CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING:

RWANDA AND BURUNDI
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to analyse the genesis and causes of conflict, especially those with violent overtones. Of the various causal factors, this study focuses on conflicts that are a direct fallout of identity assertion or ethnic aggregation. As conflict in society has different repercussions, this work concentrates on the plight of the people uprooted due to conflicts and forced to flee, namely refugees. In this chapter an effort will be made to unravel the relevant background of both the case studies, viz., Rwanda and Burundi.

It was deduced in the previous chapter that violent conflicts are not random; they are structured. Violent activity is a dependent variable with various causal factors. The main causal factor for violence is that human interaction is hierarchical and vertical. This hierarchy replicates itself in every sphere of human interaction. Hence, a study of how a hierarchical structure was established in these countries has been carried out here and it is also shown how ethnicity became a component of the conflict system.

We begin with a brief description of the geographical and historical setting of the regions. This is followed by an overview of the migrations of Bantu and then of the herders into the region.

The centrality of the state, as was argued, is of paramount importance in explaining these contemporary conflicts. It is therefore imperative to know how state evolved and crystallized. It is also essential to understand the historical process, related to the emergence of Tutsis as the ruling class. Variation of historical narrative has often served as the emotive rallying point to mobilise people. Hence, it is essential to delve into and understand this contest of histories.

The real grievance or the sense of deprivation that the Hutus felt was due to the imposition of clientships and forced labour by the Tutsi lords. This exploitation
rose sharply after the coming of the colonial power and the establishment of the office of customary chiefs. All such chiefs appointed by the colonial powers were Tutsis as the former subscribed to the Hamatic theory of superiority of the noble Tutsi \textit{vis-à-vis} the Hutu.

However, the colonial rule brought other influences especially Christianity. In the post Second World War era the Church began to incorporate social concerns and promote Hutus. As result a counter-elite emerged that employed and exploited the issue of ethnicity, to mobilise and rally the Hutus; in Rwanda it was successful in replacing the Tutsi monarchy. However, the Burundi Tutsis succeeded in continuing their control.

During the decolonisation process the elite learnt the efficacy of using ethnicity to mobilise people for political ends. Therefore, it is essential to know how ethnic groups aggregated and were mobilised. The elite or the leadership continues to employ ethnicity for political ends.

Post-independence, both these neighbours, with diametrically different elite groups in power pursued different agenda. We have also undertaken a brief study of the post-colonial developments and the ensuring political process, and demonstrated how the two countries coped with these challenges. We have also analysed the developmental model which was under stress, resulting in establishing the conflict system as discussed in the first chapter leading to genocide in both the countries.

**GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING**

Rwanda and Burundi are two landlocked countries located in central African Rift Valley. Situated slightly south of the equator, this region is one of the highest lying areas of the African continent. Rwanda has an area of about 26,338 square kilometres,
while Burundi’s is about 27,834 square kilometres. They are bound on the east and the west by the converging frontiers of Tanzania and Congo and on the north by Uganda. The river Akanagru separates both the countries except in the extreme east where the Kagera river valley acts as the border.

The climate except for the lake-shore region of Burundi is generally hot and humid throughout the year. The annual average temperature in both the countries hovers around 20°C. The average rainfall in these areas varies around 1200 mm but the volume and frequency of precipitation vary markedly according to the season. Heavy rainfall years are often followed by severe drought years.

East of the lake Kivu and traversing the entire region from north to south are giant peaks of the Congo-Nile crust. These peaks reach a maximum height at the Viruga chain in Rwanda, with Mt. Karashimbi (4519 meters) being the highest peak. This great volcanic massif covered with thick tropical woodland, merges into an undulating plateau with altitudes varying between 1400-1800 meters.

Typical landscape consists of hills and valleys scattered with eucalyptus and banana groves, interspersed with patches of pasture lands. It is a fertile region, ideal for herding and cultivation of food crops. These merge in the edges into the Savannah zone. The vegetation in the Savannah zone range from vast stretches of arid and treeless grassland to acacia shrub-land and bamboo forests.

Despite these features Rwanda and Burundi are among the poorest countries in the whole of Africa. This is partly due to the lack of any significant mineral resources and partly due to the absence of developed markets for agricultural produce. As a result, their economies continue to be subsistence economies. The only important exportable cash crop is coffee, which was introduced in 1932, by the Belgian authorities. The other main crops are beans, peas, sorghum, cassava, maize and
bananas. Food security in this region is very tenacious, as is evident from the famines of 1916 and 1946 that resulted in 50,000 and 36,000 deaths respectively.¹

Both these countries are densely populated and this tends to cause stagnation and put other kinds of stress on the economy. The population of Rwanda, according to the 1991 Census, stood at 7,142,755, with a population density of 271 persons per square kilometre. Similarly, Burundi had a population of 6,090,000 and a population density of 218.8 persons per square kilometre.

Under these conditions, fulfilling the essential needs and requirements of a dense and fast growing population has been a difficult and elusive task, resulting in the more fertile areas to be over cropped and over stocked. Inhospitable terrain—mountains and deep valleys—with thick tropical forests along with the absence of mineral resources has hindered industrialisation and development of the means of communications. There are no railways and until 1922 there were no roads for vehicular traffic. The axis of communication between Rwanda and Burundi, the Bujumbura-Kigali-Kakitumba road, was completed only in 1931.

MIGRATION OF BANTU PEOPLE INTO THE GREAT LAKES REGION
An interesting aspect of the linguistic map of Africa is that almost all the people occupying the southern third of the continent—an area spanning from the Nigerian sea coast in the west to Somali coastline in the east and up to Port Elizabeth in the south—speak similar languages. The inhabitants of this area, speak closely related languages known as Bantu languages; numbering four hundred, all derive from the same ancient language known as proto-Bantu.²

H. H. Johnson has outlined the growth and spread of the Bantu languages by retracing its history using linguistic methods. The ancestor of the Bantu were from Bahar-al-Ghazala, near the Benue and Chad basin. The first migratory movement of the Bantu was eastwards towards Mount Elgon and from there to the western shores of Lake Victoria, then to mainland Tanzania and Zairian forests. The first large-scale movement began around 300 B.C.

It has been deduced from the old vocabulary\(^3\) that the communities, which spoke the ancestral Bantu language, cultivated yam, certain other roots and cereals. The only domesticated animal was goat. Though these communities indulged in hunting, they specialised in fishing. The society was organised on the basis of kinship and the community had its specialists, leaders and religious experts. Beliefs in ancestry and sorcery were prevalent.

Some of these migrating groups decided to settle down on the eastern bank of the Great Lakes while others migrated further south. These communities soon began to develop into societies and incorporated into themselves, the inhabitants living in the region including those in Rwanda and Burundi.\(^4\)

Significant movement of the Bantu-speaking people took place in the Great Lakes region in the second half of the first millennium A.D. This brought a considerable expansion of the territories inhabited by the lacustrine societies.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) S. Langa, ibid, p. 148
\(^4\) The proto-lacustrine people on the basis of linguistic, oral tradition and archaeological evidence were the inhabitants of the Bakoba area at the turn of the Christian era. The proto-Takawe people may have lived to the south of the proto-lacustrine societies, who along with other communities living in the area of Rwanda and Burundi were incorporated into the expanding proto-lacustrine society. See: C. Ehret, "The East African Interior" in *The General History of Africa*, vol. III (Paris: UNESCO, 1985) p. 623
\(^5\) The original lacustrine societies shape among early Iron-age Bantu settlers in the area along the western and south-western shores of the Lake Victoria. They were presumably the makers of the kind Urew pottery from the Bakuba and predominately associated with impressive early Iron-age sites. The ethnic neighbourhood of these societies at the turn of the era included southern causites, probably the rift people who had spread as far as southern side of lake Victoria and central Sudanese from whose language the lacustrine word for 'cow' among others came. Some outwardly movement had already taken place by the first century of the Christian era, implanting the lacustrine dialects from which Rwanda-ha and Kongo languages would in time evolve, C. Ehret, ibid, p. 623
State of Rwanda could have borrowed any institution from the agriculturists or that any 'Hutu' ruled over the noble 'Hamitic pastoralists'. State formation among the agriculturist in this region antedates the advent of the herders. Besides, there was peaceful coexistence between both the groups prior the to processes of State formation in the fifteenth century. This State formation was to a large extent responsible for the creation of social classes in this region.

Tradition reveals that the first inhabitants of the region were forest hunters and they practised pottery and basket work. Later, the Bantu-speaking agriculturist exchanged skins and meat for salt and iron goods with them. The Bantu society was organised into different lineages and clans, and was thus structured like an extended family, with the heads of the family constituting the highest authority. As more immigrants arrived, the clan structure evolved to include others who were not.

Similarly, J. P. Webster and others content that 'wealth of the original cultural heritage was wasted on the Europeans due to their obsession with the 'Hamitic theory'. Hamitic denote Africans of a superior race opposed to Negroes, as such was applied from the earliest exploration onwards to Hima and Tutsi groups on the basis of stereotyped aesthetic impressions and political consideration. The entire civilisation of the Great Lakes was attributed to Hamito-Semitic migration from the east, which is assumed to have introduced cow, the system of royalty and even some aspects of monotheism. Speke put forward the hypothesis of an oromo invasion between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, which made the region a second Ethiopian'. J.P. Webster, B.A. Ogote and J.P. Chretien. "The Great Lakes Region: 1500-1800" in The General History of Africa, vol. V, (Paris: UNESCO, 1985) pp. 803-4

Also, it is clear from the tradition that not all pastoralist started as rulers nor did they all end up as rulers. The tradition says ' a Basiisa family of three brothers and a sister were led by an eagle to the court of King Wamera. One of the brothers Kateizi dropped out and married a local woman and adopted agriculture. The others reached the Bachwezi court. Ircmera married the king, Rugo was appointed to rule over Buzimba and Kinyongi became Wamera’s agent in Bachweju. Each was given a royal drum and a hundred head of cattle'. B.A. Ogote, n. 8, p. 511

10 There is enough evidence to show that the new States of Rwanda were not being established on Stateless people. These 'States varying in size and strength had evolved institutions of kinship as well as ritual power over land and rain. Some were incorporated into the expanding new Rwandan State. The court rituals in Rwanda were politically effective largely because they incorporated agriculturist and pastoralist rituals in society'.

State formation in this region predates the arrival of the Tutsi is evident from the history of Boranzi clan. Boranzi clan provides the link between the Batenuzi and the next dynasty – the Bachwezi.

According to 'Kinyoro tradition, the founder of the clan, Bubuke was a commoner and an official in the court of Isaza (1301-28 AD), who was the last of the 'pioneer kings' and is the grandfather of Ndahura'. The Tutsi rather than conquering rulers were the subjects in the court of king Ndumera (1344-71) of Bachwezi. The king was captured during an invasion of Ithargiro in Bukoba when a solar eclipse caused panic among his troops. He was succeeded by his son Wamara (1371-98). Wamara’s rule was more turbulent than that of his father. One of the causes for this was the advent of many new immigrant groups. He enlisted their support by appointing them in important political posts. The immigrants soon developed into over-mighty subjects'. B.A. Ogote, n. 8, p. 502
ARRIVAL OF THE TUTSI PASTORALISTS INTO THE REGION

In the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi each side/party is using different understanding of history\(^6\) to aggregate support and legitimise their actions. The control of the State was projected as a means through which the group's collective interests could be safeguarded. Without a clear relief of the conflicting histories and historical process, it is difficult to comprehend the contemporary conflicts. One should not forget here that the efficacy of historical narration in these conflicts is enormous. This is despite the warning given by Mamdani that much of the historical facts have to be considered as tentative, if not outright fictional. And this is becoming clear, as a "post-genocidal sobriety compels a growing number of historians to take seriously the political uses to which their writing have been put".\(^7\)

The herders are portrayed as civilising conquerors who introduced law and order where there was anarchy. The Bantu farmers are seen as the docile and silent majority who neither initiated any development nor founded any State. Refuting this B.A. Ogote\(^8\) opines that Rwanda provides an excellent example of the bias of portraying herders as civilising rulers. Kagame,\(^9\) similarly does not consider that the

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\(^6\) In such a polarised atmosphere, historical reconstruction is itself highly contested. Here, with an intensity that surpasses the normal cliché, there is no single history; rather there are competing "histories". Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda", \textit{Africa Today}, vol. 45(1), 1998, p. 9

\(^7\) Mahmood Mamdani, "From Conquest to Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflection on Rwanda", \textit{New Left Review} (pop), vol. 216, March-April 1996, p. 8


\(^9\) B.A. Ogote argues that the 'outmoded Hamitic theory of Kagawe and the White Fathers maintained that present Rwanda was formerly occupied by a motley of Bantu organisations. Into this region came a cohesive group of pastoralist, 'Hamitic Tutsi' from the north who introduced pastoralism, iron making, concept of kinship, a caste society and a number of new crops. Under their leader Guihanga, they established a number of Tutsi dynasties from the tenth century. Through diplomacy, conquest and economic power based on the Tutsi control of cattle, their State gradually expanded to include all of modern Rwanda. Through a system of vassalage in which the Bantu (Hutu) received the use of cattle in return for services and loyalty, the conquered were assimilated into the State. It also marks the origin of class system in Rwanda or what Maquet has termed 'the premise of inequity in Rwanda'. B.A. Ogote, ibid, p. 517
necessarily the descents from the same ancestor. The clan structure thus was able to
evolve and transform itself from kinship organisations to a political organisation with
territorial boundaries. “The chief of the clan was also the chief of the land and the
area was named after the dominating family.”

By the fifteenth century, many of the Bantu had organised themselves into
small States. Each comprising several different lineages under a ruling lineage headed
by Mwami, who was both the chief as well as a ritual leader in-charge of rain-making.
It was about this time that the migration of herders increased sharply. Initially they
were not a dominant caste and they may have been clients of the cultivators. The
herders did not move in large cohesive groups, instead they came in small groups over
a long period of time. By the end of the century however they were numerically
strong enough to form powerful lineage.

EMERGENCE OF PASTORALISTS INTO POWERFUL CLANS

Faced with a written tradition, which laid emphasis on the theory of caste and racial
opposition between Tutsi lords and Hutu serfs, recent historiography according to
Webster has devoted more attention to the ‘clan’ structures.

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11 The custom of blood brotherhood encouraged the newcomers to join old families. The groups joining them
adopted the language and customs. Changing from one clan to another seems to have been an accepted practice
in this region. B.A. Ogote, ibid, p. 509
12 B.A.Ogote, ibid.
13 But for two groups, none of them were strong enough to form an independent State – Handogo and Nijiginya.
The latter formed the ruling dynasty of Rwanda’. B.A. Ogote, ibid, pp. 517-18
14 Identification is a cognitive and emotional process in which people increasingly come to experience others as
similar to themselves. The earliest biogenetic and socio-genetic context of identification was based on kinship
in survival bands. Only with the spread of sedentary agriculture did a second socio-genetic matrix of
identification emerge in the context of the peasant village: proximity. These two, ‘blood’ and ‘soil’, for
millennia remain the main strands of identification. Abram de Swaan, “Widening Circles of Disidentification: On
the Psycho and – Sociogenesis of the Hatred of Distant Strangers – Reflection on Rwanda”, Theory, Culture and
15 Clan despite having universal presence in oral culture is not a simple group of kinfolk. Lineages are units
characterised by collective name, by their respect for one or two taboos and sometimes by tradition relating
them to their origin or by the protection of a god but they do not have territorial unity. Clans can sometimes
have smaller sub-clan units. Clans were not homogenous internally. Webster, n. 9, p. 809.
The historical background of clans is amply clear in Rwanda. There are in Rwanda eighteen large clans which encompass all Hutus, Tutsis and Batwas. But, in Burundi, the structure of clans is not very clear. There are hundreds of clans, each having a different form of association. Identity is closely linked with the exercise of political and religious of duties of long standing. Belonging to a particular clan gives the individual security, social status and prestige and access to land and other resources.

