak states has left a decisive influence on their painful present. It is an undeniable fact that ‘Conquest-a-door’ followed by imperialism were primarily economically motivated incidents. They served the economic interests of new industrial middle class of Europe that needed Asian and African colonies to sell there domestically manufactured products. Besides international trade and exploitation of resources, imperialism served other purposes such as “slavery, civilizing the barbarians, conversion to Christianity, securing strategic territories and emulation” (Holsti, 1996:61). Interests of the colonial rulers were better served in the backward or underdeveloped colonies. It was not the purpose, therefore, of the colonial masters to create or build a state in these colonies, What, at best, they did was to build up a rudimentary basic infrastructure and to introduce low level of Western education to local people so that they can easily recruit native people to govern the alien territory and disguise their real intentions. Colonial powers of the time could not even conceive of the situation that the same communication and transportation infrastructure and Western education would spread the feeling of nationalism in these colonies and later or sooner native people would assert the demand of self-determination. Development of nationalism in former colonies in this sense was completely an unintended consequence of the policies pursued by the imperial powers. In course of time the struggle between the freedom fighters of
Afro-Asian colonies and their imperial masters became more and more intensive. Neither side paid any attention to the development of state during the freedom struggle and when these colonies acquired independence from colonial rule they found themselves under peculiar conditions. They were the state without having the symptoms of statehood.

Post war international system and subsequent emergence of international society have significantly enhanced the vulnerabilities of weak states. International society can be defined in terms of "a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each state is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their, common interest in maintaining these arrangements" (Bull and Watson, 1984:1). Universal respect for the sovereign statehood is the minimum requirement for international society to exist—that states treat each other as legal equals. The principle of the legal equality of the state serves as the common identity on the basis of which international society is formed. Still in its infancy, however, international society has taken the entire international system in its reach and practically all regions of the world are covered by it.

The influence of international society on different states has shown remarkable asymmetry. Its reason can be traced in the uneven allocation of earth’s resources among the nations of the world. Emergence of sovereign state system and international society has been primarily shaped by the European great powers of the time. Situation started changing after the Second World War when the centre of power shifted from European great powers to two superpowers of the post war period. Traditional great powers like Great Britain and France still had more say in international politics than the new entrants of the club. Since most of the developing countries of Asia and Africa made a late entry into the system as a sovereign entity, they had to and are still coping with the situation in which rules, norms, terms and conditions of the game are decided by the leading Western countries of the world. The constant expansion of international society rules out the possibility of isolation as a viable option to be pursued by developing countries. Even big countries like India and China could not sustain isolation. It is imperative, therefore, for them to interact with the international environment that has been shaped by those who are at the higher or probably at the highest level of development and prosperity. Industrial
underdevelopment of weak states makes their position vis-à-vis international society very
tremulous.

The process of state building remains incomplete in most weak states. Practically
all of them originated after the Second World War through the process of decolonization.
Being the late comers in the international system most of these countries have yet to
deepen and consolidate the state within their respective societies. They lack efficient
bureaucracy, strong and skillful leadership, solid base of domestic identity and societal
cohesion necessary for the development of strong state. Most of them have weak
governing machinery that is not properly integrated with the society. Coupled with the
unfinished agenda of economic development most of these countries find themselves in a
position of an acute crisis. Constantly expanding and exceedingly competitive
international environment necessitates weak states to perform the task of centuries within
few decades. Heavy domestic and international pressure reduces the ability of developing
countries to manipulate the international system to their advantage. International system
restricts their foreign policy choices and easily penetrates into their domestic social and
political life. It is this already precarious position, which is being further aggravated by
global culture leading to situations ranging from the break down of law and order to civil
war and in certain cases complete collapse of the state.

**Microstates:** The concept of microstates is the next junction of the power spectrum. No
universal conceptualization of microstates exists in the literature of International
Relations. Territorial size, human resources and different levels of economic
development are the main areas of the contest. There are scholars like Michael Handel
who put equal emphasis on territory and population of the state. Whereas observers like
David Vital (1967), who is one of the founders of the sub discipline of microstates' security, consider only population as the sole criterion for defining the microstate. The
criterion of population has been further linked with the economic development of the
state, which leads to two types of states.

The first group would include those states that have 10 to 15 million population
with advanced economy. The second cluster contains those states whose population vary from 20 to 30 million with primitive or underdeveloped economy. Countries like
Sweden, Australia, Belgium and Switzerland fall in the former category, whereas Arab
States, South and Central America and most of African states would easily fit in the
latter tabulation (Vital, 1967:7-8). Like their personality different and distinct problems are faced by microstates.

**Economic Problems:** Universal respect for the principle of sovereign statehood immunizes the political survival of small states as an entity in the international system. Their problems are primarily economic in nature. They hang up between the domestic pressure for the economic development of the country on the one hand and their international political insignificance on the other. The small physical size of microstates confines the range of domestic resources. Small territory is generally insufficient to provide goods to the people residing over it. If the country is economically advanced its domestic requirements would be greater than those of the economically underdeveloped. In the absence of adequate base of natural resources countries’ economy in general and local industries in particular can either partly fulfill the requirements of citizens or completely fail to do so. This, in turn, increases their dependence on international aid and trade. Political insignificance of microstates in international politics reduces the likelihood of greater powers coming up with helping hands. It is especially true for those states that prefer to remain unaligned with bigger states and try to retain their hardly gained independence. The only feasible option left for microstates is foreign trade. Imports are necessary to meet the needs of consumers and exports are required to pay the price of imported material. The urgency of foreign trade and more specifically of import reduces the space of political maneuver on international plane. They are free - for the sake of argument – to opt out of international trade, but in reality it is the only practical option available to them. It is the case because social and political consequences of economic underdevelopment are generally more acute than facing the problems that stem from economic development. All countries that are undergoing the painful process of economic development generally face this problem (Vital, 1967:39-42).

**Military Problems:** The salience of national defence compels every state to devote considerable amount of its resources on its military establishment. All other considerations – political, economic, technological or even socio-cultural – converge on the issue of national defence. The sheer imbalance of these concerns and the ability of the microstates to meet them reduces the whole question of national defence to whether the state is able to undertake the responsibility of defence on its own or as a consequence,
alignment with great power is the only option. Small size, thin population and limited resources of microstates reduce the viability of the former. Emotional and ideological considerations can easily obstruct the latter. Besides emotional and ideological considerations, the feasibility of the latter depends on the availability of the great power in the immediate surroundings and its willingness to extend the security umbrella to the seeker state. The absence of great power's willingness necessitates the ruling elite of the country to undertake the responsibility of defence with more serious consequences than those that are endowed with greater material resources (Vital, 1967:58-59).

Small territorial size, thin population and limited base of domestic resources aggravate military problems of microstates. Small territory of the country leave very little safety margin in terms of space and time. If the territory exceeds the population residing in it, armed forces of the country would be too little to defend it. What it can do at best is to protect the vital centres of the country, which might consequently compromise the safety of the borders. If the state remains sensitive to its boundaries or wants to buy time by engaging with the enemy on its frontier great logistical problems would have to be successfully dealt with otherwise even the smallest strategic error would open the heart of the state to the opponent. Spatial margin of safety, therefore, is not available to a state with relatively large but weakly held territory. The case of densely populated and smaller states is more difficult. In such cases neither margin of the security could be obtained. Narrow or no strategic depth of the state renders the question of strategic withdrawal inconceivable (Ibid: 59). Iraqi invasion of Kuwait substantiates this point.

The security dilemma of small state is unique in some ways. Inherent in this predicament is the fact that effective defence is the prerequisite for political freedom of the state. Economic disabilities of small states refrain them from devoting much of their resources for building efficient military establishment. Poor population of the country cannot afford the heavy extractive policies of the state, which is necessary for the development of contemporary war machinery. Disproportionate allocation of resources to military establishment would be self-defeating for the economy of the country. Due to heavy cost of modern military whole enterprise would be read as an extravaganza, which might delegitimise the defence policy of the state. It leaves no option for small states but to seek the security umbrella of great powers. Heavy dependence on foreign military technology and the conditions on which it is provided by the donor state restricts the political and strategic choices available to the country. It is essentially a paradoxical
strategic situation in which political freedom and security of microstates become exceedingly sandwiched and given the durability of their limited physical base the situation is likely to persist in the near future (Ibid: 63-69).

Cultural Threats: The end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the involvement of great powers in the internal affairs of small states. It has resulted in decreasing cultural vulnerability of mini states. The power politics of the Cold War international system necessitated superpowers to extend security umbrella to their satellite states with direct bearing on the autonomy of the latter. With the collapse of the communist bloc great powers are increasingly becoming indifferent to make such commitments. It has, consequently, enhanced the political freedom of small states on the one hand and reduced their vulnerability to cultural penetration of the West on the other. There is no compulsion for the great powers of the day to promote particular culture and consequently invoke their criticism on the international plane. The post Cold War international system has prepared, in a way, more fertile ground for ethnic revival around the world than was available during the Cold War. It is not surprising, therefore, that slogans like pluralism and multiculturalism started gaining currency in the 1990s onwards. The growing influence of postmodern thinking also contributed in this process. Defined in terms of incredulity towards meta narratives postmodern thinking inherently invigorates respect for the cultural diversity of the world, manifestation of which are there for any one to see in the field of literature, music, theatre, movies, and television.

Modernism and Americanism are generally seen as major threats to the culture of small ethnic states. The worldwide appeal of American products and dominance of modernism have evoked this widely felt fear. But current evidence indicate contrary of this thesis. Cultural assaults of imperial era have strengthened the cultural identities of these states. There is no reason to assume that small states cannot withstand the influence of these forces by means ranging from rejection and resistance to partial acceptance. Even if the strength of Americanism and modernism cannot be underestimated, the tacit consent of local ethnic communities is must for the diffusion of these ideas.

Traditionally, political scientists and IR scholars have defined power in military and economic terms. More the military might and economic capacity of the state, stronger it is as a unit of international system and abler to influence the course of events within and outside its borders than those who have less power at their disposal. There is
no denial of this fact. Problem arises when one moves beyond the tangible variables of power and enters into the realm of ideational dimension of power. Since the proposed research deals with national identities and cultures it is the latter that has to be examined in depth in order to comprehend the principal characteristics of weak states. Barry Buzan helps us in this regard and puts forward an insightful discussion pertaining to the anatomy of weak states according to which every state contains following features (Buzan, 1991:69-96).

**Physical Base of the State:** Physical base of the state is related to its territory and population. All natural resources as well as man made wealth are also counted as physical base of the state. Given their essentiality for the formation of the state, their importance, however, should not be exaggerated. Large population, for example, is a liability rather than an asset. There is a question of quality as well. If population is not skilled or illiterate, it becomes the responsibility of the state to provide its people with not only bread and butter but also education and technical skills. India is the classic example. Large and unskilled population has made economic development of the country extremely difficult. Moreover, India is not the only country in this regard. Most of developing countries are facing similar problem.

Presence of natural resources is a prerequisite for the powerful state. But sheer presence is not sufficient. It requires technical knowledge and industrial infrastructure to exploit natural resources for the economic development of the country. In the absence of such knowledge major portion of the state’s power remains potential rather than actual. Since most of the developing countries are industrially and technologically backward, their natural resources either remain unexploited or are exported to the developed countries of the West.

Despite the proclamation of the end of geography (Richard O’ Brien), geographical location and physical size of the nation are still deemed as the most important variable in the calculation of state power. Generally a state claims the definite portion of the earth’s surface as its own and this claim is recognized in international law or by international society or both (Buzan, 1991. 91-93). But most of the developing countries do not have clear and well defined territorial borders. Their political maps were drawn rather arbitrarily by colonial masters with very little or no knowledge of demographic composition of the local area. These border disputes are the legacy of the
colonial rule and remain unresolved in many countries. Given the aspiration of these countries to ‘correct’ or ‘complete’ their respective maps, war between them is a real possibility. India’s wars with Pakistan and China, Sino-Soviet conflict, the problem of the Middle East are few illustrations.

Military capacity is the standard yardstick to measure the power of the state. All other basic components of power like geography, population, industrial capacities are important to the extent that they are convertible into military preparedness of the state. Military preparedness of the state requires military establishment supportive of the policies pursued by the state. Military establishment includes quality and quantity of the armed forces, leadership and technological innovation.

The nature of post Westphalian state and the subsequent development of international system most notably as it developed during the interwar period and after the Second World War have significantly expanded the agenda of military security. Now seemingly obvious and fairly conventional area of international politics has become extremely complicated in nature. The issue of military security of the state now involves more questions than previous times. Any miscalculation in answering these questions can seriously undermine security of the state.

While discussing military security of the state some pertinent questions are asked. Some of them are following. What is security? When and how a particular issue acquires place on the agenda of state’s military security? What are the referent objects of military security? Who are securitizing actors? How does state perceive threats and vulnerabilities? Brief answer to these questions would be attempted in the following pages.

