Chapter-IV
This chapter examines the Japanese responses to the challenge of defence burden sharing within the overall Japanese perception on the issues such as base lending agreement between US and Japan, deployment of US troops in Japan, Japanese rearmament, nuclearization and strained economic relations. It proposes to understand three following things. Firstly, the external and internal pressures on the Japanese government both to build its military as well as restrain it, secondly, the divergent and cooperative efforts made by Japan to address the US demands of burden sharing and finally, the generation of a new kind of self confidence and nationalism which led to the reorientation of Japanese responses vis-a-vis US pressures in 1990s and its implications for US.

In order to clearly situate and contextualise Japanese responses it has been attempted to divide the chapter into five phases. The basis for this attempt is to show the gradual shifts in Japanese responses and the conceptual progress in Japanese attitude vis-a-vis the US-Japan security relations. The following timeline is also thus thematically divided.

Fourthly, **Japanese Response to US Pressure for Burden Sharing (1980s).** Finally, **Impact on Japan of defense burden sharing : New phase of Self Confidence, Nationalism and Japanese Re-orientation (1990s).**

**DOMESTIC ACTORS**

Before examining Japanese responses, a brief review of major players in Japanese defense debate in essential. The Japanese responses to challenge of burden sharing has been influenced by its domestic debate on the size of defense expenditure in relation to GNP and how far Japan need to increase its defense efforts in order to manage the US Japan security relations as a whole. This debate occupied most sections of Japanese society, polity and economy. It involved not only the Prime Minster Office, Foreign and Defence Departments but also various political parties, business leaders, government officials, media and public opinion. All these sections collectively represents the Japanese thinking on security related subjects.

There are principally three ministries that deal with defense issue. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is primarily responsible for the creation and direction of Japan’s foreign policy agenda also deals with security related issues. The Japan Defence Agency comes under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which looks after
Self Defence Forces. Secondly, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the creation of national budget exerts great influence on defence policy making especially on defense spending levels. Finally, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which is responsible for overseeing Japan’s industries including defense industries, influences on defence production, military technology transfer among other things. Apart from these ministers, the role of bureaucrats, politicians, industry leaders, members of defence industry and supporting organizations like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, the industry alliances like Keidanren and its Defence Productions Committee exert considerable influence. The role of political parties in defence debate is crucial.

The Liberal Democratic Party, the single largest block in Japanese Diet since 1955, with few exceptions of some leaders has been

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maintaining a pro American stand. The main Japanese opposition parties, Japanese Socialist Party and Communist Party of Japan remained opponent of US Japan security arrangement throughout the cold war years and advocated disarmament and neutrality. The Japanese Socialist Party Chairman, Asanuma Inejiro while making his party’s stand clear on US Japan Security Relations and Security Treaty declared that the Socialist Party will continue to put all its strength and endeavor against Japan's rearmament, against US military bases in Japan and for the evacuation of those bases.

At the twenty seventh National Convention of Socialist Party (28th November 1962), the party criticized ruling LDP government for

"allowing US to maintain many military bases in Japan and occupying Okinawa and Bonin in"semi permanently." In line with this policy the LDP is strengthening the armament of Japan and leading the country to the path of nuclear armament".

The second opposition party, Communist Party of Japan advocated complete communist revolution in Japan. Their policy as called by a scholar was "disguised neutralism" which aimed to "deepen the Communist influence in Japan and weaken the free and

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6 The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan Annual of International Affairs, 1962 No. 2 (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1963) p. 191.

democratic influence". Their first objective was to destroy the security treaty with US. The rightist nationalist party, Japan Patriotic Party by following the policy of "positive neutralism" spoke openly and vigorously of Japan's need for US protection against Communist forces. They demanded rearmament of Japan. In other words, while the ruling political class favoured a cooperative US-Japan security relationship framework, which US interests and concerns were accommodated, the main opposition came from left and the right political parties. Eventually, the ruling party's line was the basis for policy. Yet, there were clear indications that the US-Japan Security Treaty would remain a thorny issue among Japanese politicians.

PHASE OF TOTAL RELIANCE (1950-60).

This phase epitomized the dichotomy of Japanese politics which emerged out of domestic lack of consensus on the issues like US Japan Security Treaty and Japanese rearmament. On the one hand there were advocators of the Peace Constitution of 1947 who wanted a Japan without military forces and involvement in the struggles of the outside world. They were strong supporters of the Peace Constitution because it reflected the disarmament of Japan. This stream of thought was mostly represented by the Socialist and Communist elements in Japanese society. On the other hand there were advocators of comprehensive Japanese US alliance system who favoured the military arrangement with the United States for two

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8 Ibid. p. 51
fundamental reasons: firstly, to protect Japan from possible Soviet aggression and secondly, for Japan's economic development. They were impressed by the demonstration of US commitment to Japanese security during the Korean war and US plans for future Japanese growth.

The fundamental problem before the Yoshida government was to strike a balance between those two extremes. In order to maintain that balance, he devised a two fold policy which maintained a total reliance on US for security guarantee and concentrate all Japanese efforts on economic development and secondly supporting of the major goals of American foreign and security policies and provide bases in Japan.

The conclusion of US-Japan Security Treaty immediately after the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 reflected the Yoshida philosophy of "total reliance" on American security guarantee. The Security Treaty 1951 maintained that

"Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan" (For detail see Appendix no.3)

In other words, the Prime Minister Yoshida Shingeru wanted America to take full responsibility of Japanese defense. In his memoir, he recalled the mutual obligation that the US and Japan would have towards each other as a result of this treaty. He said that:

"We desire the US to show clearly in the treaty that the US accepted the responsibility for safeguarding Japan. Since we were accepting the obligation of having US forces stationed in Japanese islands we consider it proper that the US should recognize an obligation to defend Japan."9

9 Yoshida has mentioned this in his memoir see foot note no.4, p 266.
The US perspective was that since Japan did not possess the power to defend itself, the US would take that responsibility. This American stand was made clear to the Prime Minister Yoshida by John Foster Dulles a special adviser to Department of State. In his April 1951's visit to Japan he stressed the fact that the US could not be expected to extend military assistance to Japan indefinitely. He said that the US would reduce the assistance as Japan's own defensive power increased. What he meant was that the US expected Japan to increasingly assume the responsibility for its own defense against direct or indirect aggression.