In Rwanda there were many pre-Nyigionya political entities which retained their ritual birue functions in modern times. In Burundi, the custody of the drum and the religion devolving on a clan reflected ancient ruling power. All these clan principalities were gradually absorbed between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries or later by the new emergent states.

The distinction between herders and farmers does not lend credence to the hypothesis of invasion and conflict. Distinctions between them, it has been argued, emerged due to geographical and climatic factors. A series of natural calamities like drought and famines perhaps changed the power structure in the region. These natural and subsistence crises were more detrimental to the farmers than on the herders. The herders could through transhumance mitigate these hardships. To survive the farmers

16 Webster, ibid, p. 811
17 'At the outset areas which serve for the activities – pastoralism on the Kagare plateaux and agriculture in the shores of Lake Victoria and on the western mountains. Between 1500-1800, the two activities were increasingly carried out in conjunction throughout the region. Ancient Kargawé is famous according to traditions, not only for its cattle but also for its farming and its beer made from sorghum'. Webster, ibid, p. 822.
18 A close analysis of oral tradition reveals a vast number of droughts and famines during the first half of the seventeenth century in Rwanda, Kyanutwara and Burundi and in the second half of the eighteenth century in Burundi, Rwanda, Kiziba and Karawe. Webster ibid, pp. 822-23. The change in power structure in favour of the immigrants took place when a great famine followed by a cattle disease occurred all over the empire. Dissatisfaction was spread, giving Kagore the military commander an opportunity to stage a coup and depose Wamera. The Bachwezi were massacred and their bodies thrown into the river. The entire Bachwazi aristocracy was annihilated or as tradition puts it 'disappeared'. B.A. Ogot., n. 8, p. 505.
were forced to seek help of the herders, thus providing leverage to the latter, and conceding economic and political edge.

The shifting of the political centre from the area of the rivers towards the wooded height in the seventeenth century was not due to expedition or conquest but due ecological factors. The new rulers entrenched themselves by developing a new system of tribute. This system of tributes was advantageous to the pastoral groups.\textsuperscript{19}

These changes between seventeenth and nineteenth century brought about a change in the Tutsi-Hutu relationship. The relationship during this period changed "from one of local trade to a more comprehensive hierarchical relationship"\textsuperscript{20}, its flexibility depended either on the State involved or the particular moment of time.

The royal power consolidated with the development of an exploitative clientship and \textit{ibikingi} land-tenure system,\textsuperscript{21} permanent standing army, and control over trade. Power was also consolidated by breaking the lineages into apolitical groups and by promoting Cwezi religion, which gave legitimacy to different monarchs.

The political order of the region was extensively transformed due to the interplay of two different trends during this period. One was the growing cohesion

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\item \textsuperscript{19} 'In Rwanda and Burundi, those who benefited from the regimes established three hundred years ago represented only a part of the herd owners, the rich Tutsi and the ruling circles that had links with the royalty'. Webster, n. 9, p. 823
\item \textsuperscript{20} Webster, ibid, n. 9, p. 823
\item \textsuperscript{21} Before the extension of central control over land, in most areas of Rwanda land had been held by corporate patrilineages. An individual from another kin group who needed might request land from the lineage head; when settled on a plot thus granted, the recipient would become a tenant, or land client of the donor lineage. In return for use of this land, he would transmit presentations of sorghum or banana beer to the lineage head from time to time, and would sometime work in the latter's fields. When Tutsi notables began to extend control over land in various parts of the kingdom during the nineteenth century, this early form of land clientship provided a model for the new political relationships which emerged.

From the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a form of land grant called \textit{ibikingi} became common. Prominent army chiefs, favoured warriors and loyal clients of the king would receive authority from the royal court to establish a land domain. These were of two types: some included pasturage alone, others included both pasturage and the people (usually Hutu agriculturalists who had previously enjoyed autonomous land tenure). Initially, tenants on an ibikingi were not constrained to provide food or services for the Tutsi, because of the need for loyal supporters in Tutsi politics at the royal court. This situation changed substantially, however, towards the end of the nineteenth century, during the reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri (ruled c. 1860-1895).

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and accumulation of power in a number of States. This also come about “through the resolution of old divisive processes and through the control and rearrangement of new influences and forces entering the region.”

The second trend was the decisive expansion of the political clout and power of three or four States at the expense of others. Buganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Bungoro became powerful at the expense of other smaller States. These changes resulted in long reign of rulers instead of the very short reigns of the preceding centuries. Time gave the rulers opportunity to construct stronger and more durable networks of authority and more secure administration. The administrative routines were regularised and so were the circulation of rewards, payments and offices. Endurance of the State meant that opportunity, and security lay in participating rather than opposing the regime.

One of the remarkable features of Rwanda is the tendency of political centralisation. Oral literature reflects the exceptional nature of such a phenomenon. However, in other States the different strata of society retained a greater degree of independence right up to the eve of colonisation. While in Burundi the State was decentralised and defused.

22 The State in the pre-colonial era, was the aggregation of productive forces, materials skills, labour and access to, or control over the nodes of regional trade circuits. As trade was growing with outside areas, the control of these was very crucial to the survival and sustainability of these States. The external trade was growing through the Bukarbc Trading systems. This was Wahili and Arab traders began to come. At first merchandise came but soon it was followed by the traders. The traders plunged into the markets and States of the lake plateau region, moving along the same deeply cut routes, west of Lake Victoria that were initially used by salt traders. Perhaps more important than the merchandise, they introduced was the market for slaves and ivory in exchange for fire-arms. Eventually Islamic and Christian preachers, European explorers, adventurers and agents followed the same footpath as the traders, creating new forces of changes in the wider lake plateau region. D.W.Cohan “People and States of The Great lakes”, in The General History of Africa, vol. VI (Paris: UNESCO, 1985) p. 273

23 In Rwanda Mwami yuhi Giahinda assumed power in the last decades of the eighteenth century and ruled for more than thirty years. His successor Mutara Rwagera ruled for three decades. Mutara’s successor Kigeri Rwabogiri ruled for nearly four decades until his death in 1895. Similarly in Burundi, there were only two rulers in the nineteenth century. Natare II Ruganbe ruled from the last years of the eighteenth century till Mwezi II Gisabo began his reign from mid nineteenth century. Gisabo ruled till his death in 1908. Cohan ibid, p. 274

24 There were about two hundred other domains, with political institutions similar to those of the larger kingdoms. Some of these smaller States were able to enhance their power within their own immediate area. Others lost control of the centrifugal forces within and became dependencies of larger States. Cohan ibid, p. 274

25 Webster, n. 9, p. 827
EXTRACTION AND ACCUMULATION OF POWER BY THE STATE

Extraction raids by the State faced resistance of food producers. The control of supplies of food had in the mean time moved to the centre of relations both, between the States and between the State and producers. The occupying expeditionary force which went to collect food consumed most of the extracted tribute and only the remainder was taken to the courts. However, the stay of the marauding army was too brief to stimulate or force a permanent expansion in the production of food and other commodities, instead was long enough to disrupt it. It was several years before the area was able to fully recover.

During the nineteenth century, resistance to organised political authority often meant enhancing the authority of religious institutions. This tended to reinforce opposition between religious and political authority across the Lakes region.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the precolonial Rwanda State was characterised by strong central authority concentrated at the royal court. Buttressed by a standing army with regiments distributed throughout the kingdom, the king ruled through a complex hierarchy of subordinates responsible for collecting revenues, settling disputes, and controlling the population. Control over cattle, a highly valued economic and social resources in Rwanda, had long been the key element in political relations and acquisition of power at the royal court. Catherine Newbury, n. 21, p. 99

Ubureetwa was only one of several administrative tools which were collectively thought of as "clientship." And the constellation of clientship patterns was dominated, in the eyes of many studied Rwandan State institutions, by uhubake, a form of cattle clientship. Despite its visibility, uhubake seems relatively unimportant relative to ubureetwa and other forms of clientship. Ubureetwa related directly to land and labour, rather than working through a posited capital item such as cattle. Catherine Newbury, ibid., p. 98

The smaller domains of the Lakes Plateau came more and more to resemble 'gardens' to be cultivated for servants, slaves, and tribute by the larger kingdoms, or simply as tramping grounds for the mobile forces from within and without the region.

Sources on the nineteenth century indicate that the extractive programmes of the major kingdoms in the region were actively resisted in the areas of production. Cohan, n. 22, pp. 276-80

Prior to 1875, Kinyaga was a place where those wishing personal autonomy, new pasturage and freedom from famine fled the Rwandese Kingdom. In 1875, the Rwandan court embarked on a process of subduing the area to protect the border of the kingdom from incursions from the West- a conscious colonising process. After this period Kinyagans had to chose between autonomy why declining status or elevating their status with compliance with the newly imposed court officials. Newbury maintains that at this time the Tutsi/Hutu categorisation acquired new hierarchical overtones while the assigning of individuals to one group or the other was based on a wide range of characteristics: birth, wealth, culture, place, physical attributes, marriage or social ties. Clientship was reorganised in this period, with some lineages linking themselves to patrons living in central Rwanda who acted as protectors of the lineage cattle. Nici Nelson, "Review of Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda: 1860-1960 by Catherine Newbury, Columbia Univ. Press, 1993 xvi + 322pp" in African Affairs, vol. 94(374), 1995, pp. 139-140

In Rwanda, kubandwa ideas and organisation had long provided complexes of opposition to the authority of political capitals, a critically important plane opposed to the principles and activities of the State and from which the penetration of the Statc was substantially excluded. At times, kubandwa organizations were sufficiently strong to challenge and overthrow existing political authority, Cohan, n. 22, pp.291-2
All said and done, the region in the nineteenth century was not a neat matrix of centralised politics. Struggles\textsuperscript{28} were on between various forces evolving both within and without the region. This brought significant tensions and set in motion a chain of pressures and changes.

The issues related to land, in a society largely without any alternative means of income generation becomes extremely complex and volatile. As Saskia states: “If Rwanda is to evolve towards a more stable future, the urgency with which the country’s land problem demands action cannot be overemphasized”\textsuperscript{29}

Before the extension of central control over land, in most areas it was held by corporate patrilineages.\textsuperscript{30} An individual from another kinship group could receive land from the lineage head. The recipient would become a tenant, or land client of the donor lineage. In return for use of this land, he would give irregular presentations of sorghum or banana beer to the lineage head and sometime work in the latter’s fields. However, from the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a form of land grant called \textit{ibikingi} became common. Prominent army chiefs, favoured warriors and loyal clients of the king were given land grants by the royal court. These grants were of two types,

\textsuperscript{28} At one level, States competed for the control of tributary agricultural zones and specialised resources such as salt, cattle and iron, as well as access to, and control over, systems and channels of distribution. The competition was not only between States but also between States and organizations and enterprises constructed very differently from the politics of the area. At another level, common folk here and there across the region sought to define through both participation and resistance the political, social, and economic space in which to pursue security and opportunity. For individuals and households across the region, the nineteenth-century State in the Lakes region often showed more of its extractive than its protective face. The responses of peoples throughout the region varied according to their limitations and opportunities. They included the reorientation of production and marketing away from the demands of the State, the evacuation of areas under excessive pressure from outside, the joining of new religious communities, the search for secure refuges, and the support of efforts to overthrow existing authority.

The world of the Great Lakes region in the nineteenth century was not simply a world of States, large and small. It was also a world in which individuals and households were in innumerable small, sometimes undramatic ways, altering their orientations to State authority to service, to production, and to the market. Cohan \textit{ibid}, p. 292

\textsuperscript{29} Saskia van Hoyweghen, “The Urgency of Land Reform and Agrarian reforms in Rwanda”, \textit{African Affairs}, 1999, vol. 98, pp. 352 -372

\textsuperscript{30} The days of communal management land was initially managed by the first lineage heads who settled in the area. They integrated newcomers by leasing them land (under \textit{ubukonde}) From around the sixteenth century onwards, a Tutsi court gradually eroded this system and land became the property of the centralized political authority instead of the lineage. In a sense this is still the case now: the modern State owns all land (except registered land) and transmits inviolable usufruct rights to the population. Saskia van Hoyweghen, \textit{ibid}, p. 358
the first included use of pasturage alone, while the second bestowed the right to use both pasturage and the people.

Initially, *ibikingi* tenants were not forced to provide food or services due to the fragile and weak control of the royal court. This situation, however, changed substantially towards the end of the nineteenth century, during the reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri31 (ruled c. 1860-1895), which witnessed a major social change. The increasing power and consolidation of the central court provided delegated chiefs with the capacity to demand additional presentations. As a result, *ubureetwa* was introduced.

*Ubureetwa* was only one of the several administrative tools or clientship relations used by the elite to exploit the Hutus. Despite its visibility, *ubuhake*, a form of cattle clientship is relatively unimportant in comparison to *ubureetwa* and other forms of clientship. *Ubureetwa* meant providing free labour, rather than indirect extraction like the maintenance of cattle heads.

In an *ubuhake* relationship a Tutsi patron transferred a cow to a subordinate, the client thereby became an *umugaragu* of the patron. Hutu clients with *umugaragy* status were not required to perform free labour under *ubureetwa*. Thus many well off Hutus became *umugaragu* to avoid the humiliating *ubureetwa*.

The *abacancuro*, were the poorest of the poor, and nutritionally the most vulnerable families.32 They were tied to their patron and to their locality. Their

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31 Rwabugiri’s granary was called *rutsindamapfa*, which means ‘conqueror of famine’, and when out realizes that dues in kind. What exactly happened to the *rutsindamapfa* at times of food scarcity? The food stored in the granaries of the royal residence had a dual purpose. On the one hand, it served to feed the royal entourage, on the other, it was redistributed as relief food to the poor and needy who lived in the vicinity of the residence. Vanwalle also quotes an informant as saying that “The hill chief (umutware w’ umusozi) had his in tore fields cultivated with crops destined to provide the granaries of the royal court. But certain of these fields were labored for his own benefit. In fact, the bulk of the in tore harvests stayed with the chief.” Johan Pottier, “The Politics of Famine Prevention: Ecological, Regional Production and Food Complementarity in Western Rwanda”, *African Affairs*, vol. 85(339), 4, 1986, pp. 222-4

32 The available data on food flows in pre-colonial and early colonial Western Rwanda suggest that the royal taxation system and the trade in non foodstuffs (including cattle) constituted two basic mechanisms through which the flow of food from surplus-producing to food-deficient regions was made possible. Such relief flows, however, did not always follow routes determined by real needs. This drawback exposes the major flaw
commitment was such that they could not travel in search of complementary foodstuffs or employment.

The scarcity of land made the land-tenure system to develop into extractive social institution and individualised. A patrimonial system of land-tenure evolved into a patron-client system over a period of time that was a means of exploitation and a symbol of oppression.

