Chapter – I
CHAPTER – I

THE ‘DOMESTIC FACTORS - EXTERNAL POLICY’ LINKAGE IN HISTORICAL CONTRAST: AN OVERVIEW UPTO THE PRESENT

The objective of this chapter is to examine the domestic factors deciding and shaping the contours of Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. These factors have been determinants in charting the PRC’s relations with other countries since its founding on 1 October 1949. (see Appendix II).

The foundations of contemporary Chinese diplomacy were laid with the victory of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the war of liberation and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In handling foreign affairs, the PRC adopted the perspectives and scientific theories of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as a guide to its analysis of the international situation and formulation of its foreign policies. Proceeding from the fundamental interests of the people of China and the world, the PRC adhered to the “principles of independence and of patriotism combined with internationalism.” While highly valuing its independence and sovereignty, the PRC supported the oppressed countries and nations in their struggle to win or defend their independence and sovereignty. The PRC's foreign policy consistently highlighted the need for safeguarding world peace, peaceful coexistence, friendly co-operation, common progress and prosperity between China and other countries, and among all other countries of the world. In the complex international system, the PRC claims that

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1 Han Nianlong (ed.), *Diplomacy of Contemporary China* (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), p.iii.

2 These principles, which later came to be known as the ‘Panchsheel,’ were first elaborated at the Bandung Conference in 1954. They are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression: non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and, peaceful coexistence. They were part of the ten principles adopted by the Bandung Conference, which in sequence are: (1) Respect basic human rights and the aims and principles of the UN charter. (2) Respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of every nation. (3) Recognise that all races are equal and all nations, big or small, are equal. (4) Non-intervention or interference in other nation’s internal affairs. (5) Respect every nation’s right of individual or collective defence in accordance with the UN Charter. (6) To not make use of collective
it has always fought against imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism and "stood firm" on the side of international justice and human progress. These basic principles of China's diplomacy have run through the provisions of the successive constitutions of the PRC regarding its foreign policy as well as become the basis of the PRC's interaction with other countries.

In the realm of foreign policy, ideology is of seminal importance. It is rare that international or domestic political factors constrain policymakers to such a degree that they are left no room for choice between alternative courses of action. Decision makers' views of political reality, whether simple and intuitive or highly complex and formally articulated, structure their environment for choice, inform their consideration of various courses of action and provide rationalisation for the choices that are made. Much of the ideology that the leaders of the PRC consciously brought to the foreign policy arena, derived from Marxism-Leninism, a formal system of ideas which provided a prism through which they viewed the world and which they believed, explained reality. An additional cluster of ideas, values, assumptions and prejudices — which may be ascribed to be an 'informal ideology' — have also shaped the external outlook and influenced the foreign policy choices of the PRC.

A vast literature on Chinese foreign policy analyses the role of ideology. Perspectives on the subject range from earlier notions that Chinese foreign policy defence arrangements to serve any great power's special interest, and to not impose pressure upon each other. (7) To not offend any nation's territorial integrity or political independence by aggressive behaviour or aggressive threat or resort to force. (8) To solve all international disputes through peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration or judicial solution and any other peaceful means chosen by the concerned parties, in accordance with the UN Charter. (9) Promote mutual interests and cooperation. (10) Respect justice and international obligation.

Han Nianlong, n, p. iv.


was the practical expression of the Marxist-Leninist world view to later views that ideology is a minor factor in foreign policy, invoked by leaders to rationalise decisions that are reached on various other grounds. In specific cases, such as the early stage of Sino-Soviet relations, the role of ideology is directly addressed.

At this juncture, it is to be emphasised that the aim of this study is to try and understand Chinese foreign policy and from time to time identify and extract the strands relating to the emergence and implementation of a policy of successful economic diplomacy. Since the 1950s, particularly since the 1970s, the study of contemporary Chinese foreign policy has developed into a significant discipline of scholarship with various schools of thought interpreting Chinese foreign policy behaviour and decision. The objective is to generate new prisms of enquiry through which Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy could be studied.

It can be inferred that Chinese leaders, like policy-makers everywhere, bring to their dealing in the complexities of foreign affairs, sets of presuppositions values, expectations, preferences and operating assumptions, that derive from three major sources. First is their socialisation into a specific culture at a particular period in time; second, their unique experiences as individuals, and their shared experiences as members of groups; third, their conscious choices as thinking political actors from the set of values, systems of thought that are available to them. Each person is not only influenced by experience, but also creates a persona as a political actor through an ongoing process of conscious choice. Through this process of creation and self-creation, foreign policy actors acquire a particular worldview or ideologically based worldview (Weltanschauung).

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An ideology may be defined as a more or less coherent and systematic body of ideas, that helps to explain the nature of social reality and provides a programme of action for changing that reality in order to achieve certain desired social goods and values. In this, Marxism-Leninism - Mao Zedong Thought (and the currently prevalent) Deng Xiaoping Theory, is unquestionably the dominant ideology in shaping and informing the views, preferences, expectations, and assumptions of Chinese which works in, among others, the foreign affairs arena as well.

I

A Brief Historical Background

The history of China's foreign policy, since the establishment of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) can be viewed as a continuum in the sense that it included the assumptions about the world upon which it was based and the institutions that had been its formal expression, which demonstrated that the Chinese had for a long time not considered the nation-state to be the basic unit in international affairs. For example, prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, the objective of China's foreign policy was not to solve problems, but to prevent problems from arising in the first place. Consequently, unique institutions and practices were developed to control what was deemed essential to implementing this policy.

For the Qing, the world was a coherent whole, their assumptions and presuppositions about the world were part of a conceptual and institutional continuum and they were themselves an integral part of the structure of Chinese institutions and behaviour. This unified vision conceptually resolved

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8 Carlsnacs, ibid., pp. 149-65.


9 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 4-19.
contradictions inherent in the Empire’s physical and political environment and those which emerged from the interplay of the worldview of traditional China with the worldviews of those with whom Qing China came into contact and conflict.

According to John King Fairbank:

"The Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles of social and political order that were manifested internally within the Chinese state and society - China's foreign relations were accordingly hierarchic and non-egalitarian, like Chinese society itself. In the course of time, there grew up a network of Sino-foreign relations...(which) we prefer (to call) the Chinese world order." \(^{10}\)

The Chinese Empire was thus culturally, institutionally, and geographically a world system, until the middle of the nineteenth century, when all this changed. The growth of capitalism in the west was accompanied by an industrial age that required ever growing markets to sustain itself. Therefore what became a necessity for the West, directly clashed with what the Empire felt and perceived to be its own necessity. Conflict was the unavoidable result. It was not the Empire’s “backwardness” but the West’s new aggressiveness and modernism, that led to this conflict. \(^{11}\) Geography and technology, hitherto factors protecting the integrity of separate societies, now became, as technology conquered geography, instruments for intercourse and gradual integration into a world system.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the West defeated the Qing three times in less than twenty years leading to the breaking down of the coherent view of the world that had guided China’s external interactions until then. As time passed, Qing officials concerned with foreign policy realised that earlier assumptions could no longer be applied. The strategies and tactics that had

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characterised the Empire's external behaviour prior to the West's attacks were now ineffective. To observers, China's hitherto perceived coherent worldview was increasingly unable to resolve the contradictions between China's world and the world of its invaders.