Security: Traditionally security of the state has been defined in terms of the absence of threat to its physical survival and core values. Although physical survival can be easily understood, the notion of core values is exceedingly problematic. Increasing paraphernalia and tentacles of the state and the significance attached with them make the notion of core values extremely broad. It leads to a situation in which the concept of security either becomes too broad to be handled properly or too narrow to mean anything that is actually relevant for the security of state. Better way of defining core values of the state would be to identify the referent object of security. The notion of referent object means; what is under threat that one is referring to? Or put it in other words; whose
identity or existence is at stake due to the emergence of a threat? The question of physical survival still remains but the notion of security becomes somewhat different. Now it takes the form of absence of "an existential threat to a designated referent object (Buzan et al., 1998:21). The designated referent object is usually but not necessarily the state. It depends on the sector in which the source of threat is located and identified. Referent object of security thus could be economy of the state if the sources of threat lie in economic sector or it could be identity of the group if the threat originates in societal sector and so on (Ibid: 21).

There are certain issues that create problems for the state on routine basis. Sheer existence of these issues do not qualify them as a threat to the security of the state. It is only when they become or they are perceived to become as critical for the functioning of the state, they are transformed from ordinary problems to the threat to the security of the state.

**Securitization:** Security is the issue that exhausts all energies of politics. It is either beyond the established rules of political game or above it. It sits on the top in the priority list of the state. Seen in this way securitization can be defined as the process through which an issue moves from non political status to security one implying that it poses an existential threat to some designated referent object of security and thereby demanding specific measures usually outside the normal political process of the state. Theoretically any issue can be placed anywhere on this broad spectrum of securitization ranging from a non political status of the issue to the securitized one. Placement of an issue on this wide ranging spectrum differs from place to place and time to time. Some states would politicize religion as is the case in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and some states like Iran prefer to securitize culture. For others culture is hardly figured out in security issues. The close connection between politicization and securitization does not necessarily mean that state is the only securitizing actor. Non state actors, sometimes, can highlight an issue to the level that it demands urgent state's action (Buzan et al., 1998:23-24).
Referent objects of Security: The state is still the most important but not the exclusive referent object of military security. Since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 the state is seen as the sole repository of the right and capability to use force. In earlier times the notion of sovereignty was limited to prince or king of the state. With the introduction of the idea of popular sovereignty the security content of the state underwent tremendous expansion. Now all civil constituents of the state - nation, government and territory - become legitimate referent object of military security in the modern state (Ibid: 52).

The cohesion of nation and state remains weak in many Asian and African states. It creates a room to include other units as tribes, clans, nations and so on in the list of the referent objects of security within the state. As many of these units aspire for separate statehood they have only transitional status of non state referent object of military security (Ibid:52).

Conversely, some pre state referent objects of military security are also operating in contemporary international system. Tribal barbarians still exist in many parts of the world. Royal families and private armies are also referent objects of military security in some countries (Ibid: 53).

Religion is the potential referent object of military securitization in many parts of the world. It is either associated with the state or nation and does not directly present the threat to the security of the state. Christian fear of Islam, Hindu Nationalism and theory of clash of civilizations are illustrations of much deeper transformation that the present international system might be undergoing. All that they suggest is that the exclusive claim of the state over military security would not remain unchallenged in times to come (Ibid: 53).

The modern state faces serious challenges within its territorial borders. The most notable challengers are secessionist movements, revolutionaries, unionists, rebel groups and would be states. Under the rubric of self-determination some of them are struggling
for separate statehood. Given the fact that nations can redefine and reintroduce themselves, many autonomist movements are likely to be accepted by their rival nations and states. The case of would be states is more prone to military securitization because it implies change in regional if not the global configuration of power (Ibid: 53).

Perceivable challenge to state comes from those actors who neither possess nor aspire to possess sovereign statehood. Armed militias, mafias, clans and gangs are the dominant candidate in this category. Most of these groups have the capacity to become as referent objects of security. Usually operating outside the state apparatus they, nevertheless, pose a direct threat to many organs of the state (Ibid: 53-54).

**Securitizing Actors:** State has been the dominant securitizing actor since the time of its inception. Government of the state is vested with the authority to define what constitutes an existential threat to it. State neatly institutionalizes the process of securitization by including emergency provisions in its constitution. State officials usually speak on the behalf of state but they at times invoke abstract principles like balance of power or more collective ones like nuclear non-proliferation. Officials of international governmental organization can also speak about abstract or collective principles as referent objects of military security (Ibid: 55).

The coherence of state cannot be taken for granted. In many countries especially democratic ones when state has many voices like pressure groups, defence intellectuals or more broadly epistemic communities, sources of securitization significantly expand. In many cases states lose control over their armies and its heads and other officers can be seen involved in the process of securitization independently of the state. Intelligence agencies and their articulate heads can also play important role in securitizing a particular issue (Ibid: 56).

The ability of less coherent and institutionalized groups such as nations and clans to securitize an issue depends on the wider public support they command in a given scenario. Where these groups aspire for statehood and have acquired perceivable symptoms of statehood except sovereignty their securitizing behaviour closely resembles with that of the state. Since military security demands highly organized and collective response, less ambiguity persists on its referent objects and securitizing process (Ibid: 56).
Threats and Vulnerabilities: There are several good reasons why military threats and vulnerabilities have been accorded primacy in international politics. Military threats, in contrast to economic and environmental ones, are more intentional and directed. Normal political behaviour gives way to use of brute force in the presence of military threats. All restraints on the use of force are suspended as the primacy of war reigns supreme in all human affairs. More seriously, the presence of military threats and their execution involves the heavy loss of men and material, social beliefs and values on the basis of which state and society exist. All social, political and economic achievements of the state come at stake due to the presence of military threat. The state unable to deter or counter the threat is destined to pay such a heavy cost (Ibid: 57-58).

Perceptions play critical role in defining threats and vulnerabilities of the state. The sense of threats and vulnerabilities is a socially constructed process susceptible to extremely different responses from state to state and time to time. Sense of enmity and amity is critical here. Depending on the sense of enmity and amity different societies respond to the same objective security conditions differently ranging from paranoia to complacency (Ibid: 58).

The perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities are largely determined by the interplay between military capabilities and the sense of enmity and amity. If enmity is the framework of securitization military capabilities of the state would be defined in terms of threats and vulnerabilities. Absolute and relative power of the opponent has to be taken into account while preparing for the defence. Absolute and relative military capabilities help calculating the nature and extent of military threat. They also help calculating how these threats can be successfully countered. States with nuclear weapons and advanced delivery system pose more serious threat to their opponents than those with no nuclear weapons at their disposal. If adversary of non-nuclear weapon state is a nuclear weapon state almost a complete power asymmetry exists between them. Even the superiority of conventional weaponry would not make much difference under normal circumstances (Ibid: 58).

Distance and terrain are two important geographical factors that influence the nature of military threats and vulnerabilities. According to conventional wisdom, military threat is perceived as more acute if it is located in nearby areas than when it originates in distant area. Rapid diffusion of military technology throughout the world poses serious question mark on conventional wisdom. Now great powers or superpowers can easily
project their military power beyond their immediate region in which they are located. Advanced technology enables states to operate militarily beyond their borders. What has not been changed by military technology is the effect of distance on perceptions of state leaders. States fear more from their immediate neighbours than distant powers (Ibid: 59). Pakistan, for example, fears more from India than France. France perceived German threat more seriously than the one presented by the Soviet Union.

Terrain heavily underpins on military vulnerabilities of state. The United States is the classic example. Atlantic Ocean has saved it from many pitfalls of the European politics. Countries with flat terrain seem to be inviting the aggressor. The case of Poland is still remembered. Strategic depth of the Soviet Union saved it from Nazi occupation during the Second World War. Switzerland has benefited enormously because of hilly borders (Ibid: 59).

Perception of threats and vulnerabilities heavily depends on history. The influence of past experience upon the present situation has many times exaggerated the sense of threat, sometimes to the extent of paranoia. France’s fear of Germany during interwar period exemplifies it perfectly. Polish fear of Germany and Russia, Pakistan’s fear of India and Chinese fear of Japan are some of the well known cases where burden of history has completely coloured the perception of threats. It is not to suggest that the entire question of military threats can be reduced to the memories of history. Countries do become locked in rivalry suddenly as well. The United States and the Soviet Union had no history of enmity. They still found themselves in the midst of bitter Cold War after 1945. Moreover, history fades the sense of enmity also. Formation of the European Union illustrates this very well (Ibid: 59-60).

Warfare and technology have been closely related in history. As commented by Hans J. Morgenthau, “the fate of nations and civilizations has often been determined by a differential in the technology of warfare for which the inferior side was unable to compensate in other ways (Morgenthau, 1997: 139). Four technological innovations are generally cited as the major breakthroughs in the history of twentieth century warfare. All of them were developed in the background of two world wars. First was the use of submarine by Germany against British naval ships in the First World War. Second was the development of the tank. It was the tank that gave decisive edge to Britain over Germany in the last phase of the First World War. Third was the use of air force in close coordination with land and naval forces. It was initiated by Germany and Japan in the
first half of the Second World War. Development of nuclear bomb was the last major invention that changed the course of warfare forever. However, enormous destructive potentials of nuclear weapons defy their rational usability (Ibid: 140).

National power of the state relies heavily on the quality of military leadership. Can military leaders make quick decisions in the time of war? Can they obtain government’s approval for their decisions? What is their attitude towards political executive? Are they aware of the latest developments in the field of technology? Are they able to formulate proper strategy and tactics during the actual combat? Can they implement their policies efficiently? These are some of the questions that have been at the heart of strategic thinking throughout the ages. Alexander the Great, Fredrick the great, Napoleon, Bismarck and Hitler are remembered even today for their skills in military leadership.

Quantity and quality of armed personnel and their distribution among the various departments of military have a direct bearing upon the power of the state. Without having skilled and sufficient men in uniform a nation would remain politically weak even if it may excel in technological innovations and military leadership. How large should be the military establishment of the state? In what proportion defence resources should be allocated among the different sectors of the military? Should country devote its resources to research and development or rely on the import of military technology? Is air force more important than naval power? Right or wrong answers to these questions generally determine the fate of the state in the time of war.

Economic wealth enormously contributes to the power base of the state. Given the fungibility of power wealth can purchase all kinds of power most notably guns and butter. Countries with high level of industrial development, GDP and per capita income can easily and quickly translate their economic potentials for military requirements. Two points should be mentioned. First, economic strength of the state heavily depends on the level of scientific and technological development. Secondly, importance of agriculture should not underrated. It has been the irony of the most developing countries that in the haste of modernizing and industrializing their economies, they generally tend to ignore agriculture sector with the serious consequences of widespread malnutrition and sometimes-even starvation. A balance, therefore, has to be maintained between agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy for the healthy economic growth and modernization.
The Idea of the State: The idea of state is the central attribute in the formation of state. Abstract in nature and consequently difficult to comprehend the idea of state defines not only the political identity of the state, but also provides the purpose for which state’s existence is legitmatized. The sources of the idea of the state can be traced in nation. “In modern usage a nation is defined as a large group of people sharing the same cultural and possibly the same ethnic or racial heritage (Buzan, 1991: 70). Culture invariably plays its role in the formation of nation. It provides the cement with which people bind themselves and acquire the identity of a group easily distinguishable from other such groups. Strong cultural ties prepare the fertile ground for the emergence of a vibrant nation. This, of course, is easier said than done for the simple reason that culture has been seen as irrelevant for political explanation. Two questions are pertinent in this context. First is, of course, why has culture been seen useless for explaining political phenomenon? As pointed out by Clifford Geertz, “that one of the things that everyone knows but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that a country’s politics reflects the design of its culture” (Geertz, 1973: 311). The nature of the concept of culture has made enormous contribution in this. It is customary if not mandatory to cite the works of Ruth Benedict and Raymond Williams to demonstrate the ambiguity, multiplicity of meanings and as some, for instance, political scientists and realists scholars in I.R., say confusion surrounding the concept of culture that renders it useless as an analytical category for the explication of things political. In this sensibility culture stands for a “concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices” (Sewell, 1999:39). Culture, in this scheme, “is commonly assumed to belong to ... society or with some clearly identifiable subsocietal groups” (Ibid:39). Thus conceived culture becomes cultures and faces following charges for not being able to explain political phenomenon.

Cultures are Contradictory: As stated by William H. Sewell, “cultural worlds are commonly beset with internal contradictions” (Ibid: 53). Current anthropological understanding emphasizes contradictory quality of culture. It is widely believed that culture, unlike economy and politics, forbids coherent articulation. Intergroup cultural dynamics, by its very nature, refers to different and often contradictory claims. Mutual incompatibility of these claims is reflected in and explained through their different cultures. Sewell agrees with this and comments, “A current anthropological sensibility
would probably emphasize the fundamental character of the contradictions rather than their situational resolution in the ritual. It is common for potent cultural symbols to express contradictions as much as they express coherence” (Ibid: 53).

Cultures are Loosely Integrated: Classic ethnographic understanding recognized different spheres of social activity such as religious functions, war, agriculture and kinship along with different cultures. They also recognized that these different aspects of social behaviour are meaningless unless they fit into some sort of cohesive cultural whole. Recent scholarship of culture seriously disputes this claim. It is “more inclined to stress the centrifugal tendencies that arise from disparate spheres of activity, to stress the inequalities between those relegated to different activities and to see whatever integration occurs as based on power or domination rather than on a common ethos” (Ibid: 53).