**SCRAMBLE AND COLONIAL DIVISION OF AFRICA**

Africa in the 1880s witnessed a major upheaval. Within a short period the entire African continent of over 28 million square kilometres was partitioned, conquered and occupied by the industrial European countries. The partition and the ensuing scramble\(^33\) for Africa was due to the coalescing of different factors in Africa and Europe during that time. Prior to the partition the European countries were already nibbling at Africa. The major factors that led to the scramble were the transition from slave trade to trade in goods and the subsequent decline in returns during the period. And by the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, European powers like France, Britain, Portugal and Germany had acquired commercial interests and were exercising considerable influence without the incumbent cost of formal annexation.

However, this attitude changed due to three major events that occurred between 1876 and 1880. The first was the new interest of Leopold I in Africa. As a consequence of this, the Brussels Geographical Conference was convened in 1876,

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which led to the establishment of the African International Association and sending of H. M. Stanley in 1879 to explore Congo. All this culminated in the creation of Congo Free State. The second factor was the activities of Portugal from 1876 onwards. The third relates to the expansionist mood of French colonial policy between 1879-80. These factors together led to the scramble among these colonial powers to grab as much area as possible and to establish at least a token presence.

Rwanda and Burundi escaped the initial thrust of scramble due to their remoteness and inaccessibility. The scramble had engulfed most of Africa before exploration of the above area commenced. The first White Fathers missionaries reached Burundi only in 1881. Subsequently efforts at penetration proceeded so slow that it prompted Roger Louis to say that “the beginning of the twentieth century saw the passing of Rwanda-Urundi as unexplored territory”. Despite the brevity of colonial rule, its impact was overwhelming on these countries. As they had escaped the previous Arab intrusion, their contact with Europeans was far more shattering.

In the rest of German East Africa tribal dislocation meant rule through appointed local officials, regardless of their traditional claim to authority. On the other hand, Rwanda and Burundi were administered on the basis of indirect rule. There

34 In 1892 the Austrian explorer Oskar Baumann, after a quick swerve through Rwanda reached the RuVulu river, which he mistook for the source of Nile. His was the first in a series of similar exploration by German officers. The most important of which was that of Count von Coetzen’s expedition in 1894. During this expedition he met Mwami Rwabugin. The friendly welcome made von Coetzen feel robbed of an opportunity to show his mantel. ‘Feeling strong and being moderately equipped with weapons we constantly would have liked cope over with a more serious enemy?’ This opportunity came when in Burundi. The encounter of Captain von Goetzen with Mwami Mewezi Kisabo of Burundi took place in 1899, but the pacification of the country by the Germans took several years and numerous military expeditions. The newly established military station in Bujumbura was nothing more than a precarious outpost. A full decade passed before the Germans had effective control over the area. Lemarchand, n. 1, pp. 47-8
35 Lemarchand ibid, p. 47
36 One of the earliest formulation of German policy is found in the report submitted by Von Grawet, the Resident of Burundi ‘the ideal is: unqualified recognition of the Sultans by us, will link their interests with ours. The ideal will probably be realised more easily in Rwanda which is more tightly organised, than in Burundi where we must re-established the old authority of the Sultan, which has weakened by wars with European and other circumstances. While in Rwanda the implementation of indirect rule came to reflect the formulation almost to the letter, in Burundi German policy showed from the very beginning a mixture expediency and improvisation. Lemarchand ibid, n. 1, p. 49
were practical compulsions for this policy. This was also partly due to the assumption that any attempt to displace the traditional rulers would be met with resistance from the local population.

**THE GERMAN RESIDENCY OF BURUNDI AND RWANDA**

When the Germans arrived in Burundi the situation was chaotic. Internecine struggle between the ageing Mwami and rebellious chiefs resulted in power being divided among a host of princely factions. Mwami's promise of co-operation was a façade to avoid direct confrontation with Germans and concentrate his energies against his domestic foes. The German dilemma pertained to reconciling the conflicting claims of Mwami and the chiefs.

Rwanda, in comparison, was a centralised State, where Mwami was the supreme ruler of the land. Although the Mwami's authority did not go unchallenged,

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37 Yet by supporting 'the chiefs against the Mwami they risked the possibility of causing irreparable harm to the prestige of the crown. By throwing their weight behind the king, they risked antagonising the chiefs. In either case a trial of strength was inevitable. The lack of co-ordination between the Governor-general in Dar-as-Salem and the Residency in Bujumbura made the situation even more aggravating and complicated.' For Captain Von Beringe, the Resident in Bujumbura the policy of non-intervention of Von Goetzen was self-defeating. He felt indirect rule cannot be applied effectively until the Mwami was made submissive to the Residency. In July 1902, he sought permission to launch a military expedition against Kasimbo but Dar-as-Salem withheld permission. Despite this the Resident acted on his own. By July 1903 'two hundred of Kaimbo's men were killed and he was forced to concede concessions. In repatriation Kasimbo consented to give four hundred and twenty four heads of cattle, open the road from Bujumbura to Muyaga and allow all caravans free passage. More importantly he was to recognise the independence of the chiefs Kilima and Macono.' Von Goetzen was furious with Von Beringe as result of which he was replaced by Von Grawert as Resident. By granting Kilima and Macono similar status led to the kingdom soon becoming fragmented into a half a dozen independent fiefdoms and Kilima and Macono trying to extend their territorial control.

As the situation deteriorated the Germans were forced to intervene militarily. 'In October 1905 Von Grawert penetrated Kilima's fief and destroyed every village he crossed. Few months later Kanugunu's fief was meted similar treatment. In May 1905 Macono was killed while trying to kill the Resident. In October of the same year Kisambo was formally recognised as the Sultan of Burundi. The stability which was envisaged was soon shattered with the death of Kisambo in August 1908. He was succeeded by his fifteen year old son Mutaga. Mutaga was unable to check the disruption his fathers death had caused.'

1908 also marked a transition of the German East African government. Von Rechenberg replaced Von Goetzen as the Governor-general and Captain Fonck took over from Von Grawent who went back on home leave. The new incumbents followed a new policy in which the 'in addition to the Mwami three categories of chiefs was defined. They were: (i) those who were in fact independent, (ii) those who recognised the authority of the Mwami; and (iii) those who were more or less independent.' This did not alleviate the crisis. Rather due to the rivalry between Queen Mother, Ndikumutima and Ntarugera whatever little authority the Mwami was eroded and he died in mysterious circumstances in November 1915. His infant son Mwambutsa succeeded him. Lemarchand. Ibid, pp. 49-55

38 Pierre Ryckmans commented on the German rule as 'on the eve of the First world War the European administration was in a State of avowed bankruptcy because it had worked towards the disintegration of the kingdom whose tradition, mores and religion were unknown or ignored; because it had encouraged intrigue instead of suppressing them.' Lemarchand. ibid. n. 1. p. 56
the contestants were neither numerous nor powerful as was the case in Burundi. This was partly because of the fact that in Rwanda there was no princely caste comparable to Burundi's *ganwa* to act as a counter-pull.

As long as Mwami was willing to recognise the German protectorate there was no need for the German Residency to capitalise on the internal divisions. Similarly, the Mwami did not want to antagonise the Germans as he wanted to expand his own territorial base.

**LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATED TERRITORIES**

After the defeat of Germany in the First World War Rwanda and Burundi became League of Nations mandated territories. A decree of 1925 provided for its administrative integration with the Belgian Congo for the purposes of currency, security and colonial bureaucracy. However, colonial legislation was applicable only if it was specifically extended to Rwanda and Burundi. These colonies also had separate budgets.

The infrastructure of colonial power apart from the administration included the missions and corporations. By 1930 there were as many church missionaries present as colonial functionaries. "The impact of church came through the control of the education system, as an agency for the transmission of an alternative value system, in allocation of opportunities for social mobility for the young." 

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39 The Germans needed the support of the Mwami to strengthen their control over the protectorate. Shortly after Von Goetzen's visit in 1894, 'a period of factional strife ensued for the succession to the throne. It culminated in the 1896 coup of Rucuncu when the Mwami Rutalinda and his family were killed and Yuhi Musing, a minor made the Mwami. Being a minor his mother Kanyogera, acted as regent and with help her brothers Kabara and Ruhinankiko. They were repressive towards other possible claimants to the throne and their supporters.' Some of these opponents like a wife of Mwami Rwabogiri named Muhumusa fled and found refuge in northern Rwanda. She was able to rally the opponents of Musing and demanded that her son Biligeya be made the Mwami. After her capture in September 1911, other groups led by Ndungute sustained the opposition. After the murder of Father Loupias by Lukarra in 1910, the acting Regent Guclovius organised expeditions to quell insubordination. 'In April 1912 Ndungute was attacked and killed along with fifty other defenders. Villages were burned, crops and settlements were destroyed and loyal chiefs appointed in the area.' Lemarchand *ibid*, n. 1, pp. 47-53

40 The reform of Molegious jurisdiction in 1933 completed the task of re-organising customary strata, and incorporating them as auxiliaries of colonial order. Despite a proclaimed adherence to the doctrine of indirect rule, the territorial administration was preparatory and interventionist on the ground M. Crawford Young, "Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi", in *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. VII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 700

41 Crawford *ibid*, p. 703
In Rwanda and Burundi, there was a virtual absence of a corporate domain. Only a few small mines existed. The large population did not permit a plantation economy to emerge. Only the infrastructure of the Missions was comparable to that of the State. The ‘White Fathers’ had by 1940 already created a large evangelistic structure with far reaching social influence.

Rwanda and Burundi lay on the margins of the War effort and thus escaped most of its rigours. The major preoccupation of the population during this period – as before – was the precarious struggle for survival. For instance the famine of 1928-29 claimed an estimated 300,000 lives or roughly ten per cent of the population. Poor rains brought renewed disaster in 1943-44 with an estimated 300,000 dead or uprooted.

During the early post-War years, initiative and control remained in the hands of the colonisers. However, with the anticipation of independence there was a spread of political consciousness and mobilisation. This process got further impetus once the Christian Democrat – Liberal coalition came to power in Belgium after the 1958 elections. The new government was anxious to signal a departure from the old colonial policy.

In Rwanda a series of events lead to the establishment of the Hutu Republic in January 1961. This chain of events began with the sudden death of Mwami Mutara III in July 1959 and the enthroning of the new Mwami without Belgian consent. This

42 In his last annual address as Governor General Ryckman declared that finally “the days of colonialism are over. The time was at hand to engineer the first controlled participation of the African populace in local political organs. The awakening aspiration of the masses for more satisfying existence were to find their fulfilment in redoubled programme of economic development joining a panoply of social welfare measures.” A working group was send in the spring of 1959. Its report in November 1959 was basis to introduce electoral principle at the Burgomaster to replace the appointed chiefs. The Councillors would serve as the electoral collage for the kingdom Councils with the Mwami becoming a constitutional figurehead outside politics and party. There was virtually no support in Rwanda and Burundi for the maintenance of a common framework. Crowford ibid, p. 707.

43 The traditional royal council, the biru convinced that foul play had been involved, convened at once without the knowledge of Belgian officials and appointed Jean Baptiste Ndahidurwa as Mwami Kigeri V. This coup was mockly accepted by the Belgians, thus suggesting that real power was with the Tutsi monarchists.
greatly alarmed the Hutus who were faced with the realisation that the real power would be wielded by the Tutsi Monarchist, and in a post-colonial period this would reinforce ubureetwa.

This sparked a week of rural violence with wide spread burning of Tutsi dwellings by Hutu peasants and Tutsi assassination of a number of Hutu leaders. Although the death toll was not large (officially 13 Tutsis and 37 Hutus), its political impact was enormous.\(^44\)

When elections were held in mid-1960, the *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR) boycotted the elections giving *Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu* (PARMEHUTU) overwhelming victory.\(^45\) On 28 January 1961, trucks arrived in the small central Rwandan town of Gitarawa with 3126 communal councillors and burgomasters. They had been summoned by PAREMHUTU with the consent of local Belgian administration after an assault on a councillor by a Tutsi gang. This assembly declared that it was the acting Constitutional Assembly and announced the birth of the Democratic and Sovereign Republic of Rwanda. Kayibanda was made the Prime Minister and Mbonyumupwa became its the President. The monarchy and all its symbols were abolished. The Belgian administration\(^46\) termed the coup as illegal. Nonetheless, it accepted the decisions.

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\(^{44}\) In the aftermath some two thousand people mainly Tutsi’s fled into hastily created refugee camps in Burundi, Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. In the following weeks no fewer than 21 Tutsi chiefs and 332 sub-chiefs were killed, arrested or forced out of office. The Belgian authorities by throwing the weight on the side of the Hutus who were now organised under PARMEHUTU. Tutsi interests were articulated by UNAR, with radical anti-colonial lexicon but royalist and chauvinistic at its core.

\(^{45}\) It captured 2390 of the 3125 local council seats. The structure of local power was radically altered by the installation of Hutu Burgomasters in 210 out of 229 communes which had replaced sub-chiefiancies. Legislative elections for a national assembly were announced for January 1961. At the UN where the Belgian credibility was at a low ebb and due to UNAR’s effective image as an anti-colonial movement the General Assembly sought to head off a immediate PARMEHUTU monopoly of power by urging for a round table. The conference was held in Ostend in January 1961, ending in an impasse.

\(^{46}\) The next 17 months before the independence on 1 July 1962 were devoted to formal legitimisation of this internally and at the UN. At the UN’s instance a referendum was held on the issue of abolition of the monarchy. Internationally supervised legislative elections took place in September 1961, resulting in 80% vote in favour of the Republic. 35 of the 44 seats went to the supporters of the Republic. In a final compromise with the UN on 28 February 1962 two ministerial posts and some local administrative nominations were given to UNAR.
Meanwhile in Burundi, in the 1950s the Belgian administration came to be identified with the Batare faction of the royalty. Thus, nationalistic vocabulary began to graft itself upon the Bezi-Batare rivalry. The Bezi were cast as anti-colonial *Union Pour le Progre’s National* (UPRONA) and the Batare *PDC* as collaborators with the administration.

CAUSES LEADING TO THE HUTU ASSERTION

The colonial rule provided the Tutsis, the opportunity to impose and strengthen the new exploitative structures like the institution of the local chief. These oppressive structures shaped the State-building and the decolonisation processes. Tutsis, Hutus, and Twas were considered internally homogenous groups and were treated differentially by the colonial State. This made the groups that had previously been internally flexible, become monoliths.

Early European explorers and administrators, as has been shown, subscribed to the Hamitic theory that the Tutsis were a superior non-Bantu race. The Church, school, administration and the army were organised around this assumption of racial superiority of the Tutsis. European religious and racial value systems were thus superimposed on an earlier social order.

In the 1920s the triple offices of land, cattle and army overlord were combined into a single position, which was confined only to the Tutsis. Hutus and Tutsis were

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47 The new ideological costumes were brought into sharper focus by the dynamic role of Prince Louis Rwagason of the UPRONA upon his return in 1958 from university studies in Belgium. UPRONA had been founded by a leading Bezi figure Leopold Biha.

48 Pierre Baranyaka, the great grandson of Mwami Natare, founded the PDC. Rwagosore stood outside this conflict and had national appeal due to his marriage with a Hutu woman and charismatic political style and his links with the palace. His assassination sent the country into turmoil on the eve of independence.

