Chapter-II
DOMESTIC INFLUENCES AND COORDINATION OF US DEFENSE STRATEGY TOWARDS JAPAN

The US defense strategy is as vulnerable to domestic influences as that of any country. It was questioned at home in terms of dollars and in terms of lives in various ways. In the case of US-Japan security relations, the vital relationship between domestic politics and the conduct of foreign policy has been clearly reflected from the beginning of security relationship.

This chapter has been divided into two sections. The first section examines the influences of executive branches on coordinating the US defense strategy towards Japan. The second section deals with the impact of American public opinion and media views on US-Japan relations and provides a link to policy.

In the US the executive departments of the government and the political appointees who head them constituted the core of foreign policy making, particularly the Department of State and Department of Defense. Although the President is the supreme boss of all these executive branch, their interests are not always synonymous. In case of US-Japan security relations, interestingly, the interlink between US Japan trade frictions and defense burden sharing also involved the other executive branches such as US Treasury, Department of Commerce, Office of US Trade Representative in forming the strategy.
towards Japan. Their influences on US security policy towards Japan has also been discussed in the later part of the first section.

The purpose of this chapter is an attempt to understand why Japan remained a centre of attraction among US policy makers through out the Cold War years? How the perspectives of State and Defense Departments, public attitude and media views changed with the emergence of Japan from a protected protégé to a leading creditor nation. Finally, an important part of this chapter involves conclusion after examining public attitude and media views on US-Japan security relation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEFENCE'S PERCEPTIONS ON US OCCUPATION ROLE.

During the occupation period the general US objective was to create an independent, democratic Japan with a viable economy and to help Japan to get place as a respected and trusted member of the society of nations. There was a fundamental consensus between the staff of Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, the US Departments of State and Defence, the Office of US President on the democratization

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of Japan. It continued a major concern till the end of occupation period. Along with the democratization, the demilitarization of Japan was also one of the major objectives which prompted General MacArther, Supreme Commander of Allied Powers to introduce the famous and most debatable “article 9” into the new Japanese constitution which forbids Japan’s rearmament. (See Appendix No.1).

However, by 1948 the US occupation goals in Japan changed with the rapid expansion of communism in Asia. The Truman administration embarked upon a policy of active resistance to communist expansion. In his memoir President Truman noted his views on the Communist expansion. He advocated a hawkish policy and maintained that the US should fight the Communist every place, “fight them like hell.” The emergence of Communist China, North Korean attack on South Korea further aggravated the situation and protection of Japan from Soviet Union became the top US priority. John Foster Dulles sternly warned.

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5 Harry Truman, Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956)p.353.

6 The increased Soviet threat to the Far East and need to protect Japan has been expressed emphatically in a memorandum prepared by Joint Chiefs of Staff see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) on Review of the Current world Situation and Ability of Forces Being Maintained to Meet US Commitments 15th January 1951, Foreign Relations of the US 1951, vol.1( Washington DC: USGPO, 1979)pp 66-68.
if Japan succumbs to communist aggression, there would be a combination of Russian, Japanese and Chinese power in the East which would be dangerously formidable. 7

To contain the growth of Communism in the Far East, two policy options were put forward which became the centre of debate among the Department of State and Department Defense. The two options were firstly, the rehabilitation of Japanese military and secondly delayed the Japanese occupation. 8 Both the State and Defense Departments acknowledged the need for adequate self defense capability for Japan but divided on the rate at which rearming can be proceed and levels of armament necessary. 9 The Department of State favoured limited self defense capability for Japan. The Assistant Secretary of State John Allison in his speech before the Japan-America society at Tokyo advocated limited Japanese defense efforts. He said,

"there need be no fear that limited defense measures by Japan will lead to war. On the contrary such measures will make it possible for Japan to join with other nations in a common front which will reduce the threat of war by making would be aggressors realize they cannot succeed". 10

John Foster Dulles in his message to the delegates at San Francisco Peace Conference emphasized on Japan's right of self

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Despite of the increasing communist threat to the Japan, officials from the Department of State were in favour of early negotiation of peace treaty with Japan and returning all bases to Japanese political and administrative control. In their understanding the occupation over a long period would jeopardize future Japanese-US relations. They argued that the Japanese people were becoming disillusioned with the occupation and the American interests could best be protected by an early peace treaty.

On the other hand, the Department of Defense was infavor of delaying the occupation period for two reasons. Firstly, in their understanding the military threat to Japan was external in nature and the US military presence could serve as a deterrent to aggression. Secondly, most of the Pentagon Officials recognized the high strategic significance of Japanese bases.

The main utility of Japanese bases, as they believed, was to act as a physical barrier blocking Soviet naval forces from the sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. Therefore they planned to convert Japan into an American military base. Further, they did not want any interference from the Japanese government on the movements of

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11 Ibid.p.37.
12 As early as June 1946 the Department of State proposed in National Security Council Resolution no. 39/1 that the islands should be returned to Japan by negotiating early peace treaty. This reference has been cited in Memorandum by Myron M Cowen, Consultant to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of State US Govt. Dept. of State Foreign Relations of the US 1952-54, Japan and China Part II(Washington D.C. USGPO) p.1170 Also see Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 14 April 1952 US Govt. Dept. of State Foreign Relations of the US 1952-54, Japan and China Part II(Washington D.C. USGPO)pp 1228-29.
13 For example see the recommendation of General Ridgway, Supreme Commander Allied Powers submitted to Joint Chiefs of Staff on US Long Term Objectives with Respect to Ryukyu Islands in which he not only underscored the significance of Japanese bases but also advocated an exclusive control on military facilities US Government, Department of State, Foreign Relations of United States - 1952-54: Japan and China, Part-II (Washington DC: USGPO) pp.1116-17.
troops in Japan. They argued that so long as Japan was protected by the US troops, Soviet Russia could not extend its influence in Far East. The strategy envisaged by the Department of Defense revealed in a report prepared by the then Under Secretary of Army, Tracy Voorhees. The report proposed a half treaty with Japan in which Japan was to enjoy internal autonomy and defense and foreign matters would be looked after by the US through Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. The War and Navy Departments opposed any withdrawal of American forces from Japan. The admirals and generals in Pentagon believed that an unarmed Japan would fall easy pray to any aggressor from North. Instead of withdrawing US forces from Japan, emphasis was given to administer Japanese bases as strategic areas.

