Chapter 5
Post 9/11 Debates: An Assessment

There is an increasing belief that the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States reversed a number of fundamental aspects of the prevalent global discourse on terrorism. Serious doubts were cast, for instance, on the time-tested dictum that terrorists want ‘a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead’. This assumption on terrorists’ aversion to using weapons of mass killing has also been put into question. Terrorists are increasingly inclined to use any weapons, which may in the future include nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons, to achieve their purpose. Terrorists have increasingly resorted to mass killings and on an increasing frequency which calls for fresh thinking and initiatives.

9/11 also make one thing clear: everyday objects could become devastating tools of terrorist violence depending on the intentions of the user. But again these objects may not have become as deadly as it seemed if it did not undergo much logistical planning and a large network of capable and committed people or groups. The hijacking of the planes and piloting them onto the targets must have taken months of planning, assisted by modern developments in communications and information technology. Not for nothing, several analysts have described the attacks in the US as indicative of the “new age” of terrorism.¹

¹ David Rapoport calls this the “Fourth Wave” of terrorism. He identifies 9/11 as the first signs of the new wave with religion as the inspiring factor after the ‘third wave’ which, according to him,
The global outcry against the attacks also indicated for the first time, and in good measure, that international efforts against terrorists could be institutionalized after all. A number of states in the international community came up with measures against terrorists affirming that these were part of the global efforts under UN auspices as per UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Both multi-lateral and bilateral forums discussed the issue and alliances were forged about how effectively the problem could be faced.

India and the United Kingdom are both states with a substantial experience in dealing with terrorism. Yet their initial reaction to 9/11 was quite in line with the general heightened rhetoric on the ‘new’ terrorist threats both diplomatically and within their respective states. There was a gradual buildup of both political and diplomatic offensive against terrorists in the following days with a portrayal of the threat indicating that the next attack of a similar kind and intensity was waiting to happen within their own borders. The response was quite comparable. The UK, but to a much lesser extent, India, immediately mobilized its anti-terrorist agents and departments into a much higher state of alert.

Both states passed tough anti-terrorist laws asserting that preempting the terrorists’ moves and their sources of subsistence as the first essential step. Also that such a passage was in line with the directives of the UNSC Resolution 1373 was inspired by revolutionary terrorism and which began a steady decline from the 1980s. Rapoport, David C., “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism”, Current History, December 2001, p. 419.
that called for "international cooperation to combat threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts." Both the countries also exhibited a much more forthcoming posture towards the United States – the victim – particularly in terms of the US diplomatic and military offensive in the aftermath of the attacks.

These overtly reactive responses, however, initiated an intense debate both within the political circles and the general public in both countries. In the United Kingdom, critics argued that the proactivism of the Tony Blair Government in this regard was far less to do with fighting terrorists than an attempt to reassert its international role. Earlier, Prime Minister Tony Blair, during his Doctrine of International Community speech in April 1999, in Chicago, had stated, "our values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society should be spread to the international community." The actions of the UK government have been seen as an attempt to realize this new political thrust. In the last two governments, it has been argued that the objective of the UK as a major international player had become quite evident. Human rights defenders accused the government of furthering the curtailment of individual freedoms and rights, which, they argued, had consistently deteriorated in the last two decades.

In the case of India too, bulk of the people have not taken kindly to the new policies of the BJP-led government in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks despite serious terrorist threats continuing at home. Critics have attacked the policies on

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the basis of two arguments. First, that the policies reflected an attempt by the new
government “to earn brownie points abroad” for the purposes of enhancing its
international and regional image, on the one hand, and ‘cornering’ Pakistan
accused of sponsoring terrorism on Indian soil on the other.\(^3\) Secondly, as an
attempt by the BJP to regain its ground as the true nationalist party both in the
states and the Centre by using terrorism as a political tool, particularly to gain
votes specifically on an anti-Pakistan agenda.\(^4\) Here too, human rights
organizations have come out with venomous attacks on the new policies saying
that this would only repeat the experiences of the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities Act (TADA), since lapsed, resulting in a continued abuse of the
liberties of the people and opening up avenues for the ruling party at the Centre to
silence the voice of the political opponents and minorities.

It may be reading too much into the criticisms offered in the aftermath of the 9/11
as terrorism has taken on a form that was highly unexpected and proved its
potency of mass destruction and also the fact that both cases face terrorist threats,
but it may also be perilous to take it too lightly. States have been known to pursue
legitimate policies for illegitimate purposes. India and the UK have in the past
used legitimate anti-terrorism measures for certain political contingencies remotely


\(^4\) For example, in the BJP Executive meeting in Amritsar, the party leaders made it very clear that POTO in particular and terrorism in general will be one of its main agenda for the upcoming elections in some states, particularly Uttar Pradesh. See, for example, “BJP All Set to Use POTO to Regain Its Credentials,” *Hindustan Times*, November 4, 2001.
connected with reducing the threat posed by terrorists. It is in this context that this chapter intends to delve into the debates generated in the aftermath of the recourse to extremely proactive anti-terrorist measures in the UK and India.

**Initial Reaction and Response**

In the days following the 9/11 attacks, the Indian government while sympathizing with the victims, condemned the act and expressed shock and outrage at the scale and nature of the tragedy. In letters addressed to the US President, George W. Bush, both the President, A.P.J. Kalam Azad, and the Prime Minister of India, A.B. Vajpayee, said that the acts were a “terrible reminder of the power and the reach of terrorists to destroy innocent lives and challenge the civilised order in this world”.

The External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, in a similar message, said that India stood in solidarity with the American people and the US government at this time of their tragedy. The Prime Minister also called a special meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) including the three Chiefs of Staff and Heads of various agencies, which reviewed the security situation, and the tragic events in the United States. At the meeting, the government initiated action for providing all necessary additional security and safeguards required for the US Embassy and Consulates in India.