The descent of China into a period of internal strife in the early 20th century was also marked by the increase in the number of foreign players involved in its international affairs. The eclipse of the Qing Dynasty, the two world wars and the civil war between the CPC and the GMD, were in a large way responsible for the emergence of a "diplomacy of nationalism." The era of ideological and political ferment as epitomised during the May Fourth Movement in the Republican period was also the age of surging nationalism in China. In diplomacy as well as on the domestic front, Chinese behaviour was dominated by a vigorous outburst of nationalist sentiment. At the Washington conference of 1921-22, the Republican government fought hard for independence and international respect, and in the post-conference period they struggled ceaselessly with the imperialist powers for tariff autonomy, revocation of extraterritoriality, and relinquishment of foreign concessions. At the Washington conference, the Chinese delegation presented a nine-point proposal which asked the participants to honour China's territorial integrity and political independence, to desist from concluding treaties among themselves that would affect China, to respect her rights of neutrality in future wars, to remove all limitations on her political, jurisdictional and administrative freedom, to review all foreign special rights, immunities, and

12 The Opium Wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60 were in a large way responsible for the decline in the power and prestige of the Qing. Studies of the political and intellectual impact of the West on Chinese society at large, i.e., that focus on broader perspective than that provided by the Dynasty's institutions, are, Frederic C. Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); Yen-ping Hai, The Compradore in Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970) and, Lin [William L] Tung, China and the Foreign Powers: The Impact of and Reaction to Unequal Treaties (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1970).
concessions in China, and to set time limits to her commitments. The intense drive to eliminate these national stigmas led to numerous clashes with foreign police and mercenaries, who reacted all too frequently with highhanded and needlessly harsh measures of repression.

II

The CPC and the ‘Domestic Condition – Foreign Policy’ Linkage

As early as 1922, the CPC began to develop, within the framework of Marxist analysis, a phenomenological approach to the description and analysis of imperialism in China. In fact, at that time the Party issued a manifesto that vividly described imperialism in China.

As stated in the manifesto:

"The result of the revolution’s defeat has been a strengthening of the world imperialist yoke and of the reactionary regime of her own militarists. The so-called republican rule is in the hands of militarists who, under conditions of semi-feudal economy, use it to join their own actions with those of the world imperialists, who are concluding an agreement with the Chinese military clique regarding loan for their military needs and for the state’s self-preservation. The foreign states are making use of the opportunity of investing their capital in China, thus acquiring, by means of a system of financial enslavement, “spheres of influence” in China and special rights and privileges. The maintenance of civil war in China is of first importance to the world imperialists for it delays China’s progress, prevents China from developing her own industry, saturates the Chinese market with goods of their own foreign manufacture, and also prevents the Chinese bourgeoisie from utilising the country in the interests of domestic exploitation.”

15 To rectify the wrongs and resolve the unfinished business of the Paris conference, the United States had organised the Washington conference from November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922. It was attended by nine powers which had interests in the Far East and the Pacific: Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Japan, China, Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal as cited in Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *Rise of Modern China* (2nd edn.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 640.


In this approach, imperialism was more than just a statistical indication of the relative weight of one or more foreign powers in the country's internal economy. It was a force that affected the daily life of the people as groups and as individuals; this departure in description and analysis gave a special direction to foreign policy thinking in the Communist Party. The departure rested on a distinction between formal structures and substantive relationships. For example, the Western powers did not oppose the movements for tariff autonomy and treaty reform in the 1920s, but the communists understood that the solutions these movements sought were formalistic and not substantive. The CPC was of the view that the dismantling of the legal structure of imperialism, (which actually was not accomplished until the end of extraterritoriality in 1943) would not change the substance of imperialism in China, which rested upon political, social, and economic relationships of power, not upon legal formulations; and these real power relationships directly affected the lives of Chinese workers or peasants in such different ways as, for example, determining what they produced or what they could purchase. The issue at hand for the Chinese Communists was not the legal description of a relationship but the actual locus of power to make decisions and the actual relationships that derived from that power.

The Chinese Communists also were aware that the development of capitalism in China was, in Marxist theory, a progressive historical development. In this view, capitalism was a necessary step in the improvement of the daily life of the Chinese people because it involved the growth and expansion of the means of production, which would both improve the quality of life and give China the capital and means to defend itself. At the same time, however, the communists considered the distortions in Chinese society produced by the particular form of capitalism developing in China as a pathological condition. A capitalism, domestically fuelled and therefore more amenable to domestic pressures, was a

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19 Brandt et al Ibid., p. 56.
21 It was this perspective which determined the PRC's attitude towards 'foreign capital' for nearly three decades after it was established.
22 As cited in, Mark Mancall, n. 13, p. 343.
very different thing from a capitalism whose command posts lay abroad, far beyond the influence of China's internal political forces. In this context, Mao had some rather interesting comments to make regarding the role of capital and capitalism, in China:

"Some people fail to understand why, so far from fearing capitalism, communists should advocate its development in certain given conditions. Our answer is simple. The substitution of a certain degree of capitalist development for the oppression of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism is not only an advance but an unavoidable process... From our knowledge of the Marxist laws of social development, we Communists clearly understand that under the state system of New Democracy in China it will be necessary in the interest of social progress to facilitate the development of the private capitalist sector of the economy (provided it does not dominate the livelihood of the people) besides the development of the state sector and of the individual and co-operative sectors run by the labouring people." 23

The post 1978 leadership thus made a radical departure in its attitude towards the role of capital when it adopted 'the Policy of Opening to the Outside World.' This shall be examined in greater detail below.

This analysis of international relations gave the Chinese communists a view of the world that necessarily differed from that of the Soviet Union. During the Long March, Mao Zedong reflected further on China's position in the world. By defining China as a semi-colony, Mao indicated that China was not, in the classical sense of the world, a colony or the possession of a single foreign power; rather, China retained the legal fiction of independence while in reality, it was a colony of the various foreign powers. 24 These powers in turn, were contending among themselves for dominance in China, and they had their agents inside China. For example, the Chiang Kai-shek regime was such an agent: its anticommmunist policies, use of the foreigner's legal language to analyse China's conditions, and reliance upon foreign support to pursue its own internal policies demonstrated that the Guomindang (GMD) was the agent of the capitalist powers. This observation, based upon phenomenological analysis within the Marxist framework that

characterised the Party's 1922 manifesto, had direct implications for the development of the party's political strategy because it meant that the Chinese revolution, by virtue of the nature of Chinese reality, could not assume the character of a proletarian revolution against a dominant bourgeois class; nor could it assume the character of a peasant revolution against a landlord class since the landlord class did not stand alone in Chinese society. The revolution had to be a national revolution against the imperialists and their agents within Chinese society.25

Therefore, imperialism is considered a relationship of dominance and exploitation; those who dominate and exploit China, or try to do so, are imperialists, and those who serve the interests of the imperialists, the compradores, are their agents. To serve the interests of the imperialists means, much more than to act as the direct agent of an imperialist power: this notion encompasses the rationalisation and justification of the imperialist's policies and behaviour, and the use of the discourse of the imperialists, their terminology and logic, to analyse China's internal and external situation.

The concept of imperialism thus took on, in the thought of the Chinese Communist Party, a much deeper and richer significance than it had enjoyed in the thought of Western Marxist and non-Marxist theoreticians and analysts. It followed from the CPC's use of the term that one could cease to be an imperialist by eschewing the relationship of dominance and exploitation that the term denoted.26 Similarly, one ceased to be an agent of imperialism by opposing imperialism, and fighting against it politically, economically, intellectually, psychologically and socially.27 In other words, no one was intrinsically an imperialist or an agent of imperialism; one defined oneself actively by assuming a particular relationship to society. This was no abstract train of thought. The United Front policy of the 1930s and the continuous attempts by the CPC to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to take the

26 Brandt et al n. 17, p. 214 and Mancall in n. 13, p. 344.
27 Mancall, n. 13, p. 343-45.
field against the Japanese, in concert with the CPC and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), were predicated upon this philosophical position. It has therefore been suggested by some observers that had Chiang and the GMD regime taken the leadership the communists urged them to assume, they would have defined themselves as anti-imperialists. It can therefore, be concluded that Chinese communist proposals for a United Front were both strategic and tactical, to be sure, but they grew directly out of a fundamental analysis of the world, not out of opportunism.