The period from 1950 to 1952 saw the US pressing upon Japan to participate in a Cold War collective security efforts led by it. The US demanded that the Japanese build a military force for self defense and commit Japan to keep US troops in that nation, reactivate dormant armament factories to aid the US in Korean War efforts and agreeing to recognize the Republic of China and to contain the mainland China.

However Yoshida declined any immediate possibility of Japanese rearmament. He said

For Japan to attempt anything which could be considered rearmament is completely out of question... the necessary wealth is lacking, even more than wealth, the necessary psychological background, which is the desire of the people to rearm is just not there... the miseries and destruction of Pacific War are still actualities for a large majority of the Japanese people.

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The Prime Minister Yoshida Shingheru capitalized on Japan's complete economic destruction in the Second World War as a shield against US demands of rearmament. At the opening of the fifteenth session of Japanese Diet following the formation of his fourth cabinet in October 1952 he said:

"Japan should naturally reinforce its defensive power as the national economy recovered. But that time had not yet arrived to consider rearmament."

The security treaty provided Japan with a cost effective security protection. While commenting on the significance of Mutual Security Treaty, he insisted that

Japan regained her national independence by the coming into effect of San Francisco Peace Treaty and was guaranteed against foreign aggression by the security treaty. The independence Japan regained through San Francisco Peace Treaty was political in nature, consisting in mainly resumption of sovereignty. Economic independence remained to be regained. To concentrate upon attainment of that goal required that our national security be guaranteed from both internal and external aggression and the security treaty would help in that.

However the treaty was criticized in Japan on three grounds. Firstly, as per the provisions of the treaty, the US forces could be used not only to defend Japan from outside attack but to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and to put down domestic revolt also if so requested by the Japanese government, Secondly, the treaty forbade Japan to grant similar rights to any third power without US consent. Finally the treaty was

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12 Yoshida Memoir Ibid p. 193
to continue until both signatories thought that alternative arrangements could safely replace United States bases.\textsuperscript{14}

The opposition parties like Japan Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party vigorously denounced the treaty and urged complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Japan. They put forward three demands: firstly, a peace treaty with all powers which had fought against Japan, secondly, neutrality in Cold War and finally, opposition to Japanese rearmament and base lending to US.\textsuperscript{15}

Yoshida realized that without a strong economic base there could be no political power. The famous \textbf{Yoshida Doctrine} which shaped the Japanese approach to world affairs strongly emphasized the subordination of Japan's international ambitions and position to the goal of national economic growth.\textsuperscript{16}

Yoshida attempted to balance the US demands of rearmament and the antimilitaristic norms in Japanese society. He neither fully succumbed to the US demands nor directly challenged the antimilitaristic norms. For instance, he accepted the US demand of creating Police Reserve Force but at the same time he made it clear to the Japanese people that the purpose of new force was just to


\textsuperscript{15} See Shibusawa Masahide, Japan and the Asia Pacific Region (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984) pp 145-46. Also see Edward Reischauer, The US and Japan No. 3 pp 324-326.

maintain law and order within the country and that no such thing as a step towards rearmament was being contemplated. He also declared "We must obey the constitutional ban on rearmament and would decline to take such steps even if such demands were received from US." 17

The Yoshida Doctrine was explicitly reflected into the first Japanese Blue Book on Foreign Relation which came out in 1957. The book concluded that "the only way to raise living standards and to increase national power lay in peaceful development and economic growth." 18 Although the Blue Book emphasized on continuing security arrangement with the United States, economic development was given priority on defense. The influence of Yoshida Doctrine remained considerable on Japanese foreign policy throughout the Cold War years, especially where economic development was concerned.

Prime Minister Kishi who replaced Yoshida while continuing his legacy of economic development adopted "Basic Policies for National Defence" in 1957. This policy advocated effective building up of defense capabilities. 19 The first Defense Buildup Plan which was initiated in 1958 emphasized consolidating Japanese Ground Self Defence Force. 20 It is significant to note that although the Basic

17 On 8th July 1950 Yoshida clarified his government's stand on security force to Diet. For his statement see the Yoshida Memoir, p. 193.
19 See for detail Japan Institute of International Affairs White papers of Japan 1977-78: p. 27.
Policies for National Defense provided for the first time a conceptual framework for future defense development of Japan, its fundamental objective remained self defense only. The policies clarified that stand explicitly.

"The Japanese government holds the view that Japan's national defense capabilities must be limited to exclusive self defense in nature and that any action exceeding this limits are strictly prohibited. Therefore the dispatch abroad of armed personnel with a mission to exercise armed action is not permitted under the constitution"

Eventually, the successors to Yoshida did not move away from the position on rearmament. All it meant to do was to create a space for future self reliance in defense preparedness of Japan. Arguably, the creation of Self Defense Force can be seen as the first step towards change.

By 1960, Japan started getting results of the generous US financial and military policies. The Security Treaty of 1951 with the United States proved extremely beneficial for Japan both on security and economic fronts. It not only protected Japan from the Soviet aggression but also enabled it to concentrate solely on economic development. Infact the Kishi government was convinced that without American security guarantee and economic assistance, Japan's the economic growth would not have been possible. To highlight the economic aspects of the benefits the Kishi government decided to agree to the revision of Mutual Security Treaty in 1960, as per the Americans demanded.

However, the decision triggered a nationwide protest and inflamed Japanese resistance to American presence. Japan's
domestic political turmoil may be evaluated by dividing them into two segments. The first comprised mainly the opposition parties and their supporters such as radical students movements, and militant trade unions. The decision provided an opportunity to the Japanese opposition parties, particularly the Socialist and Communist party to mobilize Japanese people against US-Japan security arrangement and tried to win over the public opinion their side.