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5 See the texts of letters to the US President by the President and the Prime Minister of India available at [http://www.meadev.nic.in/news/official/20010911/official.htm](http://www.meadev.nic.in/news/official/20010911/official.htm).
In a similar show of emotional outrage the United Kingdom, in the first few days, while expressing its condemnation of the attack and "our solidarity, our profound sympathy, and our prayers", announced that the attack was not only a "battle of the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism" and that the UK was in close touch with US, European and other allies, and would cooperate with them on issues of security arising out of the aftermath of the attack in the US. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said that the attacks raised serious concerns about the safety of the United Kingdom from terrorist onslaughts by groups such as the Al Qaeda. In a statement to the House of Commons on 14 September, Mr. Blair emphasized that terrorists had no respect for human life or for liberal values but that Britain and other Western countries were devoted to them. He also noted that during the attacks "at least 100 British citizens" had lost their lives making it a tragedy of "epoch-making proportions."

The Prime Minister was joined by his other Cabinet colleagues and other party members in condemning the attack. The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, described the attack as an "event of huge and almost unparalleled historical significance" and said that it was the "worst instance of terrorism against British people in half a century." Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and other smaller parties also condemned the attacks in strong terms.

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In both countries, this was followed by a number of announcements and critical decisions indicating the nature of the response that was envisaged. These may be broadly studied under the following headings: 1) assuaging religious tensions; 2) defining the act; 3) extent of support to the United States; 4) domestic imperatives.

Assuaging Religious Tensions

In both India and the United Kingdom, the government attempted to reassure the Muslim communities by pointing out that any decision to fight terrorism was not directed against them. This was in the backdrop of 'hatred' being perpetrated against the Muslims and reports of attacks against them in the United Kingdom and the perceivable religious tension with the danger of it escalating to communal clashes in India.

Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, in his address to the nation on 14 September 2001 said that he was not "prejudiced" against the Muslim community as no religion preached terrorism. He said that it was the "fringe elements" of society that sought to cloak terrorism in a religious garb thus doing grave injustice to both their faith and its followers. In a similar fashion, UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in his statement to the House of Commons on 14 September 2001 also said:

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We do not yet know the exact origin of this evil. But, if, as appears likely, it is so-called Islamic fundamentalists, we know they do not speak or act for the vast majority of decent law-abiding Muslims throughout the world. I say to our Arab and Muslim friends: neither you nor Islam is responsible for this; on the contrary, we know you share our shock at this terrorism; and we ask you as friends to make common cause with us in defeating this barbarism.¹¹

Both governments also attempted to allay religious tensions through rallying the various governmental authorities and by making official statements clarifying the government’s nature of response. For instance, on 26 September, during the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) meeting in New Delhi, the Union Home Minister, Mr. L.K. Advani, stated that there was a general agreement that nothing should be said or done that could in any way give the impression that the Government's determination to join the global war against terrorism was a fight against Islam or biased against any community.¹² It was also at this meeting that the ruling coalition adopted a unanimous resolution that said, “the National Democratic Alliance supports unreservedly and wholeheartedly the Prime Minister and the Government on the steps taken so far, are being taken now and will have to be taken in future in the global fight against terrorism.”¹³

Prime Minister Tony Blair also went on to assure the Muslim community in the UK that its actions were not targeted against them during a meeting with the representatives of the Muslim communities at 10 Downing Street on 27 September 2001. While indicating that the perpetrators would be brought to justice, the Prime Minister reiterated that he did not hold the Muslims responsible.

¹³ Ibid.
He said, “And I'd like to start by making one thing absolutely clear: what happened in America was not the work of Islamic terrorists. It was not the work of Muslim terrorists. It was the work of terrorists, pure and simple”.  

It may be noted that this issue also was a major topic of debate in Parliament during the passage of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001, wherein the provision to protect the Muslim community from being targeted for their religious beliefs was upheld.

**Defining the Act**

Even while efforts were being made to identify the perpetrators, there was tacit belief in the United Kingdom that the Al Qaeda had carried out the attacks. Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in a speech to the House of Commons on 14 September 2001 announced that the UK would go a long way in bringing to book the perpetrators, including an all-out diplomatic effort to build up world opinion against terrorists. He said, “we must bring to justice those responsible ... identify, with care, those responsible ... Once that judgement is made, the appropriate action can be taken.”  

As early as 4 October 2001, in a statement to the Parliament, Mr. Blair announced that he had received confirmed reports that “Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, the terrorist network which he heads” had planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September and that “Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were able to commit these atrocities because of their close

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15 Tony Blair’s 14 September 2001 statement to the House of Commons, [http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1598.asp](http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1598.asp)
alliance with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which allows them to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity.16

The Government of India did not clearly indicate if the Al Qaeda was to be held responsible for perpetrating the act in the US. It said that it was more interested in observing the fall-out of the events on Pakistan and Afghanistan, if the author of these strikes were traced to the Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden.17 The argument was that in case Osama bin Laden's hand was established, it would not only have serious implications on Afghanistan, where he was based, but could also implicate Pakistan, which was not only "widely known to have promoted the Taliban, which protected Laden" but also has been a source of exporting terrorism to Kashmir.18

In the three weeks following the attacks, Mr. Blair, in an attempt to convince other world leaders of the need to isolate the Taliban regime visited Berlin, Paris, Moscow and Washington for consultations. The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Jack Straw also visited the Middle East and Iran. He said that his visits abroad were to build up an international consensus against Osama and the Taliban regime and in which he noted that he had received immense support from the international community.

18 The Taliban was believed to have been promoted by Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), with the backing of the former Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, and her Interior Minister, General Naseerullah Babar. See "Govt. Discusses Fallout of US Attacks on the Region", The Hindu, 14 September 2001.
India’s diplomatic effort, quite unlike the UK’s, had a different focus. The National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr. Brajesh Mishra’s visit to the United States on 24 September 2001 was, for instance, aimed at driving home India’s position that if Al Qaeda was implicated, India had to be drawn into the efforts of the US as it pertained also to the ongoing terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, which had links with the Al Qaeda. In India’s posture there was an implicit message for the US to recognize India’s concern regarding cross-border terrorism, which earlier the US had consistently refused to openly acknowledge.