Second, Mao recognised that the internecine struggle that characterised China's own internal political conditions was complementary to the struggle among the powers for a dominant position within China. This created the space within which the Chinese Communist Party could survive, and it required the party, as a political actor inside China, to have a foreign policy and constantly to take into account in the planning of its own actions, the problems presented by foreign powers. Moreover, China's domestic agricultural economy, rather than a (non-existent) capitalist economy, provided the economic infrastructure for the economy, as also providing the economic infrastructure that led to the political fragmentation that was characteristic of the Republican period. Therefore, the Communist Party had to wage war in circumstances circumscribed by that agricultural economy. Unless the party fought where the fight was going on, so to speak, it would be irrelevant. A peasant based revolutionary strategy was not a matter of choice; it was dictated by Chinese reality. Nevertheless, the fight had to be led by the workers, that is to say, the party, even if the revolution were to be largely, even mainly based on the peasants. Within the context of the revolution, individuals and groups were defined by the relationship of dominance and exploitation they maintained with other groups in the society, and the landlords

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who abandoned that particular relationship could ally themselves with the peasants. This was the basis of the Yenan policy.31

The heart of the Yenan way was the perfection of the mass line and the sharpening of the revolutionary nationalism in the countryside, which became the twin pillars of Mao Zedong thought.32 In accordance with his mass line approach, Mao vigorously addressed himself to the needs of the peasants, carried out land reform and rent reduction programmes, and brought the peasants into full participation in the political, economic, and military organisations in the base areas. Indeed, the poverty of Shensi, (Shanxi) and the border areas stimulated, rather than impeded the birth of “peasant radicalism,” and the war against the Japanese gave new impetus to revolutionary nationalism.33 The Yenan period was therefore one of growth and preparation to ultimately take over the reins of power.

In Mao’s perspective, the revolutionary struggle inside China was not an isolated process or historical event. Given China’s condition, the revolution had to be an integral part of international political processes. After 1949, this view would have implications for the strategy recommended to other nations, struggling against imperialism, and it would allow Beijing a latitude in policy development that the West, which generally failed to understand the implications of Mao’s thought, saw as cynical opportunism.

III
United Front and Foreign Policy

By the end of 1935, the communists understood the Japanese war as a means whereby China was to be transformed from “a semi-colony of all imperialism to Japan’s own colony.” In other words, the war was the means whereby China would undergo a transformation in which it would lose the legal fiction of independence and would become one foreign power’s possession. In this

fiction of independence and would become one foreign power’s possession. In this light, the Japanese were clearly the primary enemy. Had the other imperialist powers been allied with China against Japan, they would have belonged to a different category and required a different response. As Mao said in 1937, “our united front is anti-Japanese, not anti-all imperialist.” The contradictions among, the imperialist powers themselves, in other words, had to be exploited to China’s benefit. Mao continued:

“The strengthening of British influence in China is a contradictory phenomenon of today. In the fight against Japan, because of China’s colonial position, it is possible for a third power to strengthen its position in China. Can it then be said that this is pushing the tiger out the front door and letting the wolf in the back door’. No, that would not be correct.”

If the Chinese were to oppose the British, for example, they would be driven into the arms of the Japanese. Mao concluded that this result would not be in China’s interest. “Consequently, the contradictions between China and certain other imperialist powers have been relegated to a secondary position, while the rift between these powers and Japan has been widened.” This widened the scope of the United Front concept to include those imperialist powers that could become China’s allies as a consequence of the contradictions within the imperialist camp itself. The choice of ally depended upon the need to maximise the advantages of the Chinese Revolution.

At this point, it would not be out of place to briefly examine the concept of ‘contradiction’ (maodun) which has been – and continues to be – central to the Chinese epistemological and ideological categories.

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The Concept of “Contradiction”

One salient characteristic of China’s IR theoretical discourse is the usage of the concept of “contradiction” (maodun) and for looking for major contradictions in international relations. From a Chinese perspective identifying the contradiction(s) helps in formulating strategy and tactics that have a bearing on foreign policy and diplomacy. The intellectual origin of this usage is Mao Zedong’s philosophical work ‘On Contradiction’ published in the 1930s. In this treatise, Mao argues,

“There exist many contradictions in the developmental process of complex matters. There must be a major one among them, and its existence and development of other contradictions; there must be a major one, which plays a leading or decisive role, while others are in secondary and inferior positions. Thus, when studying any process in which there exist two or more contradictions that make it a complex process, an effort has to be made to find the major contradiction. All issues will be readily solved when it has been grasped.”

Therefore, the major contradiction refers to the one that “is playing a leading or decisive role” and “stipulating or affecting the existence and development of other contradictions”.

In the early years of the People’s Republic, Zhou Enlai remarked in a foreign affairs meeting, “what actually is the world’s major contradiction? While the confrontation between the two camps is certainly basic, what actually epitomises it? Is it the rivalry between the US and USSR at daggers drawn? No. The present contradictions largely appear to be between war and peace, democracy and anti-democracy, imperialism and the colonies, and between and among the imperialist states.” Later in the same talk he gave his answer, “the major contradiction in the world today is the issue of war or peace.” After the Cultural Revolution in February 1978, the Government Work Report argued that,

A symposium in Beijing in 1994 attempted to list out the contradictions in the world following the collapse of the bipolar order and the emergence of a unipolar one in its place. The conclusions arrived at the end of the conference regarding the major contradictions were: 1. The North-South contradiction, 2. National interest contradiction, 3. Hegemonism and anti-hegemonism contradiction, 4. Rich and poor countries contradictions, 5. Economic competition contradiction, 6. World productivity contradiction, 7. Capitalist United States and the rest contradiction.

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“Presently the world’s basic contradictions are intensifying. The rivalry between the USSR and the US, the two hegemons, and the contradiction between them and the rest of the people in the world is particularly acute and has become the central issue of international relations.”

To return to the matter of the United Front Policy and the Maoist analysis of imperialism, it had direct implications for the party’s foreign policy strategy and tactics. In 1936, the American journalist, Edgar Snow, went to Yenan to interview Mao and write about the socio-political changes the CPC was bringing about in the region. Mao, speaking through Snow, tried to obtain the neutrality of the major capitalist powers. He declared that a successful war would strengthen China and that a strong China would welcome foreign support of its development.\(^{41}\) However, the failure of the West to move more actively against the Japanese, particularly after the Marco Polo Bridge incident\(^{42}\) indicated to Mao that perhaps he had overestimated the degree to which contradictions among the imperialist powers had developed and that, therefore, China could not depend upon foreign aid but would have to become self-reliant.\(^{43}\) That same year he clearly stated that, in the broader scene, the rise of fascism in Europe and the necessity to combat it took primacy over the Sino-Japanese conflict in East Asia.

It is imperative to note that several features of Mao’s early thinking concerning international relations deserve emphasis because of their fundamental role in the later development of Chinese foreign policy. First, Mao favoured cooperation with foreign powers if that cooperation was beneficial to China’s interest. Second, he insisted upon a realistic analysis of international relationships, using the concept of contradiction as an analytical tool. China could use contradictions among the outside powers, among the capitalist countries, to its own

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\(^{42}\) The Marco Polo Bridge incident on July 7, 1937 precipitated the Sino-Japanese attrition with profound consequences for both. In time, the Nationalist government in China, exhausted by years of war gave way to the CPC, while Japan faced the prospect of a humiliating defeat in the World War.