On 14th May 1960, a National Conference Against Security Treaty Revision was established by the Japanese Socialist Party. The conference organized mass demonstrations of 1,00,000 people before the Diet building. Subsequently the Socialist Party announced that 13.5 million people had signed petition against revision of the treaty. On 20th May 1960, the Socialist, Democratic Socialist and Communist parities declared jointly that the votes on the extension of mutual Security Treaty were invalid. They demanded an immediate dissolution of Japanese House of Representatives. The Japanese National Railways Union and Traffic workers Union staged long strikes against the revision.21

Interestingly, the Socialists were divided on acceptance of peace treaty. The hardliners in the left wing amongst the Socialists

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insisted that Russia and Communist China should also be involved. But all Socialists were united in rejecting the security treaty.\(^22\)

Three controversial provisions of the Revised Mutual Security Treaty became the centre of Socialist opposition. Firstly, Article VI, that was "Far Eastern Clause" which granted the US use of area in Japan for its land, air and naval force not only to protect Japan but also to defend other Far Eastern countries. Secondly, the prior consultation arrangement under which the US troop movements and use of equipment are subject to prior approval by Tokyo. Finally, the treaty retained the same base lending arrangement of 1951's Security Treaty.\(^23\)

The second turmoil was caused due to division within governing Liberal Democratic Party itself, one side was pro American and the others wanted Japan to be independent from United States. The sub-leaders in party such as Kono Ichira, Ono Bamboku and Ikeda tried to exploit the situation for their struggle within the party.

The Kishi government eventually, publicly favoured the Revised Security Treaty for two reasons, first, under the original security treaty the US had no clear obligation to defend Japan in case of an attack. Secondly, the old treaty allowed America to help to quell domestic unrest which was interpreted by the opposition parties

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as infringing upon Japanese sovereignty. This two provisions were deleted in the Revised Security Treaty creating the much needed domestic consensus especially with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

THE PHASE OF SELECTIVE RELIANCE AND STRENGTHENING OF SELF DEFENCE FORCE (1960-70)

During 1960s, Japan emerged as a economic giant with around 8% growth rate. Japanese export industries boomed and started competing with the US in South East Asian markets. Japan developed into world's third strongest economy and recorded trade surpluses with the US. With the Japanese economic development and trade surpluses with the US, the US pressure on Japan to accept greater share of financial burden of its American security guarantee increased. As the US Japan trade imbalance grew, the pressure on Japan to invest in more American defense equipment to modernize its Self Defence Forces increased.

On the other hand the groups that believed in anti militaristic norms in Japanese society intensified their activities by mobilizing Japanese public opinion on two burning issues, firstly the Vietnam War and secondly, the nuclear free reversion of Okinawa to Japanese authority.

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24 This has been dealt in greater detail in chapters I and 2nd of this thesis. Also see for Japanese economic growth in 1960s see William Lockwood, "Political Economy" in Herbart Passin ed. The United States and Japan (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1966) pp 93-128.

25 Earlier chapters deals with this question.
In the backdrop of these developments, the Liberal Democratic Party's government of Prime Minister Ikeada and Prime Minister Sato found it very difficult to balance increasing US pressure for rearmament and domestic opposition from antimilitaristic norms. They were forced to walk a narrow path on three critical issues. Firstly, the issue of modernizing Self Defence Forces and to address the US demands of defence procurement, secondly, softening the domestic opposition by getting assurances from US on the issue of Okinawa reversion and finally to decide Japanese role in Vietnam War.

The new Ikeda administration's attempt to strengthen the Self Defense Forces was a clear response to US pressure. The view gained further credence when Ikeda revised the laws establishing the Japan Defense Agency and Self Defense Forces in June 1961 and adopted a new defense plan which called for an expansion and modernization of Self Defence Forces by purchasing new weapons like Hawk Surface to Air Missiles from the US. The Second Defense Building Plan (1962-66) called for the first time to increase Japanese defense capability to cope with localized wars.\(^{26}\) The justification given by the Japanese Defense Agency for strengthening the Self Defense Forces was popularly known as **"Limited Aggression Theory"**. The theory explained:

> "A small military was all Japan would need to stave off a minor attack during the brief period before military aid arrived from US. In case of a world war, America and its allies could be engaged with the communist armies, and therefore Japan would not have to defend itself against the entire communist world, but merely the small portions of the communist military that were not being directed against the US and its allies."\(^{27}\)


However, experts believe that the Japanese Defense Agency's justification was just a rhetoric and the driving force behind the growth of Self Defence Forces was American pressure. They termed it as "US invisible hand" and argued that "the US wanted Japan to maintain sizeable fighting capability which could survive a massive preventive attack. They alleged that American financial and military assistance to Japan was crucial which made them to succumb to the American pressure. The "US invisible hand theory" however was challenged by other experts on the ground that the volatile situation around Japan constituted the bases for its rearmament. The increasing Soviet influence in the Far East made Japanese policy makers to increase defense efforts. Moreover, as they maintained, some bureaucratic agencies such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence greatly benefited from better American relations in terms of trade military assistance and thus had an extra incentive to design such polices.

The power of antimilitaristic group's protests however, forced Prime Minister Ikeda while initiating policies for Japan's gradual rearmament, simultaneously seek measures to appease them. One the one hand he emphasized on improving material life of Japanese people through his ambitious scheme of Income Doubling Policy.

On the other hand, he managed to get American reaffirmation of Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa Islands. Experts also observed that the political stability provided by the Liberal Democratic Party since 1955 and their economic policies contributed greatly in Japan's material development by 1960. That background helped Ikeda government to intensify efforts for rearmament.