Extent of Support to the United States

Both India and the United Kingdom indicated that they would be ready to support the United States in bringing to book the perpetrators of the crime, although India preferred to approach the issue more cautiously. Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, in his 14 September 2001 address to the nation warily spelled out the contours of the nature of the response that New Delhi intended. In guarded terms he said:

[F]or years we in India have been alerting others to the fact that terrorism is a scourge for all of humanity, that what happens in Mumbai one day is bound to happen elsewhere tomorrow, that the poison that propels mercenaries and terrorists to kill and maim in Jammu and Kashmir will impel the same sort to blow up people elsewhere.  

20 ibid.  

236
Without mentioning names, he said:

[We] must strike at the roots of the system that breeds terrorism. We must stamp out the infrastructure that imparts the perverse ideological poison by which the terrorist is fired up. We must hold governments wholly accountable for the terrorism that originates from their countries. In other words, to get at the terrorists the world community must get at their organisations, at those who condition, finance, train, equip and protect them ... no region is a greater source of terrorism than our neighbourhood. Indeed, in our neighbourhood - in this, the 21st Century -- religious war has not just been fashioned into, it has been proclaimed to be, an instrument of State policy. 21

The substance of the remarks clearly indicates India's position that the international community recognise Islamabad's role in aiding and abetting terrorism in Kashmir. 22

Further, the Prime Minister, while saying that the South Asian region had become the hub of terrorism, it was likely that much of the response to the destruction that the terrorists caused on 11 September could take place in the vicinity. He called on democracies to "redouble" their efforts to defeat this grave threat to "our people, our values and our way of life." 23 In doing so, he assured the US that India was "ready to cooperate" in the investigations into the crime and to strengthen the partnership in leading international efforts to "ensure that terrorism never succeeded again." 24

The Indian Government stated that it would provide all operational support to the 'war on terrorism' in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks although it did not

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21 ibid.
22 See for example, "Strike at the Roots of Terrorism: PM", The Hindu, Saturday, September 15, 2001.
24 ibid.
make any statement if it would join the ‘coalition’, if requested by the United States, to be physically involved in action against Afghanistan, although most strategic analysts in India believed that it was most unlikely that the US would ask India to do so.²⁵ India had also reportedly given site maps of militant training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan to the US and had asserted that in the event of US attacks on terrorists in Afghanistan, there was all likelihood that terrorists would sneak into India. Despite the US response to the Indian overtures, characterized more by courtesy than intent, there were indications of growing interaction between the Indian Government and the United States on the issue of the US response. The Indian National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra – one of the first top-level government officials to be sent to the US – was reported to have told US officials that the war against terrorism was also very much a part of India’s war, but what seemed to be lacking in the new American approach was a non-appreciation of a comprehensive view of terrorism in the region, which included Indian concerns, for a long term solution to the terrorist problem in the region.²⁶

On the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly Summit in New York in November 2001, the Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, met the US President, George Bush, and held discussions on the issue. In a joint statement issued at the end of the talks, the leaders agreed “[t]he current campaign against the Al-Qaida

²⁵ The point here being that the US would be more inclined to use the services of Pakistan in this matter.
²⁶ See for example, “Mishra Makes His Point on Terrorism in J&K”, The Hindu, Wednesday, 26 September 2001.
network and the Taliban in Afghanistan is an important step in a global war against terrorism and its sponsors everywhere in the world”.27 The text of the statement also noted that both the countries recognized that they were “targets of terrorism, as seen in the barbaric attacks on September 11 in the United States and on October 1 in Kashmir”.28 The two leaders also agreed that developments in Afghanistan had a direct impact on its entire neighborhood.

It was evident that India was inclined not to protest against American plans in Afghanistan even though it was a definite shift of its long-held policy against American neo-imperialism’.29 It may be also noted that in what was an indication of improved bilateral relations, the US government announced that it was lifting the sanctions it had imposed in the aftermath of the Pokhran nuclear explosions by India in May 1998 and that the situation was back to the pre-Glenn Amendment sanction days.

Top sources in the Government, however, indicated that while India would have no hesitation in cooperating, it would like to see “the situation handled in a manner that would also be beneficial to us.”30 This was made clear during an all-party meeting called by the Prime Minister at his residence on 15 September. The BJP leaders particularly wanted the United States to recognize Pakistan’s role in

28 The 1 October 2001 attack targeted the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly building.

239
abetting terrorism on Indian soil given the fact that “it harboured those responsible for the Mumbai blasts of 1993” and “the hijackers of the Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar who also found shelter there” and the party wanted the US to “specify how it will punish Pakistan”. The National Security Advisor, Mr. Brajesh Mishra, who met senior Bush administration officials and law-makers during his visit to the US was also said to have pointed out in a quiet but forthcoming way, India's stand on terrorism that specifically pointed out at Pakistan’s direct role in Jammu and Kashmir. He was also reported to have drawn attention to the networking of the Al Qaeda in the ongoing terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair explicitly stated that the United Kingdom would work “shoulder to shoulder” with the United States in the efforts to trace the culprit. The United Kingdom’s policy-response, quite unlike India’s and its other European neighbours, was characterized much more by an outward policy that involved the issues of global terrorism and its impact on international security rather than the impact of 11 September and the threat of such large-scale terrorist act on its facilities within its territory. Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, in his speech to the House of Commons on 16 October clearly outlined the UK’s policy even though the UK’s policy had been articulated by the

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31 Ibid.
33 Talking to reporters about what he meant by standing 'shoulder to shoulder' with the US, Prime Minister, Tony Blair, explained that the 11 September attacks were "not" attacks on America but on the "free and democratic world everywhere" and that at a time like this it was imperative for "her allies" to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the Americans. Text of the interview is available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1597.asp.
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on earlier occasions. The immediate objectives of the UK government’s decisions, according to him, were, to bring Osama-bin-Laden and the Al Qaeda leaders to justice and to prevent them from posing further threats, to ensure that Afghanistan ceased to harbour and sustain international terrorism which entailed a destruction of all terrorist training camps and facilities and if necessary to effect a regime change if the present leadership refused to comply with the US ultimatum of handing over Laden and other leaders. Mr. Straw said that these were to be seen along with the wider objectives of eliminating the threat posed by international terrorism, deter states from supporting and harbouring international terrorist groups and to reintegrate Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community. Further, Straw declared that the objectives were to be achieved by all available means, both political and military. This policy of the United Kingdom received the necessary support of the two other front parties – the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, although certain individuals belonging to all parties spoke out against UK’s involvement. For example, Labour member Alan Simpson formed ‘Labour against the War’ which argued for the non-involvement of the UK in Afghanistan.