49 In recent analysis by Alison Des Forges. She explains, that the creation of a myth that glorified and exaggerated the role of Tutsi in founding Rwandan State structures and exerting control over Hutu, was a "collaborative enterprise", involving European administrators, missionaries, and scholars as well as Rwandan chiefs, poets, and historians at the royal court. Catharine Newbury, n. 6, pp. 11-12
transformed into bipolar identities and institutionalised. This relationship was first shaped by the pre-colonial State but fully crystallised in the colonial State. Tutsis thus came to be identified with power and Hutus with subjecthood. "The Tutsi were like a layer of cream spread over the entire society, administering a subject peasantry, the Hutu." 50

Colonialism significantly altered the reach of the State, the forms of domination, and the nature of political competition. Most colonies were formed with a central civil authority and a constellation of district-based customary authorities of the same ethnic identity. The oppressive and onerous demands of the colonial State and its chiefs fell exclusively and heavily on rural farmers who were classified as Hutus. This situation accentuated ethnic distinctions and gave them a new meaning and cohesion.

The Tutsis soon developed a political identity and a self-consciousness of being different from the subject population, of the Hutus. Thus, some physical difference – often the nose or the height – became symbols of a great social and political difference. The colonial State built on this socio-political difference and made it the central political feature around which the State's local apparatus were constructed. These incidental physical differences thus came to bear the entire weight of State formation and oppression.

The competition between the Belgians and Germans in the region was ultimately resolved by the defeat of Germany in the First World War. However, the

50 The institutional infrastructure of Belgian colonialism was no different from that of other colonies in the continent, in social representation was. While ethnic groups in other African countries lived in spatially distinct locations, each more or less to its own local this was not the case with the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda they lived on the same hills. So that while the district-level apparatus of indirect rule in other African colonies tended to crystallize a local hierarchy that was ethnically no different from the local peasantry, giving rise to the social experience of colonialism as rule by one's own, this was not so in Rwanda. Mamdani, n. 7, p.32
change in colonial rulers did not dampen the ambitions of the Rwandan court to expand its domain. This meshed well with colonial Belgian policy goals to restructure the administrative structures and eliminate irregular lines of command. Simultaneously, Belgian policy was to make the colony a self-funding, dependent capitalist State where most natives would depend on the cash economy. This led to increased pressure on Rwandans to work. Harsh coercive measures were justified by the belief that it was good for the natives to learn to work.

In Rwanda and Burundi, as elsewhere, modernisation during the colonial period implied a process of increasing concentration of power and coercive capabilities in the hands of centrally appointed political authorities. Modernisation also involved commercialisation of agriculture. Consequently, new relationships emerged between the rulers and the ruled, as chiefs accumulated economic power along with formal political roles. They used the institution of *ubureetwa* to requisition unpaid labour. In their use of *ubureetwa*, the chiefs claimed to be continuing traditional practises, yet the form and the substance of this institution under colonial rule was drastically different from "traditional" models. Custom was used as a façade for domination and a regime based on force. Native authorities continued to exercise force unhindered, so long as that force was conveniently garbed in custom.

### THE TRADITIONAL CHIEFS

The most substantial impact of European presence was the German policy of relying on the traditional rulers in Rwanda and Burundi. The employment of Tutsi chiefs as intermediaries greatly enhanced their power. These chiefs appointed a new layer of

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51 Catherine Newbury, n. 49, p. 12

52 In the African colonial experience, custom was broadly defined to include not only personal laws but also control of land. As long as land and labour were defined as customary, they also remained beyond the scope of the market.
officials, the *ibironzi*, to assist in collecting prestations and labour from the population. Hutus who in the past had been free and autonomous, became subjects to the chiefs.

By the 1920s, the three-fold institutional framework of the colonial State was fully in place and operational. First, was the fused power of the new chief. He was not merely an administrative officer but an amalgam of legislative, executive and judicial powers at the local level. Second, these powers were justified as customary, which had the sanction of the colonial authority. Third, this customary legal authority could enforce a range of extra-economic measures and extractions and call them 'customary'. Mamdani defines this as 'the Conquest State'.

During the early period of colonialism, new forms of clientships had emerged. The shift in clientship was both due to the diminishing power of the lineages on one hand, and the rise of State power on the other hand; the latter owed it to the assistance of the European colonial power. There was a marked shift from the group patron/client relationships (called *umuhetu*) to individual patron/client relation(*ubuhake*). The hill chiefs replaced the power of the lineage heads. All lineage heads (both Tutsi and Hutu) lost their prestige owing to these changes, though some Tutsis benefited from the new structures.

Moreover, the colonial rulers were intent upon preserving what they conceived as traditional structures of power. The Belgian administration sought to rationalise and standardise the heterogeneous social relations by reinforcing the powers of the "natural rulers".

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53 The chiefs' greed resulted in an intolerable situation of harsh demands in taxes and corvee labour for the average peasant, who invariably were Hutu.

54 The German anthropologists speculated that the original population of the Lake Kingdoms were of Bantu or 'Negroid' origin, while the 'Tuutsi' were assigned to the 'Ethiopid' or 'Nilotic' stock that descended from 'Hamitic' or 'Semitic' roots. The Belgians adopted the German scholarly view and carried it into administrative practice. Swaan, n. 14, p. 109
In 1926 further pursuance of this policy by the Belgians, put in place a municipal civil registry containing file-cards of all citizens with a photograph and their ethnic affiliation. And in the 1930s, they issued identity cards that indicated a person’s ethnic category. This card then became a tool to determine an individual’s life chances. In colonial Rwanda and Burundi, Hutu came to be classified as second-class citizens.

The Belgians’ desire for administrative and ideological simplicity had lasting consequences for the people in the Great Lakes region. This “tidying up” by the Belgian colonial administration cut the mechanisms of social cohesion, including the religious belief system and clan structures. These began to dissolve the cohesion in the society and separated both the Hutus and Tutsis into monolithic groups.

THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Colonial rule also introduced Christianity. In the early period of colonial rule the Church tried to baptise the Tutsis, in the hope that as the natural rulers they will help in the spread of Christianity. However, after the Second World War, many Flemish officials and priests were appointed in the colonial service. They tended to identify more with the Hutu underdogs than with the Tutsi rulers, whom they equated with the Walloon elite in Belgium.

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55 Belgian colonial administrators were so despaired of not being able to distinguish Tutsi from Hutu, that they introduced a means-tested system of ethnic identification. Any man with more than ten head of cattle was to be permanently classified as Tutsi, and any man with fewer than ten cattle as Hutu or Twa, depending on their profession. Helen M Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”, *Journal of Modern African Studies* (New York), vol. 37(2), 1999, p. 253

56 Baptising this group would make it easier to convert the people; this is in keeping with the hierarchical approach of the Vatican clergy. When king Musinga refused to be baptised, he was deposed and his baptised son Rudahigwa was enthroned in 1931 as King Mutara III. The second generation of mainly French missionaries, however, were less faithful to the Vatican’s Philosophy. Hartmut Dissenbacher, “Explaining the Genocide: How Population Growth and Shortage of Land Helped Bring About the Massacres and the Civil War”, *Law and State* (Germany), vol. 52, 1995, p. 70.

57 Belgian officials and clergy identified more strongly with the Hutu cause, possibly because of the projection of Flemish feelings of resentment at Walloon domination onto the (completely different) situation of polarisation in what was then Ruanda-Urundi.
The success of the ‘Tutsi Church’\(^{58}\) was the vision of the colonial religious and political establishment, much of which rested on the view\(^{59}\) of a hierarchical State-Church relation; the Belgian colonial administration supported this idea. While the authority had been complex and diffuse in pre-colonial times, the Church now became the generator and stabiliser of class structure in society. While mobility across ethnic boundaries had previously been possible, now stratification was reinforced on an ethnic basis. Ethnicity, during the later colonial period, became a rigid category.

Historically, the Catholic Church in Rwanda developed into a prominent institution, of a similar stature as the State. Hence, competing indigenous groups used the Church like the State as a channel to power, prestige and wealth. The Mission dominated school system became a major channel to power. The Tutsi minority realised that they had to turn to the White Fathers to consolidate and extend their own power and political social position.

From the very beginning divisions within the society penetrated the Church to such an extent that they became institutionalised. Linden\(^{60}\) remarks that the reason why Catholic mission was highly successful was because the Catholic Church was deeply rooted in the Rwandan society, i.e. it absorbed the latter’s characteristics into its own ranks.

By the 1940s, however, the political climate had changed sufficiently, resulting in the new generation of missionaries and administrators who sympathised

\(^{58}\) The Tutsi were regarded as the noble ruler and the Hutu their subservient farmers. As a result the vision of a Catholic aristocracy, informed by the Faith and leading a subject peasantry along the paths of righteousness and economic development materialised.


\(^{60}\) Hartmut, argues that it is reasonable to suppose that colonialisation and conversion destroyed structures which had made for strict regulation of human procreation in pre-colonial times. Including the importing of a morality of reproduction and sexuality in which contraception, abortion and all forms of sexuality which do not serve for procreation such as homosexuality, masturbation, sodomy and buggery were held to be sinful. Hartmut, n. 56 p 77.
with the Hutu cause. In the seminaries a Hutu counter-elite was formed. This elite could move to power because it successfully rallied behind the support of ‘social Catholicism’. The clergy who had experienced in Europe the growing emancipation of a working class and the growth of trade unionism, felt it had a moral duty to speak against social injustice. This view was opposed to the ideas of Leon Classe. These two strands within Christianity have never been at equilibrium in the Rwandan Catholic Church. While Hutu abbeys found the support of an emancipating social Catholicism, the Tutsi abbeys on the other hand expressed anti-Belgian and anti-White Father feelings and developed a nationalist discourse.

EMERGENCE OF THE COUNTER-ELITE

One of the views on decolonisation consider that Belgian colonial authorities and the Catholic Church engineered the changes between 1959 and 1962 in Rwanda. In the 1950s they ceased to support the monarchy and its political structures dominated by the Tutsi chiefs. Thereafter they switched support to the Hutu majority. This led to the collapse of the royal power and a reversal of power relations, leading to the subsequent exodus of many Tutsis as refugees.

A contrasting view claims that while some Belgians and leaders in the Catholic Church supported change, it was actually the Hutu leaders supported by the rural majority in Rwanda, who brought about the revolution by revolting against the double colonialism, of rule by Tutsis and Belgian authorities. This view highlights rural impoverishment, grievances over extractions by chiefs, and insecurity of land tenure as central factors in the conflicts that accompanied decolonisation and the victory of Hutu candidates in the elections of 1960 and 1961. The emerging Hutu elite began to express their alienation from political role in racial terms. Catholicism gave
added impetus to this collective sense of group deprivation and oppression and resentment against the Tutsis. The Hutus discovered themselves as an ethnic group and their leaders discovered the mobilising potential of ethnicity. Social class by 1950s had hardened into ethnicity. The local elections ended in victory by the Hutu counter-elite. This had the approval of the Belgian Resident Logiest and Mgr. Perrauding, who later became Archbishop of Rwanda.

The tempo for decolonisation rose sharply after the release of Mise au Point, a proclamation for an all-Rwandan emancipation issued by the Mwami’s High Council. It called for transfer of power to ease racial tensions between Blacks and Whites. Within a month the Hutu Manifesto,61 was written by Gregoire Kayibanda,62 and eight other Hutu leaders. All these leaders were affiliated with the Church. However, there was sharp contrast between these two documents. The Mise au Point, first and foremost wanted independence and restoration of their prerogatives, while the Hutu Manifesto wanted the establishment of democracy and social reforms before independence.

These transformations helped to create the conditions for widespread rural discontent and violence. Calls for change by the Hutus provoked a backlash by the members of the Rwandan power structure. Their intransigent attitudes served to polarise further the political factions. The intemperate response by court conservatives contributed to fears and anxieties among the Hutus that in an independent Rwanda they would be relegated to the status of ubureetwa. Whatever little chance they have for emancipation would also diminish.

61 The famous “Hutu Manifesto” of the fifties in which nine Hutu intellectuals, all Catholic seminarians, whilst not attacking the racial superiority of the Tutsi refer to them as a “foreign race of invaders”(Publico 1994) and call for the use of force against them. Mamdani, n. 7, p. 13.
62 Gregoire Kayibanda, protégé of Mgr. Perrauding, had build up an extensive network of relationships with the Belgian Christian syndicalist world. This made him for the Belgians and the church the most acceptable person to lead the country towards independence. Mamdani ibid., p. 14.
The series of elections, and the anticipation of a transfer of power, triggered a chain of events loosening the hold of the Tutsi elite on the lower echelons of the State apparatus. It also led to extreme political polarisation between the Tutsis and the Hutus, which caused violent clashes. The shift from indirect to direct elections meant that there was considerable likelihood of a Hutu victory in the polls.

The Belgium authorities carried out nothing less than a coup d'état by providing the Hutus a chance to participate in the governance. Arguing that the presence of Tutsis as sub-chiefs and chiefs disturbed the public order, Logiest began replacing Tutsi chiefs with Hutus. Thus, began a revolution against what had hitherto been the main administrative basis of the colonial rule.

Among the different influences on the decolonisation process in Rwanda and Burundi was the pressure mounted on Belgium, by the UN Trusteeship Council. Being League of Nations Mandated territories Belgium had to report to the Council on the progress

63 In 1953 elections were held to create advisory councils to State organs, in 1956 the first general elections, another in 1959, and the last general elections in 1960 and 1961. Mamdani ibid.

64 On 1st November 1957, a Hutu sub-chief (one of only ten in the country) was assaulted by a gang of Tutsi youths. Rumours spread that he had been killed, and this almost instantaneously sparked rural uprisings in several parts of the country. Gangs of Hutu roamed the countryside, chasing out Tutsi inhabitants and burning houses. In these attacks powerful and wealthy Tutsis were often distinguished from Tutsi commoners. The primary targets of attack were those who were in a position of power. There was an effort to by moderates to create a middle space between extremist on both sides. However, this middle ground was eroded due to the intransigence of the Tutsi elite in giving any quarter to the Hutus and growing Hutu aspirations. These came to ahead in and around Gitarama the next month when the news spread that group of young UNAR militants had attacked the PARMEHUTU leader Dominique Mbonyunutwa, Pogroms spread from all over the country. The visiting UN mission of 1960 had estimated the killings at 200 but added the number may be even higher since the people preferred to bury their dead silently. The leaders of two of the most moderate parties, Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA) and Rassemblement Democratique Ruandais (RADER) the first primarily Hutu, the latter primarily Tutsi tried to downplay ethnicity and make an appeal to the “common people”. Mamdani, ibid., p. 15

65 On 19th October 1959, in anticipation of the next round of elections, and with the assistance of Church authorities, a Hutu political party- the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU) - was created from the old cultural association Mouvement Sociale Muhutu. Mamdani, ibid., p. 14

66 Half the chiefs and sub chiefs on the eve of 1960 and 1961 general elections were Hutu and the chiefs had control of the ballot boxes. Without this pre constitution of the local hierarchy it is difficult to explain the dramatically different out come of subsequent elections.
it was making in preparing the Africans to take over the political reins of their countries.

The first visit of the Mission of Trusteeship Council in 1948 lauded the vigour with which economic and social welfare was promoted. However, it expressed dismay at the absence of provision for political advance. After the criticism by the 1951 Mission, a decree was issued in July 1952, proposing a complex hierarchy of councils providing for limited African participation. The consultations were so indirect and filtered through the Tutsi chief hierarchy, that their impact was minimal. Once again, the 1954 Mission delivered a harsh verdict on the timidity of political development. It suggested that 20-25 years would be sufficient to complete the Trust Mission. In 1956 Vice-Governor General Jean Paul Harroy reinterpreted the 1952 decree to provide for universal male suffrage for the sub-chiefdom councils. This substantially increased the Hutu representation at the lowest level. But due to the Tutsi dominance there were only three Hutu chiefs out of thirty one in Burundi and none in Rwanda.