Finally it was John Foster Dulles, Special adviser to the Secretary of State Acheson who brought consensus among both the State and Defense Departments before negotiating the security treaty with Japan. The Security Treaty of 1951 reflected the Department of Defense's consistent demand of using Japanese bases on strategic areas and their operational use against the Soviet military building in the Northeast Asia. The Security Treaty focused primarily on the terms of continuing the American military presence on Japanese

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15 Ibid. p.128.
At the end of occupation of Japan 260,000 US military personnel remained in Japan with their bases and facilities covering 1,352 square kilometers.

After the conclusion of independent security treaty with Japan, special attention had been provided to Japan's economic revival. Interestingly, there seemed to be a fundamental consensus among all executive branches on this issue out of the fear that desperate Japan would find remedies through totalitarian measures. A memorandum from CIA Director to the Secretary of State strongly advocated US role in Japanese economic development.

"The probable emergence of a politically stable and pro US Japan will help to establish an East-West balance of power in the Far East... if Japan fails to find markets and raw materials in non-communist areas, there may develop an insistent demand for economic collaboration with the Asian mainland, under these circumstances, there will be a continuing substantial requirement for US assistance particularly in the development of foreign trade".

Japan's economic revival was viewed as a tool of building Japan as future US cold war ally. George Kennan observed:

"once the Japanese prospered under capitalism only then could they be depended on to help and defend the western system against the spread of communism".

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A paper prepared by the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff also emphasized on Japan’s economic development. The paper suggested a two-fold strategy for Japan:

“We must not only deny Japan to the USSR but also we must seek to utilize its potential in our own behalf, Japan’s neutralization would be an invitation to its absorption into the Soviet Union and therefore Japan’s orientation to the West must be accomplished and must carry with it the will to develop Japan’s strength for the common purpose of the non-Soviet world”.

**JAPANESE TRADE WITH CHINA: DIFFERENCE ON RELAXING CONTROL ON EXPORT.**

Encouraging Japan’s economic growth became a strategic priority of Eisenhower’s government. It was realized by the Eisenhower administration that economic and military assistance to Japan would be necessary to ensure Japan’s economic recovery. President Eisenhower was strongly supportive of military assistance. In his message to Congress on the significance of US military aid programme he strongly favoured the continuation of programme to strengthen the European and Asian allies against communist expansion and influence. With the same intention President Eisenhower even gone upto the extent of allowing Japan to establish trade links with the Communist China. This decision of President Eisenhower invited another intense debate between the Department of Defense and Department of State.

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24 Ibid. p.56.
Department of Defense wanted to put continued pressure on Japan to maintain substantially intact the complete embargo on all exports to Communist China, including the exports of non-strategic goods which were instituted during the period of occupation. On the other hand Department of State believed to limit the embargo to strategic items and proposed that the Japanese should be permitted to relax controls on the export to China of non-strategic goods. They argued that some degree of trade between Japan and China was essential to the economic viability of Japan. In their understanding a rigid embargo on all Japanese exports to China would intensify Japanese competition in free world markets and that would make the US efforts more difficult to bring back Japan into the free world trade community.

President Kennedy and Johnson did not differ significantly from Eisenhower in their views on security assistance and emphasized on continuation of military aid programmes. In his message to Congress Kennedy stressed that military aid was necessary to strengthen the political and economic independence of US allies by helping them to overcome the economic problems. Johnson's Secretary of State Dean Rusk in his testimony during the Congressional hearings on Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 noted that security aid to allies, both


26 Ibid, 1300.

in Europe and Asia was necessary to achieve a stable world free from the 20th century Communism.28

The American policy of encouraging Japanese economic growth without asking for contributions to the defence of Japan proved extremely beneficial to the Japanese economic recovery. The US open door trade policy for Japan resulted into the rapid increase of export of Japanese textile products to the US which posed serious threat to the US textile industry. As a result the demand, for curtailment of Japanese import and put voluntary export restrain, from the business community and their representatives in the Congress challenged the executive branch’s open door trade policy with Japan.29 The US domestic demands for putting quantitative restrictions on Japanese imports were opposed by the Department of State. A State Department report published in 1964 not only favoured the open door trade policy with Japan but also advised the office of President to resist all demands of curtailment of Japanese import.30 American ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer sent a report to the President Johnson in which he supported the Japan’s geo-economic expansion and urged to resist American industry’s demands for curtailment of Japanese imports.31

OKINAWA ISSUE: DIFFERENCES ON REVERSION.