When Sato replaced Ikeda as the next Prime Minister of Japan, he had to face the emergency situation stemming from the beginning of Vietnam War. In addition, a strong domestic demand for the reversion of administrative rights of Okinawa islands to Japan continued. During the Vietnam War the Sato administration was caught between the US and domestic pressures. As in Ikeda's time, the US pressure on Japan to provide full scale assistance coincided with the pressure from antimilitaristic norms for constraining Japan's military role and US forces in Japan. Due to strong domestic opposition, Sato resisted American pressure and offered indirect assistance. Moreover, to silence the speakers of antimilitaristic norms in Japanese society, Sato initiated several measures. For instance, in April 1967, his administration placed ban on the export of arms to Communist countries and the countries involved in confrontation.

The strong Japanese domestic demand to return the administrative rights of Okinawa islands to Japan forced the Sato

31 See US, Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, Joint Communique of Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy vol, XLV NO. 1150, 10 July 1961, pp.57-58.

32 White Papers of Japan 1971-72: p 322
administration to respond positively. The problem before Sato administration was to determine the status of the US forces deployed at Okinawa after the reversion. There were four possible options before the Sato government. Firstly, unrestricted use of the bases by US forces including the deployment of nuclear weapons; secondly, unrestricted use of bases excluding the deployment and nuclear weapons. Thirdly unrestricted use in the time of emergency upon prior consultations and finally total applications of the stipulations of the security treaty. The Okinawa Base Problem Study Committee which was setup in 1967 in its final report concluded that

"After the reversion of administrative rights, the US-Japan security treaty should be made fully applicable to Okinawa. Therefore, the US military bases in Okinawa should became subject to the Status of Forces Agreement under the US-Japan security treaty, and naturally provisions concerning the prior consultants stipulated in the exchange of notes accompanying the security treaty should also become applicable."

As was seen in the previous chapters the reversion was made according to the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué signed on November 1969.


America’s new Asia policy followed by the Nixon Doctrine altered the Japanese defense debate on its rearmament and US-Japan security relations. It has already been observed that the Nixon Doctrine was an indication of changed US policy towards Asia. In

34 Ibid. p. 14
this section Japanese responses to the changed policy will be the focus.

The Japanese domestic debate on defence in the seventies illustrated concerns about the decreasing US security commitments in the Far East and the increasing Soviet military buildup. Many believed that the Japanese security diplomacy up to 1970 was based on three fundamental assumptions. Firstly, the US would remain engaged militarily in the region. Secondly, the Japanese and American interests would remain identical and finally, the economic dimension of American foreign policy would be effectively separated from security matters. The Nixon Doctrine challenged all those assumptions. The Japanese approach was based on an implicit principle: piecemeal concessions in economic field and gradual increase of defense expenditure. The principle proved to be of tremendous benefit to Japan. It was a low risk and high return policy. It led Japan to emerge as a leading economy and establish a trade surplus with the US.

For Japan the Nixon Doctrine raised the question of the reliability of the American commitments to the Japanese security. The US action prompted a serious soul searching over future Japanese security policy. Clearly, the Japanese had to give a serious serious consideration for their own security. Ultimately that led to an increase in domestic support for Japan to shift from dependence on American led security structure to the adoption of a more

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autonomous security structure. A public opinion survey conducted by Public Relations Division of Prime Ministers Office revealed the change in public attitude. On the question “what do you think is the most important duty and task charged with Self Defence Force?” 50.4 percent people replied it was national defence and deterring of aggression from foreign countries.

Possibly, the need for genuine self reliance defense efforts was keenly felt. The psychological preparedness for accepting gradual rearmament for self defence was visible. The argument that it was not just the result of US pressure, but the volatile situation on the subcontinent due to Soviet military buildup that forced Japan to have second thought on rearmament gained ground.

Changes were witnessed even in the perception of Japanese Opposition Parties on security related issues. The Democratic Socialist Party, United Social Democratic Party, New Liberal Club, Komeito (Clean Government Policy Party) were in favour of considering defense policy in more concrete and realistic terms. For instance, the chairman of Komeito in his address to 15th party convention of Komeito stated, “

the existence of Self Defense Forces has become an established fact. Questions on the self defense force should not be left ambiguous. The question of seeking a settlement on dealing with the existence of Self Defence Force within the framework of constitution should not be left untouched. I believe the self Defense Force can not exist unless it is equipped with the capability for maintaining minimum territorial integrity.


See White Papers of Japan 1977-78 pp. 34-35.
There had been consensus among various political parties in the National Diet on the need to establish an independent committee to deliberate exclusively on defense and security related issues. Under the instructions of Director General of the Defense Agency and with the approval of Prime Minister, the Defense Agency of Japan began serious study to consolidate legal matters concerning the performance of duties of Self Defence Forces to cope with a situation in which Japan was attacked by foreign powers.

The Miki administration initiated a number of measures to consolidate Japanese defence efforts. He put forward the policy of "Minimum Defense Strategy" for Japan which reflected in October 1976's National Defense Programme Outline. The National Defense Programme Outline enunciated an explicit role for SDF in dealing with limited and small scale aggression. The NDPO called for qualitative improvements through the sophistication of major equipment items. It was an important step in accomplishing the establishment of an effective defense capability. The most important contribution of National Defence Programme Outline was that it helped to bring consensus on the use of military as a legitimate instrument of state policy.

As a response to changed US policies, Prime Minister Fukuda attempted to bring several changes in Japanese diplomacy. The diplomacy initiated by Fukuda called for the diversified foreign

39 Ibid pp. 38-39
40 Ibid pp 38-39
policy and to improve relations with as many countries possible. The White Papers of Japan while underscoring the significance of Fukuda's new diplomatic measures stated

"it is important for Japan to promote dialogue with countries of different political system and to maintain stable relations with them. The need and time is for Japan to conduct an active multilateral diplomacy on a global scale through cooperation and dialogue."

In August 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda, during his visit to South East Asian countries not only endorsed the Association of South East Nations but also pledged that Japan would become an equal partners.