\(^{43}\) Mancall, n. 13, p. 344.
advantage. Third, war was of course, a human misfortune, but it could contribute to historical progress; indeed, war made China's revolution part of the international historical struggle. War, therefore, should not necessarily be avoided.

To quote Mao,

"War is the highest form of class struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups, and it has existed since the emergence of private property and of classes." 45

In his "New Democracy" essay in January 1940, Mao Zedong outlined the numerous types of state systems the world can be reduced to, according to the class character of their political power. First, were the republics under bourgeois dictatorship, followed by republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and lastly, republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. Among these, the last mentioned is the transitional form of state to be adopted in the revolutions of the colonial and semi-colonial countries i.e. a new democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes. The anti-Japanese United Front represented this new democratic form of state. Further Mao elaborated on a theory of a world divided into two camps, one headed by the Soviet Union and one by "Imperialist Great Britain and the United States." The conflict between the two, he wrote, would intensify. In such a conflict, "it is inevitable that China must stand either on one side or on the other." Is it possible to incline to neither side?" 47 Mao continued. "No, this is an illusion."

44 Mark Selden, n.33, pp. 202-5.
The theme was picked up again in January 1947 in an essay by Lu Dingyi, then chief of the CPC's information department. Lu defined the two camps as democracy camp and anti-democracy camp and predicted that the struggle between them "will cover a greater part of the world". Interestingly, he suggested that the primary contradiction between the two lay not between the USSR and the United States but, rather, within the capitalist world itself. In this view, the revolution within China was part and parcel of the global struggle, indeed, the two were not clearly distinguishable. Moreover, the internal and the international were linked together in a "united front" of democratic forces ranged against the antidemocratic forces. The internal revolution was by definition an instance of international solidarity.\textsuperscript{48}

Mao explored the problem further in "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" in July 1949, when communist victory, was in sight. He repeatedly argued that the Chinese Revolution was only part of the international struggle: "Victory is also possible without international assistance – this is an erroneous conception".\textsuperscript{49} Slogans such as "lean to one side" and "we want to do business" indicated that there was nothing in the Chinese communist view of the world that inhibited constructive relations with the West, it was the West's policies towards the Chinese Revolution that created the inhibition.

\textbf{IV}

\textbf{Charting a New Policy: 1949 - 1976}

At its first session in September 1949, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) adopted the Common Programme, which served as the provisional constitution for the People's Republic in its early years. The programme stated that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Brandt et al., n. 17, pp. 453-54.
\end{itemize}
"The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war."  

The constitution of 1954 reaffirmed the above mentioned provisions of the Common Programme, declaring to the world that

"... in international affairs, it is China's unswerving policy to work for the noble goal of world peace and human progress."

Chinese foreign policy has evolved over a period of time from principles derived from ideology to a 'minimum ideological framework,' 52 whose precise content varies considerably over time, but which to the satisfaction of the leaders, integrates the disparate strands of foreign policy. A further elucidation of this position is provided while considering how certain predicates of Chinese foreign policy have compared overtime. A more comprehensive explanation of these positions is found later in this chapter.

Briefly these predicates at the time of liberation were:

1. The world is divided into two inherently hostile and warring camps that mirror the basic class division of contemporary society.

2. The socialist camp and its allies (including the proletariat and other 'progressive forces' in imperial states) are engaged in a world wide, historic struggle against imperialism that will eventually lead to the victory of socialism.

3. Beneficial relations between socialist states, and members of the imperialist camp are desirable, but such relations will always be limited by their instrumental and transitory character. Genuine long-term co-operation with

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52 Steven I. Levine, n. 4, p. 34.
imperialist states is impossible given the historic conflict between the two opposing world systems.

4. Relations between socialist states are based on a common identity rather than transitory interests. Socialist international relations are relations of a new type characterised by peace, long term mutual interest, genuine co-operation and fraternal solidarity.

5. Socialist states can forge coalitions with nationalist states and political movements even when these are non-socialist in character on the basis of shared opposition to imperialism.53

These ideological predicates initially provided the CPC leaders with a means of defining the PRC's national self-identity and global roles. In the spirit of the Comintern, Mao Zedong conceived of China as an autonomous sovereign member of an international alignment of socialist states headed by the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950) was the formal expression of this view.54 The prevalent ideology served a dual purpose: as a linking mechanism with other socialist states and, as a boundary marker demarcating the inner world of socialism as opposed to ideological adversaries in the outer world. It should also be stressed that the leadership's fundamental objective was of achieving national unification and maximising China's national sovereignty and security.

During the first decade and half of the PRC, the utility of each of the above ideological predicates for guiding Chinese foreign policy came under severe strain, largely owing to the constant shifts in foreign policy dynamics in an era dominated by the 'Cold War'. The function of ideology began to undergo a metamorphosis following the Sino-Soviet split. The impact of the Cultural Revolution saw the

53 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
54 On the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty, Mao Zedong said: "The signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between China and the USSR not only was of tremendous help in building the new China, it was a strong guarantee in the struggle against aggression and for preservation of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world." (Renmin Ribao, February 14, 1951) as cited in O.B. Borisov and B. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), pp. 64-68.
PRC retaining its identity-defining dimension, while, formal ideology gradually ceased functioning as a guide to action in the foreign policy arena and was increasingly transformed into a set of abstract principles and behavioural norms.\textsuperscript{55}

With Mao Zedong at the helm, the PRC's foreign policy was determined to a large extent by the primacy of politics and the importance of ideology. Separated, yet tenously linked were other factors - the foreign policies of the superpowers during the cold war era, the structure of the international system, and China's calculation of its relative power and interests. A significant reason for the domestic factors influencing foreign relations, was the impact of the Chinese revolution and the role of Mao himself.\textsuperscript{56}

It would be no exaggeration to state that the revolutionary politics as structured and outlined by Mao, strongly set the direction and content of China's approach to its domestic and international environment. Set forth in a definitive form, in Lin Biao's thesis on people's war in 1965, this perspective drew a parallel between the Chinese revolution and the Yenan spirit period involving the Party, the GMD as the domestic enemy, the Japanese as the external enemy, the masses and the correct (Maoist) strategy on the one hand, and the players who later met on the world stage - China, the Soviet Union, the United States, the Third World, and militant Maoism on the other.\textsuperscript{57}


It could further be construed that ideology was a domestic determinant influencing Maoist foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, while clearly informing the general direction of policy, occasionally pushed matters further, and delayed or quickened changes that stemmed more directly from other quarters, depending on where China was in the domestic calculus of politics induced foreign policy. 58

Still other causative elements remained outside this domestic Chinese framework as China was a significant part of the international system as a nation state. It was constrained to obey the 'laws' of foreign policy behaviour common to all nation states and was inordinately influenced by the structure of that system, and the foreign policies of the other important actors in it. During the Maoist period, the most influential of these elements was the power and the policies of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. These nations dominated the post-World War II cold war system, and figured, both in bilateral relations and within the strategic triangle, as an important part of Beijing's orientation to the external world.

A significant event that had a decisive bearing on China's interaction with the West was the Sino-Soviet split towards the late 1950s and early 1960s. From a position of fraternal association the relationship between the two had deteriorated to dangerous levels, leading to their eventual skirmish over the Chenbao Islands on the Ussuri river in the late 1960s. The deterioration in Sino-Soviet ties, it is now revealed, was more than the perceived ideological differences between the two that emerged following Nikita Krushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956. According to transcripts made available by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), the personality clash between Mao and Krushchev was more to blame. Following the demise of Stalin, Mao, considered himself to be the "senior theoretician" in taking forward the process of socialism. Krushchev, however, as a representative of a society that first succeeded in achieving a "proletarian

58 The Sino-Soviet entente cordiale and subsequent rift, followed by a 'rapprochement' with the United States, being a case in point.
revolution,” considered the Chinese counterparts to be little better than “peasants, with a rudimentary understanding of socialism.”