During the 1957 visit of the Mission to Rwanda and Burundi by the Trusteeship Council a group of Rwandan Hutus lead by Gregoire Kayibanda issued the Hutu Manifesto. This warned the Hutus that the departure of Europeans might plunge them into slavery as before. They demanded that they should at least have the right to refuse to co-operate in the effort to attain independence until mechanisms of Tutsi domination are dismantled.

On the other hand exclusively Tutsi High Council of Rwanda responded indirectly with a Statement of Views, which made no mention of Tutsi-Hutu polarity but urged for a rapid training of an elite to whom power could be swiftly devolved.

Once the colonial import of, democratic majority thinking had taken root – after the end of the Second World War – the Hutu majority began to question the Tutsi minority's legitimacy to rule, in the name of justice and freedom. Their old belief in the power of Tutsis began to crumble, leading to decolonisation.
ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY AGGREGATION

Initially, the mass killings in Rwanda and Burundi were perceived as a spontaneous outburst of long, simmering tribal hatred. There is, however, ample documentary evidence to suggest that this was the culmination of a carefully prepared, well-organised campaign, using modern means of mass communication and propaganda, civil administration and military logistics.

*Prima facie* this conflict only partly appears to be a phenomenon related to ethnic assertion. Ethnicity plays a very large and crucial role in the aggregation of discontent and the sense of deprivation in people. The conflict primarily was fuelled by the anger against the exploitation of the chiefs during the colonial rule and the fear of its reinstatement, in case the Tutsis came to power. It was a class or caste war in which ethnic identification became the marker and the rallying point. Recent events in Rwanda and Burundi illustrate, that these socially constructed differences between Hutus and Tutsis were a legitimate and potent reason for killing.

At different times and places ethnic identity could mean very different things. Tony Walter observes, that often quickly and drastically such seemingly ‘fixed’ identities can change. Contemporary scholars are unanimous in rejecting earlier interpretations of the conceptual pair of Tutsi-Hutu as fixed racial categories. But paradoxically, this is what the terms have come to imply in contemporary political

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67 The preconditions for ethnic conflict are: (a) a socially mobilised population, (b) the existence of pool of symbol connoting distinctiveness, (c) the selection, standardisation and transmission of such 'symbol-pool' to the community by the leadership, and (d) a reference group in relation to which a sense of relative deprivation (real/imagined) is aggregated.

The critical issue in identity formation is the stakes – material as well as emotional – of the ethnic group in the political system. The nature of demand articulation and aggregation by the leadership of the ethnic group. Lastly the international-context has a decisive role in the aggregation of ethnicity.

68 The assumption of ethnic identity as fixed since colonial days and not a changing social construction is not valid. Second, all Hutu-Tutsi relations are examined within the context of the modern nation State, despite the fact that Hutu and Tutsi are social categories which have never been contiguous with any political boundary. Being ‘Tutsi’ presumably means something different to those on the ground in Benaco than it does in the western press, to Tanzanians, or even to Rwandans who present accounts of the civil strife to outsiders. Tony Waters, *Tutsi Social Identity in Contemporary Africa*, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 33 (2), 1995, p. 343

69 The concept/ assumption of a ‘fixed’ identity appears to ignore the fact that there are similar ethnic divisions in neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania, where the same social category has not necessarily led to ‘ethnocide as Lemarchand’s description of Burundi’s political history would imply. Indeed, the half million or so Hutu from Burundi and Rwanda who fled during 1993-4 into the Kagera Region of Tanzania must have known that this was locally considered to be an area with significant numbers of high status Tutsi. Swoan, n.14, p. 109
discourse due to earlier scholarly writings. Nevertheless, both these ethnic identities continue to be malleable and reconstructed according to the context despite a similarity of labels across time and geography. Hence the carnage in Burundi and Rwanda cannot be explained by the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy alone. Walter further states that there is nothing inherent in Hutu-ism or Tutsi-ism, which leads to fratricide. Amongst countries with similar demographic profile only Burundi and Rwanda have had such ethnocides. Therefore, the unit of analysis should go beyond this dichotomy, and into the nature of the State. In short, ethnicity is not the sole cause of the civil strife in Rwanda and Burundi, but only an essential facilitator.

Thus, conflicts do not break out merely because there are different ethnic groups. However, the political use of ethnicity is an empirical reality. One cannot, therefore, label a war as 'ethnic conflict' because different ethnic groups are involved. Ethnicity may be a necessary cause, but is rarely a sufficiently potent one.

As is clear from above discussion the groups in both Rwanda and Burundi fit the model defined in the first chapter. At the time of decolonisation there existed a pool of symbols. During the colonial rule this symbol pool was standardised due to the policies of the colonial administration. An elite group or group leadership emerged and was able to transmit these symbols to the masses. The Hutu leadership was able to translate the economic oppression and political alienation into a sense of deprivation and anger against the Tutsis who were painted as perpetrators. Whereas in Burundi such strong categorisation could not occur due to flexibility of the social structure.

The response of the Tutsi monarchy, especially in Rwanda, was one of intransigence and increased oppression and attacks by Tutsi youth gangs on the Hutus. This further strengthened the group identity and its aggregation.
COLONIAL RULE AND THE HAMITIC THEORY

Germans and Belgians were strongly influenced by nineteenth-century rationalist thought, and both found it necessary to classify and compartmentalise people on the basis of race. They did this by expounding and internalising simple racial differences. Colonisation and missionary teaching had thus succeeded in redefining the existing cultural order by introducing the Hamitic theory. The aristocratic Tutsis were the master race, while the rural Hutus became the lower class.

From the 1920s onward informal practices were complemented with administrative techniques for identification – civil registries, identity papers, passports, photographs and so forth. However, the issue was far from settled. The debate on who exactly was a Tutsi or a Hutu and, how to tell the difference between them, continued to rage. It was inconclusive to the extent that the most fanatic proponents of racial and hereditary division between Tutsis and Hutus were worried and obsessed by the possibility of a Tutsi posing as a Hutu in order to confuse and divide them.

Nevertheless, Hartmut⁷⁰ based on her experiences opines that, all Rwandans were aware in their daily life of an ethnic divide. Everyone knew whether it was a Hutu or a Tutsi boarding the taxi or tending a market stall. Stereotypes existed on both sides – the Hutus were seen as massacring ‘savages’, the Tutsis as ‘underhanded’ and ‘malicious’. To add to it, each group internalised different views of the past. One view holds that in the pre-colonial past, Tutsi lived in symbiosis and harmony with the Hutus and Twas. European colonialism created cleavages and put an end to the social mobility. Therefore, in order to overcome these divisions that have led to violence, the

⁷⁰Hartmut, n. 56, p. 66.
ethnic categories should simply be abolished and the terminology of ethnic groups forbidden.

A different version of history propounds that clever and wily Tutsis conquered Hutus in the distant past. Then the Tutsi imposed an oppressive, exploitative rule on the Hutus and made them the servants. Colonial rule under Germany and then Belgium exacerbated and intensified but did not create the divisions. Given the history of discrimination in Rwandan society, proponents of this view have argued that, it is only by retaining the categories that one can measure progress in redressing inequalities of the past. Hardliners in both groups have accepted the myth introduced early in the colonial period by Europeans about their ethnic past. These myths and different historical understanding have been internalised by both the elite and has permeated into and indoctrinated into the masses.

TYRANNY OF THE CHIEFS AND HUTU CONSCIOUSNESS

Clientelage initially imposed collective obligations on the lineage, but *ubureetwa* relations involving individual obligations gradually replaced these collective *umuhato* fees. These bonds became increasingly oppressive and exploitative under colonial rule. The appointment of Tutsi chiefs by the colonial authority, as has been argued before, became increasingly oppressive and tyrannical. The hierarchy thus created became increasingly rigid and avenues for Hutus became limited.

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71 It is possible to distinguish at least three layers of meaning. The first layer of meaning considers the Tutsi as invaders who conquered the land that had once belonged to the 'Hutu'. But they accomplished this appropriation not simply by violent means. The second layer of meanings the Tutsi did this by trickery. The Tutsi are considered to possess innate cleverness in the art of deception, tricked the original inhabitants of Burundi into servitude by the gift of cows. Before the Tutsi came, the Hutu were not Hutu at all: they were simply abantu which signifies in Kirundi 'the Bantu peoples' or simply, 'human beings. The name Hutu, the refugees said, was imported by the Tutsi from their home in the north and means 'slave' or 'servant.' Thus 'we became their slaves' (Malkki, 1995: 71). That is what the Burundian 'Hutu' in Tanzania made of it. There is considerable historical evidence to corroborate the prevalence of such unequal relations of exchange and deference enforced by political authority and military ascendancy, in Rwanda as well in pre-colonial and colonial times. Mamdani, n. 7, p. 11.
The term Hutu was used to refer to a social subordinate in relation to someone higher. Thus a Tutsi of client of a wealthier patron is referred to as Hutu, even though his cultural identity remains Tutsi. Therefore these term connote the existence of a power relation or an hierarchy where the Hutu is extremely disadvantaged and oppressed. Moreover, there are no scope within this hierarchy of social mobility to alleviate one’s lowly position. Hence when Hutu consciousness began to emerge due to opportunity provided by the Church, it was not for a reform, but the removal of such an hierarchy. In this endeavour every Tutsi soon was labelled as an oppressor.

A specific, local relationship between two persons was generalised and decontextualized into two timeless, irreconcilably hostile categories. This was accomplished by introducing the myth of the conquest by alien Tutsis and the subjugation of the indigenous Hutus. Accordingly all Tutsi forefathers were clubbed as conquerors and exploiters of all Hutu predecessors. If some of them were not so, then they were by definition not Tutsis. Hence no accommodation was possible between Hutus and Tutsis.

This argument was further extrapolated to imply that all present Tutsis are out to regain their lost past political and economic predominance. In this pursuit they will use whatever means possible and if they do not then they can’t be Tutsis. This is the Tutsi essence. Hence it is essential for all Hutus to unite and end their subjugation by finishing every Tutsi. The elite formed to create such group consciousness were able to effectively disseminate this argument.
EXTERNAL STIMULUS TO CONSCIOUSNESS

During the Belgian mandate the restraint of ethnic confrontation broke down under the impact of reforms. These reforms included a progressive system of electoral representation. In the run up to these elections political parties emerged mainly on ethnic lines and were successful in mobilising people.

Elections set the context in which the Hutu counter-elite forged their consciousness. As the political debate became vocal, the contradiction between the Hutus and Tutsis became exposed. The alienation from State power and growing tyranny of the chiefs helped consolidate the Hutus. Tutsi identity had been forged during the formation of the Rwandan State, long before Hutu identity emerged. Tutsi consciousness was that of power while the Hutu consciousness was that of lack of power and deprivation and of a struggle for power. Hutu identity emerged as the culmination of different influences and processes during the colonial rule.

The repression of the Hutus combined with the preferential treatment given to the Tutsis by the Belgians led the former to rebel in 1959. The Tutsi monarchy was eventually overthrown in January 1961. The PARAMEHUTU succeeded to power the following a UN supervised referendum in 1961. The Trusteeship was terminated in June and Rwanda and Burundi officially became independent on 1st July of the same year.

During the 1959 Revolt and its aftermath more than 160,000 Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries and an estimated 20,000 were killed. These figures include the massive reprisals against the Tutsi after the defeat of an attempt by Tutsi émigrés to restore the monarchy in December 1963.
POST-COLONIAL PERIOD

At the end of Belgian Trusteeship over Rwanda and Burundi both these countries faced different types of challenges and were differently equipped to face them. In Burundi, the preparation for independence allowed the monarchy, the space to continue playing an active role in politics. The assassination of Prince Rwagosore, the leader of UPRONA who was to take over the reign of the government during the transition period, upset the political process to such an extent that UPRONA could never fully recover from it. This gave the Mwami an opportunity to bestow upon the institution of monarchy, a pivotal role in the governance of the country.

On the other hand in Rwanda the majority community had been able to force and oust the monarchy and the Tutsi elite in 1959. This change had the approval of the Belgian colonial power. The turmoil of 1959 also created a large refugee population in the neighbouring countries.

During their first decade in exile the Rwandan refugees were splintered into various groups revolving around different leaders. This period also saw attempts by the loyalist to pursue an armed struggle to re-establish the monarchy. The loyalist known as Inyenzi (cockroaches) organised between 1961-66 as many as ten known raids into Rwanda. In response to this 10,000 Tutsi were attacked and political leaders killed. The result was not the weakening of the regime but the increased flow of refugees.

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73 *The Uganda Argus* commented ‘the most serious of the incidents reported was a virtual invasion of Rwanda by a large force of armed people who presumably had been among the large body of refugee who had fled from Rwanda since 1961. There is no doubt of the aim of such raids it is to overthrow the Republican regime in Rwanda. But there is no sign that this has seriously challenged authority of the Kigali government and it is difficult to imagine how any band of invaders could hope to keep up a sufficiently strong attack for long enough to this. Inevitably, the attacks by the Tutsi royalist must increase the already deep hatred that caused the exodus of refugee from Rwanda when the Hutu party, PAREMUTU, came to power. *Uganda Argus* (Kampala) 7/11/1964.

In 1964, Tutsi guerrillas invaded the country, attempting to overthrow the fragile government of Gregoire Kayibanda. The invasion collapsed in its wake the Tutsi members of the government were executed, and the Hutu authorities allowed (or encouraged) massacres of several thousand rural Tutsi residents. Catharine Newbury, n. 49, p. 16.
RWANDAN COUP OF 1973

By 1973 Rwanda was very unstable as there were Tutsi pogroms all over the country. Though, it initially held a promise of pacification and justice, the coup by General Juvenal Habyarimana was primarily the revenge of the north. Radio Kigali announced on 5 July, 1973 that the Rwanda National Guard headed by its commander, Major General Habyarimana had taken power in a bloodless coup. A military *communiqué* said that the Army had taken over because the unity of the country was threatened and peace risked being compromised. Habyarimana had used the tension between the two ethnic groups, which had flared up from the end of 1972 until February 1973, to bolster political support for the army. He concentrated political and military power in the hands of northern Hutus, thereby marginalising the southern Hutus and Tutsis.

President Habyarimana formed a new ruling party called National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND). It included both military and civilians leaders.  

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74 The elected President M. Gregoire Kayibanda had allowed himself to be caught in the jaws of enemies of peace who did not want to understand that all Rwandans were brothers no matter from which region they came. PARMEHUTU and all political activity and dissolved the National Assembly. The National Guard your own children cannot tolerate that the country be divided into pieces. It cannot answer for hates and regional divisions. It refuses regional limits. *Radio Kigali Summery of World Broadcasts 5/7/1973*

In an interview to the Belgian paper Le Soir he said he had seized power in order prevent a massacre which was to have been carried out that night. A plan to exterminate certain people and we said no to the massacre. The ousted President Kayibanda was a man of honesty and integrity but was fatigued as a result a group of minor officials and incompetents had taken advantage of this. The Head of State was not able to withstand their machinations. The new ruling Committee for Peace and National Unity would control Rwanda destinies until it was convinced that the politicians were to take over again. It was his ambition to resolve Rwanda’s social and ethnic problems calmly.