The UK government said that it would endeavour to do everything possible in military, intelligence and diplomatic terms to demonstrate its understanding of,
and support for the US in the campaign against terrorism. In his speech to the Labour Party Annual Conference a few weeks after the attacks, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, called upon the United Nations, the European Union, the G8, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others to act as a community in support for the US and to eradicate terrorism. In one of its first major diplomatic efforts, the UK was instrumental in getting a resolution passed in the UN Security Council (UNSC) condemning the attacks and subsequently the UNSC Resolution 1373. On 4 October, the UK representative to the UN, Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, was named Chairman of the UN Terrorism Committee that was formed to monitor compliance with the UNSC Resolution 1373.

The most important dimension of the UK support, however, has been the contribution of its Special Forces and marines in the war in Afghanistan under the codename Operation Veritas.\(^{36}\) Action in Afghanistan, from the first days of the war, saw British troops hand in hand with the American forces. Up to a total of 1,700 Royal Marines were sent to combat zones. Special Forces including the SAS were also dispatched. British involvement in the air campaign involved the provision of support aircraft for refueling the attack aircrafts launched from US aircraft carriers and Tomahawk cruise missile attacks launched from the Royal Navy submarines.\(^ {37}\) The UK not only supplied military equipment but also


assisted the US forces in intelligence gathering and target selections. Facilities at Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean and belonging to London, was opened to the US which provided a staging post for American bomber aircraft of B-52s and B-1Bs and as refueling base for American B-2 Stealth bombers.\textsuperscript{38}

In line with Mr. Blair’s earlier announcement that the UK would play a major role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan once its objectives of removing the Taliban and dismantling the terrorist facilities of the Al Qaeda were achieved, a financial package of £200 million for post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan and the supply of food was announced.\textsuperscript{39} London also sent 1,800 military personnel to Kabul to lead the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whose efforts were to provide security in and around Kabul including eliminating anti-personnel mines, training an Afghan security force personnel, advising the Afghan police and contributing to various aid projects.\textsuperscript{40} Originally the UK troops were expected to lead the ISAF for three months, this was subsequently extended until June 2002, when the decision was announced for the return to the UK of most members of the British contingent.\textsuperscript{41}

\textit{Domestic Imperatives}

In the weeks and months following the 9/11 attacks, the wait-and-watch policy of the Indian government were indications of cautious attempts to convince the

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 74.
\textsuperscript{39} Keohane, "The Response of the British Government to the Attack on America", p. 119.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p.119.
\textsuperscript{41} ibid., p. 119.
world community of the necessity to isolate Pakistan for its role in fomenting
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of India portrayed the event as
an onslaught waiting to happen. It made clear that the international community
had been warned already by the series of attacks already perpetrated of similar scale and in more frequency. India drew on the example of terrorist acts perpetrated in Jammu and Kashmir and the amount of lives and property it had cost and argued that if the international community did not act in one concert against terrorism, including terrorism in Kashmir, terrorists could be exported from the region to continue their activities in other states.42

On the domestic front, India came up with the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) on 24 October 2001. One of the salient features of the new law was the proscription of 25 organizations as ‘terrorist organizations’. In its press briefing on the promulgation of the new law the Ministry of Home Affairs said:

[t]here is an upsurge of terrorist activities, intensification of cross border terrorism, and insurgent groups in different parts of the country. Organized crime and terrorism are closely interlinked. Terrorism has now acquired global dimensions and has become a challenge to the entire world.43

The government insisted that without a comprehensive anti-terrorist law India was finding it difficult to redress its own terrorist concerns to protect its interests

42 Though names were not mentioned, the Prime Minister of India, A.B. Vajpayee, in his address to the nation made it amply clear that the international community should act in order to restrain Pakistan from supporting terrorists engaged in Jammu and Kashmir. For example, he said that earlier he had told the Congress in the US that there was no region that was a greater source of terrorism than the South Asian region. And that if the international community did not act to restrain what was happening in Kashmir, the same people could very well carry out like activities elsewhere. See text of the Prime Minister’s address to the nation on 14 September 2001, available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/PM%27s_address_to_nation_sept 14_2001.htm.
43 The text of the Press Briefing is available at http://www.mha.nic.in/pr102001.htm#2510.
against terrorists and their sponsors who were assuming India as a ‘soft state’. Referring to the recent attacks in the US the government pointed out that India’s experiences with terrorism in all its fury and death were far more acute. It called for a national consensus and passage of the Ordinance as a regular bill in the coming parliamentary session.

Even as the Indian government was attempting to put in place the new law, on 13 December, five terrorists attempted a day-light attack on the Parliament building that saw the death of seven people. Recalling an earlier attack on 1 October of the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly building in a similar fashion, the government embarked on what may be termed as the most proactive engagement against terrorists. The Cabinet immediately passed a resolution calling for the liquidation of the “terrorists and their sponsors wherever they are and whoever they are”. This resolution was seen by many security analysts in the country as displaying an intent to use unilateral action on terrorists even across the border when it was confirmed that the terrorists belonged to Pakistani-supported Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). India began a serious of diplomatic offensives against Pakistan, which not only included the cut-off of all relations but also threatened military confrontation along the border with Pakistan with an Indian military presence of 800,000 troops.44 In the perception of the Indian government this outrageous attack was aimed at the ‘heart’ of its democracy. This, along with the attack on the American Information Resource Centre in Kolkata on 22 January 2002, fortified India’s

stance that the US recognise Indian concerns within the scope of its 'war on terrorism'.

India’s diplomatic offensive against Pakistan scaled down to some extent after Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf announced a crackdown on terrorists and asserted that Pakistan territory would not be used for terrorist strikes against other countries. New Delhi also witnessed a flurry of visits in January 2002 from senior US officials. While, the visits were seen as attempts to scale down the tension between India and Pakistan, critics maintained that these were efforts by the United States to prevent anything unpleasant happening in the region close to its ongoing activities in Afghanistan.