During the same time the reversion of administrative rights of Okinawa islands to the Japanese became the centre of debate among the Department of State and Department of Defense. In fact differences of opinion were existed right from the occupation period but became intense in 1960s due to strong Japanese domestic demand for the reversion. The office of President and the Department of State were in favour of reversion. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy, State Department’s Japan Country Director, Richard Sneider, High Commissioner of Ryukys, Ferdinand Urger, American Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson, President Nixon’s Secretary of State William Rogers etc. were certain officials who favoured reversion of administrative rights to the Japanese.32 Their support for the reversion was based on two observations firstly, the early reversion could reduce the tension between the US and Japan and secondly the reversion would not affect regional balance of power.33

The Department of State’s stand for early reversion was strongly opposed by certain Pentagon officials who were convinced about Okinawa’s strategic role in protecting US interests in the Far East. The Under Secretary of the Army, Stephen Ailes in his testimony before the House Appropriation’s Subcommittee on Foreign


Operations Appropriation during the hearings on more financial grants to Ryukyu Islands said

"our Okinawa base is an important factor in the US defense system as well as supporting factor in the free world's efforts against communism... the US will continue responsibility for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands as long as conditions of threat and tension in the Far east require the maintenance of military base in the Islands".34

US military High Commissioner on Okinawa General Caraway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Norman Orwat, Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Deputy Director for Regional Affairs, Thaddeus Holt were officials who argued that any tempering with the established system of military administration on Okinawa or any concession to Japanese opinion on this issue would undermine the entire basis of American Far Eastern policy.35 General Caraway observed that

the American position vis-à-vis all the powers in the Far East is dependent on its ability to deploy military forces... in this sense Okinawa rather than Japan, Korea, Taiwan remained the key control of the Western parity. It is essential, therefore, that the United States should not lost the grip on the island".36

Throughout the 1960s the US did not agitate about Japan's lack of defense contribution and cooperation primarily due to Japan's financial inability to contribute strategically. The Department of State and Department Defense kept on resisting the increasing domestic

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35 For details see the testimonies of various Pantagon official during the hearings on Okinawa Reversion Treaty. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Asian And Pacific Affairs Hearings on Okinawa Reversion Treaty, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 18 to 27th October, 1971 (Washington DC: USGPO 1971).

demand about Japanese unfair trade practices and putting quantitative restriction on Japanese imports.

**SHIFTS IN ATTITUDES: CONCERNS OVER TRADE DEFICIT.**

However the situation changed in 1970s with the emergence of Japan as one of the most dynamic economics in the world. Japan witnessed phenomenal increases in national production and trade. Japan’s GNP rose an average of more than 11 percent a year. In 1971 the Japanese trade surpluses with America reached to $1223.3 million. The US Secretary of State William Rogers in his Annual Report to the Congress expressed concerns over increasing Japanese trade surpluses with the United States. He said,

> "the large and continuing trade imbalance is an important element in the overall US trade and payments position... our prime goals is to reduce the deficit". 38

In this decade both the United States and Japan had extremely different economic experiences. Japan achieved double digit growth wherein the United States for variety of reasons experienced trade deficit with many countries. This promoted many Americans to question the Japanese trade practices. President Nixon himself complaint about Japanese trade policies.

> "Japan benefited greatly from the liberal trade policies of the United States. But Japan’s insistence on restricting its own markets contributed to a growing imbalance in our trade, and was an anachronism, inconsistent with its economic strength and


symbolizing a lack of economic reciprocity which could not be long sustained".39

Richard Fairbanks, President of the US National Committee for Pacific Economic Corporation noted that

"it seemed that the Japanese economy suddenly was challenging or outstripping the US in many fields- from the ubiquitous presence of Japanese consumer electronics products and automobile in American markets, to computer chips and petrochemical plants worldwide.40

The American business community, their US workers and their congressional representatives started blaming security alliance for American economic problems. This domestication of foreign policy dragged the issue of Japan’s defense into the realm of public debate and forced it to be linked with volatile trade issues. The question began to raise about the utility of defending Japan. It was strongly argued that Japan was heavily relied on American security guarantee and spent less then one percent of its GNP on defense and therefore Japan was getting free ride on defense.41

Thus the US-Japan trade friction, as noted by experts, introduced a feeling of rivalry and antagonism into the alliance. Evidences provided that the cumulative impact of these developments had three peculiar results.

First, the willingness of US to sacrifice immediate economic stability for political gains was effectively eroded. Secondly, the rise of an economic nationalism in America emphasized fair trade than free trade. Finally, the American

41 This general feeling among Americans was reflected into various public opinion surveys. For instance see the survey conducted by Asahi Evening News on 17th March, 1971. For detail see the last section of public opinion of this chapter.
domestic consensus to provide financial and military assistance to Japan declined. 42

The shift in American security policy also revealed in the President Nixon's foreign policy message to Congress

"We will continue to provide elements of military strength and economic resources appropriate to our size and our interests. But it is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security or development around the globe is primarily America's concern. The defense and protection of other countries must be first their responsibility and second a regional responsibility. Without the foundation of self help, American help will not succeed." 43

Richard Nixon in his book "Victory Without War" expressed his deep concern about Japan's apparent passivity. He called Japan as a "Reluctant Giant". 44

STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE: NEW APPROACH FOR BURDEN SHARING.

As per the shift in American security policy, the Department of Defense envisaged a new strategy for defense burden sharing among the US and its allies which is popularly known as Strategy of Realistic Deterrence 45 Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird while defining the new arrangement of burden sharing clarify that

"We do not intend to be the policeman of the world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore it is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends." 46

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For the US Asian allies, the Secretary of Defense said

“There is a need for our Asian friends and allies to strengthen their conventional forces, both to defend themselves against non-Chinese attack and in regional conjunction to build a defense compatibility which would give communist China increased pause before initiating hostilities”.47

The basic guidelines for US defense planning decided under the strategy of Realistic Deterrence were, firstly, the US could bear primary responsibility in the field of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons. Secondly, in dealing with conventional warfare, the US and allied forces share the responsibility. Finally, in deterring sub-theatre or localized warfare, the country or ally which is threatened would bear the primary burden particularly for providing man powers.48

Secretary of Defense Liard wanted Japan to assume primary responsibility for its own defense. In his Annual Defense Report 1973 to the US Congress he strongly urged Japan to procure modern equipments from the United States for the Japanese Self Defense Forces. The Department of Defense insisted for modernization of Japanese Self Defense Forces through state-of art weapons from the US.49 In their understanding this strategy would help to reduce the trade deficit.