Cultures are Contested: Conventional wisdom in anthropology presumed consensus on the most important beliefs and practices among the members of society. It was taken for granted that society is a unit based on consensus. Geertz’s notion of culture as a mutually shared symbolism is a dictum in this regard. This understanding came under serious disciplinary scrutiny in recent times. Contemporary ethnography is fully aware of the differences lying within the society. Discontented with classical understanding, recent scholarship is enthusiastically engaged in unraveling the truth of society-as-a-unit or culture as a self-containing whole. Sewell notes that “contemporary scholars, with their enhanced awareness of races, class, and gender, would insist that people who occupy quite different positions in a given social order will typically have quite different cultural beliefs or will have quite different understandings of what might seem on the surface to be identical beliefs. Consequently, current scholarship is replete with depictions of resistance by subordinated groups and individuals… cultural consensus, far from being the normal state of things, is a difficult achievement; and when it does occur it is bound to hide suppressed conflicts and disagreements” (Ibid: 54).

Cultures are Weakly Bounded: Cultural systems of different societies have displayed remarkable tendency of mingling. Rarely one comes across the social group or groups that are either completely isolated or neatly bounded. Even ancient societies characterized by the hardships of the day, most notably transportation and communication, maintained
all sorts of relationship with each other ranging from trade to war and religion to politics and diplomacy. Intersocietal interactions have tremendously intensified in modern and late modern times. Imperialism, colonialism, religious missions, trade associations, slavery, economic interdependence, diasporas, multinational corporations and international non governmental organizations are some of the undeniable facts of social history of modernity and postmodernity. In an era marked by such a vast mingling in different spheres of social life it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any society to remain isolated from the larger world. It is much harder to draw the lines between two or more groups interlaced with different kinds of relationship. It is not surprising, therefore, that in such social settings “systems of meaning do not correspond in any neat way with national or societal boundaries—which themselves are not nearly as neat as we sometimes imagine. Anything we might designate as a society or a nation will contain, or fail to contain, a multitude of overlapping and interpenetrating cultural systems, most of them subsocietal, transsocietal, or both (Ibid: 55).

It clearly follows from this discussion “that the notion of coherent cultures is purely illusory; that cultural practice in a given society is diffuse and decentered; that the local system of meaning found in a given population do not themselves form a higher-level, society-wide system of meanings” (Ibid: 55).

This rendition of culture as a barren site for political explication does not preclude the possibility of making culture useable for political analysis. William Sewell observes in this regard that “it is an error to assume that cultures possess an overall coherence or integration, neither can such coherences be ruled out apriori…” (Ibid: 55). One common thread that runs through the intellectual disciplines is that concepts do transform their meanings not only from time to time but also from one discipline to another. Seen in this way there is another meaning that has been ascribed to culture which makes the notion of culture as a useful category for explaining political phenomenon. In this sensibility “culture is a theoretically defined category or aspect of social life that must be abstracted out from the complex reality of human existence. Culture in this sense is always contrasted to some other equally abstract aspect or category of social life that is not culture, such as economy, politics, or biology” (Ibid: 39). Culture in this sense is an abstract analytical category and hence singular.

Need for cultural explanations of politics is self evident in the twenty first century. Weberian notion of the state is not helpful beyond a point in this regard. As
pointed out by Joel Migdal, "the twenty-first century state, buffeted by the winds of globalization, supranational entities, and divisive ethnic conflict, must be stripped of its myths of unity and omnipotence. With new states abounding and old states struggling with disintegrative challenges, more than ever political scientists will need ways of unraveling the relationship between states and those within their borders. They will need ways of studying the fractious process of redrawing social boundaries, of creating coalitions with some and excluding others. That is a tall order.... It will involve serious attention to cultural understanding of the state, which have made little headway, so far in the political science literature" (Migdal, 1997:222).

Having spelled out the justification for the cultural paradigm of state in order to unravel the linkages between culture and politics it is necessary to give some coherence to seemingly endlessly incoherent concept of culture. In other words, it is imperative to make the concept of culture useable for political analysis. William Sewell helps in this regard. According to him, "recent work on cultural practice has tended to focus on acts of cultural resistance, particularly on resistance of a decentered sort... But it is important to remember that much cultural practice is concentrated in and around powerful institutional nodes-including religious, communications, media, business corporations, and, most spectacularly, states. These institutions, which tend to be relatively large in scale, centralized, and wealthy, are all cultural actors; their agents make continuous use of their considerable resources in effort to order meanings. Studies of culture need to play at least as much attention to such sites of concentrated cultural practice as to the dispersed sites of resistance ..." (Sewell, 1999: 55-56). It is this institutional axis around which cultural differences converge in the large and relatively coherent cultural whole. These institutions subordinate culture to political purposes and provide political character to a country’s culture.

Institutional pivot of culture does not render cultural differences obsolete. Nor do these differences evaporate altogether in the face of strong institutional feign. These institutions, in fact, never tend to do so. Unity not the cultural uniformity is what that is sought with different degree of success. As pointed out by William Sewell,

"even in powerful and would-be totalitarian states, centrally placed actors are never able to establish anything approaching cultural uniformity. In fact, they rarely attempt to do so. The typical cultural strategy of dominant actors and institutions is not so much to establish uniformity, as it is to organize difference. They are constantly engaged in effort not only to normalize, homogenize but also to hierarchize, encapsulate, exclude,
criminalize, hegemonize or marginalize, practices and population that diverge from the sanctioned deal. By such means, authoritative actors attempt, with varying degrees of success, to impose a certain coherence onto the field of cultural practice ... Authoritative cultural action, launched from the centers of power, has the effect of turning what otherwise might be a babble of cultural voices into a semiotically and politically ordered field of differences. Such action creates a map of the culture and its variants, one that tells people where they and their practices fit in the official scheme of things” (Ibid: 56).

This enormous institutional effort to politically organize culture makes the culture of a country useful for political purposes.

Second question that needs to be raised is how can culture explain politics? Right answer to this question inevitably leads to the cultural foundations of the state. If the cultural assault of globalization on national identities of weak states is to be understood these are the areas fertile for exploration. They are following.

**Cultural Foundations of the State:** Cultural paradigm of the state in Comparative Political Analysis heavily depends on the works of eminent anthropologist Clifford Geertz. According to him,

> “at the political center of any complex organized society there is both a governing elite and a set of symbolic forms expressing the fact that it is in truth governing. No matter how democratically the members of the elite are chosen (which are few) or how deeply divided among themselves they may be (usually much more than outsiders imagine), they justify their existence and order their action in terms of a collection of stories, ceremonies, insignia, formalities, appurtenances that they have either inherited, or in more revolutionary situations invented. It is these-crown, coronations and conferences-that mark the center as center and give what goes on there its aura of being not merely important but in some odd fashion connected with the way the world is built. The gravity of high politics and the solemnity of high worship spring from liker impulses than might first appear” (Geertz, 1983: 124).

He further says that “political authority requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it” (Ibid: 143). Culture serves as a cover within which real and actual concerns of politics are clothed and caricatured before the masses. “The very thing that the elaborate mystique of court ceremonial is supposed to conceal—that majesty is made, not born” (Ibid: 124). There are some linkages between culture and politics that any state can ignore only at the risk of its peril. They are following.
Culture Frames the Context Within Which Politics Occurs: Politics of any state takes place within a specific cultural milieu. If culture requires political context to flourish, it is equally true that politics, too, is not immune from cultural influences. Cultural and politics link with each other in a symbiotic relationship. None can resist the influence of another. As pointed out by Marc Howard Ross, “culture orders priorities... It defines the symbolic and material objects people consider valuable and worth fighting over, the contexts in which such disputes occur, the rules (both formal and informal) by which politics takes place and who participates in it. In doing so, culture defines interests and how they are to be pursued” (Ross, 2000: 43).

Formation of political community depends on its culture because members of any community share schematic images of social order. Without these images the formation of political community will be extremely difficult. These images constitute the basis of any political society. It is on the basis of these shared images political groups acquire its distinctiveness vis-à-vis others. Country’s politics is inevitably structured around these images. No politics, be it autocratic or democratic, can afford to ignore the mutually shared symbolism of the group. What it can hope to achieve at best is to cerate other images side by side with already existing ones. Their success will, however, largely depend on their commensurability with existing images.

Communities are distinct as well as permeable entities. People participate in different communities and adhere to their norms. Their multiple and overlapping membership takes variety of forms. Political authority has to be culturally constituted in order to be effective under such circumstances. It reflects or must reflect regularized procedures people consider as legitimate. All this is filtered through community’s culture. People tend to identify with the fate of the community that they think they have inherited from their ancestors. They develop stake in achieving their perceived collective destiny. It is not that differences within the community disappear. They remain and translate into conflict. These conflicts too are norms governed in the sense that what to fight for; how to fight; and how to manage the fight; none of these is immune from cultural influences.

Culture Links Individual and Collective Identities: Individual and collective identities are linked on the basis of culture in a given state. It provides sense of belonging to people on the basis of which groups are formed and differentiated from other such groups. It connects the fate of individuals with that of group. As pointed out by Marc Howard Ross,
“the crucial connection at work is that of identification, which renders certain actions reasonable and removes alternatives that on other grounds might be equally plausible. Individual and collective action ... are motivated, in part, by the sense of common fate people in a culture share and involve two distinct elements: the strong reinforcement between individual and collective identity that renders culturally sanctioned behaviour rewarding and the sense that outsiders will treat oneself and other members of one’s group in similar ways” (Ibid: 44).

The dynamics of identification implies the construction of mental maps and images of the external world developed through historical experiences of the group. Cultural attachment makes the formation of identity smooth. Benedict Anderson has also written about imagined communities based on print capitalism. He has eloquently demonstrated the links between individual and collective identities. Culture puts an emotional weight on the identity formation and links it with the destiny of a group. It emphasizes unity if not uniformity with the members of a group linked with each other on the basis of shared common elements. It differentiates group’s identity with that of others thereby highlighting the uniqueness of the group. Moreover, associative bonds created by culture enable the group to withstand any crisis. In the words of Marc Howard Ross, “it should be stressed that culture is only one basis for linking individual to social identity. It can be a particularly powerful one, however, in situations of threat and uncertainty because cultural attachments are connected to very primary feelings about identity. While much of our language ... emphasizes an inherent conflict between the group and the individual, an emphasis on identity draws attention to which social attachments are an integral way of strengthening individual identity” (Ibid: 44).

**Culture Defines Group Boundaries and Organizes Actions Within and Between Them:** Culture is the crucial factor in drawing group boundaries. Recent works on boundaries also point out that culture is an important clue in identifying the group borders. As pointed out by Joel Migdal, “people’s feelings of security rest on a sense of checkpoints and markers that separate the familiar-those who share language, dress, skin color, mannerisms, citizenship, or other identifiable attributes-from the unfamiliar” (Migdal, 2004:10). Culture separates one group from another. Marc Howard Ross holds that “culture defines identity groups, it also specifies expectations, patterns of association within and between groups. Consider such basic questions as who lives with whom, who
spends time together, to whom one is most attached emotionally, who controls scarce resources, how property is transferred between generations, and how work is organized. The world’s cultures provide very different answers to each of these questions, but most important the evidence shows that how any group answers any of these questions has significance for how people act and expect others to behave” (Ross, 2000: 45).

Culture provides important guidelines for people to behave in a certain manner. It is not easy to ignore these guidelines even though the people residing within the same culture constantly contest them. Cultural norms play an important role in governing the people’s behaviour with each other. They also direct how people of other cultures are to be treated. Such cultural norms differ from one culture to another. They are elaborate in some cultures and limited or restricted in others. But they are found in every society and only very few, if any, will be silent on cultural norms governing the behaviour of its members (Ibid: 45).

People perceive their group almost naturally given often biological in nature. They tend to forget that formation of social groups has been the matter of historical construction. Their groups are socially and more importantly culturally constructed. They look natural because their reasonableness is regularly asserted and transmitted to succeeding generations. Much of group’s energy, besides sustaining it as a group, is devoted to constant production and reproduction of “we” feeling. Group’s very existence will be threatened in the absence of the feeling of identification. Scholars disagree on how the feeling of identification is created and intensified. But they remarkably agree on the point that this feeling is must for the formation of a social group. It is this feeling that is buttressed by the culture of a group (Ibid: 45).

People feel safe within their cultural borders. Very sense of belonging and bonds created by it allow people to feel at home within their cultural group. It gives them a sense of security which will be absent when they are in the territory of others. They know that their feelings and concerns will receive sympathetic treatment within their cultural borders that might otherwise remain unentertained. As pointed out by Joel Migdal, “people draw their mental maps by configuring the world as familiar and unfamiliar spaces. They are thus constantly navigating, searching for those manners of acting, that can delineate configurations of spaces where they feel that they are, or should be, relatively safe, places that somehow feel familiar and different from the chaotic sense of totally unfamiliar” (Migdal, 2004: 10).
Culture provides Framework for Interpreting Actions and Motives of Others: Interpretation of actions and motives is filtered through culture. As noted by Marc Howard Ross, “actions, like words, are highly ambiguous, and making sense of them requires a shared cultural framework to assume that the message that is sent is similar, if not identical with, that which is received. Few behaviors are so universal that they require little or no interpretation” (Ross, 2000:45). Culture frames the mental maps through which actions, motives and messages of people are decoded. It explains why people think and act as they do. Culture also explains unease with which people interact with those of other cultures. Even decoding facial gestures depends on shared cultural framework. In short, culture defines the context within which the act of interpretation takes place (Ibid: 46).