The emergence of a deep schism between the Soviets and the Chinese coincided with the emergence of Richard Nixon as the President of the United States. To Nixon's credit, he lost little time in seeking a way of establishing contact with the Chinese leadership, that at that very moment, was involved in its own process of reassessing its equations with the 'great imperialist' following the serious differences that had emerged with the 'social imperialist.' The rapprochement with the United States in May 1972 was thus a logical development.

V

Reforms and After

Unlike the Maoist period, the Dengist period was witness to major modifications and the introduction of new trends.

The most important and obvious change was the shift from the primacy of politics and hence, world revolution to that of economics or development and modernisation. In very general terms whatever appeared good for China's economic development became the rationale for shaping Beijing's foreign policy. Translated internationally, this change meant opening the door to foreign capital investment, technology transfer, trade and training.

59 Document on the Ideological and Personality Clashes that derailed Sino-Soviet ties, Compiled by the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs. These are available on http://www.cwihp.org/doc/sino- sov let/htm.

60 Official Chinese commentaries regularly described the Soviets as "revisionists" and "social imperialists." See, Peking Review (Beijing Review) of the late 1960s for further elaboration on the same.

In the constitution of 1982, the basic principles guiding China’s diplomacy are summarised in a more compact manner. Its preamble stated:

“China adheres to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries; China consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, works to strengthen unity with the people of other countries, supports the oppressed nations and the developing countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence and develop their national economies, and strives to safeguard world peace and promote the cause of human progress.”

Further, it was under the direction of Deng Xiaoping that the PRC adopted the policy of promoting economic development and to initiate policies that would seek for China a wider role in international forums and secure the membership of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as also to initiate the process for joining the General Agreement on Trade and Tarrifs (GATT).

To quote Deng Xiaoping:

“China’s foreign policy can be summed up in two sentences. First, to safeguard world peace we oppose hegemony. Second, China will always belong to the Third World... and it will do so even when it becomes prosperous and powerful, because it shares a common destiny with all Third World countries. China’s foreign policy is independent and truly non-aligned... The aim of our foreign policy is world peace. Always bearing that aim in mind, we are whole heartedly devoting ourselves to the modernisation...”


The GATT was the predecessor of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in framing rules and regulations governing multilateral trade.
programme to develop our country and to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The great changes in China's international strategy of the 1980's was given concrete shape at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, held by the CPC, at the end of 1978. The focus of the CPC and the country was channelised towards economic modernisation and construction. The meeting emphasised that China's basic task was to develop its productive forces and that economic construction is the basis for solving all domestic and international problems.

The changes had an immediate bearing on Chinese foreign policy. A process of non-aligned diplomacy according to the changes in the international system and the needs of development began to emerge.

To quote Deng Xiaoping:

"We adhere to an independent foreign policy of peace. We do not join any groups. We communicate and make friends with anybody. We combat whoever practices hegemony and whoever invades others."

The elements of China's independent foreign policy of peace can be summarised as follows:

- China will not enter an alliance with any big power or groups of countries, establish a military bloc, join in an arms race, or seek military expansion.

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China stands firmly on the side of peace and opposes hegemony.

China will determine its international positions and policies by proceeding from the fundamental interests of the Chinese people, from the interests of other countries, and from judging each case on its own merits.

This shift in international strategy carried out by Deng Xiaoping, greatly expanded the strategic sphere for China, presented the prospect for the economic restructuring and development of China, while establishing the basis for China's international strategy for the 1990's and beyond.

To quote Deng:

"From the economic point of view, the two really great issues of global significance, are: first, peace and second, economic development. The first involves East-West relations, while the second, involves North-South relations." 66

He also pointed out that the East-West issue refers to the contradiction between the West bloc, led by the U.S., and East bloc, led by the former Soviet Union, while the North-South issue refers to a contradiction between the developed North and the underdeveloped South.

The incremental nature of reform starting with the easier problems first - where the gains were likely to be rapid, and where the benefits would far outweigh the costs - helped develop and maintain a popular base for the reform programme. Credit must also be given to Deng Xiaoping, who used his prodigious political skills and his unique standing within the Chinese communist movement to manage the tensions within the reform coalition and to supervise the amelioration of the problems created by reform.

In the reform era, yet another significant concept which has surfaced from time to time – but with increasing frequency – in the Chinese official discourse is, geju or power.

VI

The Notions of “Power Configuration” and “Multipolarisation”

When the Chinese try to analyse international relations, “international configurations of power” — guoji geju and “world configuration of power” — shijie geju appear to be the most frequently employed phrases.

“World configuration of power” is defined as “referring to a general framework or structure shaped by the contrast, combination, and allocation of the various basic forces in the world arena. It is relatively stable, objective and historical.” It differs from the international situation, which can change greatly during a short period of time. In contrast, international and world configuration of power, though it changes as well, enjoys relative stability. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the study of geju once again became attractive, and a wide range of works have appeared. To quote Deng Xiaoping who made it clear in the early 1990s that China “will never serve as leader,” but “we have to make our contribution.” In the so-called multi-polarisation world (sic), China to will be a pole.

In the official view, when the cold war ended, the bipolar power configuration collapsed and the transition of geju entered into a multipolar power configuration. The discourse is clearly reflected each year in the Government Work Report, the leaders’ speeches, and other documents.

The 1992 Government Work Report for instance, claims that "while the old world configurations of power have already ended, a new configuration of power has not yet come into being, but is heading in the direction of multipolarisation. All kinds of forces in the world are fragmenting or re-aligning, and the old and new contradictions have become mixed. The world is by no means peaceful". The question remains, must there be a transitional period from the old to a New World configuration of power? Is not the current one already a new power configuration?

Responding to the questions raised, an answer was provided, claiming that for the current shift to a new world power configuration, there not only would be, but there is destined to be, a transitional period, because the global change of geju this time differed from the previous ones which emerged after the two world wars.

First, the change was not taking place as a consequence of a world war. Both the new world power configurations, which emerged after the end of the First and Second World Wars, the Versailles System and the Yalta System respectively, were created by the victorious powers through closed-door bargaining or by initiating new treaties which were imposed on the defeated powers, and thus led to transformations of political maps as well as changes in the international status of the concerned powers. The process both times was comparatively short and clear cut. By contrast, the current transition is quite different, since it is not the result of a major war. This fact determines that the shift to a new power configuration would have to be a gradual and evolutionary process.

Second, the incremental nature of the shift, to some extent, set another feature of the transitional period, i.e., the uncertain nature of development.

Third, different geopolitical situations made it impossible for changes in various areas to take place at the same speed. Europe showed a typical bipolar structure while the Asia-Pacific region was fairly pluralistic militarily, politically, as well as economically, except during a limited period of time. Therefore, the

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69 Li Peng, Zhengfu gongzuohaogao (Government Work Report), March 20, 1992.
processes and ways of power configuration shifts in the two regions were not the same. This can be seen in the developments of the two regions.

Fourth, sudden changes or events such as the Gulf Crisis/Gulf War and their disturbance and impact have to be taken into consideration.

Based on the above analysis, it was concluded that the transition to a new geju would be a relatively long period throughout all of the 1990s and well into the 21st century.  