In what may be considered as US success in influencing India and Pakistan, there was a deescalation of both rhetoric and war mongering in the LoC. It may also be noted here that even though the Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami that was responsible for the attack on the American Center in Kolkata on 22 January 2002 was said to have close links with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), India did not display a “knee-jerk reaction by blaming Pakistan” in order not to vitiate the already tense atmosphere. Moreover, in what was revealed as India’s intentions to forge a much closer alliance with the US, India reportedly accepted US

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47 Chari, P.R., “Attack on American Center, Kolkata”, in P.R. Chari and Suba Chandran, eds., Terrorism Post 9/11: An Indian Perspective (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), pp. 33-4.
“satellite imagery” of the position of forward troops deployment to avoid unwarranted military confrontation.

Meanwhile, India’s focus domestically in other areas included increased security in all airports and important government installations. During the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) meeting on 26 September 2001, the Home Minister, L.K. Advani urged the State Governments to be vigilant and step up security. He also indicated that the Chief Ministers of the Border States should be taken into confidence separately on the issue of security threats arising out of the US attacks and the possibility of communal flare-ups in the country on the issue of the Government’s determination to join the global war against terrorism as a ‘fight against Islam’. Additional security was provided for all the US consulate buildings in India. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met on 21 September 2001 to review the scenario in the region in the wake of the new development. Although the details of the meeting, which lasted 90 minutes, were not made known to the public it was widely believed to have focused on a more proactive stance on Pakistani-sponsored cross-border terrorism in terms of devising strategies about how this concern of India could be put across to the international community, particularly the United States.

On 26 March 2002, despite a lot of controversy within and without the various political parties, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was passed in the Parliament by a Joint Session, after it was promulgated a second time on 30

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December 2001 after the 13 December attacks on the Parliament building. And on
the heels of POTA, a regime to check money laundering – the Prevention of
Money Laundering Bill – was also enacted and passed by both the Houses of
Parliament. The Bill envisaged a “know your customer” policy and to report to
the regulating agencies any transaction worth over Rs. 10 lakhs.

Despite, India’s break from its traditional policy by attempting to forge a much
closer bond with the US, it has been argued that India has been left with little
choice, in terms of policy-responses, other than to focus more on consolidating its
domestic policy on terrorism. The reasons for this has been the continued
intransigence of the US authorities to recognize Pakistan as a ‘rogue’ state despite
evidences that it has been exporting terrorism on Indian soil and the fact that the
US (despite India’s overtures) has preferred Pakistan over India as a “frontline”
state in its ‘war on terrorism’. India’s increasingly rigid stand on Pakistan-
sponsored terrorism in India has also been the outcome of the growing
apprehensions that as long as the United States gave material and diplomatic
support to Pakistan, the South Asian region would be Pakistan-US-centric with
little political room for the other states in the region.

50 This has also been reflected in an article written by George Fernandes, India’s Defence
Minister. According to him, “[T]here is yet no commitment made by the US to be part of the war
that India has been fighting against this terrorism for over a decade. One should not therefore rule
out the likelihood of India having to fight its own war against terrorism on its borders, once the
US-led alliance calls off its engagement in Afghanistan ...”. Fernandes, George, “The Global
Fight Against Terrorism: Where to Begin and How to End”, in K.P.S. Gill & Ajay Sahni, eds., The
Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material & Political Linkages (New Delhi: Bulwark Books,
In the UK, the immediate response to the 11 September attacks were two fold. First, immediate steps were taken to put in place the national institutional and security apparatus to prevent attacks against targets in the United Kingdom. Secondly, the government was quick to pass the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act that provided for an extensive range of coercive and investigatory powers, which included financial transactions.

In October the Home Secretary announced that Civil Contingencies Committee and the various political and military agencies had been put in place to update preparedness, preventive action and remedial steps should they be necessary. Particularly in the area of civil aviation, while enhancing surveillance and checks at the airports, a scheme – Troika Scheme – was announced to provide ‘special’ insurance in case of terrorist outrages. The Ministerial Committee on Civil Contingencies, the COBRA Working Group and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat were to handle inter-ministerial and civil service working-groups for coordinating the measures of various governmental bodies in case of terrorist attacks.

On the law enforcement front, a Counter-Terrorism Committee under the Association of Chief Police Officers of the UK was established. The Committee was to oversee all the necessary security arrangements in and around US and

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52 Ibid., pp. 107-9.
other foreign establishments, in public places, in areas of aviation, transportation and maritime security, intelligence and surveillance and along the borders. The May 2002 budget increased the allocation for counter-terrorism to £87 million, the bulk of which was to go to the metropolitan police. The fire services, health and public safety services were also put on maximum alert with increased allocation in the budget for getting contingency plans ready in case of emergency.

The Parliament in mid-December passed the Anti-Terrorism, Security, and Crime Act, providing authorities with additional tools in the battle against terrorism. The government’s justification for the new law was ‘domestic public emergency’ arising out of the presence of foreign nationals in the UK. The government further stated that the public emergency arose out of the recognition by the UNSC, under resolution 1373, of the 11 September attacks as a threat to international security and hence urging all states to take measures to prevent terrorist attacks.

The Government in February 2001 added 21 international terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda to its list of proscribed organizations. On the basis of this Act, as of late 2001, UK authorities had reportedly frozen more than £70 million ($100,000,000) of suspected terrorist assets.

53 Ibid., p. 131.
54 Fenwick, Helen, “Responding to 11 September”, p.87.
55 ibid., p. 94.
On 8 October Prime Minister Tony Blair stated in the House of Commons that a series of air and cruise missile attacks had begun on the terrorist camps of Osama bin Laden and the military installations of the Taliban regime and were carried out by American and British armed forces with the support of other allies. He said that the attacks were carried out against 30 targets – 23 outside the main cities, 3 in Kabul and 4 in the vicinity of other large settlements. British forces, he said, were engaged in this action through the use of submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles fired against terrorist training facilities. Three weeks later, in a speech to the Welsh Assembly on 30 October, Mr. Blair announced that the air force, airfields and air defence systems of the Taliban regime were out of action and that all the main Al Qaeda camps had been profoundly damaged and destroyed and that the Taliban command and control facilities had been incapacitated. He also said that the combat troops could be recalled back while those troops mandated for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would continue to stay as long as an interim authority was in place in Kabul.