Motives require shared cultural framework for their interpretation. Ross argues that “motives are central to cultural analysis because they offer a mechanism to link individual action to a broader social setting” (Ibid: 46). Not only the interpretation but also very formation of motives depends on culture. Culture frames mental make up of people due to which they think as they do. In intercultural interactions peoples try to interpret the actions of others by referring to their own culture. They try to attribute some meaning to the behaviour of others on the basis of their own cultural experience. It explains why lot of misunderstanding takes place during intercultural encounters. It also explains much of intercultural conflicts. As pointed out by Ross,

“Cultural worldviews provide two contrasting strategies for encounters with outsiders. One is to apply the rule of one’s own culture because they are, after all, what is best known (and often all that is known), believing that outsiders will respond as insiders do. The second is to search for different rules, assuming that outsiders share few motives with people in one’s own cultures, hence will respond in heathen ways and are likely to take advantage of any weakness shown to them- for they will not follow what are viewed as “civilized norms.” This first strategy is that of generalization whereas the second is one of differentiation” (Ibid: 47).

Culture Provides Resources for Political Organization and Mobilization: Culture has historically been very effective tool for organizing political actions. In crisis situation, too, culture has been used for political mobilization of the masses. Ross agrees with this point and comments that “culture offers significant resources that leaders and groups use as instruments of organization and mobilization” (Ibid: 48). Anthropologist Abner Cohen
has spelled out six political problems that are addressed by cultural organization. According to him:

1. "Such organizations help define a group's distinctiveness, meaning its membership and sphere of operation within the context of the contemporaneous political setting, through myths of origin and claims to superiority, descent and endogamy; moral exclusiveness; endoculture; spatial proximity; and homogenization,
2. Cultural organizations meet the political need for intense internal communications among the group's constituent parts,
3. Cultural organizations offer mechanisms for decision making involving some formulation of general problems confronting the group and taking decisions about them,
4. They provide authority for implementing decisions and for speaking where appropriate, on behalf of the group,
5. Cultural organizations can provide a political ideology often rooted in the language of kinship and ritual, which gives legitimacy to power and converts it into authority and
6. Cultural organizations meet the need for discipline, through ceremonials and rituals that connect the ideology to current problems of the community” (Ibid: 48).

Role of culture in the formation of political community often exceeds the one that is presumed. Culture buttresses state building. Even in Western countries, particularly European ones, that have set the precedent to be emulated by the rest of the world, culture played a crucial role. According to Charles Tilly, “the Europe of 1500 had a kind of cultural homogeneity...The earlier unification of the Roman Empire had produced some convergence of language, law, religion, administrative practice, agriculture, landholding, and perhaps kinship as well ... the population settled shared a common culture and maintained extensive contacts via an active network of trade, a constant movement of persons, and a tremendous interlocking of ruling families. A single relatively centralized church dominated the continent’s religious life, an enfeebled empire sprawled over the continent’s central sections, clutching fragments of a common political tradition” (Tilly, 1975:18). He further comments that “the major significance of this vital and prosperous cultural homogeneity for the emergence of states was the ease it gave to the diffusion of organizational model, to the expansion of states into new territories, to the transfer of population from one state to another, and to the movement of administrative personnel from one government to another... the cultural homogeneity of the area in which the first powerful national states arose is a condition of prime importance” (Ibid: 18-19).

Religion, a critical component of culture, has drawn the attention of scholars in recent times. More and more scholars are highlighting the role of religion as legitimizing
and mobilizing factor in politics; domestic as well as international. Having spelled out the role of culture in the formation of European states it is equally necessary to highlight the role of religion for the legitimacy of governments in postcolonial states. It is noteworthy that most of the newly independent countries tried to follow Western model based on secular reason and universal modernity. Secular ideologies of the West could not take deep roots in postcolonial states for following reasons. According to Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, these ideas are:

1. “Perceived as foreign ideologies imposed from outside by elites who are overly influenced by the West, in contrast to local religious traditions that are indigenous and, therefore, more legitimate
2. The governments based on these ideologies and promising freedom, economic prosperity, and social justice have fallen far short of these promises, thus undermining their legitimacy
3. The modernization policies of these governments have led to many unsettling consequences including the alienation of those left out of the process and the breakdown in community values both of which have led to a religious backlash
4. Modern communications technology has allowed religious institutions to extend their influence
5. Greater political participation has led to increased participation by those with religious agendas
6. Greater religious freedom and more individual choice in selecting a religion has led to greater individual interest in religion” (Fox and Sandler, 2004:38).

These factors explain “the global resurgence of religion”. This theme will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. It is sufficient to comment here that religious factors can no longer be ignored in I.R. particular after the events of 9/11.

Religion has been a great motivating force in history. Religion has been defined as “a unified system of beliefs and practices related to sacred things” (Fox and Sandler, 2004:57). It is an undeniable fact of human history that religion influences worldview of the people. As pointed out by Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, “religion is often part of people’s worldviews and influences their perception of events and their actions ... religion... influences how we think, people almost universally possess a coherent, over arching, and articulated worldview, perspective, frame of reference, value orientation or meaning system that is often based on religion” (Ibid: 57). Religion captures spiritual imagination of people in a way that no other thing can. It provides guidelines for human action. It suggests temper in prosperity and gives solace in discomfort. That religion influences people’s attitude and behaviour has been substantiated by several empirical
studies. For instance, Hayes found that religiously affiliated people are more politically conservative than those whose outlook is secular. Another interesting finding is that “religiosity is inversely related to domestic violence but men who have more conservative religious views than their partners are more likely to engage in domestic violence” (Ibid: 57). Thirdly, religiosity of people has a direct bearing on their propensity toward conflict. Fourth is that religion and authoritarianism are linked with each other. Fifth is that stereotypical attitudes towards blacks, women, homosexual and communists are closely connected with religious fundamentalism. Finally, religion frames moral attitudes and preferences of people (Ibid: 57-58).

This discussion between religion and politics can be safely concluded by saying that

“religion provides an ideal blueprint for the development of an informal political organization. It mobilizes many of the most powerful emotions which are associated with the basic problems of human existence and gives legitimacy and stability to political arrangements by representing these as parts of the system of the universe. It makes it possible to mobilize the power of symbols and the power inherent in the ritual relationship between various ritual positions within the organization of the cult... The system of myths and symbols which religion provides is capable of being continuously interpreted and reinterpreted in order to accommodate it to changing economic, political and other social circumstances” (Cohen, 1969:210).

Culture Shapes Security Interests of the State: Linkages between culture and politics have so far been demonstrated within the domestic realm of the state. It will be, however, grave error to assume that culture and ideas have no bearing on the national interests of the state that are pursued in international arena. As pointed out by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, “at the most fundamental level, ideas define the universe of possibilities for action ...These conceptions of possibility, or worldviews are embedded in the symbolism of a culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse. They are not purely normative, since they include views about cosmology and ontology as well as about ethics. Nevertheless, worldviews are entwined with people’s conception of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties. The world’s great religions provide world views; but so does the scientific rationality that is emblematic of modernity” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:8). Culture, as mentioned earlier, shapes national identity of states. It is equally true to assert that culture plays significant role in the formulation of
security interests stemming directly from the national identity of states. Third principle of Waltzian neorealism—that balance of power matters in international politics—is not useful beyond the point. Similar functional identity of states as rational and egocentric actors in international politics does not explain tremendous variation in state’s external behaviour. It makes much sense to peep inside the state in order to know how functional similarity of different states translates itself into strikingly dissimilar foreign policy behaviour in a given issue area. Much of this variation can be explained with the help of culture of a given country. As pointed out by Ronald L. Jepperson and others, “norms either define (constitute) identities in the first place (generating expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context) or prescribe or proscribe (regulate) behaviors for already constituted identities (generating expectations about how those identifies will shape behaviour in varying circumstances). Taken together, then, norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave” (Jepperson et al., 1996:54). It is noteworthy that the use of the term culture is strikingly similar in the literature of foreign policy and security studies with that of sociology. In this literature too “culture refers both to a set of evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and to cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate (Ibid:56).

Culture Shapes the Identity of the State: Culture and nationalism are the biggest factors responsible for the formation of state identity. One just needs to locate the state in sociological settings in which it is embedded and operates in order to comprehend the influence of culture on the identity of state. As pointed out by Peter Katzenstein, “the state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors ... History is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity” (Katzenstein, 1996:23). Culture and its attendant institutions regulate, direct and guide state’s external behaviour in a given issue area. Large part of national interests – for the protection of which state acts in domestic and international arenas is fathomed on cultural lines. Jepperson and others confirm this point and argue, “cultural and institutional structure may also constitute or shape the basic identities of states, that is, the features of state actorhood or national identity... The concept of identity thus functions as a crucial link between environmental structures and interests” (Jepperson et al., 1996:58-59). The concept of identity comes from social
psychology where it refers to the process of the formation of self in relations to significant others. States like individuals also build certain identity in relations to significant others. These identities become sedimented over a period of time and influence, if not determine, external behaviour of the state. Nationalism has historically been the critical source of state’s identity on the basis of which states legitimize their existence. Besides physical existence, large part of state’s behaviour is directed towards the protection and promotion of their constituting nationalism. In this regard Peter Katzenstein notes that “the identities of states emerge from their interactions with social environments… Despite differences in theoretical formulation the analysis of nationalism offers an important example. Ernest Gellner stresses the importance of the instrumental logic of nationalism; Benedict Anderson emphasizes national identities are socially constructed; and Ernst Haas combines both perspectives in his discussion of nationalism as an instrumental social construction. All insist that the national identities of states are crucial for understanding politics and that they cannot be stipulated deductively. They must be investigated empirically in concrete historical setting” (Katzenstein, 1996:24).

The discussion pertaining to cultural constitution of the state can be concluded by expressing in the words of Clifford Geertz, “the network of primordial alliance and opposition is a dense, intricate, but yet precisely articulated one, the product, in most cases, of centuries of gradual crystallization. The unfamiliar civil state, born yesterday from the meager remains of an exhausted colonial regime, is superimposed upon this fine-spun and lovingly conserved texture of pride and suspicion and must somehow contrive to weave it into the fabric of modern politics” (Geertz, 1963:119).

Assessment of the Cultural Strength: Power is to politics what money is to economics. More people want to get rid of the sin more they find themselves entrapped in doing this sin. Many predicted that peace will reign in the world after the end of Cold War. Francis Fukuyama’s End Of History thesis is the classic example. These predictions were proved utopian daydreaming by the end of the twentieth century. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, two gulf wars, several interethnic skirmishes and the most importantly terrorist attack on World Trade Center, Pentagon and White House completely trashed the post Cold War optimism about the world peace. At the most minimal level these events clearly highlight that conflict does not cease to exist after the ideological rivalry of the US and erstwhile Soviet Union.
Given the fact sophistication and destructive potentials of military technology are constantly increasing, more and more scholars started exploring other avenues for the exercise of power. It is interesting to note that most of the debate about the changing nature and role of power takes place within the context of polarity and international stability. This debate, however, does have the profound implications for the tussle between global culture and national identities of weak states. Soft power is one such notion that has been put forward by an eminent Harvard based I.R. scholar Joseph Nye which is readily applicable in the context of globalization.

Joseph Nye distinguishes between two types of power: hard and soft. He further breaks down, hard power into two categories: military and economic. According to him, “military power and economic power are both examples of hard command power that can be used to get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks)” (Nye, 2004:124). He extends his analysis further by saying that there is a “second face of power” which is often neglected in international politics. If power is the ability to change the behaviour of others there are all sorts of ways through which desired outcome can be yielded. Exercise of hard power has historically been seen as the best possible way to obtain desired outcomes. But he insists that there is another way out to bring what one wants. That is what is referred to as soft power.

Joseph Nye is aware of the classic distinction between power and influence. He enlarges this distinction between influence and soft power. He writes, “soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction” (Nye, 2004:6).

Cooptation rather than coercion is the linchpin of soft power. “Soft power rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004:124). Cognizance of the fact that agenda setting is the important source of power in world politics is the single great contribution of Joseph Nye. Soft power stems from values and culture of a state that are perceived as legitimate and attractive by outsiders. In his words, “soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation- an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of
contributing to the achievement of those values” (Nye, 2004:7). He writes at another place that “it is just as important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons” (Nye, 2004:124). Soft power “co opts people rather than coerces them (Ibid:124). He specifies three sources of soft power. According to him, “the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004:11).

**Culture as a Source of Soft Power:** Nye begins his analysis of culture as a source of soft power by giving its cogent definition. According to him, “culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society. It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment” (Ibid: 11). He proceeds further with this definition of culture and tries to probe the question; what makes a country’s culture attractive? He replies by saying that “when a country’s culture includes universal values and its policies promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the relationships of attraction and duty that it creates. Narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power” (Ibid: 11). It is noteworthy that everything that is related to culture does not necessarily produce soft power. He specifies dimensions of culture that are pertinent for the production of soft power. Popular culture, commerce, education, sports, academic and scientific exchanges between states are some of the cultural instruments that produce soft power. He argues (2004) that firms, universities, foundations, churches, and other non-governmental groups have their own resources to generate soft power that may support official foreign policy goals. It makes imperative for governments to make sure that their own actions and policies produce rather than undermine their soft power.