Under the new strategy of Realistic Deterrence, a massive US troops withdrawal programme was envisaged by the Department of Defense. In 1971, from the East Asia, total 213,000 troops were

withdrawn; from Japan 6000 troops were withdrawn. The fundamental objective behind the troops withdrawal was to put greater burden on friends and allies. The following table focuses on troops reduction in 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Asian Personnel Reduction</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Jan 1971: 344,000 Dec. 1971: 159,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Jan 1971: 53,000 Dec. 1971: 43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Jan 1971: 38,000 Dec. 1971: 32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Jan 1971: 38,000 Dec. 1971: 32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Jan 1971: 24,000 Dec. 1971: 18,000</td>
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</table>

In 1978, the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield also emphasized for Japanese defense efforts in his annual report to the Congress. He commented that

"United States security objectives vis-à-vis Japan is to ensure Japan's security against nuclear threats and to cooperate with Japan under the terms of Mutual Security Treaty. In fulfilling that objective the US should continue encourage, Japan to improve the capabilities of its forces for the defense of its territory. Secondly to encourage, through close consultations; compatibility and complementarily, between US and Japanese military forces and doctrines".

CARTER ADMINISTRATION: ISSUE OF PROTECTING SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION.

During Carter administration enhancement of Japanese security role was an important goal of American security policy

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50 Ibid, p.50.
towards Japan and a key feature of Carter’s Asian Policy. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, Carter indicated that the US had to meet the Soviet threat and expressed his desire for collective efforts of the US and its allies. Carter’s intentions were reflected in his remarks at White House briefing for members of Congress. He put pressure on Japan to increase its defense budget and assume responsibility to defend its sea lanes of communication to 1000 nautical miles. In Carter’s understanding increase in Japanese defense budget would help to reduce Japanese trade surpluses with the United States.

During Carter administration a new strategic concept was evolved by the Department of Defense experts which emphasised on significance of Japan to assume defence of sealanes of communication upto 1000 nautical miles from Japanese shore. The new concept maintained that

The Persian Gulf had become a third potential military theater vital to the West along with West European and Northeast Asian theaters. Since the US has deployed forces into Indian Ocean, a new division of defense responsibilities should be envisaged between the US and its chief Asian allies. Such a division of labour would require Japan to build a conventional military force capable of defending conventional Soviet air and naval forces in the pacific within approximately 1000 miles from the Japanese shore.

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The Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey during his visit to Japan in March 1981 requested Japan to take responsibility to defend its sea lanes of communication to 1000 miles. Carter's Defense Secretary Herald Brown declared in 1981

"No American govt. and still less the American people or the American Congress are going to accept situation in which some other country feels that its our job to defend them and they needn't bother to defend themselves".  

When Japan's 1981 defense spending increase turnout to be several percentage points less than what the US had hoped for, Herold Brown publicly accused Japan of not sharing its defense responsibilities as much as America did. He called Japanese action as "complacent, unjustified and falling seriously short". He demanded that Japan should take initiative in maintaining an adequate military balance in Western Pacific and Japan should be capable of responding to any sort of crisis.  

As the US trade deficit with Japan increased significantly in 1980s, the unequal nature of security alliance once again became the centre of domestic criticism. The US trade deficit with Japan in 1981 was $15.8 billion which rose to $46.2 billion by 1985. The Carter administration's serious efforts to resolve trade frictions with Japan could not yield result. On security front, Japan was adamant on
maintaining 1 percent GNP spending limit on defense. As the trade relations, became more conflictual, it began to infect the alliance and had a serious effect to the defense relationship's integrity. The Americans began to ask questions why the US would do so much to defend on ungrateful partner.

The most significant impact of the US-Japan trade frictions and increasing US trade deficit with Japan as far as US domestic influences are concerned was the erosion of the exclusive power of the Department of State and Department of Defense to decide US strategy towards Japan and involved other executive branches such as Department of Commerce, the Office of US Trade Representative. The US Trade Representative William Brock III said in an interview

"If they spend less money on defense, they have far more opportunity for investing in support of selected industries, R and D efforts, lower interest rates and the like that make them more competitive economically".61

These departments were supported by large American business community raised new claims of protectionism. They argued that the relatively small amount spend by Japan on defense was related to its burgeoning economy and large trade imbalances with the United States.62 The various demands made by these departments were expressed in the address of Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs before the Common Wealth Club of San Francisco. He outlined six elements of US trade policy towards Japan which

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shows the intensity of strained economic relations between the two countries. 63

Firstly addressing the fundamental issues behind trade imbalances, Secondly encourage further liberalization of Japan’s financial and capital market. Thirdly removal of trade barriers, Fourthly seeking the liberalization of entire industry section, Fifthly taking action against Japan under US trade laws to remove unfair trade practices and finally cooperating with Japan internationally to strengthen the world trading and monetary system.

The US-Japan trade frictions, increase Japanese trade surpluses, and the domestic demands of burden sharing with Japan posed a dilemma for both the Department of State and Department of Defense. On the one hand, while dealing with Congress, they sought to depict the allies share as fair, at the same time, they continually reminded Japan that its defense contributions had not kept with its economic pace.