It was evident that the UK was making use of this opportunity to forge a closer relationship with the United States. Many analysts, however, see this new thrust in the foreign policy of the Blair Government as an indication of the UK's attempt to reclaim an important role in international affairs. Mr. Blair speaking at Lord Mayor's banquet on 12 November admitted that “new alliances or deeper

56 Tony Blair's statement to the House of Commons available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1621.asp.
alliances are being fashioned, new world views formed” and that the UK should “grasp the moment and move, not let our world slip back into rigidity.”58 He also said that he had on two earlier occasions – in April 1999, in his speech about a doctrine or idea of international community in Chicago and his Leader’s speech in 2001 in Brighton – made the point that the UK should take a ‘more active and interventionist role in solving the world’s problems’.

**Debate on the Indian Response**

While the nature of political debate that ensued in both countries in the post-9/11 attacks can be encapsulated in the parliamentary debates during the making of the respective anti-terrorist laws, the debates that took place outside the government have highlighted a number of insights. They have dealt with the contexts in which the two responded the way they did, the rationale behind the various policies and the intent of the respective governments. It may be worth noting that these debates have come in mostly in the form of critiques.

Critics in India enumerated a number of factors that were responsible for shaping the response of the Indian government other than the justifications offered by the government. These include India’s perception that it was being viewed as a ‘soft state’ in the aftermath of the Kargil War in 1999 in which no “victory trophy” was awarded and despite the fact that the international community was aware that in this case Pakistan was clearly the aggressor. The failed Agra Summit in which the

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58 Mr. Blair’s speech at Lord Mayor’s banquet, available at [http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1661.asp](http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1661.asp)
Indian Government saw Pakistan as having come with a “fixated pursuit of territorial acquisition in Kashmir” when India’s propositions revolved around a more comprehensive discussion on cross-border transit and other Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) – indicating that Pakistan was not interested in any ‘civilized’ diplomatic measures. These critics also argue that the 11 September attacks opened up the best ‘window of opportunity’ in India’s post-Cold War thrust to forge a closer relationship with the United States.

The Kargil war brought in a perception among the Indian government officials and a host of its defence analysts that while India appeared to have a far bigger military potential, it could not translate this in terms of war-fighting capabilities. The war also proved that in many situations Pakistan would have a military edge over India.\(^{59}\) This also meant that despite India’s size, economic superiority, and other advantages, India was seen as a ‘soft state’ by many in the international community. The other thing that the Kargil War revealed was that the Line of Control (LoC) was not sacrosanct proving India’s assertions that there was infiltration going unnoticed at the border. Pakistan’s continued assault to ‘bleed India’ by sending in militants, in the eyes of many Indians, was the outcome of India’s inability to take a US-like or a Israel-like stand against terrorism.

The hijack of the Indian Airlines flight IC 814 to Kandahar on 24 December 1999 and the subsequent release of Maulana Masood Azhar and two other militants,

Mushtaq Zargar and Ahmed Umair on 31 December, accompanied by the Foreign
Minister to Kandahar, in exchange for the hostages was also seen as not only
displaying a budge from its policy of non-negotiation with terrorists but the ability
of terrorists to engage India at the high places and getting away with it. Arnab
Goswami, for example, says that this incident “exposed the soft underbelly of the
Indian government, turning the BJP’s election slogans against a ‘soft Centre’ on
their head”.\textsuperscript{60} On 31 December the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen chief, Maulana Fazlur
Rehman Khalil was reported to have said that this was “a major defeat for the
government of India”. India’s Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, declared on 3
January 2000 that Pakistan had master-minded the hijack and urged the nations to
declare Pakistan as a “terrorist state” and particularly asked the United States to
take the initiative in this direction.

The last-minute scuttle of the talks at the Agra Summit from 14-16 July 2001 that
reportedly arose out of the contentious paragraph in the final document which
read “[S]ettlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue would pave the way towards
normalization of relations between the two countries”, reportedly convinced India
that Pakistan had come to Agra with a definitive plan to lay a strengthened claim
over Kashmir and with no effort to solve the differences between the two
countries.\textsuperscript{61} This, according to some analysts, was the reason why India refused to
sign the Pakistan-approved revised version of the contentious paragraph which
finally read “[P]rogress towards a settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue

\textsuperscript{60} Goswami, Arnab, \textit{Combating Terrorism: The Legal Challenge} (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2002),
p. 15.
would be conducive to the normalization of relations and would further the establishment of mutually beneficial cooperative relations”. The opinion among the government officials was that if Vajpayee could have gone all the way to Lahore, why was Pakistan sticking to Kashmir-centric discussions. These factors and perceptions played a major role in the subsequent action particularly against Pakistani-sponsored terrorist activities.

The 11 September attacks, perhaps, opened up the best possible opportunity to materialize its post-Cold War shift in foreign policy that envisaged closer cooperation with the United States and it was evident that India was not going to allow the opportunity to slip by. The attitude in the government was that America’s recent tragic experience with terrorism would certainly engender a more cooperative stance with regards to India’s concerns about cross-border terrorism. The Indian Prime Minister on various occasions announced, albeit cautiously, that India would go along the United States in its fight against terrorism in all its dimensions if the US isolated Pakistan for its covert activities on Indian soil. These favourable perceptions were also the outcome of the US response to India during the Kargil War, which were indicative of long-term diplomatic support to India’s terrorism/infiltration concerns. Indian government officials and defence analysts were of the opinion that engagement with the

63 The US, for instance, made it clear to Pakistan that there would be no reward for Pakistan’s aggression and that Islamabad should unconditionally and immediately withdraw from Kargil. See Chaudhuri, Pramit Pal, “A Question of Restraint: US Policy During the Kargil Conflict”, in Kanti Bajpai, Afzir Karim and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., Kargil and after: Challenges for Indian Policy (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2001), p. 349.
United States would play the most important role in reining in Pakistan – an issue that had consistently hindered India from projecting its influence both in the region and at the global level.