As Japan was adjusting itself into the new environment, the increasing Soviet influence in the Far East multiplied Japanese problems. In the late 1970s the USSR embarked on a military buildup in the Far East. The Soviet Union attempted to gain an advantage in the Far East through expansion and modernization of conventional forces. The Japanese White Papers on Defence 1978-79 expressed serious concerns about increasing Soviet influence in the Far East.

"Should Soviet military forces intend to use early fields, ports and harbours and other facilities in Indochina on a permanent basis, it would have an impact on the military balance between the US and USSR. This would seriously affect the peace and security of Far East and security of Japan's sea lanes of communications. Therefore Japan is concerned over Soviet utilization of airfields, ports, harbors and other facilities in Indo-China"

At the same time President Carter's decision to withdraw US troops from South Korea triggered tremendous debates in Japan

42 White Paper of Japan 1975-76 pp 72-73
44 White Paper of Japan 1978-79, pp. 23
regarding America's genuineness in its defense commitments as the decision came when the Soviet military buildup in the Far East was alarming. The decision was strongly objected to and demands were made to withdraw the decision

The Japanese concerns were expressed in White Papers on Defense 1978-79 which commented:

"Maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is not only closely connected with Japanese security but also constituted an important factor in the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region... Japan expressed hopes that the withdrawal of American ground forces from Republic of Korea would be carried out carefully... Japan strongly hopes the withdrawal plan be reviewed."

The Soviet defense buildup provided legitimization to Prime Minister Fukuda, Ohira Masayoshi and Zenko Suzuki's defense efforts. Attempts were made by these Prime Ministers to forge close military cooperation with the United States. This can be seen, for instance, in the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. The guidelines envisaged security arrangement to cope with the situation in which Japan was attacked by foreign powers. The guidelines maintained that in such a situation

"the Self Defense Force will primarily conduct defensive operation in Japanese territory and its surrounding water and US forces will support Self Defence Forces operations and also conduct the operations to supplementing functional areas which exceed the capacity of Self Defence Forces."

The combined exercise between the Japanese Air Self Defense Force and the US Air Force in 1978, the participation of

46 White Papers of Japan 1978-79, pp. 24
47 Ibid p. 37
Maritime Self Defence Force in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise in 1980 within the US Navy and other US allies were several others attempts of military cooperation with US made by Prime Minister Ohira and Suzuki.

**JAPANESE RESPONSES TO US PRESSURE FOR BURDEN SHARING: 1980s**

Within Japan, the ongoing debate over US-Japan security relations and Japanese remilitarization entered a new phase in 1980s. In this decade the Japanese relationship with the United States witnessed strains and stresses. In the 1980s, the US pressures on Japan for sharing defense burden increased due to new Cold War realities. Experts observed that the previous US attempts to persuade Japan to shoulder defense burden were half hearted and were not conveyed with the sense of urgency. But the changed international situation in 1980s made US pressure on Japan specific secondly, the inclusion of and economic issues in the defense debate gave it a new turn.

Japan was publicly and strongly criticized by both the US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense for not raising its defence budget significantly. The assumption underlying the US criticism was that since Japanese security was dependent on the

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48 Reinhard Drifte, *Foreign Policy of Japan* No. 39, p. 37
49 Shibusawa Masahide, *Japan and the Asia Pacific Region* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984). P. 147
The military relationship between the US and Japan intensified in 1980s. Experts observed following reasons which contributed in consolidating this cooperation. Firstly, there was public recognition that their existed a far harsher international security environment in the 1980s due to the expansion of Soviet Pacific Fleet, continued tension on Korean Peninsula and dependence of Japan on the security of sea lanes. Secondly, there was no disruptive public discussion over question of stationing land based missiles in Japan. Thirdly, there had been growing recognition that Japan with its economic development must contribute to its own defence as well as carry a larger share of the regions defence burden.

The top leaders of LDP like Ohira, Zenko Suzuki, Yasuhiro Nakasone were strongly in favour of consolidating military relations with the United State due to the massive Soviet military build up in the region. However it should be noted that a group represented mostly by the Socialist and Communist elements opposed further defense efforts. One more group representing the Japanese nationalist and ultranationalists strongly criticized US allegation of Japanese "free riding" on US security guarantee and advocated independent defense efforts.

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To cope with the challenges thrown by Russian military buildup in the far East, Prime Minister Ohira appointed a Task Force on Comprehensive Security. The basic objective behind the appointment was to examine both Japan's position in the world and threat perceptions to Japanese security. Although the whole concept of Comprehensive Security was based on the no-war premise of Japan, the Task Force made extensive recommendations as to how and why Japan should try to improve its defense capability. The report led to the formation of the Comprehensive National Security Framework which aimed at protecting Japan against all sorts of external threats through a combination of diplomacy, national defense and other measures.\textsuperscript{51} Foreign Minister Ito identified four components of comprehensive National Security Policy Framework. Firstly, continuation of US-Japan security relations, secondly moderate but high quality military capabilities to be used exclusively for self defense. Thirdly, international economic cooperation and finally, international cooperation and collaboration in energy resources, science and technology.\textsuperscript{52}

At the same time the Japanese Foreign Ministry appointed a Security Policy Planning committee on Japan's national security. The


committee in its report titled "Outline of Recent Discussions" noted that

"Under the existing international circumstances, Japan which has taken on a more conspicuous presence in the international community, can no longer avoid involvement in international politics, concentrating on economic activities only. In the field of defense Japan must free itself from the past attitude of almost total dependence on US cooperation and instead seek to strengthen its self help efforts to defend itself on its own." 53

The committee recommended that firstly, Japan being in a position to contribute to the security of the West as a whole, should actively share the cost of preserving that security. Secondly Japan should endeavor to strengthen its own defense within the framework of Japan-US security arrangement. 54

The Security Policy Planning Committee mainly targeted the Soviet military buildup in the Far East in the 1980s and prepared its report accordingly. The Japanese Foreign and Defense Ministry officials were seriously concerned about the Soviet threat and that was the basic reason why Prime Minister Okira and Zonko Suzuki were favouring close military cooperation with the US. The fear was explicitly reflected into 1980-1981's White Papers on defense.