To deflect the increasing US domestic criticism; the Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki envisaged a new strategy in 1981 which was known as “Comprehensive Security Strategy.” 64 (details of the strategy have been given in the fourth chapter) The strategy called for Japanese contribution in non military areas such as financial assistance to Asian countries. However this strategy was opposed by the Department of State by depicting it as a Japanese ploy to avoid increases in defense expenditure. The Secretary of State Alexander Haig cleared the American stand on Suzuki’s Comprehensive Security

Strategy by saying that the US did not consider economic and political activism by Tokyo as substitute for a larger military contribution to joint security efforts.65

**SHARING ROLES AND MISSIONS: DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN US, NATO AND JAPAN.**

To ensure the Japanese contribution in defense burden sharing, the Department of Defense prepared a new role for Japan on the basis of “roles and mission”.66 The new strategy envisaged an arrangement of rational division of labour between the US, NATO and Japan. On 4th March 1981 Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger told the Senate Armed Services Committee that a rational division of labour between Japan, the US and NATO allies would be a central thrust of Reagan administration’s defense policy.67 The new strategy of roles and missions was also made it clear to the Congress by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Mr. Holdridge,

> “our objective is an equitable sharing of roles and mission. That is our focus rather than defense expenditure per se. we don’t wish to become bagged down in discussion of percentage points of the defense butget in Japan or percentage of GNP. What we would like to see is the Japanese filling out their part of relationship assuming certain roles and certain responsibilities for the defense of Japan and the Japanese home islands”.68

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In Asia, the coalition strategy bifurcated the US responsibility. As summarized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Francis J West Jr.

In the Northwest Pacific the United States would provide the nuclear umbrella, offensive protection forces as necessary and assist the Republic of Korea in the defense of its territory. In the southwest and Indian Ocean the US would provide the nuclear umbrella protection force as necessary and sea lane protection.69

By dividing its security role into two distinct regional responsibilities the United States encouraged Japan to increase its own defense capabilities for air and sea control in the Northwest Pacific. As per the roles missions strategy, the US was given the responsibility for nuclear deterrence and offensive operation in the Asia Pacific region while Japan was to defend its territory, airspace and selected sea lanes of communication out to 1000 miles.

Michael H. Armacost Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in his address before the Mansfield Conference in Missoula, Montana said.70

"Within the US-Japan alliance we have constantly had to reconfigure the distribution of political burdens of our relationship. In the past Americans shouldered a disproportionate share of those burdens but the bilateral balance of economic strength has changed a growing trade deficit, the political pressure stimulated by intense Japanese competition, and the stringencies of our federal budget have all increased pressures for more rapid adjustments in the redistribution of international burdens".

The secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger pushed very hard for active Japanese military role in the security structure of the East

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Asia. While asserting the vitality of defense efforts of Japan to the US, he commented on the lacklustre Japanese defense efforts.

_The Japanese forces today have not yet reached the point of being able to carryout their mission fully. Thus, they would have difficulty in defending Japan. The defense of Japanese and sea lanes out to 1000 miles will require improvements in military capabilities. To satisfy those critical defense missions would require increase in defense spending substantially greater than the current annual rate._

Again in his Annual Defense Reports to the Congress, Casper Weinberger strongly advocated that Japan should develop sufficient capacity for its own defense and to cope with the Soviet fleet as well as its backfires.

George Shultz who replaced Haig in 1982 as the Secretary of State made the Department of State’s stand clear on defense relations with Japan when he talked to US ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield.

> "Japan has successfully gone through the postwar period. But has somehow stood outside the political and economic system that has produced progress for everyone. In standing outside, Japan has avoided taking any real responsibility for the maintenance of the system for defense or trade or general economic conditions. The American’s are continually trying to cope with all the creaks and groans of the system. So one of our objectives must be to say to the Japanese, you can’t stand outside any longer. You have such a size and scope that you must be one of the three or four nations responsible for the maintenance of the current order, not just for the benefit of Japan alone but also for the benefit of the system itself."

George Shultz outlined five areas of cooperation between the United States and Japan. The first four areas dealt with the economic cooperation which included reaffirm commitments to free trade, create

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conditions for more stable international monetary system and assist the economic development of less developed countries. The last area was related to security where Japan was asked to increase its defense expenditure to contribute the US defense efforts in the Asia Pacific region.74

The US frustration with the overall inactivity of its allies in sharing the burden, budgetary crisis, trade imbalances and bilateral trade disputes with Japan ranging from textile to steel, color television and automobiles yielded a neo conservative attitude among many Americans. This neo conservative attitude reflected into literature produced during the early 1980s. For example, a book written by former Pentagon officials Jeffrey Record and Robert Hank criticized excess US overseas involvement and strongly recommended the withdrawal of US forces75 President Reagan's lawyer Lawrence Beilenson, in his book observed that the US has trapped itself into unsatisfactory alliance. He proposed alternation in alliance mechanism and putting pressure on alliance partners to bear responsibility for their own defense.76

Several proposals were put forward regarding the mechanism of sharing defense responsibility with Japan from governmental and non-governmental experts. Economist Robert Pranger of American