In September 1992, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen delivered a speech at the U.N. General Assembly, which elaborated upon the old configuration of power. He said, “The international community gradually has broken away from the old power configuration, which was characterised by confrontation between the two military blocs. Henceforth the world is entering into a new historical stage of development heading towards multipolarity.” In other words, along with the end of bipolarity, “the world is moving into a transitional period in the direction of multipolarity.”

In China’s international studies community, there exist a number of views on whether the post-Cold War configuration of power is heading in the direction of a more balanced great power relationship or by unilateralism dominated by the United States or the West. The argument being that, following the fall of the Soviet bloc and the relative decline of the United States, bipolarity is being replaced by a new situation of multipolarisation. Under the new circumstances, Western Europe and Japan each keeps its status as a separate pole; China is an emerging pole and Russia is slowly recovering. These countries are emerging as the new constraining forces or ‘poles,’ although in contrast with the world’s only superpower today, the United States, they still remain ‘weak poles.’ A different view argued by Wang Yizhou, elaborates that the concept of “pole” differs from

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72 “Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s Speech Before the 48th UN General Assembly,” *Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily)*, 30 September 1993.
the notion of "great power". The so-called "pole" has to be a genuinely omni-bearing hegemon or leading nation in the world, its comprehensive power has to be far greater than the second-class powers in a certain era. This sort of "pole" usually has its own ideology, which is distinctive from other nations, and enjoys a clear sphere of influence. It possesses an obvious edge in politics, economics, military, science and technology, and exerts a huge influence or dominance (including the so-called "soft power") upon international relations. In recent history, the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the United States today, could be described at most as "one superpower, four great powers" configuration of power. Multipolarisation remains a goal or a process. In spite of their differences, most Chinese scholars endorse the idea that an adequate and correct analysis of the power "poles" is an important basis for formulating a nation's foreign strategy, and therefore, diplomacy particularly, strategies dealing with the major great powers. 73

Official Chinese documents show a certain consistency, arguing that, "[T]he world is heading in the direction of multipolarisation" (the 1993 Government Work Report), 74 "The tendency toward a multipolar world configuration of power is clearly gaining momentum" (The 1994 Government Work Report), 75 "Fundamental and profound changes are occurring in the international situation . . . the trend of multipolarisation is increasingly obvious." (The 1998 Government Work Report) 76 A note should be made that the 15th CPC in 1997 proposed a new and somewhat more concrete wording. It proclaimed that, "The trend toward multipolarisation unleashed new developments both globally and regionally, and in both politics and economics," 77 indicating that multipolarisation is not only found at the global and regional levels, but also in different areas such as politics and economics.

73 See Wang Yizhou, "Dangqian woguo guoji zhengzhi yanjiu de jige zhengmindian" (Some Contentious Points in the Current Study of International Politics in China), Tianjin shehui Kexue (Tianjin Social Sciences), no. 1, 1998.
It is apparent that, accordingly, one major goal of Chinese foreign policy is to strive to help promote the multipolarisation of the world. The prospect of the continuing development of multipolarisation is that a balance of power emerges among several power centres of the world and mutual checks and balances take shape. It would not be perhaps an exaggeration to note that no other theoretical reasoning has greater direct impact upon actual foreign policy than this.

**War, Peace and Development**

Chinese thoughts on war and peace have had a great impact both on China's domestic agenda and foreign policy. Analysis and judgement on the issue of war and peace have never been pure academic explorations. Rather, they have been directly related to the decision-making of domestic and foreign policies. In the 1960s, given the assessment that the danger of war was imminent, China decided to build “three fronts,” ranging from the coast to inland areas. Part of the “three fronts” strategy involved moving considerable key industries and enterprises into the interior, a change that later became a lasting problem of adjustment in the Chinese national economy.

Over the last three decades, China's thinking on war and peace has undergone successive changes that could be related to the Chinese identification of different eras (shidai). The most noticeable transformation has occurred in China's cognition of the current epochal subject, i.e., from “war and revolution” to “peace and development,” and in Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan's words, laying a theoretical foundation (lilun jichu) for China's “building a new foreign strategy in a new period”.

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78 Yang Chengxu, *Jianchi duli zizhu de heping waijiao zhengce (Upholding Independent and Peace-Oriented Foreign Policy)* (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1998), p. 42. Yang was China’s former ambassador to Austria and is President of the China Institute of International Studies.

Looking back, in the 1970s, influenced by the 'ultra-left' extremism in its domestic politics, China appeared to many to be exaggerating the danger of war. The basic tone then was that a new world war was unavoidable and pending. For instance, in January 1975, the Government Work Report read by Zhou Enlai at the National People's Congress (NPC) claimed that, “the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, are the biggest contemporary oppressors, exploiters, and the new origins of world war (sic). Their fierce rivalry will sooner or later lead to a world war. Thus we must remain vigilant, strengthen our defences, and prepare to fight.” Clearly the danger of invasion or aggression by enemies was somewhat overestimated. In 1977, against the backdrop of the formal end of the cultural revolution but also with the ultra-left radical ideology still around, the eleventh Party Congress was held. In his report to the Party Congress, CPC chairman, Hua Guofeng, argued that while “revolutionary” factors continued to grow, factors of war apparently would too. The two superpowers, USSR and the U.S. competed everywhere and this would sooner or later lead them into conflict. Considering that imperialism and social imperialism may initiate a new world war, China would have to be highly vigilant and be completely prepared.

In February 1978, the Government Work Report submitted to the Fifth National People's Congress reiterated that “Factors of war apparently increase at the same time as revolutionary factors grow.” It further argued that, “the danger of a world war increasingly and seriously threatens people in various countries. War is inevitable as long as social imperialism and imperialism exist,” and from the perspective of the entire world, a common strategic task for the people in various countries was to consolidate and expand the international united front against hegemonism and try to postpone the outbreak of a world war. This sort of assessment persisted until approximately 1978, when “seeking truth from facts”

82 Hua Guofeng, Tuanje qilai, wei jianshe, shehuizhuyi de xiandaihua qiangguo er fengdou (Unite and Strive to Establish a Modernised Socialist Power) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978).
was stressed in the spirit of pragmatism and the CPC started to shift its focus to economic construction. In December 1978, the CPC's far-reaching Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in Beijing marked a major watershed which symbolised the beginning of a new period. Interestingly, the Plenum's Communiqué, while no longer emphasising the inevitability of a new world war, reflected the view that "the danger of war still seriously exists. We must strengthen national defences and be prepared to beat the aggressors from anywhere at any time."

Therefore, with the CPC focussed on economic construction, the Chinese leadership became more and more pragmatic. Obviously, a peaceful international environment is absolutely essential if a country wants to concentrate on economic development. Entering the 1980s, the Chinese view on the issue of war and peace gradually shifted to the following view. The danger of war still exists, but power constraining war and power for peace was growing. In March 1985, Deng Xiaoping told his Japanese guests that, for many years, China kept stressing the danger of war, and later Chinese opinion somehow changed. "We feel that, although the danger of war still exists, the power constraining war is encouragingly developing." If people around the world make an effort, a new world war can be avoided.

Again, in October 1985, then Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang made a speech at a special session commemorating the United Nations 40th anniversary and said, "The era of a few great powers dominating the world has gone, and the growth of power for peace is overriding the growth of war factors. As long as all the peace-loving countries and their people unite and strive together, world peace can be maintained, and a new world war will be avoided." One of the reasons for this assessment was the role of the Third World. With the rise of the Third World and the emergence of a multi-polar power configuration in the late 1980s and early.