Political values of the states directly influence its soft power. They indicate what the state stands for and thereby enhance or diminish the prestige of country in the international arena. As noted by him, “the values a government champions in its behavior at home … in international institutions... and in foreign policy strongly affect the preferences of others. Government can attract or repel others by the influence of their example” (Nye, 2004:14). Adherence to democratic ethos and the respect for human rights.
for instance, enhance state prestige in world affairs. Whereas autocratic values may repel others in many parts of the world. The struggle for political power between monarchy and democratic forces in Nepal significantly declined the prestige of the country. Brutal assault by the communist regime on the peaceful protest of students for democracy in China in the late 1980s damaged the prestige of China throughout the world. Similarly communal riots, caste violence and all pervasive corruption and poor institutional performance decline India’s soft power in international relations. Economic success of Japan increased political clout of the country in international relations. The US, for which the book has been written, also suffered from soft power deficit during the Vietnam War and Second Gulf War. Another way of wielding soft power is to reduce the gap between promise and performance. If others perceive hypocrisy in a country’s behaviour in international affairs its soft power will be significantly undermined. It is imperative, for governments to be consistent in their behaviours with their stated objectives.

Domestic and foreign policies of the state are an important source of soft power. Nye observes that “in international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Governments sometimes find it difficult to control and employ soft power, but that does not diminish its importance” (Nye, 2004:8). Much of the legitimacy of the government rests on the essential goodness of its policies-domestic as well as international. If a state is perceived by others as successfully establishing its political authority over its subjects; promoting democratic culture within the state; respecting human rights; controlling corruption; pursuing foreign policies that respect the concerns of other states; having ability to act in harmony with others; regularizing its behaviour through elaborate and transparent institutions; being able to keep its promises; following international law, norms and regimes; fighting to control social evils; promoting public welfare and general good at home and abroad; its soft power in international politics will be greatly enhanced. In his words, “government policies can reinforce or squander a country’s soft power. Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power” (Ibid: 14).

If winning other’s heart is as important as defeating the enemy, soft power of the state is as important as its hard power. Joseph Nye made a notable contribution
International Relations by highlighting the role of soft power or intangible assets of the state in world affairs. Terms like influence, moral authority, national character, world public opinion, international legitimacy and so forth that lost their salience during the Cold War have shown amazing come-back in recent years. Nye should be credited for pointing out that “if a country’s culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks” (Nye, 2004:10-11).

It clearly follows that the culture of a given state is an important source of its soft power. Attraction of a country’s culture to which Nye associates central importance is the fair treatment of the issue at hand. Attraction, however, is just one source of cultural capital. There are other dimensions of cultural strength of a given state on which Nye is surprisingly silent. Broader framework is required in order to judge the cultural capital of a given state.

The cultural strength of the state is not susceptible to easy calculation. Being abstract in nature and intangible in form, cultural strength of the state is essentially a matter of judgement and assessment rather than that of measurement. Generally four criteria of assuredness, attractiveness, accessibility and assimilability (Sahni, 1997:29) are put forward to assess the strength of culture to which one more is added. It requires elaboration.

Cultural assurance reflects the confidence of people in their way of living. At the centre of this confidence is the belief and loyalty of people towards their traditional identity, which is being threatened by global culture. A culturally confident group can easily face the cultural flows coming from outside its territorial and cultural borders. Having firm faith in their traditions and values it can easily weigh the pros and cons of alternative ideas being presented to its members. Whereas culturally diffident people can be easily attracted or even mislead by the alien culture. It is this cultural assuredness of developing countries that has been given a big blow by the emergence of global culture spreading the sense of inferiority complex among those countries due to which they increasingly question the contemporary relevance of their traditional identity for their safe and secure future.
Attractiveness of culture signifies the extent to which particular culture appeals to the rest of the world. For example, Indian culture has attracted foreigners for its spiritualism and philosophy since ancient times. Contemporary United States fascinates people all over the world for its pragmatic culture and professional success. Highly attractive culture, however, can sometimes create problems as well. It can pave the way for significant alteration in the demographic composition of the native country and consequently change the nature of domestic politics. Increasing foreign population may also be a burden for the economic prosperity of the recipient state. Tightening of immigration rules by the US, Canada and other European countries substantiate this point.

Accessibility is related to the ease and cost with which particular culture is available to others. Heavy cost of immigration and strict and tedious visa reduces the accessibility of a given culture. Mao's China was notable example. Despite having very rich cultural heritage China was notorious for strict immigration policy during Mao regime, whereas cultures with moderate costs and flexible immigration rules lend easy accessibility to the people of the alien state.

Accessibility of a culture depends on the language in which culture manifests itself. Countries habitual in conversing and writing in English can easily attract the people from all over the world, whereas local languages make the accessibility of a culture exceedingly difficult unless foreigners are willing to learn the language of the recipient state.

Assimilation implies the process through which people of one culture are integrated into another culture. It works in two ways. Firstly, outsiders willingly abandon certain traits of their old culture and fill the gap with recipient culture. Secondly, recipient culture also absorbs some attributes of the culture of foreign nationals. Contemporary United States is the classic example. India has also been known for its assimilative culture throughout the ages.

Assertion connotes in extreme cases killer instinct with which culture makes its claim in a given issue area. It reflects not only authenticity of the claim but also degree of the sacrifice a given culture is prepared to make for the pursuit of its claims. Simply put, cultural assertion can be defined in terms of its ability to fight with its competitors in the situation of crisis. Under normal circumstances, cultural assertion denotes the sensitivity its member exhibit towards their values and lifestyles. Presence or absence of cultural
assertion can sometimes be perceived in terms of respect culture commands from its members for itself. Some precaution, however, is required to assess the strength of a given culture on the basis of assertion. Firstly, it needs to be examined in which issue area a particular culture is asserting itself. Degree of assertion and the worth of the issue need to be factored in the assessment of cultural strength on the basis of cultural assertion. If a given culture asserts itself on a trivial issue people belonging to it will be perceived as unnecessarily touchy or arrogant by others. Secondly, assertion can be used to conceal the insecurity or diffidence also. All of us come across people making tall claims; using big words; making proud statements; showing ambitious; and acting like a demagogue. If they are probed little deeper the truth of their claims immediately comes out. In reality they are very insecure, diffident and incompetent people. Same thing applies to culture as well. It is truer in those cases when the rival culture is not interested in prolonging the competition.

It needs to be mentioned that there is no necessary correlation between assuredness, attractiveness, accessibility and assimilability of a given culture. As pointed out by Varun Sahni, “it is important to keep in mind that an alien culture can be attractive without being accessible, or accessible without being assimilable (Sahni, 1997:29). Put together these elements, however, signify and add to the capacity of a nation to stand in the time of a cultural shock.

The relation between nation and state has varied enormously in history. Despite the primacy of nation-state model there is no reason to assume that the similar trajectory has to be followed all over the world. Reason for this is that nations like states are changeable entities. It is, therefore, appropriate to think that states can also create nations as much as they have created them. Barry Buzan puts forward four models for understanding the complex relation between nation and state.

Perhaps the oldest and the most favourable way of organizing the nation and state is the nation – state model. The nation exists prior to state in this model and plays an important role in creating the state. Strong nation reduces the role of state. State only manifests and protects the nation. Being firmly rooted in nation these states enjoy strong identity in international politics and the level of legitimacy is high within their borders. Strong international identity and solid base of legitimacy within the state enable them to withstand any adverse circumstances (Buzan, 1991:72-73). France, Japan, Germany, Hungary and Italy illustrate this model.
Second model works in opposite direction. It is the state-nation model. Here state precedes the nation. It is an easy course of action when large population migrate from its native land to reside in an empty or weakly held territory. It is a top-bottom model in which state plays an instrumental role in propagating homogeneous cultural traits to create the nation. Over a period of time these cultural attributes ground themselves in uprooted population providing them a sense of novel identity. The United States and Australia are the outstanding examples of this model (Ibid: 73).

The state-nation model is also applicable where the state contains multiple national identities. This process is more difficult because it requires the subordination of previous identities to the supposedly novel one created by the state. It involves the risk of extermination of indigenous people who find themselves exceedingly helpless to resist the formation of new identity backed by the state. The easier and more humane way is to add a new identity on the top of existing ones which simultaneously serves the purpose of the state as well as allows indigenous people to retain their cultural specificities. Most of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia prefer this model (Ibid: 73-74).

Part nation-state is the third model of this framework. It is a well known fact that maps of states have been drawn more on political than national lines. Sometimes it leads to a situation where people of one nationality find themselves as residents of more than one state. North and South Korea, East and West Germany, China and Taiwan are some of the best known cases where the borders of the state and nation are not identical with each other (Ibid: 74-75).

The fourth and the last model is one of the multinational-state. This model represents those states that contain two or more strong nationalities. The presence of multiple identities creates the problem of nation building and the state responds to it in two ways. First response leads to federative state which means much more than federal political composition of the state. Federative state not only permits plural identities but also encourages them. But state is structured in such a way that no single identity can dominate the entire state apparatus. The major drawback of federative state is that they are not and cannot be rooted in nationalism. It leaves a dangerous vacuum in federative states. These states consequently justify their existence by appealing to less emotional ideas like economic prosperity and geopolitical threats to its small constituents if they want separate homeland for themselves. Canada and India would easily fit in this model. Despite having unitary form of government Britain also illustrates this case (Ibid: 75).
Second response gives rise to imperial state. These states are dominated by one of the identity to its own advantage leaving others at the margin of state spectrum. Former Soviet Union was the classic example. The dominant identity may try to subjugate other nationalities through the means that vary from cultural or racial absorption to ethnic cleansing. It may use the state machinery to consolidate and retain its dominance. Non nationalist ideologies like Islam and communism are also used for maintaining the status quo. It is not to suggest, however, that imperial states are stronger or safer than federative states. They are equally vulnerable to secessionist movements. Their strength depends on economic prosperity and strong central authority of the state. Declining economy and diminishing state authority immediately provides the opportunity for separatist elements to question the legitimacy of state’s existence. This is precisely what happened in Soviet Union in the late 1980s (Ibid: 76-77).

This classification of the link between nation and state is useful but by no means exclusive. Social life rarely provides situations susceptible to such an easy comprehension. In reality states overlap these models. Most of the newly independent states, for example, would fall in second and fourth category. Only few states would qualify the most demandable nation state scheme. But it can be safely concluded that greater harmony between the nation and the state reduces the risks involved in the anarchical nature of international politics.

Necessary in its own right for the formation of states nationalism, however, leaves as many questions unanswered as it does by creating the state for itself. Even the strong national movements have left many questions pertaining to the organization, functions and purpose of the state unentertained. Since the state can serve its constituting nation in all possible ways under a given historical situation, it leaves plenty of space to be filled in the immediate aftermath of the state’s creation. Organizing ideology generally fills this gap. Socialism, capitalism, communism, mixed economy are some of the ideologies that have served the state to fill this gap. Democracy is one such ideology that has taken a deep root after the First World War. In the long run and under normal circumstances it is generally seen as the best guarantee of the security and welfare of the people for whom states have been, are and would be created.

Like much of the transition phases underwent by the world so far transformation of states from autocracy to democracy has been extremely problematic and violent. The reason is that “countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go
through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way” (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995:79). Though state transformation is susceptible to several trajectories, present chapter would focus on transition of states from other forms of government to the democratic ones because of the contemporary appeal of democracy and great powers’ insistence upon it.

With some modifications Aristotelian classification of states based on their constitution has come down to the present times. States are still identified as democracy, autocracy and mixed regimes. "Democratizing states are those that made any regime change in democratic direction that is, from autocracy to democracy, from a mixed regime to democracy, or from autocracy to mixed regime” (Ibid: 81). Viewed as a gradual process rather than sudden change democratization makes states weak and war prone in variety of ways.

Nationalism and democratization have been inevitable bedfellows in history. Present phase of world history is full of evidence where these two processes have gone hand in hand. Transformation of communist states into democratic ones in Eastern Europe is the most recent example.

As a coherent and well-articulated political doctrine nationalism saw the light of the day in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain and France. In the initial phase of its development it was a demand of the self-rule by the emerging middle class against the dynastic rulers who were notorious for their self-serving rule. These aristocracies were ruling over the people who had hardly anything in common from culture to religion. How dissociated the ruling elite was from its subject can be construed by its close connection to the rulers of other countries based on language, culture and kinship. It is not surprising, therefore, that their rule was based on the notion of divine right. They had a vested interest to refrain the spread of nationalism because it posed a direct threat to their regimes. Despite all the euphoria and lip service to the welfare of the working class the case of communist regimes demonstrated profound similarities. Rather than seeking the consent of the governed they also legitimized their rule on the vague and self serving notion of the party (that is communist party) as the vanguard of history. As a consequence both dynastic rulers of the Europe as well as the communist regimes of twentieth century had to face the popular rising based on the twin notion of self-determination along with democratic form of government. Combined with several other elements situation deteriorates further in democratizing states (Ibid: 84-86).
The precarious domestic political coalitions and weak central authority accompany the process of democratization. It unleashes the high-energy mass politics with great force. Due to the introduction of universal franchise new social groups and classes enter into the political process of the state. Spirited with high expectations related to the better and more decent life they present their demands in such a forceful manner that political leaders of the country with limited resources fail to reconcile their mutually contradictory interests. Needy of mass support political leaders respond to this situation through short term and constrictive bargains and venturesome political gambling. Emerging as well as declining ruling elites appeal to masses on nationalist lines to keep their political alliances intact. Ascending on the tide of nationalist aspirations of newly politically socialized people they fail to direct the powerful forces they themselves have unleashed. Coupled with the weak central authority new interests compete to capture the state power. Those unable to do so define their political interests in more rigid terms consequently making the state fertile ground either for civil war or for the pursuit of internationally ambitious political designs (Ibid: 88-89).