74 ibid, pp. 182-83.
76 Lawrence W. Beilenson, Survival and the Peace in the Nuclear Age (Chicago: Regnery/Gateway, 1980). Both the references of f.n. 75-76 are cited in Edward oleson, Japan US Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo Internationalist View (California: Hoover Institution press, 1985).
Interprise Institute in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs recommended that Japan should be encouraged to seek more strategic equality with the US in Asia. He observed that autonomous defense efforts would help to provide greater defense in Asia.\textsuperscript{77} The former secretary of United States Navy, I William Middendent II devised a three step formula for US-Japan burden sharing.\textsuperscript{78} According to the plan—

\begin{quote}
"Firstly, both the US and Japan must recognize the interdependence of strategic interests with regional issues, Secondly the security interests of the Japan could not artificially be confined to the North East Asia only. Peace and stability in Korea and the overall stability of the military balance in Asia was Japan's most important security consideration. Finally Combined efforts by both the countries with greater investment in the military capability, which could provide better deterrence to the increasing Soviet power. Strong and credible Japanese posture was the Most critical element in regional stability. The combined defense efforts would include close aligned inter operable defense forces, bilateral military planning, Japanese sharing of costs of maintaining the US forces in Japan and combined military exercises".
\end{quote}

Dr. Richard B. Foster, Director, Strategic Studies Centre, USA pointed out five areas where Japan could bear the responsibility.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{quote}
Firstly, permit the US bases in Japan to provide critical air and naval support for American military forces in the event they are engaged in a renewal of hostilities on Korean Peninsula. Secondly, utilize, Japanese deny the Soviet navy maritime and ground forces to access to the Pacific Ocean by blocking the Korea, Tsugaru and Soya straits. Thirdly, to deploy Japanese forces and the Western Pacific, especially if the US Seventh Fleet were engaged in a conflict in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean. And finally, use the totality of Japanese military power to dissuade the Soviet Union from opening a Far Eastern Front in the even of a US-Soviet conflict in Europe or Southwest Asia".
\end{quote}

When most Americans were criticizing Japan as a free rider on defense and forcing government to pressurize Japan for greater defense efforts, one section of American society that included some journalists, academicians, Congress members, government officials both from the Department of State and Department of Defense were not in favour of these US pressure tactics. They cautioned the Reagan Administration against excessive pressure on Japan. They were satisfied with the defense efforts taken by the Japan and were seriously concern about the consequences of Japanese rearmament. The Journalists like Hobert Rowen, Charles Williams Mynes supported the then Japanese defense efforts and recommended that Japan should be given freedom to choose its own course of action.\(^80\) Senator John Glenn who not only defended the Japanese defense contribution as adequate but also advised the Reagan administration to resume military assistance to Japan.\(^81\) The Department of Defense officials like James Auer, US ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield were in favour of letting Japan to set its own timetable for re-armament.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William Clark in his testimony before the Defense Burden Sharing Panel of the House Armed Service Committee expressed satisfaction over the alliance commitment of common defense, he pointed out six areas where Japan's contribution was clearly visible.\(^82\)


\(^{81}\) Senator John Glenn "Defending the New Japan" *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1982 pp.25-31. References of f.n. no.80-81 are cited in Edward Oleson No.76

Firstly, Japan’s mid-term defense plan covering the period 1986-90 was aimed precisely at improving Japan’s capabilities to carry out the defense missions by incorporating new and expensive defense systems such as Aegis-capable destroyers. Secondly, Japan was the largest economic assistance donor to foster political as well as economic stability. Thirdly, Japan increased its official development assistance substantially and target more united aid to countries of both economic and strategic importance to Japan and precise navigational aid system in the gulf; and $ 10 million to the US Secretary General’s peacekeeping efforts. Fifth, Japan contributed some the United States like Turkey and Philippines. Fourthly, Japan’s “out of area” burden sharing in Persian Gulf was also up to mark. Japan committed $ 300 million in foreign economic assistance to Jordan and $ 200 million to Oman. $ 10 million to establish a $ 2.5 billion a year to support the maintenance of 60,000 US service personnel in Japan. Japan’s contribution accounted for about 46% of total cost.

The former CIA Director William Colby, while commenting on the adequacy of Japanese defense efforts and the rhetoric of US criticism argued that

“Let’s say the Japanese military budget is 1% or below 1% of GNP I think there will be continuity US criticism... I do not think you might eliminate that criticism if you increased it to 4 or 5% putting most of it into economic progress, and thereby show that there is a comprehensive security approach......If Japan were way ahead of us in terms of the amount of effort that she is making( in the area of economic assistance), then I think there would be general understanding that the Japanese have made a major effort in the area appropriate for Japan to contribute. This is the way alliance should work; that we do not necessarily do the same thing, but we each do the thing that is appropriate to a good relationship between us”.

A study on Japanese security policy conducted by the US Arms Control and disarmament agency underscored the stabilizing role of the Japanese military efforts in the postwar North East Asia. The study found

Japan’s role as an economically powerful, but lightly armed national is an important influence (in the maintenance of stability in the region). Japan’s deliberate policy of foregoing the development of offensive military capabilities has demonstrated to traditional adversaries that Japan’s economic and technological strength need not foreshadow military ambitions, nor otherwise threaten the security of other nations. The acceptance of this perspective has encouraged the development of mutually advantageous economic

and political relations between Japan and other nearby nations, heightening a common stake in the stability of the status quo. This particularly evident with respect to China’s progressive opening to the West, including its recent dramatic step to normalize relations with both Japan and the United States. Although Soviet-Japanese relations remain less friendly (a result mainly of continuing territorial dispute), although correct, the limited character of Japanese rearmament, coupled with Japan’s firm alliance with the United States, has made possible the avoidance of significant political conflict and to some extent, permitted at least the prospect of mutually beneficial economic ties.84

PUBLIC OPINION

This section will examine the changing pattern of American public opinion and media views relating to foreign policy in general and Japan in particular. Experts believe that in any country, the foreign policy of a democratically elected government evolves through a pattern of pulling and hauling among competing forces within the government and the society. The public opinion plays an important role in shaping foreign policy. Although there is a general consensus that public opinion does influence foreign policy decisions, there are disagreements among experts as to the extent and degree to which foreign policy decisions are affected by public opinion. As observed by a scholar,

"the basic dilemma facing any American president in the foreign policy arena is the need for an active policy that can be made acceptable to the American public."