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83 Deng Xiaoping, SWDX, n. 68, pp. 349-355.
84 Chen Qimao, "Shilun zhanhou quoji quansi de bianhua yu zhenggu shijie chijiu heping de kenegxing" (On The Changes in Post-War International Relations and the Possibility of a Sustainable World Peace), Hong Qi (Red Flag) No.13, 1986.
1990s, the Chinese government gave up the notion of the existence of a “war threat” and started to focus on the existence of “hegemonism and power politics.”

Given that a world war was avoidable and a long period of peace could be maintained, the notion of development or common development for nations began to emerge in Chinese diplomatic discourse. Combining “peace” and “development” started in the mid-1980s. In October 1984, a leading foreign affairs expert from China, Huang Xiang, delivered a speech at an international conference in Osaka, Japan entitled “Peace, Cooperation, and Development,” in which he advocated friendly cooperation and common development on the basis of peaceful coexistence. This might have been the first instance where the notion of putting peace and development appeared together.

On March 4, 1985, when meeting with a group of Japanese guests, Deng Xiaoping, pointed out that there are two truly significant issues in the world; one is the issue of peace, the other is the issue of economics or development. Peace was seen as an East-West question, while development a North-South one. To sum up, he simply used four words; East, West, South and North. Since then, the phrase and view that “peace and development are the two great issues in the contemporary world” has continued to be used and has become standard language in official documents.

For China, peace and development are closely related, in that peace is a premise of development. They affect and condition each other. There could be no development without peace, while world peace and stability cannot be based on the economic poverty of the developing countries. So far, neither of the two problems have been solved.

In China's view, NATO's war against Yugoslavia in 1999 was a great shock and setback to peace and development. In a speech delivered in Beijing on

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85 Ibid.
86 See the Year of International Peace China Organising Committee (ed.), Weile heping yu renlei de weilai (For Peace and the Human Future) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1986), pp. 35-42.
88 On different occasions, three different words are used: wenti or issue/problem, zhuti or theme, and keti or task.
September 18, 1999, Jiang Zemin claimed that in the world today, peace and development are still the historical "trends" (chaoliu) rather than "subjects" (zhuti) as previously stated. This change possibly reflects the fierce debate the war in Kosovo stirred up and its impact. However, the basic goal of China's diplomacy, in Qian Qichen's words, is, "to create a peaceful environment for our country's modernisation and construction." This is China's determined policy and will remain unchanged.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

The five principle of peaceful coexistence refer to: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-intervention in internal affairs, equity and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence.89

The principles were initially proposed in the 1950s, and were jointly advocated by China and India. In April 1954 they were written down in the preface of the "Agreement on Trade and Communications between China's Tibetan Locality and India."90

In China's opinion, the five principles are an epochal product and are an essential component of Chinese foreign policy discourse. After the second World War, newly independent countries eagerly needed to establish an equity-based international relations, as also yearned for the development of their national economies in a peaceful international environment. To consolidate national independence, defend state sovereignty, and to seek just, equal international relations norms, were seen as key expectations of the various newly independent countries. Against this backdrop, the five principles of peaceful coexistence were widely endorsed by the international community. The ten principles adopted by the 1955 Bandung conference concretely embodied the spirit of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The "Declaration on the Principles of International Law for

89 See Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), p. 63
90 'Panchsheel' as cited n. 2.
Nations to Establish Friendly Relationships and Cooperation," in accordance with the UN charter passed by the 25th United Nations General Assembly in 1970, and "the Declaration Regarding the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" by the sixth UN Special General Assembly in 1974 confirmed the five principles. International recognition for a fundamental position adopted in Chinese foreign policy statements could be interpreted as being accommodative in nature. Furthermore, the documents of many international organisations and international conferences quoted the five principles, making them a significant part of international relations norms. The five principles have the following characteristics:

1. The five principles transcend ideology and social systems. All nations, no matter what social and political systems they adopt or what ideologies they choose, can coexist peacefully in the spirit of the five principles.

2. The five principles advocate that nations should be equally constrained in behaviour in the relationships. There are four "mutual" in the five principles, indicating that nations should coexist peacefully on a politically equal and economically mutually beneficial basis.

3. The five principles are consistent with the spirit of the UN charter, and they are practically feasible and morally justifiable.

4. For many years, the five principles of peaceful coexistence have appeared in almost every Government Work Report and have been repeatedly stressed, particularly in the 1990s.

In 1990, the Government Work Report stated that, "the Chinese Government holds that the reasonable basis of the establishment of a new international political order is the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which has already been widely endorsed in the international community. International practices have proven over and over again that as long as the five principles are..."
observed, all nations can establish and develop normal and friendly relationship, no
matter how greatly their national conditions differ; and international disputes, no
matter how complicated, will find a reasonable solution”.

In the following year (1991) the Government Work Report stated:

“The Chinese government maintains that the five principles of mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-
intervention in internal affairs, equality and mutual fundamental norms of
international relations, and are coexistent with the aims and principles of the
UN charter, as well as reflect the essential characteristics of a new type of
international relations.”

Continuing its emphasis on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, the
espouses that relationships among nations should be based on the five principles of
peaceful coexistence, and various disputes should be solved through equal
consultations. Resorting to force or threatening by force have to be opposed.”

In China’s view, a stable, secure and prosperous world requires the
following of fundamental principles to be observed in relations among nations and
in international political and economic life, to effectively guide and set the
activities of the international community. The five principles of peaceful
coeexistence generalise the most fundamental norms of international relations,
accord with the aims and principles of the UN charter, reflect the essence of
normal relationship among nations, and can serve countries with different social
systems and different levels of economic development. Among the five principles,
non-intervention in internal affairs is the core of the principles and new
international order. Mutual non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence among
nations are the basis of the five principles, and equality and mutual benefit
embodies the handling of economic relations.

(Ed.), Shisida yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Anthology of Important Documents of the
14th Party Congress), vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996).
China holds that, in over forty years, the five principles of peaceful coexistence have withstood the tests of numerous international challenges and have remained vital. History has proven that the five principles are universally applicable norms of international relations. The Chinese viewpoint is that if countries with different ideologies and social systems, as also different levels of economic development observe these principles, they will continually establish relationship based upon mutual trust and friendly cooperation.

**The Chinese Debate: Realpolitik**

At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that, within the Chinese system there is a serious attempt at defining what national interests are and how they come to be influenced. The definitions and role given to international relations and their linkage to the state are but a reality drawn by accepting the western conception and imagery of the state.

In an article on "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations," the author Yong Deng makes a distinction while setting that the Chinese conception of national interests should not be considered in terms of two mutually exclusive categories — *realpolitik* thinking and liberal values — but rather is best understood in terms of a spectrum.

The *realpolitik* adherents accept that the pursuit of national interests is the legitimate goal of a state's foreign policy. The inference made here is that the conception of national interests lies at the core of the predominant "paradigm" governing the state’s foreign policy. Realism rests on three premises:

1. The nation-state is the primary actor in international relations; hence, realism is said to be state centric.
2. There is a lack of central authority equivalent to domestic government; hence, international politics is characterised as anarchy; and .
3. International politics is essentially power politics.\(^{95}\)

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\(^{94}\) See, Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations" *China Quarterly* (London), Issue No. 142, No. 4, 1998, pp. 308-29

\(^{95}\) Martin Wight, "Western values in international relations", in Butterfield and Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 101. E.H. Carr explicitly addressed the contrast between domestic and international politics in terms
A step further is neo-realism that seeks to refine classical realism into a parsimonious, scientific theory by treating the international system as a structure shaping the unit/state behaviour.96

Chinese realists view the world as almost exclusively an arena of interactions between sovereign states engaged in merciless competitions. They view the growing transnational and multilateral networks through a state-centric prism, only focussing on how China could take advantage of these new “external environments” to protect and maximise its national interests.