*Togo Presse* reported that the new government in Rwanda ethnic balance has been respected, one member of the government is a Tutsi whilst others were Hutu. *Togo Presse 1/8/1973*

In July 1974 Major General Juvenal Habyarimana commuted to life imprisonment the death sentences passed in June on the former President M Kayibanda and 7 of his main advisors. A court martial imposed the death sentences *AFP 10/7/1974*

75 The main objective of the new party included uniting all Rwandan people. The movement will be a people’s movement and will require support without reserve from the basis cell at the bottom of the structure to the submit. He hopes to eradicate once and for all inter tribal hatred and divisions created by the country’s history. These divisions are basically between different regions of the country and between Hutu, Tutsi and two tribes. Voters in Rwanda’s 1-candidate presidential election on 24th of December 1978 gave 98.99%. The election marked a return to normal institutions after a military regime following July 1973 coup. On 17th December 1978 voters in a referendum gave 89.09% in favour of a new constitution. This replaced the 1962 constitution partly suspended in 1973. It makes MRND the sole legal party.
The identity Hutu-Tutsi is bipolar, neither can exist in isolation. As a consequence Rwanda’s first Republic tried to entrench and keep alive both the identities by re-enacting the revolution as Hutu power through periodic pogroms, expulsions and the redistribution of property to its militants in 1959 and 1963.

The Second Republic made the revolution permanent by embedding the identities Hutu and Tutsi into institutions. This institutionalisation brought about a shift in the power structure. There was a regional shift of political focus, from the southern Hutus to the northern Hutus who claimed to be the true custodians of the Revolution. The second was the shift, from civilian to the military. The second Republic maintained that the Tutsi constituted no more than 9 per cent of the total population of Rwanda the figure has remained unchanged over the decades. Administration remained vague about inter-marriage between Hutus and Tutsis and the official identity of children of these marriages. The demographic question became a crucial political issue during the crisis.

DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Before the mid-1980s, Rwanda’s government had managed to avoid becoming heavily indebted. The currency was stable and levels of inflation, foreign debt and corruption were low. More than 90 per cent of the population lived in rural areas, who were provided services like drinking water, electricity, primary education and basic health care. By the early 1990s, 70 per cent of the population had access to clean drinking water, there was a good road network in all regions, and local health clinics and schools operated in the main towns of each district.

President Habyarimana has been returned to office for another 5-year term following 19th December 1983 elections. Voters had a choice between casting a blue ballot for yes and grey for no. The turn out was high in the second election since 1973 coup. *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo) 21/12/1983
President Habyarimana liked to champion the cause of ‘the little man’. Although he included both farmers and herders in his definition, he however, lambasted the parasitic traders and the misguided intellectuals who exploited the ‘little man’ and undermined social cohesion. Implicit in this was that, the economic crisis was a conspiracy of traders, merchants and intellectuals—professions in which Tutsi tended to specialise the State sector was out of bounds for them.

From the late 1970s to the early 1980s the issue of food security was high on the agenda. The rationalisation and modernisation of the system of food production became a major task of agricultural extension workers and local development agencies. But the whole campaign was a top-down effort in the structured and hierarchical Rwanda. To increase agricultural production new farmland in areas which had hitherto remained relatively unused or where extensive grazing had been practised, were incorporated. New developments in various forms ranging from plantations, planned farming settlements (paysannats)\(^76\) and animal breeding co-operatives, and new land settlements were undertaken. The rapid destruction of the forest for increasing farmlands caused an ecological crisis. In particular, the loss of forest which guaranteed adequate supply of water put at risk the basis of existence of the most densely populated countries in Africa.

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76 Farming settlements (*paysannats*) were established on areas each 2 ha in extent and oriented at right angles to the contour lines. It is normal practice for 50 percent of the area to be put to mixed use for growing traditional field crops to cover the farmers own requirements and 50 percent is (page-98) given over to special crops (usually coffee). Situated equally on either side of (above and below the horizontal access road), the new settlements form a sequence of narrow fields, running parallel to each other at right angles to the slope. There is some doubt, however, as to how the situation will develop once the projects come to an end and the farmers have to rely entirely on their own resources. As it is, the location of the projects in the savannah regions at the edge of the rain-irrigated farming areas makes the new settlements extremely dependent on the amount of precipitation brought by the rainy seasons. Dry years can easily turn into disaster years in this region. Heger Christian Kleinert, “Settlement Pressure and the Destruction of the Forests in Rwanda”, *Applied Geography and Development* (Germany), vol. 119(29), 1987, pp. 97-98
SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE CHURCH

After the change of State control to the Hutus, episcopacy was supportive of the subsequent regimes but relying mostly on a Tutsis clergy. The Tutsi turned to the Church because access to public office was restricted on ethnic and regional basis.

While the Church had promoted the social revolution in 1959, thereafter it remained silent on social issues, as this would have damaged the economic position of the Church. It had developed into an extensive hierarchical institution "a State within the State". 77

The Church and State elite's had a mutual interest in maintaining good relationships. 78 The Catholic Church provided most of education and health care. Thereby freeing the State from the heavy burden on these heads. The State on the other hand facilitated the functioning of the Church. The central committee of the MRND was a forum where the Church and the State leaders could further their mutual interests.

The initial success of the developmental policies reduced political tension between ethnic groups. Economically both Church and State had performed well. Until 1988 Rwanda was one of the best performing countries 79 in the region. Rwanda "la petite suisse, pays des milles collines" was the favourite of the international aid community, NGO's and missions. The President was successful in establishing a coalition with both the Church and the international community for autonomy of the

77 Saskia, n. 59, pp. 400-01
78 The collaboration of State and Church was embodied by Archbishop Vincent Nsengiyumva, who was close to the presidential family and an active member in the committee of the MRND. Saskia, Ibid.
79 Observe at first hand what was the regarded (rightly or wrongly) as an outstanding example of orderly well – organised and honestly administered development. I had also lived in Tanzania and Kenya, and visited Burundi and Angola. By comparison, Rwanda in the mid-1980s gave an impression of extreme orderliness; this was the 'Switzerland of Africa'. In terms of electricity supplies, clean drinking water, clinics schools and good roads, Rwandans were relatively well provided for even compared with wealthier neighbouring countries. Helen, n. 55, p. 244
State. The Church-State symbiosis was visible at every level, and clergy were members of different development commissions.

However it was the relatives of the President’s wife, Agathe Kanziga, who ate the largest part of the national cake at the expense of both the Tutsi and rural Hutu population. When the cake began to shrink due to developmental stagnation and crisis, and the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), it initiated a process that degenerated into genocide.

POST-COLONIAL PERIOD IN BURUNDI

Burundi’s initial years after independence were marked by an effort by the Tutsi factions to strengthen control over the State and armed forces. These were then transformed into effective agent of perpetuation and expansion of Tutsi hegemony. There were repeated abortive coups or disorganised uprisings by Hutu factions to gain control of the State. After every such attempt, purges of Hutu elite took place. The change of power in Rwanda also had a profound impact on perception of Tutsis and Hutus in Burundi. Tutsis felt increasingly insecure and used even the slightest pretext to eliminate the entire Hutu elite.

The institutions of State built during the Belgian mandate soon began to exhibit cracks as stress began to develop in it. This allowed the Mwami to remove governments with ease.

81 As Abrams says ‘the revolution in Rwanda strengthened Hutu identification in Burundi and emboldened elements of the Hutu elite. It also induced anxieties among Burundi’s Tutsi who feared they could meet the same fate. Minor violence between Hutu and Tutsi activists occurred even before 1962 and the year following the independence saw Burundi politics and society become increasingly divided along Hutu-Tutsi lines. Abrams, Ibid.
82 As in March 1964 ‘the Mwami of Burundi has ordered the entrusting the conduct of current affairs of the departmental heads of Ministries until a new government is formed. The Mwami dismissed four Ministers before the government resigned.’ Radio Usumbura, 31/3/64, Summary of World Broadcasts
The next government, which was formed, soon faced a major crisis when a majority of the Assembly members tabled a motion of censure and asked the Mwami to dismiss the government. ‘35 members of Burundi National
The internal conflict within UPRONA, especially personal rivalry rather than ethnic differences, went to such an extent that one of the newly appointed premiers was killed within a few days of assuming power. One of the outcomes of the assassination was that UPRONA no longer could play the leading role in governance. Both its labour and youth movements were banned. The space vacated by UPRONA was taken over by Mwami. All these factors made the people, to look up to the institution of monarchy to lead and provide a semblance of order and stability. For the next few months the Mwami was deeply involved in the administration of the country including the army, justice, information and planning departments. Parliament as an institution was increasingly becoming redundant.

Assembly out of 64 have tabled a motion of censure against the government, accusing it of nepotism, despotism and intrusion in judicial affairs. The motion calls upon Mwami Nwambutsa IV to dismiss the Premier Albin Nyamoya and to designate a successor to form a new government. West Africa (London), 2/1/1965.

The Mwami promptly dismissed the government of Premier Nyamoya and appointed M. Pierre of the UPRONA to head the government. Explaining the reasons for his decision he said in a broadcast following the numerous errors and serious shortcoming of which Nyamoya government is guilty...we are obliged to dismiss this government. In order that the Kingdom may be governed and administered in the interest of all, we appoint M. Pierre Ngendandumuve to form the new government to form the new government. He is now the Premier, to whom we entrust the destiny of the country. We order the whole population to the Kingdom to give him their support. R. Bujumbura 7/1/1965, Summary of World Broadcasts

Unfortunately he could not implement any of the promises as he was assassinated a week later on the steps of a maternity hospital in Bujumbura. M. Appolinaire, Vice-President of the National Assembly and President of the Polite Bureau said that 'the motive of the assassination is political, rather than personal rivalries must have played at least an equal part. There appears to be no major difference between the new government and the former one, nor between the Premier and his colleagues, neither can tribal hostilities have been a factor. Le Monde (Paris) 19/1/1965.

In an attempt to revive the institution the Premier told the Mwami and the leaders of government at a meeting on 6th of October 1965, that 'the deteriorating political situation had made it imperative that the division of the legislative and executive powers in the Kingdom should be properly classified'. The Mwami promised to convene the parliament 'soon' but did not make any promises.
Tutsi factions trying to gain control and often involved in bitter feud allowed the monarchy to play an active role. This apart, there was a growing restless among the Hutu majority. They saw their chance of coming to power or even playing a meaningful role receding with the declining democratic institutions, unlike their Rwandan counterparts. This led the Hutus to adopt force to change the ruling regime but all their attempts only resulted in brutal reprisals by the Tutsi controlled army.

Violence first reared its head between 1965-66, when an attempted coup by the Hutu military officers met with violent suppression by Tutsi forces. The subsequent purging included numerous Hutu army officers and of thousands of Hutu, including virtually every significant Hutu in Burundi. A report issued by the International Commission of Jurists stated that all the Hutu elected officers of both houses of the Burundi

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86 In mid-October of 1965, a group Hutu section of the Army and Gendarme staged a coup, which was put down. ‘A mutiny of predominantly Hutu elements of the Army and Gendarme was put down by Royalist troops. Simultaneously attacks were launched in the resident of Mwami Mwamubutsa IV and on the house of the Foreign Minister M. Leopold Biha. The Mwami escaped unhurt but several of his guards were killed. The Premier was critically injured, by three bullets. The Standard (Tanzania) 20/10/1965 This engulfed the country into a spate of violence a report in the Sunday Times on 24th of October 1965 said that ‘a wave of violence erupted in the hills above the capital as Hutu joined the fleeing Gendarme in burning Watutsi houses. A mass Hutu uprising against Watutsi was feared.

The Mwami on the 19th of October 1965 in a message to the Nation informed the country ‘of an attempt coup and an attack on this palace.’ And that ‘the Army had saved situation.’ He then appealed to the people to remain calm and proclaimed martial law. R. Bujumbura 19/10/1965, Summary of World Broadcasts

In a more detail communiqué issued by the Burundi Cabinet on 20th of October 1965 State that ‘in view of the abortive attempt to remove the Head of State and attempt on the life of the Premier by a group of rebels, Who went so far as to use the Gendarme to fight the National Army. The cabinet requested the Head of State (1) to issue a stern order to execute by firing squad and without delay the perpetrators of killing. (2) To carry a sweeping investigating and interrogation of all these suspected individuals. (3) To arrest and sentence these individuals in the interests of ensuring peace and order through out the country.’ R. Bujumbura 20/10/1965, Summary of World Broadcasts

In compliance with the order of the Mwami ‘34 soldiers and gendarme were executed by firing squad on 21st of October 1965. They included five Army officers, two officers of the National Gendarme. Politicians include the President of the Senate and the former Premier M. Bamina, the President of the National Assembly, M. Emille Bucumi, the Secretary of State responsible for the Gendarme and a prominent official in Premier’s office. Uganda Argus 23/10/1965

‘A later report in the East Africa Standard on 28th of October 1965 said ‘Ten more men were executed by a Burundi firing squad on 28th of October 1965 for their part in the rebellion. They include Senate officials, a former Minister and a TU leader. East Africa Standard (pop) 29/10/1965

22 of the execution took place on 16th of December 1965 two days after the arrival of an observer sent by the Commission. He was not told of the impending execution. The commission also expressed concern about the prison conditions in which an estimated 500 to 1000 people are detained in Burundi.’ In another report the Commission said ‘no organisation aware of its responsibility can ignore in silence the execution of all the members of two houses of parliament of any country, together with a large number of principle leaders of an ethnic group, without obtaining an assurance that justice and legality have not been violated. The fact that there is no publicity is in itself alarming. Uganda Argus 10/1/1966
Parliament, and the principal leaders were among the 86 people executed after the abortive mutiny in Burundi in October in 1965.

Following the coup a Royal decree was issued in which the Mwami transformed the ministries to Royal Commissionerates with a Royal Commissioner appointed by the Mwami enjoying powers equal to that of a Minister.\textsuperscript{88}

**DEMISE OF THE MONARCHY**

During the period between 1966 to 1972 the division within the Royal family provided outsiders an opportunity to intervene. The elite faction used this division to play one section against the other. This culminated in the abdication of power by Mwami Mwambutsa to his son, with the support of the Army. However this arrangement did not last long as the new Mwami was soon deposed by the Army and a Republic proclaimed under the leadership of President Micombero. This effectively ended the role of Monarchy in the governance of Burundi.

The Mwami\textsuperscript{89} went to Geneva for medical treatment in early 1966. Hardly two months after his departure the 19 year old Charles deposed him and assumed the throne.\textsuperscript{90} As predicted by former the Mwami, this new relationship did not last even

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{88} R. Bujumbura 20/10/1965, Summery of World Broadcasts
\item \textsuperscript{89} Before leaving Mwami Mwambutsa IV issued two Royal decrees in the end of May 1966. The first decree entrusted the Price Charles ‘in the absence of the Head of State’ with the co-ordination of the activities of the government. The second decree formed a Royal Commission entrusted with the drafting of a new constitution. The Royal Commission included the President of the National Assembly, the Premier, the President of the Supreme Court, the President of the Court of First Instance, several Ministers and high-ranking civil servants.
\item \textsuperscript{90} He also dismissed the Premier M. Leopold Biha and suspended the constitution. Till a new constitution is enacted the acts of the Head of State would take the form of Royal Decrees. He also directed the Secretary of State for Defence Captain Micombero to form a new government. *West Africa* 16/7/1966
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two months. In November 1966 the Premier, Captain Michel Micombero announced that Mwami Ntare had been deposed. The first measure taken by the Captain Micombero was to dissolve the government and to assume power as the Head of State.