The process of democratization opens the flood gate for new politically significant groups and classes. Their interests – political, economic or even socio-cultural – are divergent and mostly incompatible with each other. This situation, amenable to politically amicable solutions in mature democracies, leads to different and most of the times opposite outcomes in states that are either experiencing democracy for the first time or striving to experience it at all. Democratisation compels old groups and ruling elites to define and interpret their political interests in narrow and inflexible way. It is especially true for those groups that are reluctant to adapt themselves in a constant political and economic shuffling. Due to limited resources of the infant states the situation is not inconceivable where only one option can retain political power and social privileges of the group. Given the prestige of the group at stake pursuit of the option becomes the compulsion. Compromising formulas are increasingly regarded as the defeat or the loss, which might relegate the group to the political exclusion and social marginalisation. The absence of politically congenial atmosphere renders compromising formulas to utter failure. Bubbling with nationalist sentiments, resultantly, these groups recklessly resort to revisionist policies on international plane (Ibid: 89-90).

Quick recruitment of new social groups into the political process of the state intensifies the scenario. Ruling elites – both old and new – deploy all means at their
disposal to gain currency in the emerging and constantly expanding political market. Information pools, propaganda technique, political patronage, money, organizational networking and management, and manipulation of old political institutions are some of the tools that are used for the ascendancy of power. This is how main threats are countered and efforts of opponent elite groups to mobilize masses are frustrated. Available resources enable the elite to shape the direction of the political mobilization. But the participation of different upper strata of the society in the same process renders the political scenario uncontrollable by the single elite group. What is required is the consensus between competing groups over the issue of the allocation of power and other assets of the state. In the absence of such consensus situation goes out of hand and leads to ungovernability and political deadlock of the state (Ibid: 90-91).

The mass mobilization on ideological lines is the notable feature of the democratizing state. New participants of the political process lack politically relevant information. With little or no knowledge of the rules of the game they fail to properly identify their political interests in the democratizing state. An absence of factual understanding of political scenario paves the path for successful ideological maneuvers. The efficacy of ideological mobilization, however, depends upon the social position that is sought to be defended, the nature of the group to be recruited into the political process and passionate appeals with which these ideologies are caricatured before the politically imprudent masses. The most populous and successful ideology in a democratizing state is one of nationalism. It provides not only easy inroads for the identification of elites with the masses and vice versa but also serves as the mask to hide the major class differences between rulers and the ruled (Ibid: 92).

Weak central authority of democratizing state exacerbates the situation. Previous ruling elites find it exceedingly difficult to dictate terms and conditions of the political game. Infant democratic institutions lack necessary legitimacy and faith of the people for harmonizing extremely competitive political interest of newly recruited social groups. The control of political parties over the masses is loose and the durability of their mass support is easily doubted. Even the institutions as critical as electioneering for the democratic functioning of the state are either irregular or they are viewed with suspicious eyes due to their frequent misuse by the rulers for serving their narrowly defined political interests. Imposition of undue constrains on the electoral behaviour by the state heightens the tension. Growing expectations of the people from the new state suffering with
institutional deficiency and limited resources along with short time horizons necessitate the ruling elite to recklessly pursue their political interests ignoring their long term consequences altogether (Ibid: 92-93).

**Institutional Expression of the State:** Limitation of Buzanian framework exceeds its explanatory potentials for the simple reason that it does not take into account another important question pertaining to the state- society relationship. Much of the efficiency of the state depends on how state relates itself to the society in which it is hammered. It has been mentioned in the beginning of the chapter that the relation of modern state to its society is peculiar in nature. Its enviable superiority runs parallel to its profound unity with the society. Typical of the modern state this rather strange symbiosis is often a determinant of state's ability to control its population.

Besides its physical base and idea state embodies institutions as well. It is through the institutional network state expresses and manifests itself. Legislature, executive, judiciary, constitution, bureaucracy, police and military are some of the institutions without which state's existence remains inconceivable. But sheer presence of these institutions does not make state powerful. It is the legitimacy of these institutions that sustains the state as an independent entity.

Political experience of newly independent states defies the standards set up by the post Westphalia state tradition of Western Europe. All that is identified with the state has not been replicated in the political life of former colonies. It leads to two kinds of problems. The first is ontological. Principle of self-determination and consequent emergence of bulk of new states has universalized the idea of post Westphalia state. With the liberation of former colonies these standards operate in social and political settings totally different from their original home and they unsurprisingly generate strikingly dissimilar outcomes. Second problem is epistemic-methodological. The idea of the modern state has gone deep down in the methodology of Political Science and International Relations which has coloured most of the literature written on the politics of developing countries. The idea of modern state operates as a vantage point in the literature of Political and International Relations Theory. Any 'non conformist' behaviour is seen as a 'deviance' from the original model. The mental prism of the state created by Weber and distortedly propagated by his enthusiastic popularizers has converted it into an almost a closure that resists more open intellectual inquiry of the painful political
experiences undergone by developing countries. If the political life of developing
countries is to be understood, tight grip of the Weberian notion of the state over the
discipline of International Relations will have to loosen. Rather than looking at the
political behaviour of new states as deviance, it is a time to deviate from the Weberian
model of state.

According to Joel Migdal, “The state is a field of power marked by the use and
threat of violence and shaped by (i) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a
territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) actual
practices of its multiple parts” (Migdal, 2001:15-16).

Image and practices are the main components of the state in state-society
perspective. Whereas image of the state has been universalized from fifteenth century
onwards, practices of different states exhibit remarkable dissimilarities. The standard
image of the modern state along with its salient features has already been discussed. This
section of the chapter will, therefore, focus on how practices tarnish image of the state.

It is widely held that state functions in two intersecting spheres: domestic and
international. Predominantly internal sources of weak states’ vulnerabilities compel the
burden of analysis to fall on the domestic arena in which state interacts with the society.
If the difference between weak and strong states is to be conceptualized, it is at the
junction of state-society interaction that one must look at. Domestic society provides the
space to state to manoeuvre and maximize its autonomy by subordinating other social
groups to its apparatus. State’s efforts to dominate social groups falling within its borders
have faced resistance including violent one throughout the world. It contrasts developed
states of the West from those prevailing in developing countries. Whereas the former
successfully dominates social groups within their borders, the relation between state and
society is well defined and clear cut, and the process is complete, latter are still
struggling to achieve that status. In fact post war political history of developing countries for all
practical purposes is a history of the struggle between state and other social groups
residing within its borders. Enormous power at the disposal of these groups enables them
to frustrate any policy or law of the state. Introduction of democracy makes it all the
more imperative for the ruling elite of these countries to take these groups into account.
Otherwise sheer power possessed by these groups is enough to destabilize the
government. The ruling elite willing to attain or retain its political power helplessly
responds to this situation by subordinating the state to these social groups. How this happens is as follows.

Under the heavy influence of the image of the state scholars have not paid enough attention to the intense struggle that takes place between state and social groups to establish and resist the domination of the state. State competes with these groups on the question of who would formulate rules, laws, and decrees to regulate the behaviour of people. Non compliance to state law is not simple deviance or criminal act in this situation. It manifests much deeper and more profound issue; whether state would control social organizations or would be controlled by them. Absence of the ability to control these groups does not amount to disappearance of the state. Nor does it try to dominate them by resorting to brute force. The logic of power politics compels ruling elite to pursue more accommodative strategies. These strategies serve twin purposes for the state. They buy time and give space to state to manipulate with their groups and simultaneously allow groups to retain their power (Migdal, 2001:64).

Presence of multiple social groups and weak state institutions lead to a puzzling paradox. Subordination of different social groups to the state requires strengthening state institutions. In many case these institutions have to be created from the scratch. If state is to penetrate into society and implement its policy, strong institutions are must. With one caveat it can be commented fairly easily that much of the expansion of the state in Asia, Africa and Latin America has stemmed from this exigency. The caveat is that expansion of the state apparatus should not be conflated with state’s predominance in a given society. This dilemma further opens in a situation in which ruling elite of developing countries is unable to mobilize and direct their population for state policies. In many societies with new states local population is still in the tight grip of conventional rule making organizations usually operating outside the domain of the state. These local strongmen resist the formation of channels through which state can penetrate into the society and at times mobilize it for its own purposes. The absence of reliable channels makes political mobilization of the masses exceedingly difficult. If state resorts to brute force its critical institutions such as army, police and paramilitary forces in course of time become so strong that they would make ‘state within the state’ and pose a threat to the ruling elite of the country. Moreover, frequent or excessive use of force highlights the inability of the state to mobilize its population through persuasion. This, in turn, undermines the legitimacy of the very project or in some case of the state for which
mobilization was originally sought. It is inherently a contradictory situation that compels ruling elite of the state to pursue more accommodative strategies (Ibid: 71-72).

The power of appointment of state officials is used to prevent the development of any possible rival centre of power. Ruling elite's power to appoint state officials coupled with political patronage and spoil give them clear edge over their adversaries with no such power in their hands as ruling elite of every state controls several government organizations and departments. Most of the officials working in these agencies owe their allegiance to the person sitting at the top of state hierarchy. Posts, offices and departments of state officials are frequently changed and replaced to deter any possible coalescing of ruling elite's political rivals. It is not surprising, therefore, that same person holds offices as different as commerce and defence, finance and environment and fishing and textile. There are cases in which some officials disappear from the political scene all together. The weakening of the state is deliberately undertaken in order to retain the tenure of the regime intact (Ibid: 72-74).

The power of appointment involves much more than replacing officials from one office to another or dismissing them altogether. It enables ruling elite to patronize its supporters by rewarding them with lucrative jobs. These jobs are distributed among those who exhibit deep loyalty to ruling elite of the state. It is the best antidote to garner political support especially when masses are controlled by strongmen. In the absence of mobilization support of the masses the political vulnerability of ruling elite is countered by strengthening functional bounds among state officials working in different state agencies. It makes many states extension of the family of ruling elite (Ibid: 75-76).

Third strategy is of cooptation. It is used to bring those into the corridors of power who may otherwise develop rival centre of power outside the state. Competence of the person has nothing to do with the post occupied by the person. Here consideration is one of personal loyalty to ruling elite of the state (Ibid: 76).

Ethnicity of the person is an important criterion for the recruitment of state officials. It is based on the group identity of the person. Rather than fear of coercion and legal compliance, ethnic origins of individuals is used to bind important section of the population to the state. Ethnic bargaining does not provide representation of ethnic composition of the state at large. Nor is it used for expanding state's penetration into different ethnic communities of the state. It, instead, reflects ethnic sources of loyalty and threats and significance of several state departments (Ibid: 77).
In this scheme of things the most loyal community is rewarded with the most important positions of the state apparatus. Similarly the least reliable communities are allotted the least significant state agencies. These appointments seriously jeopardize state’s ability to make binding rules for the entire society. Based on personal loyalty rather than merit of the person these appointments bring these states very close to premodern primordial political organizations (Ibid: 78).

Proliferation of several state agencies is the prominent feature of the most developing countries. Besides creating new avenues of political patronage it prevents any single state agency from becoming too powerful. The overlapping state institutions may not serve their declared purpose of policy formulation and implementation but they do fit in strategies of survival pursued by ruling elite of the state. The absence of coordination and direction over institutionalization transforms the state into a self containing labyrinth in which it looks like functioning but with little significant outcomes (Ibid: 79).

The necessity of silencing political rivals frequently leads to dirty tricks played by the ruling elite of the state. Prevalent since time immemorial recent emphasis on human rights has made them extremely notorious. Imprisonment, deportation, forceful disappearance, torture, political murder and so on are some of the tricks of the trade very much in practice in developing countries. These measures are used against both state and non state officials who are seen as politically ambitious by ruling elite of the state, Political and physical removal of significant rivals is the most preferred strategy to curtail and in many cases to destroy the power of existing groups strong enough to threaten top leaders of the state (Ibid: 80-81).

In states with limited ability to control its population ruling elite often resorts to the creation and constant shuffling of political coalition and domestic balance of power. Ruling elite of the state patronizes those state and non state agencies that can bring direct benefit to the regime. Officials and personnel working in these departments are rewarded with more state resources, prerogatives, discriminatory taxation and so on. Although this method demands more political skills, it does serve the ruling elite by increasing the longevity of its regime (Ibid: 82-83).

The politics of survival in conjunction with several other factors gives a big blow to policy implementation especially at the lower level of society. The responsibility of implementing state’s policies lies on the shoulders of middle and low level state officials. Given their middle or low position in the bureaucratic hierarchy they cannot and do not
pose a direct threat to top state leaders. They, however, enjoy considerable liberty in policy implementation and determine its outcome. Being in charge of policy implementation at the grass root level the role of these officials is critical in deciding whose policy, in other words authority, would rein supreme within their jurisdiction. Despite being so important for the success or failure of state, however, they have to face several difficulties in discharging their functions (Ibid: 84).