The 1990s saw a renewed emphasis by the Chinese on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Yong Deng in his article quotes Deng Xiaoping as having said, “... these principles should be the guidelines for the ‘new international political order’...”97 As a representation of realist thought, one need not look further. Many Chinese authors now differentiate between two attributes of national interest: one representing the ruling class, the other, the nation. They often simply assert the compatibility of the two without explaining how they can be theoretically reconciled into a “unity.” The shift is perceptible if we are to examine the writings by various analysts in the late 1980s and early 1990s that still considered national interests as predominantly a property of the ruling class. By

96 Of the tension between realism and idealism in Western political theory: see, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939).

97 Because neo-realism focuses on the international structure as its level of analysis, it is also known as “structural realism.” For the most systematic articulation of “structural realism,” see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a penetrating critique of Waltz’s views, see John G. Guggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis,” World Politics (Princeton), vol. 35, no. 2 (1983), pp. 261-85. There are many variants of neo-realist theory, a good review of which can be found in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (4th edn.) (New York: Longman, 1997), especially chapters 2 and 10.

contrast, was an account in 1994 that placed the national attribute "as the primary attribute of national interests."

The first scholarly book on China’s national interests published recently goes even further by starting with an uncompromising attack on class analysis. Its author Yan Xuetong, explains that the confusion of national interest with state interest must have arisen from the fact that, in the Chinese language, both nation and the state are often understood to refer to the same thing, guojia (or state). He goes on to make a distinction between the guojia interests in domestic politics and international politics. Whereas the former refers to the interests of the state that belong to the ruling class, the latter refers to national interests that belong to the nation as a collectivity and are enjoyed by both the rulers and the ruled. This could perhaps be interpreted to mean that the emerging consensus among Chinese authors is that national interests in international relations can be understood sui generis and are to be separated from domestic politics.

For Chinese officials and scholars alike, national interests are the embodiment of the nation as a whole and their pursuit is the natural and "inalienable right" of the nation. In international politics, "relations in interests are the fundamental factor influencing foreign behaviour, and national interests are the most long-lasting, the most influential factor and the most basic motive of the state’s foreign behaviour." Put differently, "national interests are the primary, direct motive. The rest of the dynamics are secondary and permeate the national interests." In the words of the late Deng Xiaoping, "national sovereignty and national security should be the top priority."

One of Deng Xiaoping’s major contributions was his emphasis on national interests as the “highest principle” governing international relations. Deng was

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98 Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian, Guoji zhengzhi xue gailun (Introduction to International Politics) (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 1994), especially pp. 75-76 and 83-87, as cited in Yong Deng, n. 94, p. 311.
100 Fang Tejun and Song Xinning (eds.), Introduction to International Politics (Guoji Zhengzhi gailun) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1992), p. 123.
101 Liang Shoude and Hong Yingxian, Introduction to International Politics (Guoji Zhengzhi gailun), pp. 58-66, as cited in Yong Deng, n. 94, p. 312.
hailed as being single handedly responsible for shifting China’s erstwhile approach in drawing its foreign policy lines according to the social system and ideology, to a rightful emphasis on dealing with international relations based on national interests.\footnote{Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, “On Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Strategy,” ; Gao Jingdian, “A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on International Strategy”; Wang Taiping, “A Collection of Research Papers on Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on Diplomacy,” as cited in Yong Dong, n. 94, p. 314.}

The new orientation of the CPC in the era of Deng Xiaoping was further confirmed by what was called the “28 character strategy” laid down by Deng in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Facing economic sanctions from the West and confronted by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Deng put forward seven strategies that included the following seven phrases:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Leng jing guan cha} -- watch and analyse (the development) calmly;
\item \textit{Wenzhu zhen jia} -- secure (our own) positions;
\item \textit{Chen zhe ying fu} -- deal with (the changes) confidence;
\item \textit{Tao guang yang hui} -- conceal (our) capacities;
\item \textit{Shanyu shou zhou} -- be good at keeping low profile;
\item \textit{Jue bu danfu tou} -- never become the leader;
\item \textit{You suo zuo wei} -- make some contributions.
\end{itemize}

According to an article published in Beijing this strategy can be summarised as “four \textit{bu} and two \textit{chao}.”

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Bu kang qi} -- do not carry the flag (of socialism): China should not seek to replace the role played by the former Soviet Union who was the leader for the socialist camp.
\item \textit{Bu dang tou} -- do not become the leader: China should not become the leader for the third world countries.
\end{itemize}
*Bu duikang* -- do not engage in confrontations: China should not seek confrontations with the Western powers.

*Bu shu di* -- do not make enemies: China should not intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, such as Eastern European countries, regardless of whether they have departed from socialism or not.

*Chao yue yi shi xing tai yin xu* -- go beyond ideological considerations.

*Chao tuo* -- be detached from concrete events.

That is to say, in order to concentrate on economic development (or modernisation), China should keep a low profile in international affairs. Deng's idea was that "by the middle of the next century," China should "have basically realised modernisation," and then it can be said that China "has succeeded."

**Emerging Liberal Views: Idealpolitik**

Other alternative views, classified here as *idealpolitik*, have emerged in the Chinese conception of national interests. In contrast to realism, liberalism in international relations emphasises the roles of the state and non-state actors, and sees international politics largely in terms of a positive sum game as opposed to a zero sum game. Liberalism gives great attention to the mitigating effect of interdependence, multilateral institutions and international regimes on international anarchy. Specifically, international liberalism consists of beliefs in [1] "the pacific effects of trade" ("commercial liberalism"), [2] "the pacific effects of republican government" ("democratic liberalism"), [3] "the importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries" ("regulatory liberalism"), and

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103 Qu Xing, "Shilun dongou jubian he sulian jie shi de zhongguo duiwai zhengce" (Chinese Foreign Policy, After the Major Changes in Eastern Europe and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union, "Waijiao, xueyuam, xuebao" (Journal of Foreign Affairs College, Beijing) No.4, 1994, pp. 18-19.

"the transformative effect of transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interests" ("sociological liberalism").

In Chinese writing on international relations, there is a growing recognition of interdependent reality in the world. The late 1980s and 1990s have seen frequent references to interdependence in international relations, in contrast to the complete absence of the concept of "interdependence" in Chinese writings before that time. For example a Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) editorial on the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) quasi summit in 1994 stated:

"... exchanges in economics, trade, investment, science and technology and information have increased steadily in recent years, spawning the growing interdependence" of the world economies."

Addressing that summit the Chinese President Jiang Zemin said:

"Modern technology has narrowed the distance between regions. Many challenges facing mankind often transcend national borders. Many issues, such as economic relations, trade exchanges, scientific and technological development, environmental protection, population control ... are of a global and interdependent nature, and all of them require co-operation and commonly observed standards. Since the 1980s trade contacts, market development, capital flows, industrial reallocations, scientific and technological exchanges and information outflows have increased noticeably among members of the Asia-Pacific region, leading to closer contacts." 

China had once disparaged the post-war, "embedded liberalism" — based international political economic order and its keynote institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) as "citadels of international capitalism." Yet since the late 1970s, China has reversed its attitude and joined both the World Bank and IMF in 1980. Since 1986, it has formally applied for GATT (renamed the World Trade

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107 *Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service* in Chinese (15 November 1994) in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), China (15 November 1994), and p. 2.
Organisation after 1995) membership. China’s recent pact with the United States on trade issues formalised the process of its long pending membership of the WTO. China’s participation in these institutions has facilitated information exchange and social learning, and this is evident in changes in China’s domestic institutions, policies, organisations, legal frameworks and attitudes toward the world economy.  