"The Soviet Union has been striving to increase its military strength in the vicinity of Japan and there seem to be further improvements in the Soviet far Eastern military capability and its combat readiness. The Soviet Union has been putting emphasis on qualitative improvements in addition to its traditional quantitative improvements. The Soviet military buildup and greater activity in the Far East has posed potential threat to Japan security." 55

To counter the Soviet military expansion in the Pacific, the Reagan administration developed a new maritime strategy in 1980

54 Ibid, p.329.
in which Japan occupied a central role. The strategy aimed at developing maritime forces as close as possible to the Soviet Union so that it could be striked at the earliest opportunity. Japan was the ideal staging ground for surveillance of Soviet activities. That was the reason why Reagan Administration wanted Japan to defend sea lanes upto 1000 nautical miles from Japan.56

As a response to US strategy, Japan decided to modernize its forces in order to increase its capability for the protection sea lanes upto 1000 nautical miles and surveillance of Soviet activities. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in 1981 declared that Japan would secure sea lanes upto 1000 nautical miles from Japan.57

In August 1981 at the 91st session of National Diet, a Special Committee on Security was established to survey security related issues and to formulate future security policies.58 Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in his policy speech delivered at 96th ordinary session at Diet on 25th January 1982 made his stand clear on greater defense efforts. He declared, "I will continue to work in line with Japan's basic defense policy to achieve minimum necessary defense capability.59 Japan's defense budget in 1981 was 0.91 % of its GNP which increased to 0.93% of GNP in 1982. The weight of the defense budget in the total general account budget moved from 5.12% in fiscal 1981

56 See Reinhard Drifte, Foreign Policy of Japan No.43, pp 39-40.
57 ibid. 39-40.
58 ibid, p.54.
to 5.21% in fiscal 1982. Increase in budget, though small, was a remarkable change effected in Japanese politics. Despite arguments on both sides, the question of Japan playing a larger role in US Asian security policy was answered. Japan's domestic environment had accommodated the American concerns, albeit with some reservations. Further, this trend continued throughout the decade.

During the Nakasone's tenure as Japan's Prime Minister, the Japanese defense efforts increased considerably. Nakansone managed to keep the average annual growth rate and defense spending (after 1982) in excess of 5% of General Account Budget, while the growth rate of most other budgetary items were severely curtailed in order to reduce the budgetary deficit. During his tenure the defense budget tripled from 1093 billion Yen in 1974 to 3137 billion Yen in 1985.

The Japanese Defense Agency's Mid Term Defense Programme (MTDP) for the year 1986-1990 called for an emphasis on

"...........attention to be paid to qualitative improvements of weapons in keeping with the trends in technological standards of other nation. Secondly, defense build up to be promoted and finally defense buildup to be implement on priority basis."

The Mid Term Defense Programme proposed significant improvement for the three branches of Self Defense Forces. The most important thing about the MTDP was its proposal for defense expenditure to be greater than one percent of GNP which was absent

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61 White Papers of Japan 1985-86 p. 59
in MTDP 1980-84 and MTDP 1983-87. In January 1987, the Nakasane government adopted new guidelines including defense building and abolished the one percent GNP limit on defense expenditure adopted in 1976. The defense budget for 1987 crossed the one percent GNP limitation on defense expenditure and rose to 1.013% of GNP.

While the LDP governments in the 1980s were initiating measures to cope with Soviet challenge and addressing American demands, the nationalists and utranationalists in Japan advocated independent defense efforts. They strongly opposed allegations made by some Americans that the security threat only benefits Japan. They believed that the strategic benefits to the US from the security treaty during the Cold War were significant. The free use of land bases in Japan enhanced the US forward deployment capabilities for the defense of places as far away as the Persian Gulf. They clarified their stand thus:

"It is a true that Japan was not obliged to send military forces to defend American sovereignty under the terms of treaty, but nor were South Koreans and Philippines were so obliged under their treaties. The view that Japan does not need to defend the US was misplaced. Had the Soviet Union attacked US territory during the cold war, not only would US forces stationed in Japan been involved, but Japan itself would have also automatically declared its forces on the US side."

On American accusation of Japan being a free rider of American security guarantee, they pointed out with pride that Japan had been paying most of the cost of US military units stationed in Japan. They put forward some statistics of the US-Japan defense spending to defend their arguments.

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62 White Paper of Japan 1985-86 p. 59
63 White Paper of Japan 1987-88 pp. 60-61
In real terms only Russians and Americans spend more than Japan on defense. Japan spent as much as the US on military security at the Far East during the Cold War. The US military expenditure amounted to about $300 billion in 1990, out of which $32.1 billion was allocated to its military forces in Asia Pacific region. Japan's official defense expenditure in the same year totaled around 4.6 trillion Yen of $30 billion. Japan ranked second only in term of military spending per soldier.65

Muroyama, the chief architect of this group went further and accused that not Japan but US was free riding on the security treaty. He maintained that the security treaty assured Washington of free access to bases, the exclusive privilege of hosting American forces at low maintenance cost.66 The ultranationalists like Nisohochi Hyado while demanding independent Japanese defense efforts with nuclear weapons capability argued that if Japan's defense capabilities were further strengthened and a nuclear capability developed, Japan could create the capacity to deter other nuclear powers.67

PHASE OF SELF CONFIDENCE AND NATIONALISM: JAPANESE REORIENTATION (1990s.)

In the 1990s, after the end of Cold War, a new trend of self confidence and deep current of independent attitude and nationalistic feeling was witnessed in Japan which reflected clearly in the Japanese responses to the Gulf War of 1991 and the Japanese literature of 1990s. Several accounts point to the reorientation as being prompted by the apparent disappearance of Soviet threat which generated an independent attitude prominently reflected in

65 Ted Galen Carpenter "Paternalism and Dependence: The US Japan Security Relationship" Policy Analysis No. 16
66 Daizo Sakurado "For Mutual Benefits: The US Japan Security Relationship" No. 64.
67 Ibid.
defense matters. For instance the growing internal demand for independent defense efforts rather than depending on US security guarantee. Some studies also point to the increasing Japanese frustration with the US security and economic polices towards Japan as contributing in the generation of nationalist feelings. The best example of Japanese nationalism is Shintaro Ishihara's book "Japan That Can Say No." Ishihara argued that the root cause behind US-Japan trade frictions was racial prejudice. Ishihara warned that Japan could easily alter the global balance of power by selling microchip technologies to the Soviets.