Firstly, these officials have to deal with their supervisors who have direct control over them. It is under the supervision of these regional and national planners that these middle range officials work. They cannot dare to annoy their immediate superiors whose single bad entry in the service book of the former can spoil their entire career. Second are the clients and recipients of the programme. Any government policy brings harm to some and benefits to others. Being the target of the policy recipients cannot be ignored by the state officials. Next are other regional and local actors whose interests have to be taken into account. These actors are usually other state agencies and non state actors supported by the state. They take keen interest in the allocation of resources and change of rules within their respective jurisdictions. Finally, there are local landlords and strongmen who have to be taken into confidence while implementing any state policy. Given their interest at stakes and power to assault on policy and policy planners and implementers, their interests have to be protected or putative balance has to be struck between interests of strongmen and policy of the state (Ibid: 85).

Careerism is the guiding principle of middle level state officials. Their best of energies are devoted in the calculation of their own interests rather than that of the state. Faced with tremendous pressure from within and outside the state they are frequently engaged in all sorts of push and pulls to protect their career. Cases are rare in which administrative accountability and controls are high due to which they are seen really working in the interest of the state (Ibid: 86).

Constant shuttling of agency’s heads leaves devastating impact on policy implementation. Heads of government agencies are constantly changed sometimes within months and weeks. With every new head come new priorities and policies so that he looks different from, if not better than, his immediate predecessor. These policies adversely affect the interests of local strongmen. Since burden of the policy implementation lies on the shoulders of middle level officials, it is they who deal with local strongmen. Strongmen, in turn, retaliate to protect their existing rule over the
population. The absence of professional security from the top makes these officials extremely reluctant to fight local landlords. As a result no policy receives proper treatment (Ibid: 86).

One caveat, however, must be attached. It should not be derived from the preceding discussion that leaders of developing countries do not have slightest of intention to use the state as an instrument of bringing out notable progressive social change in their society. In fact most of the leaders ascend to power with ambitious and well-articulated social and political agenda. It is the logic of the system and the dilemma posed by it that brings important changes in the attitudes and priorities of these leaders. The absence of power channels of political mobilization and the countervailing pressures that are exerted on their programme of action, brilliant though they might be, transform them into a public rhetoric, which is million miles away from the actual practices undertaken by the state to rule its citizens (Ibid: 88).

One of the major problems of weak states is the minimal level or absence of vertical legitimacy. Governments of these states carry little or no authority. The majority of their population does not adhere or give allegiance to the policies and practices of the state. Most of their citizens do not render habitual obedience to the laws, decisions and actions of the state. As a result governments of these states resort to brute force in order to enforce law and implement their policies.

Absence of horizontal legitimacy is another prominent feature of the weak states. Most of them contain multiple ethnic communities. There occurs a constant tussle between different communities either to acquire more resources or power or both. In the absence of vertical legitimacy the state finds it exceedingly difficult to mediate and if necessary to control the intra-state conflicts between two or more communities. Several factors are responsible for this situation.

According to Aristotle, state came into being for the sake of life. But life is insecure in most weak states. If state is unable to provide law, order and security to its citizens, the primary purpose of state's existence evaporates. It is probably universally held that the state must protect its citizens and residents from other citizens, various communities against each other and both of them have to be protected from the misuse of state power itself. This principle is very far from accomplishment in weak states. The state either fails in ascertaining the minimum physical security of its citizens or itself becomes the major source of threat to their lives and property. It is noteworthy that form
of government is largely irrelevant in weak states. As pointed out by Samuel P. Huntington, "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities" (Huntington, 1968:1). Weak states lack effective institutions. Their governments are unable to govern their subjects. They are the ideal sites of political instability and violence. Why is this so? Two factors are responsible for this situation. First is related to the lack of political community in weak states. "Newly independent states of Asia and Africa suffer real shortages of food, literacy, education, wealth, income, health, and productivity, but most of them have been recognized and efforts made to do something about them. Beyond and behind these shortages, however, there is a greater shortage: a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government" (Ibid: 2). In modernizing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America "political community is fragmented against itself... political institutions have little power, less majesty, and no resiliency... where in many case, governments simply do not govern" (Ibid: 2).

Second explanation is related to institutional lag of these countries. Institutional lag takes place when there is an asymmetry between political participation and political institutions governing it. Modernizing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are witnessing "rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions" (Huntington, 1968:4). Social and political changes lead to growing literacy and education, industrialization, modernization, urbanization and so forth. These changes increase political consciousness, political participation and political demands. State is expected to quickly respond to these demands. Political institutions regulating political participation and the limited resource base of the state cause political instability and disorder. In the words of Huntington "the rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low... The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change" (Ibid: 5).
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that helpless citizens look for other agencies that can ensure at least their physical survival. Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Libya, Sudan are the cases in point.

Despite the independence of almost half century, economic performance of weak states remains pathetic. Very few of them show some signs of economic progress and development. Underdeveloped economy and low GNP leads to heavy extractive policies by the state. Those unable to pay huge taxes helplessly respond to this situation by means ranging from migration to resistance and even violent revolution. This situation is further aggravated by the disproportionate allocation of the resources. Ruling elite of the state favours its community at the expanse of others. The unjust and unfair allocation of wealth leaves no option for the marginalized but to organize a coup against the state. Break up of Pakistan in 1971 is a prominent example in this regard.

Lack of consensus on political rules of the game worsens the situation. These rules of the game are generally defined in constitution. But constitutions are rarely practised in weak states. The reason is simple. Constitutionalism develops in peaceful conditions. The state mired in Hobbesian state of nature can hardly expect the effective implementation of its constitution. In reality violent politics frustrates constitutional provisions. More tragic is that the democracy is not always a viable solution to the problems of weak states. Given their multiethnic composition, election can be used as an instrument of the perpetuation of the majority rule. Under the rubric of democratic practices even the legitimate concerns of minority communities can remain unentertained. The case of Sri Lanka immediately comes to mind.

Underdeveloped constitutions and primitive institutional infrastructure render many states vulnerable to capturing by individuals, family or a group who consolidate its rule by excluding other communities from the state apparatus. Military is also used to serve this purpose. Civilian control of military is seldom the case in weak states. In fact, military intervenes in the politics. Subjugation, displacement, disenfranchisement and mass murder are some of the policies that are pursued for denying the access to political power and economic resources to those groups, which do not fit in the intellectual framework of the ruling elite. Israel, Bosnia and Sri Lanka are notable illustrations. Much of all this can be explained with the help of social capital.
Social Capital: Social capital is one of the most fascinating concepts that have gained currency in the last two decades or so. The concept provides important insights into the civic and community life of the state. That the success of the state and economy depends on the quality of civic life within it is the central message of the social capital theories. According to Francis Fukuyama, “social capital can be defined as an instantiated set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with one another. If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another” (Fukuyama, 2000: 98).

Robert Putnam, whose name is most associated with the concept, defines it as “features of social life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives ... social capital, in short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust” (Halpern, 2005: 1).

As pointed out by David Halpern, “societies are not composed of atomized individuals. People are connected with one another through intermediate social structures-webs of association and shared understandings of how to behave. This social fabric greatly affects with whom, and how, we interact and co-operate. It is this everyday fabric of connection and tacit cooperation that the concept of social capital is intended to capture” (Halpern, 2005: 3).

Social capital is a necessary element for the success of a society. Robert D. Putnam in his classic work Making Democracy Work points out the critical role social capital plays in the efficacy of the governments in different parts of Italy. However, his analysis particularly the concept of social capital is readily applicable in other areas of the world. Fukuyama’s Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity clearly highlighted the linkages between the success of society and economy and the degree of social capital within them. It is not possible to discuss the broad sweep of his work here. The essential point to be made in this regard is that increasingly social scientists are acknowledging the rule of intangible elements of social behaviour of people that may or may not lead to the success of their communities. It is increasingly asserted in the academic literature that certain kinds of norms, rules, networks and sanctions are more conducive to economic development and democratic culture. As mentioned in the previous chapter these theories derive their inspiration from Weber. Besides Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is also invoked in this context. The book
for the first time argued eloquently that the large part of the success of American
democracy can be attributed to associational life within the country. He claims “Nothing,
in my view, more deserves attention than the intellectual and moral associations in
America. American political and industrial associations easily catch our eye, but the
others tend not to be noticed...an association unites the energies of divergent minds and
vigorously directs them toward a clearly indicated goal” (Toqueville quoted in Halpern,
2005: 5). It is through social associations (relatively free from state control) “feelings and
ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the
reciprocal action of men upon one another” (Halpern, 2005: 5).

It is an undeniable fact of social life that an individual is a member of many
groups. Most of these groups lie outside the family. They simply fall between the state
and family. This social space is where the civic life of nation occurs. Social capital
operates in this sphere and influences the success of the society as well as the state. As
pointed out by Francis Fukuyama, “social capital has benefits that go well beyond the
economic sphere. It is critical for the creation of a healthy civil society- the groups and
associations that fall between the family and the state. Civil society...is said to be critical
to the success of democracy. Social capital allows the different groups within a complex
society to band together to defend their interest, which might otherwise be disregarded by
a powerful state” (Fukuyama, 2000:99-100). Main components of social capital are
following.

Social Networks: Social relations and networks are necessary conditions for social
capital to exist. Social networks are derived from the social relations of people. These
relations intensify over a period of time and acquire the form of networks. These relations
are sometimes confined to limited geographical space or spread over wider area. As
pointed out by Halpern, “in some cases the community, and the network that partly
comprises it, may be defined geographically or formally, such as a small rural village. In
other cases, its boundaries may be ill defined. The network can further be characterized
by its density (the proportion of people who know each other) and closure (the
preponderance of intra-versus inter-community links)” (Halpern 2005:10).

Social Norms:- Social norms can be defined as “rules, values, and expectancies that
characterize the community (or network) members... Many of these rules – if not all of
them are unwritten” (Halpern, 2005:10). Mention must be made of the fact that all values and norms that are shared by the members of the community do not necessarily produce social capital. As pointed out by Fukuyama, “sharing values and norms in itself does not produce social capital because the values may be the wrong ones” (Fukuyama, 2000:98). Mafias, people of underworld and criminals, for example, also share certain values and norms. Their behaviour too is governed by certain rules and norms. But they do not produce social capital for the simple reason that their values and norms are antithetical to society. Fukuyama agrees with this and comments, “the norms that produce social capital...must substantively include virtues like truth telling, meeting obligations and reciprocity” (Ibid: 99).

**Sanctions:** No society can flourish without the mechanism of rewards and punishments. Sanctions are inevitable component of social capital. “Sanctions are not just formal—such as punishments for breaking the law. Most are very informal, but are nonetheless effective in maintaining social norms” (Halpern 2005:11). They encourage certain behaviours and discourage other course of action. They facilitate social cooperation at the level that usually falls out of legal jurisdiction of the state. Sanctions particularly informal ones are more effective than law for the simple reason that they involve social criticism and praise. Individuals adhere to social norms not because they will be punished (although they might be if they regularly break them) but due to the reputation they command in the society by obeying them. Halpern notes that “more commonly...the sanction is indirect and subtle, such as gossip and reputation. The sanction can also be positive, such as praise for a helpful act...”(Halpern 2005:11)

**Trust:** Trust is so important component of social capital that, in the words of Fukuyama, it “acts like a lubricant that makes any group or organization run more efficiently... All societies have some stock of social capital; the real differences among them concern what might be called the radius of trust” (Fukuyama, 2000:99). According to Anthony Giddens, “trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles...”(Giddens, 1990:34).

Absence in time and space are the first and foremost condition for trust to exist. One does not need to trust someone or something whose actions are constantly visible or
whose cognitive processes are transparent. Similarly, one does not need to trust the system if its working is fully known and understood. Lack of information pertaining to the intentions and actions of others (individual, group or a system) is essential for trust to exist (Ibid: 33).

Another noteworthy characteristic of trust is its relation with contingency. It always implies reliability vis-à-vis the contingency of outcomes. Person who trusts someone relies on the other person’s intentions and actions to respond in an appropriate manner. As pointed out by Anthony Giddens, “this is why trust in persons is psychologically consequential for the individual who trusts: a moral hostage to fortune is given” (Ibid: 33).

Distinction must be maintained between trust, confidence and faith. Giddens argues, “trust is precisely the link between faith and confidence and it is this which distinguishes it from weak inductive knowledge. The latter is confidence based upon some sort of mastery of the circumstances in which confidence is justified. All trust is in a certain sense blind trust” (Ibid: 33).

Trust exists under two conditions in modern times. Firstly, trust operates in the context of general awareness that all human activity is socially constructed. It is not derived from some divine forces. Nor is it preordained by some impersonal cosmological order. Social construction of human activity includes the impact of science and technology on material conditions of human life. All people think one thing at the minimum that they are the master of their destiny. Secondly, trust exists in a drastically changed environment of human actions under modern circumstances. Modern social institutions have completely changed human action from the one that existed in pre-modern times. The concepts of fortune, luck and fate have been replaced by one of risk. Risk “represents an alteration in the perception of determination and contingency, such that human moral imperatives, natural causes, and change reign in place of religions cosmologies” (Ibid: 34).