A Department of State official noted that "The foreign policy officers of the government are aware of the vital connection between the attitudes held by Americans and US foreign policy."

During the Cold War time there seemed to be a bipartisan internationalist consensus among the American people to contain the

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Communism. In 1948 a public opinion survey conducted by the State Department revealed that most of the Americans surveyed were in favour of Japanese economic reconstruction to protect it from the increasing Soviet threats. In the same survey, 65% of Americans polled agreed on the active US role in Japanese economic reconstruction and 81% of Americans polled agreed that US exception troops should remain in Japan rather than be brought home. In 1951 a public opinion survey conducted by the US Public Liaison Office demonstrated that 73% of the respondents saw no chance that the USSR would change its policy. In another survey conducted by the same office in 1951, 83% of respondents favoured the US military and economic assistance to Japan. A special report on American public opinion prepared by Division of Public Studies revealed that after the Korean war there was an increasing advocacy of rearming Japan among majority Americans who were surveyed. It seems American public was convinced of Japan's strategic significance in protecting US interests in the Asia pacific region. A public opinion survey conducted on the issue of reversion of administrative right of Okinawa islands to Japan by Harris Poll revealed that 50% of the respondents were not in favour of the reversion.

90. Ibid- 91.
In the wake of Vietnam experience, a dramatic shift in American public attitudes was observed. Experts maintain that the Vietnam war was a watershed period in the recent history of American public attitude. The US debacle in Vietnam war generated a skeptical look among American public at the world. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations conducted a survey in 1974 in which they surveyed 1,513 people. Out of these respondents only 33 percent of Americans felt that defending our allies security was very important foreign policy goal.\textsuperscript{92} The advocacy of war by majority Americans in 1964 seemed disappear by 1972. It was reflected in a public opinion survey conducted in 1972. The survey revealed that out of six most important national concerns the foreign policy ranks fifth\textsuperscript{93} American public attitude on defense spending also changed. The following double focuses on this shift

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Too Much & 18\% & 52\% & 36\% & 14\% \\
About Right & 45\% & 31\% & 32\% & 24\% \\
Too Little & 21\% & 8\% & 22\% & 49\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table - 1}
\end{table}


This shift in American public attitude also reflected into US-Japan relations. A public opinion survey conducted by the newspaper Asahi Evening News shows, although 68\% of the respondents agreed

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{92}] Eugene Wittkoff, Michael Maggiotto, “The Two faces of Internationalism; Public Attitude Towards American Foreign Policy in the 1970s and Beyond” Social Science Quarterly, Vol.64.No.3 Sept 83. pp. 289-90.
\item[\textsuperscript{93}] Ibid- 291.
\end{itemize}
that it was the US obligation to help if Japan was attacked by another nation, 74 percent replied that it was also a responsibility of Japan to help the US in crisis time. The annual public surveys conducted between 1972 to 1976 by various public survey institutions shows less than 50% of Americans favoured the use of US military force if Japan was attacked by Russia or China.

Table -2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage Willing To Use Military Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan if attacked by Russia and China</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the 1970s, Japan emerged as an economic power with trade surpluses with the United States. As the US-Japan economic relations were strained, people began to think about economic challenge posed by Japan. Out of the various public opinion surveys conducted during 1970s, an important inference can be drawn that economic aspect of US-Japan relationship seemed more important for the Americans than the security aspect.

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The gallup poll conducted in March 1972 by Yomiuri Shimbun found that 50 to 70 percent of respondents felt that the US was threatened by Japanese economic development.95

Another shift was witnessed in American public attitude by the end of 1970s with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian Seizure of American Embassy personnel. Experts observed that three interconnected development contributed the shift in American public attitudes. Firstly, the decline in the import al Vietnam war secondly and finally an increase in anti Soviet and anti communist sentiments.96 This shift in American public attitude led to the victory of Ronald Reagan. An expert commented on this shift.

By the end of 1980, a series of events had shaken us out of our soul searching and into a new outward looking state of mind. The public had skeptical of détente and distressed by American impotence in countering the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By the time of 1980's presidential election, foreign that American was loosing control over its foreign affairs, voters were more than ready to exercise the ghost of Vietnam and replace it with new posture of American assertiveness.97

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in its quadrennial survey in 1980 observed that for the first time after Vietnam war 64% of the people thought that the US must play active role in world politics.98 In case of US-Japan relations the emergence of Japan as a frontline state in Reagan's new cold war strategy greatly influenced the American public opinion that reflected in various opinion polls conducted during

the 1980s. In 1983, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, surveyed American public opinion as to the country in which the US had vital interests, Japan headed the list cited by 82 percent of public and 97 percent of the elite. In another survey conducted by Chicago Council Foreign Relations 80% of public favoured American security guarantee and troops deployment in Japan.

A report by US-Japan Advisory Commission found that from 1976 to 1983 majority Americans continuously giving high status to Japan.

| Table :3 |
| American Positive Negative Responses Towards Japan and other countries |
| Countries | Percentage Positive / Negative with those with no opinion excluded. |
| Canada    | 91-2 92-3 95-2 94-2 91-3 |
| Japan     | 75-17 82-11 84-12 75-20 71-22 |
| China     | 20-73 65-25 70-26 66-29 59-34 |
| South Korea | N.A. 58-27 59-36 55-40 46-45 |


On the issue of defense burden sharing with Japan, most of the Americans in 1980s emphasized on greater defense contribution by Japan. In a survey, 48 percent of Americans agreed that the US was spending more on defense and Japan was getting a free ride.