The Japanese frustration with the US security policy was expressed by a Japanese journalist. He maintained that:

The American policy of keeping Japan militarily weak while pressuring Japan to pay more and more has built a suppressed anger and resentment among many Japanese politicians and bureaucrats. They feel that the US is demanding burden sharing without asking power sharing and leadership sharing in return. They feel treated as inferiors; they feel distrusted --- the US policy of pressuring Japan to spend more while keeping it weak can not last; it will eventually invite an unhealthy nationalistic backlash.

During the Gulf War of 1991, the Japanese government resisted US pressure to participate in joint military action due to strong

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70 Ibid. p. 339
opposition by the pacifist forces in Japan. Evidence on the confused Japanese responses during the Gulf War pointed out thus:

"Many Japanese were ambivalent about the seriousness of Iraq's threat to world peace and did not believe in the necessity of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by military means. The Japanese economic donation to the war efforts was made after extensive domestic debate and only after Japan had been criticized by the allies for its lack of support."

However, after the Gulf War several changes took place in Japanese thinking. Experts noted that the Japanese learnt several lessons from the Gulf War. Firstly, the post Cold War era was not free of armed conflict. Secondly, Japan was unprepared to take leadership role in international political affairs and finally Japan could not attain international stature by economic means only.

After the Gulf War a broad consensus evolved on the policy that Japan should became internationally more active and shoulder broader responsibilities while maintaining the foundations of US-Japan security relations. Emphasis was given on maintaining the US-Japan security arrangement due to the existence of four threat perceptions. Firstly, claims by many nations to the Sparty islands, secondly, increase in Chinese military capabilities, thirdly, the unstable peace in Cambodia and finally the continuing threat posed by the North Korean regime, which remained outside the international

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72 Francis Fukuyama, Kangdan Oh, The US-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War (RAND 1993) pp 29-30

73 Fukuyama and Oh, ibid, p 34

74 This consensus on Japan’s International role was echoed even before the Gulf War. For instance see the Foreign Policy speech by Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno to the 114th Sessions of National Diet in which he outlined Japan’s new global role, see for details White Papers of Japan 1987-88 10th Feb 1989 p. 209.
community and was suspected of developing nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{75} These threat perceptions helped the LDP government to maintain the defense spending relatively constant. Since 1990, growth in defense spending had been around two percent of GNP despite the recession\textsuperscript{76}

Thus the new security environment emerged in 1990s involved some serious threat perceptions to Japanese security. At the same time Japan was deeply concerned about the new trends of isolationism in the US foreign and security policies which manifested into the withdrawal of US forces from Philippines in 1992 and policies of military political disengagement of Clinton adminstration. In the backdrop of these developments, attempts were made by Japan to evolve a multilateral security arrangement in the Asia Pacific through cooperative approaches.\textsuperscript{77} The new Japanese thinking and policies of multilateralism reflected into August 1994's special report by an Advisory Group on Defense which is popularly known as "Higuchi Report." The report recommended three policies.

- Firstly to promote multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale.
- Secondly to buildup a highly reliable and efficient defense agency of Japan.


capability based on strengthened information capability and prompt crisis management capability and finally, to enhance the function of Japanese American Security Treaty.\textsuperscript{78}

These recommendations helped to shape the new National Defense Programme Outline in November 1995 which replaced the National Defense Programme Outline of 1976 in 1996. The National Defense Programme Outline of 1996 was adopted to cope with the new challenges and realities in three main areas.

Firstly, defending Japan, secondly, responding the large scale disaster and various other situations and finally contributing to the construction of a more stable environment. \textsuperscript{79}

From the beginning of 1990s Japan was highly concern about China's growing military potential and assertiveness. A major concern for Japan was China's claim to wide areas of South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands off Okinawa.\textsuperscript{80} In February 1992, China passed a law and proclaimed sovereignty over all Islands in South China Sea and also on the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese nuclear tests in 1995, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 multiplied Japanese fear and suspicions about Chinese ambitions.

To cope with the increasing Chinese regional hegemony, a strong need for collective security arrangement was expressed both by Japan and the US. It led to the redefinition of US Japan Security Treaty of 1960 in the context of the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for 21st Century. The joint declaration of

\textsuperscript{79} For details see Defense of Japan 1996 pp-73-80.
President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1996 called for combined security efforts for common security concerns (For detail see the Appendix No.6). During the summit Japan pledged a more active Japanese role in region. It also agreed to expand logistical support for US forces in peacetime. An agreement was signed to review the Guidelines for US Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978.81

PUBLIC OPINION

The role of Japanese public opinion particularly on Japan's defense policy making process is crucial. In the aftermath of Second World War, the Japanese public opinion had been provided consistent opposition to military build up and acted as a stumbling block in Japanese government's endeavors to address positively US pressure for burden sharing. Right from the Prime Minister Yoshida Shingeru of 1950 to Naksoni Yashihero of 1987 (See the Appendix No.2), almost all Prime Ministers were forced to walk a very narrow path between the domestic constraints imposed by pacifist public opinion and external pressures from US for defense burden sharing.

Evidence to that effect has surfaced in several studies. In main, the claim was that in the post World War II years Japanese public attitude was influenced by two values - political psychological and economic psychological value.82 The political psychological value which led to the pacifist neutralism was a direct reaction to the

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Japanese militarism and tragic effects of atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The political psychological value has been symbolitically expressed in the article 9 of 1947's Japan's New Constitution and influenced Japanese public attitude towards US Japan security arrangement. The various public opinion surveys conducted during 1950s demonstrated that the American military presence never enjoyed robust support. The following chart shows Japanese national opinion on American bases between 1950 and 1958.