The goal of India to achieve its twin objectives of coming much closer to the United States and the isolation of Pakistan became much more realistic when the Parliament building was attacked in broad daylight and the accusing finger was pointed to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) with support from the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), organizations known to be supported by Pakistan. Giving a cue that India was contemplating action on terrorist facilities across the border just as the United States had attempted to bring “justice” to the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks, a resolution to liquidate “terrorists and their sponsors everywhere” was passed by the Cabinet and there was an almost instantaneous build-up of forces along the LoC.64 Voices were echoing in the government circles that “the government should do what America has done in Afghanistan and what Israel is doing in Palestine.”65

The response from the United States to the military build-up came in the form of diplomatic pressure urging restraint through top-level US government official visits which included Secretary of State, Colin Powell, Ambassador on Counter-Terrorism, Francis X. Taylor, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) chief, Robert

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65 Ibid., p. 17. Shrichand Kripalani, BJP Member of Parliament from Rajasthan was reported to have made this statement.
S. Mueller and Defence Intelligence Agency chief, Thomas Wilson.\textsuperscript{66} While details of what transpired between the two governments were not divulged, it was clear that the United States did not want India taking any action against Pakistan given its engagement in Afghanistan. In what may be termed as a scale-down from its earlier position, Indian government officials said that the troops would not be pulled back until India was convinced that Pakistan was serious about curbing infiltration. The United States was able to elicit a statement from the Pakistani President that was intended to appease India. In India, US government officials also did not hesitate in praising Musharraf for the ‘steps’ he was taking against terrorist organizations in Pakistan.

Most analysts in India pointed out that all these visits of the US officials focused on de-escalation of the rising temperature between the two countries. This, according to some of them, was a welcome development because it was suggestive of the growing intention of India to promote its interests vis-à-vis the United States. India’s hopes that such overtures would ultimately translate into recognition of India’s credentials over that of Pakistan allowed India to depend more on Washington to defuse the tension in the region.

Crudely put, in the eyes of these critics, the Indian response had far less to do with ‘fighting terrorism’ but was part of its attempts to ‘alienate’ Pakistan as a responsible democratic state. India’s policy of coming closer to the United States

has been seen as an effort to revived ties that would enhance its image both regionally and globally.

**Debate on the British Response**

Quite similar to the nature of the critiques in India, there have been a number of opinions against the proactive response of the United Kingdom to the attacks in the United States. While some argue that the main reason for the United Kingdom to have responded the way they did was the perception of the UK of its own vulnerabilities given the decades-old experience with Irish terrorist activities and attacks by foreign terrorists on its soil and the death of more than 100 British nationals in the Twin Tower attacks, others point out that decisions in this regard has been indicative of the shift in the British government’s foreign policy that has sought for a new role in international affairs, particularly after its involvement in the Kosovo crisis.\(^67\) The government, for example, continually asserted that although Northern Ireland has been seeing relatively peaceful days, the ‘looming’ threat of international terrorist acts was seen as becoming more real and dangerous.\(^68\)

Before 11 September, the UK’s response to terrorism was built around the various legal measures it formulated through the years. While other forms of political,

\(^68\) Bruce George, Labour Chairman of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, was said to have drawn attention to the failure of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review to address the issues of “asymmetric threats” and “other weapons which the weak may choose to deploy against the strong”. He was also said to have told the House that the bombing of the US Embassies in East Africa was going to be the “war of the future”. Quoted in Keohane, “The Response of the British Government to the Attack on America”, p. 114.
economic, diplomatic and military/police response were also initiated, most of these were focused on terrorism related with Northern Ireland and consolidating its domestic anti-terrorist measures. Its diplomatic efforts in this regard were also limited to being a “party to multilateral treaties of the ‘extradite or submit to prosecution’ model”, although it may be noted that the UK in conjunction with other European partners were the first countries to effectively apply sanctions against states sponsoring terrorism as per the Bonn Summit Declaration 1978.⁶⁹

It was the Blair Government’s approach towards political resolution that allowed the UK to take a much more outward-looking policy on terrorism. Significant in this regard was the close cooperation it was getting from the United States both for resolving the Northern Ireland conflict and for pursuing an upbeat policy against terrorism in the foreign policy realm. It was the United States that contributed towards the start of the peace process through a small group of Irish-Americans, with key political and corporate links, who were instrumental in persuading the Clinton White House to become interested in Northern Ireland.⁷⁰ Traditionally sympathetic towards militant republicanism, the United States moderated its attitude to encourage Irish republicans to consider the advantages offered by a ceasefire and a peace process. This new approach of the Clinton Administration brought the two countries much closer with regards to fighting terrorism.

The improving relationship between the two countries was also made clear in the active involvement of the UK in the Kosovo crisis under the imprimatur of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In what was seen as a “sharp break with the tradition of pragmatic British foreign policy”, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in his “doctrine of the international community speech” in Chicago in April 1999 said in unambiguous terms that “countries like Britain and the USA – that is the major rich Western states – speak for the international community” and “persuade and, where necessary induce others to accept their perspective”.

In the Kosovo conflict, the Blair government also judged that the UK was particularly effective in using its connections with key actors and its military and diplomatic sources to advance both its humanitarian values and the international agenda. The increased mention by the UK Government at the international level of issues such as international community, humanitarian intervention, international morality, poverty and debt in developing countries and war crimes tribunals has been seen as attempts by the UK to pursue a much more outward looking policy.

Critics have argued that the attack on the United States gave the UK an opportunity to showcase this new shift in its foreign policy to the international community. In his statement to the House of Commons on 14 September, Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made it apparent that the UK’s involvement in the attacks

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72 Ibid., p. 116.
on 11 September would be on the basis of the terrorists’ assault on “basic democratic values” everywhere.\textsuperscript{73} Impressing upon members of the NATO that the attack not only was targeted against the West and its values, but also was instructive of future attacks in the West, the UK took active part in calling upon the Alliance members to invoke Article 5, which determined that this attack in America was to be considered as an attack against the Alliance as a whole. It also endeavoured not only to get the UN Security Council to pass a resolution to take all necessary steps to combat terrorism but also stressed that the Council members should translate the solidarity into support for action.