The new regime even after one year in power did not allow open airing of opposition. In an effort to contain opposition six former ministers and MPs were
arrested and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in Bujumbura, for writing and distributing an open letter against the President. However, this did not quell the opposition and the restlessness among the Hutus. Towards the end of 1969 at least 20 people were arrested in Bujumbura following the discovery of a plot against the State.

Tass reported in January 1972 another coup attempt in the summer of 1971. A military Tribunal in Bujumbura had passed military sentences on a large group of civilians and military, who were charged with complicity in an anti-government plot. Among these, were several former ministers. Nine people were sentenced to death, seven sent to prison for life, and the rest of them were given lesser sentences, and six were acquitted.

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92 Three other arrested in the same case last May were imprisoned for terms ranging from 3 to 7 years. The former President of the Legislative Assembly M. Thadde Siryumuswi was jailed for 10 years. *Daily National* (pop) 27/12/1968

93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs M. Labare Ntawaishiore said that 'the plot was financed by a foreign embassy in Bujumbura as is clearly indicated by the confession of the arrested plotters. They intended to overthrow the government in the night of 16th and 17th September 1969. Their leader was Major Charles Karorero, head of Logistics Bureau of the General Staff of the Army and Captain Nicodeme Katahiro, who was in charge of military school of Bujumbura. There were also civilians such as Minister of Planning and the Economy M. Barnabe Kanyaruguru and the National Belgian Company M. Joseph Cimpove. All of them were Hutu.' *Le Monde* 14/10/1969

In a related move the government declared the Belgian Ambassador Gen. Henniquian 'person non grata' for allegedly backing the abortive coup d'etat. The move was reported in a communiqué. Gen. Henniquian in the Bujumbura post since 1962 had already left for Brussels recalled by the Belgian government for consultation. In a later move the Burundi government said it had never accused Belgium or any other State of being accessory to the attempted coup d'etat of September. The rumours circulating in Bujumbura were only aimed at hurting the good relation between Burundi and Belgian governments. *Egyptian Gazette* 20/10/1969

In the trial of the accused in the plot to overthrow the government, 23 people including 19 soldiers were condemned to death for their part in the September coup were shot on 22nd of November 1969. Although 25 were condemned on 28th of November 1969 of these 2 Ministers M. Balthazar Ndereraho and M. Andre Kabura had their sentences commuted to hard labour for life

Commenting on the executions, Radio Bujumbura said that the punishments were designed as a warning to any other would-be plotters. In Brussels, the Foreign Ministry said the execution had taken place despite a Belgian government appeal for clemency. In a communiqué the Ministry said that it had intervened through diplomatic channels with exclusive humanitarian aims. In July 1970 the regime embarked on political reform by convening the UPRONA's National Political Bureau. The party on 30th of July 1970 adopted the its charter after a long debate. The President of the party will henceforth become the party's Secretary General and the party's chief officers at lower levels will henceforth be known as First Secretary. A five man executive bureau of the central committee has been established to implement the directives of the party congress and the decisions of central committee. The highest party instance is the National Party Congress, which will be composed of the members central committee, two members for each provincial council, the members of the central committee of movements integrated into the party, one delegation for each associate organisation and one delegate per commune. The congress will be held every 2 years. R. Bujumbura 30/7/1970, *Summery of World Broadcasts*

94 Tass (Moscow) 25/1/1972

Later the President commuted the death sentences on all 9 men for their part in the abortive coup in July 1971. One of the 9, the Foreign Minister M. Libere Ndabakwaje was freed on 5th February 1972 and the rest were given hard labour for life *APP (pop)* 5/2/1972

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THE 1972 GENOCIDE

Similarly, the former Mwami was arrested by the government after trying to invade Burundi with the support of White mercenaries, on 31 March, 1972. Radio Bujumbura announced on 7 May, 1972 that an unspecified number of people had been executed for attempting a coup. After consideration the military tribunals sentenced a number of Burundian nationals. It went on to suggest that the reactionary agents within the ruling Tusti elite had carried out the coup attempt.

On 30 April, 1972, in Burundi there was simultaneously a coup d'etat aimed at restoring ex-King Ntare V to power, and a rebellion aimed at overthrowing the Tutsis. These disorders were of an exceptionally serious nature and troubles ensued throughout the country. The Burundian government in order to regain control of the situation took harsh and repressive measures, killing a large number of people. A Belgian television reporter M. Walter Geerts returning from Burundi confirmed the accusation of genocide on part of those in power in Bujumbura against the more

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95 The report did not give details but asked the people of Burundi to be on they're guard against the threat to which the republic almost fell victim. The militants must not forget that this was not only an attack against our republic, it was Africa and the honour of Africa that was the target of the sworn enemies of the African continent. 'Guardian (London) 1/4/1972

President Amin met the former Mwami Ntare of Burundi who arrived in Uganda from West Germany on 21 March 1972. The President Amin had told the Mwami that he did not know of his visit but assured him that nothing would happen to him in Uganda. He warned him however against planning subversive activities against Burundian government with whom Uganda has good terms and that he would ask the Burundi government to allow the Mwami to return as a private citizen. R. Kampala 23/3/1972, Summary of World Broadcasts

A spokesman for the Ugandan Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 4 April 1966 gave the following version of the return, the Mwami Ntare was sent along with his two Burundian friends after a meeting between the Burundi Foreign Minister M. Artemon Simbananiye. In the meeting the M. Simbananiye gave verbal assurance of President Micombero about the safety of the ex-King and allowing him to return as a private citizen. The ex-King was sent in President Amin's helicopter but on arrival he was taken to an unknown destination. R. Bujumbura later announced that the military forces engaged the enemies of the nation and exchanged gunfire with them, near the commando camp, where the other groups of attackers overwhelmed the security forces guarding the Ntare V. The traitors attempted to rescue the King from the hands of the security men. On both sides people died and with them then died the last Ntare who was killed during the fighting.

96 R. Bujumbura 7/5/1972, Summary of World Broadcasts

97 Radio Kinshasa reported on 3rd May 1972 that in response to an appeal by Colonel Micombero and because Burundi had helped Zaire President Mobutu had agreed to send troops to Burundi. These would have a limited role in connection with logistics.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bujumbura on 8th May 1972 appealed from the pulpit to Burundian leaders to avoid revenge and reprisals against of the uprising and urged the government to be judicious. According to the East Africa Standard there were mounting fears in Bujumbura over the fate of hundreds of detained Hutus. What was probably originally a Hutu uprising might now have into a revenge campaign by the ruling Tutsi. The government appeared on 8th May 1973 to be in control of major centres of the countries
numerous Hutus. He believed and estimated that 50,000 to 1,00,000 Hutus had been killed at the time he left the country and added that repression was still in full swing in Bujumbura and in the provinces of Lake Tanganyika.98

On 4 June, 1972 President Micombero said that peace had finally been restored in Burundi. In certain regions the Civil Defence groups comprised mainly of Hutus who beat the attackers side by side with their Tutsi brothers.99

Addressing Army officers at a reception on 18 June 1972 the Army Chief Lt. Col. Dabemeye announced the end of military operations against the rebels. More importantly, he said Burundi’s Armed Forces have proved once more that they constitute the foundation on which a prosperous and free Burundian society can be harmoniously consolidated.100 It is this foundation that has ensured that no Hutu elite can emerge as a challenger in Burundi.

At first the government denied that any genocide had taken place. When persistent reports of foreign journalist pointed to the large-scale killings, the government reacted by blaming the killings upon the Hutu rebels and suggesting that all the 50,000 to 100,000 estimated dead were Tutsi victims of Hutu violence.

98 Le Monde 28/5/1972
It was only by the end of May 1972 that the Army was able to regain calm. The official account of events broadcast on 30th May 1972 Stated that it was exactly 31 days since Burundi lived through tragic events. It was during the night of 29-30th April 1972, that the forces of evil armed criminal hands in order to shed blood of the sons of the nation. It was during the night of 29th April 1972 between 1900 and 2000 hours local time that group of mercenaries - foreigner- numbering 10000 and armed with poisoned machetes, knobkerries, automatic weapons and Molotov cocktails swarmed into Burundi. A contingent of 4600 rebels was involved in the fighting and around Bujumbura and 5000 rebels were active in other areas mutilating children, massacring and raping. According to the count made by teams of volunteers entrusted with the disposal of the corpses of the victim the number of dead is approximately 50000. This figure does not include those who have disappeared and refugees in Tanzania and Uganda. The documents captured clearly show that the aggressor wanted not only to topple national institutions but that they also had a carefully prepared plan for the systemic extermination of the entire Tutsi tribe. R. Bujumbura 29/5/1972, Summary of World Broadcasts

99 The intention of genocide appears very clearly from the documents seized. The number of Tutsi victims was more than 50000. The attackers were trained outside our territory. They were about 25000 including some Mulelists. Complicities were many but it is right to note that a very large number remained attached to the national cause. R. Bujumbura 4/6/1972, Summary of World Broadcasts
Radio Bujumbura reported that the authorities were protecting all Burundians regardless of their ethnic origins. ‘Our hunt has been for the rebels and outlaws who attacked our country and not for anyone else. We are not persecuting the Hutus but punishing the guilty’ R. Bujumbura 4/6/1972, Summary of World Broadcasts

100 He said “now that a victory in the ground is won. We must pay special attention to discipline. Daily Nation 19/6/1972
The Tutsi reaction had systematically aimed at eliminating the Hutu elite and thus render the Hutu people forever disadvantaged vis-à-vis their more advantaged fellow countrymen. It also ensured that they harbour lasting animosities, which repeatedly erupt into more violence in years to come.

The events of 1972 cemented Tutsi political, social and economic hegemony in Burundi and left the Hutu community traumatised and leaderless, dispersed and defused. The ethnic conflict consequently remained subdued until 1988. This caused large number of Tutsis and Hutus to flee for refuge in the neighbouring countries.

**RELATIONS BETWEEN RWANDA AND BURUNDI**

Both the countries at the time of decolonisation were governed by diametrically different elite groups. As a result the relations between the two were acrimonious from the very beginning. While in Rwanda the Hutus had dislodged the Tutsi from power, in Burundi the monarchy was able to retain power. The Tutsis in Burundi had

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101 Abrams says 'increasing anti-Hutu provocation by local Tutsi officials led to Hutu uprisings. It broke out in the capital and parts of the countryside. The insecure Tutsi regime used the opportunity to slaughter not only the rebels but also the entire Hutu and rival Tutsi elite including every educated Hutu in Burundi. Aided by Tutsi civilian and youth militias, the Army is estimated to have slaughtered up to 250000 Hutu and driven out 150000 of the them from the country. Abrams, n. 80, p. 146

102 In mid 1988 violence again reached such extent that Mr. Code Cisse, UNHCR representative in Rwanda said after touring the area on 20th and 21st of August 1988 'we cannot talk about a civil war because only one side was armed. It has become a massacre by the Burundi Army. Financial Times (London) 23/8/1988.

The trouble started according to one account when a Tutsi soldier shot dead 2 Hutus. This led to rioting in which around 1000 Tutsis were killed. This led the almost exclusive Tutsi Army bombing and burning Hutu villages. Another version says that massacres started after months of army manoeuvres aimed at checking Hutu smuggling of coffee. The Hutu revolted around 6th August 1988 killing perhaps as many as 2000 Tutsi. AFP 20/8/1988

The government blamed unspecified outside agitators for inflaming the Hutu. The military government had declared nation wide curfew and imposed travel restrictions. The Foreign Minister told diplomats in Bujumbura 'for these trouble making extremists, the solution of the problems of Burundi can only be achieved by the extermination of part of the population. Burundi News Agency 18/8/1988

103 The period up to 1966, also saw the relation between Rwanda and Burundi being strained and tense. In a cable to President Kayibanda of Rwanda on 28th of January 1964 the Premier of Burundi M. Ngendandumwe protested against Rwanda’s ‘flagrant and repeated violation of Burundi territory and of acts committed against the Burundi border inhabitants Radio Usumbura 28/1/1964, Summary of World Broadcasts

In reaction to this President Kayibande in a letter to the Mwami of Burundi accused Burundi of being responsible for attacks in Rwanda territory by harbouring ‘Inyenzi terrorist’ and for the failure of recent negotiations between the two countries. Radio Kigali 30/1/1964, Summary of World Broadcasts
witnessed the fate of their brethren after they lost power in Rwanda. With every pogrom and consolidation of the Rwandan Hutus, the insecurity of the Burundian Tutsis increased. Similarly the continuance of Tutsis in power in Burundi made the Rwandan Hutus insecure and apprehensive.

Both the regimes being antithetical to each other, constantly complained and protested to the UN, OAU and, other such fora, of intrusions, cross-boarder attacks and support to extremist groups. Simultaneously, these regimes were sympathetic to the condition of their brethren. Pogroms, killings and violent clashes in one of the countries resulted in a similar action and a spate of protests, in another.

104 'It is know that the subversive Mulelist movement, which has its headquarters in Usumbura in Burundi, is directed by the Inyenzi terrorist who attacked Rwanda last December. The present collusion between various movements in Usumbura today proves to the world the truth of Rwanda's assertion at the time of the events of December 1963 and the Lagos conference in February 1964. Rwanda declared that through its complexity with the terrorist on Rwanda's border, Burundi or more precisely, its capital Usumbura - is a centre of subversion against its neighbour. In the present circumstances, the Rwandan Republic wishes to affirm its solidarity with the great Congolese nation and hopes that this criminal subversion will not harm its economic revival. Radio Kigali 30/1/1964, Summary of World Broadcasts

In April 1966 both the countries send delegation to talks in Ksenyi on the northern shore of Lake Kive. The delegation discussed the problem of refugees and subversion, economic and agricultural co-operation and the establishment of diplomatic relations. According to official sources in Kigali the Burundi delegation agreed to 'a stage by stage normalisation of relation between the two countries. Uganda Argus 19/1/1966

In response to this letter the Rwanda government cabled the following letter to the OAU and UN. It Stated that Rwanda had sent warnings to Burundi government this year that Burundians who had sought refuge in Rwanda after the massacre of Hutu intended to return by force. It had also expressed regret that bandits with automatic weapons had several times crossed into Rwanda to loot and disturb the peace. It had also protested against the tenacious Burundi radio Statement aimed at making International opinion believe that Rwandans were attacking Burundi. The cable further accused Burundi of trying to divert world opinion from the massacres by creating tension with Rwanda, and of maintaining on its territory and supplying with transport to over 2000 Tutsi terrorist, equipped with automatic weapons who were ready to attack Rwanda. Radio Kigali 25/1/1966, Summary of World Broadcasts

Burundi rejected the contention of Rwanda in a broadcast the Burundi's Foreign Minister declared that claim reigned through out the territory. He further Stated that the 'Rwandan government should therefore before seeking to establish order and security in other territory, re-establish order and justice in its own country where genocide had been reigning since 1959. R. Bujumbura 28/1/1966, Summary of World Broadcasts

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Addressing the OAU council the Burundi Foreign Minister accused Rwanda of engaging in subversive activities with assistance of what he called terrorist from Burundi living in Rwanda. Many Burundi citizens have been killed as a result of raids from Rwanda. He requested OAU to send a mission for an on the spot investigation of the situation which was contrary to the OAU and UN charters.