**NATIONAL OPINION ON AMERICAN BASES 1950-58**

| Question: Do you approve or oppose the presence of US bases in Japan |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|            | September 1950 | June 1953      | October 1957   | February 1958  |
| Approve    | 30%            | 27%            | 18%            | 8%             |
| Oppose     | 38%            | 48%            | 60%            | 58%            |
| Don't Know | 32%            | 35%            | 22%            | 34%            |

Source 83

The economic psychological value was a response to the Japanese commercial devastation in the Second World War and therefore priority had been given to Japan's Economic development. This values reflected into famous Yoshida Doctrine which called "economy first" principle

This passivity and attitude of neutralism remained strong in the early 1950s. It was encouraged by the socialist and communist elements in Japan. However it has been observed that the intensity of public passivity considerably reduced by late 1950s and

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83. Ibid. p.4.
especially after 1958. The public surveys conducted during the time demonstrated that opposition to the security treaty was mollified and people were in favour of revision of the security treaty. A public opinion survey conducted by Tokyo Shimbun in 1959 on alignment with the United States or neutrality question found that 54.3% people favoured alignment with the US.84 Another survey conducted by the same newspaper on "Support for revision of the 1951 security treaty found that, more than 50% were in favour revision.85 The Japanese government's policy responses need to be seen in tandem with these background.

As many have noted main reason contributed to the shift was Japan's economic development. This helped the US Japan Security Alliance have a greater salience in policy. By 1960, the economic benefits of security arrangement with the United States were visible. The US policy of encouraging economic growth and huge financial assistance facilitated Japan's economic development. It was largely accepted in Japan that without American security guarantee and financial support, the economic growth would not have been possible. The credit also goes to Prime Minister Yoshida and Kishi who systematically balanced the domestic antimilitaristic norms and US pressure, and tried to develop a domestic consensus.

Another shift in Japanese Public opinion was observed in 1970s. It was a response to changed US polices after its debacle in

85 Ibid.
Vietnam war. The shift in public attitude was in favour of Japanese rearmament for self defense. Since there were uncertainties about US security commitments on the one hand and increased soviet threat on the other. The 1968 and 1979 Asahi polls suggested that there had been a decline in the credibility of US pledges to protect Japan. The following answer shows how Japanese confidence become less about the US security commitment to Japan in 1970s:

Question: **In case of emergency, do you think US will come and defend Japan?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>October 1969</th>
<th>November 1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 86

A public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Ministers Office in 1978 revealed that the defense consciousness of the Japanese public had increased considerably. 54% of people surveyed stated that they were determined to defend Japan. 87

In the other words, the Japanese public perceptions had, over the years, shifted in favour of a redefined security alliance with the US. The bilateral alliance mainly viewed by the public as a guarantee to Japan's economic prosperity and external stability.

In the 1980s, Soviet the fear of increased soviet influence in the Far East was clearly reflected in the public attitudes which turned

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its support for defense efforts and gradual increase in Japanese
defense capabilities. Various opinion polls conducted during the time
expressed that fear. A public opinion survey conducted by Tokyo
Shimbun demonstrated that 60.9% of respondents said “there was a
danger” or “their might be a danger of Soviet expansion.” According
to a mid 1982 data compiled by Potomac Associates, 45 percent
Japanese believed that defense expenditure should be kept at
present level and more than 86 percent were in favour of a strong
Self Defense Force.

The end of Cold War and the Gulf War of 1991 marked a
significant transformation in Japanese public opinion on Japan’s
role in the world and the role of self defence force. A public opinion
survey conducted by the newspaper Ashai Shimbun, immediately
after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, 78 percent of Japanese opposed the
dispatch of Self Defence Force to the Gulf. But when the allied
offensive began, 74 percent Japanese fully approved the SDF’S
participation in Gulf War. Another public opinion survey which was
conducted after the Japanese Diets approval of a plan to allow the
SDF to participate in UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 55%
people said they were well aware about the defense issues and
supported the self defense force participation. Opinion survey
conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that

88 Reference cited in Jason Gottlieb “Representative Democracy and Military Policy in Postwar
Japan: The Role of Public Opinion” No.29.
89 US-Japan Advisory Commission, “Challenges and Opportunities in United State – Japan
Relation” Report Submitted to the President of United States and Prime Minister of Japan
September 1984 p. 10
90 Reference cited in Jason Gottlieb. No.29

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the percentage and Japanese who believed that “Japan has the responsibility towards international community to promote its own internationalization had undergone increase from 26 percent in 1989 to 45.7 percent in 1993. Scholars have observed two major reasons for the shift. Firstly, to boost Japan’s international image and secondly, threat perception to Japanese security particularly from North Korea. On the issue of US-Japan security arrangement, it was observed that people had a favourable tilt. A public opinion poll conducted by the newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun in December 1995 demonstrated that a majority of Japanese believed that in their national interest it was good to maintain the US-Japan security Treaty.

The renewed Security Treaty with the US in April 1996 and the negotiations to review the Guidelines of Defense Cooperation of 1978 are yet another indication of Japan's gradual perceptual shift. Both the Japanese public and politicians alike are growingly aware of Japan's heightened political role in East Asia. Despite inherent problems and unresolved issues, the question of Japan's triangular relationship with the US and China with implications for entire Asia Pacific region has become the focus of tremendous internal debate in Japan. Events such as Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, Chinese missiles tests as well as disputes over Senkaku Islands have heightened the fears of China's hegemony among Japanese politicians. Perhaps it

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91 Francis Fukuyama, Kangdon Oh, US-Japan Security Relations after the Cold War No.72p.38.
has also laid the ground for what some have called "intense strategic competition" if not tension and hostilities between these two great powers whose history is characterised by unresolved tensions, hostilities and mutual distrust.