The UK support to the United States, according to most analysts, was intended to clinch a berth as the front ally of the United States in Europe.\textsuperscript{74} According to them, it was in the best interest of the UK to have the US as its partner across the Atlantic to realize its twin objectives of asserting and influencing events both in Europe and on the international stage. Besides, the UK had no intention of jeopardizing the already strong economic links with the US – the US is Britain’s largest trading partner.\textsuperscript{75}

The introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000 has been viewed by critics as the first indication of this outward policy and represented a “decisive break with the past.”\textsuperscript{76} From a focus on domestic terrorism in the other laws, the new law

\textsuperscript{73} See text of Tony Blair’s speech available at \url{http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1598.asp}.
\textsuperscript{74} See for example, Dorman, “Loyal Ally”, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 74.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 85.
particularly targeted terrorist threats that had an ‘international’ character. The passage of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001 with provisions aimed not only at international terrorists but also their reach and influence has fortified this argument of the critics.

An Assessment
At the very outset, any assessment of the initial response of India and the United Kingdom to the events following 9/11 terrorist attacks show that despite their long and quite similar interface with terrorism their response has not been identical if not completely divergent. Critics remain convinced that the proactive responses indicate in clear terms ‘political’ reasons for the resort to such policies. In the UK, point to the clear “shift” in the government’s posture against terrorism to a political-internationalist agenda and in India, the accusation has been that the heightened emotion against terrorism gave the BJP an opportunity to strengthen its political ambitions in the region, as also manipulating the people for votes on an anti-Pakistan agenda.

These arguments posited by critics seem to have been further strengthened by certain factors. In the case of the United Kingdom, quite contrary to government justifications of an escalation in terrorist threats, the Strategic Defence Review 1998 of the Blair Government had said, “today there is no direct military threat to the United Kingdom” – a statement fortified by the scale-down if not complete
cessation of all types of violence in the aftermath of peace in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{77}

A heightened anti-terrorist preparedness despite such reports allowed critics to view the new policies as going too far at the expense of civil liberties of its citizens. In the case of India too, the Ministry of Home Affairs statistics indicated a decrease in terrorist incidents in the year preceding 2001 in Jammu and Kashmir, the supposedly chief state of concern.\textsuperscript{78} Although this may be reading too much into bare statistics, as the number of lives lost has been massive, this has given an opportunity for critics to attack the chief premise on which the Government had based its policies.\textsuperscript{79}

While the official rationale proffered in both cases has been the future threat of such scale and devastation within their territories, critics argued that in both cases the attempt had been to take advantage of the new development to overhaul their respective foreign policy strategies to the new and shaping international order that see the United States as the sole superpower and hence ‘going along’ with the US would be to the advantage of both countries.

It may be noted that both the UK and India, until recently, had not agreed to the unilateral approaches of the US in dealing with various global issues. In the case

\textsuperscript{77} The Strategic Defence Review, Cm.3999, London: HMSO, 1998, Chapter 3 on Defence Missions and Tasks.

\textsuperscript{78} There were a total of 919 civilian, 536 security personnel and 2020 militant fatalities in the year 2001. In 2002, fatalities included 783 civilians, 439 security personnel and 1561 militants. See http://mha.nic.in/annual\%20report(contents).htm

\textsuperscript{79} For example, the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, a human rights research organization based in New Delhi, argues that the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance was promulgated despite reports of declining death statistics and de-escalation in terrorist violence. See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance: Government Decides to Play Judge and Jury (New Delhi: SAHRDC, 2001), pp. 16-7.
of the UK – a country that had consistently argued in favour of a multilateral approach towards various international issues – it was the involvement in the Kosovo crisis that saw a shift in its long-held policy of multilateralism. While the NATO bombing of Kosovo was not mandated by the United Nations, the UK argued that its policy-shift was the result of the massive humanitarian assaults being perpetrated in the State. After 11 September, the UK Government also pointed out on several occasions that one of its core reasons for joining the war on terrorism was the nature of the humanitarian crisis arising out of the governmental policies in Afghanistan. It argued that it would also take an active part in the reconstruction of Afghanistan once a change in regime had been effected in the state. It became evident that the UK had accepted American unilateralism.

Indian foreign policy has also consistently favoured multilateralism. Quite like the UK, India’s overtures to the US in the aftermath of 11 September indicated a change that point towards its willingness to fall in line with the US provided it accepted Pakistani aggression in Jammu and Kashmir which the US was unwilling to do given its interest in the facilities in Pakistan for its various trysts in the region and which it knew it would not be getting from India. India’s overtures, however, have been indicative of its willingness to accept the US approach towards various global issues.

In both cases, the Government contended that its new outlook and its willingness to work with the US was based on the ‘threat to democracy everywhere’. Both
argued that there had been an escalated attack on democracies because these societies allow even extreme elements to be part of the political processes. The two governments maintained that democracies should get together to fight against the challenges posed by elements opposed to the way ‘civilised’ people behaved in international life.

Critics, however, have not taken kindly to this justification. They maintain that in actions taken by both governments democracy had become the victim in the increased constraints on civil liberties of the ordinary citizens through the various legal measures and military/police strategies, despite reports that domestic terrorism had been on the wane or had not escalated. They also point to the growing attempt by both countries to pursue an aggressive foreign policy agenda that envisaged a new roles for both in their respective regions of interest.

A number of these arguments go on to prove the perils of a concept such as terrorism. All through the chapters of this thesis the intrinsic linkage between ‘terrorism’ and politics in the dynamics of everyday governance has been established. The political debate on terrorism, particularly, in the two cases above has given prominence to the ‘political’ rather than ‘terrorism’ aspect of the threat. The difference has been the rather wide gap in the degree of ‘politicismisation’ of the issue. It must be noted that the post-9/11 debates took place with little regard for concerns that would promote the rights and liberties of the people indicating that in times of crisis, governments tend to become reckless and are prone to promote
authoritarian tendencies even in democracies and which usually takes place in the form of politicizing 'security'. In times of crisis, wisdom suggests that it is a much more focus on the 'human' rather than politically coercive and authoritarian measures that will impact positively on the core contentions of the protagonists of conflict including terrorism.