105 In February 1964 Burundi's Premier urged OAU to convene a conference on the Rwandan disorder where, according to him, 8000 to 15000 had been killed in political massacres organised by the Rwanda government. On four occasions Rwanda troops have pursued refugees into Burundi territory. Burundi was acting as host to 35000 Rwanda refugees, 5000 of whom had crossed in recent weeks East Africa Standard 6/2/1964 Also the toll was 5000 not 200000 as claimed by Rwanda. But the insurgents lost 20000 Rwandans involved in internal affairs of other States. 'Rwanda's repeated participation in successive genocide against our people, its tribalisation of all political organs on the colonial and nazi model and its granting of shelter for mercenary clique showed that t was nothing less than a bridgehead for re-colonisation of Africa Daily Nation 12/10/1972
However the relation between Rwanda and Burundi during the period, 1966-72 saw de-escalation from high tension and moving the UN, for efforts in increasing co-operation. That there was an easing of relations can be gauged from the President Micombero’s comment while accepting the new Rwandan ambassador, that Burundi wanted to settle the question of Rwandan refugees on its territory on the basis of Geneva Convention. The co-operation necessitated a climate of frankness going beyond possible quarrels.106

All said and done the essence of their relationship was that each elite was paranoid. They feared that other elite represented their possible future and the consequence of loss of power. It was this stark reminder that kept both the regimes on the tenterhook.

106 ‘I am convinced that beyond the individuals there are more things which unite us that separate us. ‘The relations had been strained particularly since the short lived uprising in May 1972. In October there was a radio war AFP 13/2/1973
CRISIS OF REFUGEES

The internal condition in both the countries produced a large number of refugees. A substantial number of them were from Rwanda as the Tutsis were organised, better equipped and possessed skills which enabled them to easily migrate. On the other hand the Hutus of Burundi were disorganised and tied to their land, making it difficult for them to flee freely.

The condition of these refugees, was precarious, and became more so as their number began to rise. There were about 150,000 refugees from Rwanda in Uganda, Burundi, Tanganyika and the Kive province of Congo since 1962. They were often at the mercy of the host governments' changes in policy towards them. For instance Congo agreed to abrogate eviction orders only after intervention by Mr. Felix Schnyder, High Commissioner for Refugees. The Congolese Premier M. Tshombe agreed to abrogate a decree to expel 60,000 Rwandan refugee from Congo. The decree was passed in August 1964.

The period also saw refugees becoming Stateless people with none of the States except Tanzania willing to allow them to stay, as the prospects of their return diminished. Even in Tanzania the refugees found opportunities decreasing and only available to very few. There were also large scale translocation of the refugees.

Commenting on the Tanzanian policy towards refugee was Mr. Kawama, the second Vice-President of Tanzania. The government policy for accepting refugees

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107 According to UNHCR in May 1964, there are 40000 in Burundi, 36000 in Uganda, 60000 in Kive province of Congo, 14000 in Tanganyika, well over 100000 Tutsi still remain in Rwanda. Some occupy important administration. These countries have asked UNHCR for support, according to a report in the Uganda Argus on 31st of January 1964. It also said that a total of 12000 refugees have left Rwanda in January 1964. Uganda Argus 7/1/1964

108 R. Elizabetville 5/2/1965, Summary of World Broadcasts

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was enumerated as: (i) any refugee can stay in Tanzania provided he obeys the law and does not interfere with the politics of the country, (ii) the government will provide to the refugees food and medicine until other help is available, (iii) if a refugee chooses to stay in Tanzania, he must work to become self-supporting.¹⁰⁹

Meanwhile in Uganda, Mwami Kigeri V the exiled former ruler of Rwanda, appealed on 6 December 1972 to his fellow refugees in Uganda to co-operate with the President Amin’s regime and to ignore the rumour mongers in their ranks. This followed General Amin’s threat to expel the thousands of refugees from Uganda for allegedly plotting against the present Rwanda government. The Ugandan Minister of Information informed the Lagos meeting of OAU that the refugee problem has reached such proportion that the government of Uganda was facing difficulties in fulfilling its role of providing humanitarian support.¹¹⁰

On the other hand the President of Rwanda M. Gregoire Kayibanda appealed to refugees who fled from Rwanda to return in peace or live quietly in their adopted countries, without backing terrorist activities and those aimed at weakening Rwanda. Some of the refugees, he believed, ‘were looking for a settlement in order to return to Rwanda to live honourably with their families.’¹¹¹

Most often the conditions of refugees was open to interpretation of the host government due to pressure to accommodate more and more refugee. Over 300 Rwanda families with nearly 3000 cattle head crossed into Uganda since the beginning of August 1978. In Rwanda, mainly the Tutsis fled due to a new policy of

¹⁰⁹ The Standard (Tanzania), 23/12/1964
¹¹⁰ He further said ‘Uganda has so far spent £341031 on these refugees but most of this money spent by the refugees on purchase of arms. Refugees were even selling the food given to them by the Ugandan government in order to spend money on their former Mwami. They had abused Ugandan hospitality by forming groups to invade Rwanda to overthrow the government. Uganda had no alternative but to send some of these people away unless Uganda received help. Uganda Argus 5/3/1964
¹¹¹ Uganda Argus 2/4/1964
the Rwandan government. They were told that it was doubtful whether Uganda would consider them as political refugee since there was no civil was or violence in Rwanda and they were warned not to use Uganda as a base for malicious propaganda against Rwanda.112

At the same time efforts were made to settle the refugees permanently in some countries. In an effort to resettle refugees in a permanent manner, it was announced in Geneva that Tangyanika had agreed to resettle 10,000 Tutsis in Tabora region. The UNHCR, the Lutheran World Federation signed an agreement with Tangyanika and Zanzibar to establish an agriculture community in a fertile unpopulated region for these refugees.113

However, not all refugee were so fortunate. Uganda was being pressed to readmit nearly 40,000 Rwandans who were drive out from their home, in south-west Uganda in October 1982 and were camped in settlement just inside Rwanda. Another 32,000 were living on the Ugandan side of the border. Local Ugandan officials and Ugandan Peoples Congress youth member ordered the refugees out of their home after clashes between some Rwanda refugees and locals. President Obote said they had left in panic and no government orders were given. Rwanda is pressing for their return saying that only some 6000 of them can be considered as Rwandan nationals.114

Eventually refugees became pawns in the hands of different countries. High level delegation of Uganda and Rwanda met in Kabali but failed to solve the problem of the stranded refugees. The number of refugees waiting on both sides of the border rose to 100,000. Uganda insisted that they were not uprooted by government orders, but they should be settled in Rwanda. On the other hand Rwanda said it considers

112 R. Kampla 16/8/1978
113 East Africa Standard 3/5/1964
114 The Times (London) 19/1/1983
them Ugandans. It has agreed to, settle only those refugees whom it considers as its
citizen, and who want to live in Rwanda. However, there are many others who would
prefer to return to their former homes in Uganda if their security is assured.115
Rwanda maintained its hardline posture. In July 1986 the Central Committee of
MRND ruled:

Rwanda cannot allow itself to welcome back Rwandan refugees who left the
country. The main reason for the decision is demographic and in consequence
refugee must be integrated into the population of the country where they are
at present. Rwanda is totally incapable of ensuring even food security should
there be a mass of refugees. The UNHCR should make this decision their
own and convey its logic and reasonableness to the interested parties.116

A joint communiqué was issued at the end of the meeting of Heads of State
East and Central Africa in Nairobi, and one of the main problem discussed was that of
refugees, Particularly with regard to refugees who used the host country for
subversion and agitation against their country of origin. It was agreed that such
refugees, as distinct from refugees accepted on humanitarian grounds, should not
receive support of any kind.117

Apart from problems of daily existence that the refugee had to face they faced
harassment from insurgents groups. The local authorities also harassed them,
sometimes even imprisoning them. To alleviate this the UN in 1964 airlift another
2000 Rwandan refugees from the Kivu province of Congo to western Tanzania.
Tanzanian Christian Refugee Service operated by the Lutheran World Federation took
care of them. They developed villages of 100 one-acre plots for resettlement of the

115 The Times 10/3/1983
116 AFP 27/7/1986
117 East Africa Standard 4/4/1966
refugees. It cost about £178,500.\textsuperscript{118} However, such large funding has not been forthcoming later.

UNHCR’s regional delegate for central Africa, M. Alian remarked that 30,000 refugees from Burundi are located in the Kive region in the East of Zaire. The Zairian authorities are considering transferring them about 100 km towards the interior of the country to stop them carrying out reprisal raids against their country.

In an effort to achieve a degree of security, the refugees tried to integrate with the local population and secure citizenship. About 15,000 Rwanda refugees have become quite much integrated with local population and some of them have taken Zairian nationality. More than 15,000 refugee from Rwanda have applied for Tanzanian citizenship. It is said there are 20,440 Rwandan in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{119}

Massive translocation of refugee to newer homes, brought in an element of uncertainty in the life the refugees. Some 23,000 Burundi refugee were transferred to the hilly region of Mishamo near Kigoma from their present camps. The refugees survivours of 1972 massacres will be joined in Mishamo by 13,000 other refugee now living in Kigoma region. The move was due to lack of arable and water in the region. In Mishamo the refugees were to be settled in highlands, similar to the areas they inhabited in Burundi. The transfer was made possible through the combined effort of Tanzanian government, UNHCR, World Food Program and the Lutheran World service.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{118} The Standard 23/12/1964
\textsuperscript{119} AFP 29/8/1978
\textsuperscript{120} AFP 6/1/1979
THE EMERGENCE OF RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT

The case of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) sheds light upon the politics of exile and of reform. The political mobilisation of those in exile is often in response to changes at the international level and also in the host country from where they have fled.\textsuperscript{121}

The events of 1972-73 pre-empted the emergence of a second group called \emph{Imburamajo}, composed of peasants, and school teachers, who argued that the right to return be separated from the restoration of the Monarchy. But in 1974 General Amin overthrew President Milton Obote, and subsequently developed a close relation with the former Rwanda Mwami. When forces loyal to President Obote attempted to invade Uganda Mwami Kigeri convinced Amin that as a threat to the Monarchy, the \emph{Imburamajo} were also a threat to his regime. This prompted Amin to crush the new movement.\textsuperscript{122}

By mid 1970s the leading political organisations in the refugee community became inert. The policy of the Rwandan government was that the country was already under demographic stress, so those who had fled should make their homes elsewhere. The prospects of imminent return seemed increasingly distant, the struggle for personal survival increased and the host countries’ government permitted refugees less and less room for political organisation. Under these conditions the refugees’ principle strategy was to attempt to become part of the host societies. However, by the mid 1980’s the strategy of blending into the host societies began to collapse and the reality of Statelessness again became the dominant theme in the diaspora.

It was in an increasingly uncertain life in exile that Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) was organised with a clear leftist ideology. Their strategy

\textsuperscript{121} Reed, n. 72 pp. 479-80
\textsuperscript{122} Reed, ibid, p. 482
involved working through cultural organisations which would foster a sense of nationalism within the diaspora. It distributed papers at various gatherings and conference even if unable to gain officials entry. They were unable to attract more than a small intellectual following. 123

When the guerrilla war began in Uganda by National Resistance Movements (NRM), among the founders were two Rwandans – Fred Rwigyema and Kagame – both RANU activist. As attacks against refugees escalated more and more members joined NRM and its military wing National Resistance Army (NRA). In the process a large cadre of Rwandan exiles received first hand experience in guerrilla warfare.

The significance of the victory of NRM was enormous to the Rwandan refugees’ struggle. If Ugandans guerrillas of NRA could defeat their government which was an internationally recognised regime with a military forces far superior to that of the rebels then the Rwandans too could do it. In order to integrate different groups RANU Congress in 1985 empowered its political bureau to form a task force under Tito Rutaremara. University students were send directly to refugee camps who reported back in December 1987. Based on these inputs RANU Congress released three documents: a revised political program known as Eight Point program, a new operational guidelines, and a personal code of conduct. It also decided to rename the movement as Rwandan Patriotic Front. 124

Although NRA was to demobilise the non-Ugandans as far back as 1986 but due to military pressure it was not done. By 1990 the war in the north had subsided and plans for a general demobilisation were under way once again. Around the same time Rwigyerna was removed from his command post; RPF felt it had to act quickly.

123 Reed, Ibid. p. 484
124 Reed, Ibid. p. 485
The opportunity came in October 1990 when both President Habyrimana and President Museveni were attending the UN summit. This meant that President Museveni could distance himself from any Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) activity until it was too late to stop. On the night of 30 September 1990, 4000 Rwandan members of NRA withdrew from their barracks in absolute secrecy and began to march south towards the border and attacked Rwanda.\textsuperscript{125}

At the turn of the decade in both the countries, the State was under stress, and other institutions of society like the Church had lost their legitimacy. The refugee population too was restless as it realised that no one wanted them, thus the capture of State was the only option for return. The Hutus were restless for power in Burundi. In this situation both the societies, which had already witnessed large scale violence were poised for another round of violence.

CONCLUDING POINTS: THE PRIMING OF THE CONFLICT SYSTEM

As is clear from above discussion, in both the countries by early 1990s or late 1980s, a conflict system had been established and fully prepared, for the conflict to move from the contradiction and attitudinal level to the behavioural manifestation.

The emergence of Tutsis as the ruling elite displaced the Hutus, and the formation of the exploitative structures with the support of a strong State was the precursor to the establishment of structural violence. The arrival of the colonial powers helped the Tutsis to further deepen and entrench this violence. This violence was personified in the office of the local chief. Colonial rule also propounded the Himatic theory and formulated a policy based on it. This transformed both the groups into monoliths.

\textsuperscript{125} Reed, Ibid. p. 487
However, it was only after the Church took up social issues after the Second World War that the Hutus realised their deprivation and alienation. They also realised the potential of ethnicity to rally and mobilise the masses. As a consequence, the conflict which was hidden in the structures of the society became manifest and conflict attitudes primed. As the decolonisation process began, these groups which got primed, resorted to attacks and violent clashes. Thus the conflict entered into its manifest or behavioural phase with youth gangs attacking each other, and there were regular pogroms.

After independence when the Hutus came to occupy power in Rwanda, the ruling elite used the fear and threat of the Tutsis returning to power to keep in control. However, cracks developed in the ruling elite and the northern Hutus took over power, but they continued to use the spectra of Tutsi return. Efforts were made to instil this conflict consciousness to overcome their short-coming. When economic downturn occurred, the regime used the examples of successful Tutsi farmers and business men to revive the fears in rural Hutus.

Mass media and other devices were used to deepen this consciousness and military training was give to Hutu youths. Village security committees were formed and lists of Tutsis were prepared. This was then used by a small leadership whose insecurity and fear of loss of power made them avoid negotiations and instead plan and perpetuate genocide.

In Burundi, the Hutus were hopeful of being provided space due to the flexible nature of society and the presence of many different avenues of social mobility. This feeling was reinforced by experienced during the council elections conducted by the colonial administration, where some Hutus were elected as councillors. As a
consequence the Hutus leadership did not feel the necessity for consolidation and aggregation using ethnicity.

However, after independence and seeing the conditions of the Rwandan Tutsis, the ruling Tutsi elite in Burundi realised the implications of allowing Hutus to power. They systematically dismantled the democratic space so that the majority Hutus were unable to gain access to power. Meanwhile the Burundi Hutus became restless and the position and the privileges enjoyed by the Rwandan Hutus only heightened their sense of deprivation. Therefore, they attempted to capture power by force, but failed. However, after every such an attempt by Hutus, made the paranoid Tutsis to embark on a massive reprisal killings and ethnic cleansing.