Trust is inevitably interlaced with risk. Trust reduces the likelihood of danger and uncertainty involved in certain course of human action. In contrast, risk is by definition related to the uncertainty and the danger of particular course of action. It exists when the outcome of one’s action is not sure or completely sure. There are, of course, certain mechanisms that reduce the risk involved in human action. But, in comparison to trust, risk relates more to uncertainty and danger (Ibid: 35).
Why is trust important? Trust is important because functioning of economy and democracy requires certain degree of cooperation. Cooperation presumes some kind of moral community based on certain moral principles like honesty, thrift, telling the truth, keeping one’s promises, reciprocity, helpfulness and other civic virtues. As pointed out by Jennifer A. Widner, “it is by now almost a truism to suggest that higher levels of generalized trust are important for cooperation and growth. Higher levels of trust help facilitate contracts, make people more likely to invest, and create a basis for compromises where one party won’t realize a benefit except with a delay” (Widner, 2004:225).

Moreover, trust enhances the efficacy of the organization. Fukuyama argues that “trust can dramatically reduce what economist call transaction costs-costs of negotiation, enforcement, and the like-and makes possible certain efficient forms of economic organization that otherwise would be encumbered by extensive rules, contracts, litigation, and bureaucracy” (Fukuyama, 1995:90). Much depends on the habits of the community. If the members of a given community are in habit of cooperating among themselves, its social capital is automatically increased. In reverse case, however, lot of energy will have to be devoted in building trust among the members of the community. Fukuyama remarks that “moral communities, as they are lived and experienced by their members, tend to be the product not of rational choice in the economists’ sense of the term, but of nonrational habit” (Ibid: 90).

Public spirit and voluntarism are the important components of social capital. They are more important where the state has to be built from almost complete institutional deficiency. Newly formed state with its limited ability to reach the remote corners of the country desperately needs spirited masses coupled with voluntary association in the civic life of the state. Public spirit and voluntary association lubricate wheels of the state. It enables the state to concentrate its scarce resources for urgent priorities leaving others to be taken care of by the sensible people of the country. As pointed out by Widner, “in countries, as in institutions, a willingness to contribute to voluntary problem-solving efforts can dampen conflict potential and generate some of the rudiments of growth without assistance from the center. Strong states are those that can depend in part on such activity” (Winder: 2004:229).

Predisposition to participate in social and political life is a necessary condition for the successful functioning of the state. This primary condition of states success has not been given adequate attention in the scholarly discourse on social capital. It, however, is
a crucial dimension of the social capital of the country. As pointed out by Widner, "studies of social capital usually exclude this attitude, but because so many...agreements seek to involve ordinary people through the exercise of the vote and through other formal institutions, this predisposition is potentially important... It signals a willingness to work through established channels, presumably as an alternative to insurrection or the kinds of gossip and foot-dragging that constitute hidden forms of resistance" (Ibid: 229). In fact, it is one of the major problems of weak states that people do not want to participate in public life. Success of democracy depends on the quality of leadership as well as vigilance of the public. Being frustrated by their democratic experience people display remarkable political apathy in weak states. With modernization comes literacy, education, awareness, urbanization, mass media and exposure to new forms of life. They inevitably lead to revolution in rising expectations. Ability of an infant state-to satisfy the demands and expectations of people is limited in relation to their aspirations themselves. There develops, consequently, a gap between aspirations and their satisfaction. "This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political instability" (Huntington, 1968:54).

Sense of optimism is unsurprisingly missing in most weak states. Clearly intangible in form sense of optimism is a good indicator of legitimacy of the state. It also points towards the degree of social capital possessed by the community. As noted by Widner, "investment and compromise depend on having long time horizons or judgments that one is going to be better off in the future. People who are not optimistic, and therefore have shorter time horizons, may not invest and may be more likely to decline investments or exchanges and compromise that involve a payback in future" (Widner, 2004:231). Besides economy, sense of optimism is required for polity as well. People optimist about their future exerts less pressure on their governments than those who are deeply insecure.

Welfare of citizens clearly indicates the efficacy of the state. Being a buzzword the notion of welfare is susceptible to variety of interpretations. Money is the first criterion. Widner holds that "wealth has a big effect... People who earn more money or consider that their circumstances have improved financially do consider themselves better off, and that counts for a lot" (Ibid: 227).

Rule of law increases people's sense of well being. It is truism to assert that well governed state enhances the well being of their citizens. Safety of men and material, in
contrast, is a big concern of people in states mired in Hobbesian state of nature. As pointed out by Susan Rose Ackerman, “the establishment of the rule of law can imply either a strengthening of state capacities or a weakening of state power... By definition, a weak state cannot engage in organized predation, but it can disrupt lives and economic activity by its very weakness and its inability to control violence and the destruction of property... a fragile democratic state can be undermined by its own failure to limit private lawlessness” (Ackerman, 2004:182). Absence of rule of law increases people’s sense of insecurity. It is not an exaggeration to claim that most of political apathy that characterizes weak states precisely stems from the absence of the rule of law. People do not trust their government because they act according to private concerns rather than in public interests. Public law is subordinated to private interests and even whims, fancies and idiosyncrasies of political leaders in weak states. Widner notes that “individuals who say that security is a problem in their communities feel much less well off than individuals who live in communities where security is more assured. This feeling appears to be independent of personal worry about being the victim of crime. Concern for one’s own person is less important than the level of security in the community as a whole” (Widner, 2004:227).

Culture plays a crucial role in building social capital of the country. It is noteworthy that David Halpern neglects the role of culture in his discussion of components of social capital. He identifies only three components of social capital: social networks, norms and sanctions. Culture does not figure in his scheme of things. Not only David Halpern but also contemporary economic discourse neglects the role of culture in the success of economy, society and political system. As pointed out by Fukuyama, “for the past decade, the central debate over the global economy has taken place between the neomercantilists and orthodox neoclassical economists... What both sides in this debate miss is the role of culture” (Fukuyama, 1995: 101-102).

All this is changing rapidly. Scholars are increasingly realizing the role of culture not only in social capital but also in state building. Fukuyama holds that “it is clear... that both the need for an industrial policy and the ability to implement one effectively are dependent on cultural factors like social capital” (Ibid: 102).

Reasons for the neglect of culture in economic and politics are not hard to discern. As pointed out by Lawrence E. Harrison, “the conclusion that culture matters goes down hard. It clashes with cultural relativism, widely subscribed to in the academic world,
which argues that culture can be assessed only on their own terms and that value judgments by outsiders are taboo. The implication is that all cultures are equally worthy, and those who argue to the contrary are often labeled ethnocentric, intolerant or even racist” (Harrison, 2000:55). This tendency has been further aggravated by rational choice theory in economics. If one world is to be used to describe the theoretical edifice of rational choice theories; it is rational universalism. It postulates “that people will respond to economic signals in the same way regardless of their culture” (Ibid:55). They tend to forget that the same supposedly universal reason operates in a certain cultural milieu. Culture not only influences the reason but also in some very fundamental sense shapes and trains it. Harrison eloquently demonstrates the limitations of colonialism and dependency theories that have so far been used to explain economic underdevelopment of postcolonial states in general and Latin American countries in particular. In his words, “if dependency and imperialism are not responsible for our economic underdevelopment, our authoritarian political traditions, and our extreme social injustice what is?” (Ibid: 58).

He lists several attitudes that pose formidable challenges in the path of economic development of the state. They are following.

1. **The resignation of the poor**: Static cultures promote philosophy of poverty. According to this philosophy, meek and poor shall inherit the earth. Another version of this philosophy puts forward the idea that “to be poor is to deserve heaven. To be rich is to deserve hell. It is good to suffer in this life because in the next life you will find eternal reward” (Ibid: 60).

2. **Fatalism**: People of static cultures believe in fatalism. They exhibit remarkable disdain for values like thrift, industriousness and manmade destiny. As pointed by Harrison, “individual initiative, achievement, self-reliance, ambition, aggressiveness—all these are useless in the face of an attitude that says we must not challenge the will of God” (Ibid: 60).

3. **Discrimination with Girls and Women**: Members of parochial cultures believe that the right place of women is their home. They should remain within the four walls of the house. People of these cultures place low or sometimes no priority to the education of women. They think that girls do not need education, as they have to get married. Their attitude towards the boys is different. They should go to work and earn the livelihood for the family.
4. **Distaste for work:** Parochial cultures give low importance to work. Most of the people in this culture believe that they should not be bothered about the work. God will provide food and shelter because he has given birth to them. People work to live but do not live to work in the scheme of parochialism.

5. **Tyranny of Time:** People of parochial culture prefer to surrender before the tyranny of time. It is because of bad time they are poor, unlucky, backward and underdeveloped. Little thought is given and efforts made to change the time.

6. **Irrationality:** Unprogressive cultures are remarkably irrational. They do not attach much importance to scientific rationality. Since everything is predetermined nothing much can be done to alter the course of life. Wisdom lies in recognizing this universal truth which cannot be changed. Religious dogma and orthodoxy colour their views about the life.

7. **Neglect of the Future:** Conservative cultures strikingly emphasize their glorious past and painful present. In fact, they tend to reduce the pain of miserable present by remembering their so-called past. What is completely neglected is the future. Rational calculation and future planning are usually discarded. Uncertainties of life are emphasized to the extent that future can neither be predicted nor planned. Presentism prevails.

Progressive cultures stand in direct contrast to parochial ones. According to Lawrence Harrison, progressive cultures reflect different beliefs and attitudes towards life. They are following.

1. **Time Orientation:** Progressive cultures devote their energies to and attention on future. Instead of glorifying the past to console from miseries of the present, they opt to plan future. As pointed out by Lawrence Harrison, “future orientation implies a progressive worldview-influence over one’s destiny, rewards in this life to virtue, positive-sum economics.”

2. **Work Ethics:** Progressive cultures display great respect for work. Members of these cultures believe in the ethics of hard work. Nothing is given by God and everything has to be gained by work is the guiding principle. “Work structures daily life; diligence, creativity, and achievement are rewarded not only financially but also with satisfaction and self-respect” (Harrison, 2000:299).

3. **Education:** Progressive cultures respect education. Their members realize the importance of being educated in modern scientific world. They pay serious
attention and devote considerable resources to educate their children. Moreover, girls are not discriminated in progressive cultures. They are educated and trained professionally as men are.

4. **Merit:** Progressive cultures respect individual merit and efficiency. Every individual is judged on the basis of his merit in progressive cultures. Unlike static cultures in which nepotism prevails, progressive cultures encourage people to excel.

5. **Community:** Community life is strong in progressive cultures. Members tend to identify themselves with the community within which they lead their lives. They trust people that are beyond their respective families. As observed by Lawrence Harrison, “the radius of identification and trust extends beyond the family to the broader society. In static cultures, the family circumscribes community. Societies with a narrow radius of identification and trust are more prone to corruption, tax evasion, and nepotism” (Ibid: 299).

6. **Ethics:** Moral and ethical values govern the behaviour of people in progressive cultures. Code of conduct is strictly followed. Deviance is liable to punishment. Level of corruption is low and civic life is healthy in progressive cultures. As pointed out by Lawrence Harrison, “the ethical code tends to be more rigorous in progressive cultures. Every advanced democracy appears among the twenty-five least corrupt countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index” (Ibid: 299).

7. **Justice and Fair Play:** Justice prevails in progressive cultures. Fair play is the hallmark of social life. No one gets undue advantage and none is unnecessarily discriminated against. Most people behave in a just manner (Ibid: 300).

8. **Authority:** Authority is diffuse and horizontally allocated in progressive cultures. It is exercised efficiently. Authority is structured in such a manner that no organ of the system can behave irresponsibly (Ibid: 300).

9. **Secularism:** Religion plays little role in progressive cultures. It is generally confined to personal sphere of members. Social life in progressive cultures is based on the principle of secularism. As pointed out by Lawrence Harrison, “the influence of religious institution on civic life is small in progressive cultures; its influence is often substantial in static cultures. Heterodoxy and dissent are encouraged in the former, orthodoxy and conformity in the latter” (Ibid: 300).
10. **Frugality**: Frugality is valued in progressive cultures. It is the backbone of financial security. It helps attracting foreign investment. People are economic in progressive cultures.

The discussion can be safely concluded by saying that “these ten factors are generalized and idealized, and the reality of cultural variation is not black and white but a spectrum, in which colors fuse into one another... virtually all of the advanced democracies – and high-achieving ethnic/religious groups...would receive substantially higher scores than virtually all of the Third World countries” (Harrison, 2000:62).

Having discussed various components of the power under the rubric of physical base, ideational character and institutional efficiency of the state it, however, needs to be mentioned that there is no necessary one to one relation among these ingredients of national power. A country might be weak or partially strong in any one or two sectors of power unless it extraordinarily compensates in other area or areas. Deficiency of all segments of power would amount to the serious weakness or failure of the state. Physical base, for example, makes India a strong state. Performative legitimacy of state institutions is extremely poor in the country. The case of Pakistan provides the perfect example in which the physical base of the state is reasonably strong but country is seriously missing ideational and institutional power. Countries like Canada are the classic illustration of the situation in which state possesses sufficient physical and institutional power at its disposal but they are still struggling to acquire their national identity.

The discussion can be safely concluded by saying that the strength of states moves from one pole to another at the huge spectrum of power. What is significant is the direction in which state is moving at a given point in time. If the idea, physical characteristics and institutions of the state are well articulated and perform reasonably well, state can be easily called strong and successful. Converse of this leads to the category of weak and failed states. This alarming situation of weak states makes the influence of global culture worth exploring.