The following graph shows the percentage and American people favoring increased Japanese defense expending in 1980s.

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The graph clearly shows after 1973 the demand for increased Japanese defense spending has been increased. In 1980 more than 40 percent Americans agreed that Japan should spend more on defense.

**Media Responses**

The mass media, as interpreters of the world to Americans, plays an important role in shaping public opinion on foreign and security related matters. The administrators and lobbyists from all sides do their best to influence media coverage through news conferences, briefings etc. It is observed that there is a close link
between the treatment of events in the newspaper and public opinion on those events.


Like the public opinion, the media views has been changed overtime on US foreign and security policy in general and US-Japan relations in particular with the shifts in US foreign policy. Broadly, the shifts in media views can be categorised into three phases, firstly the cold war phase, secondly the post Vietnam war phase and finally the new Cold war phase.

During the Cold war phase the media favoured US involvement in world affairs and international institution. To face the Soviet challenge the press agreed on liberal trade and foreign military aid policies.\(^{102}\) In the early cold war years the newspapers such as New York Times, Christen Science Monitor, Washington Post and Washington Star were strongly supported the economic and military assistance to Japan as

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\(^{102}\) This factual information has been provided by Bernard Cohen, “Foreign Policy Makers and the press” in Andrew Scott and Roymond Dawson eds., Readings in Making of American Foreign Policy (New York: McMillan, 1965) PP.131-32.
"a moral obligation that goes with worldwide power and responsibility...Washington should explore the ways to stretch aid rather than strick it"\textsuperscript{103}

The New York Times in its editorial on 24\textsuperscript{th} July 1959, agreed that the military assistance to US allies must be continued and better administered. The editorial further commented that for the countries who were under communist threat, the military assistance could defend their freedom against communist subversion\textsuperscript{104}

The same views was expressed by Washington Post in its editorials on 14\textsuperscript{th} March and 29\textsuperscript{th} July 1959. The Washington Post not only supported the US economic and military and policies to the Far Eastern Countries including Japan, South Korea, Vietnam but also reminded American people that such policies indeed existential to protect US interests.\textsuperscript{105}

In 1960 when congress invoked major cuts in military aid programmes for 1961, the New York Times criticized Congressional move as "step potentially dangerous to our foreign policy as it is clearly irresponsible"\textsuperscript{106} The Los Angeles Times also opposed the cuts on the ground that the military assistance promoted international and regional stability.\textsuperscript{107}

In the 1970s the economic aspect of US–Japan security relations become favorite of American press. As the US–Japan trade frictions intensified in 1970s with Japanese trade surplus, more news

\textsuperscript{103} For the Cold war phase and press response see Barnard Cohen The press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1965) pp. 75-76.

\textsuperscript{104} New York Times, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 1959 P.24

\textsuperscript{105} The Washington Post 14\textsuperscript{th} March 1959, P.22 and 26\textsuperscript{th} July 1959 P. IV-8

\textsuperscript{106} New York Times, 15\textsuperscript{th} June 1960 P. 40

\textsuperscript{107} Los Angeles Times 15\textsuperscript{th} June 1960 P.40.
on Japanese trade practices, import restrictions started occurring in American newspapers. As observed by a scholar, the number of articles in *New York Times* on Japan increased by 20% in 1970s and most of them were related to US-Japan trade frictions.\(^{108}\) The typical headlines during those days were—"Japan's Drive to outstrip US" "Japan's Remarkable Industrial Machine" "Towards the Japanese Century" etc.

In 1980s in the wake of new Cold war realities, the inadequate Japanese defense spending, the organic link between Japanese trade surpluses with United States and Japan's minimal defense efforts were the issues highlighted prominently in major newspapers. The *Washington Post* and *The New York Times* were in favour of increased Japanese defense efforts. Many reports were based on the assumption that the relatively small amount spent by Japan on defense was related to its burgeoning economy and huge trade surpluses with the United States. Highlighting this, the *Washington Post* editorialized on 31\(^{st}\) December 1982.

"The Japanese have been usually shortsighted in failing to keep their trade with the United States more in balance. The same insensitivity is apparent more in defense. Trade frictions and defense frictions are now growing and feeding each other"\(^{109}\)

During the June 1981 US visit of Japanese Prime Minister, Zenko Suzuki, he announced that Japan would defend seamlessly up to 1000 miles from Tokyo bay. He also agreed on major defense procurement deal with the US. The American press appreciated those


The Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasane during his press conference in Washington D.C. admitted that the previous Japanese defense efforts were not adequate. The Wall Street Journal commented on that issue thus- “you could hear the amen chorus echoing off the Pentagon and State Department.”

From the various American public opinion surveys and media responses on US-Japan Relations during 1950 to 1990, some inferences can be drawn.

Firstly, Right from the occupation period most Americans and press had a fundamental consensus on Japan’s strategic relevance and therefore they favoured US active involvement in Japan’s economic reconstruction and favoured liberal military aid policies, financial assistance to Japan.

Secondly, The Vietnam war coupled with Japan’s economic development trade surpluses with the US brought shift in American public attitudes and media views towards Japan. The economic


aspects of the relationship become more important and they started considering Japan as a threat to US economy. Japan occupied main place in press news and public discussions.

Finally, in 1980s, in the wake of new cold war with the Soviet Union, most American and press started feeling that Japanese defense spending was inadequate and should be increased.